PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S PASSING FROM POWER(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 16, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

T SECRET PSB D-24
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON' D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN1
for the
EXPLOITATION OF STALINIS PASSING PROM POWER
(CODE NAME: "MIDRIB"
I It is stressed that this is meant to be a flexible' constantly
under review) guide to profitable action and not a rigid. un-
changing directive.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON,, D. Co
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
for the
EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S PASSING FROM POWER
(CODE NAME: "MIDRIB")
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I
II
PROBLEM* . .
APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES . , . . . , . . . , ,
4
III
GENERAL SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS ? . ? .
6
IV
PHASE I: STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES TO BE SOUGHT
PRIOR TO STALIN IS DEATH . ? . . . . ? . ? ? ? ? .
10
V
PHASE II: STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES TO BE SOUGHT
FOLLOWING STALIN''S DEATH . . . . . . . . . . .
13
VI
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES . . . .?. . . . . .
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
for the
EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S PASSING FROM POWER
(CODE NAME: "MIDRIB")
To exploit Stalints passing from powerl and the related problems of
succession in order to gain the most therefrom in support of approved
U. S. objectives vis.-a-vis the Soviet Unions;
1 In this paper the phrase ilpassing from power" and "Stalin's death"
are used synonymously
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APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES
As set forth ins
A. NSC 20/11 "U. S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter
Soviet Threats to U. S. Security," November 23, 1948.
especially paragraphs
19a. "To reduce the power and influence pf the USSR to limits which
no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independ-
ence and stability of the world family of nations."
"To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international
relations by the government in power in Rusia, to conform
with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter."
20a. "To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Rus-
sian power and influence from the present perimeter areas
around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the
satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR,"
b. "To encourage development among Russian peoples of attitudes
00 -
which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit
a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the abili-
ty and determination to achieve and maintain national inde-
pendence #"
d. "To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government
to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the
basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving
in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set
forth in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter."
21e. "To place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power,
and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the
satellite countries."
B. NSC 58/2 "U. S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in
Eastern Europe," December 13, 1919.
"As the most feasible course of action available at this time,
the United States should attempt, by methods short of war, to
disrupt the Soviet-satellite relationship and bring about the
gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant
Soviet power and influence from Eastern Europe."
"Endeavor to cause an increasing isolation of the confirmed
Stalinists from the nationalist elements of the Communist
Party and from popular support in the satellite states toward
the end that their power will be reduced."
Co NSC 68 "U. S. Objectives and Programs for National Security,"
April 14, 1950, Restates the provisions of NSC 20/40
D. State Department Paper "Ui S. Attitude Toward a Possible
Liberated Russia" January 16, 1951.
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This paper is basrfkhe primary thesis at the pres-
ent Soviet regime will,~either collapse or be ove thrown as a
result of internal or xternal pressures or a cokbination of
them both. Aesuming that the "cold ware of the U. S.
and the Free World vis-a-vis the Soviet Union does not amts-
e-R34 change within the next decadeythe only substantiation for
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use of tfie policies and objectives
tated in the paper is to
enough internal pressure
t the present regime will
oncessions that the
present form of government will not be
ority the regime presently possesses,
to create such chaotic conditions th
either collapse or have to make such
cause the death of. Stalin to genera
zement,, ensure participation in normal international inter-
able to exert the auth-
/ A
1. To introduce a democratic system'fahich will guaran-
internal orders repudiate ambitions of national aggrandi-
tee
course, and develop Russian resources for the benefit of the
country and its peoples.
2. To reduce the police power zo conszitiutionai ii nits
consistent with the enjoyment of individual freedoms includ-
ing ingress to and egress from Russian lands for Russians and
foreigners in accordance with generally recognized interna-
tional practice.
3. A federal system which while recognizing and presbr-
ving the economic interdependence of the components of the
present system grants a substantial measure of political,,,and
constitutional autonomy to the non-Russian nationalities.
As to the nationality issue based.on the primary consid-
eration of rallying all " t oet in the struggle (armed
conflict?) against the Kremlin-the p er sug^;ests our best
course of action:
1. To establish a representative form of government in
Russia with firm guarantees of individual freedoms.. but leav-
ing the solution of the nationalities question to plebiscites
to be conducted among the various minorities under some form
-qf international supervision.
Statement of Aims
It is also necessary to formulate a statement of U.. S. aims for a
future liberated Russia which could be proclaimed to the world and par-
ticularly to the peoples of the Soviet Union on the event of a general
conflict.
1. Overthrow the Bolshevik tyranny;
2. Liberate the victims of MVD terror;
3. Land to those who mork it, job choice to the workers;
It. Freedom from Stalinist oppression;
5. Self-determination for the nationalities;
6. Welcome fop the Soviet peoples within the family of nations,
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SECTION III
GENERAL SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
discussion
1. Severe strains and tensions are believed to exist in the Soviet
system despite its apparent unity and strength. U. S. policy should be
designed to exploit both the normal tensions and any intensifications
thereof which may arise at certain critical points. A study of possible
crises indicates that it is well-nigh impossible to deal with MIDRIB as
an isolated plan. Careful thought shows that while MIDRIB deals speci-
fically with,the problems of succession and the strains inherent in a
dictatorial regime when a transition of power control is to be made, it
is but one of several possible crises in the Politburo (due for example
to a Kirov-type assassination) which would involve the same or similar
strains. While this is being studied as a special case. it is essen-
tial that the possibility of other cases be noted and that it be reali-
zed that this study, with appropriate modification, might be applicable
to similar crises regardless of the precipitating causes.
