INTELLIGENCE HANDBOOD SPECIAL OPERATIONS BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 322
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1970
• Content Type: CH

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No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Handbook
BOLIVIA
i7cul rot
HSO No. 12
February 1970
N
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declauificotion
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No Foreign Dissem
INTELLIGENCE HANDBOOK
FOR
BOLIVIA
No Foreign Dissetn
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PART I - THE SETTING
Page
I. History of Violence 1
A. Revolutions and Insurgency
B. Che Guevara's Adventure
II. The Contemporary Scene - A Nation in Transition 9
A. Characteristics of National Life 9
B. B9via's Place in the World 12
I. The Land
A. Focus
B. Andean Highlands
1. Cordillera Occidental 22
a. Terrain and Climate 24
b. Vegetation and Land Use 26
2. The Altiplano 27
a. Terrain and Climate 29
b. Vegetation and Land Use 31
3. Cordillera Real
a. Terrain and Climate
b. Vegetation and Land Use
33
33
39
4. Central Mountains and Valleys 42
a. Terrain and Climate 42
b. Vegetation and Land Use 44
S. The Yungas 46
a. Terrain and Climate 48
b. Vegetation and Land Use 49
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6. Front Ranges 53
a. Terrain and Climate 53
b. Vegetation and Land Use 55
C. Eastern Lowlands 59
1. Northern Rain Forest 61
a. Terrain and Climate 61
b. Vegetation and Land Use 63
2. El Beni 64
a. Terrain and Climate 66
b. Vegetation and Land Use 70
3. Santa Cruz 74
a. Terrain and Climate 74
b. Vegetation and Land Use 77
4. Chaco 78
a. Terrain and Climate 78
25X1 b. Vegetation and Land Use 79
1. Food and Water 79
a. Plants 79
b. Animals 86
c. Water 95
2. Natural Hazards 97
a. Plants 97
b. Mammals 98
c. Reptiles and Fish 103
d. Insects and Arachnids 110
e. Weather 112
3. The Human Element 114
4. Principal Diseases in Bolivia
II. The People
A. General
B. Ethnic and Social Groups
1. Introduction 125
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Page
2. Highland Groups 125
a. Aymaras 125
b. Quechuas 130
c. Minor Indian Groups 133
d. Cholos 134
e. White or Upper Class 137
3. Lowland Groups 139
a. Mestizos 139
b. Indians 142
c. White or Upper Class 147
C. Education
D. Religion
E. Living Conditions
1. Housing
2. Health and Sanitation
III. The Economy
A. General
1. Economic Power and Control
2. Employment and Labor
3. Agriculture
4. Industry
5. Finance, Investment, and Banking
6. International Economic Relations
B. Transportation
1. General
2. Roads and Trails 175
a. Roads 175
b. Trails 190
3. Railroads 200
4. Inland Waterways 204
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5. Air Transportation
6. 2iloss - Border Movement
Page
209
214
C. Telecommunications 230
1. General
2. Telephone and Telegraph 230
a. Domestic 230
b. International 231
3. Broadcasting 233
4. Special - Purpose Systems 234
5. Special Communications Problems and 234
Vulnerabilities
IV. Political Dynamics 237
A. General 237
B. Structure of Government 239
1. Central Government 239
2. Regional and Local Government 240
C. The Government and the People 241
D. Political Parties
PART III - ANALYSIS OF BOLIVIAN INTERNAL SECURITY 249
I. The Forces of Subversive Insurgency
A. General
B. Opposition Parties
II. Internal Security
A. General
B. Military Forces 260
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25(K1 Security and Intelligence Services
B. Economic and Military Assistance Programs
IV. Observations and Conclusions
Appendixes
Appendix A -- Chronology of Key Events in Bolivia
Since 1940
Appendix B -- Reading List
Appendix C -- Recommended Maps and Charts
Appendix D -- Recommended Films
Page
263
271
291
293
297
299
Tables
Table 1 -- Area and Population By Departments 122
Table 2 -- Characteristics of Navigable Rivers 224
Table 3 -- Selected Bridges 228
Table 4 - Structure of Government, 1967 244
Table 5 -- Bolivian Political Parties 246
Table 6 -- Organization of the Bolivian
Intelligence and Security Services
Table 7 -- Distribution of National Guard Personnel-
1967
Table 8 -- Distribution of National Department of
Criminal Investigation Personnel - 1967 267
Table 9 -- Bolivia-Country Team Organization (Following) 267
Table 10-- American Firms, Subsidiaries and Affiliates
in Bolivia
Table 11-- American Voluntary Agencies Working
in Bolivia
Maps
Following
Page
77461
Bolivia:
Guerrilla Operations
4
58810
Bolivia:
Physical Regions
18
58019
Bolivia:
Indian Tribes
122
58020
Bolivia:
Transportation
176
58923
Bolivia:
Airfields
214
57942
Bolivia:
Common Carrier Open Wire
Communications Network
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Following
Page
57940 Bolivia: Common Carrier High-
Frequency (HF) Radiotelegraph
Networks, June 1968
57938 Bolivia: Common Carrier High-
Frequency (HF) Radiotelephone
Networks, June 1968
57936 Bolivia: Specialized High-Frequency
(HF) Radiotelegraph Networks, June 1968
232
232
234
Photographs
Figure No.
(Abbreviated les)
Page
1
Generalized profile of Bolivia
20
2
Cordillera Occidental
23
3
Laguna Colorado in Cadena Volcanica
25
4
Rio Lauca flowing into Bolivia
2.5
5
Altiplano near La Paz
28
6
Altiplano south of Salar de Uyuni
28
7
Southern part of Lago Titicaca
30
8
Cultivated fields
32
9
Small farms on slopes facing Lago Titicaca
32
10
Indians fishing on Lago Titicaca
34
11
Chopping salt from Salar de Uyuni
34
12
Snow-covered summit on Cordillera Real
35
13
Glacier in northern part of Cordillera Real
35
14
Nevado Illampu, highest mountain in Bolivia
37
15
Nevado Huayna Potosi
38
16
Nevado Illimani overlooking La Paz
38
17
Barren slopes of Cordillera Real
40
18
Catavi-Siglo Veinte mining complex
41
19
Skiers on slopes north of La Paz
41
20
Cultivated fields in Cochabamba Basin
45
21
Giant cactuses and thorny mesquite trees
45
22
Small village southeast of Sucre
47
23
High slopes above a Yungas valley near Coroico
50
24
Tributary of Rlo Beni near Coroico
50
25
Cultivated slopes near Coroico
52
26
Central section of Front Ranges north of
Rio Parapeti
56
27
Undergrowth in central section of Front Ranges
57
28
Dense rain forest along Peruvian frontier
62
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Figure No.
Page
29
Brazil-nut tree beside Rio Beni
65
30
Ancient raised fields in Llanos de Mojos
67
31
Rectangular lakes northwest of Trinidad
68
32
Canoe on flooded street in Trinidad
71
33
Tall grass in Llanos de Mojos
71
34
Swamp buggies in Llanos de Mojos
72
35
Swamp buggy stalled in vegetation
72
36
Giant lily pads in Llano de Mojos
73
37
Cattle on flooded field in Llanos Mojos
75
38
Rio Grande south of Santa Cruz
76
39
Oca, tuber grown on Altiplano
81
40
Yuca, tuber grown in lowlands
81
41
Banana tree in Yungas
81
42
Papaya
82
43
Tropical yam
84
44
Prickly pear
85
45
Algarroba
85
46
Llamas in high. Andes
87
47
Chinchilla
87
48
Vizcacha
88
49
Cavy
88
50
Condor
90
51
Armadillo
91
52
Collared peccary
92
53
Agouti
92
54
Sloth
94
55
Ronsoco, or capybara
94
56
Lago Suches on Peruvian border
96
57
Waterfall west of Santa Cruz
96
58
Puma
99
59
Jaguar
100
60
Ocelot
102
61
(a) Tropical rattlesnake, (b) bushmaster, and
(c) coral snake
104
62
Fresh-water stingray
106
63
Stingray making a strike
107
64
Piranha
107
65
Dentition of a piranha
109
66
Canero
109
67
Camp in northern Cordillera Real
113
68
Contact between jungle Indians and missionaries
117
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Figure No. Page
69 Street scene in Santa Cruz
70 Malb Aymara Indians
123
127
71 Male Aymara 127
72 Aymara religious fiesta 129
73 Indian marketplace on Altiplano 129
74 Male Quechua Indian 131
75 Hat popularized by Quechua women 131
76 Indian market in Cochabamba area 135
77 Cholo family in Altiplano community 135
78 Cholo wedding procession in La Paz 136
79 Dominant white aristocracy 138
80 Street scene in La Paz 138
81 Mestizo girls in Beni area 140
82 Mestizo children of Riberalta 140
83 Mestizo boy of Santa Cruz region 141
84 Mestizo boy of Santa Cruz region 141
85 Chacobo Indians of Beni area 143
86 Chacobo Indian family group 144
87 Movima Indians in Western dress 145
88 Movima Indians in Western dress 146
89 Outdoor classroom in Cochabamba area 149
90 Outdoor classroom on Altiplano 149
91 Adobe Indian dwelling on Altiplano 153
92 Adobe Mestizo dwelling in Santa Cruz area 153
93 Wooden dwelling in Chapar6 area 154
94 Hut in Santa Cruz area 154
95 Separate kitchen, Santa Cruz area 155
96 Outdoor laundry on Rio Caranavi 155
97 Typical water outlet, town of Pulacayo 157
98 Indian slum in La Paz 157
99 Worker housing at Catavi Tin Mine 158
100 Primitive mining practices 160
101 Primitive mining practices 160
102 Section of Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway 177
103 Turns on Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway 177
104 Slopes along Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway 178
105 Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway bridge 178
106 Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway at "Siberia" 179
107 Trucks mired in mud at "Siberia" 179
108 Road between La Paz and Desaguadero 181
109 Section of Pan-American Highway 181
110 Landslide on Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway 182
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Figure No.
Page
111
Switchbacks on La Paz - Santa Ana road
182
112
F
h
d
d
d
og-s
rou
e
roa
183
113
Cable car across Rio Espiritu
Santo
183
114
Close-up of cable car
185
115
Detours around detours
185
116
Close-up of ruts
186
117
Fording an Altiplano river
186
118
Poorly-drained road
187
119
Streambed used as road
187
120
Track along water divide
188
121
Track across Altiplano
188
122
Loose sand along track
189
123
Eroded section of track
189
124
Caravan fording Rio Piray
191
125
Narrow jungle roads
191
126
Chuspipata - Coroico bus
192
127
Bus on mountain road
193
128
Passenger riding loaded truck
194
129
Llama pack train
196
130
Burros used as pack animals
196
131
Inca road used as foot trail
197
132
River crossing in lowlands
197
133
Oxcart on track
198
134
Fording arroyo by oxcart
198
135
Saddled riding ox
199
136
Dockside loading area, Guaqui
202
137
Woodburning locomotive
202
138
Self-propelled railroad passenger car
203
139
Rivercraft on Rio Beni
206
140
Barges on Rio Mamore
206
141
Callapo (lashed balsa rafts)
207
142
Powered dugout canoe
208
143
S.S.Ollanta on Lago Titicaca
210
144
Ferryboat on Lago Titicaca
211
145
Balsa boat
211
146
Aircraft at Tarija Airport
213
147
Cargo aircraft at Trinidad Airport
213
148
Landing strip
215
149
Seaplane landing dock
215
150
Sod landing strip
217
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Figure No.
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151
Auto ferry, Tiquina Straits
217
152
Railroad Bridge across Rio Grande
222
153
Suspension bridge over Rio Pilcomayo
223
154
Suspension bridge
223
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FOREWORD
The writing of this Handbook
commenced while Rene Barrientos still served as President
of Bolivia. His untimely death in a helicopter crash in
April 1969 triggered a struggle for power which led to
military seizure of the government less than six months
later.
monotonous succession of such struggles for nower_
where history has witnessed violence, turmoil, and a
This Handbook describes the,land and people of Bolivia
The Handbook also synthesizes information from man
sources on those features of Bolivian n t'
It
describes physical and sociological factors which have
shaped the country's development and seeks to provide an
understanding of the Bolivian people -- their attitudes
and values, and their relations with the outside world,
particularly the United States.
A variety of classified and open sources was used in
writing this Handbook. The NIS General Survey, Bolivia,
March 1968, augmented by contributions from specialists in
the fields of economics, geography, health, population,
telecommunications, and 'transportation, provided the basi
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I. History of Violence
A. Revolutions and Insurgency
Bolivia's history is a melancholy but turbulent story of
insurgency, revolution, and dictatorship. The unsettled
political conditions, often marked by violence, which we
witness today in Bolivia are a continuation'.of the long his-
tory of the instability which this troubled country has suf-
fered. While the activities of Che Guevara, as part of an
international conspiracy, caused world attention to focus
briefly on Bolivian troubles, he was but the latest of a
series of adventurers and power seekers who sought to over-
throw the established government.
The first recorded revolution in Bolivia took place
around 1470 when the Aymara tribes rose against the Incas,
who had invaded the country some 20 years earlier. The
Spanish arrived on the scene in 1538 and, after subduing the
Indians, began to fight for power among themselves. The
discovery of silver at Potosi in the mid-1500's led to vir-
tual enslavement of the Indians who worked the mines under
inhumane conditions, causing a legacy of hatred which still
underlies Bolivian politics. In 1780 Tupac Amaru, capital-
izing on Indian hatred for their oppressors, mobilized the
Indians of the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes in an effort to
expel' the Spanish and restore the Incan empire. After
besieging La Paz for over 100 days, the Indian forces were
defeated and brutally subjugated. The effect of the rebel-
lion was to further polarize the Bolivian population by
creating a sense of unity and identity among the Indians
and convincing the Spanish that the Indians should be rigidly
suppressed and excluded from their society.
Napoleon's invasion of Spain and appointment of a puppet
king for Spain and its colonies in the early nineteenth cen-
tury caused further division in Bolivia. Some of the popu-
lace supported the new ruler, others clung to the old Spanish
dynasty, and still others stood for complete independence
from Spain. Independent military forces developed in the
larger Bolivian cities.
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The Spanish monarchy, restored after Napoleon's defeat
in 1814, made the error of setting aside certain laws which
had favored the colonials, thereby accelerating their grow-
ing resentment against the crown. By 1825, conditions in
Bolivia had so badly deteriorated that marauding troops were
plundering throughout the country. At this point, Simon
Bolivar sent Marshal Sucre with Peruvian troops against the
remaining Spanish forces. After a bloodless campaign, a
Declaration of Independence from Spain was issued on August
6, 1825. The delegates who met to form a new government
placed their individual ambitions above national unity.
Bolivar, accordingly, assumed dictatorial power in order to
impose unity. His rule was followed by that of Marshal Sucre
who soon was deposed in a revolt led by the dictator of Peru.
A president installed by the Peruvians was assassinated five
days later, and the Bolivians then elected their first native-
born president, Andres Santa'Cruz.
Bolivia's next forty years were marked by intrigue and
revolt caused by public lack of confidence in the leadership
which had lost national territory in two wars: one with
Chile over the Pacific ports, and the other with Paraguay
over the Gran Chaco.
After the war with Paraguay there was a series of dis-
turbances. Colonel Toro, leading a military coup, overthrew
the Constitutional Government in 1936. He was forced into
exile a year later, and his successor, Colonel Busch, com-
mitted suicide in 1939. General Bilbao, the next President,
was physically beaten and forced to leave the country by his
former supporters when he insisted on holding a constitutional
election. President Villaroel was shot and hanged in La Paz
in 1946, and Victor Paz Estenssoro fled the country. Their
party, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was outlawed,
but in August 1949, made an attempt to overthrow the regime.
The MNR was voted into power in 1951, but a junta intervened
and Paz Estenssoro was not allowed to return from exile.
In 1952, the junta was overthrown in a popular revolution
and Estenssoro returned as president. His government was
committed to a profound social revolution announced in three
decrees: 1) The expropriation and nationalization of the
tin mines; 2) Universal suffrage without literacy or income
requirements; and 3) Land reform, including redistribution of
the large estates. Through this program power was taken from
the white minority and given to the Indian majority.
Estenssoro and the MNR dominated Bolivia's political life
for the next ten years. He ran for re-election in 1964, but
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the MNR was splintered so badly that the military forced him
to accept General Rene Barrientos Ortuno as his running mate.
Although he won the election, public reaction to his handling
of the "November Revolution" forced his resignation. Anti-
government riots broke out in mining towns and peasant centers,
and Paz Estenssoro was forced to leave the country. A
military junta, led by Barrientos and General Alfredo Ovando
Candia, seized control of the government and the MNR collapsed.
To justify its seizure of power, the military asserted that the
MNR had betrayed the ideals of the revolution.
Barrientos and Ovando served as co-Presidents until 6
August 1966 when Bolivia returned to civilian constitutional
rule with the inauguration of Barrientos as President. Until
his death in a helicopter crash on 27 April 1969, Barrientos
dominated the Bolivian political scene and enjoyed widespread
popularity. He attempted to unify the country and to create
an environment for stability and progress.
Vice President Luis Adolfo Salinas succeeded to the
presidency but held office only five months. It was inevitable
that eventually he would collide with the Armed Forces.
Holding to a strict legalistic interpretation of the Con-
stitution, he consistently took positions unacceptable to the
military leaders. He succeeded also in alienating important
elements of the Congress and his own party. On 26 September
1969 the Bolivian Armed Forces seized the government and
installed their Commander-in-Chief, General Ovando, as President.
Ovando apparently had decided that Siles would work against
his candidacy in the 1970 election and further hesitation
might weaken his chances to lead the military to power.
The new "Revolutionary Government" issued a 19-point
proclamation that reflected its nationalistic and leftist
orientation. Among its more significant features, this
proclamation called for agrarian reform, state ownership
of basic industries and natural resources, accelerated rural
development, a new concept of social justice, and a "nationalistic
moral revolution."' Although the United States recognized
the new government on 10 October, the strong anti-American
attitude of the Ovando regime became evident almost immediately.
Its nationalization of the American-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil
Company was followed by demonstrations calling for expulsion
of AID and the Peace Corps, and threats against other
American companies.operating in Bolivia.
As of this writing, it appears that the center of the
Bolivian political system is moving rapidly to the irrational
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nationalist left. General Ovando himself, as leader of the
junta, has been characterized as having no deep political
convictions and being prepared to work with any element to
advance his position. The expropriation action indicates that
a radical faction in the cabinet has gained the upper hand
and can be expected to lead the government along a more
extremist course. There is conviction in some quarters that
the nationalistic trend may gain further momentum and bring
grave consequences for the nation's economy. Some observers
see no hope for a deteriorating situation which can lead only
to a series of coups and counter-coups. It appears that the
key problem now facing the nation is the absence of leaders
of sufficient stature to discipline an increasingly anarchic
political scene, and bring order and reason to the Bolivian
government.
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BOLIVIA: GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
E L f B E N 1
a~u
Trinidad
O
Mururafa?
LA PAZ
COG BiAMBA
,Cochabamba
SANTA
CRUZ
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B. Che Guevara's Adventure
A key feature of Castro's plan to carry out subversion
throughout Latin America was his attempt in 1966-67 to esta-
blish in Bolivia a guerrilla warfare base under Ernesto "Che"
Guevara's leadership. Captured diaries and other documents,
supplemented by interrogation of prisoners who participated
in the operation revealed the theory, strategy and tactics
which Havana had adopted to implement its hemisphere-wide
policy of armed revolt. They also exposed the conflict between
Castroism and the pro-Soviet Communist parties over control
of the Latin American struggle. (See map 77461)
Che Guevara, one of Castro's lieutenants, who had acquired
international prestige by virtue of his prior service in
Guatemala, Cuba and the Congo, was selected to lead the Bolivian
operation. He stood as a paragon of dedication to the
international proletarian revolutionary cause, and a myth of
his invincibility had grown up in leftist circles.
As early as 1965, Cuban leaders had begun to collect
information and make plans for exporting their guerrilla move-
ment to the mainland. Early in 1966, Castro selected Bolivia
as the country best suited for launching his attack. From
his viewpoint, Bolivia was a geo-political center from which
the National Liberation Movement could be spread into Peru,
Chile, Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. The terrain of south-
eastern Bolivia seemed ideal for guerrilla operations, and the
country, weakened by economic and political problems, appeared
to offer the most favorable conditions for insurgency.
The operation would carry out the doctrine advocated by
Castro, Che and Jules Regis Debray, a young French Marxist
theoretician -- that the real revolution must originate as a
guerrilla movement in the hinterland -- it cannot be effected
by city-bred "revolutionary" parties. They would repeat the
Cuban experienee in which the guerrillas, operating from the
countryside, would demonstrate the impotence of the central
government, win the support of the oppressed, and cause the
development of a truly revolutionary political party.
In early 1966 Che had returned secretly to Cuba from his
disappointing Congo experience. He selected about 20 Cubans
experienced in guerrilla warfare and trained them for the
projected Bolivian operation. The organization was to consist
of action units in the mountains supported by city-based
elements. A five-man advance party left Cuba in July and flew
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to La Paz by way of Prague. In La Paz support was provided
by Rodolfo Saldana, a member of the outlawed pro-Soviet Bolivian
Communist Party (PCB/S). He served as a communication channel
with Havana; made surveys, provided supplies, weapons and false
documents; and was responsible for recruitment of students and
couriers. He also promoted support from Argentina and incor-
porated Peruvians into Che's force. Saldana received $40,000
from Havana to finance these activities.
After preparations for the Bolivian operation were com-
pleted, Che left for Bolivia. He arrived in La Paz on 3
November 1966, disguised as a Uruguayan businessman bald
and wearing hornrimmed glasses. Che travelled by jeep from
Cochabamba and then by foot to reach the base camp about 40
miles north of Camiri at Nancahuazu. There he directed short
reconnaissance marches and had caves dug for storing food and
supplies. In December, Mario Monje, General Secretary of the
PCB/S, came to Che's camp to demand that he be recognized as
the political and military leader of the revolutionary struggle
in Bolivia. The real issue was whether the Cubans would lead
a united front of all parties in Bolivia or whether the parties
would control their own activities. Che rejected Monje's
demand. Negotiations broke down, the PCB/S's Central Committee
refused subordination to political direction from Che's command,
and Che and his 12.guerrillas were left without Soviet Communist
Party backing.
On the first of February 1967, during a season of heavy
rains, Che and 30 of his men began a long training march. They
crossed the Rio Grande with great difficulty and, continuing
northward for about 20 miles, made their way through the foot-
hills of the Eastern Andes. Forced to rely on poor maps, they
lost their way and for two weeks wandered up and down creek
beds and climbed rocky slopes. At this higher elevation, Che
suffered a painful lung condition and his band was wracked by
starvation and disharmony. The local Indian populace either
chose to ignore the guerrillas and their message of "liberation"
or refused to cooperate with them.
On 23 March the Bolivian nation was shocked to learn that
Che's band had ambushed an Army patrol. On 10 April Bolivian
Army forces were moved into the guerrilla camp area but suffered
19 casualties. Just as Che was preparing to issue his manifesto
on the "National Liberation Army of Bolivia", the tide turned
against him. On 17 April the guerrillas split into two groups,
one under Che's command, the other under Joaquin. Late in April
the Army captured three individuals -- Debray, Bustos and Roth --
-6-
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to whom Che had assigned the task of enlisting international
support for the Bolivian guerrilla movement. About this time,
also, Che lost radio contact with Havana and was limited to
slow courier service. During May and June the guerrillas
numbered about 50 men but two or three were lost at each en-
gagement with the Army. Prompt action by President Barrientos
blocked miners' support for the revolution on which Che had
counted.
Che's guerrilla action climaxed on 6 July when his band
took over the Army garrison at Samaipata. Soon thereafter,
plagued by desertion, sickness and loss of equipment, Che's
remnants faced defeat. The final skirmish took place on
7 October 1967 when Che was wounded and taken prisoner.
Two days later he was executed. Of those who formed his
guerrilla band, only five survived. Two years later, on 9
September 1969, his chief lieutenant Guido "Inti" Peredo
was killed during a clash between the police and ELN members
in La Paz.
Che's campaign was doomed to failure from the start.
Castro's brand of revolution was not acceptable in Bolivia
and his assessment of Bolivia's President, its people and Army
was unrealistic. Guerrilla relations with the Communist parties
of Bolivia were marked by distrust and the local parties
supported Che only to the extent that it did not interfere with
their own plans and activities. They refused to make their
personnel available in any organized manner to the guerrilla
band. Che, for his part, stubbornly refused to cooperate with
those whose support he needed. He failed completely in his
attempt to gain the sympathy of the local campesino population
upon which he counted to sustain his struggle. He was unable
to coordinate his efforts with students and workers. He was
incapable of bringing about harmony between the Cubans and
other members of his guerrilla group. Che, in other words, was
not the leader he claimed to be. Although he had planned a long-
term organizational effort"of recruitment, building of support
elements, and reconnaissance of operational areas, his band's
violations of good security practice forced it into premature
action against the.Army. He had developed no alternative plan
and had not worked out a satisfactory intelligence collection
system. His support network of communications, logistics and
recruitment began to crumble when fighting commenced. Che's
death and the destruction of his movement was a serious blow to
Castro and enhanced the position of both the Soviet and Chinese
Communist oriented elements of the Communist parties in Bolivia
and other Latin American countries.
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An intriguing footnote to this tale was the role played
by one Tania,(nee Haidee Tamara Bunke). Argentine by birth,
she moved to East Germany at 17 years of age. While attending
college, she was recruited by the intelligence service of the
German Democratic Republic to penetrate Castro's movement. She
moved to Cuba and preceded Che to La Paz when Castro decided to
center his guerrilla movement in Bolivia. It was Tania who
brought Monje to Che's camp to discuss the direction and leader-
ship of the revolution. In March 1967 she brought Debray and
Bustos to the camp but, on this trip, left her jeep in Camiri
with compromising evidence that alerted Bolivian authorities.
From that time on she remained with Che, finally dying in a
river crossing ambush set by the Bolivian Army. The fascinating
question about Tania remains unanswered: was it her emotional
attachment to Che which led her to commit grave breaches of
Communist discipline, or was she obeying orders from Moscow to
betray Che's mission in Bolivia at the cost of her own life?
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II. The Contemporary Scene -- A Nation in Transition
A. Characteristics of National Life
Bolivian society is in a state of flux characteristic of
a nation seeking political maturity but still operating on a
primitive socioeconomic and cultural base. The diverse elements
of the population have not yet been welded together behind
clear and common goals. The Revolution of 1952 awakened the
social and political consciousness of the masses, sharpening
their aspirations for a better life. The fundamental purposes
of that revolution were to integrate the Indians into full
citizenship, create conditions requisite to raising living
standards, and solidify the bases of democracy in the process
of achieving these purposes.
In spite of considerable progress toward attainment of
these revolutionary aims, Bolivia lacks a national consensus
and many segments of society remain reluctant to accept the
orientation of the revolution. While its goals are publicly
endorsed by all major parties, the central issue of politics
is the future course the revolution will take and how it will
further the self-interest of the many conflicting social and
economic groups. The revolution drastically shifted the con-
centration of wealth and power, destroying the monopoly of
the elite, but brought unrest and instability in its wake.
The lower classes, divided by their ethnic, linguistic and
class differences, are disillusioned by the inability of
Bolivia's leaders to fulfill the revolutionary promises. The
old elite still maintains a high degree of social and ethnic
self-consciousness.
Bolivian society is highly personalistic, and under-
currents of suspicion and antagonism are directed at individuals,
institutions and social classes. Behind a fascade of government
stability and party unity, the many discordant ethnic, regional
and economic elements are held in tenuous balance by manipulation,
patronage and bargaining among groups of political strongmen.
National development is inhibited by an absence of general
support for any given order, be it the system of government or
basic socioeconomic principles. Political and economic faction-
alism slow the effective implementation of programs designed
to unite the nation and meet the aspirations of its people. The
government must cope with a myriad of functional pressure
groups -- campesinos, bureaucrats, miners, urban factory workers,
students, private entrepreneurs and intellectuals. The most
stabilizing force is Bolivia's military class which has achieved
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a high measure of popular acceptability and which plays the
dominant role in government. Unified, and led by officers
dedicated to the reformist principles of the revolution, the
Army is deeply involved in modernizing and strengthening the
socioeconomic structure.
While progress has been made toward national political
unity, there are natural, ethnic and economic forces which
continue to divide the nation. Bolivia faces complex and
vexing problems which appear to defy solution. The country's
terrain and climate create unsurmountable barriers to effec-
tive communication and understanding among the people and
separate them from their government. Villagers, isolated by
geography, persist in their peculiar cultural, ethnic and
historic patterns and prejudices. A particularly trouble-
some situation exists in the deeply rooted heritage of
regionalist conflict between the isolated Santa Cruz region
and the cities of the highlands, traditional centers of
economic and government power. Sessionists by nature and
history, the people of Santa Cruz presume a racial and
cultural superiority over the residents of the Altiplano
whom they accuse of political and economic exploitation.
The political landscape is dominated by the competition
among political leaders for the support of the dominant classes
of society, particularly the,campesinos, miners and urban
lower classes. Comprising approximately 65 percent of all
Bolivians, the Indian campesino population has a strong poten-
tial in the political life of the nation. Although the
campesinos do not yet comprise a cohesive element in society,
they are reconciled to a degree on the national level. These
"workers of the countryside" are organized into the National
Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (sindicatos) and
claim over two million members affiliated with the national
trade union federation. The most important political aspect
of the sindicatos is their support of armed militias but
they also are used as an effective avenue for the expression
of rural initiative . The power of the rural sindicatos has
been so great that political leaders of great prominence have
been drawn into sindicatojpolitics.
Miners and other more urbanized industrial workers
constitute a second group of great political power. This
group has an awareness of common interest and class conscious-
ness deriving from a history of labor strife and denial of
social and economic opportunity. Labor unions often serve as
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local civic associations in concert with neighborhood councils,
women's groups and sports teams, thereby establishing ties which
cut across occupational specialities. The union worker, united
within his own group, tends to separate himself, however, with
respect to other social groups.
The middle class is a somewhat less important political
target. Comprising the urban merchants, white-collar workers,
professionals, government bureaucrats, and students, this class
has attempted to distinguish itself from the lower classes and
to have its status acknowledged. More than any other, this
group has given rise to social and political radicals and many
of its members have assumed positions of leadership in radical
movements of the right and left. The most politically active
group of the middle class is the students who have two major
organizations, the Federation of University Students and the
National Confederation of Students.
The nagging economic problems which Bolivia faces today
derive from the anomalies to which the country fell heir: a
deformed national economy, an exaggerated dependence on foreign
markets and international commodity prices, a high percentage
of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture and
existing outside the money economy, lack of trained manpower
and managerial competence, and an inability to generate internal
savings for development.
One of the most fundamental problems which the nation faced
following the revolution was the establishment of a viable;
framework for national decision-making. This became increasingly
critical as the government expanded its control over the working
of the economy. The government assumed responsibility for
maintaining economic and monetary stability, providing education
and training, operating the nation's most important sources of
wealth, enacting and enforcing labor standards, providing social
welfare services, and regulating labor management relations.
Sharp disagreement developed between the government and organ-
ized labor on the orientation and aims of the revolution,
contributing to the economic upheaval which has characterized
the period since 1952. The destruction of the stable, if
underproductive, agrarian system produced economic chaos, and
a host of difficulties followed nationalization of the mines.
In its hasty reorganization of the economy, the government
failed to formulate sound plans for industry, labor and agri-
culture. Investors were left without guarantees of payment;
industrial leaders were shorn of their managerial powers; urban
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labor and mine workers received higher salaries with little
regard for increased efficiency; land reform and its enforce-
ment was weak; and inflation persisted along with budget
deficits.
Instability in the economy has been caused by the wasteful
operations of state enterprises, expansion of welfare programs
beyond the resources of the government, favoritism toward
organized labor, and widespread corruption and inefficiency in
administrative practices. When economic choices have been made,
too often the preferred solution has been that which promised
quick gains to partisan, regional or individual interests
rather than to national goals.
In spite of its extensive mineral and petroleum resources,
Bolivia remains one of the poorest countries in Latin America.
Per capita income is second lowest (after Haiti) in the Western
Hemisphere. Although the economy grew at an average annual
rate of more than 5 percent from 1961 through 1967, its ability
to continue to maintain a reasonably high growth rate is
dependent on several factors beyond Bolivia's control. One
such factor is international tin prices. Bolivia's heavy
dependence on exports of tin has subjected the economy to
severe fluctuations in export earnings as world demand for the
metal has changed. Another essential factor is its ability
to attract the large amounts of foreign capital needed to
develop the rich mineral and petroleum resources. To some
extent, government incentives to foreign investors and the
maintenance of political stability will determine whether such
capital will be forthcoming in the required amounts. Agricul-
tural development, which will require the use of improved
technology in the overpopulated highlands, combined with emi-
gration to the underpopulated eastern lowlands, is made difficult
by the Indian farmer's centuries-old cultural attitudes and
his irresponsiveness to economic incentives.
B. Bolivia's Place in the.World
The character of Bolivia's foreign relations has had a
major impact on the country's political, economic and social
development. In little more than half a century, through wars
and cessions'. Bolivia lost half of its national territory to
its five neighbors. Since the colonial period, the export of
mineral wealth has, on the one hand, contributed to the country's
growth and, on the other, created frictions with its world neigh-
bors. The United States, particularly, has been accused of
"economic imperialism" and interference in Bolivian internal
affairs because of heavy American interests in the country's
extractive industries.
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Bolivia has viewed the lack of an outlet to the sea, its
chronic dispute with Chile, as its principal international
problem. The War of the Pacific produced enduring bitterness
against Chile (but see below). In the Treaty of 1904, ending
that conflict, Bolivia ceded its Pacific Coast territory to
Chile; in return, Chile granted Bolivia the duty-free use of
the ports of Antofagasta and Arica, and agreed to build a
railroad from Arica to La Paz. In 1962 Bolivia severed
diplomatic relations with Chile in protest against the latter's
plan to divert water from the Rio Lauca; Bolivia withdrew from
the Organization of American States (OAS) in protest against
the inaction of the body toward that issue and did not resume
its seat until 1965. While behind-the-scenes efforts to nor-
malize the situation began in 1966, Bolivia has not yet restored
full diplomatic relations with Chile.
When Bolivia nationalized the Gulf Oil properties, it
embarked on a policy which has changed the nation's image on
the world scene. This action affected not only Bolivia's
relations with the United States, but with its sister Latin
republics and the Soviet Union, as well. Towards the United
States, the Bolivian Government has taken an officially
pugnacious attitude. It appears willing to jeopardize the
economic and military assistance which has helped sustain the
nation. Towards the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the
Ovando regime has made a conciliatory gesture by deciding to
exchange ambassadors. (Bolivia established diplomatic relations
with the USSR in 1945 but never had exchanged missions.) Some
observers imply this is indicative of a Bolivian intent to
seek Soviet trade and assistance if relations with the United
States continue to deteriorate. The pattern of Bolivian-Soviet
relations, however, would suggest this to be an unlikely pos-
sibility. (In 1966 President Barrientos declared that,
although his government would not establish diplomatic relations
with Communist nations, it was ready to accept their aid,
provided it was granted on terms which were acceptable to Bolivia
and not conditioned on political concessions.)
Bolivia's relations with other Soviet-oriented nations have
been intermittent and spotty. Hungary has maintained a legation
while the Yugoslavs have an embassy in La Paz. Czechoslovakia
had exported films and other cultural media to Bolivia until the
two nations broke relations in 1964. Bolivian economic relations
with Communist nations have been insignificant, but a number
of Bolivians have studied in those countries.
Cuba, of course, is a special case. The 1967 Cuban
intervention in Bolivian internal affairs punctuated an undefined
relationship between the two countries. Bolivian leftist
groups initially had looked with favor upon Castro's rise to
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power. When Cuba became firmly associated with the Soviet Union,
however, it had a disrupting effect on Cuban-Bolivian relations,
and on the attitude of those groups. Bolivia reluctantly sup-
ported the Punta del Este resolution of January 1962 which
condemned Communism as incompatible with the inter-American system,
supported the Alliance for Progress, and excluded Cuba from the
Inter-American Defense Board. In August 1964 Bolivia broke dip-
lomatic relations with Cuba under strong United States and OAS
pressure. The future course of relations between Bolivia and
Cuba is not clear, but in October 1969 General Ovando declared
that Bolivia would accept Cuba back into the OAS. He explained
that Bolivia stands for self-determination and that the demon-
strated approval of Castro by the Cuban people is sufficient
reason for Cuba's re-admission. He did not specify that Bolivia
would re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, but expressed
the hope that Cuban interference in Bolivian internal affairs
would cease.
Toward its other hemispheric neighbors, Bolivia generally
has maintained good relations and, in the wake of the Gulf
incident, Bolivia has come to symbolize Latin. resistance to
American power. Bolivia's attitude has even softened toward
Chile as a result of that country's rejection of Gulf's move to
embargo shipment of pipeline construction materials to Bolivia.
Relations between Bolivia and Argentina, which have grown close
both economically and politically, have been strengthened further
by Argentina's offer of assistance in the pipeline matter.
General Ovando has reversed his past record of conservatism to
declare his administration the "ideological brother" of the
Peruvian military regime which took earlier nationalization
action against the International Petroleum Company. While minor
problems have arisen over the ill-defined borders between Bolivia
and Brazil, relations between these two countries have been rela-
tively satisfactory. Bolivian nationalism represents a radi-
calization of the political militarism that began five years ago
in Brazil. Despite the Chaco War of the 1930's, Bolivia's
relations with Paraguay have been generally amicable since World
War II.
In a broader hemispheric sense, Bolivia has joined with
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in establishing (May 1969) the
Andean Group, a subregional group within the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA). The Andean Group grew out of a 1966
meeting which, remarkably, saw members overcome some of their
traditional enmity toward each other. They were able to develop
an action program which sought, among other objectives, to pro-
mote freer trade, harmonize economic and social policies, mobi-
lize resources to finance investment, and intensify the process
of subregional industrialization.
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25X1
Bolivia, a land of amazing contrasts, spreads over an
area larger than Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas combined. The
terrain is dominated by the impressive Andean mountains that
tower miles above the remainder of the country. Sharply
contrasting forested plains and savannas form the remainder
of the country. Bolivia's climate is just as diverse as its
terrain -- ranging from the bitterly cold, windy and dry
highlands through transitional zones in the mountain valleys
to the hot and humid lowlands. Dense rain forests, swamps,
marshes, and dry thorn forests provide a varied covering
for the Lowlands while only a sparse growth of vegetation
giving way to barren salt-flats, rocky slopes, and snow-
25kc1overed peaks are found in the mountains.
Bolivia's relatively small population, an estimated
3,748,000 people, are mostly of Indian ancestry, primarily
Quechua and Aymara. Even though a majority of the population
is officially classed as Indian, Bolivia is run by a small
group who claim a Spanish or European heritage. Many of
these so-called whites (blancos) trace their ancestry back to
the conquistadors, but because of considerable interbreeding
in the colonial era, few can truthfully deny some Indian
ancestry. Nevertheless, Bolivians recognize three classes
of people. At the top of the ladder are the whites, next
come the cholos (those of Indian or mixed ancestry who have
adopted Western ways), and last the Indians who retain their
traditional way of life.
Bolivia's inhospitable terrain and climate has had con-
siderable influence on settlement patterns. While there are
only enougi people to make up a country-wide average of nine
persons per square mile, population densities in a few areas
of the northern Altiplano and the east-facing valleys of the
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Cordillera Real exceed 100 per square mile. Vast areas of
the southern Altiplano and the Eastern Lowlands are almost
entirely uninhabited. In recent years, migrations from the
highlands into the major cities and to government-sponsored
colonies have somewhat altered the previous (1950) country-
city population ratio of 65 percent rural and 35 percent
urban.
Health and sanitation conditions are among the worst in
the Western Hemisphere, the ignorance of the majority of the
population as to the elemental rules of hygiene being com-
pounded by the country's physical environment. To further
aggravate this problem, housing and education must be cate-
gorized as sub-standard in terms of Western values. The
majority of dwellings are small, overcrowded, and without
the most basic essentials. Despite government efforts to
improve education, the illiteracy rate remains near 70 per-
cent.
Roman Catholicism is the professed faith of 90 percent
of Bolivia's people. The practice of this religion, however,
varies markedly among the social and ethnic classes from
orthodox Catholicism to various admixtures of traditional
beliefs to, finally, the Indians who never have been com-
pletely converted. Minority religious groups include rela-
tively small numbers of Protestants, Jews, assorted eastern
faiths, and animists.
Both communication and transportation are extremely
difficult; as a result, many areas have little, if any, con-
tact with the outside world, and a journey of even a few
miles can become a major undertaking. Bolivia's telecommuni-
cations facilities and services are poor by any standards.
Many areas have no telecommunications service and the exist-
ing networks are often overloaded. With the exception of a
wireline network on the southwestern plateau, Bolivia is
dependent upon high frequency radio for long-distance communi-
cation. Both private and government radiobroadcasting systems
do exist, but most transmitters have only a small reception
radius.
Bolivia's transportation network is rudimentary. Most
roads and railroads are concentrated on the Altiplano and
the adjoining mountains and valleys. Of these, only 3,600
miles out of an estimated 9,000 to 16,500 miles of road are
passable throughout the year, and the 2,300 miles of railroad
are in poor condition and inefficiently operated. As a result,
even where roads or railroads exist, travel is at best uncer-
tain and at worst hazardous. In the vast areas of the Eastern
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Lowlands, the only transportation is via unimproved waterways
or by air. While the air fleet is small and generally old,
the airlines serve a relatively extensive network of airfields
and provide the most important and often the only link between
isolated settlements and the principal urban centers.
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Bolivia, Che Guevara's choice for a guerrilla base in
South America, is a landlocked republic bounded by five
other countries. It occupies some 424,000 square miles of
territory, with maximum dimensions of about 900 miles from
north to south and 800 miles from east to west. In spite
of its completely tropical location, the country experiences
a wide diversity of climatic conditions because of the great
altitudinal differences within and between its two major
regions (see Map 58810).
The western two-fifths of Bolivia, the Andean Highlands
Region, towers miles above the rest of the country and is
cold, windy, and very dry. Although bleak and inhospitable,
the highlands include the most densely settled sections of
the country. Major urban centers -- La Paz, Cochabamba,
Oruro, and others -- are located in valleys and basins at
elevations well over 10,000 feet. Except for a zone of dense
forest along its eastern flank, most of this area supports
only a very sparse growth of natural vegetation; broad salt
flats, snow-covered summits, and rocky mountain slopes within
the highlands are almost barren.
In contrast, the forested plains and savannas that stretch
to the Amazon and Paraguay river basins and comprise the vast
Eastern Lowlands Region are hot and humid. They are covered
by dense rain forest, extensive swamps and marshes, seasonally
inundated grasslands, and, in the south, dry thorn forest.
Most sections of the lowlands remain largely uninhabited
except for scattered villages and towns along the larger
rivers.
Within each of the terrain regions environmental condi-
tions vary greatly, especially along the eastern side of the
highlands. Mountain slopes and valleys in this transitional
zone may be lush tropical jungles or cactus-covered deserts,
depending on their exposure to or protection from the moisture-
bearing northeasterly winds that sweep in from the plains.
The sparsely settled foothills most nearly approximate the
environmental conditions of the Sierra Maestra of Cuba and
were the center of Cuban-supported guerrilla activity in
Bolivia.
