REVISION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD D-23 COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BASED ON THAILAND.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 13, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURIT INFORMATION
vawt
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
COPY NO. 5 4
July 28, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
SUBJECT: Revision of PSB D-23.
In reference to my memorandum of July 27, 1953, I am now
transmitting a copy of the revision of PSB D-23? July 24, 19:3,
COPY NO. prepared in the Department of State, together
with a copy of States summary. In addition, there are enclosed,
for reference t
1. Copy of my memorandum of July 27, COPY NO. 51.j~ ;
2. Copy of State Department memorandum in connection
with State Department proposed draft of PSB D-23 (undated);
3. Copy of memorandum to Mr. Bonsal, PSA, from
Ambassador Stanton, dated July 16, 1953.
George A., Morgan
Acting Director
SECURITY INFORMATION
1.
of1Pag3
83908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
Cony No 5
SECURITY fl FORMJTION
TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Jul,,, 27, 1953
I ZORAXVDUU 7
TO: Psychological Strategy Board
SUBJECT: Revision of PSB D-23
A revision of PSB D-23, prepared in the Department of State as
noted at the last Board meeting, will be circulated as soon as it can
be mimeographed. At the request of the State Department a statement
setting forth the considerations that led to the revision, together
with copies of a memorandum by the United States Ambassador to Thailand,
are circulated herewith. Since PSB D-23 is still before the NSC, I hope
the Board will consider at least the central issues raised by the pro-
posed revision at its meeting on July 29.
To help define those issues, I would li':e to comrent as follows:
1. NSC action No. 786 b directed PSB to prepare a plan for
"coordinated psychological operations based on Thailand." If Phase II
of PSB D-23 is deleted, the plan becomes simply a plan for Thailand, not
for operations based on it. Thus one question is how to handle the pro-
posed change with the NSC#
?
2, Phase II in PSB D-23 is not laid dorm as a final decision to act
but indicated as a direction for contingency planning and preparation
"for utilization of Thailand as a base - when and if conditions permit"
(para 3, p. 34). Several of the State cortiments seem to ignore this dis-
tinction. Thus with regard to acceptability to the Thai Govern ent and
effects on relations with other Asians and Allies, there is no question
of proposing Phase II to any of thgnuntil conditions have evolved further
alon~Z lines indicated in PSB D-23. Also with regard to commitment of
non-native forces, the State corr ent tapes no account of the possibility
that national policy with regard to VPC may be implemented by the time
Phase II is reached. Hence the issue that concerns PSB D-23 is not
whether Phase II makes seise under present circumstances bit whether it
should be adopted as a basis for getting ready to meet probable future
circumstances.
3. That Southeast Asia is not a political unity is obvious, but
this does not exclude important parts of it from becoming more unified
for certain purposes when and if the communist threat spreads and the
.U.S. injects its partnership as a basis of fresh confidence. Here again,
the issue is not the present but the future. If we not only admit the
actual dividedness of the area but insist on thin'.:ing in no other terms
for later on, we play into the hands of communist divisive ctrateMr.
It is not a question of airing at iC % unity in Phase II. The idea
would be to radiate moral as well as material strength outward f .ri the
Thai base as far and fast as it will go.
SECURITY 121 OR RATION Page 4
TOP SECRET of 2 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 .i' Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECM3.ITY 33TFORIUATION
TOP SECRET
1. In respect to the Ambassador's sor=,ent on economic aid it should
be noted (para (5) p. 30) that the main recommendation is for maintenance
of economic aid and technical assistance programs "at least at the
present scale", in order to avoid the obvious contradictions resulting
from any decrease in such pro gems. It is also intended (pares (5) (c)
p. 30) specifically to aid in development of Northeastc-n Thailand, a
point mentioned as desirable in the fmbassad.or's memoraiidurt.
5. PSB D--23 does not corunit us to any fixed view of prospects in
Indochina (para 2, p. 25, para 6, p.25). If the main free-world effort
remains there, it is still important to strengthen the Thai flan':.
Geor e A. Horgan
ActinS Director
SECURITY fl!FOI- IATION Page 2
TOP SECRET of 2 pales
q gg0c
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
TOE SECRET ~SEC,URITY INFORMATION
STATE DEPARTIv1ENT M&MORANDUM IN CONNECTION WITH STATE
DEPARTMENT PROPOSED DRAFT OF PSB D-23
The State Department proposed draft of PSB D-23 is based on the
Department's objections to Phase II of PSB D-23 and upon a memorandum
from ambassador Edwin F. Stanton, copy attached, which strongly
supported the Department's objections and provided additional informa-
tion and reason.
The Department believes that Phase II of the plan is unacceptable
on the grounds that it would be most probably unacceptable to the
Thai Government, would be damaging to our relations with the Associated
States of Indochina, Burma, Indonesia and India, who, far from being
impressed, would become convinced that our real intent was to provoke
conflict between the countries of South Asia and the Communists and
would thus be confirmation of communist propaganda charges. In short,
the U.S. would lose in prestige and influence not only in Thailand but
throughout South Asia, and Asians would view our activities in and from
Thailand with increasing apprehension and our friendly overtures to
them with suspicion.
Aside from the fact that the Asiatic nations concerned would not
accept our proposed actions under Phase II, the real5.ties of the
situation among those nations would make any efforts under Phase II
abortive as the area is not a region in a political sense and should
not be treated as such, every nation presenting a separate and unique
problem, requiring special treatment.
Aside from Asiatic and regional considerations it is highly
Improbable that the British and French would accept the dramatic ex-
pansion of U.S. leadership envisaged in Phase II of the paper, as the
French and British are both maintaining heavy military and economic
commitments in southeast Asia, including substantial numbers of non-
native troops, while the comparable U.S. figure of non-native troops
is zero, and we have given no indication of our preparedness to extend
vastly our military commitments in the area.
In view of the foregoing, the proposed draft was achieved by
excising Phase II of the plan and certain phrases in the body of the
plan which led up to Phase II.
TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORI4i T'IQ
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
July 16, 1953
PSIS D-23. "U.S. Psychological Strategy with Respect
to the Thai Peoples of Southeast Asia."
Having perused the above mentioned paper, I would endorse
"Phase I", which proposes in coordination with U.S. military programs,
to consolidate Thailand as a secure base, by increasing its strength
and making its frontiers more defensible. This, in essence, is
what the U.S. Government has been doing in Thailand during the past
two and one-half years through the extension of military and economic
assistance to Thailand and the conduct of both overt and covert in-
formational activities,
With respect to a military assistance program, I believe that the
Thai economy and finances will not support any great increase in the
military aid which has been planned and which is now in process of
being implemented. Every effort should be made, however, to expedite
shipment of military equipment which has been programmed, par-
ticularly artillery, and to assign without delay the addJ.t-4LCM.-,:L
personnel requested by MAAG, Thailand, in order to expedite the
training of the Thai Armed Forces. The assistance being extended by
our Government to the Thai Police should not be overlooked. To meet
the threat to Thailand's frontiers occasioned by the Communist
invasion of Laos, the strength of the Thai Police is being increased
by some 5x000 men, at least 50% of whom will be trained and equipped
by
';ith respect to our economic aid, I fool, on the, basis of con-
versations with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and other
members of the Cabinet, that the Thai Government does not desire
any great increase over and above the level of aid which has boen
extended during the past two years. In fact, the Thai Government
finds the setting aside of counterpart funds a very considerable
burden and is an obligation which it would like our Government to
waive. I believe, therefore, that it would not be advisable to
increase economic aid except for such emergency projects in north-
eastern Thailand as may be agreed upon. It should be borne in
mind that the economic assistance which we have extended to Thailand
is not of such a nature as materially to lessen the financial burdens
incurred by the Thai Government in connection with expenditures
for military purposes. The only exception to the foregoing is the
assistance which MS4 can give with respect to highways.
