ESTIMATE OF WORLD REACTIONS TO KOREAN CEASE-FIRE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010019-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 22, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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A','.-,EX (A)
ESTIMATE ,F :URLi'+ rtrACTIOINS TO
P V LC, ? c. NTS
AN INTELLICi:;~IJCI i,STIi,%TE
Prepared by
The .stimate Croup
Office of Intelligence Research
This is an Intelligence Report;
nothing in it is to be construed
as a statement of U,3. or Depart--
mental policy or a recommendation
of any f iven policy.
A?;CUST 22, 1951
T1': D -ARTY NT 07 STATE
STiTt.MV,T OF 'E' PROBLEN
To estimate the extent of free world acceptance of the Communist propaganda
line in the event (a) of a breakdown of the Korean cease-fire talks or (b) of a
prolongation of the talks?
DT,SC!)S;SIUr
An examination of official and unofficial expressions of opinion in the
rton-Com~unist world since the beginning of the cease fire discussions in Korea
reveals a progressive falling off in world interest in the Faesong talks from
the high point reached immediately after Malik Is statement of June 230
This is understandable enough. Pfter the initial round of excitement at
the prospect for an end to the Korean war, governments and peoples alike turned
quickly to the consideration of issues and problems on the various local scenes.
In some countries where press and governmental comment on international affairs
no tmally cores in V umeo oIndia,_ for x trr~~~ r;a prcoceup; c3 nY wi t"s1 nearer issues
has cut drastical,;.y into. the am-bunt, of n,ws..ri n!% ar,i of lc i;, ~ time rrF' J ed to
of peace irl :,or'ea:, t,ven Yt.`ic re n unusually dramatic local events
have sups; vend, the passage of ti-ac, the somewhat technical nature of the cease-
fire talks, and the prolonged bargaining character ti cy have now acquired, have
together dulled public and,, apparently, official concern with events in Korean
Nowhere in the non-Communist 'v orid, certainly, does there seem to be any present
and general disposition to view the Korean negotiations as a possible prelude
to Armageddon, On the contrary, the prevailing attitude in the free world has
settled down for the time. being to something not very far from indifference.
This very lack of interest undoubtedly has been a factor blunting the edge
of the Communist propaganda campaign. For all. the effort of Communist organs
and Communist "peace" organizers, the party line on Korea appears to have been
smothered, for the.most.part, by the apathy or preoccupation of the groups to
whom the Communist, appeal has been directed. It is possible only to speculate
about other. explanations for the failure of the Communist propagandists to
obtain a favorable response to their claim that US imperialism alone stands in
tYe; way of a peaceful settlement in Korea. In some degree, it seems likely
that the demonstration of US readiness to discuss peace and that US leadership
had every desire to limit the Korean war, coming immediately upon the spectacular
evidence of the MacArthur incident, pas had a favorable effect on many ~Troups
previously ready to believe the worst
b
U
a
out
S intentions. Beyond this, there
may be reason to hope that the iiremlin'a cynical appeal to the nearly universal
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of the Free worlsd toward Krem n x~rotestatiars. ;.t all event the Communist
desire for peace is now beginning to be received with a matching cynicism
version of the specific issues raised at,Kaesong seems to have real ned very
little currency; itisalmost as though the world looked on the, detailed
is.:aes as being largely irrelevant to the major point: that is whether or
n ,,t the Communist worlc: now wishes nneac a in Korea.
tkese reasons for t :e GorQ unist propaganda failure are broadly correct,
then a prolongation of the Kaesong talks is not alone likely to make the free
world any more receptive to the Communist aone.al. The Communist propaganda
lane, in the event of continuing :ne 4 otiations, is predictable. It will continue
along carrot-and-stick line s, holding out the carrot of peace while at the same
time implying broadly that if t:'e U:, "warmongers" refuse the carrot, th:c n the
al e easepiwil be st,tofsickcontinuine bloodshed. rat every point e?urinl
' s will be taiaced on US intransigr:nce and US
univil lingness to seek realistically for peace. By way of contrast, great weight
wl 11 be placed on the exclusive communist natant on peaceful intentions. Atrocity
themes, built around the alleged. effects of US air action, will be eTphasized,
The threat that the war may be renewed on a grander scale will be subtly but
persistently introduced.
bince, this propaganda approach has gained little free world acceptance
thus far, it is most unlikely that its appeal will be enhanced by further
,dragging out of the 'aesong discussions. gather, apathy toward the Korean
talks is likely to deepen as time goes on.