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Bolivia, Che Guevara's choice for a guerrilla base in
South America, is a landlocked republic bounded by five
other countries. It occupies some 424,000 square miles of
territory, with maximum dimensions of about 900 miles from
north to south and 800 miles from east to west. In spite
of its completely tropical location, the country experiences
a wide diversity of climatic conditions because of the great
altitudinal differences within and between its two major
regions (see Map 58810).
The western two-fifths of Bolivia, the Andean Highlands
Region, towers miles above the rest of the country and is
cold, windy, and very dry. Although bleak and inhospitable,
the highlands include the most densely settled sections of
the country. Major urban centers -- La Paz, Cochabamba,
Oruro, and others -- are located in valleys and basins at
elevations well over 10,000 feet. Except for a zone of dense
forest along its eastern flank, most of this area supports
only a very sparse growth of natural vegetation; broad salt
flats, snow-covered summits, and rocky mountain slopes within
the highlands are almost barren.
In contrast, the forested plains and savannas that stretch
to the Amazon and Paraguay river basins and comprise the vast
Eastern Lowlands Region are hot and humid. They are covered
by dense rain forest, extensive swamps and marshes, seasonally
inundated grasslands, and, in the south, dry thorn forest.
Most sections of the lowlands remain largely uninhabited
except for scattered villages and towns along the larger
rivers.
Within each of the terrain regions environmental condi-
tions vary greatly, especially along the eastern side of the
highlands. Mountain slopes and valleys in this transitional
zone may be lush tropical jungles or cactus-covered deserts,
depending on their exposure to or protection from the moisture-
bearing northeasterly winds that sweep in from the plains.
The sparsely settled foothills most nearly approximate the
environmental conditions of the Sierra Maestra of Cuba and
were the center of Cuban-supported guerrilla activity in
Bolivia.
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Bolivia, Che Guevara's choice for a guerrilla base in
South America, is a landlocked republic bounded by five
other countries. It occupies some 424,000 square miles of
territory, with maximum dimensions of about 900 miles from
north to south and 800 miles from east to west. In spite
of its completely tropical location, the country experiences
a wide diversity of climatic conditions because of the great
altitudinal differences within and between its two major
regions (see Map 58810).
The western two-fifths of Bolivia, the Andean Highlands
Region, towers miles above the rest of the country and is
cold, windy, and very dry. Although bleak and inhospitable,
the highlands include the most densely settled sections of
the country. Major urban centers -- La Paz, Cochabamba,
Oruro, and others -- are located in valleys and basins at
elevations well over 10,000 feet. Except for a zone of dense
forest along its eastern flank, most of this area supports
only a very sparse growth of natural vegetation; broad salt
flats, snow-covered summits, and rocky mountain slopes within
the highlands are almost barren.
In contrast, the forested plains and savannas that stretch
to the Amazon and Paraguay river basins and comprise the vast
Eastern Lowlands Region are hot and humid. They are covered
by dense rain forest, extensive swamps and marshes, seasonally
inundated grasslands, and, in the south, dry thorn forest.
Most sections of the lowlands remain largely uninhabited
except for scattered villages and towns along the larger
rivers.
Within each of the terrain regions environmental condi-
tions vary greatly, especially along the eastern side of the
highlands. Mountain slopes and valleys in this transitional
zone may be lush tropical jungles or cactus-covered deserts,
depending on their exposure to or protection from the moisture-
bearing northeasterly winds that sweep in from the plains.
The sparsely settled foothills most nearly approximate the
environmental conditions of the Sierra Maestra of Cuba and
were the center of Cuban-supported guerrilla activity in
Bolivia.
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B. Andean Highlands
The Andean Highlands Region of Bolivia includes most of
the forested highland areas
This region constitutes the broadest section of the great
Andean chain of lofty mountains that extends along the Pacific
coast of South America. Within the region, snowcapped peaks
rise to elevations of over 20,000 feet and the general surface
elevation is greater than 14,000 feet. Moving from west to
east across the highlands, one encounters first the volcanic
Cordillera Occidental straddling the border with Chile, then
a gradual slope down to the high plains that are collectively
known as the Altiplano, next a sharp rise to the extremely
high Cordillera Real, and finally a descent through forested
gorges and ridges, known as the Yungas in the north and as
the Front Ranges in the south, to the Eastern Lowlands (see
Figure 1).
The difficulty of moving over the varied terrain of the
Andean Highlands depends largely on the direction of movement,
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Figure 1. Generalized profile of Bolivia.
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the section to be traversed, and the season. In general, it
is easier to follow the northeast-southeast "grain" of the
country, and most of the main roads and rail lines follow
this trend. Movement across the grain may involve the use of
high mountain passes or the crossing of numerous streams.
The best period for movement in most of the Andean High-
lands is the dry season, from about June through August; at
this time the ground is usually firm and streams are fordable.
During the remainder of the year, especially in the rainiest
period, December through February, flash floods often inter-
rupt traffic, and many of the small mountain streams become
unfordable torrents. Miry ground under the crust of the salt
flats is at its worst from January through May.
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25X1
The Cordillera extends along the entire border with
Chile and forms most of the western margin of the Altiplano
(see Figure 2). This subregion, occupying the southwestern
extremity of the department of La Paz and the western parts
of Oruro and Potosi Departments, consists of a chain of vol-
canic mountains with intervening basins containing salt flats
and shallow saline lakes. It is an area of hot springs,
geysers, lava flows, grotesque wind-eroded rocks, and steep-
walled canyons.
The Cordillera is traversed by very few improved roads
but is crisscrossed by pack trails and in few places presents
an insurmountable barrier to movement. Most of the large
volcanic peaks of.the range are fairly widely spaced, and
the intervening areas generally flat to rolling. The small
salt flats and lagoons can be crossed or circumvented; the
broken lava slabs and boulder fields and occasional deep
canyons impede movement only locally.
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Figure 2. Cordillera Occidental. The large salt flat to
the right is the Salar de Empexa.
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a. Terrain and Climate
The Cordillera Occidental trends in a north-south direc-
tion and is divided into three main sections. The northern
section is known as the Cordillera de Pacajes y Carangas, the
central as the Serranfas de Sillillica, and the southern as
the Cadena Volcanica. Many peaks throughout the chain rise
to elevations over 18,000 feet. The highest mountain, snow-
capped Sajama with its huge volcanic cone rising to an eleva-
tion of 21,391 feet, dominates the northern part of the chain.
The central section of the cordillera, the Serranfas de
Sillillica, is bordered to the east on the Altiplano by two
enormous salt flats -- the Salar de Coipasa and the Salar de
Uyuni. From the highest peak in this part of the chain,
19,669 feet, a spur of mountainous terrain juts eastward
between the salt flats.
The southernmost part of the Cordillera Occidental, the
so-called Cadena Volcanica, is not a distinct mountain range
but a series of high volcanoes aligned in various directions
and connected with numerous secondary hills and ridges.
Several of these volcanoes also reach elevations over 19,000
feet. No volcanoes, here or elsewhere in the chain, are
active, although some emit sulfurous gasses and steam.
A number of small salt lakes occupy enclosed basins
within the mountains, especially in the south. Most of
these basins have reached the stage where the area surfaced
with salts is greater than that of open water. Many basins
are merely large marshy areas, topped by muddy salt, some-
times soggy, sometimes with a dry crust, and with here and
there ?a shallow lagoon. Usually the open water is only a few
inches deep, and even the larger lakes are seldom more than 3
or 4 feet in depth. The salt crystals may form tough solid
bottoms or, when mixed with windblown sand and clay particles,
veritable quicksands. The largest lake in the subregion is
Laguna Colorada (see Figure 3), in the southern part of the
Cadena Volcanica, and the largest salt flat is the Salar de
Empexa, due west of the huge Salar de Uyuni on the Altiplano.
There are few large streams in the high, arid Cordillera
Occidental Subregion. The Rio Mauri, flowing out of Peru,
crosses the northern part of the subregion and joins the Rio
Desaguadero on the Altiplano. A number of smaller, intermit-
tent streams tributary to the Mauri flow in from Chile. Far-
ther to the south, the Rio Lauca flows from a relatively
broad highland basin in Chile through a pass in the cordillera
and into Lago de Coipasa on the Altiplano (see Figure 4);
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Figure 3. Laguna Colorada at
12,500 feet in Cadena Volcanica.
Note the flamingos in flight
above the lake.
Figure 4. Rio Lauca flowing
out of Chile into Bolivia in
background. The arid rock-
strewn slopes support little
vegetation.
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Chilean plans for diverting its waters for irrigation purposes
have been the subject of bitter protests by Bolivia. Else-
where in the cordillera, intermittent streams feed small lakes
lose themselves in the sogjay subsurface beneath the
2 4ist of salt flat
A number of high passes, all over 13,000 feet, cross
the cordillera. The most important are the Tacora Pass in the
north, through which the rail line extends from Arica, Chile
to La Paz; and the OllagUe Pass between the Serranias de Sillil-
lica and the Cadena Volcanica, the route of the rail line from
Antofagasta, Chile to La Paz. The other passes are utilized
by pack trails.
High, bleak, and desolate, the cordillera is subject to
fierce winds and severe cold. Because of the general aridity,
the snowline is unusually high, and only the loftiest peaks,
such as that of Mount Sajama, are perpetually snow covered.
Even on the higher mountains, most of the snow disappears in
the superdry atmosphere. Rainfall is scarce, especially on
the western slopes, and the only streams in the cordillera are
formed from the snowmelt of higher peaks. The eastern flanks
of the mountains receive slightly greater rainfall because of
the more humid easterly winds. The moister slopes of the
northern part of the range receive up to 20 inches of precipi-
tation, while the more arid southern sections receive less
than 10 inches. Because of the great altitude of the cordil-
lera, the air is generally cold and rarified. Charana, at
slightly over 13,000 feet in the main pass through the north-
ern part of the range, experiences mean maximum temperatures
of only 67?F during November, the warmest summer month, and
a mean minimum of 10?F in July, the coldest winter month. The
greater part of the subregion, situated at considerably higher
altitudes than Charana, experiences correspondingly lower
temperatures. Nighttime temperatures in many places often drop
well below 0?F. Newcomers to the area are likely to suffer
from the mountain sickness called soroche or puna, which results
from a deficiency of oxygen at high a titudes.
I- I Most of the landscape is desolate
with only a few patches of yellow ichu grass sprouting here and
there and an occasional thola bush growing from a rocky crevice.
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A curious, very resinous, mosslike plant known as the llareta
is also found in the subregion; because of its moundli ek-form,
it looks more like a boulder than a plant. Bunch grass and
widely scattered bushes cover the lower slopes of the moun-
tains, the margins of some small lakes, and-the valley bottoms
of some intermittent streams where at least a minimum of mois-
ture is available. Elsewhere, especially in the arid south
and on the higher slopes of the rocky mountains and volcanoes,
the terrain is practically devoid of vegetation.
Flocks of llamas and alpacas are grazed where the ichu
grass is most abundant. Thola bushes and llareta plants are
chopped for firewood; the latter is especially rized where-
ever little other fuel is available. Organized exploitation
has so diminished the supply of this fuel plant that it may
soon be completely destroyed. Chilean clandestine encroach-
ment into Bolivian territory, chopping and hauling out llareta,
has occasionally given rise to frontier incidents.
The cordillera is very sparsely settled, particularly in
the south, and cultivated plots are found only in isolated,
widely spaced oases and in some of the deep canyon bottoms
protected from the strong winds. Small mines are scattered
along the Chilean border where sulfur deposits occur in
irregular patches on the sides of volcanoes and in the sites
of old craters. Local sulfur refineries (which use llareta
as fuel for their retorts) truck most of their product to
Chile.
basins flanked by high mountains.
2. The Altiplano
The Altiplano Subregion is located in the departments of
La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi and consists of a series of broad
The Altiplano is actually part of an enormous trough that
extends northward through Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. Bordered
to the east and west by the giant Andean Cordilleras, the Alti-
plano is only slightly less desolate and forbidding than the
surrounding mountains (see Figures 5 and 6). Although it com-
prises mostly vast, flat, windswept plains, it also contains
extensive areas of rugged, deeply dissected terrain, and nearly
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Figure S. Altiplano near La Paz. The level surface
of the Altiplano ends abruptly at the edge of the
deep valley, which is the site of the capital.
Figure 6. Altiplano south of Salar de Uyuni. Low
bushes are scattered across the plain; steep bluffs
rise in background.
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a quarter of the total surface is covered by marsh-bordered
lakes and salt flats.
Movement on the Altiplano is generally unrestricted
throughout the extensive flat, unbroken sections but may be
hindered by scattered hills or more seriously impeded by
highly dissected terrain in other sections. The marshy
ground along much of the Rio Desaguadero and around Lago de
Poop6 and some of the other smaller Altiplano lakes is a
serious obstacle to all types of surface movement. Across
many parts of the large salt flats -- the Salar de Uyuni and
the Salar de Coipasa -- movement is possible even by trucks,
but it is hazardous because of weak spots in the surface,
especially around the margins; vehicles have been known to
break through and sink out of sight.
a. Terrain and Climate
Most of the Altiplano is situated at elevations ranging
from 12,000 to 14,000 feet. It slopes gently from north to
south with the higher northern part characterized by rolling
relief, the central by broad plains and lakes, and the lower
southern by huge salt flats. Spurs from the volcanic Cordil-
lera Occidental jut eastward into the subregion, but a corri-
dor of low ground along its eastern margin connects the major
basins. The principal features of the larger basins are,
from north to south, Lago Titicaca, Lago de Poop6, Lago de
Coipasa, Salar de Coipasa, and Salar de Uyuni.
Lago Titicaca is a deep, fresh-water lake, half in Bolivia
and half in Peru (see Figure 7). It is about 135 miles long
by 70 miles wide and is situated some 12,500 feet above sea
level. Small islets dot its surface, and the irregular shore-
line is characterized by a succession of peninsulas and embay-
ments. The largest embayment is connected by only a very
narrow strait to the main body of the lake. Hills rise steeply
around most of the lake except at its northwestern and south-
eastern ends where there are rich agricultural plains. The
shallow, marsh-fringed Rio Desaguadero drains the lake to the
south. The river is subject to frequent flooding and often
abandons its channel. After a course of almost 250 miles its
waters finally empty into Lago de Poop6, a highly saline lake
less than half the size of Lago Titicaca. Poopo's only outlet
is a small stream that flows southward for a few miles and
then disappears into the arid ground. Southwest of Lago de
Poop6 lies the small Lago de Coipasa, a remnant of a much
larger lake now occupied by the Salar de Coipasa. Still
farther to the south is the huge Salar de Uyuni, an enormous
salt flat some 90 to 100 miles long and about 80 miles wide;
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Figure 7. Southern part of Lago Titicaca.
A buildup of cumulus clouds is typical over
the Altiplano during the summer wet season.
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it is separated from the Salar de Coipasa by a long spur of
high ground extending eastward from the Cordillera Occidental.
Surface conditions of the salt flats are constantly changing,
not only from wet to dry season but within shorter periods as
well. Water or very moist soil is found only a few inches
below the hard crust of salt in many places, and the margins
of the salt flats are particularly treacherous. Near the
center of the Salar de Uyuni, however, the salt reaches a
thickness of 50 feet.
The climate of the subregion is generally cold, dry, and
windy. The northernmost section, around Lago Titicaca,
enjoys somewhat less rigorous conditions because of the
ameliorating influence of the lake waters. The mean annual
temperature in this section is about 50?F, and the mean
annual precipitation is about 25 inches, most of which falls
from October through March. Farther to the south, in the
central part of the Altiplano, the climate is markedly colder
and drier. The mean annual temperature is about 40?F to 45?F,
and the mean annual precipitation is from 10 to 15 inches.
Rains may be intense in the central area from January to
March, but evaporation rates are high during most of the year.
The southern part of the Altiplano is very cold and dry. The
mean annual temperature is less than 40?F, and the total
annual rainfall is only about 4 inches; during some years,
no appreciable rainfall is recorded.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
The natural vegetation of the Altiplano is very sparse.
Bunch grass, thola bushes, and llareta plants are the typical
natural cover in most of the sub-region. In the south the
sterile salt flats support no vegetation except a fringe of
reeds around their margins. Reed marshes are also found on
the shores of Lago Titicaca, along the Rio Desaguadero, and
around some of the smaller lakes of the central part of the
Altiplano.
The potato is the most important crop of the Altiplano
and is widely grown in protected sites at lower elevations;
barley and a number of other hardy cereals are cultivated
at somewhat higher elevations. Vegetables, beans, wheat,
and alfalfa thrive in the immediate vicinity of Lago Titicaca.
The best agricultural lands are located on level terrain at
the southeastern end of the lake (see Figure 8), but small
cultivated fields are found all around its shores. On the
steep hillsides intricate agricultural terraces help prevent
erosion and can facilitate cross-country movement (see Figure
9). In the northern part of the Altiplano large herds of
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Figure 8. Cultivated fields on level land south-
east of Lago Titicaca.
Figure 9. Small farms and terracing on slopes
facing Lago Titicaca. A band of marsh fringes
this section of the Lake.
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llamas and alpacas and sizable flocks of sheep are grazed,
but in the arid southern sections both crop cultivation and
livestock grazing are much more limited. Fish are taken from
Lago Titicaca (see Figure 10) and Lago de Poopo. Mineral
deposits are exploited in a number of places; the most impor-
tant is the great copper deposit at Corocoro, about 50 miles
southwest of La Paz. High-grade salt is chopped from the huge
salt flats in the south (see Figure 11).
The Cordillera Real, alofty chain of mountains bordering
the eastern side of the Altiplano,
Its great heights and steep slopes, particularly in the north,
channel movement to relatively few passes, and even these are
often choked with snow or blocked by landslides.
The most impor-
tant tin mines in the cordillera have been the scene of
numerous violent clashes between Government troops and miners
-- the latter are prime targets for Communist agitation.
The Cordillera Real includes the highest peaks in Bolivia,
and serrated crestlines over 19,000 feet are common throughout
the range. Steep, rocky, and lashed by frigid gales, the
cordillera stands as an imposing barrier between the Altiplano
and the lowlands. Snow and ice cover extensive areas of the
upper slopes, and many of the snowfields are laced by treach-
erous crevasses (see Figures 12 and 13). The higher peaks
are jagged and often shrouded in clouds. The lower slopes
are blanketed by immense deposits of gravel and sand.
a. Terrain and Climate
The subregion is divided into five main sectors. The
most northerly extends from the Peruvian frontier to the
gorge of the Rio de la Paz southeast of the capital; it
averages about 18,000 feet in altitude for over 100 miles
and includes the highest mountains in the country. Illampu*
(21,489 feet), the loftiest peak in Bolivia; Chachacomani
(20,528 feet); Huayna Potosi (20,407 feet); and Illimani
*Nevado Illampu has two main peaks, the highest of which
is known as the Ancohuma peak (shown on Map 58810).
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Figure 10. Indians fishing from totora reed boats
on Lago Titicaca.
Figure 11. Chopping salt from Salar de Uyuni on
southern Altiplano.
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Figure 12. Climbers on snow-covered
summit on Cordillera Real near Peruvian
border.
Figure 13. Glacier with crevasses in northern part
of Cordillera Real. An immense cornice of ice and
snow caps the high peak in background.
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(21,184 feet), overlooking La Paz (see Figures 14 through 16).
These mountains are snowcapped the year around. The best of
a number of difficult routes across this part of the cordil-
lera goes northeastward from La Paz to Santa Ana, which is on
the Rio Beni in the Yungas; the high point on the route is
slightly over 15,000 feet.
The second sector extends from the Rio de la Paz gorge
southeastward to the vicinity of Oruro, where a road and a
rail line cut across the range to Cochabamba (see Figure 17).
The rail line is the northernmost of three that branch off
the main railroad running southward on the Altiplano from
La Paz to Argentina. The highest peak in this sector reaches
19,258 feet.
The third sector, from Oruro to El Paso del Condor,
includes some of the lowest parts of the range; the mountains
adjacent to Lago de Poopo are mostly under 15,000 or 16,000
feet (the lake itself is at an elevation of slightly over
12,000 feet). Farther to the south, however, in the Cordil-
lera de los Frailes, peaks again rise to elevations over
19,000 feet. In the northern part of the sector, a rail line
from Machacamarca extends southeastward to Uncia; the highest
point on the line, where it crosses to the eastern side of the
range not far from Uncia, is at about 14,000 feet. A highway
parallels the rail line and continues southeastward from
Uncia to Sucre. The Pan-American Highway follows another
route across the range farther to the south; it goes from
Challapata to Potosi. Near the southern end of the sector is
El Paso del Condor one of the world's highest passes (15,715
feet) utilized by a railroad. The line extends from Rio
Mulatos to Potosi and on to Sucre.
The fourth sector includes the Cordillera de Chichas,
which also has mountains rising to elevations over 19,000
feet.
Finally, the fifth sector, which includes the Cordillera
de Lipez, curves westward in two parallel arms that enclose
the southern end of the Altiplano with mountain peaks reach-
ing elevations over 20,000 feet.
Most of the streams originating in the high mountains of
the cordillera flow eastward to the lowlands. Except for a
few providing snowmelt to Lago Titicaca, no sizable rivers
flow westward to the Altiplano. In the north the important
streams are headwater tributaries of the Rio Beni. Most
notable is the Rio de La Paz, which originates near the city
of La Paz and passes through the cordillera in a spectacular
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Figure 14. Nevado Illampu, highest mountain in
Bolivia, as seen from village of Sorata near its
base.
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Figure 15. Nevado Huayna Potosi. The
animals grazing on the rocky slopes are
llamas.
Figure 16. Nevado Illimani over-looking La
Paz.
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gorge. This great gap is about 12 miles wide and over 2 miles
deep, but the river itself rushes through a narrow channel
bordered by almost vertical cliffs. Most of the streams
draining the drier central and southern parts of the range
are headwater tributaries of the Rio Grande and Rio Pilcomayo;
with little or no snowmelt to draw on during the dry season,
the majority are intermittent.
The cordillera experiences very cold weather, and the
higher sections have a polar climate the.year around. Because
temperatures are below freezing throughout the year at alti-
tudes above about 16,000 or 17,000 feet, practically all of
the precipitation occurs as snow. Permanent snowfields blan-
ket the higher slopes. of the northern mountains, while in the
south, where precipitation is considerably less, only scat-
tered high peaks are snow covered. While showers and thunder-
storms occur, most of the rain falls at lower elevations in
the subregions to the east. Strong local winds and violent
squalls known as juntas often roar through the valleys and
mountain passes, sometimes bringing transportation over the
high passes to a standstill. Clouds and mists frequently
envelop the lofty mountain peaks, creating hazardous flying
conditions. Maximum cloudiness occurs during the summer
half year (mid-October to mid-April), which is also the sea-
son of maximum precipitation, thunderstorm activity, and air
turbulence.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
The cordillera supports only a scattering of yellowish
turf and an occasional bush or small tree at lower elevations.
The high, rocky slopes are mostly barren or covered with snow.
Only in some of the deeper gorges, such as that of the Rio de
la Paz, are there patches of relatively dense vegetation.
Sheep, llamas, and alpacas are grazed at lower elevations
near some of the small villages scattered through the bleak
mountains.
Tin is found in the northern and central sections of the
range, and antimony, lead, and zinc are found in the south
(.see Figure 17). Small mining camps are situated in nearly
inaccessible valleys and perched precariously on steep slopes
at elevations between 15,000 and 17,000 feet; higher up there
are no permanent settlements. The larger mines are located
at elevations below 15,000 feet. The most important tin-pro-
ducing area in the country is the Catavi-Siglo Veinte mining
complex about 4 miles north of Uncia (see Figure 18). The
snow-covered mountainsides near La Paz are among the world's
highest ski slopes (see Figure 19).
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Figure 17. High barren slopes of Cordillera Real
in tin-mining district west of Inquisivi. Note
the truck on the road.
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Mmdi&
Figure 18. Part of Catavi-Siglo Veinte mining
complex near Uncia.
Figure 19. Skiers on slopes north of La Paz.
A ski lift nearby reaches an elevation of
18,300 feet.
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4. Central Mountains and Valleys
25X1
The broad expanse of mountains and deep valleys of this
subregion lie in the departments of Cochabamba, Potosi,
Chuquisaca, and Tarija. Compared to the Cordillera Real
there are few commanding mountains; elevations range from
15,000-foot mountain peaks in the west to valley bottoms at
about 4,000 feet in the east. Much of the area is composed
of high, flat to rolling plains called pampas. These are cut
in many places by deep gorges and valleys of rivers flowing
to the Eastern Lowlands. Most of the subregion is semiarid,
and vegetation is scanty except in some of the valleys and on
favored slopes at lower elevations. A number of fertile,
irrigated basins scattered through the subregion support the
densest concentrations of rural population in the country.
a. Terrain and Climate
Two principal river systems, the Rio Grande in the north
and the Rio Pilcomayo in the south, have cut deep valleys
southeastward across the high surface of the subregion. The
drainage divide between the two systems lies in the vicinity
of Sucre. Where the valleys pass through resistant rock they
are very narrow, but elsewhere they widen out to form broad
strips of flatland and, in some cases, relatively extensive
valley basins.
The Cochabamba Basin in the northern part of the subregion
is one of the most important agricultural areas in the country
(see Figure 20). At an elevation of slightly over 8,000 feet,
it is bounded to the north and west by rugged mountains that
rise to 12,000- and 15,000-foot elevations. Streams draining
the basin empty into the Rio Caine, which in turn joins the
Rio Grande. The level basin floor is some 15 miles long by
about 6 miles wide. Its margins are flanked by extensive fans
of alluvial material eroded from the surrounding mountains.
These alluvial surfaces and the valley floor itself are cut by
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numerous small streams that feed into the main river. Irri-
gation ditches running to cultivated fields also dissect the
valley bottom
The high, steep Cordillera de Cochabamba, north of the
Cochabamba Basin, forms the divide between drainage flowing
northward to the Rio Chapare and to other streams of the
Yungas Subregion and drainage flowing southward to the Rio
Grande. Small glacial lakes set in rocky basins within the
mountains are fed by torrential streams pouring down from
the snowmelt of higher peaks.
West of the Cochabamba Basin and continuing southward
down the western side of the subregion, spurs of the Cordil-
lera Real, 11,000 and 12,000 feet high, alternate with river
valleys. Typically, the larger valleys are from a quarter to
a half mile in width; their flat floors are covered by allu-
vium and are occupied by braided river channels. The valley
sides in many places rise very steeply from the level floors.
Most of the longer valleys are oriented in a northwest-south-
east direction and are joined at right angles by steep-
sided quebradas or canyons. Tongues of the flat terrain
penetrate a short distance up the canyons from the broader
valleys. Unfamiliarity with the terrain may
into these box can
intervalley areas cons
plateaulike surfaces.
The
The Sucre Basin, somewhat smaller than the Cochabamba
Basin, is situated in the valley of a tributary of the upper
Rio Pilcomayo at an elevation of about 9,000 feet. The
basin itself is intensively cultivated, but most of the
surrounding terrain, which rises gradually to elevations of
10,000 or 11,000 feet, consists of barren plains and high,
rocky hills.
Continuing southward from Sucre, the country presents a
broad panorama of gray and brown dome-shaped mountains. The
gentle lines of the terrain are broken only where deep canyons
have cut into the high surface; some of the more impressive
gorges drop as much as 2,000 feet. To the south, aridity
increases and most of the valley bottoms are dry and sandy.
Dry, shallow lake basins filled with stones and boulders are
common, and a few small, widely scattered salt lakes dot the
high rolling country. The extreme south, which includes the
fertile Tarija Basin, is a jumble of deep canyons and gorges
set between arid mountain slopes.
25X1
25X1
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The whole eastern part of the subregion is generally
lower than the west. It is characterized by distinct longi-
tudinal ridges reaching elevations of 8,000 to 10,000 feet;
these ridges are breached by the Rio Grande, the Rio Pilcomayo,
and a few other sizable streams that flow to the Eastern Low-
lands.
Sucre and some of the other highland basins enjoy spring-
time weather the year around, but the climate throughout most
of the subregion is severe, with many hot days and freezing
cold nights. During the winter, April through September,
strong cold winds sweep across the exposed highlands. In the
south, these winds raise funnel-shaped masses of dust which
swirl over the arid plains; occasionally, a dozen or more
whirlwinds are visible at once. At midday during the summer,
the deep canyons in the eastern part of the subregion often
become stiflingly hot. Precipitation decreases generally
from north to south, with Cochabamba receiving slightly over
21 inches a year and Villaz6n, on the Argentine border, receiv-
ing only about 12 inches. During the dry season, from April
through September or October, monthly mean precipitation for
most of the subregion drops to an inch or less. For extended
periods from October or November through March, streams that
are generally mere trickles may swell to unfordable propor-
tions.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
Most of the subregion is high and arid, supporting only a
scattering of bunch grass and low bushes, but a few widely
spaced valleys and basins have sufficient water for irriga-
tion. Here and there small groves of gnarled trees cling to
protected sites of boulder-strewn-slopes. Toward the lower,
eastern side of the subregion, natural vegetation becomes
somewhat denser and grass-covered plateaus alternate with
wooded valleys. There are also extensive areas of cactus in
the more arid sections of the east. In some places thorny
plants cover the ground as far as the eye can see; giant
club-cactuses with fluted columns up to 75 feet high, immense
clumps of prickly pear, and low trailing varieties form veri-
table forests of cactus (see Figure 21). The trailing cac-
tuses are particularly dangerous; their sharp spines penetrate
shoe leather and are hard to extract from the foot. Mules
often get them in their noses while nibbling on leaves or on
the scattered blades of coarse grass. Cactus forests are
especially well developed in the area north of the Rio Mizque,
on the southern flank of the Cordillera Oriental, at eleva-
tions between 5,000 and 6,000 feet.
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Figure 20. Cultivated fields in
Cochabamba Basin. A large airfield
is visible in background.
Figure 21. Giant cactuses
and thorny mesquite trees
on southern flank of Cor-
dillera de Cochabamba near
Comarapa.
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The Cochabamba, Sucre, and Tarija Basins are the most
notable of a number of relatively densely settled agricul-
tural centers scattered through the subregion. Relying
heavily on irrigation, these areas produce considerable
amounts of vegetables and grain, especially wheat, barley,
and corn. They also support numerous small vineyards and
orchards. In addition to these relatively fertile valleys
and basins, small settlements and individual farms are
widely scattered throughout the highlands, often in what
seem to be hopelessly unproductive locations (see Figure
22). In some sections with no streams, poor-quality water
is obtained from deep wells. The Indian farmers, who are
adept at conserving their scanty water supplies and at irri-
gating, grow fruit and cultivate small fields of grain,
although the greater part of their subsistence is usually
derived from flocks of sheep and goats. Harvested grain is
piled in heaps and surrounded by fences of thorny brush to
keep away the animals, and corn fodder is often stored in
the tops of low trees. Small guardhouses in the centers of
grainfields, sometimes built into the branches of stunted
trees, are occupied by watchmen day and night as long as
crops are in the fields.
5. The Yungas*
A wide variety of tropical and semitropical crops
grows in the less steep valleys. In spite of its seemingly
rich agricultural potential, the area as a whole is not
densely populated. There are serious impediments to movement
in the Yungas caused by the complex of valleys, mountain spurs,
ridges, and hills; the deep rivers such as the Rio Beni; and
the almost impenetrable vegetation.
*In Bolivia, u~ ngas (an Aymara word) refers to the warm,
lush valleys of t e eastern slopes of the Cordillera Real
lying at elevations of about 3,000 to 8,000 feet, such as
those of Nor Yungas and Sur Yungas Provinces of La Paz Depart-
ment. The term as used in this report applies to the whole
moist zone along the eastern slopes of the mountains and is
an extension of the ceja de la montana (eyebrow of the jungle)
zone of Peru.
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Figure 22. Small village southeast of
Sucre. The rocky ground provides stones
for fencing fields.
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The Yungas is a transitional zone between the northeastern
flank of the high Andean cordilleras and the vast plains of
the Eastern Lowlands. It is an area of very uneven terrain,
precipitous slopes and gorges, swift streams and waterfalls,
and deep forested valleys. Nights are cool, rather than cold
as they are at higher elevations, and days are less swelter-
ingly hot than farther down in the lowlands. Rocky steep-
walled canyons above the timberline and heavily forested val-
leys at lower elevations are major restrictions to movement
through the subregion.
a. Terrain and Climate
The subregion is about 400 miles long in a northwest-
southeast direction and tapers from a width of about 75 miles
in the north to about 25 miles in the extreme south. Across
this relatively narrow band, elevations drop sharply from
approximately 13,000 feet in the west to 1,500 feet in the
east. At the higher elevations, broad spurs of the Andes jut
to the northeast between deep canyons; intermediate levels are
characterized by northwest-southeast-trending mountain ridges
and valleys; the lower elevations include the steep-walled
gorges where major rivers breach the remaining ridges and flow
to the eastern plains.
The northwestern two-thirds of the Yungas is drained
primarily by the Rio Beni and its tributaries, among the most
important of which are the Rio Tuichi (or Machariapo) and the
Rio Bopi. The Rio Tuichi originates high in the mountains
near Pelechuco, not far from the Peruvian border, and describes
a broad arc across the northern part of the subregion, flowing
into the Rio Beni a short distance upstream from Rurrenabaque.
The Rio Bopi joins the Beni at San Miguel de Huachi; its princi-
pal tributary, the Rio de la Paz, has eroded upstream completely
through the cordillera, and its 4eadwaters lie in a deep canyon
on the Altiplano. Between the Rio Tuichi and the Rio Bopi
numerous other swift-flowing streams drain the high slopes of
the Cordillera Real.
Farther south, where the Cordillera de Cochabamba takes a
more easterly trend than the main Andean ranges, the area in
the angle formed between the two cordilleras is drained by the
Rio Cotacajes and its tributaries, especially the Rio Ayapaya.
Most of the northern flank of the Cordillera de Cochabamba is
drained by tributaries of the Rio Mamore, chiefly by the Rio
Chapare and the Rio Ichilo. The warm lower valleys of this
part of the subregion are sometimes referred to collectively
as the Yungas de Cochabamba. Individual yungas within this
section include, among others, the Yungas de Totora, the Yungas
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de Poja, and the Yungas de San Mateo; the last, located near
the southeastern end of the subregion, was the scene of
numerous reported sightings by local campesinos of remnants
of Che Guevara's guerrilla band.
For most sections of the subregion, annual precipitation
averages 30 to 65 inches. The summer months, December through
February, are the wettest, but all the other months receive
at least an inch of rainfall. Annual temperatures, in typical
sections of the Yungas at elevations of 3,000 to 8,000 feet,
range between about 60?F and 70?F; temperatures at higher ele-
vations are considerably colder. During the day, prevailing
easterly trade winds sweep warm, humid air from the lowlands
up the valleys of the Yungas. As this air rises, it con-
denses, and the slopes at elevations of 10,000 to 13,000
feet are frequently shrouded in a dense mist that sharply
reduces visibility. At night, however, local mountain breezes
usually dispel the fog masses. In the lower valleys, the
opposite is true, and cold damp fogs are common at night
rather than during the day. The subregion is not uniformly
moist; some of the deep valleys are screened from the humid
easterly winds by intervening mountain ridges and experience
extremely dry weather the year around. The upper valley of
the Rio de la Paz is an example of an area where such desert-
like conditions prevail.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
The very highest parts of the Yungas -- the cold, rocky
mountain slopes -- are practically devoid of vegetation (see
Figure 23). Descending toward the northeast, one passes
through a zone of grassy meadows with occasional bushes grow-
ing in the valley bottoms. At about 12,000 or 11,000 feet,
scattered low trees mark the upper limit of the mist forest.
At lower elevations, where humidity is high, stands of knobby
evergreen trees become increasingly dense and mosses, lichens,
ferns, and epiphytes (a non-parisitic plant) abound. Continu-
ing down into the deep valleys, the slopes at elevations of
about 9,000 to 6,000 feet support dense growths of mountain
forest; even the steeper slopes are covered with vegetation
(see Figure 24). The forest is characterized by a wide vari-
ety of trees and includes cecropias, tree ferns, and extensive
stands of tall bamboo which, together with many smaller plants,
form impenetrable thickets. In this zone the air is less humid
and mosses and lichens are fewer, but most of the trees are
still covered with an abundance of epiphytes. At about 6,000
feet the dense forest gives way to drier, more open woods with
extensive grassy clearings and, in some places, cultivated
plots. Below about 5,000 feet, high-trunked palm trees are
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Figure 23. High slopes above a Yungas
valley near Coroico. Note the bend of the
road near center of picture.
Figure 24. Tributary of Rio Beni
near Coroico in Yungas. A small
hut clings to the side of the wooded
slope in background.
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increasingly common while at elevations below 3,000 feet, the
vegetation of the Yungas merges with the typical dense rain
forest of the Lowlands. Some of the drier mountain slopes
and valleys do not exhibit the usual altitudinal zonation of
vegetation, and many semibarren deserts are scattered through-
out the subregion. Certain areas support dense growths of
xerophytic plants including agaves and huge tree cactuses.
One side of a valley may be densely forested, while the other
side is only sparsely dotted with dry scrub and cactus.
Most of the subregion is sparsely settled; the only fairly
large concentrations of population are in the more favored
valleys where subsistence farming predominates. Some grain
and potatoes are grown above the forest line, but from the
upper limit of the forest down to about 6,000 feet there is
almost no cultivation. The most extensively cultivated zone
of the Yungas lies between elevations of about 6,000 and 3,000
feet. Oranges, bananas, lemons, and limes are grown at all
altitudinal levels within this zone. Oranges ripen mainly
from May to June, whereas bananas -- the most important food
of the Yungas -- mature throughout the year. From about 5,000
feet downwards coca and coffee are grown in plantations pre-
pared in stepped ridges and furrows up the steep sides of the
hills. Scattered irregularly for miles over every suitable
slope, the coca terraces are visible from afar, their charac-
teristic ribbed patterns contrasting with the surrounding
natural vegetation (see Figure 25). Coca leaves, the source
for cocaine, are picked from the small trees or bushes three
or four times a year. Cacao is grown in more humid places
near the valley bottoms; it ripens in February and March. In
a few particularly humid places at lower elevations cane sugar
is raised. Among the many other products of the Yungas are
manioc, rice, pineapples, mangoes, avocados, papayas, figs,
and guavas. Usually the cultivated fields are located well
up on the valley sides above the riverbeds, where slopes tend
to be less steep than in the immediate vicinity of the rivers.
Hilltops and ridges that are not too high may also be culti-
vated, but cultivated fields are almost invariably located on
slopes.
Before they were largely destroyed by excessive cutting,
the quina trees (Cinchona sp.) of this subregion were an
important source o igi-grade quinine bark, and the Yungas
have also been exploited to a minor degree for rubber. The
fine timber resources of the area have been little used, how-
ever, because the rugged terrain precludes low-cost logging.
Gold is found in alluvial deposits of the Rio Kaka and its
tributaries, occuring as small particles in the sands and
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Figure 25. Cultivated slopes near
Coroico in Yungas. Coca terraces are
visible near center of picture,
banana trees in foreground.
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gravels of the riverbanks, terraces, and riverbeds. Natives,
in addition to prospectors and adventurers from all over the
world, pan for Bold alone these Yungas streams.
6. Front Ranges
The eastern front ranges of the Andes encompass a belt
of steep, north-south-trending sandstone ridges lying between
the high mountains and valleys of central Bolivia and the Low-
lands in the east. The belt varies in width from about 50 to
60 miles. The northern part of the subregion is located
mostly in Santa Cruz Department: the southern part in Chuqui-
saca and Tarija Departments. Elevations range from slightly
over 9,000 feet in the west to just under 2,000 feet in the
east, with most of the ridges at about 5,000 feet.
Travel is not difficult in sections of the broader valleys
of the Front Ranges where the vegetation is not too thick,
but large rivers such as the Rio Grande, the Rio Parapeti,
and the Rio Pilcomayo may interrupt movement. Another problem
is posed by the steep sided and, in places, densely forested
ridges. Few gaps occur in their long ridges, and those that
do may be occupied by unfordable streams.
The ranges are composed of parallel ridges or cuestas of
brilliant red sandstone separated by longitudinal valleys.
Rivers in the subregion form a trellis pattern, with the main
ones -- notably the Rio Grande and the Rio Pilcomayo -- cutting
eastward through the ridges by way of narrow, steep-sided water
gaps. Most of these gaps are hard to negotiate since streams
fill the valley floors and the sides of the gorges rise per-
pendicularly. Potholes, 3 or 4 feet deep in the rocky stream
bottoms of the gorges, add to the difficulty and danger of
fording, even in periods of relatively low water. Often it is
easier and safer to climb over the ridges than to attempt pas-
sage through the water gaps, even though they are quite steep
and may rise 3,000 feet above adjacent valleys. Few good
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passes or saddles break the sharp crestlines of the ridges.
The clay binder of the sandstone and the periodically torren-
tial rainfall make for treacherous footing and frequent land-
slides on many of the slopes in spite of their fairly thick
protective cover of vegetation. Except where the forest is
particularly dense, movement is generally freer in the longi-
tudinal valleys between ridges; these are narrow in the west
but broad and flat-floored in the east. The major impediments
to such north-south movement are the large rivers.
The subregion is divided latitudinally into three sections
by the Rio Grande and the Rio Pilcomayo. The section north
of the Rio Grande is the highest. One of its mountain peaks,
near the village of Vallegrande, reaches an elevation of more
than 9,000 feet, and much of the surrounding country lies at
an elevation well over 5,000. The long parallel ridges char-
acteristic of most of the subregion are less sharply developed
in the northern section, which consists essentially of two
massive highland blocks with an intervening saddle of lower
terrain. The crest of the saddle (at slightly over 5,000
feet) is the site of the town of Samaipata on the highway
from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz. It is an area of rocky crags,
unscalable cliffs, and overhanging precipices; many of the
formations are as smooth as if cut with q knife. Dark caverns
penetrate the steep valley walls. The Rio Yapacani, originat-
ing near Vallegrande, flows northward through a very deep
canyon that separates this part of the Front Ranges Subregion
from the Yungas to the northwest.
The central part of the subregion, between the Rio Grande
and the Rio PilcQmayo, is lower and has more flat land than
areas to the north and south. Most of this section lies at
elevations between 2,000 and 3,000 feet. The highest ridges,
in the west, are not much over 5,000 feet and,are more continu-
ous than ridges in the east. The Rio Parapeti cuts across the
middle of the area, passing by the town-of Camiri or} its way
eastward to the lowlands. North of the Rio Parapeti the
ridges are oriented slightly to the west of north; south of
the river they trend slightly to the east. The longest and
most distinct mountain ridge is that of the Serrania de
Aguaragile, which extends southward from the Rio Parapeti.
The southern section of the subregion stretches from the
Rio Pilcomayo to the Argentine border. It is characterized by
distinct north-northeast-trending ridges, including that of
the Serrania de Aguarague, which continues down from the north.
The ridges are about 5,000 feet high, with individual peaks
up to about 7,000 feet. Much of this section is drained by
tributaries of the Rio Bermejo flowing into Argentina. The
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upstream portion of the Rio Grande de Tarija drains the fer-
tile Tarija Basin but does not provide easy access to this
area. The main route across the southern part of the Front
Ranges goes from Tarija to Villa Montes via Entre Rios and is
reportedly very difficult.