The psychological objectives listed under "Phase I" have also
received a great deal of attention and through information programs,
both overt and covert, the dangers of Communism have been brought
home to the Thai people and their will to resist either Communist
aggression or Communist blandishments has been stimulated. However,
I seriously doubt that an expansion of the program in the covert
field would be effective. Experience has shown that covert in-
formational or other activities cannot long remain covert in
Thailand, CIE, which has been engaged in a certain amount of
covert informational and propaganda activity, has experienced
this difficulty and I believe has about come to the conclusion
that such activities are not only expensive but are hardly worth-
while. In the overt field there is stall much which can be
accomplished by the extension of informational activities to the
provinces. However, this can only be achieved through an increase
of personnel, preferably personnel having at least a basic
knowledge of the Thai language, and through increased appropriations.
With regard
TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATTOIJ (319908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 t? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
NOW~A '5
,. ; i ii x ?11 ~rcm ri
With regard to "Phase II" which envisages the use of Thailand
as a base for the creation and training of para-military forces for
use outside of Thailand, I may say, on the basis of my close associa-
tion with the Thai Government and people for the past seven years,
that I am certain the Thai Government would be most reluctant to
agree to the use of Thailand for such purposes. While the Thai are
anti-Communist and strong supporters of the United States, they are
at the same time realists. They see their country surrounded by
strife and hostilities instigated by the communists. They have
within their own borders Chinese And Vietnamese minority groups
who are potential Fifth Columnists. In these circumstances they
are naturally reluctant to acquiesce in any action which would be
definitely provocative to the communists. It is true that communist
propaganda within Thailand and that disseminated from both Moscow
and Peiping has repeatedly charged that the United States is turning
Thailand into a base for the conduct of military operations against
them, but the Primo Minister and other members of the Government
have been in a position to emphasize and reiterate the fact that the
Thai Government has never been requested by the United States Govern-
ment to make use of Thai territory for military purposes and, further-
more, that the Thai Government would not agree to such a request
if made. The statements to which I have referred reflect the real
feeling not only of the Government but of the Thai people, I think,
therefore, that it would be a very serious, mistake for us to make a
proposal of this nature to the Thai Government, Furthermore, I
think sentiment both within and without the Government would. be so
strongly opposed to the use of Thailand for such purposes that the
Government might well fall If we should insist. There is the
further consideration that it would be wholly impracticable to use
Thailand for the purpose of training Para-military forces and then
dispatching them into adjoining territory in operations against
the communists. Such operations could not be kept secret and it Is
certain that the most serious complications would arise with the
Burmese, with the Laos, the Cambodians and also, in all probability,
with the French and the British, May I also point out that while
we are proposing to make use of Thai territory for pare -military
purposes we are not proposing to give Thailand any guarantee to
come to that country's immediate assistance in case of invasion.
For the above reasons I am convinced that to pursue the policy
proposed in "Phase II" would seriously impair our good relations with
the Thai, would be equally damaging to our relations with Burma,
Indonesia and India who, far from being impressed, would become con-
vinced that our real intent is to involve and embroil the countries
of South Asia with the comriiies, and finally it would be confirmation
of communist propaganda charges. In short the United States would
lose in prestige and influence not only in Thailand but throughout
South Asia, and .sians would view our activities in and from Thailand
with increasing apprehension and our friendly overtures to them with
suspicion.
Lot us strengthen Thailand itself in every possible way and thus
encourage those friendly people to stand against communism both now
and in the future, but let us not embarrass our Thai.. friends and
cause the other nations of South Asia whose friendship we seek, to
look askance at us.
89908
TD QTirDT`m - MIrT1t.7TmV Txn,nTRRnmTnnr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
vrVen' ryraeu u W. o ti: w
Daft
July 2I.., 1953
SFC T~F': TY 1:1'`. Oz.4-_T TON
TOP SFCFFT
PS ,
`i,.RY OF D?7.JTR"E 1T (Y' STATE, F.EVT ~Oi (D7
J. S YC11OLOGIC,L 27,;'i, CYY "ITH T1~ r C;T TO TFIE
TIAiI x r Oi'I'S OF OtTTHF " T A `:.D\'t .. . ~_ .
I. His sion
To dete.rmine the psychological implications c.nd consequences of
communist strategy in Southeast Psia, end to establish a sound U. S.
psychological strategy in the area with resot:ct to the Thai Peoples of
Southeast Asia.
II. Conclusions
1. That communist expansionist activity in Southeast Asia is growing
in strength and potency. Developments in comr.,unist stratexy in the Thai
ethnic area pose an imminent threat to Thailand, which :'Just be met rapidly
with an effective political-psychological military counter eff'ort, or
Southeast Asia could fall to the communists without overt intervention
by the Chi:ese Communist armed forces.
2. That Thailand is politically and eon ra hic~ 1. y the most suitable
Thai ethnic base in which to initiate and develop a substantial counter
effort.
3. That Thai.landrs econorj, basically ac-ricultural, is :~t present
strained ?y measures necessary for t'ie national security. This situation,
occurring at a time ,!hen inere-sed communist pressure; is imr?i.nent, calls
for economic 7.id ?rogra.ms at the levels of the several years past at least,
SECITi.I Y I :r OI":/-TIoN 1
.^_ TOP `:C1'ET of 4 pages
89.9Q8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
Sumnary Draft
SECURITY 1 CANON July 24, 1953
TOP SECRET
to support beneficial long-ranee projects, and to reduce the danger of
dissidence in the Northeast.
4, That the ethnic bo :ds of the Thai peoples scattered through
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Southern China can contrihv te? to the
psychological and military effort to prevent comnunist expansion.
5. That U. S.. support and activation of a Thailand-based counter
effort must utilize and exploit fully the normal channels of contact with
native elements Ty placing highly qualified individuals in important posts
in Thailand and utilizing every phase and form of psychological warfare to
prepare the minds and emotions of the people to collaborate in the effort;
that this sup-ort.:.lust relate to sync`xronized covert and overt efforts
including extensive Para-military operations.
6. That a coordinated political effort to bring French policy towards
Indochina more in accord with the realities of the situation ?,ust be con-
sidered a major factor in the ov^.rall effectiveness of the resistance
effort based in Thail:md while expanded U. S. progr4as for strengthening
Thailand could assist in making this effort more effective.
7. That the pronosod expansion of U. S. activities based on Thailand
is feasible in the light of that country's capabilities, providing emphasis
is placed initially on reducing Thailond's vulnerabilities.
Consequently, progr.:ms should be aimed at strengthening Thailand's
ability to resist communist aggression or subversion, with only such
necessary supporting programs in the information field in adjacent areas
as are consistent with the existing patterns of inter-Allied relationships.
SECUE7TY IN I URA ITIOP1 2
TOF S ,CF;ET . of 4 pages
h99ng
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
us,"
Summary Draft
SECURITY I TOR1:'F.TION July 2/4., 1953
TOP SECT ET
III. Pro osed Psycho12gic .l StratSaj Phan
1. In coordination with U. S. military progr~'ms, consolidi-te Thailand
as a secure base, by increasing' its strength and raa1 i.ng its frontiers more
defensible.
a. Pavveholo 3oa1?~ 4b ectives
(1) Stimulate, crystallize, maintain, and coordina=te the
active resistance in Thailand to communist aggression, subversion,
and oppression.
(2) ThroW hout all of Southeast Asia maximize the favorable
aspects, and minimize any unfavorable aspect, of U.S. support to
Thailand.