It must,be noted, however, that the world Communist propaganda campaign
would as.sudly -ain in popular attention from any Soviet action directly or
indirectly related to the Koreannegotiations? A startling conciliatory
move--say, a Soviet signature to the Japanese peace treaty or, equally, an
overt wsrl .ke act in Korea, or elsewhere--would necessarily give new life to
thq Communist peace or war campaign, either raising world h:pes or arousing
latent fears
A breakdown of the Kaesong talks would alter the Communist propaganda
campaign bialy in monor detail. there would be a major effort to pin-point
US responsibility for the failure of negotiations, chiefly by seizing upon
the simplest and most dramatic issues--most probably the location of the
Cease-fireline and the,buffer zone but perhaps repeated "violation" of the
neutral zone--and asserting and reasserting that it was US stubbornness and
bad faith a.n rejecting the 38th parallel (after indicating an intention to
aeeept it) that had dashed the world's hope for peace. Otherwise, the main
lines of Communist propaganda would remain unchanged except, perhaps that
even greater emphasis would be given to,the war motif.
There, is little, doubt that the fact of a breakdown of trc Korean negotiations
would alarm most of the free, world. In some areas, notably the rhilippines,
Turkey, and most of Latin America, where public and official opinion is condi-
tinned to belief ' in the. unchangeable malevolence of the Soviet world,
alarm would be mixed with an I-told-you-so reaction. ::astern European opinion
would be apprehensive at the prospect that the US would adopt the elements of
the MacArthur program and thus bring World War III a long step nearer. In most
of Asia an the Near but, fear of an approaching World ,far III would be height-
ened and some credence ;would bef%iven to the Communist argument that US unwil.i-
ingness to compromise was to blame for the ending-, of negotiations,
In practical terms, the direct and immediate consequence of a breakdown
rsbnpcl, too the. Korean war woua substantially increase its contribution; the.
r ions ths,t have, thus far refused to take an, active part in the UN action
world Continue to refuse. The group of states tending most strongly to
neutralism -India and its followers in Asia and the Near East--would become
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build its military forces rapidly, unless, that is, a Soviet-Chinese attack
appeared to be an imminent possibility Over all, the present military and
Japan, if its hopes for a peace treaty had been realized, would be spurred
the inglish speaking members of the British Common ealth would ,draw nearer
to the US point of view on Far Eastern policies as regards China and Japan
would not slacken but n6.ther would it be likely to accelerate. The UK and
power conference would increase. The pace of rearmament in '?.esterra Europe
would look upon events in Korea as confirmation of their view that the UN
htr ened in their neutralist tendencies; many of the nations in this
pcti ic lineup in the world would remain for the short period, unchanged.
from signingthe US draft of a Japanese peace treaty,
sposed to endorse Soviet proposals for big power negotiations covering
the entire range of Far astern issues and, more than likely, would refrain
'Idia,,Burma., and Indonesia. These countries at least would be likely to be
teaty are concerned, would be limited mainly to. the three Asian nations,
as well,, A breakdown of, the Kaesong talks prior to the conference would
give the Soviets the club of a threatened and imminent,eX,tension of the
Korean *ar. Once again, the response, so far as signatories to the peace
tactics might well find responsible attitude in India, Burma, and
Indonesia, among the signatory nations,, and in Iran and the Arab Near East
4on,,'on Soviet terms, of outstanding Far pastern issues; or (c) raise the
,pirospect that both the Korean and Japanese impasses could be broken by a
big power conference covering all Far Eastern issues, Any one of these
I create in drapatic,fashion an atmgspherc favorable to a general discus-
`Atm .stice on t:,estern acceptance of Soviet, proposals regarding Japan; (b)
soften Communist terns at Kacsonrr in order to nhtai n art ar+r,natnnnt and t.h,ien
C rLfearenee is .convened, the Kremlin may (a) condition agreement to a Korean
However, the relationship of developments at Kaesong to the pending
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communist propaganda cam,gaign, built upon the Kaesong talks, has
thus far met wi th , indifference and skepticism throughout the free world,
ep Prolongation of the discussions at Kaesong would be likely to in.
cre ee non=Communist ind fference and skepticism toward the Communist appeal.
,. A breakdown of the Kaesong talks would give rise to alarm in most
significant change would occur as regards troop contributions to Korea or
eutralist tendencies inthese areas would become more cpnrirmed, No
would find some, acpeptance in ; auth and Southeast Asia and, the Near East.
Of, Asia and 1-.estern Europe, Communist propaganda, which would attempt to
put the entire onus of the failure of negotiations on US intransigence
Western turopean, rearmament,
theta in' Kaesong are likely to have a significant effect only upon India,
Band Indonesia, states whose attitudes toward signing the treaty are
fie, so far as the Japanese peace treaty conference is concerned develop--
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