Weather in the subregion varies widely, from freezing
cold on the barren slopes of the higher mountains to stiflingly
hot in the narrow enclosed canyons at lower elevations, and
from dry and dusty in the sun-parched plains adjacent to the
Chaco to oppressively moist and sticky in the deep, jungle-
choked valleys farther west. The warmest months, October
through March, frequently have temperatures in the upper 90's
(Fahrenheit degrees). In the damp forests, where air circula-
tion is slight, the hot and humid atmosphere makes physical
exertion extremely tiring during the summer. During the cold-
est months -- June through August -- temperatures at elevations
over 6,000 feet frequently drop to well below freezing. South
of the latitude of Villa Montes, freezing temperatures may
occur at even lower elevations. Rain falls predominantly in
the summer, from October through March, although the onset of
the wet season is very irregular. Precipitation for the sub-
region as a whole averages about 30 or 40 inches annually,
with wide variations from year to year and from place to place.
In general, the northern part of the subregion receives more
rain than the south. The rain often takes the form of violent
cloudbursts, mostly during the evening or night.
Many of the smaller streams dry up completely during the
winter. Larger streams seldom run dry, although even the Rio
Pilcomayo has been known to do so. When flash floods occur
during the rainy season, even the smallest dry bed can become
a torrential mountain stream. Some streams can be extremely
dangerous because of their large drainage areas; rainwater
may accumulate upstream and then rush down under a bright sky
to surprise anyone in the downstream portion. These "tidal"
waves have been known to sweep away entire trains of pack
animals. Fords across many of the streams are frequently
impassable during the rainy season.
b. Vegetation, and Land Use
Much of the subregion is densely forested (see Figures 26
and 27). Up to an elevation of about 6,000 feet, many mountain
slopes are covered with a wide variety of semideciduous trees,
epiphytes, and lianas. Pines appear above this in isolated
stands and at still higher elevations in dense stands with a
rich undergrowth of ferns. Near the upper limit of the rela-
tively narrow band of pine forest, alders are found and above
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Figure 26. Central section of Front Ranges north of Rio Parapeti.
Note the sharp ridges and dense vegetation.
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Figure 27. Thick undergrowth in vicinity
of abandoned guerrilla camp near Gutierrez
in central section of Front Ranges.
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them, at 7,500 or 8,000 feet, are barren slopes or alpine
meadows. During the rainy season, October through March,
vegetation in the semideciduous forest is thick and luxuriant
and scattered clearings within the forest are covered with
rich green meadows. During the dry season, April through
September, however, the forest underbrush thins out consider-
ably, man trees lose their leaves, and much of the grass
withers 25X1
Some sections of the subregion, especially the higher or
more arid parts, support only sparse vegetation. In the north,
on the semiarid plain about Pampa Grande, cactus and other
thorny plants grow along the rocky beds of intermittent streams.
East of Pampa Grande the vegetation increases in density and
grades from low brush to the large trees on the green mountain
slopes facing Santa Cruz. Much of the area to the east and
south of Samaipata, with the exception of the tracts cleared
for cultivation and the bare sandstone summits, is covered
with light forest and a dense undergrowth of climbing bamboo,
palms, and ferns. From Samaipata southwestward to Vallegrande
the country is mostly barren, with only a few trees near some
of the watercourses.
In the southeastern part of the subregion the sharp rocky
crests of the long mountain ridges are usually barren. Many
of the valleys have been invaded by monte, the typical vegeta-
tion of the adjacent Chaco Subregion. 7 me consists of a com-
bination of thorny brush and scrubby trees that usually reach
a height of no more than 15 feet. Patches of desert, support-
ing only a sparse growth of cactus, are also found in some of
the drier valleys.
Isolated farms, mostly devoted to subsistence agriculture,
are scattered through the more fertile valleys. Frost prevents
the planting of crops such as coca and coffee, but pepper, pea-
nuts, tobacco, maize, potatoes, and a large quantity of sugar-
cane are cultivated with some success. The value of the rich
meadowland in the area is considerably reduced for cattle
because of the prevalence of poisonous herbs.
Oil is exploited at three sites in the subregion. The
field at Camiri, the northernmost of the three, produces about
75 percent of Bolivia's oil and is connected by pipelines to
refineries at Cochabamba and Sucre. The other fields are
farther to the south, near Sanandita and at Pozos Bermejo on
the Argentine border.
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The hot, humid, insect-infested, and sparsely settled
Eastern Lowlands
and are far removed from most large population
centers. o great is the isolation and so formidable are the
barriers to movement in the region that a section in the
department of El Beni has historically been used as an "open"
prison.
The Eastern Lowlands Region is a vast expanse of low,
flat, and in places swampy terrain, with only a few isolated
areas of higher ground rising to elevations over 2,000 feet.
The region is drained to the northeast by tributaries of the
Amazon River of Brazil and, to a much lesser extent, to the
southeast by tributaries of the Rio de la Plata system of
Argentina and Paraguay. The northernmost part of the region,
comprising the department of Pando and adjacent areas, is
densely covered with tropical rain forest. Farther to the
south, in the department of El Beni, broad bands of forest
along the major rivers alternate with extensive savannas that
are subject to flooding in the wet season. Continuing to the
south, in Santa Cruz Department, the country is also pre-
dominantly low-lying savannaland with ribbons and patches of
forest, but it includes a sizable area of hilly to mountainous
terrain as well. The most southerly part of the Eastern Low-
lands Region, the Bolivian Chaco or Chaco Boreal, is an exten-
sion of the Gran Chaco of Argentina and Paraguay; it is gener-
ally characterized by low, flat terrain covered by dry thorn
forest, although it is extensively flooded during the rainy
season.
The principal barriers to movement in the Eastern Lowlands
are dense vegetation, broad rivers, and seasonally flooded
savannas. The giant trees and tangled undergrowth of the
northern rain forest restrict practically all movement to
rivers or to narrow jungle trails. Tall coarse grasses and
scattered patches of forest impede movement through the vast
savannalands of El Beni and Santa Cruz. Thick forests of
thorny scrub in sections of the Chaco make movement slow and
painful.
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Most of the larger rivers are unfordable the year around,
especially in the northern part of the region. During the wet
season, even the small intermittent streams of the southern
plains may become unfordable for extended periods. Steep
bluffs flank short sections of the major rivers, but more
serious obstacles develop when water levels drop and expose
broad expanses of soft mud. The large permanent lakes and
marshes may necessitate long detours for movement on foot
throughout the year, but during the dry season most of the
shallower water bodies are greatly reduced in size and are
easily circumvented.
When seasonal floodwaters rise to several feet across'the
plains, movement on foot, on horseback, or by motor vehicle
is ruled out over a wide area, but canoe navigation is prac-
tically unlimited in all directions. As floodwaters recede,
the plains may be converted into a great morass of soft mud,
dense grasses, and broad lagoons -- too shallow for canoes and
too soggy for movement on foot.`
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Weather conditions are best from May through September when
cloudiness and thunderstorm activity are at a minimum.
The almost complete lack of radio aids to navigation, the
inadequacy of aeronautical chart coverage, and the sparsity
of landing facilities make flying over the area dangerous and
difficult. Runways of many small airfields frequently become
unserviceable during the rainy season -- the period when they
are most critically needed. The broader rivers and larger
lakes provide useful landing sites for seaplanes
Helicopters can be used effec-
tively over much of the region; the broad sandbanks along
many of the larger rivers provide excellent helicopter landing
sites in forested areas, and almost unlimited landing areas
are available in open sections of the savannas, at least dur-
ing the dry season
25X1
25X1
The Northern Rain Forest Subregion is mostly a flat,
densely forested plain, which has been largely unpopulated and
underexploited since the rubber boom during the early part of
the century,
The Northern Rain Forest occupies the northernmost part of
Bolivia between the Rio Beni and the borders with Peru and
Brazil; it includes all of Pando Department and the northern
section of La Paz Department.
Elevations within the subregion range from slightly over
1,000 feet in the southwest to slightly under 500 feet in the
northeast. There are a few low hills, such as those near
Cobija, but none are significant obstacles to movement or
sufficiently high to provide broad views of the surrounding
territory. Rivers and forests dominate the landscape (see
Figure 28).
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Figure 28. Dense rain forest along Peruvian frontier. The larger
river is the Rfo Heath, which forms the boundary between Bolivia,
on the right, and Peru, on the left. Note the old meander scars
and oxbow lakes.
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Except for the Rio Abuna and several smaller streams in
the north along or near the Brazilian frontier, practically
all of the subregion drains into the Rio Beni, which forms
most of the eastern margin of the subregion. The Beni joins
the Mamore to form the Rio Madera, which flows northeastward
into Brazil. Principal left-bank tributaries of the Beni,
moving upstream, are the Rio Orton, Rio Madre de Dios, and'
Rio Madidi. Of these, the Rio Madre de Dios is the largest
and most important; it is navigable upstream to the Puerto
Maldonado area of Peru. In places the rivers and streams are
bordered by fairly high bluffs, but there are many sandy
beaches and low banks where small craft can easily be pulled
ashore. The sandbanks and beaches of the larger streams and
rivers also serve as useful landing sites for helicopters in
a subregion where clearings in the dense forest are few and
far apart. Rapids are numerous on all of the rivers so that
even canoe navigation, especially on the upstream portions of
the smaller streams, requires numerous portages. The subregion
has no large lakes, but there are some fairly extensive marshy
areas in the vicinity of Porvenir to the southeast of Cobija;
these impede movement locally but can be bypassed without much
difficulty.
The climate of the subregion is hot and humid. Maximum
temperatures over 100?F occur in September and October; mini-
mums as low as 45?F may occur in June. During the day, when
temperatures are high, canoe travel on the larger rivers can
be extremely hot and uncomfortable as there is no protection
from the sun. Hacking one's way through the jungle is even
more exhausting. Precipitation is abundant, ranging from
about 60 to 70 inches or more annually. The rainy season
extends from October or November through March or April, cor-
responding with the summer. In the dry winter months of June
through August, water levels drop to the point where many
rivers are navigable only by very shallow-draft boats. Janu-
ary, February, and March are generally the cloudiest months;
June, July, and August are the clearest months and the best
for flying.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
Dense tropical forest covers the greater part of the sub-
region. The huge trees form an almost continuous canopy of
green, broken only here and there by a meandering stream or
the horseshoe-shaped scar of an abandoned river channel. Dense
vegetation makes many of the smaller streams and all minor
topographic irregularities invisible from the air. The heavily
overgrown banks of'rivers and streams give way in places to
long sandy beaches, generally backed by dense zones of tall
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cane known as cafia brava. Palm trees are common along the
riverbanks and are scattered throughout the jungle. In many
parts of the forest the cane, tree roots and branches, under-
brush, and innumerable climbers and vines combine in thick
tangles that can be penetrated only with the aid of a machete.
Open woods and savanna are fairly extensive in the south,
especially between the Rio Beni and Rio Madidi; these are
easier to traverse 25X1
Little of the forest has been cleared for agriculture.
Small areas in the immediate vicinity of riverside villages
are cultivated, and primitive Indians practice slash-and-burn
agriculture in scattered forest clearings.
The whole subregion was once dotted with small rubber
camps, and the names of these tiny settlements continue to
be carried on many maps although the places themselves have
dwindled to an insignificant few huts or have been swallowed
up by the encroaching forest. Rubber is still collected, but
on a smaller scale. There are no large plantations, but many
wild rubber trees are scattered through the northern part of
the forest, especially near the Rio Madre de Dios, the Rio
Ort6n, and other major rivers. Typically a Bolivian seringal
contains about 120 scattered rubber trees. During the 3-month
season, May through July, a worker taps about 40 trees a day.
In the off-season he works on the brazil-nut harvest and supple-
ments his food supply by hunting and, fishing.
Brazil nuts have always been an important product of the
subregion. When the nuts are ripe, in December or January,
practically the entire population of many small villages moves
upriver to gather them. Harvesting begins only after the nuts
have fallen to the ground, since they grow too high to be
picked (see Figure 29). The gatherer waits in a simple hut
with a sharply inclined roof (to avoid the danger of an unex-
pected fall of the heavy nuts) until the wind shakes the nuts
from the high branches.
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Figure 29. Brazil-nut tree beside Rio
Beni. The tall branchless boles of
these typical rain-forest trees are dif-
ficult to climb.
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The El Beni corresponds roughly to the department of El
Beni with the addition of a portion of the department of
Santa Cruz to the south. It consists of a vast grass-covered
plain laced by meandering streams and broad, forest-fringed
rivers. Elevations in the subregion range from about 1,000
feet at the base of the mountains in the south to about 500
feet in the extreme north. Suffering alternately from flood
and drought, the area is only sparsely settled. Large herds
of semiwild cattle range the rich savannas, but there is
little agricultural development.
a. Terrain and Climate
The whole central portion of the subregion is occupied
by the Llanos de Mojos, a broad plain some 70,000 square
miles in extent with few relief features over 10 feet high.
Most of this low-lying area is seasonally covered with water.
Terrain with relief over 3 feet is seldom or only briefly
flooded; usually it is forested and consists of low divides
and the remains of natural levees. The small amount of
ground over 6 feet in height consists of rock outcrops
around the margins of the Llanos and of manmade mounds --
raised fields and causeways built by the Indians in pre-
Hispanic times (see Figure 30). A few isolated rock outcrops
form small hills as much as 100 feet above the surrounding
terrain. A series of parallel, northwest-southeast-trending
ridges mostly less than 50 feet high lies near the center of
the subregion just south of Santa Ana. Ridges and hills are
more common and higher toward. the eastern side of the subregion.
The major river in the subregion is the broad Rio Mamore,
which flows northward through the center of the area. The
Mamore derives most of its waters from the Rio Grande and Rio
Chapare and from a whole series of long left-bank tributaries
originating in the Yungas; it is a tributary of the Rio Madera.
Low ground such as old meander cutoffs may contain some
surface water most of the year, whereas slightly higher depres-
sions are only seasonally flooded. The subregion has several
thousand permanent lakes, ranging in size from 200-square-
mile Lago Rogoaguado to small lagoons 50 or 60 feet across.
Most of the lakes are no more than 5 to 10 feet deep, are
enclosed by low ridges, and have no inlets or outlets but are
apparently fed mainly by precipitation. They serve as impor-
tant sources of fresh water, especially during the dry season
when most of the small streams dry up. Most of the lakes
have nearly straight sides, which are consistently oriented
northeast-southwest, and many are almost square (see Figure
31).
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Figure 30. Ancient raised fields in the Llanos de Mojos,'EI
Beni Department. Note the forested islands of higher ground.
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Figure 31. Rectangular lakes northwest of
Trinidad. The Rio Mamore is in background.
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Weather is wet and hot during the summer, October through
April, and dry and warm during the winter, May through Septem-
ber. At Trinidad,, near the center of the subregion, the mean
annual temperature is about 78?F; approximate mean monthly
temperatures range from a high of 81?F in March to a low of
74?F in August, whereas absolute maximum temperatures are about
102?F toward the end of November and absolute minimum tempera-
tures are about 50?F in June. Relative humidity is unpleas-
antly high only during December and January.
During the winter, cold fronts called surazos may pene-
trate the subregion from the south, bringing rain, strong
winds, and sudden drops in temperature. The prevailing winds
for most of the year are from the north and average about 3
miles per hour; surface winds up to 60 miles per hour have
been reported.
Rainfall averages 60 to 70 inches a year. The dry season,
including months with about 2 inches or less precipitation,
usually lasts from May through September. Rainfall is heavi-
est from December through March and lightest from June through
August. It is distributed fairly evenly over the northern and
central portions of the subregion but decreases in the south-
east and is considerably higher in the southwest. Todos
Santos receives over 100 inches -- the highest recorded rain-
fall in Bolivia. The length of the wet season increases
toward the southwest, which is rainy practically the year
around, and decreases to about 5 months in the southeast.
Rainfall varies considerably from year to year and from place
to place in the same year.
The period of flooding lags about 2 months behind the
rainy season. Flooding begins in late December, reaches a
peak in February, and then begins to recede in late March.
Overland travel may be difficult well into July because of
the soft mud and pools of water. Some 40,000 square miles
are inundated during the period of maximum flooding in normal
years, and exceptionally high floods, invading the forested
areas, may cover 60,000 square miles. The depth of flooding
varies from a few inches to 5 or 6 feet. The years of major
flooding in the lowlands do not correlate with the years of
high local rainfall, since much of the water may be runoff
from heavy rainfall in the mountains to the west.
Toward the beginning of the wet summer the subregion is
lush and green,
verted into vast marshes dotted with islands and sinuous
bands of gallery forest. Great flocks of birds fly overhead,
As the season progresses, the grasslands are con-
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25X1
fish from the rivers swarm over the flooded plains, and land
animals seek the high ground. People rely on small boats
for practically all movement (see Figure 32). During the dry
season the marshes become muddy wastes filled with stagnant
pools, rotting fish, and rank grass before drying out com- 25X1
grasses turn brown, and
clay soils crack. The small rivers and pools dry up, but
most of the larger rectangular lakes persist. Dusty trails
and smoke from extensive grass fires sharply reduce visibility.
Overland movement is easy, but fresh water is so scarce that
birds migrate northward and animals converge on the permanent
lakes and rivers.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
The central part of the subregion, the Llanos de Mojos,
consists mainly of grassy savanna and scrub or palm savanna,
with patches of forest on islands of higher ground and along
the riverbanks (see Figure 33). Dense semievergreen forests
border the Llanos to the northeast, north, and west; a broad
band of rain forest and semievergreen forest lies to the
southwest, along the margin of the Yungas; and deciduous
forest covers the somewhat drier southeastern section of the
subregion.
The boundary between open grassland and dense forest is
quite sharp in places, but elsewhere there is a transitional
zone of grass with scattered trees. Grass with few or no
trees occurs where flooding normally lasts 5 months or more;
on slightly higher ground that is flooded for 3 or 4 months
there are usually a number of widely spaced trees; and on
ground that is only briefly flooded there is generally a
scrubby growth dominated by palms or by small thorny trees
such as the acacia. Palm trees are particularly numerous in
the eastern section of the Llanos de Mojos. Semievergreen
forests grow on the natural levees and other well-drained
tracts in the Llanos, but many of these have been considerably
reduced by logging and by slash-and-burn agriculture. Aban-
doned meander channels and other depressions that retain
water the year around are usually choked with tall grasses,
sedges, and floating plants such as the giant water lily and
water hyacinth (see Figures 34 through 36). On some of the
lakes, floating mats of vegetation are thick enough to sup-
port small trees.
Cultivation in the subregion consists almost exclusively
of slash-and-burn agriculture and is. confined to forested
areas. Large herds of cattle range over the grasslands,
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Figure 32. Canoe on flooded street in
Trinidad, El Beni Department, during wet season.
Figure 33. Tall grass in the Llanos de Mojos.
Palm trees grow on the higher ground.
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Figure 34. Shell Oil Company swamp buggies
in the Llanos de Mojos.
Figure 35. Swamp buggy stalled in rank
vegetation of old meander channel.
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Figure 36. Giant lily pads near Santa Ana in
Lianos de Mojos. Fully grown pads may reach
over 6 feet in diameter.
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especially in the southern part of the Llanos between Santa
25X1 Ana, Trinidad, and San Borja;
Figure 37).
25X1
The Santa Cruz Subregion occupies most of the high depart-
ment of Santa Cruz. It is slightly higher and considerably
drier than the vast marshy lowlands to the northwest. Much
of the country consists of flat to rolling savanna with scat-
tered forests and marshes, but in a number of places low
sandstone hills and mountains break the general monotony of
the landscape. In general, the subregion is as sparsely
settled as other sections of the Eastern Lowlands, but the
area around the departmental capital of Santa Cruz, near the
foot of the Front Ranges, supports a relatively large agri-
cultural population.
a. Terrain and Climate
Most of the subregion lies between elevations of 1,000
and 2,000 feet, a considerable area lies between 500 and
1,000 feet, and a small marshy section in the southeast along
the Brazilian border is under 500 feet. The highest and most
distinct mountain range in the entire Eastern Lowlands is the
Serrania de Santiago located immediately north of the railroad
that crosses the southern part of the subregion from Santa
Cruz to Corumba, Brazil. It is about 100 miles long, 20 miles
across, and slightly over 5,000 feet in elevation at its high-
est point.
The principal streams draining the subregion are the Rio
Grande, Rio Parapeti, Rio San Miguel, Rio San Martin, and Rio
Paraguay. The Rio Grande flows out of the Front Ranges into
the lowlands south of the town of Cabezas and swings north-
ward in a broad arc to join the Rio Mamor6; its muddy banks
and swift currents combine to form a serious obstacle to move-
ment between the important town of Santa Cruz and the area to
the east (see Figure 38). A much smaller river, the Rio
Parapeti, flows out of the Front Ranges farther to the south
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Figure 37. Cattle on partially
in Llanos de Mojos. flooded field
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Figure 38. Rio Grande south of Santa Cruz, near area where it
emerges from Front Ranges to meander across lowlands.
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and then loses itself in the Banados de Izozog, an ill-defined
marshy tract roughly 2,400 square miles in extent. The Bafia-
dos de Izozog are drained to the north by intermittent streams
emptying into a small lake known as the Laguna Concepcion,
which in turn is drained by northward-flowing tributaries of
the Rio San Miguel. The Rio San Miguel, Rio San Martin, and
Rio Paragua are tributary to the Rio Itenez, which forms a
long portion of the Brazilian border. Small tributaries of
the Rio Paraguay drain the low, marshy southeastern part of
the subregion.
The climate of the subregion is somewhat drier than that
of areas to the northwest. Average annual rainfall is about
50 inches, most of which occurs from December through March;
July and August are the driest months. Here as elsewhere in
the Eastern Lowlands variations are wide, from year to year
and from place to place, in the amount of precipitation and
in other elements of the weather as well. Mean daily tempera-
tures range from a maximum of 92?F in January to a minimum of
58?F in July. Santa Cruz has a recorded absolute maximum of
105?F in November. Occasionally, surazos bring cold winds
from the south followed by a clay or two of cool weather;
they may cause freezing temperatures in the winter or tem-
peratures as low as the mid-40's in the summer. The surazos
are frequently accompanied by violent thunderstorms and
destructive winds.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
Savanna woodland with palm and riverbank forest covers
most of the subregion. Extensive marshes, such as the Bana-
dos de Izozog, occupy the lower ground. Short palms are
found on slightly raised hummocks in the savanna, while
taller palms and trees grow where the country is more roll-
ing and better drained. In the north a broad band of rather
low and dry but dense forest flanks the Rio Guapor6. To the
south the vegetation grades into the still drier scrub char-
acteristic of the Chaco. The sandstone hills and mountains
of the Serrania de Santiago are mostly treeless.
By far the most important agricultural area in the Eastern
Lowlands is centered on the town of Santa Cruz, which has been
the focal point in recent years for new settlements and colo-
nization projects. The main crops are sugarcane, rice, and
corn. Cane is planted in November and harvested in May.
Grapefruit, oranges, tangerines, bananas, and papayas also
are produced. Cattle are important; herds that have been
trailed down from El Beni are grazed for fattening before sale.
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Hogs and poultry are raised on small farms. Besides Santa
Cruz, the areas about Concepcion, San Ignacio, and Robore
are of agricultural significance.
25X1
The Bolivian Chaco is the northernmost part of the great
lowland plain known as the Gran Chaco, which extends south-
ward into Paraguay and Argentina. It forms a generally flat,
poorly drained arc along the Paraguayan frontier east of the
Front Ranges and south of the Banados de Izozog and the Ser-
rania de Santiago.
Most of the subregion lies at elevations of 500 to 2,000
feet and slopes down gently from west to east. A small iso-
lated peak in the southwest, about 30 miles from Villa Montes,
rises to slightly over 5,000 feet (some 3,000 feet above the
surrounding terrain), and another peak, to the northeast not
far from the Paraguayan border, rises to 2,300 feet (about
1,300 feet above the surrounding terrain); but the country is
generally flat to rolling.
Permanent streams are few. The Rio Pilcomayo flows out
of the Front Ranges, past Villa Montes, and across the south-
western corner of the subregion. A number of small tribu-
taries of the Rio Paraguay drain the Serrania de Santiago and
wind through low swampy terrain in the east near the Brazil-
ian border. Elsewhere, the subregion is drained by a network
of intermittent streams that dry up completely during the long
winter dry season.
The climate alternates between extremely dry winters and
wet summers. Numerous small salt lakes and salt flats scat-
tered through the subregion reflect the great aridity of the
area. Rainfall averages only 30 to 45 inches annually,
practically all occuring from December through February.
Drought prevails most of the remainder of the year. Tempera-
tures are generally high the year around, but seasonal and
daily ranges are greater than in areas farther north. Aver-
age daily maximums are in the upper 90's (Fahrenheit degrees)
from October through January, the hottest period, and daily
minimums average about 40?F from June through August, the
coolest period.
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During the rainy season, torrential downpours occur day
and night, completely inundating some areas and lacing others
with endless lagoons. Animals move to higher ground toward
the north and west or become marooned on small islets. During
the long dry season, all but a few small salty pools disappear.
b. Vegetation and Land Use
Open stands of quebracho and
other
hardwoods interspersed
with coarse grasses and cactuses
cover
the sandy soils of
the flat to rolling country; palm
trees
form dense groves
on the heavier soils in shallow swales.
The palm groves
sometimes signal the presence of water,
but more often than
not the water is saline and unpotable.
Extensive areas are
covered by monte or chaparral, low thorn forests that can
rip clothing to shreds or puncture the tires of motor vehi-
cles. Some forests are quite open, others impenetrably
dense;
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Because of the sandy soil and long droughts, there is
little agricultural activity in the Chaco. Goats and semi-
wild herds of cattle range over the area just before the
flood period. The forests remain practically untouched,
except in the vicinity of the Santa Cruz-Corumbd railroad
and the railroad running southward to Argentina along the
margin of the Front Ranges, where they have been heavily
cut for crossties.
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The principal edible crops of Bolivia, together with
their harvest periods and most important places of cultiva-
tion, are listed below.
Crop Harvest Period
Corn April and May
Winter wheat October and
November
Spring wheat May through
July
Barley May and June
March through
May
Quinoa February and
March
White March through
potatoes July on Altiplano;
April through
June at lower
elevations
Highland valleys and
area around Santa Cruz
Highland valleys
Altiplano
Highlands up to eleva-
tion of 9,000 feet;
only forage barley at
higher elevations
Santa Cruz area (upland
varieties) and El Beni
(irrigated or paddy
varieties)
Altiplano
Altiplano and high
valleys; Lago Titicaca
area most productive
Quinoa is a pigweed, rich in protein and minerals; its
seeds can be cooked in soups or ground to meal for bread.
In addition to white potatoes, other root crops are oca
(see Figure 39), a tuber grown on the Altiplano; and manioc
(see Figure 40) and sweet potatoes, which are cultivated in
the Lowlands. Manioc is a shrubby plant about 3 to 9 feet
tall with jointed stems and deep fingerlike leaves; its large
fleshy rootstalk may be cooked and eaten as a vegetable or
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Figure 39.
Oca (Oxalis
to erosa),
widely grown
in highlands
for forage
and food.
Figure 40. Yuca (Manihot escuentla).
Its tuberous root is one of the s aples
of lowlands.
Figure 41. Banana tree in the
Yungas. Banana trees and plantains
are very common at lower elevations.
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TENDERIZE MEAT
WITH MILKY JUICE
OF YOUNG FRUIT
Figure 42. Papaya (Carica papaya). The fruit may be eaten raw
or cooked.
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dried and used in the form of a coarse flour. Sugarcane is
a major crop in the lowlands. The outer layer of the cane
can be peeled off and the inner pith chewed for its refresh-
ing and nourishing sap -- a source of quick energy.
Large quantities of tropical fruits such as oranges,
bananas (see Figure 41), plantains, pineapples, mangoes,
avocadoes, papayas (see Figure 42), figs, and guavas are
grown in the Yungas and in settled parts of the Eastern Low-
lands. Temperate-zone fruits such as-peaches, grapes, apples,
pears, and plums also are grown in the highland valleys of
Cochabamba, Sucre, and Tarija.
are generally more common in the rainy season, but in areas
where the seasonal definition is not pronounced, as in the
northern lowlands, they may be available at any time of year.
Palm trees are among the most abundant and useful wild plants
in the lowlands. The fruit and several other parts of many
species of palm are edible. In abandoned sites of former
cultivation one often can find bananas, plantains, papayas,
tropical yams, and manioc. The first two are widespread in
the lowlands. Papayas and tropical yams (not to be confused
with the sweet potato) are common in open sunny places in the
jungle, and in clearings around former habitations (see Figure
43). Yams can be recognized by their vines, which climb the
trunks of trees; their tubers should always be cooked prior to
eating. In many parts of the lowlands, manioc grows wild;
poisonous varieties taste bitter but are edible if ground to
a pulp and boiled for at least an hour. Many other varieties
of wild tubers can be eaten, but care must be taken to avoid
the numerous poisonous species. Sugarcane grows semiwild in
many places in the lowlands. Young bamboo shoots are edible
and appear in quantity in many parts of the lowlands following
rains. Prickly pears, or tunas (see Figure 44), are common at
lower elevations on the Altiplano, in dry locations in the
Central Mountains and Valleys, and in the Yungas. They bear
small sweet edible fruits. Algarroba bushes (see Figure 45),
found both in the highlands and in the Chaco, yield edible
pods and seeds that are much appreciated by the Indians.
The bulbous root of the water lily also is eaten. Brazil nuts
and many other edible kernels and seeds are available in the
forests.
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EDIBLE TUBERS
YAM TUBERS -
ALWAYS BOIL
Figure 43. Tropical yam (Dioscorea sp.). Yams are common in
jungle clearings.
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Figure 44. Prickly pear
or tuna. The reddish-
yellow fruit is sweet and
juicy.
Figure 45. Algarroba
(Prosopis sp.) which
grows as bush in high-
lands and as tree at
lower elevations. The
seeds and pods are
edible.
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Practically all animals are edible, if not always particu-
larly savory, and even lizards and snakes can serve as food
in emergency situations. Game animals and other wildlife
are most abundant in the moister highland valleys and in the
Eastern Lowlands, but the dry highland areas also support a
significant quantity of animal life.
The animals most characteristic of the Altiplano and of
other sections of the semibarren highlands are the domesticated
llamas (see Figure 46) and alpacas and their wild relatives,
the guanacos and vicunas. The llama is used principally as a
beast of burden and the alpaca as a producer of wool. Both
can be eaten as can the wild guanacos and vicunas. Guanacos
are rare and the smaller vicunas are only slightly more common,
but small herds occasionally may be encountered grazing in
the wild recesses of the mountains. The vicunas are particu-
larly prized for their meat and fine fur.
In addition to the llamas and alpacas, other domesticated
animals -- sheep, goats, pack mules, burros, and, in some areas,
cattle -- are potential sources of meat in the highlands.
A number of rodents have edible flesh. The best known
are the chinchilla, vizcacha, and cavy. The chinchilla (see
Figure 47) is a squirrellike animal that lives in isolated
locations, burrows or crevices in rocky parts of the Alti-
plano and in the surrounding mountains up to elevations of
about 16,000 feet. Colonies of chinchillas live on seeds of
the algarroba bush, lichens, and cactus fruits. To supplement
a normally bleak diet, the highland Indians search for the
seeds of plants like the algarroba, which the chinchillas
store in holes under rockpiles. The vizcacha (see Figure 48)
is a larger animal than the chinchilla. Both species are
smoked out of their holes and killed with sticks. The cavy
(see Figure 49) is a tailless rodent about 1 foot long that
lives in deserted parts of the Altiplano and in mountainous
areas where there is enough soil to support its warrens.
The smaller semidomesticated variety of cavyy is the well-known
guinea pig, which exists in great numbers about the Indian
dwellings and serves as a convenient food.
Fish can be taken from some of the less saline lakes of
the Altiplano. They abound in the marshy bays and shallow
inlets around the shores. The rainbow trout of Lago Titicaca
(introduced from the United States) are now quite common, and
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Figure 46. Group of llamas high in the Andes.
Chinchilla, which inhabits Altiplano
and isolated mountain areas.
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Figure 48. Vizcacha, larger
and more numerous than the
chinchilla.
Figure 49. Cavy. Fried
cavy is a popular dish
among the highland
Indians.
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some large specimens weigh as much as 20 pounds. Fishing
nets concentrated near the mouths of rivers that enter the
lake are effective in catching them during the spawning
migrations. Other fish common to these lakes include catfish
and several types of top minnow. The local Indians employ
casting nets, reed traps, spears, and long-handled dip nets.
The last may be used along the shore late in the evening when
fish come into shallow water to feed or at night by torchlight
from totora reed
Large numbers of birds, including southern geese, ducks,
grebes, coots, cormorants, gulls, plovers, snipes, avocets,
curlews, ibises, and herons, are found about the margins of
larger lakes such as Lago Titicaca, in small mountain tarns,
and in the marshes of the Altiplano. The Indians hunt grebes
in the reed marshes at night, using torches. Huge condors
(see Figure 50), turkey buzzards, and a number of other carrion
feeders and birds of prey also can serve as sources of meat
in the highlands. The eggs of the Andean flamingos are con-
sidered a great delicacy and are easily stolen from the nest-
ing grounds around the margins of small isolated lakes such
as Lago Colorada.
Wildlife is much more abundant on the moister mountain
slopes east of the lofty Cordillera Real, in the lower valleys,
in the Yungas, in the Front Ranges, and in the Eastern Low-
lands. Among the game animals of the high mountain slopes are
two kinds of deer, the guemal and the dwarf padua (only 15
inches high), which graze in the steppes and the upper fringes
of the forests at elevations between 10,000 and 16,000 feet.
Other edible animals of the upper zone of trees include opos-
sums, coatis (raccoonlike animals), and armadillos (see Fig-
ure 51). Armadillos also are found in some of the arid val-
leys of the Yungas and Front Ranges where near-desert condi-
tions prevail. On'the forested slopes, at somewhat lower
elevations, peccaries and agoutis (see Figures 52 and 53) are
numerous, and both are highly prized for their flesh. The
peccary is a small wild pig; the agouti a stout-bodied rodent
up to 20 inches in length. The agouti sleeps by day in holes
in trees or in the ground, but it may come out in the evening
or early morning. A hunter's trick is to throw stones into
the air to simulate the sound of falling fruit and lure the
agouti from his nest. Sloths (see Figure 54) and monkeys
are common in forested areas below 3,000 feet. Monkeys can
be skinned and gutted or singed whole and cooked with the
skin on so that the thin layer of fat under the skin is not
lost. A good roast monkey can provide food for 2 or 3 days
if all parts are eaten, including the head and tail. When
eaten raw the meat is tough but the liver is very tasty.
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Figure 50. Condor, giant bird of
high Andes, with wing-spread up to
15 feet.
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Figure 51. Armadillo, found in both mountains and lowlands.
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Figure 52. Collared peccary. This wild pig is smaller
and less aggressive than the white-lipped peccary.
Figure 53. Agouti,
rodent that lives in
forested areas and
is mainly nocturnal.
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In the dense forests of the lowlands, streambanks are
usually the best hunting grounds. Tracks in the sand are
clues to the favorite watering spots of animals, generally
narrow sections of beach where the jungle comes down almost
to the water's edge. Heavy forests in the vicinity of water
are frequented by the tapir, a large ferocious-looking ~Lni-
mal which is actually very shy and nonaggressive. Tapirs,
rarely seen by day, often come down to the rivers at night,.
and their three-toed tracks are readily identified in the
sand. The meat of the tapir is tough but delicious. Huge
rodents called ronsocos or capybaras (see Figure 55), which
frequent stream amend marshy areas, are hunted on land
and by canoe. Turtles, found along the rivers, are valuable
for their palatable red meat and eggs; the latter can be dis-
covered in the sand of the riverine beaches.
Small deer inhabit certain sections of the Chaco and the
savannas. They are difficult to find when the grass is tall,
but at night they approach streams or small lakes to drink.
Peccaries also are found in the Chaco. Occasionally, during
wet season floods, whole herds are stranded on small islands
of high ground when they may be slaughtered. 77 1
Fish are plentiful in the rivers and lagoons of the
Eastern Lowlands. Practically all types are edible, even
the voracious and greatly feared piranhas, which are tough
and boney but very tasty. The deeper holes of the rivers
are often the best fishing spots. Fish can be taken with
hook and line, using pieces of banana or plantain as bait.
Stingrays and giant catfish (some weighing over 100 pounds)
can be speared as they lie in the shallow turbid water near
snore; both are good to eat. Cana brava, the tall cane that
is so common along many of the streams, provides excellent
material for light but durable fishing spears. The jungle
Indians also employ bows and arrows, various sorts of traps,
and fish poisons such as barbasco. The poisons are most
effective in pools where there is little current. When
flood waters recede at the onset of the dry season, many
small isolated pools are left teeming with fish which can be
caught very easily. Each year when the Rio Pilcomayo shrinks,
literally hundreds of thousands of fish are left high and dry
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Figure 54. Sloth. Hard to see in
the forest, the sloth hangs motion-
less from branches.
Figure 55. Ronsoco, or capybara, world's
largest rodent. Ronsoco meat is a favorite
food of the jaguar.
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along its banks. The fish may be cooked, eaten raw, or dried
and smoked to be saved for a journey.
I Parrots and macaws have much better meat
than one might imagine. In addition to a very wide variety
of small birds such as thrushes and jays, some sections of
the forest abound in larger species such as the pavo (turkey)
and the curassow. These are often found in the trees along
the riverbanks. The curassow is a large greenish-black bird
whose delicious white meat is even more highly prized than
that of the turkey. Herons, egrets, adjutant birds, and red-
winged blackbirds are very abundant in and about the exten-
sive marshes and lakes of the lowlands. On the open savan-
nas and in the Chaco, flocks of rhea -- the South American
equivalent of the African ostrich -- are common. These are
hunted with bow and arrow or sometimes with the bola, a
weapon consisting of a long cord with two or more heavy
balls attached which can be thrown in such a way as to
entangle the legs of the bird. The meat of the rhea is
tough but edible; its large eggs also are eaten.
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Figure 56. Lago Suches in high mountains on
Peruvian border.
Figure 57. Waterfall
and mountain stream west
of Santa Cruz.
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soutnern savannas and the Chaco are subject to
severe seasonal droughts. Few but the larger rivers and
lakes in these sections persist throughout the year; most of
the small pools of stagnant water that do remain attract
large numbers of animals and usually become polluted. Vast
areas of the sun-baked Chaco are completely devoid of surface
water. The local Indians have wells as deep as 15 to 20 feet.
If these run dry, they drink the water that collects in the
hollow axils of the leaves of certain plants or dig up and
suck the moisture from the bulky tuber of the cipoy (Jacaratia
hassleriana). Widely scattered oases in the Chaco can bee
i enti ie by the presence of palm trees; quite often, how-
ever, the water is salty and unpotable.
Where cactuses are available, their pulpy interiors can
sometimes be used to assuage thirst. In forested areas about
the margins of drier savannalands water often can be obtained
from banana trees. With luck, a knife dug into the trunk
brings forth a gush of drinkable water. Trees growing closer
to the semiarid areas generally yield less water than those
farther away. Certain types of lianas, or vines, common
throughout most of the jungle areas, also yield appreciable
amounts of water when long segments are cut and held verti-
cally.
2. Natural Hazards
The forests of Bolivia are rich in plants with thorns and
sharp spines. Some of the larger thorns are quite tough and
can inflict deep puncture wounds that easily become infected.
Along the wooded riverbanks in the Yungas, canelike palms
called yacitaras are much dreaded because of their barbed
spines, w is o ten lacerate unwary boatmen passing beneath
their long overhanging stems. Extensive cactus forests
scattered through the drier sections of the Front Ranges can
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be entered only at the risk of incurring painful wounds, and
great care must be taken to prevent mounts and pack animals
from injuring themselves while grazing. Sword-edged cane
grass must be avoided in many sections of the savannas, and
in the Chaco one must be wary of the thorny monte vegetation
with its thickets of brittle prongs and brandis, which can
snag clothing and cause minor cuts and scratches. Even these
minor wounds should be treated promptly to avoid the danger
of infection.
In addition to plants that prick or scratch, there are
many with poisons that cause irritating rashes on contact
and others that are poisonous if eaten. Adequate clothing
can provide protection from plants that are poisonous on
contact, as well as from thorns. Only an intimate knowledge
of the flora, or refraining from eating unknown species, can
insure against the danger of consuming poisonous plants. As
a general rule all plants with milky saps should be avoided.
If it becomes necessary to eat an unfamiliar plant it is
best to try only a small sample and reject it if the taste is
bitter or otherwise disagreeable. Usually any food that mon-
keys eat is also safe for human consumption.
b. Mammals
Large predatory animals such as pumas, bears, and jaguars
(see Figures 58 and 59) usually do not constitute a serious
direct hazard unless wounded or cornered. Most of.them give
man a wide berth if possible. The puma, or mountain lion, is
an extremely voracious beast who lives high in the cordilleras
at the upper limits of the grasses but often descends to
hunt, especially during the winter. The puma is not content
unless he has destroyed a whole herd, even though he may con-
sume only one animal. Pumas have apparently learned to avoid
armed men, and they much prefer to escape rather than attack.
They have been known, however, to maul unarmed Indians and
children. A wounded or otherwise weakened man should be wary
of pumas, especially in the winter when game is scarce.
Bears are not common, but the spectacled bear (Tremarctos
ernatus) is known to inhabit the high Andean slopes, an
oti er species are found in small numbers at lower elevations.
The jaguar ranges widely over the Eastern Lowlands and
into the Andean foothill zones. A formidable animal with
a massive head and weighing up to 300 pounds, the jaguar is
easily capable of mauling or killing a man. The greatest
danger is not to men but to their pack animals or livestock.
Unlike the puma, the jaguar usually kills only a single animal
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~ y ' ^ '..tom y cif ?'! w to `?
Figure 58. Puma, voracious predator of the highlands.
--99-
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Figure 59. Jaguar, largest of jungle predators.
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-- a guanaco for example -- and leaves after his meal.
Attacks often occur at night and are generally made from
the downwind side of a camp. The neighing and restlessness
of mules often indicate that they sense the presence of a
jaguar.
Less dangerous and much smaller than the jaguars are the
tigrillos or ocelots (see Figure 60). Weighing about 35
pounds, they are mainly nocturnal, often hunt in pairs, and
keep in touch with a mewing call. Tigrillos climb trees and
are usually found in densely wooded country or in cane thick-
ets. They sometimes feed on young domesticated stock and
poultry and may attack a man if he surprises them in the act
of eating.
White-lipped peccaries are among the most dangerous ani-
mals of the forest, especially when concentrated in a large
herd. If one of these wild pigs is wounded, the whole herd,
numbering as many as 100, may surround and attack the hunter
with their vicious razor-sharp tusks. The most expedient
means of escaping their attack is to climb a tree, but one
can be stranded there for a considerable time before the
beasts leave. Peccaries can be detected by the peculiar
pungent odor that hangs in the air in their vicinity.
Vampire bats are common at lower elevations in the Yungas
and in the Front Ranges. The vampire has needle-sharp inci-
sor teeth with which it makes small cuts in the skin of its
victim; it laps up the blood with its tongue. For some
unknown reason, bats exhibit preference for certain indi-
viduals, both human and animal. Thus, even though a number
of men or beasts may be available, the bats frequently
attack only one or a few out of a group night after night.