(3) Ericoura e and strengthen all feasii1e cooperation among
the court ries of Southeast ..`:.sia pith e^ ch other and with the British
and French, and of both the former and the latter with the U. S.
b. Basic Tasks
(1) trhorever possible in cooperation +aith the Thai Govcrnment
and aking use chiefly of indigenous outlets, develop or expand U.f?.
overt information programs directed to Southeast Asia, with initial
emphasis on those aimed at Thailand and other Thai ethnic groups.
(2) Stimulate and supnort effective overt and covert informa-
tion activities of the Thai Government in sup"nort of objectives
compatible with National Policy.
(3) Develop, expand, or intensify non-attributable U.S.
activities in support of all of the objectives in National Policy.
SECUJ'Tn'Y ITTOR :.TION 3
SEGr T of 4 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
~Ww low
SECURITY IP? ORI u.TIOAT Summary Draft
IT SECRET July 24, 1953
(4) Develop, expand, and accelerate to the greatest extent
sound programs for the creation and employment of indigenous
guerrilla and Para-military forces capable of effective active defense
against communist invasion and infiltration of Thailand.
(5) Maintain at least at the present scale, and possibly
increase beyond the FY 1 52 and FY 153 level, the economic aid and
technical assistance program.
(6) Strengthen and make o1il.igatory educational courses for
all official U.S. personnel, designed to give them a background of
the history, culture and languages within which they twill work in
Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.
(7) Strengthen orientation programs for indigenous military
personnel, and suitable information programs for the general public,
taking into account local cultural attitudes.
(8) Tactfully, aid on a realistic basis, induce the Thai
Government to carry out measures intended to reduce Thai vulnerabilities
to communist subversion.
SECURITY IlT0 RP'~.TION
TOP -',YCRETy
4
of 4 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
tow %
SECURITY INFORMATION
DRAFT _
TOP SECRET July 24, 1953
PROPOSED REVISION BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PSB D-23
U. S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO THE
THAI PEOPLES OF ,SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. MISSION
To determine the psychological implications and consequences of
communist strategy in Southeast Asia, and to establish a sound U.S.
psychological strategy in the area with respect to the Thai peoples of
Southeast Asia.
II? ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
1. Analysis of Communist Strat;,, ,,y
a. Evolution of communist strategy in Southeast Asia since
the beginning of 1953 has introduced a new and dangerous element Into
the chronic problems of this unsettled area, From a long-term viewpoint
a particularly significant development has been the setting up in
January 1953 of a "Thai Autonomous Area" in a portion of Yunnan Province,
roughly half the population of which is Thai. This move almost certainly
indicates on the part of communist strategists an intent to manipulate
and subvert -- and perhaps a hope ultimately to dominate -- all of the
Thai peoples. There are approximately 352000,000 human beings of Thai
or closely related ethnic origin -- including nearly 20,000,000 in Thai-
land itself -- scattered throughout Southeast Asia, with strategically
significant concentrations of them in Indochina, Surma,. and China, as
well as Thailand. The pattern of ethnic distribution is such that if
the communist Pan-Thai strategy were successful the communist forces
could easily turn the French position in Vietnam, and from Thailand as
central base, attack either Bruma or Vietnam from the rear, while
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP
I
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
vwmo~ Novo
SECURITY INFORMATION
` OPSORET
seriously threatening the British position in Malaya. Apart from the
possibilities of large-scale military action, the new communist strategy
could achieve success more gradually. by a steady infiltration and subver-
sion of all the Thai territories, accompanied by guerrilla raids and
political pressures aimed at undermining the free governments in Thailand,
Laos and Cambodia. This is probably the most dangerous aspect of the
strategy.
b. The Vietminh invasion of Laos graphically illustrates the
threat in Southeast Asia. Regardless of the immediate military outcome in
Laos, the communist forces there have achieved some important results. The
most significant one is to have established in Laos a base for further
militaryg para-military, and subversive attacks. Another valuable
result, from the communist point of view, is to have demonstrated, both
to the native populations and to the French, an inherent weakness of the
French defensive .position in Indochina, namely that while the French
can successfully defend any chosen position, they have difficulty in
depriving their adversaries of the initiative. Even if the Vietminh
forces withdraw completely from Laos, they have demonstrated how
easily they can enter it at will, and in setting up a "Free Laos" govern-
ment they have signified an intention to expand or resume the invasion
later.
c. The immediacy of the threat to Thailand depends in part on
the degree of military and political success achieved by the Vietminh in
Laos, but even if the border areas of the neighboring state are effectively
cleared of communist influence, it remains serious. For the time being
it is largely psycho-political, and still in the probing stage. It will
SECURITY ORMATION 2
TOP SES CRET
of 33 pages
80908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
I
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
recede only slightly as communist power withdraws from its border, and
increase very sharply as it returns again. The threat will grow in pro-
portion to inability of French Union forces to cope with it successfully,
and if the Vietminh in any future military action is able to create a
sufficiently strong impression of irresistible surge, of "invincibility",
many influential Thai will be tempted to seek some accommodation with the
enemy, The danger that the communists may subvert non-communist opposition
elements and ambitious careerists in Thailand is particularly grave if --
as some reports suggest -- the exiled leader of the opposition, Pridi
Phanomyong, is now living in Communist China and collaborating with the
"Free Thai" leaders, The internal situation in Thailand is further
aggravated by the presence of a strong communist movement in Thailand's
large Chinese community.
d, In summary, it seems evident that the flexible, many-sided
but coherent communist strategy represents a very serious threat to the
tribes and nations of the Thai ethnic group, including Laos.and Cambodia,
which occupy the heartland of Southeast Asia. This threat would be re-
enforced by communist progress in Vietnam or Burma and can be politically
and logistically supported from bases in Chinese territory. Similarly, its
political and its military aspects are mutually reenforcing. The physi-
cal characteristics of most non-coastal parts of Southeast Asia are such
that small groups of lightly armed guerrillas, living off the country,
can effectively harass numerically and technologically superior forces.
To the extent that this constant harassment is successful it weakens the
morale of the forces seeking to preserve law and order, thus diminishing
their effectiveness at the same time that it lowers their prestige and
authority in the eyes of the local population, thus facilitating the
recruitment of new guerrilla bands. If the vicious girc .e_o f -Ps eY holo caj
SECURITY INFORMATION I
TOP SECRET of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 ti Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFMTION
TOP SECRET
rirsment reac es oin at which It is tonalra
, tlx ingXeasin eonmuni
canabilities for nsychol.ogical harassment it is 1ikg y to spell the doom
of Western, or Western-orjented,, R?olitico-. ilita r control 4n Sou? beast
Asia un e s it can somehow be b oken. Cn the other hand it also constitutes
a potential communist vulnerability, for any expression of authentic
indigenous and popular resistance to communism by counter-guerrilla bands
or even by village militia forces would have adverse effects on communist
morale and prestige out of all proportion to its military significance.
2. Peter
: s r ti n of U.S., Countser-Strategy
Y 1
a. In the face of the communist strategy for Southeast Asia
outlined in the foregoing section, it is clearly essential for the West
to develop an equally vigorous, flexible and coherent counter-strategy.
