PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WASHINGTON PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN S DEATH

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: April 23, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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DATE "-Pro 23, 1953
COPY NO. 57
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SECURITY INFORhA TION COPY NO. 5--j-
TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
PSB D-40
April 24, 1953
PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH
NOTE BY TIIE ACTING DIRECTOR
This paper was reviewed and revised by the Board at its inform-al
meeting on March 19, 1953, and subsequently approvad by vote slip action
completed on April 23, 1953. The final text embodies changes drafted by
the Working Group (Stalin) and cleared with the member agencies.
In accordance with the instructions of the Board, paragraph 3B of
Part II of the draft of i rch 20 and the CIA Anne:: have boon referred
to the Working Group for coordination as agency supporting plans.
The paper is subject to continuing review by the Working Group under
its Terms of Reference (PSB D-40/1) which provide that the WGS "will
constantly review this plan in light of the developing situation and
propose changes when needed".
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PIAN FOR PSYCHO?AGICAL,MWITATTON OF STALIN'S DEATH
ARC,,,,, T T -- IN 'R.ODL TION
1. Prc~?alez
a. The problem is to devise a plan of psychological operations as
one part of a comprehensive program for the exploitation of Stalin's death
and the transfer of power to new hands in order to make real progress
toward our national objectives.
b. No once-for-all psychological plan is possible in the present
situation. Psychological operations, like other actions, must be capable
of rapid and flexible adjustment to changes in the situation. Therefore,
a strong, high-level, continuing interdepartmental working group should be
especially constituted to keep psychological plans and operations under
continuous review and in harmony with national policy.
2. Basic-Considerations,
a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have sufficient
impact on the Soviet system to produce those changes which we would regard
as real progress toward our national objectives. They can only contribute
to the success of diplomatic, political, military, and economic actions
taken by the United States Government, or aggravate stresses which emerge
within the Soviet system itself. They should be fully geared into a com-
prehensive program for the exploitation of the situation in the Soviet
Orbit created by the death of Stalin and installation in the USSR of a
new regime.
b. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what the elements of
such a program should be. However, it has been essential in drawing up
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this plan of psychological operations to make certain assumptions about
national policy. The assumptions adopted for the purposes of this paper
are set forth in paragraph 3 below. If these assumptions are in error, the
plan for psychological operations will have to be adjusted accordingly.
3.
A sum bons
a. It is assumed that the fundamental objectives of the United
States with respect to the Soviet system remain as stated in the relevant
National Security Council papers, namely, NSC 20/1+, NSC 68, NSC 114, and
NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental objectives are:
(1) To bring about a retraction of Soviet power and influence
from the satellites and Communist China and thus a reduction of
Soviet power and influence in world affairs.
(2) To bring about a fundamental change in the nature of
the Soviet system--which would be reflected above all in the
conduct of international relations by the Soviet regime in a
manner consistent with the spirit and purpose of the United
Nations Charter.
b, It is assumed that the United States Government intends to ex-
ploit to the full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the
difficulties inherent in the transfer of power to make progress toward
these ends.
c. It is assumed that the United States Government will.undertake
a comprehensive program of action-involving whatever diplomatic, politi-
cal, military, and economic measures are appropriate and are within our
capabilities-to make real progress toward our national objectives and
that this plan for psychological operations, as revised from time to
time, is part of this integrated campaign.
d. In order to utilize fully the unique world position of President
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Eisenhower* it is assumed that the major move in this national campaign
will be a Presidential speech delivered at a time when it is likely to
achieve maximum effect, outlining a United States program for peace.
This will be intended as P. serious move which will., we hope, lead to
serious negotiations for adjustment of these issues. It follows, there-
fore, that the move must be treated and built up as a serious effort on
the part of the United States to make progress toward a peaceful world.
4. chologri.e al Estimate of the Situation*
a. It has long been estimated that one of the most promising
opportunities to make real progress toward our national objectives with
respect to the Soviet system would arise following the death of Stalin.
The inescapable necessity of transferring power to new hands, no matter
how careful the preparations for it, has created difficulties and un-
certainties for the Soviet Union and the Soviet system as a whole which
may endure for some time and which may, in due course, result in a severe
power struggle in the Soviet hierarchy. We should not be misled by the
apparently smooth transfer of power. A despotism can be ruled in the
long run only by a despot and history is strewn with unsuccessful efforts
to replace a tyrant with a committee. There is a real question whether
Nh.lenkov (or anyone else) will be able to bring or maintain all of the
power factors under his iron control as Stalin did.
b. Among the facts which have already emerged, the following are
of particular significance in developing a program of psychological
operations designed to support our national effort to make progress
toward our objectives:
(1) The accession to power of the now regime has been
executed in a dramatically rapid and apparently resolute manner.
*This should be read in conjunction with the Special
Intelligence Estimate of the situation (SE-39, birch 12, 19531
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(2) The reorganization of the party and governmental
apparatus has some similarities to the organization employed.
during World War II, which points to an effort to concentrate
power in a manageably small number of hands and to present,
both internally and externally, an impression of hardness and
unity and continuity at the top.