Very few people are awakened by the feeding of the bats
because their saliva contains an ingredient that deadens the
pain of the wound; the saliva also contains an anticoagulant,
and, small as it is, the wound frequently continues to bleed
for some time after trie bat has stopped feeding. The bats
transmit diseases that infect large numbers of cattle. One
of the worst of these is the frequently fatal paralytic
rabies, which has occasionally been transmitted to humans.
Bats attack only when the victim is motionless and only in
the dark. A light fends them off, and proper netting affords
good protection from their attacks. Pack animals are most
vulnerable to vampires and over a period of time may grow
quite weak through loss of blood.
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Figure 60. Ocelot, smaller than jaguar. The ocelot is
usually found in thick woods.
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c. Reptiles and Fish
Dangerous reptiles and fish pose no hazard throughout
most of the highlands. Practically all of the snakes, except
a small harmless species on the Altiplano, are found at ele-
vations below 10,000 feet. The forested lower slopes of the
mountains and the vast Eastern Lowlands, on the other hand,
support a fairly large number of dangerous reptiles including
the fer-de-lance and several related species of pit vipers,
popularly known as jararacas. Generally gray-green in color
and up to 6 feet in length, these highly venomous snakes
occasionally crawl onto trails or into clearings to bask in
the sun. Like most other snakes, however, they are mainly
nocturnal and are most dangerous at night.
Tropical rattlesnakes, bushmasters, and coral snakes
(see Figure 61) also are found at lower elevations. Rattle-
snakes are usually light gray or brown with black and yellow
markings; large specimens can reach 8 feet in length. Very
poisonous and vicious, they are most common in the hilly,
drier sections of the Front Ranges, not in the thickly for-
ested areas. Bushmasters are reddish yellow with dark brown
or black markings; sometimes measuring in excess of 10 feet,
they have exceptionally large fangs and a reputation for
aggressiveness. They prefer dry ground in densely wooded
areas and often hide in animal burrows. Coral snakes are
small -- usually about 2 feet long -- and brightly colored
with red, black, and yellow or white bands. Generally slug-
gish and nonaggressive, they are likely to attack only if
stepped on or otherwise directly molested. Their fangs are
very small and are dangerous only to exposed portions of the
body, such as bared hands or feet, but their venom is excep-
tionally potent and a bite may well be fatal. Coral snakes
strike with a peculiar side-swinging motion, twisting their
heads to one side if they are picked up or stepped on. They
are found in almost every type of terrain at lower elevations,
usually living in holes in the ground.
Another greatly feared poisonous snake is the loro
machacuy or so-called parrot cobra. Usually olive green and
up to almost 7 feet long, it hangs from trees in the lowland
forest, sometimes over trails or streams, and attacks its
victim by biting the face, neck, or shoulder. It is best to
avoid traveling at night on foot through snake country,
especially in forested areas, and to look first before step-
ping over fallen logs or reaching hands into rocky crevices
when climbing'. Good boots provide excellent protection against
most snake attacks, and loose trouser legs are probably better
than those stuffed in the tops of boots. Men have been saved
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Figures 61 (A, B
and Q. Tropical
rattlesnake, bush-
master, and coral
snake - three of
the most dangerous
reptiles of low-
lands.
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from snake bite when the striking reptile fastened its fangs
in the flapping trousers instead of the leg itself.
Many lakes and rivers of the Eastern Lowlands are infested
with caymans, large reptiles similar to crocodiles. Some of
the bigger ones reach lengths over 15 feet. Although rela-
tively awkward on land, caymans can raise their bodies on
stumpy legs and run with surprising speed for short distances.
Caymans sunning themselves on shore should be approached
cautiously. Most will slither away into the water at one's
approach, but hungry individuals occasionally rush toward an
intruder. The long powerful tail is capable of knocking a
man flat and within reach of the tooth-studded jaws. In the
water, powerful strokes from the tail propel a cayman so
rapidly that escape from its attack is very difficult. To
dangle arms or legs over the side of a canoe in areas known
to be inhabited by caymans invites disaster.
Fresh-water stingrays, known as rayas (see Figures 62
and 63), are found in many of the lowlan rivers and even
in some of the larger streams of the Yungas such as the Rio
Alto Beni. These leathery, repulsive-looking flat fish are
sometimes as much as 1-1/2 feet across. Their venom can
paralyze a man within minutes. The ray's sting or venom
apparatus consists of a sharp ,spine of hard boney material
about 6 to 8 inches lon enveloped in a sheath of skin. An
integral part of the raps long whiplike tail, it can be
lashed forward like the sting of a scorpion. The venom is
produced in spongy tissues occupying grooves in the sting.
A series of sharp recurved teeth or barbs along either side
of the sting make it very difficult and painful to remove
from a wound. Stingrays commonly lie almost completely
buried in the upper layer of a sandy or muddy bottom and
are a definite hazard to anyone wading. The chief danger
is in stepping on one. When the body of the ray is pinned
down by the weight of the victim, the fish can make a suc-
cessful strike with its sting. This danger can largely be
eliminated by pushing or shuffling one's feet along the
bottom. It is also recommended that the bottom first be
probed with a stick in order to rid the area of hidden rays.
Although injuries from rays occur most frequently about the
ankle joint and foot, chest wounds have also been reported.
In addition to extreme pain, a wound may cause vomiting,
diarrhea, muscular paralysis, and death.
The much dreaded piranha, or aallometaa (see Figures 64
and 65), is common in many parts of the Eastern Lowlands,
and great caution should be exercised to avoid it when
entering unfamiliar waters. It is particularly dangerous
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Figure 62. Fresh-water stingray common in lowland rivers.
Note the sting in the tail.
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Figure 63. Stingray making a strike. Most wounds
are inflicted on the foot or-ankle.
Figure 64. Piranha, terror of lowland streams.
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to enter a stream if one has an open wound or sore. When
attracted by blood, large numbers of the small but ferocious
fish may immediately attack and devour man or beast. Their
powerful jaws and razor-sharp teeth can reduce even a large
animal to a bare skeleton within minutes. Indians crossing
streams thought to be infested with piranhas do so with one
hand guarding their genitals.
Another hazard in the waters of the Eastern Lowlands,
especially in the larger rivers with sandy bottoms, is a
loathsome, wormlike little catfish known as the canero (see
Figure 66). In its juvenile stage it measures only 2 to 3
inches long by a small fraction of an inch thick, and it can
enter any orifice of the human body; after entering the body
it is likely to become wedged in by its fin-spines and may
cause painful hemorrhages and even death. In its adult
stage the canero reaches lengths up to 7 or 8 inches and
will attack --man as well as other animals, inflicting nasty
circular wounds from which it sucks the blood.
Electric eels are found in the marshes, lagoons, and
other quiet waters of the Eastern Lowlands. These fish are
not true eels but belong to the same group as the carp.
Adults are olive brown with brilliant orange under the head
and throat. Some of the larger ones attain lengths of 6 to
7 feet and are capable of delivering very powerful electric
shocks. They often stun horses and mules fording streams
or marshy areas. A man ordinarily is not killed outright
by the shock of one of these creatures, but he may be
knocked insensible and drown. Electric eels are particu-
larly dangerous when they attack in a group.
In addition to the various kinds of dangerous fish,
many lakes and pools in the lowlands are infested with
bloodsucking leeches that attach themselves to the bare
skin of any human who enters their waters. Leeches are
usually black or brown, and those that attack humans are up
to an inch or so in length. They have two suckers with
which they firmly attach themselves to the skin. Their
bite is relatively painless and may go unnoticed. If unin-
terrupted, the animal will fill its body with blood and then
drop off its victim. A firmly attached leech should be
removed carefully because the jaws are buried in the wound,
and if they are broken off infection may result. The best
way to remove a leech is to put a little salt on it or hold
a lighted cigarette near its body; this often causes the
worm to turn loose of its own accord. A feeding leech
secretes a material that keeps the blood from clotting, so
the wound is likely to bleed for some time after the parasite
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Figure 65. Dentition of a Piranha.
Figure 66. Canero, one of scourges of low-
land rivers.
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is removed. This bleeding should be stopped by pressure.
Very small leeches sometimes get into the mouth as a result
of drinking unsterilized water. They may attach themselves
to the soft tissues in the mouth or nasal passages and in
such cases should be removed by a physician.
d. Insects and Arachnids
Insects and arachnids, by far nature's greatest threat
to survival in many parts of Bolivia, are particularly
abundant in the lowlands. Among those that transmit serious
diseases are mosquitoes, mites, fleas, ticks, and lice.
Malaria, encephalitis, and dengue may be carried by mosqui-
toes; hemorrhagic fever by mites; typhus and bubonic plague
by fleas; relapsing fever by ticks; and typhus by lice (see
4, Principal Diseases in Bolivia).
Wasps, bees, ants, spiders, scorpions, and centipedes
are plentiful in the lowlands. Stings and bites from these
pests can be painful and dangerous and should be carefully
avoided. Caution should be used when climbing trees, for
their branches and foliage are often alive with biting ants.
Certain species of small hollow-stemmed cecropias, very
common in clearings, host myriads of tiny brown stinging
ants. The alo Santo, a tall slender tree with a hollow
trunk, is o ten filled with fire ants, vicious insects
whose bites smart and burn for many hours after they are
inflicted. Boots, shoes, and other clothing should always
be carefully examined and shaken in the morning to rid them
of scorpions. The venom of certain species of scorpions is
harmless to humans, but that of others is extremely toxic
and may cause severe illness or even death. Minor insect
bites and stings should be treated with cold compresses or
mud applied locally; more serious cases may call for the use
of antivenom serums and other medicine.
Upon entering the marshy areas of the Eastern Lowlands,
one is likely to be enveloped by huge clouds of mosquitoes.
As the day progresses, one species is replaced by another.
The anopheles are most active about dusk. Even worse than
the mosquitoes are the swarms of little flies (plumes, mari-
huis, and mantas blancas), which are small enough to-pass
through ordinary mosquito netting. Hands and feet soon
become completely covered with tiny blisters and sores where
the flies have fed. More annoying still are the small
sweat-bees, exasperating insects no larger than house flies,
which dart about getting into one's ears, eyes, nose, and
mouth; they do not sting, but their continuous harassment
is maddening. Smoke from a campfire sometimes discourages
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most of these flying insects, especially the smoke produced
by the wood of the palo santo.
Some sections are relatively free of certain insect
pests but abound in others. For example, the country about
Rurrenabaque, where the Rio Beni emerges from the Yungas,
is relatively free of mosquitoes and piume flies but is
plagued with a species of blow fly. i s-insidious pest
lays its eggs in moist clothing. Its larva, known as the
screw worm, when hatched by the heat of the body, bores
into the skin and develops into a grub about an inch in
length. As the grub digs to enlarge its living quarters,
the sensation is that of being drilled with an auger. The
local campesinos usually apply tobacco juice over the sore
spot and squeeze the worm out -- a very painful operation.
Clothing should be dried out completely whenever possible
to avoid infestation by blow flies.
Small sand fleas, tropical chiggers called aniguas, are
widespread. These insects deposit their eggs in-the tender,
soft skin between the toes, where they develop in a small
sac about the size of a pea. They should be cut out with a
sterilized knife.
On the Altiplano and in the surrounding mountains the
air is exceptionally thin and clear; daytime temperatures
are usually pleasantly cool and never enervating. This
coolness at high altitudes, however, tends to make one
unwary of the danger of sunburn. The direct actinic rays
of the sun, unfiltered by the thin atmosphere and reinforced
by reflected light from salt flats or other barren surfaces,
can burn the face and hands severely. Prolonged exposure
to the sun, even when not immediately uncomfortable, always
should be avoided. The dryness of the air can also lead to
parching of the skin, especially on the lips, the fingertips,
and between the fingers, and generous doses of ointment
should be applied to prevent cracking. At night, freezing
temperatures combined with fierce winds and occasional heavy
snowfalls are major dangers in the mountains, and warm cloth-
ing and bedding are essential, especially where shelter is
unavailable (see Figure 67).
Newcomers to the highlands often suffer from the mountain
sickness known as soroche or Puna, which is caused by a defi-
ciency of oxygen inn tleaatmosphere at high altitudes. Many
people begin to suffer at about 12,000 or 13,000 feet. The
symptoms include headache, nausea, nosebleed, dizziness, a
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Figure 67. Camp beside glacier in northern
Cordillera Real. This group is well clothed
and equipped for survival in the high moun-
tains.
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tendency to gasp, and a weakness that makes almost any physi-
cal exertion very difficult. The higher the altitude, the
worse the symptoms are likely to be; extreme cases may result
in death. Attacks of soroche should always be anticipated
when climbing in mountainous country over 15,000 feet. Rest
or retreat to lower elevations is usually the only effective
means of finding relief. Within a few days most people
become adjusted to living at high altitudes and the symptoms
of soroche disappear.
In contrast to the cool highlands, the jungles and savan-
nas of the Eastern Lowlands are often uncomfortably hot and
humid, particularly during the summer wet season. The oppres-
sive air greatly reduces human endurance, and exhaustion comes
on rapidly with any strenuous exercise. Minor cuts and
wounds that ordinarily might be ignored must receive very
careful treatment or they will not heal. Clothing and equip-
ment are constantly soaked from downpours, and provisions are
spoiled by mold and mildew unless well protected and venti-
lated. Sunstroke and heat prostration must be guarded against
on the open savannas and in the vast shadeless portions of
the Chaco.
The highlanders of Bolivia, mostly Aymara and Quechua
Indians, are nonaggressive types who seldom offer direct physi-
cal violence. Generally sullen and unfriendly toward strangers,
they become openly hostile only when drunk. Great tact and
patience are required to overcome their morbid distrust of the
white man, which is based on centuries of persecution. Through
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scrupulously fair treatment, however, one can eventually gain
the Indians' confidence.
If the cooperation of an entire community is desired, it
may be wise to seek out the local medicine men. These are
divided into a number of classes, each with its own special
field of healing or magic. By far the most important and
influential are the occult wizards called chamakani; no
action of any importance is undertaken by an Indian-
ian community
without the knowledge and consent of the local chamakani.
His identity is usually kept secret from outsiders and can be
ascertained only through careful observation over a long
period. Generally, he is an older man who wears humble dress
and no token of distinction or authority. Having discovered
him, he should be addressed respectfully as hacha-tata, or
"great father", and amply rewarded for any of his services.
Travelers in remote sections of the highlands have observed
that through sheer pigheadedness the Indians sometimes are
unwilling to sell food or other necessities even for fabulously
high prices. In such cases the best course of action is simply
to take what is needed and leave a fair payment; the Indians
will make no resistance and will be perfectly satisfied with
the transaction. In some areas coca or other items are more
acceptable forms of payment than money.
The cholos, or mestizos, are generally much easier to deal
with than the pureblooded Indians. They too have their unat-
tractive traits of temperament, however, and many observers,
perhaps overcritical, have noted their greed and treachery.
It should be remembered that "cholo" is a term of contempt,
corresponding roughly to "dog" in English, and no mestizo is
pleased to be addressed as such.
The wild Indians of the Eastern Lowlands have been greatly
reduced in numbers. Many have been pacified and brought into
missionary camps; others live practically as slaves on the
cattle ranches of the area. In the most remote sections, how-
ever, especially in the densely forested areas, a few com-
pletely savage tribes still exist. Some of these groups are
warlike and aggressive and will attempt to repulse or destroy
anyone who enters their territory. In most instances, however,
their actions are motivated by fear and a desire to defend
themselves against intruders. Individuals or small unarmed
bands that display no hostile intentions ordinarily are safe
from their attacks.
If contact is desired with the jungle Indians, weapons
should never be displayed, and hunting with rifles should be
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temporarily halted. Presents such as beads or bush knives
may be placed at spots that the Indians are known to frequent
in order to initiate contact. In making the initial personal
contact, one should leave conspicuous equipment behind and
remove clothing so as to appear more natural to the Indians
(see Figure 68). After mutual confidence has been established,
supplies and equipment may be brought forward. A shotgun
and medicine are very helpful. By contributing to the food
supply and curing the sick, one may become enough of an
asset to the tribe to be tolerated. Even when the Indians
appear to be friendly, however, great care should be taken
never to alarm them. A group of missionaries recently was
slaughtered after a friendly reception by the Indians.
The Indians can be of tremendous aid in identifying
edible and poisonous plants, finding game, treating wounds,
and providing a host of other services indispensable for
survival in remote regions. On the other hand, they can be
formidable foes. A few have acquired shotguns or old muzzle
loaders, but their main weapon is usually the bow and arrow
with which they are expert marksmen. Their arrows often are
set with multiple barbs that are extremely difficult to with-
draw from a body wound. Other weapons in their armory may
include spears, cudgels, sword-edged clubs, and fish-spine
knuckle dusters. Some of the tribes in the northern rain
forest also use blowguns with curare-poisoned darts. If
hit by a dart, one should remove it immediately and, if pos-
sible, suck out the poison. The doses are ordinarily sub-
lethal to humans but may cause partial paralysis and violent
illness. Fortunately, blowguns are used mostly for hunting
and not for warfare.
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Figure 68. First contact between wild
jungle Indians and missionaries. The
missionaries have removed their shirts
in order to identify themselves with
the natives. Note the longbows and
enormous arrows.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
II. The People
A. General
Among the independent nations of South America, Bolivia
exceeds only Guyana, Paraguay, and Uruguay in size of popula-
tion, which in 1966 was officially estimated to be 3,748,000*.
Little danger of overpopulation exists in the foreseeable
future. Population density is only nine persons per square
mile, lowest on the continent except for Surinam, Guyana, and
French Guiana, and the annual rate of growth is only 1.4 per-
cent, well below the average for Latin America as a whole.
The 1950 census classified 65 percent of the population
as rural and 35 percent as urban. This may have been an
unrealistic calculation, however, since the census included
as urban all inhabitants of towns with more than 2,000 per-
sons. Thus, the urban statistics probably included many
whose way of life was essentially rural. The rural popula-
tion probably is closer to 75 percent of the whole.
The urban environment is dominated by the city of La Paz,
which had an estimated 1965 population of 360,000. Depart-
mental capitals range in size from Cochabamba, with.95,000
inhabitants, to Cobija, an oversized jungle outpost of 3,000
inhabitants. Most urban areas lack adequate electricity,
potable water, and sewerage. Santa Cruz, the fastest grow-
ing city in the country with a population exceeding 90,000,
is only now beginning to pave its streets and is a veritable
quagmire during the rainy season (see Figure 69).
The Bolivian population is predominantly Indian. In
fact, among the nations of Latin America, Bolivia has the
highest percentage of Indians -- approximately 63 percent
of its population was so classed in the 1950 census. Que-
chuas and Aymaras are by far the most numerous of the Indian
groupings. Quechuas make up 36 percent of the total popula-
tion, while the Aymaras comprise another 25 percent. The
homeland of the Aymaras is the Altiplano, where they domi-
nate the population of a very bleak region (see Map 58019).
Their greatest concentration is in the area around Lago
Titicaca, including the Peruvian shores. Some Aymaras also
*Official estimates are based on the last census which was
taken in 1950. See Table 1 for the population of Bolivia by
Departments.
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64
60
.
BOLIVIA
B R A Z LL
?* ~~ ` 1
INDIAN TRIBES
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Oa
LOWLAND INDIAN TRIBES
HIGHLAND INDIANS
(by Linguistic Families)
8. Ignaciano
not identified
28. Chipaya
Panoano Family
9. Trinitario
17. More
29. Uru
Pacahuara(probably)
1
10. Baure
18. Cayuvava
.
2. Chacobo
19. Itonama
=Aymara
Guaraniano Family
20. Movima
=Quechua
Tacanano Family
Jo
11
.
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22. Chimane
3. Chama
4. Cavinena
11
r
.
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24. Leco Y ura re
5. Toromono (probably)
14. Pauserna
25. Ayore
.
6. Tacana
15. Guarani
27Chiqu ano
26.
7. Reyesano
16. Tapiete
co
7. Matta o
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Figure 69. Street scene in Santa Cruz.
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are located in extreme northern Chile. Quechuas are more
widely distributed throughout highland Bolivia, being most
numerous in the broad east-facing valleys of the departments
of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and Potosi. Peru is the homeland
of the Quechuas, and they are found in far greater numbers
there than in Bolivia. The remainder of the Indian group-
ings -- about two and one-half percent of the total popula-
tion -- are composed of small tribes of the Eastern Lowlands.
The distribution of population is very uneven (see Map
58810). The Spaniards found the Indians of the Inca Empire
living on the northern part of the Bolivian Altiplano and
in the east-facing valleys of the Cordillera Real, and these
areas are still the principal centers of settlement. On the
farmlands bordering Lago Titicaca and in the broad valleys
around Cochabamba, population densities exceed 100 per square
mile. Inhospitable climate and rugged terrain continue to
discourage settlement in the southern sections of the Alti-
plano and the upper elevations of the Andes. The Eastern
Lowlands, however, comprising nearly three-fifths of the
national territory, can support a much denser population.
In recent years there have been both spontaneous and
controlled migrations away from the densely settled, often
marginal lands of highland Bolivia. One avenue of migration
has been from the countryside to the city, with La Paz the
goal of most. The town of El Alto, just above La Paz, has
grown in a relatively short time to 25,000 persons, mostly
Indians living in adobe huts. There also has been a spon-
taneous movement of Indians into the Yungas, northeast of
La Paz; when a road to Caranavi was opened, all available
agricultural land was occupied in less than three years.
From the crowded Cochabamba valley area thousands have
migrated downslope to the subtropical Chapare region.
Government colonization schemes that originated in the
agrarian reform following the 1952 revolution have fostered
the movement of Indians from highland Bolivia to agricultural
colonies in the east. The Santa Cruz area has been a favored
locale for government colonies. In addition to the highland
Indians, some immigrants, chiefly Japanese, Okinawans, and
German Mennonites, have settled there. Approximately 30,000
Bolivians, for the most part Indians and mestizos from high-
land areas, enter Argentina annually to participate in the
sugar, cotton, and tobacco harvests. About one-third settle
there permanently. An estimated half million Bolivians have
entered Argentina in this fashion and have remained there.
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B. Ethnic and Social Groups
The Bolivian census of 1950 divided the population into
Indians and non-Indian categories. These categories only
partially reflected race; additional criteria included such
cultural factors as language and adherence to Indian folk-
ways. Thus, one who principally spoke an Indian dialect or
who participated in the life of an Indian community was
classed as an Indian in the census. Conversely, a person
speaking Spanish and living in a manner that might be con-
sidered Western or European was put into the non-Indian
category. By these definitions, 63 percent of Bolivians are
Indians and 37 percent are non-Indians.
This simplified breakdown, however, does not present an
accurate picture of the socio-cultural caste system which
exists in Bolivia. The social elite is-composed of a minor-
ity group that claims a Spanish or European heritage. Many
of the so-called whites (blancos) trace their ancestry back
to the conquistadors, but because of considerable interbreed-
ing in the colonial era, few truthfully can deny some Indian
ancestry. At the other end of the social ladder are the
indigenous Indians -- primarily the Aymaras and Quechuas of
highland Bolivia, but also the seminomadic forest Indians
of lowland Bolivia.
Between these two extremes is a group that usually,
although not necessarily, is of mixed ancestry. In highland
Bolivia members of this group, who are known as cholos,
include mestizos, or persons of mixed Spanish and Indian
ancestry. The cholo class is not defined strictly on blood
lines, however, and also may include Aymaras or Quechuas who
have discarded Indian ways and have learned to speak Spanish.
This transformation from Indian to cholo is most common in
the larger cities where the Indian is apt to lose contact
with his traditional society. In lowland Bolivia the term
cholo is not used; rather a variety of local terms are used
which apply only to persons of mixed Spanish and Indian
ancestry. Thus, when assessed in terms of cultural orienta-
tion, the population of Bolivia appears to be 53 percent
Indian, 32 percent mixed, and 15 percent white.
2. Highland Groups
a. Aymaras
There are approximately 930,000 Aymara Indians in Bolivia.
Next to the Quechua they comprise the largest segment of the
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Indian population. The Aymara homeland is the Lago Titicaca
Basin and the northern Altiplano of Bolivia. In the pre-
Columbian era the Aymara expanded westward to the Pacific
coast and northward into Peru, but they never effectively
settled any of these areas. Subsequently, they were conquered
by the expanding Incan Empire and again shortly thereafter by
the Spaniards. From that time they have remained, for all
intents and purposes, a subjugated race.
The Aymaras are short of stature -- adult males average
about 5 feet 3 inches, females about 5 feet. They have large
heads, long torsos, and relatively short legs. Their hair is
black, and facial hair is sparse or absent. The eyes are
black, and the Mongolian fold is common, being more pronounced
in females. The most conspicuous facial features are an over-
sized nose (see Figure 70) and large, fleshy ears. Skin
color varies from a coppery brown on the Altiplano to darker
and less ruddy shades at lower elevations.
The traditional Aymara costume still is worn, although it
has been replaced to some extent in recent years by factory-
made garments (see Figure 71). Male garb consists of tight,
ankle-length trousers slit at the lower end, a short tight
jacket, a poncho, and a knitted wool cap with earflaps that
is worn under a homemade flat hat (see Figure 72). Males
carry a small woolen bag in which coca leaves are kept.
Female garb consists either of a large number of superimposed
and differently colored knee-length skirts or one anke-length
skirt, along with a homespun shawl and an embroidered blouse.
Felt hats in various styles are worn, including the derby of
the chola (see Figure 72). Homespun textiles are made from
the wool of sheep, llamas, alpacas, and vicunas, although
the weaving craft is dying out with the acceptance of factory-
made cloth and clothing. Most adults wear, homemade sandals,
fabricated from used tire strips or untanned cowhide, while
children and some women commonly go barefoot.
Despite their nominal conversion to Catholicism, the
Aymaras have retained most of their ancient religious beliefs.
Thus, their religion blends Christian and pagan practices.
Aymara social life revolves around numerous religious
ceremonies and fiestas in which drinking, dancing, and feast-
ing -- all to excess -- serve as important emotional outlets
from an otherwise hardscrabble existence. Aymara dance forms,
which vary from locale to locale, are colorful; stories, many
relating to the Spanish conquest, are woven into the dances
and reveal a keen sense of humor.
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Figure 70. Male Aymara Indians.
Figure 71. Male Aymara. Only vestige of native
costume is wool cap (under felt hat) with ear
flaps.
-127-
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Colorful weekly markets and annual fairs are an important
adjunct to the social and economic life of the Aymaras and
are particularly relished by the women as a place to exchange
gossip (see Figure 73). Since a cash economy has not devel-
oped in Aymara communities to any extent, bartering is common.
The ancient method of silent trading, a throwback to times
when differing dialects made communication difficult, still
survives. Fairs are usually associated with a religious
event. The most popular is that of the Virgin of Carmen at
Copacabana, which attracts as many as 50,000 persons annually.
The Aymara have been farmers throughout their history,
and have developed a deep and abiding attachment to their
barren homeland. Their traditional way of life is communal.
Numerous small groups are bound together in communes (ayllus)
by kinship and common ownership of land. The ruling w 1tte
class has slowly but relentlessly encroached upon the Indian
lands, forming large estates and reducing free Indian hold-
ings to inaccessible and marginal farmlands. As late as the
1920's the President of the country expropriated six ayllus
along the shore of Lago Titicaca. Thus, the majority of the
Aymaras were forced to live on large estates where they were
quite literally the personal property of the owner. They
were allotted small plots of land to be used in raising their
own crops, but were obligated to spend much of their time
laboring in the hacienda fields or in service of the master's
home.
Aymara folkways revolve around a complex, male-dominated,
socioreligious hierarchy in which achievement is measured by
service to the community. Thus, a young Aymara entering
adulthood begins his community duties as a cabecilla or dance
group leader, moves up through more responsible positions,
and eventually becomes eligible for the highest office --
il~ i~ kata, or headman. He serves in this post for one year
an at the end of his term, chooses his successor. He then
has completed his duties to the community and becomes a
parado or ex-officer. By this
time,
having personally borne
all of the expenses required by
his
various positions, he
probably is ruined financially.
In
fact, the Indian on his
rise up the ladder usually goes
into
debt early and remains
so throughout his life.
The Aymara's devotion to his ancestral homeland remains
strong, and perhaps it has even been strengthened by his
reestablished freeholder status. Government attempts to
relieve land pressure on the Altiplano by colonization of
the lowlands have not been eminently successful among the
Aymaras, although there has been some spontaneous migration
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Figure 72. Aymara religious fiesta.
Traditional native costume is evident. Some
males are wearing modern garb.
Figure 73. Indian marketplace on the Altiplano.
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to the Yungas. Aymaras who have taken work in the mines con-
sider mining a short-time occupation, and most look forward
to returning to the life of a farmer.
A number of the character traits attributed to the
Aymaras cannot be taken at face value. For example, accounts
of their stupidity and inability to carry on a conversation
reflect more an effort to remain isolated than a lack of
intelligence. The Aymara often uses a shield of sullen
aloofness against outsiders. When among his fellows he dis-
cards this shield, revealing the lighter side of his nature.
They also characteristically demonstrate patience and forti-
tude in the face of considerable adversity.
Since 1952, reform measures have changed the formal
structure of society and legally eliminated its attendant
caste system. Indians are no longer considered Indians,
but campesinos. In informal relations, however, the Aymaras
are still at the lower end of the social scale, and their
suspicion of the outside remains.
b. Quechuas
Quechuas comprise the largest Indian group in Bolivia --
36 percent of the total population or approximately 1,350,000
persons. They are dispersed over a wider and more physically
varied area than the Aymaras, being found in the Altiplano as
well as the broad eastern valleys, in remote rural locales as
well as urban environments. They are not a homogenous ethnic
group. Many, especially those residing in isolated communi-
ties, consider themselves unique. The principal binding tie
is the Quechua language that was imposed on several divergent
groups of Indians by the Incas. Antagonism between Quechua
communities is not uncommon . In 1965 two Quechuan groups in
Potosi Department -- the Laimes and the Jucumanais -- for-
mally ended a decade of tribal bloodshed.
In physical appearance the Quechua resembles the Aymara,
giving rise to the possibility that they are of the same
racial stock (see Figure 74). Traditional Quechua dress,
however, is distinct from the Aymara and reflects a degree
of regional diversity through variations in color and design.
Males wear breeches, leaving the lower half of the leg bare.
An open shirt with a sleeveless jacket and poncho completes
the attire. Women wear a single skirt, an open shirt or
bodice, and a long cloak hanging down in back. The most
common headgear for women is a hard, high-crowned, white
straw hat (see Figure 75); in some localities the hat is black.
Both sexes carry coca leaves in a small woven pouch. The
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Figure 74. Male Quechua Indian.
Figure 75. High-crowned white
hat popularized by Quechua
women.
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native costume is still worn in isolated Quechua communities.
Elsewhere, particularly in the Cochabamba Valley, factory-
made clothes have been worn for many years, especially by
males.
The Roman Catholicism of the Quechuas blends Christianity
and paganism, though to a lesser degree than among the Aymaras.
The spiritual world of the Quechuas is less complex, and com-
munal religious observances with their attendant hierarchy
are lacking. Traditional dances and music played on aborigi-
nal instruments, considered much less colorful than those of
the Aymaras, survive only in remote Quechua communities.
Much of the Quechua music now heard throughout the Cochabamba
Valley comes from the tin pan alleys of La Paz. Weekly mar-
kets remain an important feature of Quechua life (see Figure
76), but the shops and stores of the larger towns are of
growing significance as the desire for modern industrial
products increases.
Patterns of land tenure in the Quechua areas differ con-
siderably from those of the northern Altiplano. Large haci-
endas with their exploitive and suppressive tendencies are
less common; a dense pattern of small farms is more charac-
teristic of the eastern valleys. Here, contacts between the
Indians and the whites and cholos are more frequent and
friendly. In fact many cholos are small subsistence farmers
whose level of living is no higher than that of the Indian.
Intermarriage between Indians and cholos on the same level
is not uncommon. This liaison with non-Indian elements has
made it relatively easy for the Quechuas to adapt to social
changes, to seek educational opportunities, and to partici-
pate in the national life. They have responded more readily
than the Aymaras to colonization attempts, and many thousands
have migrated to new lands in the Chapard region. Quechuas
have proven far more adaptable than Aymaras to the changes
produced by the 1952 revolution. In fact, the syndicatos,
or rural labor unions, which have been the most successful
agitators in effecting the agrarian reform act, began in the
Cochabamba Valley among both Quechua and cholo farmers.
There still remain, however, many thousands of Quechuas --
including many who worked as serfs on large haciendas prior
to agrarian reform and many others who still live in isolated
communities -- who exhibit the same self-repressive, sullen,
backward attributes that characterize the Aymaras.
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c. Minor Indian Groups
(1) Urus and Chipayas
Within the Aymara area live the remnants of two Indian
tribes with distinctive language and ethnic identities. The
Urus live along the banks of the Rio Desaguadero and the
nearby shores of Lago Titicaca, having lost their tribal
lands to the Aymara. Some actually dwell on reed rafts on
the lake itself. Intermarriage with Aymaras has reduced
their numbers, and the last pure-blooded Uru was reported
to have died in 1962. The remaining mixed bloods, though
few in number, still retain vestiges of Uru culture and live
apart from the Aymara community.
The second tribal group, the Chipayas of the Carangas
district in Oruro Department, inhabit the driest and least
hospitable part of the Altiplano, growing some crops, herd-
ing llamas, and bartering cheese to the Aymaras for potatoes
and quinoa. Many have learned to speak Aymara and use it in
preference to their own tongue. Intermarriage with neighbors
is increasing while adherence to their own culture suffers.
Perhaps there are no more than 300 Chipayas today, and they
seem destined to a fate similar to that of the Urus.
(2) Callahuayas
The Callahuayas of the province of Saavedra in northern
La Paz Department are a distinct group among Bolivian Indians.
Purportedly a subtribe of the Aymaras, they consider them-
selves a separate ethnic group. Certainly their way of life
and their achievements place them apart from the average
Aymara, if their race does not. The Callahuayas are the
famous traveling doctors of the Andes, wandering from Colombia
to Argentina to dispense a multitude of herbs and charms.
Through the centuries they have acquired a knowledge of the
many herbs and medicinal plants that grow in the Andes, and
their secrets remain closely guarded within the group. Their
once distinctive costume has been replaced by a European
style of dress. All that remains is the chuspa, or large,
finely woven shoulder bag in which herbal me icines and
charms of stone or silver are carried. In their journeys the
male Callahuayas travel in groups of eight to ten, while their
women remain at home. Their itineraries may last up to a
year or more. Formerly the range of these groups was much
greater than it is today. Barriers to international travel --
passports, visas, and identification cards -- now make it
bothersome, expensive, and increasingly difficult to travel
outside Bolivia.
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The census of 1950 and Bolivian statistical data since
that time have not recognized the cholo class. By unofficial
estimates, however, cholos comprised about 32 percent of the
total population or approximately 1,200,000 persons in 1966.
The most widespread of Bolivian ethnic and social groups,
they are found in relatively large numbers in all departments
of highland Bolivia, in urban as well as rural areas.
Cholos are primarily the products of intermarriage
between whites and Indians during colonial times. The term
cholo, however, also connotes a way of life. Many Indians,
either through necessity or desire, have discarded their own
ways for those of the cholo and are so identified. Due to
the loose definition of the group, there can be no composite
physical description of the cholo. It appears, however, that
in cases of intermarriage Indian characteristics tend to
dominate up to the third or the fifth generation (see Figure
Cholo males have adopted a modified Western style of
dress. The cholas (female) are not as susceptible to change
and their dress, for the most part, still is traditional.
It shows regional variations, on the Altiplano consisting
of several brightly colored knee-length skirts, a colorful
blouse, and a bowler-shaped felt hat (see Figure 78). In
the eastern valleys the skirts are longer and the hat is
straw, with a wide brim and a stovepipe crown, all painted
a gleaming white enamel.
Female conservatism is evident in fields other than
dress. Although cholos are bilingual, speaking both Spanish
and either Quechua or Aymara, the native language is pre-
served and preferred by women, even in urban areas where
Spanish is dominant. Adaptions of the Indian folk religion,
magic, and curing techniques that are a part of the cholo
background are perpetuated mostly by women. This is particu-
larly true in rural areas where the ancient gods still are
venerated to some extent. Cholo ceremonies are celebrated
only on a family basis, as with the Quechua, and they lack
the formal ritualism of the Aymara. In urban areas many
of these traditions have no practical application and tend
to lose their significance. Many urban cholos, however,
still rely on folk medicines and charms, most of which can
be bought in the markets of all large cities. In both urban
and rural areas, cholos celebrate the major religious events
of the year with as much fervor as the Indians.
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Figure 76. Indian market in
Cochabamba area. High-crowned
white hat is favored by women
in this area.
Figure 77. Cholo family in an
Altiplano mining community.
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Figure 78. Cholo wedding procession in
La Paz. Note modern garb of men and traditional
costume of women.
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The urban cholo usually works in a factory, in a service
industry, or is self-employed as an artisan or shopkeeper.
Many rural cholos are subsistence farmers, especially in the
Cochabamba Basin where they live side by side with Quechuas.
Many also are engaged in various trades serving rural areas,
and prior to 1952 it was the bilingual cholo who was employed
as administrator or overseer of the large haciendas.
A small, urban-oriented middle class composed of mer-
chants, white-collar workers, and professionals has recently
developed in Bolivia. Although persons in this class do not
conform to any specific social or cultural definitions, most
are from a cholo background. The principal exceptions to
this are certain immigrant groups who lack proper credentials
for inclusion in the upper class. They are set apart from
lower class urban cholos by occupation, a higher level of
education, and better living conditions. Salaries in this
group are meager, however, and barely suffice to sustain
living standards above the cholo and Indian classes.
Cholos, especially those in urban areas, enjoy a degree
of social mobility. Those who have attained a measure of
economic success can marry white persons. The children or
grandchildren of such unions usually will be accepted as
white, although the fact that they come from cholo stock is
not forgotten for two or three generations. Patience and a
lack of ostentation are necessary prerequisites for the cholo
who wishes to move up. Wealth alone is insufficient -- tin
magnate Simon Patino, the wealthiest Bolivian of the prerevo-
lutionary era, was never accepted by the elite. In the belief
that cholos were social climbers bent on usurping white domi-
nance, the elite promulgated the concept of the cholo stereo-
type as a halfbreed retaining only the worst traits of both
ancestors.
e. White or Upper Class
About 15 percent of the total population is considered to
be white. In the strictest sense, the Bolivian upper class
is composed of a small, elite group of families who claim
Spanish, or in some cases, European descent. Proper lineage
is vitally important, but inasmuch as intermarriage between
Spaniards and Indian women was common in the colonial era,
the existence of some Indian blood is not a detriment. This
explains, in part, the acceptance of cholos who marry into
the white class. Nevertheless, Caucasian features and a
strong Hispanic background are accorded the highest values
(see Figures 79 and 80).
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Figure 79. White aristocracy dominates the
military hierarchy.
Figure 80. Street scene in La Paz. Many
persons have strongly Caucasian features.
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The Bolivian elite, also referred to as La Rosca, is
urban oriented. Palatial homes are maintained in La Paz,
Cochabamba, and other large cities of the highlands. For-
eign residences also are maintained, and fluency in French,
German, and English is not uncommon. Although scholastic
achievement is not rated highly, it is considered a mark of
achievement to send one's children to private schools in
Europe or North America.
Throughout most of Bolivian history the elite held a
virtual monopoly on the wealth, the land, and national
political power. The 1952 revolution, however, stripped them
of their leadership, and the subsequent agrarian reform appro-
priated most of their extensive landholdings. Those who kept
their wealth in foreign banks and enterprises have been able
to' retain their level of living. Others simply emigrated,
to live in opulence abroad. Some have attempted to cultivate
cordial relations with individuals in the new government.
Their effective power has been sharply eroded, however, and
their influence is but a fraction of what it once was.
3. Lowland Groups
The dominant racial group in the sparsely populated low-
lands of eastern Bolivia are a mestizo people. Because of-
the physical isolation of the area from highland Bolivia, a
different culture has developed. There never has been any
fusion between the cholo, or highland mestizo, and the low-
land mestizo. Natives of the Santa Cruz area consider the
Bolivian highlanders, whom they call kollas, inferior and
resent their presence when they migrate to the lowlands.
In the densely settled areas of Santa druz, mestizos are
known as cambas. The physical characteristics of both Indian
and Spanish ood are evident, but the Spanish culture is
dominant (see Figures 81 through 84). The language is Spanish,
religion is an orthodox Roman Catholicism, and dress is West-
ern in style. Little remains of anything aboriginal. Mes-
tizos in other lowland areas probably are similar in racial
and cultural attributes, although they have different names.
For example, in the southeast the chapacos, who are a blend
of the Spaniards and the Tomatas Indians, are the dominant
rural element; mestizos in the Chapare' region are commonly
called yuras.
The majority of lowland mestizos are subsistence farmers,
tenant farm laborers, or squatters. Land always has been
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Figure 81. Mestizo girls in the Beni area.
Figure 82. Mestizo children of
Riberalta. Note variations in
the dominance of Spanish and
Indian ancestry.
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Figure 83. Mestizo boy of Santa Cruz region.
Note dominant Caucasian features.
Figure 84. Mestizo boy of Santa Cruz region.
Note dominant Indian features.
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plentiful and, if one so desired, he could become a freeholder.
People in the lowlands lead a leisurely life, perhaps in tune
with the climate. It is relatively easy to grow enough food
for one's family, and limited markets provide no stimulus to
overproduce. The growth of colonies in the Santa Cruz area
has not yet affected this traditional way of life.
The exact number of Indians in the Eastern Lowlands, in
1950 estimated at 87,000, is not known. They are a vanishing
race, however, and are widely dispersed, living in or near
settlements as well as existing as forest nomads. Many of
the 27 individual tribal groupings contain less than 1,000
persons. The Sirionos, probably the most numerous, are
approximately 8,000 strong.
The typical Indian of the lowlands ranges in height from
5 feet to 5 feet 4 inches and has dark features. In some
there is a distinct Mongoloid tendency (see Figures 85 and
86). In the forest habitat their clothing is minimal. Upon
absorption into more civilized groups, they adopt the local
dress -- usually shirt and pants for. men and a long cotton
dress for women. Feet are bare (see Figures 87 and 88).
Contact between lowland and highland Indians may have
existed at one time, but in general, topographic barriers
prevented any extensive intermingling. In the colonial era
contacts between forest Indians and Spaniards were apparently
more frequent than today. Jesuit missionaries made extensive
inroads into the Eastern Lowlands in the 17th century, con-
verting many of the natives and bringing them into missions.
With the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, many Indians fled
back to the forest, forgetting Christianity and resuming a
nomadic life. For many this was their only means of protec-
tion. Without the Jesuits they fell prey to the exploitation
of colonists and adventurers. The rubber and quinine booms
of the last 100 years brought in groups of immigrants seeking
a quick profit. In many cases-they enslaved the Indians and
forced them to work under brutal conditions. Faced with
abusive treatment and ravaged by new diseases, their numbers
dwindled.
Those who by force or choice move into settlements or are
absorbed by the advance of the frontier retain little of
their aboriginal culture. A few small groups remain under
the protection of Catholic missions. The Summer Institute
of Linguistics, operating from a base near Riberalta, pro-
vides medical assistance and limited education to a number
of tribes and devises alphabets for the tribal languages.
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Figure 85. Chacobo Indians of Beni area.
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Figure 86. Chacobo Indian family group.
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Figure 87. Movima Indians who have adopted
Western dress.
