LEGAL VS ILLEGAL STATUS: SOME CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO BANNING A COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100040001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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N? 300
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL STATUS:
SOME CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO BANNING
A COMMUNIST PARTY
CIA/SRS-4
4 January 1957
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Legal vs. Illegal Status:
Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party
I. The Nature of the Problem
Since the emergence of the Soviet regime in Russia, nearly
every state in the world has been faced with th.:,J problem of how
to treat a national Communist party. Governing circles, at
least in recent years, have almost invariably recoanized the
Party as the subservient agent of a foreign power and its objec-
tive to be the overthrow of the local political and social order
and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In
most countries, only small minorities have been won to the
acceptance of this objective, but in a few places Communist
parties, through the exploitation of genuine grievances and
aspirations, have gained wide popular support.
In countries that are both non-Communist and non-demo-
cratic, the problem oE the local CP is usually dealt with in the
manner accorded all opposition groups and movements. The
Communist Party falls under the ban, provided by law or decree,
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pertaining to subversive political activity. In some of these
countries the repression is thoroughgoing and effective; in
others it is sporadically successful; in still others it is little
more than an inconvenience to the Party's efforts at organi-
zation and agitation.
The problem is more complex and difficult in democratic
countries with their traditions of political toleration and their
guarantees of civil rights. The Communist Party can utilize
the constitutional and statutory provisions which protect the
political activity of opposition groups, and it can appeal to
the courts to defend the alleged rights of the Party and its
members. It can employ the electoral machinery and repre-
sentative institutions of the state to propagate its cause and
to sabotage the political process. Under the cover of a legit-
imate political party, it can serve the Kremlin's interests by
propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and espionage.
In democratic states, moves to ban the Communist Party
raise serious legal problems. It is difficult to devise laws
and administrative orders that strike at the Party and yet
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do not interfere with the activities of non-Communist opposi-
tion groupi. Legal definitions sufficiently precise to net the
Communist Party and discriminatory enough to satisfy the
courts are not easy to draft. Moreover, Communist parties
have become ,adept at taking advantage of this condition in
democratic countries. By changes of names and officers
and by persistent litigation, they have frequently evaded the
enforcement of the law or have delayed its application for
long periods of time.
Besides the legal problems involved, moves to outlaw
a Communist Party sometimes encounter opposition from
influential segments of the public in democratic countries.
Some of this opposition arises from a philosophical premise
that it is wrong to repress by legal means any body of
opinion or professed political organization however repug-
nant its views may be to the majority of the citizens of the
country. Another kind of opposition argues that it is tacti-
cally unwise to outlaw the Party. Persons holding this view
contene that, in a healthy democratic state, the Communist
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Party will never gain many adherents when it has to compete
in a free market of ideas and that its rigid adherence to the
"line" disgusts all voters but a self-deluded fringe. Further-
more, they believe that it is easier to battle a visible enemy
than one underground.
II. Historical Experience
Since 1917, history provides examples of many different
policies for dealing with local Communist parties. The
experience of a number of countries is instructive for the
present-day consideration of the problem.
A. Western Europe
During the era of the Weimar Republic in Germany the
Communist Party operated as a legal political organization,
and, as the strongest section of the Comintern outside
Russia, it seemed to prosper. It achieved considerable
electoral success, polling approximately two million votes
in the presidential election of 1925 and almost four million
in 1932. Just before the Nazi coup it had 100 members in
the Reichstag. It built up numerous broad front organiza-
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tions. During the same period the KPD continued to pay
lip service to revolutionary radicalism and to maintain
skeleton staffs of an underground apparatus. However, the
bulk of the Party, both leaders and rank-and-file, became
smug and complacent; they failed utterly to comprehend the
magnitude of the disaster which struck them when Hitler
seized power. Their attempts to transform the entire,
huge Party organization into an illegal movement were so
clumsy, amateurish and half-hearted that Hitler found it
comparatively easy to ban the Party and all its fronts in
1933 and to wipe out its underground cadres in the follow-
ing years. The Nazi repression of the KPD was thorough.