2. Although there is some disagreement in the member departments
and agencies of PSB as to the likelihood of the occurence of an exploit-
able crisis at the time of Stalin's passing from control, the majority
opinion holds such a crisis will occur. Those who believe a crisis is
improbable base their opinion on a belief that the internal power dis-
tribution of the Soviet Union is such as to force the Politburo, regard-
less of power struggles, to maintain equilibrium. Those who believe a
crisis probable maintain that the individual drives for power and sur-
vival will force a struggle regardless of the above, All agree that
carefully planned action on the part of the U. S. increases the likeli-
hood of such a crisis.
3. In contributing toward a crisis, the present over-all aims of
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the U. S. must be borne in mind. In particular, any crisis which might
force the USSR to plunge into a global war is neither desired nor profit-
able.
i, At present it appears that Stalin's passing from control and the
related problems of succession are more likely than any other developments
except major war which we desire to avoids to lead to a serious internal
crisis which might be exploited in support of U. S. policy. Such a crisis
may well present the U. S. with an opportunity for major gain in its cur-
rent cold war effort. All plans and operations should be formulated with
the above paragraphs in mind.
5. It is further felt that if this plan is to be really effective,
if it is to contribute to the unseating of the present regime and replac-
ing it with one more acceptable to the United States, certain recognized
policy decisions and attitudes are involved. These attitudes are not
necessarily firm or binding statements of U. S. policy but they provide
a position within which operators can provide a consistent answer to those
with whom they must deal, while the U. S.. retains considerable latitude
as concerns a final policy decision. Briefly, these problems and what
are believed to be approved answers thereto, as derived from the Depart-
ment of State paper of 16 January 1951, "U. S. Attitude Toward a Possible
Liberated Russia," are listed below:
a. What do we wish to do in case such a crisis does occur?
Answer: Every effort will be made to exploit such a crisis; however,
actions should be avoided that would give any faction a valid claim that
the U. S. was interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union,, We
will undoubtedly look with favor upon a 'g ine iiberatiON movement which
gives any"hopetof furthering our aims. Ifs a amine-liberatlar movement
does not appear, the situation will have to/appraised as it develops
in order to determine what issues, if any, offer favorable opportunities
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for specific actions or attitudes on our part*
b. Definition of certain U. S. objectives to the degree that
prior to achieving a crisis we may answer certain questions of those
groups-whom we desire to,. ,. ipulate. These questions, which concern the
future of a liberated Russia., include specifically the following: A h.fi
(I) Internal Affairs
(a) The nationality problem
(b) The land reform problem
(c) Others
Answers to these questions are generally given in the State Department
paper referred to above. Briefly, the U. S. position on the nationality
problem is one of selfrdetermination; just so that the governments .formed.,,
are not inimical to the continuance of our own existence. The land reform
problem is regarded as an indigenous problem which must be solved by the
people who are tilling the land. The traditional U. S. attitude is that
he who tills the land should own it and while we will not force this de-
cision on anyone, we will provide., to the extent practicable at the time.,
an atmosphere in which such decisions can be made free of duress.
(II) U. S. attitude concerning territorial integrity toward
Russia,
Answers Generally, it may be stated that although the principle of self-
determination applies$ the U. S. would be unfavorably disposed toward
any attempt to reduce by forceful partition the territorial limits of the
USSR below those of pre-World War II USSR.
(III) U. S. attitude toward a future balance of power in
Europe vis-a-vis Russia?
Answers This problem cannot be settled until the factors involved become
more tangible and predictable than they are at present. The requirements
of our allies,, as well as ourselves., should be kept in mind as the situa-
tion develops, with the minimizing of future wars as a governing criterion.
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6. In the exploitation of any crisis which may overtake the USSR,
the decisive power factors will be the military, the police, and the
Communist Party. These should receive special study, and our plans as
to what we wish to achieve in such a crisis must be made in light of the
above. Unfortunately., there is little but speculative intelligence avail-
able as to the possibilities of our using any of these instruments or the
personalities that control them. A fact that must be borne in mind is
that any premature indication of U. S. support to any person or group could
be a de facto death warrant, This, of course, it a double-edged weapon
and one which could well be tested nowt.,
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SECTION IV
PHASE I
1. To orient a portion of the overt and covert activities in the
field of psychological operations and to direct possible overt acts of
the U. S. Government to maximize the psychological strains inherent in
the certainty of Stalin+s passing from power in order to gain the most
therefrom in support of approved U. S. objectives vis-a-vis USSR.
Conclusions
2. In light of the foregoing, it is believed that the U. St Govern-
ment should, in the execution of Phase I of this plan, embark upon a con-
certed effort to achieve maximum, divisive results between members of the
Politburo, the major'instruments of power, and the people who control
them; that the policy attitudes mentioned in paragraph 5 of Section III
above be scrutinized by PSB and the Department of State and if consist.