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Figure 88. Movima Indians who have adopted
Western dress.
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A number of Indians still live completely outside the
national life, leading a nomadic existence deep in the for-
ests. Isolated cases of exploitation and even slavery still
can be found. When faced with the encroachment of civiliza-
tion, the Indians either retreat deeper into the forest or
adjust to the new life. The Yuracare Indians of the Chapar6
region exemplify the latter. Here spontaneous settlement
from the Cochabamba area is taking place, and in response
to this the Yuracare have developed a degree of fluency in
Spanish, have accepted employment on riverboats and ranches,
and sell some fruits and vegetables to passing boats. They
do not maintain permanent homes, however, reflecting the
strong nomadic tendency in their background.
c. White or Upper Class
The elite of lowland Bolivia are proportionally much
smaller in number than their counterpart in the highlands.
It is probable that this group is of purer Caucasian stock
since there was less intermarriage here than in the high-'
lands. The lowland elite have had little contact with the
rest of Bolivia and the outside world, and they have main-
tained friendly relations with lower classes in the area.
Wealth is not considered important since there is not much
to spend money on; similarly the control of land is less
attractive when land is so plentiful. The ability to com-
mand a large labor force, however, is an important indica-
tor of power. Because of the abundance of land and the lack
of friction between peasant and master, agrarian reform has
not made extensive inroads into lowland Bolivia where large
haciendas remain.
The illiteracy rate in 1950 was nearly 70 percent. In
1952 the revolutionary government had the improvement of
education as one of its more important objectives. A number
of government agencies were formed to implement educational
policies and the Code of Education was enacted in 1955.
Literacy courses were started in factories and other places
of employment. Official estimates indicate that the illit-
eracy rate today remains close to 70 percent indicating
that efforts of the past decade are just about keeping pace
with the rate of population growth.
There are many reasons for this lack of progress. Pub-
lic education cannot be significantly improved as long as
both economic and political instability characterize the
country. Funds are often unavailable to provide adequate
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supplies of textbooks, pencils, and notebooks. Many schools
lack benches or desks (see Figures 89 and 90). Rural areas,
where the bulk of the populace resides and where illiteracy
rates are highest, suffer the most. Many rural communities
are so scattered and small that it is impractical to provide
teachers and schools. Many children have learned only Aymara
or Quechua at home; consequently, they first must learn
Spanish. Conversely, the teacher should be bilingual.
Although there is some degree of public apathy toward
education among the rural poor, there is no dearth of stu-
dents when facilities are available. Many rural families
send their children to live with relatives or friends in
town simply to attend school, further overcrowding the limited
urban facilities. Rural communities usually respond quickly
to Government appeals for self-help in school construction.
The Bolivian Indian appears more receptive to education,
especially that which imparts vocational skills, than his
counterpart in other Latin American countries. The desire
for schooling is strong among cholos for they realize that
an education is a practical means of improving their economic
and social status. Though barely literate themselves, cholo
parents attempt to provide as much education for their chil-
dren as possible.
Privately sponsored schools, especially those run by the
Roman Catholic Church, are an important complement to the
public school system. In the early 1960's approximately 20
percent of the entire student population was enrolled in
parochial schools. The Roman Catholic Church has been espe-
cially prominent in promoting literacy. Maryknoll fathers
reach a considerable number of Indians by radio with Spanish
literacy classes from La Paz in Aymara and from Cochabamba
in Quechua.
Secondary education, consisting of both academic and
vocational schools, is as yet of little importance in Bolivia.
Enrollment requires at least four years of primary education,
and few Bolivians attain this level. Most vocational schools,
including teacher training schools, are operated by the Govern-
ment, while more than half of the academic schools are private.
Secondary schools usually are located only in the larger towns
and cities.
There are seven universities in Bolivia (one in each of
the departmental capitals except Trinidad and Cobija) but
only a minute proportion of the population is able to gain
university training. Standards are generally low. Most
professors and students must work full time at other jobs.
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Figure 89. Outdoor classroom in Cochabamba area.
Figure 90. Outdoor
classroom on the
Altiplano.
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Thus, classes are concentrated in the early morning and late
afternoon and evening hours, and there is little time for
homework.
U. Religion
More than 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic.
Minority groups include relatively small numbers of Protes-
tants, Jews, assorted eastern faiths, and nomadic tribes of
the lowlands practicing a primitive animism. The Bolivian
Government recognizes Roman Catholicism as the state religion,
although it does not prohibit other faiths. The Catholic
Church receives financial assistance from the state, and
religious education is a part of the public school curricu-
lums although non-Catholics are not compelled to attend.
Despite the apparent dominance of the Catholic Church,
its influence on communicants is weakened by the small size
of its clerical force.. The number of parishes and of priests
has failed to keep pace with the growth of the population.
The high ratio of dropouts at the country's four seminaries
indicates a lack of interest among Bolivians in a religious
career. The void has been partially filled by various reli-
gious orders, notably the Franciscans, Maryknollers, Jesuits,
and Redemptorists. Although much of their activity is
directed toward education and charitable works, many also are
active in parish work in rural areas, often taking the place
of the regularly assigned priest who may not appear in the
area more than a few times a year. Most of these religious
orders are composed of non-Bolivians, with Spaniards, North
Americans, and Italians the most numerous foreign groups.
The practice of Catholicism in Bolivia varies among
social and ethnic classes. The white elite considers reli-
gion to be the sphere of women. The Latin ideal of mascu-
linity does not include religious devotions, and strict adher-
ence to religious practices is discouraged among boys once
they reach adolescence. Ceremonial observances are honored,
but the depth of religiosity beyond these outward manifesta-
tions is not considered great.
The Indian was never completely converted to Catholicism.
Although Catholicism was accepted, preconquest pagan beliefs
were retained. The Catholic Church tends to ignore a wide
range of secular behavior providing certain religious forms
are recognized. Thus, the Indian remains a deeply supersti-
tious person, fully believing in the supernatural, utilizing
charms and fetishes, and consulting witch doctors and divin-
ers rather than the clergy. The Indian looks upon Catholic
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rites and celebrations primarily as social outlets. Fiestas,
held on the numerous saints' days, frequently become little
more than drinking sprees.
Pagan beliefs involve a wide variety of spirits that
affect nearly every aspect of daily life. Though common to
all Indians, they are strongest among the Aymara. Spirits
are believed to reside in physical locations such as moun-
tains, rivers, and caves. An Indian, upon approaching such
a spot, will uncover and bow his head, kneel, and offer a
few coca leaves. Whirling dust caused by the wind is
believed to indicate the presence of a spirit. A witnessing
Indian will fall on his knees and pray for protection. One
cannot travel long in highland Bolivia without viewing a
ceremony in honor of the best known of the spirits -- Pacha-
mama, or mother earth, a goddess often confused with the
Virgin Mary. Veneration of her is especially important dur-
ing planting and harvesting in order to insure a good crop.
A special day for honoring Pachamama is set aside each year,
usually during Holy Week. The famous Indian god Ekkako,
meaning good fortune, also has survived. The Catholic
Church initially tried to eliminate the worship of Ekkako,
but having failed, accepted the cult to the extent of set-
ting aside a special day (24 January) for worship of this
spirit. It has now become one of the more popular holidays
of the year among all highland Bolivians. The Carnival,
preceding Lent, however, is the biggest of the annual fiestas,
bringing forth the most expensive costumes and perhaps the
highest consumption of liquor.
The Catholicism of the cholo is not easily defined. In
theory, to be considered a cholo one must have divested
himself of Indian ways, including pagan beliefs. In practice,
however, especially in rural areas, cholos frequently utilize
the services of a magician, diviner, or curer, and may even
present offerings to Pachamama. The cholo also may reject
overtly all Indian beliefs simply to gain social acceptance,
but secretly retain his belief in certain spirits.
Protestant missionary activity began in Bolivia in the
late 1880's. Since then a number of denominations, includ~
ing fundamentalist groups, have been active. The Seventh
Day Adventists, who have concentrated their efforts among
Indians in the Lago Titicaca region, are today the largest
Protestant denomination. The other two most active denomina-
tions are the Methodists and the Canadian Baptists. Rates
of conversion are not impressive -- the Protestant community
in 1962 was barely one percent of the population. Since
prestige is lost by such a change in a predominantly Catholic
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community, those converted usually hold firm convictions and
seldom revert. Religious freedom has been officially pro-
claimed since 1906, but there remains a degree of friction
between the established Church and Protestant elements.
E. Living Conditions
1. Housing
Substandard housing is the rule in rural areas throughout
Bolivia. Dwellings are small, overcrowded, and without the
most basic essentials. Construction materials reflect the
physical resources of the particular area. Adobe -- a sun-
dried brick composed of straw, sticks, and mud -- is most
common. On the Altiplano, roofs are of straw or, in the
vicinity of Lago Titicaca, of totora weed (see Figure 91).
In the lowlands palm or bamboo wood is as basic a building
material as adobe; roofs are of palm leaves (see Figures 92,
93, and 94). Floors of packed earth and a lack of windows
and toilet facilities are country-wide characteristics.
Rural homes serve mainly as dormitories and storage
areas. Cooking facilities, using dry dung, cornstalks,
llareta, or wood for fuel, are in a shed or lean-to apart
from the house (see Figure 95). In the highlands most domes-
tic duties are carried on outdoors against a sun-facing wall
rather than in the cold, cramped, dark quarters of the hut.
One can travel across the Altiplano on a winter's morning
and see Indian families emerge from their unheated huts to
warm themselves in the sun.
Beds are unknown throughout most of rural Bolivia. The
Altiplano Indian sleeps on a hard mud platform, completely
clothed, covered by a sheep pelt or a homespun, ruglike
piece of wool. In the lowlands, woven straw mats are spread
out on the floor and hammocks also are employed. Outdoor
sleeping is not uncommon. Screens are not used because it
is believed they limit the circulation of air.
Water, whether for drinking, cooking, or washing, is
obtained from natural sources (see Figure 96). Since these
sources also are used for sewage disposal, pollution is
widespread. In the lowlands, pauros -- tanks excavated in
the ground and filled with water during the rainy season --
provide a reservoir for stagnant and polluted water.
In the restricted suburbs of La Paz and Cochabamba the
Bolivian upper class and resident foreigners enjoy living
conditions that approach middle class American standards.
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Figure 91. Thatch-roofed,
adobe Indian dwelling on
the Altiplano.
Figure 92. Thatch-roofed, adobe mestizo dwelling
in Santa Cruz area.
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Figure 93. Thatch-roofed wooden dwelling
Chapare' area.
Figure 94. Thatch-roofed hut in Santa Cruz area.
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Figure 95. Separate kitchen. Santa Cruz area.
Figure 96. Outdoor laundry
on the Rio Caranavi.
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Elsewhere, substandard housing characterizes all of Bolivia's
large towns, cities,'and mining communities. Multiple-unit
dwellings, usually two-story buildings and sometimes made
over from large single homes, are common. Families occupy
one room that opens in the back onto an enclosed patio. If
there is piped water, it will consist of one spigot in the
patio that is used by all families (see Figure 97). Latrines,
if available, are also in the patio. Although there are
some modern apartment buildings in La Paz and Cochabamba,
adequate housing for middle class technical and semiprofes-
sional workers is scarce. Slums and squatter settlements,
the homes of impoverished urban dwellers and rural migrants
seeking employment, fester on the fringes of all the cities
and towns. The latter usually find themselves living in
squalor far worse than they left behind in the country (see
Figure 98).
Mining communities, though uniformly drab, provide a
somewhat better environment. These usually are company-
built towns with barrackslike rows of adobe or concrete
dwellings separated into one- and two-room apartments (see
Figure 99). They normally are rent free to the miners, and
have some lighting and ventilation along with primitive
water and sanitation facilities.
Despite the cold of the Altiplano, indoor heating of
any kind is as unknown in the cities of Bolivia as in the
hut of the poorest campesino. One reason is the scarcity of
fuel, but there is also a widespread belief that bronchial
difficulties will result if one sits in a heated room. It
is not uncommon for Bolivians to spend many indoor hours
wearing heavy sweaters and outercoats.
Health and sanitation conditions in Bolivia are among the
worst in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts by governmental
agencies, assisted by United States and United Nations aid
programs, to improve health conditions are often lost on a
populace that is ignorant of even the most elemental rules
of hygiene. The physical environment serves to intensify
the health problem -- high altitudes and chill temperatures
of the Altiplano engender respiratory disorders, while the
warm, humid lowlands breed a variety of disease-carrying
pests and intestinal parasites. Mortality rates (at least
20 per 1,000) and infant mortality rates (300 to 400 per
1,000) are high, and the average life expectancy is only 44
to 45 years.
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Figure 97. Single water tap supplying all residents
of a city block in town of Pulacayo.
Figure 98. One of many Indian slums of La Paz.
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Figure 99. Worker's housing at Catavi
Tin Mine.
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Although the ratio of physicians to the population in
the larger cities is low (9.7 per 10,000), it far exceeds
the deplorable rural ratio (1.8 per 10,000). Fully 80 per-
cent of Bolivian doctors live in the larger urban areas.
Hospitals and clinics are grossly inadequate and also are
concentrated in urban areas.
The highland Indian is noted for his physical endurance,
particularly his ability to travel long distances afoot with
little sustenance. Despite this physical vigor, malnutrition
lowers his resistance to the variety of ailments that con-
stantly threaten him. Caloric intake, even for individuals
performing hard physical labor, generally averages under
2,000 calories a day. Starchy foods make up the bulk of
the diet and enormous quantities of potatoes are consumed
on the Altiplano where the harsh climate and meager soil
will support little else. Even in the verdant lands of the
eastern valleys and the lowlands, however, few vegetables
are grown, and high starch foods such as yuca, rice, and
bananas are favored. Improvements that might result from
an adequate diet are indicated in the records of Bolivian
army conscripts, most of whom are Indians. Conscripts add
an average of 2 inches to their height and 25 pounds to their
weight during their time in service.
Working conditions and practices among the lower classes
contribute to further health problems. The Indian custom of
carrying heavy loads over long distances, begun in childhood,
produces bad posture, round shoulders, and flat chests.
Additional bodily strains are placed on women who toil for
long hours in the fields in a stooped position and on miners
who work with pick and shovel in cramped quarters (see
Figures 100 and 101). Miners also are prone to silicosis
from the inhalation of dust-laden air.
Ignorance of and disregard for personal hygiene are
major contributing factors in the spread of disease, espe-
cially respiratory and alimentary infections. The lack of
personal cleanliness among the highland Indians is difficult
to imagine. Face and hands are rarely washed and baths are
never taken. There is, of course, little inducement for
bathing in melted snow in the cold and raw Altiplano. Bath-
ing is more common in the warmer climate of the Yungas and
lowlands. The highland Indian wears the same clothes day
and night, never changing garments until they literally fall
off. Lice, fleas, and other body pests are common. Because
of inadequate or nonexistent sewage facilities and the drink-
ing of polluted water, few people are free of worms.
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Figure 100. Primitive mining practices.
Figure 101. Primitive mining practices.
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The belief persists that residents of the Altiplano, espe-
cially Indians, cannot adapt to life in the tropical lowlands.
Successful colonization by Altiplano Indians at lower eleva-
tions, however, belies the claim that long residence in the
thin air of high altitudes makes one physically unable to
live at or near sea level. The Indian's past dislike of the
lowlands was due largely to the various tropical diseases of
which he had no knowledge and little resistance. If adequate
protection is provided against yellow fever, malaria, bubonic
plague, typhoid, typhus, and Chagas' disease -- all present
in tropical Bolivia -- and adequate time is allowed for
adaptation to changes in clothing, diet, and climate, there
is no physical reason why the Altiplano Indian cannot live
in the lowlands.
The chewing of coca leaves, a widespread habit among
the highland Indians and fairly common among the cholos, is
rarely practiced in the lowlands. The habit, contracted
early in life, is common to both sexes. The traditional
view is that without coca the Indian could not survive the
rigors of his daily life. Others maintain that coca has a
deleterious effect, dulling the Indian's senses and lowering
his resistance to sickness.
In the absence of modern medical practices and facilities,
folk beliefs are common, especially among the highland Indians
who have a host of primitive curative measures. Even in the
markets of cosmopolitan La Paz, dried llama foetuses and
other items for medicinal uses can be purchased. While some
of these practices appear bizarre, modern science recognizes
the value of certain Andean herbs. Such well-known drugs as
quinine and ipecac originally were used by the Bolivian
Indian. The most famous of the Bolivian herbalists are the
Callahuayas, traveling medicine men who wander the length
of the Andes, dispensing their curative powers. No fair or
market in Bolivia is complete without the Callahuaya with
his numerous wares spread out before him.
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III. The Economy
By almost any statistical measure, Bolivia is one of the
poorest and most backward countries in Latin America. Per
capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) amounted to only $230 in
1967 -- second only to Haiti in Latin America and lowest in
South America. More than 60 percent of its population is
illiterate, and most of the rural population participate only
marginally in the money economy. The country's poverty and
shortage of employment opportunities have prompted large scale
emigration to Argentina during the past 20 years.
Although most of its land is too high, dry, rugged, or
inaccessible for easy farming, Bolivia otherwise has a favor-
able natural resource endowment. The country has extensive
forests, substantial mineral resources, a large hydroelectric
potential, and significant deposits of petroleum and natural
gas. Bolivia is the largest producer of tin in the Western
Hempisphere and also produces important amounts of other
minerals, but a large portion of its resources remain untapped.
Bolivia's difficulties in developing its natural potential
reflect not only the rugged and inhospitable terrain and the
isolation of some regions but also an inadequate transportation
system, a history of inept government and revolutionary dis-
turbances, insufficient capital resources, a severe shortage
of managerial and technical skills, and the small size of the
domestic market.
In the first years after the Revolution of 1952, the
economy suffered from both rampant inflation and declining pro-
duction under the misguided policies of the new government.
A harsh economic stabilization program brought inflation under
control in 1957 and helped to create conditions for Bolivian
exports improved. At present, monetary stability is one of
Bolivia's greatest economic strengths.
During 1961-67, the economy grew at an average rate of
more than 5 percent annually, and by 1965 per capita GDP had
regained its pre-revolutionary level. The principal factors
underlying this growth were rising levels of foreign trade
and increased investment both by private firms and by the public
sector -- the latter supported by improved fiscal performance
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and by inflows of foreign aid. In 1967, a satisfactory rate
of growth was maintained because of a surge in petroleum pro-
duction -- the result of large investments by Gulf Oil. In
1968, in spite of increased public investment, the growth
rate declined to 4.5 percent as petroleum production leveled
off and prices for Bolivia's other exports continued to decline.
The Bolivian economy is generally dependent on imports
for all but the most elementary consumer durables, and imports
also supply all of its capital equipment. Despite considerable
success in boosting exports, the expansion of imports has
given rise to deficits on the current account in most recent
years. Moreover, continued heavy dependence on exports of tin
has subjected the economy to severe fluctuations in export
earnings as world demand for the metal has changed.
Bolivia faces serious problems in maintaining a reasonably
high rate of economic growth. Prices for Bolivia's exports
have declined from the high levels of 1965 and 1966 and are
expected to decline further. Long term economic growth will
require agricultural improvement, further expansion and diver-
sification of exports, and the development of the transportation
system. The nations most important need is adequate capital
to develop resources. This capital must come from foreign
sources because domestic savings, though increasing, are clearly
inadequate. Bolivia's future development, therefore, will be
determined largely by its ability to attract sufficient
quantities of private foreign capital and by the availability
of concessionary financing from the US government and inter-
national financial organizations.
1. Economic Power and Control
The Bolivian government exercises a degree of control
over the economy that is above average in Latin America.
Government ownership of economic enterprises is widespread
and extends into all nonagricultural sectors. Government-
owned economic enterprises usually account for about 20 per-
cent of GDP. Control also is exercised through government
direction of the distribution and marketing of petroleum
and a few basic consumer goods, price support programs for
some crops, fiscal and monetary policies.
The five principal economic enterprises of the Central
government are as follows: The Bolivian Mining Corp. (COMIBOL),
The Bolivian State Petroleum Co. (YPFB), the National Railroad
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Enterprise (ENF), the national airline (Lloyd Aereo Boliviano-
LAB), and the Bolivian Development Corporation (CFB). Of
these, by far the most important is COMIBOL (see Section 4
below). The government also has established monopolies to
sell alcohol, matches, and salt. Since 1962, the establishment
of public-owned plants for the production of sulfuric acid,
cement, sugar, and milk and the provision of equity capital
for numerous private enterprises have extended government
ownership to a significant share of manufacturing. Selective
guidance of private sector production has been provided by
protective tariffs for domestic manufactures and government
supported marketing cooperatives for rice and for wool and
hair products.
Since 1960, the government has engaged in developmental
planning. It devised a 10-year plan for 1962-71 and 2-year
plans for 1963-64 and 1965-66 as guides to economic expansion.
These plans, however, proved too vague and unrealistic to
provide an adequate basis for establishing investment priorities
or for obtaining foreign aid. In 1966, they were replaced by
a series of plans for specific public investment projects,
chiefly in transportation, electric power, and agriculture.
After the Revolution of 1952, the economic power of the
once powerful large landowners and mine-owners was almost
completely eliminated. Although a considerable part of
Bolivia's mineral production remains in private hands, pri-
vate mines tend to be small. The most important private
company in the nation is the US-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil Company
(see Section 4 below) which became the country's largest pe-
troleum producer in 1967.
2. Employment and Labor
The labor force -- defined in Bolivia as the economically
active population of age 10 and older -- was estimated in mid-
1965 at 1,851,000, or somewhat less than half the total
population. Females constitute about 43 percent of this group.
Almost 70 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture,
forestry or fishing; mining employs slightly more than 3 per-
cent, manufacturing 8 percent, commerce and services a little
more than 15 percent.
Labor productivity is low in almost every branch of the
Bolivian economy and is possibly the lowest in South America.
Bolivia has few vocational schools, and those that exist
produce a very limited number of graduates. Only a minority
of the labor force is literate and only about 5 percent have
advanced technical or professional skills. Some improvements
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in productivity, especially in petroleum, construction, and
medium-scale agriculture, have been made since 1965.
Although overt unemployment is low (estimated at about 4
percent in 1963), underemployment is endemic, especially in
seasonal and subsistence agriculture. When adjustments are
made for these factors, total unemployment may range as high
as 17 percent. The problem is exacerbated by the concentration
of the population in the highlands, where opportunities for
increased employment are limited. At the same time, a labor
shortage exists in the underpopulated agricultural areas of
the eastern plains. In the manufacturing sector, estimates
during the early 1960's indicated that the average industrial
plant was overstaffed by 10 percent and some by as much as
90 percent.
Almost all aspects of employment conditions are regulated
by the Labor Law of 1942, and its amendments, supplemented by
some more recent legislation. The code contains provisions
governing the form and content of individual and collective
contracts; special requirements for the employment of women,
minors, apprentices, homeworkers, and domestic servants; safety
and hygienic standards; general conditions of work, including
wages, hours, and vacations; and the right to organize. The
provisions of the code have not always been upheld in practice.
Between 40 and 50 percent of all economically active Bolivians
belong to trade unions or peasant leagues. The most important
and powerful organizations are the Trade Union Federation of
Mine Workers of Bolivia, the General Confederation of Factory
Workers of Bolivia, and the Confederation of Railroad Workers
of Bolivia. Acting together, these three unions are able to
paralyze the Bolivian economy, an ability they have displayed
several times in the past 15 years. Since the 1965 labor reform,
which included military intervention in the mining districts,
the power of the mineworkers' unions has been held in check.
Although the leadership and orientation of Bolivia's most
important unions has been traditionally of the far left, the
power of the extremist elements has greatly decreased in recent
years.
3. Agriculture
Bolivian agriculture is the least efficient and most back-
ward in South America. Although employing 67 percent of the
labor force, agriculture provides only about 22 percent of GDP
and is unable to supply the population's food requirements.
The Bolivian diet remains one of the poorest in the hemisphere.
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Major factors restraining agricultural development are the
shortage of fertile land in the populated regions, the limited
size of the commercial market for agricultural products,
primitive farming methods, and the inadequacy of facilities for
transporting crops and livestock products to urban markets.
Prior to the Revolution of 1952, Bolivian agriculture was
dominated by large estates worked by peasants who received the
use of small plots. During the revolution, these estates
were seized and broken up into very small, owner-occupied farms.
While involving social and political benefits, the land reform
has created economic problems in the Altiplano and Cochabamba
areas, where many holdings are too small to provide more than a
bare subsistence level of production. In addition, irrigation
facilities, terracing, and other fixed investments were allowed
to fall into disrepair.
The government's recent agrarian reform efforts have con-
centrated on colonizing thinly populated areas in the eastern
lowlands. To expand production and relieve overcrowded
conditions in western Bolivia, the government has assisted the
migration of settlers and has constructed roads to broaden access
to new areas. Although the rate of migration has accelerated
during the past decade, the total number of migrants still is
disappointingly small.
Most of Bolivia's agricultural output consists of subsistence
crops consumed by the producer or bartered in local markets.
Potatoes are the major subsistence crop in the Altiplano and
valley areas. Corn is important both in the eastern lowlands
and in the valley areas. Other important subsistence crops are
quinoa (an Andean grain), manioc, sweet potatoes, barley, and
bananas. Traditionally, the major commercial crops have been
wheat, coffee, citrus fruits, and coca. Wheat production has
been slowly declining since 1956 because of the competition of
cheaper imported wheat flour. Bolivian coffee, produced in the
Yungas region north of La Paz, is potentially one of the highest
quality coffees in the world. Although production is increasing
under the impetus of a government program, the nation has not yet
been able to fill its 50,000 bag export quota under the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement. Coca, a narcotic consumed by
virtually all adult Bolivian Indians, is still an important
commercial crop in spite of government discouragement.
Since the completion of the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway
in 1954, which opened the market of Cochabamba and La Paz to
agricultural products from the eastern lowlands, commercial
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production of rice, sugar, and cotton has become increasingly
important. Most of Bolivia's recent gains in agricultural
production have been made on the relatively efficient medium-
sized commercial farms in this area. For example, total rice
production rose from about 28,000 metric tons in 1954 to an
estimated 66,000 metric tons in 1968. Similar gains have been
made in cotton and sugar production, although the annual
variation in sugar output is somewhat greater than for other
crops.
Cattle are raised in all parts of Bolivia, but commercial
beef production is centered in the eastern lowlands. The
estimated cattle population of 2.5 million is of poor quality
and disease and insect infestations are endemic. Although
sheep number somewhat over 5 million, there is little commer-
cial production of mutton or wool. Both the llama and alpaca
are common in the Altiplano, where they are used as a source
of food, wool, and fuel and as beasts of burden.
4. Industry (Mining, Fuels and Power, Manufacturing)
Because of Bolivia's extensive reserves of nonferrous metals,
the nation's market economy has been dominated by the mining
sector. It is the largest producer of tin in the Western
Hemisphere and also produces commercially significant amounts
of antimony, bismuth, lead, tungsten, zinc, and silver, as well
as small quantities of copper, sulfur, cadmium, and gold. In
addition to its nonferrous mineral resources, Bolivia has a
large, unexploited deposit of high-grade iron ore estimated at
40 billion tons of iron, or about 10 percent of known world
reserves. This deposit, which is located in a remote region
near Corumba on the Brazilian frontier, has a high silica content
that makes its exploitation uneconomic at present.
In 1966, mining and mineral processing accounted for 12 per-
cent of GDP and employed about 4 percent of the labor force.
Mineral ores, concentrates, and refined metals accounted for a
little more than 80 percent of export earnings in 1968. Mining
in Bolivia remains difficult and costly, however, because of
extreme difficulties of access to the mineral deposits. High
production costs have made the level of output very sensitive
to changes in world market prices for metals. In addition,
inadequate supplies of fuels and electric power have hampered
the development of mineral processing.
The mining industry is dominated by the Bolivian Mining
Corporation (COMIBOL), a government enterprise that took over
control of the three largest tin-producing companies (Patino,
Aramayo, and Hochschild) when the revolutionary government
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nationalized these companies in 1952. COMIBOL accounts for
about 60 percent of value added in mineral production and
processing as well as 60 percent of the value of mineral
exports. It is by far the largest enterprise in Bolivia,
accounting for about 5 percent of GDP and employing about
23,000 men directly and an additional-10,000-12,000 men
who supply ore on a contract basis.
In addition to the 20 mines operated by COMIBOL, the
private sector operates some 64 medium and 3,000 small mines.
These private mines produce almost all of Bolivia's antimony,
gold, and sulfur, over 50 percent of the lead, zinc, and
copper, and about 30 percent of the tin.
Bolivia ranks eighth among the 20 Latin American republics
in the production of primary commercial energy. Production
in 1966 was equivalent to 1.1 million tons of coal. A large
portion of output, however, is exported in the form of crude
petroleum. Consumption of commercial energy was only about
180 kg. per capita in 1966, the lowest in South America
except for Paraguay.
The nation's proved petroleum reserves of more than 240
million barrels are exploited by these firms: the Bolivian
State Petroleum Co. (YPFB), the Bolivian Oil Company, a small
firm owned by US and Argentine interests, and the Bolivian
Gulf: Oil Company, a subsidiary of the US-owned Gulf Oil
Corporation. Production increased from about 500,000 barrels
in 1.952 to 3.6 million barrels in 1957. After remaining
stagnant for almost a decade, petroleum output nearly doubled
in 1966 as the result of sizeable investments by the Bolivian
Gulf Oil Company. In 1967, Gulf production quadrupled and
raised national production to 14.5 million barrels. Production
of YPFB declined, however, reflecting the failure to discover
new major oilfields and the gradual exhaustion of existing
deposits. In 1967, about 72 percent of production was exported,
most by way of a pipeline to the Chilean port of Arica.
Bolivia also has natural gas deposits estimated at about 2
trillion cubic feet. Natural gas will become an important
export when the Argentine-Bolivian gasline is completed in 1970.
The importance of the electric power industry to the national
economy lies principally in the fact that it is the primary
energy source for tin, lead, and zinc mining. In 1966 total
installed capacity was 185,000 kilowatts (kw.), and production
was an estimated 575 million kilowatt-hours (kw.-hr.). About
60 percent of capacity and 80 percent of production were pro-
vided by hydroelectric installations; the remaining 40 percent
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of capacity consists almost entirely of internal combustion
powerplants (diesel and gas turbine). There is no regional
or national transmission network.
Although Bolivia's manufacturing sector is still fairly
rudimentary, its structure has been changing. Factory output
now exceeds that of handicrafts, and industries producing
intermediate goods are increasingly important. Production has
expanded at an average rate-of 5 percent to 6 percent per year
since 1959. The greatest relative advances have occurred in
the areas of lumber and lumber products, chemicals, and
machinery; however, food processing, textiles, beverages and
tobacco, and building materials still account for the major
portion of value added by the manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing, nevertheless, is still beset by a number
of problems. Low utilization of capacity is endemic, along
with small-scale equipment, poor plant layout, obsolete
technology, and poor managerial skills. Fuel and electric
power are scarce and costly. Credit is inadequate. Generally
low income levels and the fact that about half the population
is outside the money economy restrict demand for manufactures.
Legal and illegal imports of cheaper goods from Peru, Argentina,
and Brazil compete with Bolivian manufactures.
5. Finance, Investment, and Banking
Perhaps Bolivia's greatest economic achievement has been
its successful fight against inflation. A stabilization
program, initiated in 1956, replaced a controlled system of
multiple exchange rates with a free exchange rate; sharply
reduced the budget deficit; limited Central Bank financing
of deficits of the autonomous government agencies; reduced
credit to the private sector; eliminated government price
controls and subsidies on consumer goods; and liberalized
regulations regarding private imports, exports, and exchange
payments. As a result of the program, the cost of living,
which has approximately doubled each year from 1953 to 1957,
became relatively stable. Only in one year, 1959, did the
cost of living rise by 20 percent. During 1960-1967, prices
rose at an average annual rate of about 6 percent, as
successive Bolivian governments continued an anti-inflation
policy.
During this period, it has been possible to expand the
money supply at a rate far in excess of growth in real out-
put without strong inflationary pressures because of the
gradual monetization of some economic activities traditionally
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outside the money economy. The money supply expanded at a
rate ranging between 9 percent and 26 percent annually
during 1960-1966, but the rate of expansion dropped to 3
percent in 1967 and 4 percent in 1968. This reduced expansion,
which appears to be the result of decreased demand for credit
due 'to high interest rates and political instability, has acted
as a further check on inflation.
Attempts to balance the budget have been less successful.
Although current revenues have risen about twice as rapidly
as current expenditures since 1964, rapidly increasing invest-
ment expenditures have resulted in a growing deficit. In
earlier years, budget deficits were financed largely with
external grants, but since 1964 they have been covered to an
increasing extent by foreign loans and internal borrowing
(chiefly from the Central Bank). In 1967, rising military
expenditures for counter-insurgency activities and a sharp
increase in capital investment raised the overall deficit to
445 million Bolivian pesos, equivalent to more than 5 percent
of GDP. Somewhat less than half of this deficit was covered
by net disbursements of foreign long-term loans, while the
remainder was financed by the Central Bank or covered by a
rise in the central government's floating debt. In 1968,
although the current account was nearly in balance, the over-
all deficit totaled an estimated 477 million Bolivian pesos,
about 80 percent of which was financed by external borrowing.
Most government agencies are partially dependent on
transfers from the central government, although a few of the
largest have begun to operate on a self-financing basis.
Currently, tax payments are being made by YPFB and the govern-
ment-owned match factory. COMIBOL made substantial payments
to the government in 1966 but suspended them in mid-1967, when
its operations failed to meet projected levels. Although
total revenues have been growing fairly rapidly, there is an
apparent need for additional internal revenues, such as might
be derived from the politically controversial agricultural
income tax proposed by Barrientos.
From 1964 through 1968, total fixed investment increased
at an average annual rate of nearly 10 percent in real terms.
During this period, investment has risen from 20 to 23 per-
cent of GDP. Public investment varies between one half and
three fifths of total fixed investment, depending in part
upon the availability of foreign financing for public sector
projects. Private investment grew at an average annual rate
of almost 16 percent between 1964 and 1967. A large part of
this increase was attributable to foreign investment in the
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petroleum industry. In 1968, total private investment fell
by 6 percent, reflecting in part the completion of certain
oil industry projects.
The banking system of Bolivia consists of the Central
Bank, 14 private commercial banks, and 3 investment banks.
The Central Bank is divided into a monetary department and
a banking department. The monetary department performs the
central banking functions; it grants loans and discounts
exclusively to official borrowers and banks and sets discounts
and rediscount rates and reserve requirements for commercial
banks. The banking department is the most important commercial
bank in Bolivia. Its operations are financed by credits from
the monetary department, by foreign aid funds, and by private
deposits.
6. International Economic Relations
The Bolivian economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade.
It is estimated that in 1968 the value of imports and exports
of goods and non-factor services equalled about 25 and 20 per-
cent of GDP respectively. Imported investment goods represent
more than h,alf of gross domestic investment, and imported con-
sumer goods and industrial inputs (mainly for domestically pro-
duced consumer goods) constitute about one fifth of total
private consumption. To pay for these goods, Bolivia relies
heavily on foreign exchange earnings from the export of tin,
petroleum, and other minerals.
In 1967, tin accounted for 54 percent of export earnings,
petroleum for 16 percent, other minerals for 25 percent, and
other products (primarily sugar, coffee, coca, hides, and wool)
for 5 percent. Capital goods are the most important import,
followed closely by consumer goods, each accounting for about
40 percent of the total. About half of the imports of consumer
goods consist of foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco.
The United States is Bolivia's most important trading
partner, purchasing about 39 percent of its exports and supplying
more than 41 percent of its imports in 1967. However, the im-
portance of the United States as a source of Bolivia's imports
has decreased since 1964, when it supplied 51 percent of Bolivia's
requirements. During this period, other Latin American countries,
Europe, and Japan have increased their sales to the Bolivian
market. While supplying only 5 percent of Bolivia's imports, the
United Kingdom is the single most important customer for
Bolivia's exports, absorbing 43 percent of total exports of 1967.
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Most of these purchases consist of tin ore concentrates, which
are refined in British smelters either for domestic use or for
re-export. Trade with LAFTA countries has increased significant-
ly and represented 8 percent of Bolivia's exports and 13 percent
of imports in 1967.
Bolivia's balance of payments performance improved consid-
erably during the early 1960's culminating in an $18 million
surplus in 1964, followed by a somewhat smaller but still
substantial surplus in 1965. Since then, a considerable de-
terioration has taken lace, with an almost negligible surplus
in 1966 followed by a $$9 million deficit in 1967. In 1967
Bolivia's net foreign reserves declined to $33 million from
the record $42 million in 1966. It is estimated that the
reserves decreased by an additional $4 million in 1968.
The 1967 deficit occurred in spite of a continuing improve-
ment in Bolivia's trade balance. Exports rose to $153.4 million
in 1967 while imports totaled $151.8 million, giving Bolivia
a small favorable trade balance on an f.o.b. basis. As a result
of a sharp increase in profit remittances and other service
payments, however, the deficit on current account rose to $37
million. Capital inflows on official loans, combined with small
amounts of grant aid, increased the surplus on capital account
to $30 million, in spite of a $1 million net outflow of private
capital. This surplus on capital account, while slightly higher
than the 1966 figure, is considerably below the $46 million
surplus recorded in 1965, when extensive petroleum investments
were being made.
Bolivia's external public debt has more than doubled during
the past eight years rising from $170 million at the end of 1960
to $370 million at the end of 1968. The terms and interest
structure of this debt, however, are favorable. Most of the con-
tracted loans have amortization periods of between 15 and 50
years, and more than 60 percent of the total debt was borrowed
at 3 percent or less. In 1968, amortization and interest on the
external debt was equal to less than 10 percent of export earnings.
It is expected, however, that the debt servicing burden will
increase substantially during the next three years.
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B. Transportation
The Bolivian transportation network is rudimentary. Most
roads and railroads are concentrated on the Altiplano and the
adjoining mountains and valleys in the southwestern third of
the country. In vast areas of the Eastern Lowlands unim-
proved waterways and limited air flights provide the only
transportation.
While estimates of road mileage in Bolivia range from
9,000 to 16,500 miles, only about 3,600 miles are passable
throughout the year. Only one major hignway is asphalt
paved. More than half of the roads are actually cart tracks
or trails, traversable by motor vehicles only in the dry
season, and in many cases only by vehicles with four-wheel
drive. Most of the main and secondary roads are poorly
maintained, and many are dangerous to traverse. Washouts
and landslides in the mountainous sectors frequently inter-
rupt traffic.
The 2,300 miles of railroad in Bolivia are divided into
two major, unconnected systems -- Eastern and Western --
that are generally in poor condition and inefficiently oper-
ated. Historically, however, railroads have transported the
bulk of Bolivian imports and exports.
Unimproved river channels afford the only means of sur-
face transport in extensive areas. of the Eastern Lowlands,
although the volume of traffic is low. Rapids and falls
along the lower reaches of the two principal streams, the
Rio Mamor6 and the Rio Beni, now prevent direct access to
the Atlantic Ocean via the Amazon River.
Due in part to the inadequacies of surface transporta-
tion, considerable freight and passenger traffic moves by
air. The airlines serve a relatively extensive network of
airfields although the air fleet is small and generally old.
Air routes are the most important and often the only link
between isolated settlements in the Eastern Lowlands and the
principal urban centers.
2. Roads and Trails
a. Roads
Bolivia's sparse road network is concentrated in the
Southwest, where the system was initially developed to serve
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mining areas and the principal highland population centers.
In recent years access roads have been pushed across the
Cordillera Real to areas of agricultural colonization in the
Yungas valleys and along the margin of the Eastern Lowlands.
Eventually they will link the highlands with the heads of
navigation on the major waterways in the lowlands. Elsewhere
within the vast lowlands there are few roads worthy of the
name.
The primary road network consists of two main trunk
routes and several branches (see Map 58020). The principal
east-west route extends from the Peruvian border at Desagua-
dero (16?34'S 69?02'W) eastward via La Paz, Caihuasi (17 43'S
66?59'W), and Cochabamba (17?24'S 66?09'W) to Santa Cruz
(17?48'S 63?10'W). The main north-south route, which coin-
cides with the Pan-American Highway for most of its extent,
stretches from Puerto Acosta (15?32'S 69?15'W), on Lago Titi-
caca, southward by way of La Paz, Oruro (17?59'S 67?09'W),
and Potosi (19?35'S 65?45'W) to the Argentine border at
Villaz6n (22?06'S 65?36'W). A connecting route extends from
Ipijana (17?34'S 65?14'W) on the east-west trunk route,
southward through Sucre (19?02'S 65?17'W) to Potosi. A
branch route projects southeastward from Sucre to Camiri
(20?03'S 63?31'W), and another extends from Iscayachi
(21?31'S 65?03'W), on the Pan-American Highway, eastward to
Villa Montes (21?15'S 63?30'W). Penetration routes lead from
La Paz northward to Santa Ana (15?31'S 67?30'W), from Cocha-
bamba northeastward to Todos Santos (16?48'S 65?08'W) and
from Santa Cruz northward to Guabira (17?19'S 63?16'W).
The only paved sections of the primary routes are the
Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway (Figure 102), the Santa Cruz-
Guabira penetration road, and two very short segments of the
Pan-American Highway in the vicinity of La Paz and Oruro.
The highest volume of traffic reportedly occurs on the Cocha-
bamba-Santa Cruz Highway, the only highway on which 10- to
12-ton semitrailers are used. This highway is not adequately
maintained, and the asphalt surfacing has deteriorated badly
in places. It is slippery and dangerous when wet. The road
climbs steadily from Cochabamba to an elevation of approxi-
mately 12,500 feet on the crest of the Cordillera de Cocha-
bamba and then descends via a twisting, often precipitous
route through rugged canyons and over numerous rivers to
Santa Cruz at an elevation of 1,600 feet (Figures 103 through
105). At the crest a 10-mile stretch of road remains unpaved
due to adverse weather and ground conditions. These heights
are enshrouded in clouds, and the ground is soft and unstable
because of the perpetual rain, fog, and mist (Figures 106 and
107). Permanent maintenance crews are stationed here at
"Siberia" to keep the road passable.
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Mategu
Jaru
60
.L
BOLIVIA
TRANSPORTATION
Railroad
PAH
Cobija
58
Selected Roads
Paved
Gravel; all-weather
Gravel; seasonal for standard vehicles;
probably passable most of the year
with 4-wheel drive
Dirt; seasonal
Unimproved track; impassable much of
the year
Pan American Highway
Head of navigation
Departamento boundary
Departamento capital
50
Statute Miles
50 100
Kilometers
150
150
10-
100
-1 4
.tagal
:NA
eiSa
yy BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION /Sr~
[ \NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
?
enta a
de la Ro a
San Ignacio
NI T
J//'San Miguel
U Z
Santa Rosa
\\ LJgU?a
\JConcepej1,i
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Figure 103. Series of turns
along Cochabamba-Santa Cruz
Highway.
Figure 102.
Section of
paved
Cochabamba-
Santa Cruz
Highway.
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Figure 105.
Cochabamba-
Santa Cruz
Highway
Bridge over
Rio Piray.
Figure 104. Precipitous
slopes along Cochabamba-
Santa Cruz Highway.
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Figure 106. Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway at
"Siberia". Note fog and muddy road surface.
Figure 107. Gasoline trucks mired in mud at
"Siberia".