(3) The following three features of the reorganization
deserve special mention. First, it continues an effort, under
way for some time, to strengthen its control over the military
and to bid for its loyalty. Second, the recently criticized
internal security apparatus has been consolidated and placed
for all to see in the hands of the most experienoed.and ruthless
policeman of them all Beria. Third, there has been an, extensive
regrouping and consolidation of industrial and transportation and
economic ministries, with control being placed in the hands of a
few lieutenants.
(4) The initial pronouncements by the new regime stressed
the leading role played by the Great Russian people. The funeral
speeches emphasized the multinational character of the USSR. Thus
the regime may fear that the non Russian Republics as well as the
satellite states are of doubtful reliability and may have to be
held in line by increasingly tight measures of repression. The
fact that Stalin was a Georgian and Ilenkov is a Great Russian
may have symbolic significance in this connection.
(5) Although current "peace" moves suggest that the Kremlin
is altering its ttonduct of foreign and domestic policies, there
is nothing at the present time which indicates a fundamental
change in the long-range objectives of the Soviet government.
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C. On the other band, the very rapidity with which the transfer
of power has been effected, the nature of this change, and measures
taken by the Kremlin to obtain the good will of the people, together
with the unimpressive funeral ceremonies and the brevity of the mourning
period for Stalin., and the warnings against "disorder and panic"" suggest
that nervousness and concern over the stability of the new regime are
prevalent at the highest levels.
d. It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that the regime
hopes to avoid serious external difficulties until it has consolidated
its power or unless a struggle for power develops in such a way that one
aspirant or another sees an opportunity to advance his interests by pur-
suing an aggressive and adventurous course. It is also in the nature
of such a new regime that it must try to achieve the appearance of strength
and permanence. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:
(1) The new regime is ublikely to undertake any actions
that would lead to general war.
(2) While altering certain lines in the conduct of foreign
and domestic policies the new rulers will probably adhere for the
time being to the doctrines of Soviet communism:
(3) The new rulers will react promptly, sharply, and perhaps
even excessively to any external threats.
e. The new regime may be presumed to be concerned for some time
with the problems of:
(1) The loyalty and subservience of the satellite regimes.
(2) Relations with Communist China.
(3) The loyalty of the Armor.
(4) Internal security.
(5) The attitudes of minority nationalities in the USSR.
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(6) Party control of government and polices close ties
between party and people,
f. Regardless of its overt attitudes toward the outside world, the
new regime is bound to be concerned with the consolidation of its inter-
nal position. Serious friction within the regime may nevertheless arise
over external issues, and is specially likely to occur in dealing with
novel or difficult decisions.
5. Strategic o. na.
a. The plan for psychological operations must be drawn up within
the context of a strategic concept. Although its formulation is beyond
the scope of this paper, it has been necessary to outline the main feat-
ures of a strategic concept as a basis for the psychological plan. If
this concept is revised, the plan for psychological operations will have
to be revised accordingly#
b. Aims In accordance with our fundamental objectives and as
the most promising ways of making real progress toward these objectives,
our basic aims in the present situation are to use the opportunities
presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer
of power to now hands,
(1) To foster any and all divisive forces within the top
hierarchy of the Kremlin with particular reference to the b'lenkov.
Beria-Molotov-Bulganin situation.
(2) To exploit the basis of schism between the leaders of
the Kremlin and major power elements of the Soviet bloc, including
the military establishment.
(3} To stimulate divisive forces between the Kremlin and
the-satellite governments including Communist Chinas
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(4) To maximize the disaffection between the peoples of
the Soviet Union and the regime.
(5) To maximize the division between the peoples of the
satellites, including Communist China, and the Soviet regime.
(6) To maintain and increase unity between the governmental
leaders of the free nations.
(7) To maintain and increase the unity between the peoples
of the free nations.
(8) To follow through successfully in the defense building
of the United States and the other free nations.
(9) To attain a sound economic position for the United
States and the other free nations with widespread confidence
in President Eisenhower's economic leadership.
(10) To expose vigorously the motives and pitfalls of any
false "peace" campaigns.
(11) Without contributing to the prestige of the Soviet regime,
to combat any wishful thinking in the free world as to the current
weakness of world communism,
(12) To react resolutely to any new aggression.
c. Yethcds
(1) in effort: strategE of choice. One of the most
significant means of furthering the above aims is to confront
the communist rulers with difficult major choices in a way which
does not encourage them to close ranks, but which tends to isolate
them and divide their counsels, while uniting humanity, especially
the free world, with us. The Presidential speech, assumed above,,
should serve this purpose.
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(2) Supporting effor rta
Wit ~~ respect to the campnunist world:
(a) We should confront the untried regime with other
stimuli apt to provoke internal arguments.-we.g,, occasions
requiring decision, or failures leading to recrimination.
but avoid threats or sabre-rattling.
(b) We should plague it with doubts--e;g., about re-
liability of key individuals and groups.
(c) We should foster internal antagonisms by other
suitable means, such as fostering nationalistic feelings.
(d) We should combine "carrot" and "stick" both in
direct support of the main effort and in executing the other
supporting efforts. An essential feature of the strategy of
choice is a "push-'pull." situation, combining pressures and
inducements which show the disadvantages of a choice contrary
to our interests and the advantages of one which is favorable.