000+,4- Ape V syry,,{ r A"Z..*
ent withho*x==ttittrdes they be approved.
3. Instructions be issued to overt agencies in the field to strong.
ly slant U. S. output to the USSR and the satellite areas in such fashion
as to maximize the strains inherent in this stated problem; and t at the
general line to be followed in this slanting conform ought to ttfe fol-
lowing outline:
a* it should be emphasized that all the evils which are found
in the system of government presently in control in the Soviet Union are
personified in Stalin and the question asked whether or not the system
will permit the selection of a successor to Stalin who can or will correct
these evils. What successor might even give hope for relief? (A compara-
tive weakling such as Molotov?) In connection with the above, some of
the more vulnerable facets of the Soviet regime are listed below;
(1) Intellectual and Spiritual Enslavement
(a) The historical achievements and truths as well as
accomplishments in the field of arts and sciences
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truly proud heritages of the peoples of the Soviet
Union -- have been repeatedly amended, misinterpre-
ted, prostituted, or eliminated at the whim of
Stalin or the Party, only that which can be iden-
tified with Stalin or which can be dialectically
prostituted to glorify Stalin or the Party is
allowed to remain in what constitutes the cultur.,
al basis of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus,-
the peoples of the Soviet Union are constantly
robbed of their traditions, codes of conduct,,
history, and achievements.
(b) Suppression of Religion
(2) Deprivation of personal liberty (Slave Labor)
(3) Deprivation of the fruits of their toil
Crushing taxes
Planned low standard of living
Collectivization
1. Questions and doubts should be raised in the light of past
history with respect to the effects of Stalin's passing from power in
all strata of the Communist world, e.g. s
as Will Malenkov.-ism, Beria-ism,~etc., follow Stalinism?
b, Will a purge of enemies of the present heir-apparent follow?'
Will there be changes in the Communist Party? In the Army?
d. Will the successor to Stalin try to outdo his predecessor'
and thereby increase the hardships of the people under Kremlin domination?
e. Are changes and/or developments now taking place as a
result of the heir-apparentss actions and plans for the future?
f. Is this to be another "time of troubles" for Russia?
g. Will. Stalin's death save mother Russia?
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h. Will Stalints successor see to it that Russians are given
the peace, freedom and an abundant life which can be had now,, instead of
political promises for the remote future?
5. 'Follow the same general scheme above with suitable modifications
in all areas outside the USSR*
25X1 C
7. It is recommended that the Department of State and CIA be
directed to prepare operational plans in support of the above and submit
them for information and coordination to PSB.,
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SECTION V
1. To exploit the crisis which may be engendered by Stalinta
death in the interests of the U. S.
Conclusions
2. In the light of the general summary and analysis in Section
III above, it is believed that the U. S. Government should., in the execu-
tion of Phase II of this plan, purFsue the following course:
a. Have a specific study made to develop whatever intelligence
sources can be found on possible splits or trends in the Politburo, (A
memorandum with specific, recommendations is to be forwarded by PSB on
approval of this paper to the appropriate authorities ftselojis
be That on the death of Stalin no official word of condolence
or sympathy be given by the U. S. and that the President make a brief
-tatement to the effect that no such statement should be made by any
governmental bodyq,A
c. That the U. S. should have in readiness a proposal of the
first magnitude to place before the UN outlining a plan for peace,
dis- armament, atomic control, and economic progress, This plan will outline
the U. S. position vis-a-vis USSR with special reference to the Soviet
Armed Forces. This plan should be submitted to the UN immediately upon
The panel has considered the view the U. S. should under-
line its feelings toward the government in Power in the USER by making
the most bare unsympa tic statem.nt_ protocol demands. The panel
feels this is an unreal and'untirise mingling of classic diplomacy with
the situation which had best be dealt with otherwise; that the psycho-
logical loss which would be inherent in any gesture on the part of the "
U. S. which could be construed as approval of Stalinfs regime or lend-
ing the taint of legitimacy to hip successor would far outweigh any
possible gains. I %
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the first firm evidence of ,Stalints passing from power*
d. That in the following order, test cases be run by CIA to
test the validity of the 1a t statement in paragraph 6 of Section III:
(1)
(2) Malenkov
F8 (IA.ahgAlt J
e. That a Watch Committee, composed of one member from the
Department of State, CIA and Defense, and chaired by PSB, be establish
ed to survey the plan periodically and insure that operational planning
in support thereof shall be properly executed and coordinated,
f. That the Department of State, CIA and Defense be directed
to prepare coordinated, operational plans in support of the above and
submit them for information and coordination to PSB.
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ASSIGNMCNT OF RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The establishment of a Watch Committee - Director of PSB.
2. Chairing of Watch Committee - Assistant Director for Coordina-
tion for PSB.
3. Intelligence tasks - Deputy Director, CIA.
It. Preparation of Operational Plans - Deputy Director, CIA; Depart-
ment of State; Department of Defense.
5. Review of Plans - Assistant Director for Plans for PSB.
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