Therefore a more vigorous exercise of U.S. leadership is the first require-
ment for a successful anti-communist strategy in Southeast Asia. (This
does not imply that there should necessarily be a more gMarent exercising
of U.S. leadership; we should continue to work with and through indigenous
leadership whenever possible.)
b. Like the present communist strategy, the proposed new
strategy must include military, economic, political and psychological
programs. Not only must a major effort be made in all these fields$ but
the several efforts must be mutually reenforcing. Insofar as a priority
of effort is indicated, it is in the politico.-psychological field where
the communist threat is greatest. The most urgent single need is to create
an atmosphere of victory. Of nearly equal importance is the requirement
for the Western powers to demonstrate convincingly to the indigenous
peoples that the colonial era is dead. This includes giving greater
recognition to the nationalist aspirations of the native elites but it is
CUR TY FOFW T~.. N -4
LOP SECRET of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
a handicap for us to deal with Asian nationalism solely through the
urbanized, westernized, upper and middle classes. We must learn
eventually to associate ourselves with Asian nationalism, as the communists
do, at the village level, though shortage of qualified personnel makes
this difficult at the present time. In particular we must meet the
communist military threat at the village level by developing local
resistance forces, and guerrilla bases. Finally, while intensifying the
struggle against communism everywhere in Southeast Asia, we should focus
our efforts upon the Thai area because it is at the same time a region
vulnerable to the communist effort, and a good base for counter-attack,
against the communist position.
co It is obviously indispensable for the U.S. to maintain
Thailand,, the central core of the Thai ethnic group, goegraphically the
logical base for counter operations against the communists, and the glacis
of the British position on the Kra Isthmus, as an anti-communist bastion
in Southeast Asia. This implies strengthening the French effort in Indo-
china, particularly in Laos and Cambodia, but cannot be achieved solely by
such means. Equally intensive but differently oriented U.S. programs
must be developed both in Indochina and in Thailand itself, and if the
effort in Thailand is adequate to meet the communist challenge locally,
It will tend to generate a new U.S. capability for stimulating and assist-
ing the French in Indochina, for injecting now vigor into the struggle
against communism throughout Southeast Asia; in other words, a successful
development by the U.S. of the potentialities of the Thailand position would
not only strengthen the defense of Malaya and Indochina but would enable
us to outflank the Vietminh position.
SECURITY INFORMATION .5
TOP_ SECRET of 33 pages
R99n
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
V-4101 1%W
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The process of develanment outlined above ineude. such
act .vitles ass are neressary tooonssolidate That, wed a. a secure base b_y
increasing its tree t and m n is fron iers more defensible. Thailand
should be considerettl , p i.nc pal eographieal a of the pr p ed U OS.
s f So Asia. and the ceBtZal
aerate .y, with respect to the. Thai people
of proms s
concept of thiadt ate v should be the d vel en in Thailand
which gradually create a climate of v ctor In the light of the require-
ments set forth in paragraphs a. and b. above, Thailand is the logical in fact the only possible -- focus of the integrated, offensively-defensive
U.S. strategy needed to defeat communist designs aimed against the Thai
peoples iU Southeast Asia:
d. Vigorous and coordinated U.S. psychological, political,,
economic and military programs in Thailand, developed in accordance with
the offensive-defensive concept expressed in paragraph c., would have the
following major advantages=
(1) Even if modest in terms of equipment and American
personnels they would create the impression that the
United States is determined not to abandon Southeast Asia
to the communists.
(2) More active U.S. leadership in Thailand will tend
to raise the morale of non-communist indigenous nationalist ele-
ments in other Thai ethnic areas such as Laos and Cambodia --
because it will suggest the possibility of greater U.S. support.
(3) By sponsoring a dynamic politico-military guerrilla
movement, the U.S. would have created a strong potential for
resisting communist forces with minimal expenditures of western
manpower. Even in the event of a large-scale Chinese invasion,
SECURITY INFORMATION 6
TOPSECRET
of 33 pages
80908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
Nw~ N4100
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
guerrilla harassment might prove a significant factor in
slowing down the invaders, preventing them from making the
most economical use of their manpower, and above all in
crystallizing and maintaining the resistance of the local
populations.
(4) The obvious need to coordinate U.S. military, para-
military and psychological programs for the defense of
Thailand with similar British and French programs in
the area creates a possibility of exerting greatly increased
U.S. influence over the French conduct of their struggle against
communism in Indochina. This influence would be psychological
for the most part and would result from the overt pronouncements
necessary to prepare the indigenous people to accept U.S. support
in good faith, France could not reasonably refrain from modi-
fying her policy toward Indochina under the circumstances*
e, There appear to be no unqualified disadvantages inherent
in the proposed U.S. strategy based upon Thailand, but there are risks of
implementing the strategy in an ultimately self-defeating manner which
should be recognized so that they can be avoided or reduced. The main
ones are as follows:
(1) Generating British and French suspicions that
U.S. programs in Southeast Asia are a cloak for U.S.
"ambitions" detrimental to their interests.
(2) Generating similar suspicions of U.S.
"imperialism" on the part of extreme Asian nationalists.
(3) Creating expectations on the part of some
indigenous elements., particularly the Pan-Thai enthusiasts
in Thailand, that the U.S. can be induced to support
SECURITY INFORMATION 7
'OP SECRET of 33 pages
Soong
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
extreme, unreasonable or premature nationalist ambitions
detrimental to the legitimate interests of our Allies or
of other friendly nations.
(4) Providing pretexts for either the French or
the Thai to relax their own efforts against communism
and to throw the whole burden for the defense of South-
east Asia on the United States, this to include leading
the Thai to rely on the ultimate commitment of U.S.
military forces in Thailand.
(5) Founding misplaced hopes upon Thai military
capabilities, or attempting to impose patterns of
military development upon the Thai armed forces which
are not adapted to their cultural and social. environment.
(For an analysis of social and cultural factors affecting
Thai military capabilities, see III, 2, co: below.)
(6) Fostering only disappointment in U.S. official
and unofficial circles in the event that U.S. and Thai
interests diverge at a future date, with the result that
use of the forces created and activated in line with this
strategy are misused or abused, seen from the U.S. view-
point. This is a real and major danger, especially in terms
of U.S. public opinion, requiring both vigilance and
adroitness in U.S. diplomacy to avoid putting the U.S.
"over the barrel", i.e., use of the U.S. commitment,
taken as a right or a favor by the recipient, against the
U.S, as leverage for condoning actions not in the U.S.
interest.
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
S
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
1400, Nm~
SECURITY INFORM&TION
TOP SECRET
(7) Launching uncontrollable forces, or otherwise
creating harmful political situations, through the large-
scale employment of indigenous guerrilla forces. Since
the proposed strategy is based in great part upon develop-
ment of a large-scale indigenous resistance to communism
at the village level, this hazard is a considerable one, par-
ticularly in the light of past history. While the United
States achieved some remarkable tactical successes in the
development and employment of native guerrilla forces in
World War II, both in the China and the India-Burma
theaters (the military record of the O$S-sponsored Kachin
Rangers was particularly outstanding), the long-range
effects of such operations in Asia and elsewhere have often
proved harmful to the national interests of the powers
sponsoring them. Careful planning can mitigate but may
not entirely eliminate such adverse results. In any case
the risks should be considered acceptable on the basis that
there is no feasible and more acceptable alternative;
f. In conclusion, it appears from the considerations in the
foregoing paragraphs, that the United States can and should meet the threat
of communist strategy aimed at the Thai peoples in Southeast Asia by
vigorous coordinated programs, primarily focussed on Thailand but intended
eventually to achieve maximum exploitation of Thailand's capabilities*
particularly her psychological capabilities, as an offensive-defensive base.
III. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THAILAND
1, General Survey
as U.S. programs to implement the conclusions of Section II
must take into account both the general character of the country and its
SECURITY INFORMATION S
TOP SECRET
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
specific assets and liabilities from the viewpoint of such programs,
The most pertinent general characteristics can be summarized as follows:
(1) The population of Thailand in mid.-1953 is
estimated at just under 20,000,000. Of this approximately
15 percent (about 3,000,000) are Chinese.
(2) The literacy rate is estimated at between 30
and 40 percent, which is relatively very high for Asia,.
(3) The Thai economy, which Is largely agricultural,,
is basically sound. Hunger and other forms of misery are
negligible as factors forming the growth of communism.