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Segments of the east-west route west of Cochabamba are
unpaved. Between Desaguadero and Caihuasi the road is two
lanes wide, and the gravel surface is passable in all weather
(Figure 108). From Caihuasi to Cochabamba the road crosses
rugged terrain and generally is very difficult to negotiate
during the rainy season (December through March). The earth
and rock surface of approximately one-fourth of this segment
of the road is only one lane wide.
The north-south route is an all-weather gravel road, two
lanes wide, from Puerto Acosta to Challapata (18?54'S 66?47'W).
From Challapata southward to Villazon it varies in width and
condition (Figure 109). Although the road is classified as
an all-weather route on a recent map of the Bolivian National
Road Service, during the rainy season several segments prob-
ably are passable only by four-wheel drive vehicles.
The remaining roads of the primary network, while rela-
tively narrow, are normally passable in the rainy season.
Traffic on all of the primary roads is subject to periodic
interruption because of landslides, washouts, or flooding
(Figure 110).
A special effort has been made to keep the penetration
routes open from La Paz to Santa Ana and from Cochabamba to
Todos Santos. These incredible roads climb over passes
14,000 to 15,000 feet in elevation and then descend precipi-
tously, by switchbacks, to the valleys below (Figure 111).
They are narrow, and on the Cochabamba-Todos Santos route
only one-way traffic is allowed. Northbound traffic is per-
mitted on Wednesdays and Saturdays and southbound traffic on
the other days of the week. Steep grades, blind turns, and
frequent rain and fog make driving hazardous in the mountains
(Figure 112). Traffic is periodically interrupted by flood-
ing in the lowland section of the Cochabamba-Todos Santos
road, between Villa Tunari (16?57'S 65?24'W) and Todos Santos.
There is no bridge across the Rio Espiritu Santo at Villa
Tunari. The river can be forded during periods of low water,
and there is a cable car (See Figures 113 and 114) and a small
vehicle barge ferry to transport traffic. During periods of
high water, however, there are delays in crossing because of
the limited capacity of the cable car and the ferry.
While secondary and feeder roads constitute most of the
road network, the extent in each category of road is unknown.
In theory, secondary roads are seasonal dirt roads, and feeder
roads are unimproved cart tracks or trails, traversable by
motor vehicles in the dry season. In actuality, roads in the
two categories appear to differ only in their degree of
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Figure 108. All-weather gravel road
between La Paz and Desaguadero.
Figure 109. Section of Pan-American
Highway near Villazon.
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Figure 110. Landslide blocks section of
Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway.
Figure 111. Switchbacks on La Paz-Santa Ana road.
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Figure 112. Fog-shrouded section of narrow
Cochabamba-Todos Santos road.
Figure 113. Cable car across Rio Espiritu
Santo.
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disrepair and danger. The few existing improved dirt roads
seldom are maintained adequately outside the urban areas and,
as a result, they deteriorate rapidly. If the road surface
is breached by a washout or the collapse of a culvert in rela-
tively flat areas, trucks simply detour around the obstacle
until a new track is beaten out. In many places there are
detours around detours (Figures 115 and 116). Most roads
follow old wagon tracks or trails and some, such as the road
from Santa Cruz to Yacuiba (22?02'S 63?45'W), were formed
merely by the repeated passage of trucks over the trails.
Bridges are frequently nonexistant, and the roads cross
streambeds at natural fording places (Figure 117). Drainage
is very poor on the vast majority of roads (Figure 118). In
some cases the road lies 1 to 3 feet below the general sur-
face level, and the only drainage is into the roadbed rather
than away from it. Such roads are muddy and impassable dur-
ing the rainy season and rough and dusty in the dry season.
Some tracks and trails in mountainous terrain follow
streambeds and are utilized by motor vehicles during the
dry season (Figure 119). During the rainy season, vehicular
traffic on such routes is limited to brief periods when the
floodwaters recede. There is always a danger that vehicles
may be trapped by flash floods on trails that wind along
narrow canyon floors. Tracks that follow water divides are
more likely to be passable during the rainy season (Figure
120).
Little reliable information is available concerning the
network of secondary and feeder roads on the Altiplano.
Available maps show a relatively dense network of unimproved
tracks and trails in the northern and southern parts (Figures
121 through 123), but route delineation differs greatly from
map to map. There are very few tracks or trails in the cen-
tral part between Lago de Poop6 and the Salar de Uyuni and
Salar de Coipasa (salt flats). Although some local people
drive across the salt flats regularly to the Chilean border,
only persons thoroughly familiar with the area should try
this. The margins of the salt flats are soft and treacher-
ous, and safe entrances and exits can be made at only a few
known points. Once out on the flats, vehicular traffic can
move pretty much with impunity as long as the surface is
not covered with water and the driver can see to avoid holes.
Vast reaches of the Eastern Lowlands have no roads. Much
of this region is subject to seasonal flooding, and extensive
areas in the north are heavily forested. The unimproved sea-
sonal road or track from Santa Cruz to Yacuiba skirts the
lowland, and several seasonal tracks lead eastward from it
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Figure 114. Closeup of cable car.
Figure 115. Detours around detours
across mudflats on Altiplano.
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Figure 116. Closeup of ruts.
Figure 117. Fording a river on Altiplano
during dry season.
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Figure 118. Poorly drained section of Santa Cruz
- Yacuiba road near Villa Montes.
Figure 119. Streambed utilized
as a road during dry season.
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Figure 121. Track across
Altiplano near Laguna
Colorada.
Figure 120. Track along narrow
water divide.
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Figure 122. Loose sand along track near
Uyuni.
Figure 1271. Severely eroded section
of track southwest of Uyuni.
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to the Paraguayan border. Secondary roads extend from the
Santa Cruz-Guabira paved road to San Carlos (17?24'S 63?45'W)
on the Rio Yapacani and to Remanso (17?34'S 62?49'W) on the
Rio Grande (Figure 124). Tnree short seasonal roads in the
extreme northern part of the lowland interconnect ports on
different rivers. Roads are under construction and trails
have been opened in parts of the agricultural colonization
zone between Santa Cruz and Todos Santos (Figure 125). Else-
where in the lowlands, cart tracks and trails serve scattered
settlements. The oxcart is the usual vehicle; however, some
of the tracks are jeepable in the dry season. A few motor-
cycles have been introduced recently in the larger settle-
ments.
As of 1 January 1967, there were 18,143 passenger cars,
14,546 trucks, and 1,597 buses registered in Bolivia. Rules
governing vehicle loads are lacking; overloaded trucks cause
considerable damage to bridges and roadbeds designed for
lesser weights. Traffic laws are generally ineffective.
Outside the urban centers there is little control, and in
the cities traffic is regulated by police only during day-
light hours. Traffic lights are almost nonexistent after
dark, and stop signs and similar indicators are unknown,
even in the capital. Careless drivers are rarely arrested.
As a result of these factors and the hazardous roads, the
country has one of the highest accident rates per vehicle-
mile in the world.
Gasoline pumps are few and far between outside the
larger cities. For example, in 1960 there were no pump
stations along the main highway between La Paz and Cocha-
bamba and only two such stations between Cochabamba and
Santa Cruz. Sometimes gasoline can be purchased at stores
in small towns along the main routes, where it usually is
siphoned from 50-gallon drums into 5-gallon cans and then
poured into the vehicle tank.
Public transportation has improved in recent years, and
buses connect most of the population centers that are located
on the primary highway network (Figures 126 and 127). In
many areas trucks carry passengers (Figure 128).
Numerous tracks and trails are suitable only for pack
animals and for foot travel. Most of the trails are not
mapped, and in heavily forested areas they generally are not
discernible on aerial pnotograpns.
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Figure 124. Caravan fording Rio Piray west of Guabira.
A bridge across the Rio Piray was nearing completion in
June 1967.
Figure 125. Narrow jungle roads in colonization
zone north of Santa Cruz.
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Figure 126. Bus used between Chuspipata
and Coroico on the La Paz-Santa Ana road.
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Figure 127. Bus on mountainous section
of Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway.
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Figure 128. Passengers riding on loaded truck.
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Pack animals are still widely used for local transporta-
tion in the highlands (Figures 129 and 130). Llamas are
more commonly used at higher elevations. on steep, narrow
mountain trails, and burros are used in the quebradas
(ravines) and the larger valleys. Pack trains transport
minerals, for example, from mines to the railheads and carry
agricultural products and firewood from villages to the
larger towns. On the return trips they carry flour, wheat,
and various commercial articles.
Burro trains consisting of 10 to 30 animals cover from
12 to about 20 miles per day, depending on the weather,
condition of the animals, and the load carried. Each burro
can carry a load of about 165 pounds. Llama trains are
larger -- from 20 to 70 animals -- since spares are required.
The llama will carry a load (100 to 120 pounds) for only one
day at a time, and must be left free from any burden on the
succeeding day; therefore, the herdsman' usually takes two or
three complete sets of animals each trip. Both burros and
llamas feed on shrubs or vegetation along the riverbanks and
do not require supplemental food. Most pack trains actually
travel very short distances -- seldom more than 20 miles.
Foot trails in the mountains are generally very narrow,
steep, and rocky (Figure 131). They often follow dry stream-
beds. Larger streams are crossed by means of rope suspension
bridges or by oroyas (cableways). An oroya consists of a
basket, seat, or trapeze suspended from a -pulley that runs
along a wire cable stretched across the river or valley. The
traveler hauls himself across or is drawn from one side to
the other by means of a rope.
Horse trails and oxcart tracks are common in the Eastern
Lowlands, particularly in the grassland areas (Figures 132
through 135). The oxcart is the only reliable means of
transportation over the muddy plains in the rainy season.
Human portage is widespread among the lowland Indians.
Burros or horses are useless on primitive trails in remote
areas of the forested lowlands. Numerous small streams and
arroyos must be crossed, and every mile or so larger streams
are reached that may be 10 to 30 feet wide and 5 to 15 feet
deep. The stream bottoms are generally a morass of mud and
soft sand, and pack animals bog down if,they attempt to
plunge through the quagmire. A felled tree will serve as a
footbridge for a man but not for pack animals. Another
problem is the lack of forage for burros or horses along
jungle trails. The ground is generally wet beneath the
tropical forest, and in many places the mud along the trails
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Figure 129. Llama pack train near Potosi.
Figure 130. Burros used as pack animals.
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Figure 131. Old Inca road used as foot
trail.
Figure 132. River crossing in northern lowlands.
Horses are unsaddled and led across the river.
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Figure 133. Oxcart on track near Trinidad:
Figure 134. Fording an arroyo by oxcart.
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Figure 135. Saddled riding ox.
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may be ankle deep even in the dry season. The foot traveler
can negotiate such trails once he abandons the notion of
keeping his feet dry. In such conditions, 15 miles would be
considered a good day's hike. During the rainy season whole
segments of jungle trails are impassable on foot, and dugout
canoes become the most reliable means of travel.
The railroads are the principal carriers of freight in
Bolivia. They consist of meter-gage, single-track lines
that are divided into two major systems. The Western System
links the mining areas and the principal population centers
in the highlands with seaports in Chile and Peru. The lines
of the Eastern System connect Santa Cruz with railroads in
Argentina and Brazil.
The Western System consists of seven state railways that
were recently merged into a single system operated under
authority of the National Railway Enterprise. One private
company, the Guaqui-La Paz Railway, though administered and
operated separately, connects with and is considered part of
the Western System. The La Paz-Charafia and the La Paz Oyague
segments of the system connect with Chilean railroads at the
international border, forming through routes from La Paz to
the ports of Arica and Antofagasta, respectively. The Guaqui-
La Paz Railway connects with the Southern Railway of Peru at
Puno via a ferry across Lago Titicaca (Figure 136). This
route provides access to the Peruvian ports of Matarani and
Mollendo. Bolivia's mineral ore exports and most of her
imports of foodstuffs, machinery, and essential commodities
are transported over these three routes. Branch lines extend
from Oruro through Cochabamba to Mizque (17?56'S 65?19'W) and
Arani (17?34'S 65?46'W); from Machacamarca (18?10'S 67?02'W)
to Uncia (18?27'S 66?37'W); from Rio Mulatos (19?42'S 66?47'W)
through Potosi and Sucre to Tarabuco (19?10'S 64?57'W); and
from Uyuni (20?28'S 66?50'W) to Villazdn at the Argentine
frontier, where connection is made to Buenos Aires via the
Argentine State Railways.
The Eastern System consists of the Corumba-Santa Cruz
Railway and the Yacuiba-Santa Cruz Railway. The former is
operated by the National Railroad Directory. At Corumba it
connects with a Brazilian line to Sao Paulo. The Yacuiba-
Santa Cruz Railway, under the administration of an autonomous
Bolivian-Argentine commission, connects with the Argentine
State Railways, which provide service to Buenos Aires. A
seldom-used branch line extends to Cuevo (20?27'S 63?32'W)
from the main line near Boyuibe (20?25'S 63?17'W).
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On the Altiplano the railroads operate at elevations
between 12,000 and 13,500 feet, and the lines are laid out
in long, straight sections with slight grades. The principal
exception is the descent from El Alto (16?30'S 68?10'W) to
the city of La Paz. The track over this 5.6-mile section is
electrified and has a 7 percent gradient.
Branch lines extend from the Altiplano into the adjacent
zone of mountains and valleys and cross difficult terrain at
elevations ranging from about 8,000 to 15,000 feet. Numerous
sections have long grades of 3 percent and curves with a
minimum radius of 246 feet. There are many bridges and some
22 tunnels on these lines.
The railroads of the Eastern System have long, straight
sections of track and gentle gradients. The ruling gradient
on the Yacuiba-Santa Cruz line is 0.8 percent, and the sharp-
est curves have a radius of 820 feet. The ruling gradient on
the Corumba-Santa Cruz line has been estimated as 2.5 percent;
data on the minimum radius of curvature are unavailable.
Major bridge construction was required to span the Pilcomayo,
Parapetf, and Grande rivers. The longest of these bridges
crosses the Rio Grande on the Corumba-Santa Cruz line, on
which there is also one 1,312-foot tunnel.
Roadbeds, which generally lack ballast, range from barely
adequate to deficient. Ninety percent of the track is more
than 40 years old. The tracks of the La Paz-Oyagiie main line
on the Altiplano and the relatively new Yacuiba-Santa Cruz
Railway are substantially better than the average. The road-
bed of the Corumba-Santa Cruz Railway is in the poorest condi-
tion of all. The tracks are uneven, and frequently ties are.
ignited by the burning ashes that are dumped from woodburning
locomotives. Replacement ties are in short supply; on the
line between Cochabamba and Mizque wornout ties have been
replaced by large rocks inserted under the rails. Maximum
axleload limits range from 14.5 to 18 short tons.
Most rolling stock is old. Steam locomotives, powered
by fuel oil, predominate on the Western System, and wood-
burning locomotives on the Eastern System (Figure 137).
Diesel engines are used on the branch line from Machacamarca
to Uncia, and on the Corumba-Santa Cruz line. The Guaqui-
La Paz Railway uses six electric locomotives on its short
electrified section from El Alto to La Paz.
Passenger trains are operated on the main lines, and
self-propelled passenger cars (autocarriles) are used on
some of the branch lines. The autocarriles, powered by
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Figure 136. Dockside loading area at Guaqui.
Figure 137. Woodburning locomotive on
the Corumba-Santa Cruz railroad line.
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Figure 138. Autocarril or self-propelled
railroad passenger car.
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gasoline engines, range from old automobiles mounted on
special railroad bogies to newer buses adapted for running
on rails (Figure 138). Several autocarriles operate on the
La Paz-Oruro-Cochabamba-Mizque line. A similar service,
called the litorina, operates once a week on the Corumba-
Santa Cruz 1-in-e-.-The mixed passenger and freight train that
also operates on the Corumba-Santa Cruz line has been the
source of many anecdotes. Until the recent changeover to
diesel power, this run took anywhere from 2 to 6 days to
complete, depending upon the number of mechanical breakdowns
experienced by the woodburning locomotive. The old passenger
cars reportedly are still used -- the first-class coach has
wooden benches and no panes in the window frames; the second-
class cars are windowless boxcars without seats. People fre-
quently ride on top of the cars.
4. Inland Waterways
While Bolivia's inland waterways carry only a minor part
of the total volume of cargo transported annually, they are
of great significance in large sectors of the Eastern Low-
lands. Navigable rivers total 6,000 miles in length;
another 12,000 miles could be improved for modern barges.
Bolivia is divided into three drainage networks. The
most extensive system, consisting of rivers that drain the
central and northern parts of the country and flow northward
to the Amazon, include the Rio Beni, the Rio Mamor6, and their
many tributaries. Rivers in the southeastern part of the
country, draining southward as part of the Rio de La Plata
system, include the Rio Paraguay, Rio Pilcomayo, and the Rio
Bermejo. The third system of interior drainage on the Alti-
plano is composed of Lago Titicaca, the Rio Desaguadero, and
Lago de Poop6.
The rivers of the Amazon and La Plata systems, with head-
waters in the high mountains, are swift and turbulent along
their upper courses. Upon reaching the lowlands they become
slow, sluggish, and shallow. The rivers flow in an endless
series of meanders and frequently change course. Unstable
riverbanks are easily undermined during floods. Fallen trees
protrude into the channels and pile up at the meander curves,
snagging masses of lesser debris and forming barriers to
navigation.
Rivers are subject to sharp variations in water level.
The period of high water extends roughly from October to May.
As the water level drops in June and July, an increasing
number of obstacles to navigation -- sandbars, rapids, and
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tree trunks -- are exposed. Expanses of mud along the river-
banks make landing difficult during this period. Low water
level, reached in late July or August, generally continues
for the remainder of the dry season; sudden temporary rises
in the water level, however, are not uncommon if heavy
storms occur in the headwater areas. Navigation is generally
easier at high-water stage, but there is always the danger of
striking objects concealed just below the surface. Extensive
areas adjacent to the rivers are flooded during the rainy
season; in some areas one may travel considerable distances
across country by dugout canoe or small flat-bottomed boats.
The general characteristics of navigable rivers are given
in Table 2. Riverboats operate on the main rivers and on
the larger tributaries (Figure 139). Most vessels are pow-
ered by steam engines with wood-fired boilers; a few have
diesel or gasoline engines. The riverboats generally steam
throughout the night on the larger rivers, but on smaller
streams they navigate only during daylight. Shallow-draft
motor launches ply the smaller navigable tributaries as well
as the main rivers and large tributaries, pulling large flat-
bottomed barges, one on each side (Figure 140).
Rafts and dugout canoes are used locally on rivers and
streams not suitable for regular commercial navigation. These
streams are usually too narrow, shallow, turbulent, or encum-
bered by rapids for general use.
Considerable down-stream rafting is done on the turbulent
rivers of the northern Yungas area, particularly on the tribu-
taries of the upper Rio Beni. A single raft (balsa) is built
of seven balsa logs -- no more and no less -- riveted together
with pins of ironwood. The bow of the raft is pointed and
the logs are bent upward to form a prow. To carry heavy loads,
two or more balsas are lashed together to form a large plat-
form called as caTlapo (Figure 141). A four-raft callapo can
carry a ton or more of cargo. The platform is covered by
woven bamboo mats and a canopy of mats may be added for
shelter. The floor of the callapo may be submerged slightly
below the surface by the weigi htofof the load making it neces-
sary to stow dry clothes and perishable cargo in waterproof
sacks. Indian boatmen, one at each corner of a calla o,
skillfully navigate the craft through dangerous rapids and
whirlpools.
Dugout canoes also are used locally on these rivers (Fig-
ure 142). One reportedly may travel by canoe from Guanay
(15?28'S 67?52'W) up the Rio Mapiri to Mapiri (l5?15'S 68?
10'W); up its tributary, the Rio At6n, to Apolo (14?43'S
68?31'W); and from Tipuani (15?33'S 68?00'W) via the Rios
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Figure 139. Rivercraft at Riberalta on the Rio
Beni.
Figure 140. Launch pulling barges on the
Rio Mamore.
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Figure 141. Callapo, consisting of balsa rafts lashed together.
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Figure 142. Typical outboard--powered dugout
canoe.
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Tipuani, Kaka, and Beni to Santa Ana (15?31'S 67?30'W). Dug-
outs also can be used on small streams in the Eastern Low-
lands, such as the Rio Heath that flows along the Bolivian
border with Peru. Boatmen with local knowledge of a particu-
lar river are needed to pilot canoes over shoals, rapids, and
other obstacles. Canoes can pass upstream through rapids
with little difficulty through proper use of punting poles
and by gunning the motor at the proper time. Ropes and
cables occasionally are needed to pull boats through rapids,
and portage may be necessary. Overhanging tree branches,
tangled roots along river bottoms, canebrake, and fallen
trees impede movement in places, particularly along small
lowland streams. Snakes on overhanging branches and sting
rays and electric eels in the quieter reaches of streams are
hazards for the unwary.
On the Altiplano the inland waterway system consists of
Lago Titicaca, the Rio Desaguadero, and Lago de Poop6. Lago
Titicaca is navigable by small steamers. While the eastern
side is very deep, steamers sometimes run aground on the
shallow southern part. The water level fluctuates seasonally.
Summer rains and melting snow may cause a rise of 5 to 6 feet
above low-water level. Lake steamers of the Peruvian Corpora-
tion ply between the rail terminals at Guaqui, Bolivia, and
Puno, Peru (Figure 143). Daily hydrofoil service was recently
introduced between Huatajata, Bolivia (16?10'S 68?44'W), and
Puno. Isolated communities of Indians live on islands in the
lake. Sailing boats ferry people to the mainland each day,
using onshore winds in the morning and offshore winds in the
evening (Figure 144). Native fishing boats abound on the
lake. The principal fishing grounds are situated within two
miles of the lakeshore. Men fishing for carachi use the
picturesque balsa boats, made of totora ree Figure 145),
whereas trout fishermen generally use 15-foot wooden boats.
The fishermen do not use outboard motors but row out to check
their nets before dawn, returning about 10 a.m. to deliver
their catch to the waiting cannery trucks.
The Rio Desaguadero, the outlet for the lake, drains into
Lago de Poop6. The Rio Desaguadero, about 250 miles long,
is navigable by shallow-draft boats during high-water periods
only. Lago de Poop6, relatively shallow, is of little impor-
tance for navigation.
5. Air Transportation
Much freight and passenger traffic moves by air because
satisfactory surface transportation is lacking in many parts
of the country. Airlines provide regular service during the
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Figure 143. S.S. Ollanta on La.go Titicaca.
Note the tiny balsa boat in the foreground.
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Figure 144. Passenger ferryboats on Lago
Titicaca.
Figure 145. Balsa boat made of
totora reed.
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dry season to many isolated towns in the Eastern Lowlands.
Only limited service is provided during the rainy season
when most airstrips in the lowlands are rendered unservice-
able.
Braniff International Airlines maintains a regular
schedule of international flights to La Paz. Lloyd A6reo
Boliviano (LAB), the largest civil airline, provides sched-
uled service to 31 domestic airfields as well as to Arica,
Chile; Buenos Aires and Salta," Argentina; Corumba and Sao
Paulo, Brazil; and Lima, Peru. The company operates 11 air-
craft, using Douglas DC-6B models on international flights and
Douglas C-47/DC-3's and converted Boeing B-17G bombers on
domestic flights (Figures 146 and 147). The company has a
generally poor service record, the result of inefficient
management.
Transportes Aereos Militares (TAM), the military air
transport unit of the Bolivian Air Force, provides both
scheduled and nonscheduled civil air service, using C-47 air-
craft. Most flights are to airfields not regularly served
by LAB but some flights are competitive with those of commer-
cial airlines.
Ten private nonscheduled and charter carriers were regis-
tered as of March 1967. Most of these small operators have
one or two cargo planes and provide specialized services and/
or fly into small towns that are not served by LAB or TAM.
Relatively more significant than the others are Compania
Boliviana de Aviaci6n (BOA), Aerolinea.s Abaroa, and Trans-
portes Aereos Benianos, S.A. (TABSA).
BOA is a well-run organization operating nonscheduled
passenger/cargo flights from La Paz to various airfields in
northern Bolivia and, on occasion, to Arequipa, Peru, and
Arica and Antofagasta, Chile. More than half the cargo
flown consists of meat produced on the cattle ranches in the
lowlands. The company has six aircraft, ranging from Curtiss
C-46 cargo planes to converted B-17 and B-24 bombers.
In terms of freight tonnage carried, Aerolineas Abaroa
occupies third place among all the civil airlines. It
operates four Douglas C-47 and one Curtiss C-46 aircraft.
No information is available concerning the types of cargo
carried or the specific areas of operation.
TABSA operates two C-46 cargo planes and one converted
B-25 bomber on nonscheduled domestic and international flights.
It has been operating the C-46's between La Paz and Miami as
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Figure 146. Lloyd Aereo Boliviano DC-3 aircraft
at the Tarija Airport.
Figure 147. Lloyd Aereo Boliviano converted
B-17G aircraft at Trinidad Airport. Beef carcasses
are flown from Trinidad to La Paz.
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an irregular carrier, principally carrying airplane engines
to Miami for maintenance. TABSA's aircraft are used domes-
tically to transport meat from the Beni area to La Paz.
Light planes may be chartered locally for flights to the
many landing strips which are too small or too poorly main-
tained to handle cargo transports (Figure 148). Seaplanes
are also employed, landing on the rivers in the northern low-
lands (Figure 149). As of March 1967, 31 small companies
and individuals offered air taxi service. Most operators
have a single light plane but a few have two or three air-
craft.
Airfields and landing sites are well distributed over
the country. More than 300 have been reported, but many
are unconfirmed; the USAF Aeronautical Chart and Information
Center lists 70 operational airfields (see Map 58923).
Thirty-one airfields receive scheduled commercial flights.
The El Alto Airfield (La Paz) is the only airfield in
Bolivia capable of handling jet traffic. Braniff Interna-
tional schedules Boeing 707's and Douglas DC-8's to El Alto
but the airfield is open only to daylight jet service.
(No Bolivian airfield is equipped for night operation.)
Only El Alto, Cochabamba, and El Trompillo (Santa Cruz)
airfields have permanent-surfaced runways. Most operational
airfields have a single runway with either gravel or sod
surface
(Figure 150). They lack drainage and are closed
to
traffic
after heavy rains. Operations on the Altiplano
are
further
limited by altitude. Relatively longer runways
are
required
for aircraft to handle comparable gross takeoff
and
landing
weights than at lowland airports.
Few navigational aids are available. Air-to-ground radio
facilities are available at about 40 airfields; nondirectional
radio beacons at 21 airfields. Support and service facilities
are generally limited or lacking at all but the three largest
airfields.
Bolivia is a landlocked country bounded by Peru, Chile,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. The boundaries extend
through sparsely populated areas that are generally lacking
in good access routes. Rugged terrain and/or natural vege-
tation would restrict cross-border movement along many sec-
tors. Borders are not patrolled effectively and smuggling
is a local commonplace. Customs checks are made at the
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Figure 148. Landing strip for light aircraft.
Figure 149. Seaplane
landing dock on Rio Beni.
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principal border crossing points. Bolivian customs authori-
ties have cooperative jurisdiction with the Army at points
along the land frontier and with the Navy on frontier rivers
and Lago Titicaca. The Army is generally responsible. for
Bolivia's internal security, the Navy for reconnaissance and
control of the waterways. The latter's capability for per-
forming that function is negligible. The Guardia Nacional
de Seguridad Publica performs the police function within
towns.
The principal routes across the Bolivia-Peru border con-
sist of the Rio Madre de Dios and Lago Titicaca waterways;
the Guaqui-La Paz Railway, which connects at Guaqui with a
railroad ferry across Lago Titicaca to Puno, Peru; an all-
weather road from La Paz to Puno via Desaguadero; and an
alternate seasonal road from La Paz to Puno via Copacabana
(16?10'S 69?05'W), requiring ferry passage between San
Pedro (16?13'S 68?51'W) and Tiquina (16?13'S 68?52'W)
(Figure 151). A new road leads to Cuzco, Peru, from Puerto
Maldonado (12?36'S 69?11'W), the main Peruvian port on the
Rio Madre de Dios waterway. This road is passable only in
the dry season between Puerto Maldonado and Quince Mil
(13?16'S 70?38'W) and is restricted to one-way traffic
between Quince Mil and Urcos (13?42'S 71?38'W) on weekdays.
The direction of traffic flow is reversed on alternate week-
days, and two-way traffic is permitted on Sundays.
Numerous foot trails, known to local inhabitants,. lead
across segments of the border on the Altiplano and in the
section of the northern lowlands situated north of the Rio
Madre de Dios. Small streams, such as the Rio Heath, can
be used during the rainy season for movement by dugout canoe
across or along some parts of the border in the northern low-
lands. Rugged terrain and dense vegetation restrict movement
considerably in the mountainous region between the Altiplano
and the northern lowlands.
Railroads serve as the principal routes across the Bolivia-
Chile border. The line from La Paz to Arica, Chile, crosses
the frontier near Charafia (17?36'S 69?28'W), and-the line to
Antofagasta, Chile, crosses the border near Oyagiie (21?14'S
68?16'W).
Seasonal tracks or trails that are impassable much of the
time cross the Bolivia-Chile border at various points, but
only a few serve more than the local area. Significant
tracks, which interconnect with the main road network, cross
the border at points near the towns of Charafia and Bueno
Vista (ca. 19?56'S 68?32'W) and via the Portezuela de Silala,
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Figure 150. Sod landing strip at Puerto
Villaroel.
Figure 151. Auto ferry crossing Tiquina
Straits.
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Portezuela Linzor, and Portezuelo del Panizo mountain passes
(22?01'S 68?02'W; 22?11'S 67?57'W; and 22?24'S 67?56'W,
respectively). Movement to the frontier is restricted over
a broad area by the extensive salt flats of Uyuni and Coi-
pasa. Persons thoroughly familiar with the salt flats regu-
larly drive vehicles across them; reportedly, many carry
contraband goods across the Chilean border.
Many political exiles are reported to have returned
illegally to Bolivia by taking the train from Arica, Chile,
to the last station before crossing the Bolivian border,
proceeding across the border on foot through nearby hills,
and then boarding another train for La Paz. Contraband
goods have been brought into Bolivia with little difficulty
on the Arica-La Paz train. This situation may change as the
result of a 1967 law redefining traffic in contraband as a
crime rather than a misdemeanor and imposing severe penalties
on contraband activities.
Two railroad lines and three roads provide the main
access routes to the Bolivia-Argentina border. A railroad
line from La Paz crosses the border at Villazo'n, and the
railroad from Santa Cruz crosses at Yacuiba. Alternate
routes of the Pan American Highway in southern Bolivia extend
to the Argentine border at Villazon and at the international
bridge near Pozos Bermejo (ca. 22?44'S 64?22'W). At these
points they connect with all-weather roads to Jujuy and Buenos
Aires, Argentina. Segments of the Pan American Highway within
Bolivia are classified as all-weather roads near the border,
but some sections through mountainous terrain to the north
are passable only in dry weather. The third access road to
the Argentine border stretches from Santa Cruz to Yacuiba.
Little more than a seasonal track along most sectors, it
bears relatively heavy truck traffic during the dry season.
A trail branches off this road at Campo Pajoso (21?55'S
63?40'W) and leads east-southeastward across the lowland to
the Argentine border at D'Orbigny.
Contraband traffic in cocaine reportedly moves from
Cochabamba by both air and road to the Argentine border near
Pozos Bermejo, and from Santa Cruz by road and railroad to
Yacuiba.
The only routes to the Bolivia-Paraguay border consist
of unimproved seasonal tracks and trails which are impassable
during the rainy season and rough and dusty during the dry
season. Their exact alignment is uncertain, but some of the
more significant lead from Villa Montes to Canada Oruro
(21?40'S 62?24'W), Paraguay; from Villa Montes to 20 de
S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
Octubre (ca. 21?03'S 62?15'W); from Boyuibe (20?25'S 63?17'W)
to Fortin VillazSn (20?35'S 62?16'W),.Paraguay; and from
Charagua (19?48'S 63?13'W) to Fortin G. Mendoza (20?07'S
61?55'W), Paraguay. The tracks from Boyuibe and Charagua
connect with the seasonal Trans-Chaco road across the Para-
guayan Gran Chaco.
The principal transportation links between Bolivia and
Brazil are the Corumba-Santa Cruz Railway and the several
navigable waterways that extend along segments of the border.
The railroad is in poor condition, but provides weekly pas-
senger service, of sorts, to Corumba, Brazil, and thence by
a Brazilian railroad line to Sao Paulo. The railroad report-
edly has been used for smuggling contraband -- narcotics,
arms, ammunition, and various luxury goods -- into and out
of Bolivia. Some items are shipped disassembled and con-
cealed among legitimate goods; others are carried by passen-
gers. Upon entering Bolivia the stop for a customs check
is made at the railroad station serving Puerto Suarez --
about an hour's ride from Corumba. A smuggling technique
reported in 1966 was for youths carrying parcels to leap off
the train as it slowed down before arriving at the station.
They disappeared into the forest and, after the customs
check, reboarded the train beyond the town.
During the rainy season, ferry service by steam launch
is maintained between Puerto Suarez, on the Laguna Caceres,
and Corumba, on the Rio Paraguay.
The Rio Mamor6 and its tributary, the Rio Itenez (Rio
Guapor6 in Brazil), extend along the Bolivia-Brazil border
for a combined distance of about 660 miles. These rivers
are navigable by shallow-draft launches from Guayaramerin,
on the Mamor6, upstream along the border for a distance of
625 miles, and thence on into Brazil to the head of naviga-
tion on the Rio Guapor6 at the town of Mato Grosso.
Bolivian products, such as cattle, rubber, and Brazil
nuts, are smuggled across the Rio Mamor6 to Brazil to avoid
payment of duties. Most of the contraband reach the Brazil-
ian town of Guajara-Mirim, across the river from Guayaramerin,
both a river port and the terminus for the Madeira-Mamore'
Railroad. This antiquated railroad is used for the trans-
shipment of goods between P6rto Velho and Guajara-Mirim,
bypassing the unnavigable reaches of the Mamor6 and Madeira
rivers. Narcotics and contraband reportedly move via the
railroad to P6rto Velho, where they are placed aboard ocean-
going vessels. Plans have been made to discontinue service
on the railroad and to remove the tracks when a highway is
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
completed along the same route. Some sections of the existing
dirt road probably are traversable only in dry weather.
A seasonal dirt road connects Guayaramerin with Riberalta
and Cachuela Esperanza on the Rio Beni, affording a transship-
ment route from these small river ports to the Rio Mamore and
across it to the terminus of the Madeira-Mamore Railroad.
Discontinuous segments of the Rio Abuna form part of the
northern border of Bolivia with Brazil. The river is navi-
gable by small craft from its mouth to the rapids at mile 13,
and from the rapids on upstream for 227 miles to Santa Rosa
(10?36'S 67?25'W).
Rio Acre forms the boundary along the 77-mile stretch
between Cobija (11?02'S 68?44'W) and Inapari (10?41'S 67?50'W).
The river is navigable for craft drawing up to 3 feet and
affords year-round access to the Amazon River without trans-
shipment. A seasonal dirt road connects Porvenir (11?15'S
68?41'W), on the Rio Tahuamanu, with Cobija. Small boats
ferry passengers across the Rio Acre from Cobija to the Brazil-
ian town of Brasildia and from Ifiapari to Seringal Paraguacu.
The river can be forded at both points during the dry season.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
Figure 152. Multispan railroad bridge across
Rio Grande near Puesto de Pa=ilas.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Figure 153. Narrow suspension bridge over
Rio Pilcomayo near Millares.
Figure 154. Small suspension bridge on the
Cochabamba-Todos Santos road.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
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Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
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Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP8O-01444ROO0100120001-5
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
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Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Selected Bridges
Length
Location (feet)
Road Bridges
Rio Azero, near Chincana 236
(19?37'S 64?07'W)
Rio Chico, near Villa 113
Abecia
(20?59'S 65?22'W)
Rio Desaguadero, at 164
Peruvian border
(16?34'S 69?20'W)
Rio Grande, near La 577
Barca
(18?34'S 65?08'W)
Rio Grande de Cinti, 257
near Palca Grande
(20?45'S 65?16'W)
Rio Parapeti, near 131
Camiri
(20?02'S 63?31'W)
Rio Pilcomayo, near 577
Millares
(19?21'S 65?13'W)
Rio Pilcomayo, near Unknown,
Villa Montes
(21?16'S 63?30'W)
Rio Pojo, near Pojo 234
(17?45'S 64?48'W)
Rio San Juan, near 262
El Puente
(21?17'S 65?17'W)
Remarks
Narrow steel suspension
bridge
Narrow bridge
Steel pilings; reinforced
concrete stringers; capac-
ity, 20 short tons
Steel suspension bridge,
known as Acre Bridge
Single-span, steel sus-
pension bridge
Single-span, steel sus-
pension bridge; low capac-
ity
Single-span, steel sus-
pension bridge
Three-span suspension
bridge
Five-span, reinforced con-
crete bridge; masonry piers
and abutments
Single-span, steel suspen-
sion bridge
S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP80-01444R000100120001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3 (Continued)
Length
Location (feet) Remarks
Rio Tumusla, near 315 Narrow bridge
Tumusla
(20?31'S 65?39'W)
Rio Yara, near Caranavi 180 Single-lane, two-span steel
(15?46'S 67?36'W) pony, half-through truss
bridge; wood deck; 15-ton
capacity
Railroad Bridges
Quebrada de Chocaya, Approx. Eight-span bridge
near Atocha 145
(200571S 66?14'W
Rio Desaguadero, 360 Structural data unavailable
near Calacoto
(17?15'S 68?37'W)
Rio Grande, near 5,250 Multispan, steel, through
Puesto de Pailas truss bridge
(approx. 17?40'S
66?47'W)
Rio Mulatos, near Approx. Ten-span bridge
Rio Mulatos 180
(19?42'S 66?47'W)
Rio Parapet!, near 820 Nine-span bridge
San Francisco
(20?01'S 63?09'W)
Rio Pilcomayo, near 1,390 Seven-span, steel, through
Villa?Montes truss bridge
(21 16 S 630291W)
Rio Poopo, near Poopo 250 Thirteen-span concrete
(18?23'S 66?59'W) bridge
Rio Tapacari, near Approx. Fifty-four-span bridge
Parotani railroad sta- 885
tion (17?34'S 66?20'W)
Rio Viscachani, near Approx. Single-span bridge
Ayoayo 100
(17?07'S 68?00'W)
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S-E-C-R-E-T
C. Telecommunications
1. General
Telecommunications facilities and services in Bolivia are
poor even by Latin American standards. The existing communi-
cations networks are often overtaxed, and many areas of
Bolivia have no telecommunications service. The only exten-
sive wireline network is confined primarily to the Altiplano
in the southwestern third of the country. The rest of the
country is dependent upon high-frequency (HF) radio for long
distance communications. Although both government and pri-
vately owned common carrier systems exist, many business
firms have found it necessary to establish and maintain their
own radio systems. International communications links con-
sist of point-to-point radio and wirelines to neighboring
countries.
Radiobroadcasting service is provided by both government
and private organizations. Most of the transmitters are very
low powered and have only a small reception radius. While
the Bolivian government does not regulate private broadcast-
ing closely, anti-government propaganda is not permitted.
2. Telephone and Telegraph
a. Domestic
Bolivia has no microwave or cable systems and, thus,
relies exclusively on wirelines and HF radio for domestic
communication. Open wirelines are extensive throughout the
southwestern plateau area, connecting about 700 towns (see
Map 57942), but the quality of service is poor and outages of
25 percent are common. Most of the wirelines provide only a
single circuit, but a few major links (e.g., La Paz to Oruro)
have multi-channel capacity. The country's wiretelegraph
system is operated by the state telegraph network (Red Tele-
grafica del Estado -- RTE) and controlled by the General
Directorate of Telecommunications (Direcci6n General de Tele-
comunicaci6nes -- DGT), a government ministry. The small
long-distance telephone system which uses both open wirelines
and HF radio is operated by the National Telecommunications
Enterprise (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones -- ENTEL).
According to a government decree of 1965, ENTEL is scheduled
to take over, integrate, and upgrade all non-military govern-
ment telecommunications.
Four separate HF radiotelegraph networks provide common
carrier service throughout Bolivia. In many regions of the
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S VIO 89.9 Zb6L9
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idOO O ?ow" a3a~,xx3
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(suogegs uaaM;eq sq!n P fo
lagwnu aqp 83ez!pui s/PJawnN)
I321D3S
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country, these networks provide the only service available.
The DGT operates a nationwide HF radio network primarily for
government use. Two private firms, the International Company
of Bolivian Radio (Compania Internacional de Radio Boliviana
-- CIRBOL) and the Interdepartmental Radioelectric Service
(Servicio Radioelectrico Interdepartmental -- SERVAL), also
operate widespread IIF radiotelegraph networks. Another pri-
vate company, Radio Rural, operates an HF radiotelegraph
system with service confined to the Santa Cruz area.*
There are only about 25,000 telephones in Bolivia,
nearly all of which are concentrated in seven cities and
used only for local service. More than half of the tele-
phones are located in La Paz alone, and the rest are spread
thinly among Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Sucre, Potosi,
and Tarija. Most of the phones are used by private subscrib-
ers, but about 4,000 are located in various government offices.
Bolivia's international communications are limited to
wirelines and HF point-to-point radio, linking it with sur-
rounding countries and New York. All American Cables and
Radio Company (AACR -- an ITT subsidiary) has a wiretele-
graph circuit from La Paz to Oruro to Iquique, Chile. Thq
government (RTE) has wirelines in some border areas which
provide connections into neighboring countries. Principal
among these are lines from Villazon to La Quiaca, Argentina;
from Yacuiba to Pocitos, Argentina; from Uyuni to Antofagasta,
Chile; and from Copacabana to Puno, Peru.
International HF radio circuits are more numerous. A La
Paz newspaper, Empresa Editora "El Diario", S.A.,receives
radioprinter, radiotelephone, and radiophoto services from
the United Press International. La Paz also is served by
single-channel common carrier telephone circuits with Santi-
ago and with Buenos Aires. Radiotelegraph circuits provide
the largest number of international links, as shown in the
following tabulation.
International HF Radiotelegraph Circuits
Bolivian Number of
Terminal Circuits Foreign Terminal Ownership
La Paz 1 New York, U.S.A. Cirbol
La Paz 1 Arequipa, Peru GOB**
* See Maps 57940 and 57938
**Government of Bolivia
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BOLIVIA: Common Carrier High-frequency (HF) Radiotelegraph Networks, June 1968 CONFIDENTIAL
Cobija
Copaca an
fago
Titicaca
Santa Ana
0
Santa Rosa
Nueva
Moca
Rue
Apolo I
de)
de J\
Poopo
Cachuela
Esperanzf
uin
lagdalena
YaCuiba
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIRBOL* Network
Circuit
(Compania Internaclonal de Radio Bollviana)
RADIO RURAL Network
Circuit
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
CONFIDENTIAL
Puerto
hL6LWZ
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BOLIVIA: Common Carrier High-frequency (HF) Radiotelephone Networks, June 1968
SECRET
618
6
4
60
BRAZIL
o?
NATIONAL Network*
b
O Radiotelephone station
~ ?
,/
to
? 1
tps
uayaramerin
?<
(Operated by Govt. of Bolivia Dept.
of Posts and Communications)
,
``~cobi]a~? ,
v
? d?
ralta
oa~
'?