Even today, the Communist element in the ruling Party in
the Soviet Zone of Germany is largely an artificial struc-
ture, brought back to life by Soviet military power rather
than by intrinsic political impulses. The Party in Western
cermany suffered equally from losses in leaders and organ-
izational continuity inflicted upon it during the twelve years
of Nazi dictatorship. Recently banned by a decision of the
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Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic, the Party
had seen its popular vote fall from 5.7% in the first post-
war election to 2.2% in 1953. It had no representatives in
the present Bundestag, since it failed to receive the consti-
tutional minimum of 5% of the national vote, the percentage
litequired in order to participate in the distribution of seats.
In view of the Communists' waning fortunes, the Govern-
ment was widely criticized in Western Germany for pursu-
ing the litigation it institufad in 1951 to ban the party.
The history of the Communist Party of France sup-
plies a picture in reverse. While operating as a legal
party in the 1920s and '30s, it gained comparatively few
adherents. The Party was outlawed by the French Govern-
ment in 1939, but it was not effectively repressed. During
the Nazi occupation, Communists were active in the Resist-
ance movement and gained sympathy and respectability as
stalwart patriots. Thus accepted, the Party withstood the.
Gestapo's repressive measures which had destroyed the
German CP. It emerged from the war period as a well
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organized, disciplined Party with widespread popular sup-
port. Although the number of cardholders has fallen since
1946 from about 850, 000 to 350, 000, the PCF has regularly
polled more than a quarter of the total vote in postwar elec-
tions. It is currently the largest Party in the National
Assembly with 150 members.
The Italian Communist Party has shown a similar
resurgence. Outlawed and repressed during the Fascist
era, it emerged, especially in Northern Italy, as an active
resistance force toward the end of World War II. The PCI
has had the voting support of approximately one-fifth of the
Italian electorate in the postwar period, and through its
working alliance with the Nenni Socialists, it has controlled
more than one-third of the seats in the parliament. In addi-
tion, the Communists alone or with their PSI allies dominate
about 25% of the local governments in Italy.
With respect to the French and Italian Communist parties,
caution should be observed, of course, in attributing too much
importance to the tempering and solidifying effects of combat-
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ing opposition, since there are a number of causes to
account for Communism's postwar strength in both coun-
tries. War-time conditions, moreover, produce a special
situation. The parties undoubtedly benefited from Allied
help to the Resistance movement and from their participa-
tion in patriotic fronts. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that both parties withstood the repressive efforts of effi-
cient security services and, when legalized again, promptly
demonstrated widespread support in elections and in labor
organizations.
The Communist Party of Spain, which was a miniscule
organization of about 3, 000 members in 1935, gained an
unknown number of adherents during the Civil War when
the USSR supplied the only major foreign aid to the Loyalist
cause. By legislation of the Franco regime in 1939 and 1940,
the Party was outlawed along with other opposition groups.
The repression has been effective, and the Party is estim-
ated to have currently no more than 3, 000 hard core members.
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National Communist parties have always operated as
legal organizations in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. They were polit-
ically unimportant in these countries before World War II.
They had no success in competition with the Socialist parties,
which claimed the allegiance of large sections of the working
population and of leftist-inclined professional groups. Dur-
ing and immediately after the conflict, the Communist parties
in these countries all gained considerably in members and
voting support as a result of the USSR's war-time prestige
and the Communists' resistance activities in the occupied
areas. It was a temporary surge, however. As the nature
of Soviet foreign policy became clear and as the subservience
of the local CPs to the Kremlin "line" was revealed, the
parties, except in Finland and Iceland, declined to their
former impotence as legal organizations. Probably the Com-
munist coup in Czechoslovakia was the most important single
event contributing to the decline of the parties in most of the
Northern European countries.
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Tables in the Annex show the voting strength of the
Communist parties in the postwar elections.