However, for the first time in years the Thai balance of
payments became distinctly unfavorable in 1952, due
principally to a steep decline in the proceeds from the
export of rubber and tin which, together with rice, are
Thailand's chief export commodities. Indications are that
the balance of payments will remain unfavorable in the
foreseeable future. The national budget, moreover, has
shown increasingly serious deficits in recent years due to
necessary and entirely justifiable expenditures for defense,
economic development and salary increases for underpaid
civil servants. Additional expenditures for the armed
forces, the police, the evacuation of refugees, etc.,
required as a result of the newly intensified communist
threat in Laos will now lead to an even greater deficit
in 1953 than was originally estimated. It should also
be noted that the particularly exposed Northeastern
provinces bordering on Laos are under-developed and con-
stitute an economic depression area. A second economic
SEC URITTY INFORMATIoj
~'_TOP SECRET
10
of 33 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
%40~ *40
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
depression area is developing in the tin and rubber
producing southern provinces situated in the Malayan
peninsula.
(4) Railroad and highway communications systems,
while still inadequate for economic and military purposes$
were sufficient to sustain large-scale movements of
Japanese troops and supplies into Burma and Malaya in
World War II. They are supplemented by an extensive
system of waterways. Bangkok has a good all-weather
airport, and there are a number of smaller military air-
ports through the country.
(5) Except for the Chinese community which is
chiefly centered in the cities and larger towns and in
the Bangkok area, the population is culturally fairly
homogenous. The northern and northeastern parts of the
country are largely peopled by Lao whose level of
sophistication and whose language,, which is a That dialect,
are comparable to those of their kinsmen in Laos$ in the
Shan States of Burma and in southern Yunnan. Despite
poor communications the central Government has for a
long time carried on effective administrati-on in all
parts of the Kingdom, and although there has been
occasional banditry there has been no large-scale armed
opposition such as in Burma.
(6) During the period of colonial expansion Thailand
never fell under European domination as it succeeded in
balancing the various Western powers which encroached
on her borders. British and French Influences in the
SECURITY INFORMATION 11
fO SECRET
of 33 pages
aQnnp
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
i 1
SECURITY jNFO%%TION
TOP SECRET
economic and legal fields, however, became very strong
leaving the Thai with strong suspicion of British and
French intentions and a profound dislike of the French
in particular. Thai feelings toward the United States
have been friendly and at present Thai-U.S. relations
are more intimate than at any time previously. The Thai
have a deeply rooted sense of identity with King, religion
and country, which is a unifying force and which provides
them with an inner toughness which has enabled them to
withstand the viscissitudes of modern politico-economic
stresses. Before World War II the Thai Government was
Irredentist and for a brief period the Thai dreamed of
unifying areas of Laos, Cambodia, the Shan States of
Burma and of Malaya in a greater Thailand. Some of these
dreams were fulfilled by Japanese support for the duration
of the War. There was little evidence of national mourning
or resentment, however, when the Allies forced Thailand to
disgorge the fruits of these aggressions after the War.
(7) Thailand has a government which in form has
the principal characteristics of a democratic constitu-
tional monarchy. However, these instruments of government
are used in a traditional authoritarian manner by the
ruling class which is successfully perpetuating a one-
party form of government. Attempts at gg-os d'etat have
been frequent as actual changes of the personnel in power
are only possible by a show of force in spite of the fact
of occasional general elections. None of these attempts
has been successful since November 1947 and there is no
SECURITY INFORMATION 12
TOP RE T of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
140~ *400
SECURITY INFORMATION
TO SECRET
reason to believe that any attempts will be successful
in the near future unless they have the benefit of foreign
military support. Although the Crown rests uneasy the
present government appears to be comparatively stable,
the present Prime Minister having exerted direct or
indirect control for about eleven of the 21 years of the
constitutional regime, five and one-half of these years
being under his present term of control. Within the
ruling group there is constant jockeying for position and
personal advantage among the more prominent individuals
heading up power components of the government.
2. Bpeoial Political. Social and Cultural Factors
a. U.S. relations with Thailand's various governments have
been generally good. During transitions of power in Thailand the U.S.
Government has refrained from becoming involved in Thailand's internal
politics. During World War II when the then Prime Minister Phibun Songgram
was technically an ally of the Japanese and had declared war on the United
States, the U.S. Government did not retaliate with a similar declaration
of war.being convinced that Thailand's declaration did not represent the
sentiments of the Thai nation. During the War the U.S. Government con-
ceived and directed an underground intelligence movement led by
Pridi Phanomyong who was they Regent, Before the end of the War the Regent
engaged in a typical Thai political effort having the benefit of a wealth
of American-supplied arms and forced the Government of Phibun Songgram to
fall, using the occasion of a parliamentary vote of non-confidence in order
to prevent interference by the Japanese, an interference which neither
Phibun nor Pridi desired. Pridi continued until November 1947 as the real
power behind the Government when Phibun, who had reassembled his prewar
forces in a new pattern, succeeded in again eeizing political power by a
coup d'etat and forced Pridi into exile. The U.S. Government withheld
SECURITY INFORMATION 13 .
TOP SECRET r%p 11 ?Onoe u (3 9 0 8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
recognition until the new regime was able to go through certain proceetes
of a constitutional sort, including the acceptance of a new constitution
to suit the occasion and a general election. Repeated efforts have been
made by Pridi and his "Free Thai" followers to reassert their control over
the Goverment but without success. As the years continue to pass it has
become increasingly manifest that Pridi and his followers can only hope to
return to power if they have substantial foreign military backingo
In view of the current struggle between the communist nations
and the free world Pridits handicaps for a political return have increased.
The fact that Pridi. is believed by the Thai to be in China and to have
Inspired the recent developments of a communist nature in Sibsong-Panna
(Yunnan) and in Laos further disqualifies him for a return to Thailand under
present conditions. Pridits personal position is further made difficult by
the fact that most Thai accept the idea that he was in some way responsible
for the murder of King Anande..
There are other anti-Government elements in Thailand which
are friendly with the Royal Family and which would probably prefer an admin-
istration which administered by constitutional and democratic methods.
However, there seems little prospect of these elements bearing any political
weight at present.
In spite of apparent shortcomings in Thailandts Government
from an American point of views the Government appears to be acceptable to
the general Thai population. Furthermore, the U.S. Government is receiving
from Thailand most, if not all, of the varieties of cooperation and assist-
ance which it desires and which it is possible for the Thai Government to
deliver. The Thai Government has taken a forthright stand against communisma,
has provided armed forces in Korea, has voted with the U.S. on all major
issues in the United Nations and is prepared to make what combat stand it is
SECURITY INFORMATION 14
TOP.-. SHORET
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
VIM/ V%W
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET .
capable of against communist armed aggression. It is believed that the
Thai Government would be prepared to cooperate in further reasonable sugges-,
tions, some of which are envisaged in this paper, to strengthen its stand
against communismo
b. There is a strong communist movement in the Chinese community
possible including 2,000 or more skilled and trained communists with a
following of perhaps another 20,000 communists in the total community of
about 3 million. The Thai communist movement is small and not vital although
it might become energized if communist forces appeared likely to exert fatal
pressures upon the Thai Government. The Chinese communists dominate what
little trade-union activity there is in the country, and are particularly
well entrenched among maritime workers and river men. The Thai Government
and Chinese community have been looked in a struggle since 1939 wherein the
Chinese aim to survive as Chinese and the Thai aim to absorb them or to
eliminate them. The sharpness of the struggle was brought about by the
fact that the Chinese had a stranglehold on the petty trade of the nation
as well as of a large part of the major industries, and at the same time
were decelerating their normal absorption into the Thai community by the
strengthening of Chinese schools, Chinese newspapers and Chinese clubs. The
efforts of the Thai to control all aspects of Chinese cultural and economic
activities has aroused a great deal of friction. The U.S. Government has
attempted to remain clear of this internal Thai problem and on the one
occasion when the Chinese Nationalist Government asked for U.S. assistance
in securing better treatment for the Chinese in Thailand, the U.S. Govern-
ment took the position that it was sympathetic with the Thai Government which
was faced with a burgeoning minorities problem which seemed to have no ready
solution,
ECURITY INFONMION
TO ECET of 33 pages
89909
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
Nw~ 1100
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SEC T
at While not systematically anti-foreign and though they are
generally well-disposed towards Americans, the Thai have a great deal of
pride and are about as quick to resent a patronizing or arrogant attitude
on the part of Westerners as other Asians, "Face" plays an important role
in Thailand, as in most Asian societies, but the Thai concept of "face" is
highly sophisticated and is paradoxically allied with their sense of humor
and ridicule. They intensely dislike arrogance, pomposity, sanctimoniousness,
rudeness and'inability to control one's temper.