SERVAL Network
Circuit
r
"(Servicio Redioelectrica interdepartmental)
l :'.
r
tfe
0 50 1,00 150 Miles
nez
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
OSan oa
uin tt~
SECRET
c
adalena
1adalena
BOUNOA Y REPREBEN ATON ap
ana
NOT NECESSARILY
P
ERU
RAZIL
/ Rurre
S T 'nidad
orja Q
? gna i ?
Logo
o
1
jjttcaca
bacaba
16-
PAZ
a o,
o os onto
"
San Ignaci
ern II
?
'
T n I f`' o
c
amb
q
l
n`
San a Cruz
San Jose
Oruro
?
?
an Pedro t. Ai ui a
alleg nde
Robore
?
Suarez ?
ucre 0
~
Padill
otosi
Charagua
?
~?
OE
Camlrl
IOUynni
Camarg
I
Villa Montes
TuPi a
?
PARA
GU
Tariia
AY
CHILE
..~V,i-Ila.en
Yaciba?
,.
Bermejo
~
J
!
A
A
RGENT
~p~fl
I N A
?
J68
! 1' 6
4
6 0
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Bolivian Number of
Terminal Circuits
Foreign Terminal
Ownership
La Paz
3
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Lima, Peru
Cirbol
Cables
West Coast
La
Paz
1
Montevideo, Uruguay
GOB*
La
Paz
1
Santiago, Chile
Cirbol
La
Paz
N.A.**
Asuncion, Paraguay
GOB*
Cochabamba N.A.**
Arequipa, Peru
GOB*
Riberalta N.A.**
Puerto Maldonado, Peru
GOB*
Riberalta N.A.**
Porto Velho, Brazil
GOB*
3. Broadcasting
Bolivia has 63 licensed radiobroadcasting stations. The
two highest-powered stations (20kw and 10kw) are located in
La Paz and are operated by the government. The remainder
are privately owned. The government does not exercise its
right to regulate the activities of private stations on a
day-to-day basis, but it does not tolerate the broadcasting
of anti-government propaganda. Most unlicensed stations
appear to have been effectively silenced as a result of govern-
ment crackdowns.
Of the 63 licensed stations, about half broadcast simul-
taneously on both the medium and shortwave bands, and two of
them also simulcast FM signals from La Paz. The remaining
stations broadcast only on the medium-wave band. Only 7 of
the 61 private stations have as much as 5 kw of power; all
of the others operate at 1 kw or less. The two government-
owned transmitters have their own independent power supply,
but all the private stations are dependent on public power.
More than three-quarters of the country's radiobroadcast-
ing stations are concentrated in only four cities: 27 in La
Paz, 9 in Cochabamba, 7 in Santa Cruz, and 5 in Oruro. There
are also radiobroadcasting stations in the following towns:
Trinidad, Concepcion, San Jose', Villa Montes, Tarija, Potosi,
Sucre, and Llallagua. There are no broadcasting networks as
such in Bolivia, but stations occasionally pick up and trans-
mit programs originated by other stations. For the country
as a whole, there are an estimated 300,000 radio receivers --
the equivalent of one set for approximately every 12 persons.
All receivers must be imported since Bolivia does not manu-
facture this type of equipment.
Government of Bolivia
**Information not available but probably single circuit.
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There are no international radiobroadcasting stations in
Bolivia and television broadcasting is still in the discussion
stage.
4. Special-Purpose Systems
Some of the most effective point-to-point radio systems
in Bolivia are those operated by certain government and pri-
vate entities to service their own specialized needs. The
Bolivian army operates a network of at least 22 fixed HF radio
stations. Most of the outstations on this network can com-
municate directly with T,a Paz by either voice or telegraph,
but not both simultaneously. With assistance from USAID, the
Bolivian National Police has established a voice radio network
equipped with 100-watt, single sideband transceivers. This
net links La Paz with Oruro, Santa Cruz, Potosi, and Villazon
(See Map 57936). Single-circuit radio telegraph networks are
operated by the Bolivian railroads and the Banco Minero (Mining
Bank), both state-owned. The railroad telegraph links extend
along all the major railroad routes while those of the Mining
Bank radiate out from the main office in La Paz to branch
bank offices located in Bolivia's major mining towns. Finally,
each of the two airlines serving Bolivia, the state-owned Lloyd
Aero Boliviana (LAB) and Braniff International Airways, operates
its own radio communications network. Available information
does not indicate clearly the technical characteristics of
these airlines communications facilities, but it is probable that
all of them are capable of at least one manual Morse circuit.
5. Special Communications Problems and Vulnerabilities
The physical environment of various regions in Bolivia
can entail some unusual problems for the communicator.
Electronic equipment to be used in jungle areas should be
tropicalized in order to minimize the adverse effects of
moisture and fungus. Even with proper equipment, strict
preventive maintenance is necessary in tropical climates.
Commonly used portable VHF equipment usually requires a "line-
of-sight" transmission path which may be difficult to obtain
in mountains. Radio signals are rapidly attenuated by dense
foliage; therefore, in forest areas it is necessary to elevate
antennas above the level of foliation to obtain more than a
small fraction of designed transmission range. During the
mid-day hours the maximum usable frequency usually falls to
approximately 5 megacycles. Thus, from roughly 1100 to 1500
hours daily (times are subject to considerable variation)
networks utilizing higher frequencies, such as the National
Police SSB system, undergo total blackout.
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BOLIVIA: Specialized High-frequency (HF) Radiotelegraph Networks, June 1968
Calacot
irn9uad 2
Laqo
de
Poopo
AR
'UN
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
Network
Circuit
NATIONAL POLICE
Network
Circuit
(All stations utilize 100 watt
single side-band transmitters)
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
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IV. Political Dynamics
A. General
Bolivia's present political system represents in large
measure a reaction against the social and economic order which
prevailed virtually unchanged throughout the first half of the
20th century. The revolution of 1952 altered drastically the
character and direction of Bolivian life. Prior to that date,
Bolivia was essentially a classic feudal state in which a
small white and mestizo oligarchy kept the Indian population
in a condition of virtual slavery. The rapidity and totality
of the transformation brought on by the revolution shook
Bolivian society to its core -- the political, economic and
social foundations of the traditional order were utterly
destroyed and a new, vaguely defined, but totally different
order was established.
As the old social structure and its political parties
disintegrated, newly emerging groups filler. the void. These
new political parties share many qualities and attitudes in
common. They differ sharply, however, as to the specific
methods by which domestic reforms are to be achieved. Not
only is there a lack of political consensus among the several
parties but, equally important, almost every political move-
ment has undergone a split, with the splinter parties them-
selves then factionalizing into right, center and left wings.
The political scene is obscured by the inability of the many
diverse elements to work together, and non-political organi-
zations play important roles. The regime in power at any one
point in time faces a wide spectrum of opposition parties
representing all shades of political opinion. The most
important political pressure groups are the military, campesinos,
miners and industrial workers, and students. The middle class,
not yet an important political force, is interested primarily
in security, tranquility and maintenance of the status quo.
The clamor of the campesinos and miners, long subordinate and
impoverished, dominates the political scene. While organized
labor supports the aims of the revolution, there are conflicting
political factions within the movement and their loyalties
are directed at individuals rather than the system of government.
Labor has heavily influenced government policy. Its importance
in Bolivia's power balance has made it a target group for all
political parties seeking control of the government apparatus.
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Political behavior still is conditioned by traditional
values and mores of Bolivian life. Provincialism, corruption,
violence and inefficiency seriously limit the attainment of
national goals and the satisfactory functioning of day-to-day
affairs of government. An incapacity for long-range planning
is another serious inhibitor to effective government. Bolivians
favor a kind of order which arises out of strong central poli-
tical authority. In the government this is reflected in
absolute supremacy of the executive over the legislature. So
long as a leader remains in undisputed command of the situation,
there is little overt opposition to his decisions. Nationalism
as a political ideology has great emotional appeal to most
? Spanish-speaking Bolivians. The national revolution, with its
goals of social change, political regeneration, and economic
development, is a source of inspiration to the people. The
number of Bolivians who participate directly in national poli-
tical life has increased greatly. This fact, and the continuing
demands of the Indian and miner groups;, are among the major
determinants of the future course of Bolivian political devel-
opment.
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B. Structure of Government.
1. Central Government
The Bolivian constitution of February 1967 provides for a
highly centralized form of government with separation of powers
among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Separ-
ation of powers, however, is a fiction; real authority is
vested in the person of the President who serves both as head
of state and of the official party. This sixteenth constitution
in Bolivia's history replaced a document which the military
imposed in 1965 (see Table 4).
The Executive Branch consists of the President, Vice President
and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). The President and Vice
President are elected by direct universal suffrage for a term
of four years, after which they must retire for four years before
again being eligible for election. Both are required to be of
Bolivian origin and at least 35 years of age; each must be a
candidate of a legally recognized political or civic group and
not have a criminal record.
The constitution gives the President broad powers and governs
his relations with the legislative branch; he is charged with
enforcing and implementing laws which the legislature enacts; as
head of the armed forces he has the power to increase the size
of forces, call up reserves, and suspend the constitutional rights
of persons endangering public order; to preserve civil order he
can use the "state of siege", a modified form of martial law; he
administers taxes and the disbursements of revenues; he conducts
foreign relations; and he supervises the municipal governments.
One of the President's most important sources of strength is the
power of appointment through which he exercises control over a
large number of public servants at all levels of government. He
appoints ministers, chief executive officers and all officials
whose appointments are not delegated specifically to another
branch of government.
The Legislative Branch (the National Congress) is a bicam-
eral body composed of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
Senators and deputies serve a four year term. The Congress fixes
the number of deputies and their method of election; there are
three senators from each of the nine departments, elected by
direct universal suffrage. The legislature is not an important
policy making body; for the most part it responds to the will of
the President. The Chamber of Deputies is concerned primarily
with fiscal matters; in addition to its legislative duties, the
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Senate serves as a trial court of last resort on charges brought
by the Chamber of Deputies against the justices of the Supreme
Court and the Attorney General. Either chamber can initiate
bills; the Supreme Court can initiate legislation pertaining to
legal codes; the President can initiate bills through his Minis-
ters. When Congress is not in session, its functions are
performed by a commission of congress composed of nine Senators
and eighteen deputies elected by their respective houses and
presided over by thee Vice President.
The Judicial Branch comprises a Supreme Court, superior
(district) courts, and such other tribunals as the legislature
may deem necessary. The Supreme Court has a president and
eleven judges who staff the court's three chambers, serving ten-
year terms. The Supreme Court is vested with judicial review
of questions involving the constitutionality of laws, decrees,
questionable action of the Executive Branch, and the arbitration
of differences arising between the municipal or departmental
authorities. Judges receive extremely low salaries and most
take bribes as a matter of course.
2. Regional and Local Government
The country is divided into nine political departments.
The prefect for each, appointed by the President, is responsible
to him for fiscal and administrative matters and exercises the
President's military authority in his own area. Each department
is divided into provinces of which there are 93 throughout the
country. Centralized control is further insured by the
President's appointment of provincial subprefects who operate
under direction of the National Minister of Government, Justice
and Immigration. Provinces are divided into cantons, the
smallest unit of local government. Bolivia has 983 of these
local units which are administered by corregidores, appointed
by the departmental prefect. Many corregidores customarily
serve without formal remuneration and thus have been the
governmental link perhaps most susceptible to corruption.
Municipal governments theoretically are autonomous, function-
ing under the direction of an elected municipal counsel. Actually
the President exercises control from the capital by choosing a
mayor from among the members of the municipal counsel and super-
vising the municipalities within the structure of the local
government.
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As in the past, the Indians in some areas continue to be
organized in their traditional community groups (ayllus).
Historically, the Indian has not had a voice in the national
government but has continued to make quasi-political decisions
in his selection of local communal leaders (Jilakatas or
Mallcus). This practice has preserved the tradition of local
community responsibility and explains the ability of the
Bolivian to enter into national political life with no great
difficulty or disruption of political stability.
C. The Government and the People
The character of the Bolivian people, their political
heritage, and the underdeveloped nature of their country have
made for only a tenuous reliance on constitutional procedure
as the method for accomplishing change. The people's conviction
that personal ambition motivates and dominates politics and
government explains the lack of confidence in the ballot box
and other democratic procedures. Bolivians rarely have been
meticulous in their allegiance to the nation's government or
its laws and processes. Envious resentment of the group in
power is commonplace and the concept of loyal opposition is
absent. Nearly all pay lip service to democratic methods but
strikes and mob violence are the traditional channels for
seeking redress of grievances, and to restore and maintain
order, the government continues to use heavy-handed measures.
The desire for political power has taken precedence over
the fulfillment of socio-economic goals. Self-seeking political
ambitions have led to the fragmentation of political movements,
creating a myriad of contending groups within every sector of
the political arena and making coalitions unwieldy and govern-
ments unstable. Democratic processes are abbreviated or
ignored in a fierce struggle for political dominance and
survival. Politics most often have been an end rather than a
means, and necessary reforms have been overlooked or neglected.
The fruits rather than the social utility of office have been
most prized, and struggle for political power has taken on a
life-and-death intensity.
In recent years there has been some moderation in the
intensity of political friction with its resulting disruption
and violence. Political moderates and democratic elements
have achieved ascendancy in labor and student fields, as well
as control of important governmental and public positions.
Some political groups have moderated their differences, if
not their ambitions, in working together for non-political
goals.
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This moderation may be no more than a passing phase, for
political and social imperfections that contribute to disunity
and disorder are deeply ingrained. They stem not only from
the primitive stage of political development, but also from
disruptive traits in the Bolivian character. Bolivian person-
alismo -- the emphasis put on individuality -?- tends to fragment
political movements into groups of contending personalities,
divided by ambition have aggravated political regionalism and
have been manifested in lack of political cohesion and flaunting
of governmental authority and constitutional methods. The
peaceful implementation of legislative and administrative mea-
sures has been impeded by regionalism, the multiplicity of
competing groups and personalities, disregard for authority,
an underdeveloped government structure, corruption and in-
efficiency, and inadequate information and propaganda media.
Direct and drastic steps, such as the declaration of a state
of siege, often have been the only alternatives to government
inaction and stagnation. Although Bolivian governments have
been wary of circumventing democratic processes, they tradi-
tionally have done so. Restrictions have been imposed on
information media to prevent the dissemination of news pre-
judicial to the administration. The principal targets of
these controls have been the extreme right and the extreme
left. Moderate opposition groups have been allowed a degree
of freedom of expression but have used this freedom judiciously.
Government policy is dedicated to introduction of change
into the socio-political order and in basic attitudes which
underlie that order. Old patterns persist, however, and basic
socio-economic factors inhibit the government's effort to
explain its policies and programs to the people. Bolivia has
the largest percentage of Indian population of any Latin
American country, with the exception of Guatemala. Of this
element, only 8 percent have any knowledge of Spanish, the
tongue spoken by whites and mestizos and the official language
of the country, while about 38 percent speak only Aymara and
54 percent only Quechua. Many in the mestizo group, which
represents at least 30 percent of the population, are illiterate
or at best semi-literate. Little modernization has been
achieved in the Bolivian school system, and only the upper-
class segment of society, about 10 to I5 percent of the popu-
lation, has been given adequate opportunity for education.
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In addition to being handicapped by language and literacy
barriers, government efforts to reach the people are seriously
restricted by the country's economic underdevelopment. The
bulk of the population is engaged in primitive agriculture
and lives at bare subsistence levels. The conventional news
media -- press, radio, motion pictures -- are beyond the reach
of all but the relatively wealthy, and only a small proportion
of the literate group can afford a newspaper subscription,
radio set or an occasional evening at the theatre. Less than
a dozen daily and weekly newspapers are published in Bolivia
with a combined circulation of not more than 125,000. Tele-
vision has not been developed and there are in operation less
than 30 radio broadcasting stations and 100 motion picture
theaters. These media service the departmental capital cities,
primarily La Paz.
The current regime, recognizing its heavy dependence on
favorable public opinion, has undertaken an intensive propa-
ganda program which is designed to reach every segment of
society and every populated corner of the country. The
government has been successful in spreading throughout the
country the conviction that it is genuinely dedicated to the
cause of Bolivia and its people. Except for groups of the
middle and most of the small upper-class, there is abundant
evidence that the administration receives broad popular support.
Tangible evidence of the effectiveness of this program has
been popular reaction to activities of subversive groups.
Whenever revolutionary attempts have been engineered by oppo-
sition elements, or even when such attempts are rumored, the
people have responded readily to official appeals for pre-
paredness or armed counteraction.
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 ~ viq #r ct r v rnment, 1967
NATIONAL
CONGRESS
?.:AAttarney General
ouncilPfor Iioneta y
Stabilization and
Economic Development
i"'National Office of
Information
SUPREME
COURT*
(10-year terms)
National Courts
of Labor and
Mining
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
(Cabinet)
Legislative
Commission
? Agriculture,
Animal Husbandry,
and Colonization
? Campesino Rural Affairs
? Culture, Information, and
Tourism Education
? Finance and
Public Credit
? Foreign Affairs and
Worship
Government, Justice,
and Immigration
Labor and Social Welfare
Mines and Petroleum
National Defense
National Economy
Planning, Development,
and Coordination
Public Health
Public Works and
Communications
? Secretary General of the Presidency
? President of the Bolivian Mining Corp.
? Ministers (1) without Portfolio
DEPARTMENTAL
~~g Tr
= i y
y I
ONAL
rr~
Mi NICIPAL
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p g to m a
norginated by the Senate, and
elected by the Chamber of :Deputies
* u `es ;nominated & Supreme Court
as t ,by the enat r_. ~.,xu
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D. Political Parties
Bolivian political parties present a confusing picture of
plotting, splintering, factionalism and shifting coalitions.
This Section first sketches an outline of key political party
developments during the period 1952 through early 1969; it
then describes the more important pro-government and non-
communist opposition parties on Bolivia's current political
scene. (Table 5 lists these parties and their leaders.)
(Part III covers those parties and organizations which, through
subversive insurgency, oppose the present government.)
From April 1952 until November 1964, Bolivia had a modi-
fied multiparty system with one party, the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR), heavily dominant. Other parties,
some rooted in the pre-revolutionary period and others formed
after 1952, coexisted uneasily with the revolutionary party.
The MNR initially suppressed any serious challenge by opposition
groups of either left or right, but its position weakened during
the second Paz administration. One group pulled away in 1960,
creating what later became known as the Authentic Revolutionary
Party (PRA); the left sector broke off in March 1964 to form
the National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN). The MNR
essentially collapsed after Paz was overthrown. Juan Lechin's
PRIN had a temporary ascendancy but it and the Bolivian left
were dealt a severe blow by Lechin's exile, the failure of the
leftist-inspired general strike, and the temporary military
occupation of the mines.
For two years after the ouster of Paz, Bolivia was ruled
by a military junta. In preparation for the election of 1966,
which he won by an impressive 61 percent of the vote, General
Barrientos had formed a coalition of four political parties,
encompassing both conservative and leftist views. Called the
Bolivian Revolutionary Front (FRB), it was composed of the
PRA, the Popular Christian Movement (MPS), the Social Democratic
Party (PSD), the Leftist Revolutionary Party (PIR), the Chaco
War Veterans Confederation, and the National Confederation of
Rural Workers (Campesino Confederation). The FRB, never more
than a paper organization, was dissolved in July 1967 when the
PSD withdrew from the coalition, followed by the PRA. Through
the remainder of his presidency, however, Barrientos was able
to retain the support of most of these ex-FRB components. With
the death of Barrientos in April 1969, Vice President Salinas
became President. Almost immediately, political jockeying over
his successor commenced. For a period of several months, it
appeared that General Alfredo Ovando would take his chances in
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BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
(As of May 1969)
PARTY
Pro-Government
Popular Christian Movement (MPG)
(Movimiento Popular Cristiano)
Authentic Revolutionary Party (PRA)
(Partido Revolucionario Autentico)
Leftist Revolutionary Party (PIR)
(Partido de la Izquierda
Revolucionario)
Social Democratic Party (PSD)
(Partido Socialista Democratico)
Non-Communist Opposition
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)
(Falange Socialista Boliviano)
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
(Partido Democratico Cristiano)
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
(Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionario)
National Leftist Revolutionary
Party (PRIN)
(Partido Revolucionario de la
Izquierda Nacionalista)
LEADER(S)
Hugo Bozo Alocer
Walter Guevara Arze
Richard Anaya Arze
President Luis Siles
Salinas
Mario Gutierrez
(exiled)
Gonzalo Romero
Remo Di Natale
Benjamin Miguel
Victor Paz
Estenssoro (exiled)
Victor Andrade
(exiled)
Hernan Siles Zuazo
(exiled)
Juan Lechin Oquendo
(exiled)
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the 1970 election. On September 26, however, the Bolivian
Armed Forces, in a bloodless coup, installed Ovando as President.
A number of the political parties that had supported Barrientos
announced their adherence to the revolutionary government.
The four more important pro-government parties are the
MPC, PRA, PIR and PSD. The MPC, formed in 1965, is a center
left party which generally supports the ideals of the 1952
Revolution. It favors economic development through industrial-
ization and close cooperation with the United States and the
Alliance. The party's support comes principally from
campesinos living in the Cochabamba valley and the Department
of La Paz. The?PRS, an offshoot of the MNR, has its strength
among miners, worers, teachers and youth groups. The PIR,
organized in 1940 by a group of Marxist intellectuals, draws
its support from Cochabamba and stands for industrialization
and diversification of the economy. The PSD, formed in 1945
by university intellectuals, was formerly led by Siles
Salinas. Considered conservative in the context of the post-
1952 Revolution, the PSD program calls for higher ethical
standards in government, more efficient use of U.S. aid, and
more freedom for labor organizations. (The PALIC -- Agricul-
ture-Labor Party of the Christian Left -- a new grouping of
campesino and labor elements, emerged in 1967 to support
Barrientos but has not achieved status as a political party.)
The non-Communist opposition parties, also four in number,
are the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), Christian Democratic
Party (PDC), MNR and PRIN. Of these the MNR is numerically
the strongest although it has been in serious eclipse since
1964. Conceived by a group of middle and upper-class intell-
ectual dissidents, its members represent a wide range of
political persuasion from right-of-center to extreme left.
The party was virtually destroyed in the 1964 coup and attempts
to reunify it have foundered on conflicts between leaders and
over policies. The FSB, founded in 1936, gained initial
strength because of its identification in the popular mind
with the fascism then triumphant in Europe. Although it sought
the support of the general populace, its principal strength
lay in the extreme right. Following the 1964 Revolution, the
party split into two principal factions; it participated in
the 1966 election under the name of the Christian Democratic
Community (CDC), winning 12.5 percent of the vote, second only
to the FRB. Internally confused over policies and programs,
the FSB maintains a basically anti-government position in
Congress. The PDC was organized in 1945 by a student group
and its following consists mainly of university professors and
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students, although it finds some support among the youth and
middle classes in the cities of La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba.
Its platform calls for a "moral reawakening" based on
Christian concepts, technological advancement, agrarian re-
form, and reorganization of the mines. The PRIN, which after
the November 1964 Revolution became the military junta's
principal threat, has never recovered its previous labor
strength and is seriously factionalized. The PRIN did not
participate in the 1966 election.
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ANALYSIS OF BOLIVIAN INTERNAL SECURITY
I. The Forces of Subversive Insurgency
A. General
In the decade after 1952, Bolivia witnessed seventeen
unsuccessful armed revolts, most of which were organized
by the rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB). Since
November 1964, however, the chief subversive threat has
come from the extreme left. The six principal leftist-
oriented opposition parties are discussed in Section B.,
below. Five of these parties either are preparing for,
or actually involved in, activities aimed at the ultimate
overthrow of the Bolivian Government.
Most political "outs" engage to some degree in sub-
versive activities against the regime in power, but many
are too small to constitute a real threat. Moreover, they
are as badly organized, if not worse, than the pro-adminis-
tration parties. They suffer internal division which inhibits
coordinated action with other parties. Some prefer to guard
jealously a small traditional prerogative rather than risk
loss of identity in merging with another party.
Foreign influence over subversive organizations is quite
extensive in comparison to the small size and impact of these
groups on the political system. It extends to both Communist
and non-Communist opposition groups, and takes the form of
training, financial assistance, asylum, indoctrination and
supplies. Cuba has played a unique role in Bolivian political
affairs. Although Castro was unsuccessful in his efforts to
establish a second "Sierra Maestra" in the Andean Mountains,
Che's ill-planned campaign has served as an object lesson,
both to the Bolivian Government and to those others who might
aspire to overthrow the government through guerrilla warfare.
The Soviet Union, for its part, generally seeks to discourage
insurgency tactics and to emphasize political means, in the
belief that displacing U.S. influence and extending Soviet
influence can only be a gradual, long-term process in which
diplomatic ties, expanding economic relationships, and local
Communist Party actions all will play a role. The Chinese
Communists, on the other hand, have fostered insurgency through
propaganda and guerrilla training.
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The general strategy of the Communist parties has been
to exert pressure on the government through strikes, demon-
strations and propaganda. They seek to infiltrate the. ggvern-
ment, other parties, the educational system, public information
media, and in particular, organized labor. Communist influ-
ence in the Bolivian labor movement, which reached its peak in
early 1965, since has waned as a result of inroads by democratic
elements, vigorous government measures, and labor weariness with
political strife. The Communists still accord high priority,
however, to regaining their position among the laboring class
and to'exploiting economic grievances.
Communist influence on students has been on the decline since
1957. That year witnessed the beginning of significant non-Com-
munist participation in the chief national university student
organization, the Bolivian University Confederation (CUB), which
is empowered to establish relations with all labor, peasant,
professional or other movements. Today only 10 percent of all
university students are believed to be Communists, but Communist
influence is present in most university faculties and adminis-
trations, and strong in some. For example, most of the key posts
of the universities of Potosi' and Oruro are controlled by Com-
munists or pro-Communists. Relative to their actual number, Com-
munists exert a disproportionate influence on students through
collaboration and alliances with groups of almost every political
persuasion. Two primary factors -- the large number of Communist
and pro-Communist professors, and the inadequacy of courses which
describe the Western democratic process --- contribute to continuing
Communist strength in the field of education.
In their effort to form a unified, Communist-directed opposition
to the government, the Communists have penetrated other political
parties, principally the National Leftist Revolutionary Party
(PRIN) and National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Their efforts
have been hampered, however, by factionalism between elements in
these and the several Communist parties. It should be noted that
there are extremist elements in each opposition party who would
join with almost any subversive movement to overthrow the existing
order. In the following section, these opposition parties are
discussed under two major categories: Communist-inspired (POR,
PCB/S, PCB/C); and non-Communist groups and activities (FSB, MNR,
and PRIN).
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B. Opposition Parties
The Communist movement originated in the late 1930's among
radical Bolivian political exiles in Argentina and Chile. The
Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR) dates to the early
1940's and reached the peak of its influence in the period 1946-
52. In 1963 the POR divided into three main factions: two fac-
tions bore the name Lucha Obrera (Workers' Struggle) -- one,
recognized by the Fourth International, was led by Hugo Gonzalez
Moscoso; the other, aligned with the Latin American Bureau of
the international Trotskyist movement, was led by Amadeo Vargas
Arze. The third, the Masas (Masses) faction, was led by Guillermo
Lora Escobar. When the PRIN was formed in March 1964, the POR
sought to ally itself; the Gonzalez faction even contemplated
merging with the PRIN. After the government took action against
leftist groups in May 1965, the Gonzalez faction turned to plans
for organized antigovernment violence, establishing in September
the National Guerrilla Command. In August 1966 it drew up a one-
year guerrilla plan which included obtaining funds from abroad,
cooperating with Peruvian guerrilla forces, establishing a command
headquarters in Santa Cruz, and forming an armed youth front called
the Workers' Armed Revolutionary Front.
The principal goals of the POR are to consolidate party unity,
work for a united leftist front, and prepare for armed revolution.
Claiming that it is the true representative of Marxism-Leninism in
Bolivia, the POR condemns the PCB/S and maintains good relationships
with Fidel Castro. In 1968 the POR had an estimated membership of
1-2,000 with strength concentrated in the cities and departments of
La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosi and Oruro (including the nationalized
mine unions in the latter two departments), the rail union at Oruro,
and among university students. The POR maintains ties in Argentina
from where approximately ten members have traveled to Cuba for
guerrilla training since early 1968. The POR has some subversive
potential, particularly in mining areas, but its effectiveness as
a guerrilla force is limited by the party's small size and internal
division.
The orthodox Communist Part of Bolivia (PCB) was established
in January 1950 by a group of dissident elements who broke away
from the Leftist Revolutionary Party (PIR), the first Marxist-
oriented party to be established within Bolivia. In August 1964
a split occurred in the PCB, due principally to longstanding per-
sonal rivalries among its leaders. The existence of a separate
dissident Communist Party, referred to as the Pro-Chinese Bolivian
Communist Party (PCB/C) was formalized by convocation in April
1965 of the Extraordinary First National Congress of the PCB/C.
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Each of the two parties, PCB/S and PCB/C, claims that the other
is a dissident faction. The PCB, as reflected in its division,
has been characterized by constant jockeying for power. Party
policy and tactics have been defensive rather than aggressive
in character, oriented more toward survival than growth, and in-
volved in reacting to rather than guiding events. This has resulted
in confusion, apathy, discord and distrust among the rank and
file. Its chief tactic has been directed toward formation of
alliances with other leftist groups but generally these have not
borne fruit.
The Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB/S) is led by
Jorge Kolle Cueto. Typical of most Communist parties, it is
based on the principles of discipline, democratic centralism,
and indirect elections. Party policy calls for overthrow of
the established regime and installation of a socialist system.
There is deep division within the party, however, on the tactics
to be employed in achieving this objective. Generally, the
PCB/S is inclined toward the longer, non-violent road to power,
illustrated by its enunciated policy of peaceful political strug-
gle in the July 1966 election and the recer~t decision to reac-
tivate the FLIN. Despite this reiteration of non-violence, party
leaders have been compelled to acquiesce, in theory at least, to
calls from within the party for guerrilla. warfare.- This acquies-
cence is reflected in adoption of the goal of developing a guer-
rilla potential modeled after the Venezuelan Armed Forces of
National Liberation.
The party is not believed to be actively preparing guerrilla
activities, but its leaders are concerned at the extent of pro-
guerrilla sympathy within the party and the collaboration by some
members with the Army of National Liberation (ELN.) (This Cuban-
supported group is composed of elements from all opposition
movements, including in addition to the PCB/S, the POR, PDB/C,
and possibly the PRIN. The advanced state of ELN plans to
initiate urban terrorism was exposed in July 1969 when Bolivian
authorities arrested ten persons associated with the ELN and
POR. Subsequent interrogation reportedly revealed the presence
of several Cubans in the La Paz area.)
The PCB/S is organized into three types of cells -- factory,
neighborhood and farm worker. (Committees responsible for party
organization were established in 1965 in the following regions:
Zone 1 -- northern Bolivia, between La Paz and Cochabamba; Zone
2 -- mining areas of Oruro, Potosi and southern Bolivia; and
Zone 3 -- eastern Bolivia, including El Beni and Santa Cruz.)
Its strength is concentrated heavily in the departments and
capital cities of La Paz, Potosi (especially the Catavi mining
complex), Oruro and Cochabamba. It has scattered strength in
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Sucre and the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando and El
Beni. The party had an estimated 3-4,000 members in 1968, mostly
drawn from the worker, intellectual, student and other middle
class elements; less than 10 percent were peasants. The main-
tenance of close ties with Moscow lends the PCB/S its principal
prestige while party strength revolves around national leader-
ship's personal following among important labor leaders. Its
influence and effectiveness is diluted, however, by the presence
of more active and powerful Marxist groups among labor and students
Leadership has been indirect and distant, reaching rank and file
through a network of local and regional leaders whose devotion
and reliability have not been absolute. "Moreover, inadequate
ideological training and spiritless leadership have left the
party inherently unstable.
The Communist Youth of Bolivia (JCB), with a membership of
some 1-2,000, is an integral element of the PCB/S. Its chief
area of activity has been among students in universities and
secondary schools where it has variously competed with, col-
laborated with, or fought against the rival youth groups of the
MNR, PRIN, FSB, PSD and POR. It has been weakened by internal
friction, fear of government repression, inadequate finances,
and inability to regroup its forces since the PCB split and the
government crackdown of May 1965.
The Pro-Chinese Bolivian Communist Party (PCB/C), led by
Oscar Zamora Me inace i., had an estimated membership of 2,000
in June 1968, of which only about 200 were active. The party,
and its youth element (JCB/C) has regional committees located
in La Paz, Siglo XX, Huanuni, Oruro, Cochabamba, Sucre and
Santa Cruz (location of the PCB/C Military Commission.) Guer-
rilla training allegedly has been carried out in the Chapare
area of the Department of Cochabamba; the Caranavi Zone of the
Alto Beni region; the city and jungle environs of Santa Cruz;
and in the Yungas of La Paz Department. In-country training
includes reconnaissance exercises, political/guerrilla instruction,
classes in explosives, and tactics of sabotage and urban war-
fare.
Party policies and objectives consistently have included the
following: strict adherence to the Marxist-Leninist line and
opposition to Soviet (PCB/S) revisionism and Trotskyist (POR)
adventurism; resistance to U.S. "imperialism" and all Bolivian
parties "in league with the imperialists"; formation of a united
anti-government popular front against all reactionary elements
to obtain power and establish a revolutionary government; support
of strikes, and opposition to government mining reforms; expansion
of party influence among miners, factory workers, peasants and
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students; improvement in party organization, financing and
propaganda; and, since early 1968, development of the party's
insurgent capability. Party leadership has become increasingly
concerned over the extent to which pro--Cuban sentiment has
appeared among its members. There is evidence that the ELN is
recruiting among PCB/C members; the inactivity of the party's
guerrilla arm -- the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) -- reportedly
is causing some members to seek enrollment in the ELN.
With its penchant for more violent revolutionary action, its
uncompromising stance on most issues, the lack of ideological
homogeneity among its leadership and membership, and a leadership
even less capable than that of its parent PCB, the PCB/C has made
little headway. It is currently too disorganized to lead any
type of united revolutionary struggle in Bolivia. The chief
threat of the PCB/C as a subversive force lies in its strength
in several mining areas, its potential support for other sub-
versive elements (most of its own potential guerrillas are student
adventurers), and its ability to invoke and take advantage of urban
disorders.
The National Revolutionary Movement; (MNR) has been described
as an 'ageing and toothless tiger", well reflecting the present
state of party affairs. Those who formed the party during the
years of political ferment following the Chaco War were united
by their discontent, intense nationalism and desire to create a
national party based on mass support. Today these same men offer
no new ideas and have lost their monopoly on the ideology of
national revolution.
The original MNR platform, published in June 1942, advocated
land distribution through colonization; nationalization of public
services; action against large private monopolies (the dominant
mining interests); a system of obligatory social security; and
legislation to improve the lot of the working class. The party
leaders achieved many of their objectives, but after 1964 the
party factionalized under Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernan Siles
Zuazo, and Victor Andrade, who today still lead their separate
and unreconciled factions. Paz and Siles remain dominant figures,
and efforts to rebuild the party tend to orient around them.
Efforts since the July 1966 election to reunify the party have
met with little success.
The MNR epitomizes traditional political tactics of opposition
parties in Bolivia in its belligerent opposition to the govern-
ment and total lack of ideological consistency. The bulk of
MNR membership is willing to take advantage of any circumstances
or temporary alliance that might damage the reputation and effec-
tiveness of the present governjnent. Notorious for its temporary
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support of widely disparate groups in hopes of seizing power,
the MNR since 1964 has sought alliances with the FSB, PRIN,
POR, PCB/C, PCB/S, PDC, and the military. While publicly it
supports democratic methods of political change, in practice
it resorts to extra-legal tactics of harassing the government
with the intent of weakening it through demonstrations, strikes,
terrorist actions, conspiratorial activities and other civil
disturbances. The MNR carries on clandestine activities both
within and without Bolivia: it collects funds from exiles, most
of whom are located in Lima. Caracas, Montevideo, Santiago,
Washington and Argentina; and it seeks financial support from
Chinese and Cubans in Paris, from the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City, and from the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party.
In their efforts to regain public support, party moderates
urge that the party follow peaceful activities. Other, however,
argue for capturing the leadership of the leftist forces in the
conviction that they ultimately will oust the present government.
While the MNR has a militant youth section (MNRU), increasing
strength within the universities, and a growing capability within
urban areas, the party remains too fragmented to really threaten
the stability of the Bolivian Government. Regardless of the actual
effectiveness of MNR opposition, the Bolivian Government considers
it the most serious threat to stability. The Government uses any
pretext to arrest its leaders and weaken its influence.
The Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) has led an erratic and
troubled sixty-three year existence. During the first decade of
MNR rule, the FSB was the prime mover in at least 12 of the 17
attempted armed revolts and probably was implicated in the other
five. For the past decade it has been the principal non-Com-
munist subversive force in Bolivia. Following the 1964 revolution,
the FSB split into two principal groups -- one, led by party chief
Mario Gutierrez, tended to be intransigent, revengeful, unwilling
to share power, and inclined toward violence and conspiracy. The
other, under deputy chief Gonzalo Romero, favored a more pragmatic
approach and sought opportunities to participate in government,
even on a coalition basis. This disagreement over policy has per-
sisted to the present, and colors the party's attitude toward the
1970 election. In February 1969, Romero resigned when Gutierrez
(now in exile) declared that the FSB would support the presidential
nomination of General Ovando Candia.
The ideological orientation of the FSB is unclear. Its prin-
cipal objective simply is to obtain a position of power within
the government. To achieve this it is able, without internal
contradiction, to unite with leftists, cooperate with Communists,
or associate with the military. In recent years the party never
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has adhered to a specific course of action for any significant
period. The FSB appears content.to criticize all government
activities, without offering any substantive alternatives.
The Bolivian Government has accused the FSB of being involved
in a subversive campaign. While the party is not sponsoring in-
country training for its members, as early as October 1968 it was
showing interest in sending members to Cuba for 90 days training
in urban and guerrilla warfare. The party itself probably will
not be the instigator or driving force behind any major effort
to subvert or overthrow the government. It is possible,
however, that the FSB might join in a leftist combination
to include the PRIN, PDC, PCB/C, PCB/S and POR -- a
coalition which could assume a strong insurrectionist thrust,
and which could jeopardize the government.
The National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) is composed
primarily of remnants of labor unions, t e Youth sector, and
intellectuals who left the MNR with Lechin in 1964. After his
expulsion from the MNR, Lechin sought political and financial
support from, and alliances with, groups ana parties of almost
every hue in the political spectrum. He failed in these efforts,
due largely to the fact that the PRIN is a collection of hetero-
genous groups which have never achieved political unity and
ideological homogeneity.
This weakness continues to plague the party. Rightist elements
reject Lechin's overtures toward leftist parties, while leftist
elements adamantly refuse to follow the party in alliance with
rightist parties. Even within the individual left, center and
rightist factions of the PRIN there are cleavages between pro-
Lechinists and anti-Lechinists; between those willing to cooperate
with the government in power and those totally opposed to it;
between those favoring collaboration with certain individual leftist
or rightist parties and those favoring rival parties; and even
between those who espouse a legal political struggle and those
who champion violent solutions.
The PRIN continues to advocate profound change in the structure
of Bolivia that would bring the working class to power. It sees
no alternative to popular insurrection to overthrow the government
in power. Whether or not the PRIN has agreed to become part of a
revolutionary front with other political groups to overthrow the
Bolivian Government is not clear. Much confusion surrounds the
reported signing by the PRIN in October 1968 of a pact with the
Unified faction of the MNR, and the PDC.
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The PRIN finds primary strength among the labor element in
the mining areas, most of which preserves its loyalty to Lechin.
Party influence in the universities has increased but the PRIN
is not believed to have any significant support among the cam
pesinos. An assessment of the threat potential of the PRIN sug-
gests that it lacks the necessary strength and discipline to oust
the government by its own action, nor can it forge an alliance
large enough to neutralize the government's military capability.
By harassing the government through street demonstrations and
terrorist activities, however, the PRIN might provoke an over-
reaction which would permit it to take part in a general movement
to overturn the regime. In this sense, and by reason of its
anti-government orientation and opportunism, the PRIN must be
acknowledged to have a significant subversive potential.
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II. Internal Security
A. General
The Bolivian military establishment, with a total strength
of approximately 21,000, consists of a predominant army, an
embryonic naval force, and a small air force. Bolivia also
has a 3,600-man National Guard, primarily a police element
with little or no military capability. Although Bolivia is
a member of the Inter-American Defense Board and a signatory
of the Rio Treaty of 1947, it is capable of contributing
little more than moral support to hemispheric defense.
The Bolivian military establishment, in contrast to the
situation in most Latin American countries, has enjoyed
little prestige and self-confidence. The army was defeated
ignominiously in two wars -- by Chile in the war of the
Pacific in 1879-84 and by Paraguay in the Chaco War of
1932-35. In the revolution of 1952, the army yielded to
the police and militia and remained in partial eclipse
until 1964. In November of that year Rene Barrientos
Ortuno, commander of the air force and later President,
established a military junta. Under his leadership the
strengthened army overcame the miners' militia and reoccu-
pied the mines; in 1967 it successfully countered Che's
guerrilla band. These two actions have done much to enhance
military prestige.
The United States exerts predominant foreign military
influence in Bolivia. Bolivian officers and eligible non-
commissioned officers are trained at military schools in
the United States and Canal Zone, and in Bolivia by U.S.
Army and Air Force missions and U.S. mobile training teams.
Arms and equipment are supplied under the U.S. Military
Assistance Program (MAP). Argentina also has provided
military training and some equipment.
The Minister of National Defense is assisted by under-
secretaries for each service and by the Directorate General
for Territorial Administration who supervises the nine
military regions into which the country is divided. Admini-
stratively, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is
subordinate to the Minister of National Defense; operationally,
he is directly under the President. The Commander in Chief
exercises operational control through the commanders of the
three services. The nine military regions correspond to the
administrative departments. Region commanders are concerned
primarily with operating the conscription system for all
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services; they do some mobilization planning and carry out
administrative functions for all-three services.
With the exception of priests and higher church offi-
cials, all males are subject to conscription for military
service, but hardship deferments are granted liberally.
The period of obligatory military service has been one year
but in 1967 the term was extended to two years by presiden-
tial decree to permit more extensive training. Young men
of the upper classes normally avoid conscription either by
participating in the high school premilitary training pro-
gram or through entrance into the service academies. Most
conscripts are from the lower economic classes. Predomi-
nantly Indian, they generally are tough, amenable to disci-
pline and eager to learn.
Nearly all Bolivian officers are graduates of the mili-
tary or air academies. High school students fulfill their
military obligation by participating in military training
conducted on weekends and vacations during the last two
years of high school. The quality of conscript training
varies widely from unit to unit and the short period of
service allows for only individual training. Increased
training -- but probably not above company level -- will
be possible if the two-year decree is extended. There have
been no joint or combined training maneuvers or exercises
since 1963, but this has been somewhat compensated for by
frequent joint field experience; e.g., against militiamen
in the 1964 coup; against dissident miners in 1965 and
against Che's guerrillas in 1967.
Bolivia has no present capability to produce arms,
ammunition, or specialized military equipment for its -
armed forces, and lacks the industrial base for development
of any significant capability in the near future. Domestic
oil refineries meet most needs for petroleum products
although aviation gasoline, jet fuel, and lubricants must
be imported. Food and clothing are supplied from domestic
production but all other military equipment must be obtained
from abroad. In the period between 1958 and 1966 the United
States provided, under its Military Assistance Program (MAP)
U.S. $18.2 million to sustain the Bolivian armed forces.