B. Near and Middle East
In the Near and Middle East, most governments have
banned local Communist parties by law or decree. Repres-
sion has been sternly carried out in some of these states;
in others, illegality has imposed only mild handicaps to
Communist activity. In this area the fluctuations in the
fortunes of the local parties have depended much more upon
the willingness and efficiency of their governments to take
repressive action than upon legal or illegal status.
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran are currently maintaining
reasonably effective control over the outlawed parties.
Egyptian repression of local Communists has continued
despite closer relations between Cairo and the Soviet Bloc.
It is open to question, however, whether this policy can be
maintained in view of the likely influx of Communist advisors
and technicians and the public favor which the Kremlin has
won during the Suez crisis.
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In Greece, the Communists, who were thwarted in
their ?attempt in 1944 to seize the government by the Greek
and British liberating forces, resorted to armed insurrec-
tion. With Soviet connivance, they were supplied and
succored by the adjacent satellite states. Their military
defeat was accomplished through U. S. aid and advice and
by Tito's timely defection. Today the illegal Party, al-
though harried and repressed by the authorities, exercises
considerable influence in Greek politics, with the acquies-
cence of the governing coalition, through a front organiza-
tion, the United Democratic Left (EDA). Wary of attacks
on its front activities, the Party has not neglected its clan-
destine organization.
The importance of governmental policy and effective
police action on the condition of an illegal Party is well
illustrated in the case of Iran. During the Mossadeqh
regime the Tudeh Party operated in an undisguised manner
and grew to an estimated membership of 35, 000. While the
Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues were not Com-
munists, their toleration of the Tudeh Party led them to
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become increasingly dependent upon the rabble-rousing
support it could organize. The successor government,
under Zahedi, greatly reduced the Party's influence in
Iranian affairs. Its membership is now estimated at
about 7, 000.
The Iranian experience has a parallel in the current
situations in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Sudan. In
these countries, as during Mossadeqh's tenure in Iran,
the local Communist parties, although illegal, have be-
come increasingly bold in their overt activities. They
proclaim an extreme nationalist and anti-Western line,
and they gain the backing of other opposition groups by
playing on their fears that official repression will not be
limited to the Communists alone. The weak and unsure
governments of these countries, where the military and
police authorities are themselves deeply involved in polit-
ical intrigue, have neither the will nor the power to en-
force the laws against the Communist parties. By contrast,
the control which Nuri as-Said has exercised over Iraqi
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politics since his country's independence has resulted in
effective repression of the Party.
The Communist Party (MAKI) is a legal organization
in Israel, but conditions peculiar to that country have kept
it small and relatively unimportant. The Socialist move-
ment has held the allegiance of the working class and many
professional people. Moreover, Soviet opposition to Zion-
ism and to the emigration of Jews from the Bloc, as well
as the Kremlin's support of Arab nationalism, have been
heavy weights for the Communists to carry. As a result,
the Party's appeal is largely to embittered Arabs living
within Israel.
C. South Asia and the Far East
In South Asia and the Far East the fortunes of the
local parties, whether under conditions of legality or
illegality, have been mixed. The Communist Party of
India, operating legally since independence in 1947, has
developed into a considerable menace to constitutional
government. Although harassed by the authorities for
subversive activities, it has exploited with some measure
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of success the divisive tendencies in a country of many
races, castes, and linguistic groups.. Con.ditian s in Indo-
nesia have been even more favorable for the Party, since
unlike India there has been no governing majority compar-
able to the Congress Party with its nationalistic record,
strong organization, and popular leaders. Indonesia's
numerous parties, sectional quarrels, and xenophobic
nationalism have offered a benevolent soil for the growth
of a legal Communist movement.
The CP of Japan, emerging from underground during
the Occupation, has shown itself to be a danger to demo-
cratic government, although still a relatively small party
and subject to police curbs on subversive activities.