(e) Fluctuations in direction and emphasis (e.g,, between
carrot and stick) should be used as an added means'of confusion
except where steadiness of tactics is desirable for a special
reason.
(f) Probing (see d(2) below).
W3ii 1,res. ec, t to the free, , arld;
(g) The most promising ways of furthering our aims with
respect to the free world are:
(I) To stress the importance of increased strength
and unity by emphasizing the new elements of
danger and opportunity in the situation.
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(a) To manifest a willingness and desire to co-
operate in developing unity of effort by the
free world. In this connection it will be
desirable to approach our allies in a spirit
of give and take.
(h) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties be-
tween the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world
due to the absence of any outstanding figure of stature, ex-
perience and ideological prowess as the new leader of world
communism.
It may be noted that some time may elapse before
the divisive forces inherent in the present Soviet power set-
up can mature into a severe power struggle. Initial and inter-
mediate actions, therefore, should not compromise the prospects,
of successful psychological action in the event that the power
struggle breaks in the open.
Phases
(1) Tnl Period. During the next few weeks a serious
effort is justified in order to prolong and exploit the condition
of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. A major
part of this effort should be to set forth the issues which prevent
free world countries and the USSR from achieving a genuine world
peace and to place the onus squarely upon the Soviet government
for failure to accept U. S. offers to resolve these issues. The
Presidential speech is assumed above especially for this reason.
(2) Subse ug?ent Phases.
It is most important that initial
action be followed by a series of integrated steps. Above all,
operations should be prepared to make the Kremlin assume maximum
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liability if it does not accept the proposals in the Presidential
speech. N3easures should be takeflto germinate the seeds of dis-
unity and to probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system. If
events develop very favorably, these steps could culminate in a-.
(3) Climax in which the communist system would break into
open internal conflict. This culminating phase in our strategy
should begin if and when such conflict seems near. If it never
comes, the strategy should still have contributed usefully to our
basic purpose.
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ARRT11
IAN FOR PSYCHOIAGICA L OPERATIONS
Genera .
a. The importance of psychological pressures in the present situation
is of sufficient moment to warrant not only the concentration of all psycho-
logical media upon the stated objectives, but also the resolute deielopment
of expanded and more effective capabilities. Even more essential, perhaps,,
is the determination to seize and consistently maintain the initiative
through psychological operations imaginatively conceived and dramatically
executed. Before it can win the hearts or influence the intellects of
its targets, United States psychological strategy must capture their
imaginations.
b. The major hope of fulfilling the aims of this plan lies in sub-
stantive government acts of psychological significance. The Presidential
speech assumed in Part I, para. 3.d. is the keystone upon which the
present psychological strategy is based. This assumed speech, and the
various official actions which would stem directly from its need, however,
to be complemented by a series of psychologically significant acts. All
but a few of the overt and covert psychological programs proposed in the
following paragraphs of this section are intended primarily to exploit,
prolong and intensify the psychological impact of various political
economic and military actions.
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3. Overt infqrMjjw.p-par
a. While the possibilities for rapid increase in capabilities and
effectiveness of our overt information programs is limited-the scale
of the present effort is already considerable--these programs are also
called upon to play a vital role in the implementation of the plan and
the need for maximum energy, initiative and resourcefulness in develop-
ing the broad tasks listed below is no less great than in the case of
covert operations,
b. In the situation with which this paper deals, all governments
and all peoples of the world may be assumed to be deeply interested,
first, in accurate reporting and interpretation of events in the Soviet
Union and their consequences and, second, in the relationship of the
United States to the situation and its intentions and its actions with
regard to it. Therefore, a primary responsibility falling upon official
overt information media is to provide widespread factual coverage and
reliable commentary, from original and attributable sources, on develop-
ments,, including the statement of the President crystallizing the attitude
of the United States. This is the essential foundation upon which effect-
ive propaganda will rest,
e. Successful use of overt media in the operation will require
careful coordination of all media. Of special importance will, be the
coordination of official statements, inasmuch as such statements are the
most effective weapons for overt use. The watch cormnittee envisaged in
this plan must be specifically charged with alerting overt media in ad-
vance to forthcoming actions and their significance. (For example,
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should a public statement be intended to launch a "trial ba]loon," the
overt media should be advised in order to give it maximum dissemination.)
d. In propaganda directed to many areas, much should be made of the
fact that this is a time for purposeful, determined and united action on
the part of the West.
e. With the change in regime, defection deserves a high priority
in propaganda. The principal role of overt media in this work is not
the direct inducement of defection but such indirect assistance as publi-
cizing defections when they occur and indicating that escapees from behind
the Iron Curtain are not returned to captivity.
f. Congressional and public leaders should be consulted with regard
to exploitation of the new situation and particularly as to the impera-
tive necessity for maintaining the continued building of defensive
strength in the United States and the free world.
.g. This plan should be under constant review in light of the
developing situation.
4. sut3n Actions.
Appropriate political, military and economic actions consistent
with this plan and related to it should also be undertaken.
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