The armed forces have no central purchasing agency, no
formal depot system, and no adequate system of stock control,
accountability, or supply discipline. Major items of equip-
ment normally are purchased on the open market by agencies
of the Ministry of National Defense and minor items are
purchased locally by using units. Such stocks as exist
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are maintained at the central arsenal in La Paz, with some
minor allocations to small national arsenals in Cochabamba
and Sucre. Most vehicle routine maintenance and repair
work is done within units by drivers and mechanics; heavier
equipment shops for major repairs are severely handicapped
by a shortage of spare parts, tools and lubricants. A cen-
tral arsenal in La Paz has limited facilities for repair
and maintenance of small arms and artillery and minor
repairs can be made within units.
Medical services are provided almost entirely by civil-
ian doctors who are attached or integrated into the military
units. Medical installations are few, small, and poorly
staffed and equipped; forward units operating against the
guerrillas in 1967 had almost no medical support.
B. Military Forces
The Bolivian Army, which has played a prominent part in
the country's history, has a three-fold mission: to defend
the country, maintain internal security, and perform activi-
ties of benefit to the national economy. Army personnel
strength, although comprising over 80 percent of total armed
forces, is less than that of the army of any neighboring
country except Paraguay. This, coupled with major defi-
ciencies in organization, training and logistics, renders
the army incapable of defending Bolivia against incursion
by any of its neighbors. The army is capable, however, of
maintaining domestic order provided it remains united and
loyal; as currently constituted, the army could not cope
with widespread insurgency. If non-Communist dissident
forces were to coalesce against an unpopular government,
it would be in line with army tradition to join the dissi-
dent. Almost 50 percent of the army's combat strength is
deployed in or near the capital and the mining regions for
protection of the government and the tin mines on which the
economy depends. The remainder is thinly deployed over the
vast and sparsely populated areas of northern and eastern
Bolivia, principally engaged in colonization, road building,
subsistence farming, and related civic action programs.
Comprising some 16,800 officers and men, the army is
organized into 9 infantry divisions, 1 division of school
troops, and the following separate units: 2 infantry regi-
ments (1 motorized), 1 cavalry regiment, 1 transportation
company, 1 maintenance company and the Engineer Command,
consisting of 5 battalions. Division headquarters are
located at Viacha, Oruro, Villa Montes, Camiri, Robore,
Riberalta, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Trinidad and Potosi.
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The six separate units are based in or near La Paz while
the Engineer Command, with headquarters at La Paz, has its
battalions deployed at Tarija, Caranavi, Vallegrande,
Guayaremerin, and Uncia. A special forces unit (Centro de
Instrucciones de Tropas Especiales - CITE) is attached to
the 7th Division at Cochabamba. CITE is one of Bolivia's
best units and is almost always deployed when disorders
erupt.
The typical division is organized into two or three
understrength regiments, a cavalry squadron and an artillery
battalion. Arms and equipment, generally of European manu-
facture, are obsolescent and the divisions lack mobility.
Other than for the two training centers for conscripts at
La Paz and Cochabamba, training is erratic. Lack of ade-
quate unit training is offset somewhat by on-the-job train-
ing in riot control and counterinsurgency operations.
The Bolivian Naval Force, with a personnel strength
of 1,480 and 11 small craft, has its headquarters in La Paz.
None of the naval force ships have armament and the naval
infantry's Mauser rifles are largely unservicable. Naval
force training largely parallels army training with con-
script training left to the individual unit commander. The
army provides most of the naval force's logistic support.
The 1st Naval District, with headquarters in Riberalta, is
responsible for the Rio Beni. It has a fleet of three small
river transports and a naval infantry battalion of 135 men
based at Cachuela Esperanza. The 2nd Naval District, with
headquarters at Trinidad, is responsible for the Rio Mamore.
Its fleet consists of four river transports; a naval infantry
battalion of 115 men is based at Boca Chapare. The Lake
District has its headquarters and a training center at
Tiquina on Lago Titicaca. Its fleet will consist of four
40-foot U.S. patrol craft.
The Bolivian Air Force, with a strength of 2,450 (of
which 2,208 are nonflying personnel) is loosely organized,
casually trained and poverty stricken. It boasts 78 piston
engine aircraft of which 7 are fighters; the Force has no
jet aircraft or bombers. Tactical units normally are dis-
posed on airfields at El Alto, Cochabamba, Tarija, Caranavi
and Riberalta.
The major basic deficiency of the air force logistic
system is lack of funds which often are so short as to ground
aircraft because of inability to purchase fuel and repair
parts. The air force completely depends on outside sources
for aircraft and spares and often resorts to cannibalization.
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Inadequate shops and tool shortages hamper maintenance; the
variety of aircraft inventory complicates equipment procure-
ment and training of technicians. Ordnance storage and
handling procedures at the three principal bases at El Alto,
Cochabamba and El Trompillo are inadequate and unsafe, making
these areas ideal sabotage targets.
The Air Force can provide fairly effective support to
ground units against small-scale insurgencies and it has a
limited transport service capability. It would not prove
effective, however, against widespread disorders or large-
scale guerrilla operations. Its troop airlift, supply and
rescue capabilities are considered fairly adequate. During
the 1967 insurgency, the Air Force failed to demonstrate
effective surveillance, strafing and bombing capabilities.
The experience gained during that campaign, however, is
reflected in an improved capacity of the Air Force to per-
form its primary missions of internal security and air
transport.
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C. Security and Intelligence Services
The organization and function of the security and intelli-
gence services of Bolivia have reflected the country's political
instability. 'Varying with each change in government or regime,
their principal objective always has been the maintenance of the
group in power and repression of the opposition. The present
organization of the Bolivian Security and Intelligence Services
is shown on Table 6.
Security Services -- With a combined strength of approxi-
mately 6,000 men, the civilian security services are organized
into a National Police Agency comprising the National Guard of
3,700 members, a 1,000-man National Traffic Service and the
National Department of Criminal Investigation (DNIC) of some
1,300 men. The Minister of Government, Justice, and Immigration
exercises authority over the National Police Agency which is
charged with law enforcement and preservation of internal
security. The figure of 6,000 approximates estimated national
needs but the police are not capable of coping with serious
public safety or internal security problems. It is only under
the control and tutelage of the Armed Forces that an effective
police force can be developed.
Following the 1952 Revolution, the police were deliberately
developed as a counterweight to the military. Since that time,
the two forces have regarded each other with suspicion and dis-
like. They have been rivals for political power and each has
subordinated the other during the period of its ascendancy. In
1965 the MNR's Carabineros (National Police) were disbanded by
the military junta, their functions being divided into the
three present components. The junta replaced a number of police
officers with military commanders and authorized the Armed Forces
to confiscate large amounts of essential police equipment. Today,
the National Directorate of the three police services is headed
by military officers.
The police traditionally have suffered from a number of key
deficiencies in leadership, organization, training and equip-
ment. Their intelligence and investigative capabilities are
inadequate and police forces are widely scattered throughout
the country; approximately 1,700 are stationed in La Paz.
Initial responsibility for maintenance of public order rests
with the National Guard, a quasi-military organization. Normally
armed only with a wooden baton, the Guard exists only at the
sufferance of the Armed Forces. The DNIC is responsible for in-
vestigating crime, and groups or persons threatening the security
of the country. It gradually has been developing into Bolivia's
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 Organization o mt ie Bolivian Intelligence
an ecur t r ervicesry
Intelligence
Section, G-2
National Directorate
of the Notional Guard
Army
General Staff
National Directorate
of Criminal Investigation
National Directorate
of Traffic
Navy
General Staff
Air Force
General Staff
> _ Relt ase 2GCt 6 / 7 : GIA-F DPBC 4 ~1. I } 3
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main civilian intelligence and security organization but lacks
resources, facilities, training and management. Notoriously
inefficient, it has difficulty in performing basic criminal
investigative missions. The DNIC is held in suspicion by
government officials as well as by the average citizen since
some of its personnel came from the earlier Political Control
organization which had a reputation for repression and brutal-
ity. Tables 7 and 8 indicate the 1967 distribution of
National Guard and DNIC personnel, respectively.
Police capabilities have been improved through assistance
provided by the United States under its AID Public Safet
25X6
The attainment of a strong autonomous police
force is possible over the long run provided there is a period
of relative stability during which traditional hostilities
die, and the Armed Forces come to appreciate the need for a
civilian police shield. (See Table 9, Country Team).
Intelligence Services -- Before the overthrow of the
military junta by the M R in 1952, Bolivian intelligence and
security responsibilities were divided between the Army and
the Carabineros. In 1954 a Department of Control and Political
Security (DCP) was created but, as the result of intense
public pressure, this Department was reorganized in 1959 as
the Directorate General of State Information and Security
(DGIS). No effective civilian intelligence organization existed
in Bolivia during the period between the ousting of President
Paz in November 1964 and the outbreak of Che Guevara's activity
in March 1967.
The obvious weakness of government intelligence during
the early stages of the Cuban-led insurgency led both civilian
and military authorities to begin planning the reorganization of
their intelligence services. The military and police services,
forced to work together because of the insurgency, developed
a sense of comradeship. Shortly after the outbreak of guerrilla
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DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL - 1967
LOCATION OFFICERS NCO'S
GUARDS
TOTAL
General Directorate
of the National Guard
La Paz 40
1
National Directorate
of the National Guard
La Paz 262
24
66
352
National School of
Public Safety
La Paz 65
18
27
110
Departmental Admin
La Paz 238
229
856
1323
Departmental Admin
Oruro 53
16
130
199
Departmental Admin
Cochabamba 85
22
266
373
Departmental Admin
Chuquisaca 51
16
133
200
Departmental Admin
Potosi 46
17
170
233
Departmental Admin
Tarija 41
6
85
132
Departmental Admin
Santa Cruz 75
19
254
348
Departmental Admin
Departmental Admin
Frontier Post
Beni
Pando
San Ignacio 8
7
30
45
Frontier Post
Tupiza 4
6
25
35
Frontier Post
Villazon 4
6
15
21
Frontier Post
Yacuiba 4
2
22
29
Frontier Post
Pto. Suarez 4
1
8
13
Frontier Post
Guayaramerin 2 _
2
14
18
TOTALS: 1020
397
3176
3593
SECRET
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ISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PERSONNEL
1967
TABLE 8
INSPECTOR
NITS GENERAL INSPECTOR
COMMISSARIES
DETECTIVES
AGENTS
TOTAL
a Paz
1
1
73
311
155
541
ruro
6
19
75
100
ochabamba
4
28
61
93
huquisaca
5
8
47
60
otosi
9
14
70
93
arija
2
14
43
59
-anta Cruz
5
23
79
107
eni
3
5
36
44
ando
1
S
21
27
,an Ignacio
3
17
20
upiza
1
4
17
22
acuiba
1
2
21
24
uerto Suarez
2
5
7
illazon
1
2
13
16
;uayaramerin
3
5
8
termej o
1
4
5
:iberalta
2
6
8
TOTALS:
1
1
111
446
675
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S-E-C-R-E-T
activity, measures were undertaken to train personnel in
intelligence techniques. The action against Che provided
the Army with practical field experience in interrogation
and demonstrated the importance of prompt communication, the
significance of captured documents, and the value of cooper-
ation with the campesinos. In early 1968, the U.S. Army
Mission, using a Mobile Training Team, provided an intelli-
gence course which was designed to provide Bolivia with a
nucleus of trained personnel capable of developing the
intelligence system of the Armed Forces. Through the efforts
of the U.S. Army Intelligence Advisor, action is continuing
to establish a full-time intelligence school for selected
Army personnel.
As presently structured, the country's intelligence
and security organizations are under the Ministry of
Government, Justice, and Immigration; or the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces. There is no intelligence or
security organization directly under the President. Within
the high command of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Council
of National Defense (CSDN) is the forum for review of intelli-
gence and security matters.
A small civilian intelligence department operates in the
National Department of Criminal Investigation (DNIC). Within
the National Guard, an Intelligence Department is responsible
for collecting and evaluating information on political, labor
union and police activities. No significant penetration of
subversive groups is known to have been initiated by the
National Guard. A small intelligence section within the
General Staff of the Armed Forces has responsibility for
analyzing Communist and leftist propaganda for the Commander-
in-Chief.
There is a G-2 section in the General Staff of each of
the three military services. Army G-2 has the normal duties
of collection, analysis, production, distribution, operations
and liaison. As of late 1968 it employed an estimated 70
persons full time. While the Army's is the most experienced,
its capability is limited by inadequate funds and, most
importantly, by lack of trained personnel at all echelons.
It has very limited surveillance, censorship and communications
capabilities; most of its sources are overt. Each of the
Bolivian Army's ten divisions has one G-2 officer and one
clerk. A military police element exists under the Army's
organizational structure. Its units, varying in size from 90-
man companies to 10-man squads, perform riot and traffic
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control duties. Bolivian overseas intelligence collection is
limited to the activities of Army attaches, primarily operating
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.
The Navy's G-2 consists of one officer and one clerk;
there are no intelligence officers in subordinate units. Navy
G-2 is primarily an information office with collection limited
to river traffic. The Air Force's G-2, comprising five individ-
uals, is also an information office with extremely limited
intelligence capability.
As a result of the joint U.S.-Bolivian Army Modernization
Study conducted in January 1968 and approved for implementation,
the intelligence organization of the Armed Forces will be
altered effective 1970. Improvements are scheduled for the
training, budgeting and communications phases of intelligence.
While Bolivia's overall intelligence and security capability
is not strong, definite improvements have been achieved since
1967.
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TABLE 10
AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES IN BOLIVIA*
AIRLINES, COMMERCIAL
1. Braniff International Airways, Avenida Camacho 1421,
Casilla 1967, La Paz
2. Petroleum Helicopters de Bolivia, Santa Cruz
3. World Wide Helicopters de Bolivia Ltda., Casilla 721,
Cochabamba
AUDITING
Arthur Young & Co., Avenida Camacho 1377, Casilla 1390,
La Paz
1. Banco Boliviano Americano, Calle Loayza 127-133,
Casillas 418-1791, La Paz
2. Bank of America, Calle Mercado 1046, Casilla 2787,
La Paz
3. First National City Bank, Calle Collin Edificio
Compaiiia Boliviana de Seguros, Casilla 260, La Paz
BUSINESS MACHINES
International Business Machines Co. de Bolivia, Avenida
Camacho 1372, Casilla 1061, La Paz
CHEMICALS AND PHARMACEUTICALS
1. Liquid Carbonic de Bolivia S.A., Calle Salinas s/n,
Casilla 571, La Paz
2. Laboratorios Abbott de Bolivia, Avenida 20 de Octubre
1743, Casilla 255, La Paz
1. Housing
a. Builders International, Inc., Avenida Villazon
1966, Casilla,4808, La Paz
b. Quiroga Rivas Rivas Ltda., Avenida Mariscal
Santa Cruz 1365, Casilla 2452, La Paz
*Trade List, Bureau of International Commerce, U.S. Department
of Commerce, August 1968 (This list is not to be considered
as all-inclusive.)
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TABLE 10
/cont./
a. Demopoulos and Ferguson-Galindo, Calle
Santivanez 4064, Casilla 1105, Cochabamba
b. J.A. Jones Construction Co., Calle Jordan,
Edificio Venturini, Casilla 904, Cochabamba
c. Tippetts, Abbett McCarthy Stratton, Casilla
568, Cochabamba
William Brothers Sudamericana Ltda., Casilla
496, Cochabamba; Casilla 1215, La Paz
ELECTRIFICATION
Kuljian-Prudenci-Claros, Avenida Ballivian 5463,
Casilla 1558, Cochabamba
ENGINEERING
1. Baker & Wibberley, Associates, Avenida Villaz6n
1960, Casilla 2177, La Paz
2. Harza-Galindo, Calle Santivanez 4064, Casilla
1105, Cochabamba
MINING (Exploration, Production, Export)
1. Ambo Ltd., Calle Socabaya 340, Casilla 2532, La Paz
2. Bolivian Tin Corp., Casilla 108, Potosi
3. Churquini Enterprises, Inc., Calle Potosi'814,
Casilla 1603, La Paz
4. Compania American Smelting Boliviana Ltda., Calle
Montevideo 52, Casilla 901, La Paz
5. Empresa Minera Estalsa S.A., Calle Pagador 1734,
Oruro
6. Lipez Mining Co., Calle Reyes Ortiz 59, Casilla
1215, La Paz
7. Sociedad Minera Comercial Ltda., "SOMCO LTDA",
Calle Potosi 940, Casilla 932, La Paz
8. Trans-American Resources, Inc., Calle Ayacucho
320, Casilla 632, La Paz
9. Empresa Minera Chisum y Cia., Casilla 453, Oruro
10. Empresa Minera Porco, Calle Bolivar 50, Casilla 31,
Potosi
11. South American Placers, Edificio Linale & Weiss,
Avenida Montes 605, Casilla 939, La Paz
12. C. Tennant Co. (Bolivia) S.A., Avenida 20 de Octubre,
Edificio Emusa, Casilla 2657, La Paz
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TABLE 10
/cont. /
MOTION PICTURES
Bolivia Films Ltda., Calle Comercio 943, Casilla
1255, La Paz
PETROLEUM (Exploration, Cementing, Drilling, Production, Export)
1. B. J. Service, Inc., Yacuiba
2. Atlantic Refining Co., Calle Bueno 138, Casilla
2950, La Paz
3. Baroid - Division of National Lead Co., Santa Cruz
4. Bolivian Gulf Oil Co., Casilla 642, Santa Cruz;
Casilla 1458, Calle San Martin 92, Cochabamba
5. Bolivian Oil Co., S.A., Plaza Venezuela 1456,
Casilla 892, La Paz
6. D & D Drilling and Construction Co., Casilla
1458, Cochabamba
7. Parker Drilling Company of Bolivia, Casilla 1414,
Santa Cruz
8. Tide Water Oil Co., Avenida Villaz6n 1960, Casilla
2463, La Paz
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. All America Cables & Radio, Inc., Calle Socabaya
326, Casilla 163, La Paz
2. International Standard Electric, Ltd., Calle Bueno
144, Casilla 669, La Paz
1. Tire recapping and retreading - Productos T6cnicos
Bolivianos, Casilla 1620, Cochabamba
2. Engineerin of water well systems - Boyle Engineering
Co., Avenida Ballivian 5421, Casilla 531, Cochabamba
3. General - (Transportation, import-export, flour
milling, cement manufacturing, mining) Grace y Cia
(Bolivia) S.A., Calle Mercado 1099, Casilla 852,
La Paz
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B. Economic and Military Assistance Programs
For more than two decades, Bolivia has been the recipient
of substantial foreign economic and military assistance,
principally from the United States. Between 1946 and 1968 the
United States provided some $513 million in assistance, of
which $492.4 was in economic aid and $20.8 in military support.
During this same period Bolivia received $107.2 million in
assistance from various international organizations: $72.1
million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);
$17
million from the International Development Association (IDA);
$15.2 million under the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP); and $2.9 million from other UN agencies.
During the period 1961-67 Bolivia,was one of four Latin
American countries which received the largest share of U.S.
assistance. Nearly half this sum was from USAID while one
quarter consisted of U.S. Export-Import Bank loans. The
remainder was in the form of loans and grants under the Food
for Freedom program, the Social Progress Trust Fund (administ-
ered by the IDB), and Peace Corps outlays. In recent years
there has been a shift away from heavy Bolivian dependence
on bilateral U.S. aid toward assistance from international
agencies and countries other than the United States. USAID's
share in total external assistance to Bolivia has dropped
from 80 percent in 1963 to a 1968 figure of 61 percent. (To
keep foreign assistance to Bolivia in proper perspective,
over $13 billion in aid was provided by the United States to
all Latin American countries, including Bolivia, during the
period 1961-67, while international agencies provided another
6 billion.)
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ument Denied
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The programs of American private, non-profit agencies in
Bolivia frequently reach individuals and small groups who might
be overlooked by large-scale government plans. In recent years
there have been more than 600 American men and women working
among both the rural and urban Bolivian population. These
Americans were associated with some forty agencies, (see Table 11)
of which over half were church sponsored or affiliated. Many
of the church groups were engaged in such work as family
planning, providing education and recreation for young people,
and distributing food, clothing and medicine. Other groups
worked at increasing and improving food production, furnishing
mobile teaching teams in rural areas, and assisting in the for-
mation of cooperatives and credit unions. Most groups had their
headquarters in La Paz, Cochabamba or Santa Cruz. These programs
add an important "people-to-people" ingredient to the official
American assistance effort.
The story of external assistance to Bolivian development
is not complete without a brief synopsis of that received from
other major donors: West Germany, Japan and Great Britain.
The West German Government has provided elementary and secondary
school teachers, has made scholarship grants available, has
staffed and equipped a mechanics training center in La Paz, and
has assisted COMIBOL. The German Government also has supported
private German organizations working in Bolivia, including the
German Bishops' organization (MISERCOR), and the "German Peace
Corps" which has sent volunteers to work in Chuquisaca Depart-
ment and in the Santa Cruz area. Japanese Government economic
assistance takes the form of lines of credit. The Japanese
Government also has helped modernize the La Paz telephone
system and the Bermejo sugar complex; Bolivians have received
technical training in Japan under GOJ grants. The British
Government has provided technical assistance to the agriculture,
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AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WORKING IN BOLIVIA
CHURCH SPONSORED OR AFFILIATED
1. Andes Evangelical Mission, Cochabamba
2. Catholic Medical Mission Board, La Paz
3. Catholic Relief Services, La Paz
4. Christian Children's Fund, ---
5. Church of God (Holiness), La Paz
6. Church World Service, Cochabamba
7. CUNA International, Cochabamba
8. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Cochabamba
9. Dominican Fathers, La Paz
10. Dominican Sisters, Santa Cruz
11. Franciscan Fathers, La Paz
12. Franciscan Sisters, La Paz/Mapiri
13. Lay Mission - Helpers Association, Santa Cruz
14. Lorettine Sisters, La Paz
15. Maryknoll Fathers, Cochabamba
16. Maryknoll Sisters, Cochabamba
17. Mennonite Central Committee, Santa Cruz
18. Methodist Church, La Paz
19. Missionary Sisters of the Immaculate Conception of
the Mother of God, La Paz
20. National Jewish Welfare Board, ---
21. Papal Volunteers for Latin America, (Lima, Peru)
22. Seventh Day Adventist Welfare Service, La Paz
23. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, La Paz
24. Sisters of St. Mary of the Third Order of St. Francis,
La Paz
25. Sisters of The Most Precious Blood, La Paz
26. World Gospel Mission, Santa Cruz
27. Xaverian Brothers, La Paz
OTHER AGENCIES
1. American Foundation for Overseas Blind, ---
2. American Institute for Free Labor Development, La Paz
3. American Leprosy Mission, ---
4. American Women's Hospitals Service, La Paz
S. Cooperative League of the USA, La Paz
6. Direct Relief Foundation, ---
7. Heifer Project, Cochabamba
8. Meals for Millions Foundation, ---
9. Medical and Surgical Relief Committee, ---
10. New Tribes Mission, Cochabamba
11. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, La Paz
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TABLE 11
/cont./
12.
Public
Administration Service, La Paz
13.
Summer
Institute of Linguistics, Riberalta, Beni
14.
World
Neighbors, La Paz
15.
W. K. Kellogg Foundation, ---
16.
Young Womens Christian Association of the U.S.A.,
Source:
Latin America-Technical Assistance Programs of U.S. Non-
Profit Organizations-Directory 1967; Technical Assistance
In ormation Clearing House of the American Council of
Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service Inc. New York, N.Y.
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mining and education sectors, as well as participant training
grants. The French Government has extended scholarships for
study in France and has supplied technical assistance to a high
altitude biological research laboratory in La Paz. Other foreign
countries which have rendered limited assistance to Bolivia,
principally in the military training and equipment area, are
Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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IV. Observations and Reflections
This concluding chapter of the Handbook brings Bolivia's
experience into clearer focus by looking at it as part of
the lar er Latin American icture.
The character of change now taking place throughout Latin
Possibly the most potent of these forces is a resurgent
nationalism, sweeping across Latin America, transcending
ideologies and boundaries. The ascendancy of populist
military regimes is a second dominating influence which is
altering the political scene in many countries. Urbanization
is another phenomenon which has brought pressures for social
and political change. One of the most dramatic developments
of the past decade is the conversion of the Roman Catholic
Church from a staunch defender of the established order to
an outspoken advocate of social change. In sum, Latin America
is in a process of an upheaval which requires new under-
standing, and new approaches on the part of those who are
involved in the affairs of that region.
The nationalism of present day Latin America is an ill-
defined love of country, rooted to the new accessibility of
the Latin illiterate by radio and other means to information
about the rest of the world. Though he may be a captive of
his slum or immobilized on his mountainside, no longer is
he isolated from outside thought and ideas. He is becoming
aware that life can be better, that he can have improved
health, a more rewarding job, and greater educational oppor-
tunities for his children. His leaders, responding to
demands for social and economic reform, often seem to act
recklessly and irrationally. Taken in the name of national
interests, their actions often have only deepened and intensified
domestic instability.
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This new nationalism finds expression in the denunciation
of American policy and the expropriation of American-owned
companies and properties. The United States has become a
convenient target for Latin frustrations in their own home-
lands, because of the promises of the Alliance for Progress
which could not be fulfilled. This frustration derives from
the fact that the typical Latin American nationalist leader
operates from two basic but false assumptions, one political,
the other economic. First, he asserts that the hemisphere is
comprised of equal, sovereign and independent countries.
Second, he assumes that his country must become self-sufficient
in agricultural and industrial production. As a result of
these two assumptions, he places much of the blame for his
country's.plight on interference from the outside world. As
the leader of a developing nation, he refuses to accept the
fact that the struggle to build a nation must be won by the
combined efforts of the people themselves plus a generous
inflow of assistance from developed nations.
Today, more than half of the 270 million people of Latin
America live in nations governed either directly by military
juntas or by military-dominated regimes. This is a new breed
of military officers representing a sharp break from the
classic stereotyped "strong-man" dictator of past years.
Strongly nationalistic in outlook, and for the most part
originating from the middle class, these officers appear dedicated
to their country's social and economic revitalization. The
question has been raised of course, as to whether they are truly
motivated by patriotism and high ideals or, rather, are simply
consumed by chauvinistic nationalism. Some observers fear for
the cause of democratic institutions and sense that these
military leaders will be reluctant to relinquish their new
power. Others, however, are impressed by this new officer
corps' demonstration of an increasingly high degree of profes-
sionalism and their understanding of the social and economic,
as well as, military facts of life about their country. The
Rockefeller report appraises them in the following terms:
"Motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency,
and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared
to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social
and economic progress." These military leaders use the word
"revolutionary" to describe the nature of their objectives.
There is persuasive evidence that they indeed deserve their
new title - "revolutionaries in uniform".
Seemingly insurmountable problems, largely associated with
the causes and consequences of urbanization, and the dif-
ficulties in implementing land reforms, confront both the
civilian and military governments of the Latin states. The
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governments of many of these countries face dreary cycles of
demoralizing inflation, lagging agricultural production,
inadequate foreign exchange, rising debt burdens, and dependence
on single products or crops often in world oversupply. The
economic and technological gulf between these countries and
the more advanced industrial states continues to widen.
Purchasing power is inadequate and poorly distributed, and
the credit and market system leads to exploitation, high
prices and low return to the farmer. A growing gap exists
in income and living standards, between rural and urban areas,
and between different regions in a single country. Deficiencies
in economic institutions prevent economic growth commensurate
with the region's resources and its population growth needs.
This population explosion, unequalled anywhere in the
world, has forced many peasants off the land and into urban
centers, and has vitiated the effectiveness of national
development programs. Contrary to general opinion, however,
rural-urban migration is not the primary underlying factor
in the rapid inflation of city populations, either in Latin
America or in other underdeveloped regions. Rather, it is
the result of sheer biological increase at a rate unprecedented
in man's experience.
These masses of unskilled, underemployed and poverty-
stricken slum dwellers offer a ripe target for subversive
agitators who have shifted their efforts from the rural
areas to the cities. (Contrary to the expectations of
leaders such as Che, the supposedly seething peasantry has
proven to be quite conservative so long as it has been able
to scratch out a meager existence from a small plot of
ground.) The key to political power now lies in the cities
and an increase in the scope and intensity of urban terrorism
can be expected. It will involve those elements of the
population -- extremist students, trade unionists, and
disenchanted intellectuals -- who traditionally have opposed
the established order and whom the Communist parties will
attempt to unite in a common cause. As in the past, the
city-based universities will provide a convenient "take-off"
point for a general urban struggle, reflecting particularly
the frustrations and impatience of the young. Other than
in the case of military coups, it can be assumed that the
forces which undertake many future revolutions in Latin America
will develop and operate primarily from the festering slums
of the growing cities.
At present there is deep division among leftist elements
who have been forced to re-assess their revolutionary strategies
in light of these forces of change. Some groups continue to
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urge rural guerrilla warfare while others insist that the
struggle must focus on the cities alone. It is generally
believed that these subversive groups are not capable now
of conducting major insurgency operations, nor of forming
armed units without significant outside support. In this
context, Castro's role deserves comment. Sobered by his
Bolivian failure, as well as by Soviet interest in good
relations with Latin American states, he apparently has shifted
his doctrinal approach to revolution in Latin America.
Acknowledging that each country should develop its own
revolution, in its own style, according to its own conditions,
he admits that there may be more than one path to revolution.
He warns, however, that Cuba can wait patiently for revolution
in other Latin nations, and continues to train revolutionaries
for export. It is worthy of note that the majority of the
urban-based terrorist groups, referred to above, are pro-
Castro in outlook.
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 squarely faced the problems
caused by poor education, feudal land tenure, difficulties in
communications, social isolation and extreme demographic
pressures. Encouraging progress toward solution of these
problems were being made under Barrientos. The Ovando govern-
ment has not been willing or able to reinstitute the sound
economic policies of the Barrientos government. Instead, it
has undertaken a deliberate campaign to destroy the Barrientos
image and to liquidate the regime's potential enemies. Ovando's
rhetoric has failed to detail any reform of the government
structure. There is yet no evidence that Ovando has any deep
appreciation of the economic disaster he is creating. His
nationalization action halted Bolivia's single most important
development project -- the oil industry -- with damaging
consequences for much-needed foreign investment and aid. His
willingness to sacrifice economic requirements to short-term
political goals is certainly leading to :higher budget deficits,
permissive labor policies, and accelerated inflation. Bolivia
is a classic example of the small country where fierce
nationalism, impatience for progress, and the need for outside
aid -- the pivotal elements of development -- have led to a
quickening deterioration.
Still lacking popular support, the government faces
opposition from within its own ranks and the possibility of
countercoups cannot be ruled out. While the more pragmatic
members of the cabinet may succeed in moving toward more
moderate positions, there is no present evidence that the
Ovando government is willing or capable of taking those measures
necessary to achieve political stability or even retain power.
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Signs of discontent appear increasingly among the middle
class and business community, the government's relations
with the campesinos and unionized workers grow more strained,
and even the possibility of renewed rural insurgency and
urban terrorism cannot be discounted. The government has
promised a massive literacy campaign and a reform of the
government structure, but tremendous obstacles stand in
the way of achieving these objectives. Bolivia thus appears
to be suffering through yet another period of political and
social instability, a condition which has characterized the
history of that unhappy land.
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN BOLIVIA SINCE 1940
1940 National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) founded
1946 (Jul) MNR-supported regime ousted by revolt
1950 Communist Party of Bolivia founded (origin
actually dates to late 1930's among radical
Bolivian political exiles in Argentina and
Chile)
1951 Victor Paz Estenssoro, MNR candidate, wins
plurality in presidential election; military
junta assumes power to block MNR victory
1952 (Apr) MNR, led by Hernan Siles Zuazo, stages suc-
cessful revolution with armed worker and
police support; Estenssoro returns from exile
in Argentina to assume presidency
1953 Complete economic collapse of Bolivia and
internal anarchy averted by emergency finan-
cial aid from United States
1956 (Jun) MNR candidate Siles Zuazo elected President;
MNR wins all Senate and most Chamber of
Deputy seats in first congressional election
since the Revolution of 1952
1960 (Aug) Paz Estenssoro begins*second term as President
1961 (Aug) Constitution of 1961 promulgated
1964 (May) Paz Estenssoro elected President for third
time; General Rene Barrientos Ortuno elected
Vice President
(Nov) Military ousts Paz, establishes military junta
under Barrientos and Armed Forces Commander
General Alfredo Ovando Candia
1965 (May) Leftist labor leaders imprisoned and exiled;
military occupation of tin mines
1966 (Jul) Barrientos elected President
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APPENDIX A
1967 (Jan) Culmination of struggle over leadership of
Bolivian insurgency; Ernesto "Che" Guevara
assumes control
(Mar) Outbreak of Castroist insurgency
(Apr) President Barrientos boycotts hemispheric
summit meeting because Bolivian access to
the sea not included on agenda
(Oct) Capture and death of "Che" signals defeat
of the Castroist guerrilla movement
1968 (Jul)
1969 (Apr)
(Sep)
(Oct)
Government stability threatened by scandal
over Minister of Government's transmittal
of Che's diary to Cuba
Barrientos dies in helicopter crash. Vice
President Siles assumes presidency in
constitutional succession
President Silos deposed by military coup;
General Ovando, Commander of the Armed
Forces, assumes presidency
Seizure of Gulf oil subsidiary signalling
possible nationalization of other foreign-
owned industries
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APPENDIX B
1. ACIC. Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World, vol 8,
Nov 1963. S.
2. Air Force. Search and Rescue Survival, AF Manual 64-5,
1962. U.
3. Air Force. Survival, AF Manual 64-3, Training ed, 1962. U.
4. Alexander, Robert J., The Bolivian National Revolution,
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958. U.
6. Army. Survival, FM 21-76, 1957. U.
9. Barton, Robert, A Short History of the Republic of Bolivia,
La Paz - Cochabamba: Werner Guttentag - Los Amigos del
Libro, 1968. U.
10. Bolivia, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos. Censo
Demografico - 1950, 1955. U.
11. Burton, Maurice, Systematic Dictionar of Mammals of the
World, 2d ed, London: Museum Press Ltd) 1965. U.
12. CIA. NIS 93 GS (REV), Bolivia, "General Survey," Mar 1968.
S/NFD.
13. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 32, "Highway," Jan 1961. C/NFD.
14. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 33, "Inland Waterway," Apr 1956.
C/NFD.
15. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 21, "Military Geographic Regions,"
Mar 1964. C/NFD.
16. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 53, "Political Dynamics," May
1958. C/NFD.
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READING LIST (Continued)
17. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 57, "Subversion and Insurgency,"
May 1967. S/NFD.
18. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 24, "Topography," Feb 1964.
C/NFD.
19. CIA. NIS 93, Bolivia, sec 23, "Weather and Climate,"
Jan 1964. C/NFD.
21. Cloudsley-Thompson, J.L., Spiders, Scorpions, Centipedes
and Mites, New York: Pergamon Press, 1958. U.
22. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. A Glossary of
Useful Amazonian Flora, Washington: Office of Emergency
Management, 1943. U.
26. Debray, Regis, Revolution in the Revolution?, New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1967. U.
28. Denevan,.William M., The Aboriginal Cultural Geography
of the Llanos de Moos of Bolivia, Berkeley: University
of Cali ornia Press, 19 bb. U.
29. Duguid, Julian, Green Hell, New York: The Century Company,
1931. U.
30. FBIS. Broadcast Notes for Bolivia, Apr 1967. OUO.
31. Holmberg, Allan R., Nomads of the Long Bow, Pub no 10,
Washington: Smithsonian Institution., Institute of Social
Anthropology, 1950. U.
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READING LIST (Continued)
32. James, Daniel (editor), The Complete Bolivian Diaries
of Che' Guevara and other Captured Documents, New York:
Stein and Day, 1968. U.
33. James, Preston E., Latin America, 4th ed, New York: The
Odyssey Press, 1969-.--IT--
34. Joint Publication Research Service, Commerce. Che Guevara
and the Revolution in Latin America, JPRS/L 28YO, 1968.
GUO.
35. La Barre, Weston, American Anthropologist, vol 50, "The
Aymara Indians of the Lake Titicaca ateau, Bolivia,"
Jan 1948. U.
36. Leonard, Olen E., Bolivia: Land, People,_ and Institutions,
Washington: The Scarecrow Press, 1952. U.
37. Miller, Leo E., In the Wilds of South America, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918. U.
38. Navy. How to Survive on Land and Sea, rev ed, 1951. U.
39. Needler, Martin C. (editor), Political Systems of Latin
America, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co, Inc, 1964. U.
40. ONI. Poisonous Snakes of the World, ONI Study 3-62, 1962.
41. Osborne, Harold, Bolivia, London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1954. U.
42. Osborne, Harold, Bolivia - A Land Divided, London: Oxford
University Press, . U.
43. Osborne, Harold, Indians of the Andes, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul Ltd, U.
44. Porter, Charles 0. and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle for
Democracy in Latin America, New York: The Macmillan Go,
45. Shelford, Victor E. (editor), Naturalist's Guide to the
Americas, Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Co, 1226.
U.
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APPENDIX B
READING LIST (Continued)
46. State, Agency for International Development, Office of
Public Safety. Republic of Bolivia Police Communication
Survey Report, Apr 1 LOU-.
47. Sterba, Gunther, Freshwater Fishes of the World, translated
and revised by D.W. Tucker. New York: e Vi ing Press,
1963. U.
48. Troebst, Cord Christian, The Art of Survival, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co, Inc, 1965. U.
49. US Dept of Agriculture Mission to Bolivia. Bolivian
Agriculture, Washington: Western Hemisphere r~ , Regional
Analysis Div, Economic Research Service, 1962. U.
50. Zondag, Cornelius H., The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65 -
The Revolution and its Aftermat ,, New Yor : Frederick
A. Praeger, 1966. U.
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APPENDIX C
Recommended Maps and Charts
For accurate topographic detail, the best map coverage
of Bolivia is provided by the Carta Nacional, Bolivia,
published at 1:50,000 by the Instituto Geog ar fico Militar
(IGM) in collaboration with the Inter-American Geodetic
Survey. Sheets of this series are highly accurate, but
coverage is limited to the highlands in the area west of
La Paz and south of Cochabamba. New areas are being mapped,
but it will take several years to complete the series. As
sheets become available the Army Map Service (AMS) revises
them to meet U.S. military requirements and distributes them
as AMS Series H731.
For complete topographic coverage of Bolivia, the USAF
Operational Navigation Chart (ONC) series published at
1:1,000,000 bytiheIISAF Aeronautical Chart and Information
Center (ACIC) is best, but the charts contain numerous mis-
takes and omissions. For example, two nonexistent railroads
(not even under construction) are shown running northward
and westward from Santa Cruz, and some spot elevations are
inaccurate. All of Bolivia is also covered by the Mapa
Aproximado de Bolivia en 70 Hojas at 1:250,000. This series
includes numerous place names, but the poor quality ozalid
sheets are obsolescent and depict relief sketchily.
Only a few good thematic
maps
exist for Bolivia. Vege-
tation-distribution maps for
the
whole country are particu-
larly scarce; those that do
exist
are not in agreement one
with the other. Population maps, also scarce, are usually
at such small scales as to provide only a very general and
inexact impression of population distribution.
The ONC 1:1,000,000 sheets are reasonably complete for
location of airfields over 2,000 feet in length, but the
latest edition of the Airfields and Seaplane Stations of
the World always should e consulte for up-to-date infor-
mation. Aeronautical charts soon become obsolete unless
continuously revised with construction of new airfields and
abandonment of old ones. No available charts show all of
the airstrips under 2,000 feet in length. For contact fly-
ing -- navigating by visual comparison of ground features
with those shown on charts -- the ONC's are generally inade-
quate because they lack detail, especially over the broad
forested areas of eastern Bolivia.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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APPENDIX C
El Transporte Fluvial en Bolivia, a four-volume work
publis e by the Servicio de Hi rografia (Hydrographic Serv-
ice) of the Bolivian Navy, contains numerous medium-scale
(1:250,000) fold-out strip charts of the major navigable
rivers of Bolivia. These charts contain many soundings and
show all of the twists and turns of the rivers in great
detail. Areas of special interest and important navigational
hazards such as rapids and falls are represented at larger
scales (for example, 1:10,000) on separate charts.
1. Instituto Geografico Militar, Carta Nacional, Bolivia,
1:50,000, 1963-68. About 190 sheets. U.
2. Army Map Service, Bolivia, 1:50,000, Series H731,
1963-68. Thirty-eight sheets converted from IGM series.
U/NFD except Bolivia.
3. (Authority Unknown), Mapa Aproximado de Bolivia en
70 Hojas, 1:250,000, 1933-51. Seventy ozalid sheets. U.
4. Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, USAF
Operational Navigation Chart (ONC), 1:1,000,000, 1967.
Sheets ONC N-25, N-26, P-26, and P-27. U.
5. Comando de la Fuerza Naval Boliviana, Servicio de
Hidrografia Naval, El Transporte Fluvial en Bolivia,
4 volumes, La Paz, 1964-67.
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APPENDIX D
1. Amazon Family. Julien Bryan/International Film Foundation,
1961, 16 mm, sound, color, 19 minutes. CIA film P7063. OUO.
(Simple existence led by jungle latex gatherers.)
2. Bolivia. McGraw-Hill Text-Films, 1965, 16 mm, sound, color,
15 minutes. CIA film X0044. OUO.
(Communication and transportation problems.)
3. Bolivia. Julien Bryan/CIAA, 1943, 16 mm, sound, black and
w iT te, 19 minutes. CIA film E7351. OUO.
(Physical features, resources, industry, cities.)
4. Bolivia: Changes in'A riculture. Univ. of Wisconsin; AID,
1 3, 16 mm, sound, color, 21 minutes. CIA film V6562. OUO.
(Marketing problems in lowlands; development activities.)
5. Bolivia - David Brinkley's Journal. NBC/TV, 1963, 16 mm,
sound, black and white, 29 minutes. CIA film S6327. OUO.
(Review of events and consequences of 1952 Revolution.)
6. Bolivian Military Coup, 1964. CBS/TV, 1964, 16 mm, sound,,
black and white, 17 minutes. CIA film T6867. C.
(Barrientos, Lechin speak; riots and demonstrations.)
7. Economic Diversification (Un Poquito de Diversificacion
Economics). Telecine, Ltd. (Bolivia/USIA), 57, 16 mm,
sound, ack and white, Spanish track, 35 minutes. CIA
film K7193. OUO.
(Ex-tin miner re-establishes himself as lowlands farmer.)
8. Geography of South America: Countries of the Andes. Coronet
Films, 1958, 16 mm, sound, color, 11 minutes. CIA film P0634.
OUO.
(Bolivian people in their historic and geographic en-
vironment.)
9. Johnny Learns to Read - Juanito Sabe Leer. USIA, 1956, 16
mm, sound, black and white, Spanish track, 31 minutes. CIA
film P6821. OUO.
(Construction, operation of AID-sponsored Indian school.)
10. The High Plain. Julien Bryan/CIAA, 1942, 16 mm, sound, black
and white, 19 minutes. CIA film E7155. OUO.
(Life among Aymara Indians - culture, traditions,
occupations.)
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No Foreign Dissem
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