In moral and religious matters the Thai are formally Buddhists,
ceremonially Hindus and practically, for everyday living, spirit worshippers.
From their Buddhism they derive an ideology of lofty moral perfection which
is sought by a few of the Monks. Buddhism also emphasizes the shortcomings
and imperfections of all human beings, and consequently the Thai are not
surprised at evidences of greed, corruption, graft, mal-administration and
the other inadequacies of human society, though they may aspire mildly to
a better order of things. The graft which is commonplace among high Thai
officials and which is.lamented by Westerners is a hangover in the think-
ing of the Thai from the sumptuary privilege of the Royal Family, the
ruling class. High office carried with it certain perquisytes and oppor-
tunities for personal aggrandizement. The most that can be hoped for in
improving this situation in the near future is for the new ruling class to
reacquire a monopoly on it and to require the lesser officials and general
public to relinquish whatever amounts they have been taking. There is no
possibility of eliminating graft as long as the Thai Government continues
to be an authoritarian one-party government, but discreet and realistically-
oriented U.S. pressure can be useful in inducing the Thai Government to
carry out measures intended to reduce Thai vulnerabilities to communist
subversion in order to retain for the free world the confidence of certain
SECURITY INFORMATION 3-6
...
TO SECRET
TO,,...EC
89909
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
of 33 pages
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORNATION
TOP SECRET
westernized Thal who might otherwise be lured into the communist camp by
propaganda attacking the corruption of the Phibun regime,
The Thai national character insofar as any such broad
generalization can be valid -- conveys an impression of a people who are
gentle and light-.nded, not given to ponderous philosophic thought nor to
great warlike and military ambitions.
It is certainly true that the con-
stant Buddhist teaching against destroying life has had the effect of
softening the Thai warlike spirit of earlier centuries. Nevertheless, the
Thai have shown in the past, and continue to be capable of, great cruelty
and severity and know how to accept hardship and even death when they feel
impelled to do so. There is a ready willingness to solve difficult prob-
lems by assassination; preferably by poison, but alternatively by more
direct methods. This is perhaps a symptom of their love of intrigue and
of their inclination to form small. groups about powerful or important
individuals, The Thai are incorrigible individualists, there being no
more individualistic person in the world than the Thai villager who resents
regimentation and likes to live his life in a free and independent manner.
When organized into military organizations the Thai do respond well to
training. In Korea Thai troops have behaved satisfactorily under fire
and their casualty rate has been high. Observers of guerrilla training
report that the Thai who were selected for such training responded well
and developed into very efficient guerrilla units. It seems probable that
Thai character and cultural institutions are better suited to guerrilla
activities than to the development on a large-scale of conventional military
forces, but this by no means rules out the possibility of training selected
small or medium-sized units, and certain categories of military personnel,
to a high level of efficiency.
SECURITY INFORNATtON
TOP SECRET
17
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
-,.._...TP.-.PSEC SECRET
d. Great care should be taken in the selection of U. S. official
personnel for duty in Thailand, It seems essential to provide men not
only of technical skill, energy and moral integrity able to win the re-
spect of the Thai but also men who have no sense of racial or color super-
iority who are tactful., peaceful,, cheerful, tolerant, and sensitive in
their human relations, warmly human, The Thai do not get on well with
people who are of cold and aloof personality.
They make good friends
easily with persons who treat them as equals. The success of U, S.
programs in Thailand depends heavily on the selection of high-class U. S.
field personnel and perhaps the extent and diversity of our programs
should be limited more by our selection of desirable personnel than by
any other factor, Americans who had close relations with the Pridi re-
gime during and shortly after the War, even though of high caliber and
of proven ability, suffer the obvious handicap of being identified in
the minds of the current Thai Government with their principal political
opposition. It is probable that any such Americans who returned to
SEC URTTY INFORMATION
56 S.EcCRFT
18
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
v SECURITY INFORMATION ,,
TOP SECRET
Thailand would be under constant suspicion of trying.to favor Pridi and
his followers to the detriment of the Government.
3. Capabilities of Thailand
a. Communications: The principal radio broadcasting facili-
ties in the country are controlled by the Government. The existing trans-
mitters are low powered; they will soon (date unspecified but estimated
June, 1953) be supplemented by a 50 KW short.-wave station now being con-
structed by the Government. On the receiving side there are 92,295
licensed sets, 4,295 of which are public, i. e.,, for use in public squares
and market places, There is no indication of geographic distribution,
though most are undoubtedly in Bangkok.
The press is characterized by irresponsibility and frequent
changes. Most daily newspapers average 1,000 to 2,000 circulation, with
8,000 to 10,000 maximum figure. An estimate of 50,000 may be made for
total national circulation, Newspapers, confined to Bangkok and
Chiengmai, are in Thai, Chinese and English (2 English dailies, and 1
weekly, all in Bangkok). Some have known sponsorship or control, as the
Director-General of Police, Communist Party, etc. Thai language magazines
are numerous and varied, many feature translations from English.
The Thai Government has a small Information Department. It
has excellent arrangements for distribution of posters and other
materials through Buddhist priests and temples,
b. Armed Forces: Of the approximately 100,000 men in the
Thai Armed Forces, 35,,000..40,000 are in the Army, about 40,000 in the
National Police, and between 15,000-20,000 are in the Thai Navy and Air
Force; their equipment is generally obsolete and frequently unusable due
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SMT,
19
of 33 pages
ooa~p
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TLP SECRET
to lack of ammunition and parts The Air Force has 316 planes, mostly
obsolete and many of which are in poor condition.
The Thai Department of Defense has set up a Psychological War-
fare Section, after a survey by the FECOM Chief of Psywar Section; other
instruction has been given Thai officers in Tokyo and at Ft. Bragg.
The Thai Police Force is under the Home Ministry and controlled
by Police General Phao. It operates an Antio-Communist Propaganda Section,
and is responsible for frontier security and internal security in both
urban and rural areas.
c. Conclusions: While Thailand has some useful capabilities
for psychological and Para-military programs, her Armed Forces, despite
increased U.S. assistance, and even if supplemented by large-scale para-
military programs, .appear to be inadequate to assure the defense of the
Kingdom within the near future against a major communist military attack.
Failure to convince the Thai military authorities that some western
assistance, at least in the air, would be rapidly forthcoming in case of
such attack, might vitiate the whole program. If it is not considered
feasible to ear-mark some U. S. air. strength for the defense of Thailand
in case of need, then there is an urgent need to develop outside Thailand
an international volunteer force comparable to the wartime "Flying Tigers"
which could intervene in Thailand. Unless opposed by jets, this force
could make effective use of World War II fighter-bombers by applying the
techniques developed by the USAF and the AVG for use against ground troops.*
The conclusions of SE --45, June 2, 1953, entitled "Thailand's
Ability to Withstand Communist Pressures or Attacks through mid-19544"
are reproduced in Annex A.