Effective police control in the Republic of Korea and in
Taiwan, where the local parties are outlawed along with
all subversive movements, has kept the Communists :re-
pressed in recent years. In the Philippines, the reduction
of a dangerous Communist movement has been accomplished
by a combination of police and military action and construc-
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tive social measures, notably the agricultural resettle-
ment of defecting Huks.
D. Latin America
With the exception of Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador,
and Mexico, the Communist parties are illegal in all
Latin American countries. A Party's status in law, how-
ever, is no guide to its influence in the political and cul-
tural life of each of the twenty-one nations of the region.
In the countries where the Party is outlawed, enforce-
ment ranges from effective repression to occasional
harassment. Enforcement is probably best in the dictator-
ships, such as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and
Venezuela, where the police are experienced in the sup-
pression of opposition movements. In Brazil, a vigorous
and publicly supported campaign of repression in the period
1947-48 has since subsided to the point where the Party
operates with little effort at concealment. The Brazilian
Communist Party was able to play an influential role in
the presidential election of 1955, and its infiltration of the
military and public services has reached, in the view of
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some observers, alarming proportions. The Party's
strident propaganda against U.S. -Brazilian cooperation
has led to its acceptance as an ally by the ultra-nationalists
who share its aims in this respect. Together they have
whipped up agitations that have on occasion overborne the
more moderate political forces of the country.
Whether illegal or not, the Communist parties in
Latin America have had a good deal of success in infiltrat-
ing labor, student, and professional groups. Economic
backwardness and the need for political reform in many
Latin American countries often cause the leaders of these
groups to cooperate with the Communists or to embrace
them as reforming allies.. Front movements are thus
easily organized and exploited by the Communists.
Latin American liberality with respect to political
asylum and the general lack of control over the movement
of individuals have enabled Communist leaders to evade
many of the legal measures against subversive parties.
Mexico is a popular country of active exile. Furthermore,
there is a good deal of travel to and from the Iron Curtain
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countries. The Latin-American Communists have recently
found it less easy to arrange international meetings, travel,
and liaison, but in most countries they still face only
hindrances and not barriers to their activities.
III. Results of Experience
Several generalized conclusions may be drawn from the
experience of many countries in dealing with the problems
posed by national Communist parties.
A. A Number of Factors Affect Growth and Influence
of Parties
In the first place, legal status is only one of a number
of factors affecting the growth of a national Party and the
influence it wields. The importance of these factors varies
from place to place and changes under the impact of internal
and external developments.
Geographical proximity to the Communist Bloc has both
favorable and unfavorable effects upon local parties, whether
legal or illegal. Parties like the Viet Minh in Indochina and
the Tudeh in Iran have undoubtedly been aided by their near-
ness to the Bloc. The Communist Party of Finland, which
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has not declined in numbers like the other Scandinavian
parties, has probably also benefited from proximity to the
USSR. Travel for purposes of consultation and training is
easy, and the flow of supplies and propaganda materials is
facilitated.
On the other hand, the Communists in West Germany,
Austria, and Turkey may suffer from their geographical
location. In the first two countries, where many people
have experienced occupation by the Soviet Army and live
close to the police states it maintains, the Party has little
appeal. The West Germans are aware every day of the
contrived and artificial nature of the SED in the East Zone
and of its leaders' subservience to Moscow. The Turks,
with their centuries of resistance to Russian imperialism,
are little attracted to a Party which is so patently an agent
of their perennial enemy.
Other factors influencing the growth and power of a
local Communist party are the political situation and the
social conditions in the country in question. Where timor-
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ous and vacillating governments succeed one another in a
pattern of continuing futility, the Communists have a favor-
able situation to exploit. In a number of countries ineffective
government betrays a social order and an economic system
in need of reform. The forces of change are drawn to the
Communists. They at least have a program of action. They
are prepared to crack the strongholds of vested interests.
To industrial workers dissatisfied with the distribution of
the national income, to peasants hoping for land reform, and
to frustrated intellectuals, the Communist Party often seems
the only vehicle for the attainment of their aims. In countries
where constitutional methods hold out real hope of change and
opportunity to these dissatisfied elements, the Party's appeal
is weak.
Much has been written explaining the support of the Com-
munist Party by millions of French and Italian voters in the
above terms. Ineffective government and the slow pace of
social and economic change can be accepted as forming the
principal basis of Communist appeal. Weak government
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coupled with the rigidity of the social order explains, in
large measure, the growth of Communism in spite of legal
bans in several Near Eastern countries. Conversely, the
Communist parties in the Northern European countries
have never attracted much support because their political
systems have been responsive to change and have produced
governments capable of giving effect to reform programs.
A further factor bearing upon a local Party's position
in a given country appears to be the intentions of the USSR
with respect to that party. These are not publicized, of
course, but it seems clear that the Kremlin regards a
good many of the national parties as helpful but not very
important allies. They are useful as sources of delegates
to "world-wide" congresses, as propaganda bodies, and as
agencies for the recruitment of persons for underground
and espionage work. They are not taken very seriously as
the vanguard of revolution. The cavalier attitude of the
Kremlin toward the leaders of the British and American
Communist parties was illustrated after the 20th Congress
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of the CPSU when they learned, to their obvious embarrass-
ment, of Khrushchev's speech through its publication by the
Western press. Moscow will fulminate mightily when one
of these weaker parties is legally banned, as it did recently
over the West German CP, but whether or not the Kremlin
considers that Communist capabilities have been seriously
impaired is open to question.
B. Outlawry Is Usually Detrimental but not Fatal
A second major conclusion to be drawn from the histor-
ical record is that the outlawing of the Communist Party is
usually detrimental but seldom fatal to the Party's capabil-
ities. The banning of the Party probably will deprive it of
real advantages. In democratic countries, it will lose its
rights to participate in political campaigns, to nominate
candidates, and to win elective offices. If it has no success
in an election, the Party has at least spread about a good
deal of Communist propaganda. In case it elects some can-
didates, it has acquired useful tools to disrupt and discredit
democratic procedures. The turmoil often created by the
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Communist deputies in the French and Italian parliaments
has contributed to the contemptuous attitude with which many
citizens view these assemblies. Moreover, Communist
officials in a predominantly non-communist government can
render cooperation with traditionally friendly states diffi-
cult or impossible and bring the country into closer rela-
tions with the Soviet :Bloc even against the desires of a
majority of the people. Iceland is presently a case in
point. Furthermore, as a legal Party, the Communists
can always delude some people into serving their cause
through easily organized friendship societies, cultural
groups, and committees for this or that purpose. Such
organizations are often the sources of revenue, some of
which is applied to causes far from the interest and inten-
tions of the non-communist donors.
While outlawry will cost a Party real advantages, Com-
munists can sometimes turn their misfortune to good account.
The Party membership is reduced to a-hard-core of militants
who are prepared to serve obediently. New recruits are
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usually dedicated revolutionists or individuals attracted to
clandestine activity and willing to undertake hazardous
assignments- When directing an illegal organization, Party
leaders can concentrate on building the underground appara-
tus and on subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Moreover,
the money available to the Party can be expended on a
limited number of objects; the support of frequently bankrupt
publishing activities will not be necessary. Thus, illegality
may toughen and sharpen the Party and enhance its clandes-
tine potential. Greece and Brazil are examples of countries
where the local parties, although outlawed, remain a serious
threat to the security of the state.
C. Comprehensive Repression is Necessary
A third conclusion is that banning a Communist Party
is relatively unimportant in reducing its capabilities as an
agency of Soviet imperialism unless it and all associated
activities are effectively repressed at the same time. It
must be recognized that the legal Party is only one arm of
a Communist organization. Such an organization consists of
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at least five elements:
1. The overt Party, organized and conducted to
participate in the political system of the country.
2. The clandestine Party, with an underground
apparatus usually subdivided into political, paramilitary,
and intelligence components.