SECURITY INFO TION
TOP SECRET
20
of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP-~, SECRET
4. U S . Ca pabil ties n Thailand
as Covert capabilities: There is in existence an organiza-
tional nucleus for activities now programmed and approved, and capable
of expansion for further activity.
b. Official representation: There are 245 Americans in Thai-
land (not including scheduled increases in WA personnel), consisting ofs
Diplomatic Mission 96
MAAG 97
N.SA 32
UM 20
LSIS operates in Bangkok, Chiengmai, and S ongkla, and through
the Thai and Chinese press, pamphlets, exhibits, fairs, motion pictures
and radio. Exchange of Persons is also handled under the direction of
the PAO, and by WA.
As in other Southeast Asian countries, the Regional Produc-
tion Center in Manila provides support with its extensive facilities.
VOA Thai language programs originate in Now York and are
relayed by Manila, Although recent economy moves resulted in orders for
their elimination, they have now been extended indefinitely.
c. Capabilities elsewhere in the area: In the neighboring
countries, Burma, Malaya, Laos, and Cambodia, USIS in particular has
facilities and personnel which are capable of closer integration with
programs aimed primarily at Thailand but having an effect on or related
to its neighbors, Fo,- examples, educated Laotians, other than products
of French universities, have almost all attended universities in Bangkok,
thus providing a direct cultural link.
d. The MSA program in Thailand, according to the figures
scheduled for June 30,. 1953, employs about one hundred Americane, of whom
29 are administrative and the balance in operational work. The latter
SECURITY INFORMATION 21
TO S;REr of 33 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
Nv~ S.4
SECURITY INFORMATION
P SECRET
category may be broken down as follows;
Public Health
19
Agriculture
25
Transportation
6
Industry
1
Education
18
Public Administration
2
In the past, certain adjustments have occurred to the expressed desires
of the Thai Government; among the recent ones is the addition of the public
administration specialists,
The reduction of U. S. economic aid to Thailand from Y7
million in FY 152 to $6.2. million in FY 153.. and the planned further reduction
to $5 million in FY 154 cannot fail to reduce U. S. capabilities in the
economic field, Even should Thai reaction to this reduction of U. 3,
economic assistance be less pronounced than there is reason to fear, a
U. S. policy of "retrenchment" will certainly not strengthen the Thai
resolve to continue as an anti-comtmunist bastion in a communist pressure
area, but on the contrary, increase their fear for the future etd create
a lingering feeling of doubt and uncertainty;. In order to demonstrate
tangibly our firm intention to stand by Thailand in her hour of need,
it is important that a modest increase in economic aid be made in. FY '54
as compared to previous years, and it is essential, at the very least,
that no decrease below the FY 153 program take place.
e, Conclusions : if the economic and military aid programs
are strengthened as suggested, U. 'S, capabilities for carrying out the
new programs required by the situation in Southeast Asia.appear to be
adequate, with a few exceptions. The U. S. Mission In Bangkok,. is an
able one. On the other hand, the proposed development of Thailand requires
the assignment there of some suitably--qualified and outstanding Americans
SECURITY INFORMATION' 22
M---~TU SECRET SERET
-..-~.........,. of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFOBN TIM
TOP ECRET
to fill certain key posts. The most essential requirements appear to be
the following.
(1) A public affairs officer of sufficient experience
and seniority to be effective in promoting highly effective
U. S. information programs and in coordinating them with
similar officers in adjacent countries and with the
responsible Thai officials.
(2) A director of U. S- guerrilla and para-military
training programs in Thailand with sufficient rank and
prestige to be effective in resolving problems of
coordination with comparable French and British
activities in the area in the event that possible future
extension of U. S. para-military activities in Thailand
creates a need for such inter-Allied consultations.
(3) A director of U. S. counter,-intelligence and
security activities in Thailand.
SECURITY INF'ORMAT ON 23
TOP G I T of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
IV. C ONCTS
1. That communist expansionist activity in Southeast Asia is
growing in strength and potency. Developments in communist strategy in
the Thai ethnic area pose an imminent threat to Thailand, which must be
met rapidly with an effective political-psychological military counter
effort, or Southeast Asia could fall to the communists without overt
intervention by the Chinese Communist armed forces,
2. That Thailand is politically and geographically the most suit-
able Thai ethnic base in which to initiate and develop a substantial counter
effort.
That Thailand's economy, basically agricultural, is at present
strained by measures necessary for the national security. This situation
occurring at a time when increased communist pressure is imminent, calls
for economic aid programs at the levels of the several years past at
least, to support beneficial long-range projectsf and to reduce the danger
of dissidence in the Northeast.
4. That the ethnic bonds of the Thai peoples scattered through
Thailand, laos., Cambodia, and Southern China can contribute to the psychological
and military effort to prevent communist expansion,
5. That U, S. support and activation of a Thailand based counter
effort must utilize and exploit fully the normal channels of contact
with native elements by placing highly qualified individuals in important
posts in Thailand and utilizing every phase and form of psychological
warfare to prepare the minds and emotions of the people to c ollaborate
in the effort; that this support must relate to synchronized covert and
overt efforts including extensive para..-military operations,
SECURITY INFORMATION
Pf1D Cr.+n n" m
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY SNFOEMA+ ION
TOP SECRET
6. That a coordinated political effort to bring French policy
towards Indochina more in accord with the realities of the. situation
must be considered a major factor in the overall effectiveness of the
resistance effort based in Thailand, while expanded U. S. programs for
strengthening Thailand could assist in making this effort more effective,
7. That the proposed expansion of U. S. activities based on Thai-
land is feasible in the light of that country's capabilities, providing
emphasis is placed initially on reducing Thailand's vulnerabilities.
Consequently programs should be aimed at strengthening
Thailand's ability to resist communist aggression or subversion,
with only such necessary supporting programs in the information
field in adjacent areas as are consistent with the existing
patterns of.inter-Allied relationships.
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY P ? N
1. Nat nal Po X :
The overall objective of U. S. policy in respect to Southeast
Asia is stated in NSC 124/2 as: "preventing the countries of Southeast
Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop
the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to
contribute to the strengthening of the free world."
SECURITY INFORMATION
25
MITE CICT of 33 pages
89908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
2. In coordination with V. S. military programs consolidate
Thailand as a secure base by increasing its strength and making its frontiers
more defensible.
4. Psychological Objectives;
(1) Stimulate, crystallize, maintain,. and coordinate
active resistance, in the first instance in Thailand, to
communist aggression, subversion, and oppression mainly by:
(a) convincing them that the U. S. is
determined to assist them in their resistance to
communism;
(b)
developing confidence in their own
capabilities for effective resistance to communism.
(2) Throughout all of Southeast Asia maximize the
favorable aspects, and minimize any unfavorable aspect, of
U. S. support to Thailand by.
(a) building up the conviction that commu-
nist strategy in respect to the Thai peoples of Southeast
Asia imperils all of Southeast Asia;
(b) increasing the belief that U. S.
support in Southeast Asia will facilitate the solution
of major political and economic problems in the area --
including rural development and land reform in a
manner satisfactory both to Asian and to western interests,
without any taint of disguised U. S. colonial aspirations.
SECURITY INFORMATION 26
PP SECRET
of 33 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET ~.