3. Front organizations of various kinds -
political and social organizations as well as business enter-
prises, which serve as auxiliaries, allies, or covers for
the Party. They may be founded by the Party, penetrated
by it after establishment by non-Communists, or indirectly
influenced by remote control.
4. Individual Communists in sensitive positions,
such as government officials, officers of the armed forces,
molders of public opinion (editors, broadcasters, publishers,
teachers, and artists), and key persons in strategically
important industries.
5. Diplomatic, military, trade, and other mis-
sions of Communist governments whose activities often
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include propaganda, espionage, and subversion.
All these elements of a Communist organization are
supported and aided by external Communist activities.
These include propaganda, printed and broadcast, directed
?
toward the country in question, invitations to international
meetings, student exchanges, and training courses in the
USSR or elsewhere for nationals of the country.
Repression, therefore, requires lopping off all arms
of the octopus-like organization. Banning the overt Party
will probably be injurious to the Communists, but it is un-
likely to inflict a fatal wound. Indeed, as previously
indicated, it may lead to the concentration of Communist
resources on less obvious but more dangerous activities.
To deal effectively with the ramified Communist organ-
ization a government needs loyal and efficient security
services. The law or decree banning the overt Party must
be enforced. But this action is only a start toward genuine
repression. A thorough-going program would include the
following measures:
1. The underground elements of the Party must
be penetrated on a high level and in many places.
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2. Key Communist personnel must be identi-
fied and their movements and activities brought under
surveillance or at least intermittently checked.
3. All organizations, groups, and business
enterprises suspected as Communist fronts must be
inve stigated.
4. Persons in sensitive positions in govern-
ment, the armed forces, and strategic industries must
be screened and periodically re-checked.
5. Overt propaganda issuances of Commun-
ist missions must be monitored as leads to clandestine
activitie s.
6. Listening to foreign Communist broad-
casts must be prevented by jamming, confiscation of
short-wave radio sets, and police action.
7. Foreign mail must be censored to pre-
vent an influx of Communist propaganda.
8. Travel abroad must be controlled to
prevent persons from participating in Communist-
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managed congresses and training schools.
A comprehensive program along the above lines is
difficult to carry out except in a dictatorship. Nazi Ger-
many offers probably the best example of the successful
extirpation of Communism's multi armed organization,
although Hitler's foreign policies, it may be noted, con-
tributed greatly to the spread of International Communism.
The pre-war Italian and Japanese governments applied
similar methods, but Communist organizations survived
to emerge in dangerous strength in 1945.
Granted that no democratic government and few
authoritarian regimes will apply the full catalogue of
repressive measures necessary to suppress Communist
activity for all practical purposes, it remains important
that the banning of the overt Party be accompanied by
several additional types of action designed to handicap
and weaken the Communist potential in the country.
These should include the penetration of the Communists'
underground apparatus; the identification and surveillance
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mileilOPIE.ETTTIAL
of Communist Party members and sympathizers; the
screening of personnel in sensitive positions; the prosecu-
tion of Communists for perjury, bribery, espionage, sub-
version, and similar crimes; the exposure of fronts and
infiltration efforts, and informational programs to create
a public awareness of the dangers of Communism. (It may
be noted that the U.S. Government, without banning the
Communist Party or infringing civil liberties, has greatly
reduced and contained Communist capabilities by pursuing
these methods).
The cooperation of all law enforcement agencies is
essential to a satisfactory degree of repression. The police
must act promptly and skillfully to arrest Communists
violating the law, the executive authorities must support the
police, and the courts must mete out the penalties provided.
The roundup of some rank-and-file members and minor
functionaries, the raiding of a suspected headquarters, and
the imposition of light fines and sentences are not major
deterrents to Communist activity. Communists expect and
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are prepared for such harassment. Short prison terms
are accepted as opportunities for recuperation and the
planning of future work. Under lax or corrupt administra-
tion, a jail cell may become a convenient headquarters for
covert Communist activity.
D. Support of Public Opinion Required
The final conclusion is that governmental action to coun-
ter Communism in a country must have the support of public
opinion if it is to be effective. A majority of the population
must believe that the banning of the Party as a legal organ-
ization is necessary to the security of the state. If the
Communist Party is small and seemingly powerless, an
educational program may be required to explain the useful-
ness of a legal ban. Outlawry of the Party as an election
stunt or as a diversion from serious public problems or
criticism of the governing authorities will probably redound
to its advantage, for Communists can then pose as martyrs
and victims of political spite.
Enforcement of the legal ban on the Party and the insti-
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IL
tution of other repressive measures require continuous
popular support, not just a surge of outrage and indigna-
tion. In other words, the political environment must
remain favorable to the government's efforts. Hitler's
security forces, for instance, which were remarkably
successful in liquidating the Communist underground in
Germany, were far less successful when called upon to
suppress war-time Communist resistance in Nazi-
occupied areas, although they were assisted by native
fascists and collaborators. This difference in perform-
ance by the same organization, operating with the same
personnel and using the same techniques, can be explained
mainly by the difference in public support. In Germany,
millions of people were convinced Nazis, and even those
who were not, had the traditional German respect for
authority and power. The great mass of the population,
therefore, cooperated willingly with the security forces.
In France, and elsewhere in occupied areas, people were
not only hostile to the occupying power but often distrust-
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ful of the police of their own country. Hence, they impeded
reprisals against the Communists even though many of them
were anti-Communist. In several Middle Eastern countries,
the lack of public support has rendered the outlawry of the
Party an almost meaningless gesture. Outlawry has gained
for the local Party the sympathy and cooperation of other
opposition groups who fear the same fate. Therefore, en-
forcement is lax, and the security services get little cooper-
ation from the public.
IV. Considerations to be Weighed
A government contemplating the legal banning of the
local Communist Party should weigh the following consider-
ations:
A. Is the overt Communist Party of such strength and
influence that it represents a significant menace to the
stability of the state?
B. If the Communist Party is growing in strength and
influence, are there measures of reform which can be taken
to reduce its appeal?
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C. Can a statute or decree be drafted, given the
nation's constitution, its judicial doctrine, and its polit-
ical traditions, that will be an effective weapon against
Communists, their organizations, and activities?
D. Are the state's police and internal security
services efficient enough to enforce the legal ban on the
overt party and to repress the other activities into which
the Communists ? efforts will be channeled?
E. Is public opinion prepared for a measure outlaw-
ing the Communist Party?
F. Will there be continuous popular support for
enforcement of the ban and the additional measures
necessary to repress the local Communist movement?
These questions should be pondered and weighed in
the light of conditions in each country. No standard
answers are possible. In some countries, outlawing
the Party is a step, and an important one, in reducing
the Communist potential. In others, it may be of little
significance insofar as Communist capabilities are con-
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cerned. In still others, it may convert a minor irritant
in the body politic into a menacing disease. Some Com-
munist parties have withered and died under conditions
of illegality; others have spread their underground roots.
Legal proscription, one can conclude, is not necessarily
the answer to the Communist menace.
* * *
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ANNEX
Communist Vote in Several Northern European
Countries in Recent Elections
Date of Percentage of
Election Popular Vote
Seats in
Lower House
Belgium 1946 12.7 23
1949 7.5 12
1950 4.7 7
1954 3.6 4
Denmark 1945 12.0 18
1947 6.8 9
1950 4.6 7
1953 4.8 8#
Nether- 1946 10.6 10
lands 1948 7.7 8
1952 6.2 6
1956 4.8 4*
Norway 1945 11.89
1949 5.8
1953 5.1
Sweden
11
3
1944 10.3 15
1948 6.3 8
1952 4.4 5
1956 5.2 6
United 1945 0.4
Kingdom 1950 0.3
1951 0.1
1955 0.1
2
# Seats in unicameral legislature.
* Will be increased to 7 when lower house is enlarged
from 100 to 150 seats.
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