(3) Encourage and strengthen all feasible cooperation
among the countries of Southeast Asia with each other and with
the British and French, and of both the former and the latter
#
with the U. So
b,, Basic Tasks t
(1) Wherever possible in cooperation with the Thai govern-
ment and making use chiefly of indigenous outlets, develop or
expand U. S. overt information programs directed to Southeast
Asia, with initial emphasis on those aimed at Thailand and other
Thai ethnic groups which:
(a) make clear the active partnership of the
Ti. S. in the struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia
to preserve their freedom and cultural integrity and
to realize their legitimate national aspirations;
(b) seek to convince all the peoples of
Southeast Asia that the communist threat to Laos and
Thailand imperils the entire area, and that without
an effective c ounter-effort the free or emergent
nations of Southeast Asia will fall under the yoke of
Red Chinese imperialism;
(c) through emphasis on communist vulner-
abilities (e.g, to aggressive guerrilla action) seek
to Increase the confidence of the free peoples of Asia
that with Free World assistance, they are not and will
not be helpless in the face of the communist threat;
# European support for U, S. national purposes in Southeast Asia
should be developed within the scope of the Psychological Strategy
Plan for Western Europe (FSB D-36 as approved).
SECURITY INFORMATION
7CP SE~.ttET.
27
of 33 pages
83908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
. TOP
(d) publicize and effectively exploit any
concrete illustrations of constructive policies or
achievements initiated by the U. S. or other nations,
western or indigenous, In line with the objectives of
paragraphs 2.a.(2) and (3).
Action: State
Support: CIA
(2) Stimulate and support effective overt and covert
information activities of the Thai Government in support of
objectives compatible with those in paragraph 2.a.
Action: State (See Appendix A)
(3) Develops expand? or intensify non?-attributable
U. Si activities in support of all of the objectives in
paragraph 2, with particular emphasis upon the followings
(a) winning the support of the nationalisti-
cally-oriented indigenous elite for the constructive and
increasingly active role of the U. S. in the area.,
(b) exploiting the support thus obtained
to stimulate more active opposition to communism;
(c) neutralizing communist influence and
sympathy in the overseas Chinese communities, wherever
possible developing support for free world objectives,
Action; (See Appendix A)
(4) Develop, expand, and accelerate to the greatest
extent sound programs for the creation and employment of
indigenous guerrilla and para-military forces,, capable of
effective active defense against communist invasion and
infiltration of Thailand.
Action: (See Appendix A)
of 33 pages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP S aC T
(5) Maintain at least at the present scale., and
possibly increase beyond the FY 152 and FY '53 level., the
economic aid and technical assistance program, with special
emphasis on projects which:
(a) illustrate the interest of the U. S.
in the welfare of the indigenous peoples (rural
development and health projects);
(b) support military objectives (improvement
of strategic roads and railroads);
(c) aid the development of the strategically
exposed, economically depressed Northeastern provinces.
Action: NEA
(b) Strengthen and make obligatory educational
courses for all official U. S. personnel? designed to give
them a background of the history, culture and languages within
which they will work in Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand,
Laos, ,and Cambodia. Such instruction and indoctrination as is
given in the U. S. should be-supplemented by continuing formal
and informal programs in the area,, wherever possible utilizing
the services of local people who have had travel or other
grants from U. S. agencies. language teaching should be en-
couraged. All these programs should be aimed at obtaining a
maximum favorable psychological impact from the activities and
local contacts of all official U. S. personnel.
Action: State
Defense
CIA
NSA
SECURITY IZORMATION
29
'k'P S IT
of 33 pages
8:3908
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
OP SECRE
(7) Strengthen orientation programs for indigenous
military personnel, and suitable information programs for the
general public, which, taking into account local cultural
attitudes:
(a) stress U. S, respect for the human
value and military capacity of the indigenous peoples;
(b) inspire confidence in available U. S.
egvlpment, of U. S. military leaders, and of U, S.
training methods and concepts of warfare over those
of the communists;
(c) indoctrinate indigenous trainees for
PYl Program,
Action: State
Defense
Support: CIA
(S) Tactfully, and on a realistic basis, induce the
Thai Govcrnment to carry out measures intended to reduce Thai
vulnerabilities to communist subversion, and at the same time,
by all suitable means combat present or potential communist
influence upon former opposition leaders.
Action: State (See Appendix A)
c.eciapl T3ndertak's,:
(1) apartment of State:
(a) Strengthen the existing USIS program in
Thailand by:
assigning to Bangkok, at the time of
the appointment of the new U. S. Ambassador, a
Public Affairs Officer of the highest calibre;
SECURITY INFORMATION
..__,. TOPS CLa` RET
.......~? EC. E ,, of 33 pages
30
PS - n~
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 r
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
O SECRET
expediting the assignment of a Thai
language officer to the vacant position in
Bangkok;
turning over to the. Thai Government the
US 1S launch "AMERICA" for its operation, on the
understanding that it will use certain agreed
American US IS material;
arranging for increased funds for local
publications in the Chinese language programs;
arranging increased funds, and, as
necessary, additional staff. to build up local
USIS radio programs and locally-produced films;
providing for more leader and specialist
travel grantsp and, if required, additional staff
to handle the important Exchange of Persons
Program and the Bi-National Institute Program
in Bangkok;
utilizing to the maximum extent visual
aids as a means of reaching people otherslise
untouched by U. S. media.
(b) Explore the feasibility and desirability of
setting up under indigenous control a mobile radio transmitter
at or near the Thai--Laos frontier.
(c) Intensify information activities in northeast
Thailand.
S ITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
3l
of 33 pages
?99fl8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
lfto~ 1140
SECURITY INFORMATION
OP SECRET
(d) In conjunction with the appointment of
a new U. S. Ambassador to Thailand, assign the best
qualified bfficer available for a thorough survey of
the unofficial attitudes and aspirations of the Thai
and other indigenous peoples as they affect the imple.
mentation of this strategy. Recommendations for
modifications of approach, emphasis, timing, etc.,
should be his main objective,
(e) Request the Chinese Nationalist Govern-
ment in Formosa to assign a more effective diplomatic
representative to Thailand, if reports on the ineffec-
tiveness of the present charge dta?faires are accurate.
(f) Continue the Thai language broadcasts
on VOA, unless it is found that better use can be made
of existing personnel. and organization.
(g) Promote regional inter-Asian exchange
of persons, with emphasis on the exploitation of
selected Chinese intellectuals from Hong Kong; the
exchange of younger businessmen, already started
should be intensified.
(2) Rapartmept of Defense:
(a) Stage, as soon as possible, a show of
U. S. air st;ength in Bangkok. This should be done
after consultation with the local Mission as to timing,,
and as to whether it should be undertaken by the United
States alone or possibly with the British and French.
SECURITY INFORMATION 32
TOP of 33 pages
8 0(",R
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP--.. SECRET
(b) Attach to MAAG a suitably qualified
psywar officer to establish close relation with the
Psychological Warfare Section of the Thai Department
of Defense, and to cooperate with other U. S. infor-
mation personnel.
(c) Effect pre-arranged coordination and
timing of air or naval courtesy visits with overt and
cove:t PW agencies to insure full PW exploitations,
(3) Nutual Security Aged
(a) Determine the effect and influence of
U. S. private enterprise (business, missionary,
fo-dations) and both exploit wherever possible their
favorable aspects and minimize conflicts with them
arising out of governmental operations.
(b) Promote in the United States cultural,
handicraft, and other exhibitions, in. cooperation with
the local governments, with appropriate publicity
linking their popular appeal with indigenous aspirations,
local conditions, anticommunist objectives, etc.
(c) Continue with a high priority economic
programs in support of the objectives of this strategy.
4. Imp? ementatio?:
The standard provisions for coordination, revietr, evaluation,
and logistic support will apply to this Plan, with the special provision that
agency arrangements to implement the specific provisions of the Plan shall be
completed and coordinated as a matter of urgency not later than one month
after the date of PSB promulgation.
6J9r11
SFyCURITy INFORMAL N 33
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP80-01065A000300020033-6