PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200130012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 15, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
25X6
COPY NO.
PSB D-15/a,
February 15, 1952
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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PSB D-.Y/a
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WAS1JINGTON, D. C.
525X6
PROBLEM
To prescribe specific courses of action for the reduction of com-
munist power in Italy.
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SECTION II
APPLTCABII",' APPROVED " OLIO I DS
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SECTION III
SIMLRY AND ANALYSIS
The Communist Position in Italy
Strategic Significance to the USSR
1. The Italian eonummist apparatus has strategic value as a dangerous
fifth column in the event of war. In the absence of war it represents a
harassing force aimed at reducing or nullifying the Italian contribution
to NATO, influencing Italian opinion toward a neutral or pro-Soviet
position, and hampering economic recovery. The Italian communist apparatus
is thus a serious threat to vital U.S. interests in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East.
Tmin
2. The fact thE?t national elections may be held in Italy in 1952,
and are certain to be held not later than 1953, gives special significance
to any currently projected action against Italian communism.
Strength
3. The PCI, together with its captive, the left-wing Nonni
Socialist Party (PSI), constitutes the strongest communist bloc in any
country of Western Europe, and its strength is almost equal to that of the
governing Christian Democratic Party. The dune 1951 local elections (in
about two-thirds of the provinces of the country) indicated that the PCI
and PSI were supported by about 34 percent of the electorate, as compared
with 31 percent in the national elections of 1948; whereas the Christian
Democratic-strength declined from 48.5.percent in"1948 to about 38 percent
in 1951 on a nationwide basis. Despite 1951 defeats in many key cities,
the communist bloc continues to control a number of important municipal
governments as well as a large number of smaller cities and villages. As
a result of the 1948 national electionsp it holds some 31 percent of the
seats in the two houses of the national Parliament.
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4. Italian eommunismis greatest present source of strength is its
control of the CGIL, Italyls largest trade union federation, and its con-
sequent domination of Italian organized labor. The CGIL has about 3.5
million (it claims about 5 million) dues-paying members with an especially
strong position in transportation and communications, public utilities,
government arsenals, shipbuilding and most of the metal-fabricating in-
dustries; and among agricultural day laborers. This CGIL position gives
the communists a strategic hold on the nationts economy, a vantage point
for sabotage and spying; a chance to pose convincingly as the chief defend-
ers of the working class; considerable indirect income from government and
private industry sources in the form of salaries of trade union officials,
subsidies, and rent-free use of government and municipal properties; and a
means of exercising discipline over workers through control of Social
Security boards, employment advisory boards, and factory councils.
5. Communist Party membership has declined from a peak of some 2.3
million in 1947-48 to an estimated 1.7 million, of whom perhaps 500,000
are militant. Membership strength is concentrated in the northern in-
dustrial cities and among farm workers in the Po Valley and north central
Italy. The communists also dominate the cooperative movement which is im-
portant in the agricultural areas. The party is csp bly led by experienced
militants and highly organized with emphasis on small local cells and con-
tact with the individual. Party schools, front organizations, and vacati'nn
centers are all highly developed% Various service organizations for veterans,
pensioners, orphans, etc., are highly organized and are officially recog-
nized by government agencies,
6, Although some communists have been eliminated,; PCI members still
remain in many influential posts in the national administration and key
industries. The party has a powerful and effective propaganda organization,.
and controls about a quarter of the newspaper circulation of Italy.
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Ito parcrilitdicy forco.- nupbtrinj abbutt'' 50,000,, hao boon alloir6d
to deteriorate in terms of organization and readiness.
Lurea of Strength
7, Italian communism found its opportunity for growth in the weak-
ness of Italian society in the postwar periodo
(a) Economically, this weakness has resulted in continuation of
the long-standing economic distress of the mass of workers and peasants
which contrasts sharply with the wealth of the small upper class. Destruc-
tion and defeat in World War II were followed by a serious postwar inflation
which,, until it was brought under control, heightened the distress and
insecurity of the workers. The physical destruction during the war, a
high rate'of population increase, poverty of natural resources, and a
monopoly-ridden industrial structure have all contributed to chronic un-
employment (which has stood at or near 2,000,000 since 1948), under-
employment, and, among the employed, to low productivity and low real
wages. Among the 50 percent of Italians who work on the land, highly
concentrated land ownership has fostered a large agricultural proletariat.
(b) Various political and social weaknesses have reinforced these
economic difficulties. The lack of social consciousness among upper class
elements has exacerbated class warfare in industry and agriculture, has
slowed down the de Gasperi government's reform program (particularly in
land redistribution), and has caused the government to rely heavily on
police action in dealing with labor and agrarian discontent. The absence
of a strong democratic parliamentary tradition; cultural backwardness and
illiteracy, especially in the South; widespread cynicism toward government;
a lack of citizenship responsibility; and traditions of violent political
and social action prevailing in some areas, have increased the difficulties
for the democratic parties. Although Italy's ex-enemy status impeded a
return of national pride and confidence, stabilization of democratic
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government and increasing Italian participation in the community of free
nations, especially the Atlantic Community, have greatly enhanced morale.
The experience of wartime disaster and defeat has, however, left a wide-
spread desire for peace and a reluctance to make economic sacrifices or
take military risks, especially when these are regarded as competitive
with social and economic improvements and reforms.
89 The Italian communists were quick to exploit these weaknesses in
the immediate postwar era. By April 1946 they had captured the left '. y;
Socialist Party, the CGIL, and the major part of the Italian cooperative
movement and were thus established as masters of the Italian labor movement
and chief advocates of the worker's cause. In this operation they were
aided not only by their own tradition of party discipline and tactical
skill, but also by the long-standing Italian tradition of class-conscious
labor unity; by a skillful use of fear and intimidation techniques; by a
lack of outstanding leadership in the Socialist Party; and by their
prestige as leaders of the wartime Partisan movement.
Anti->Communi fit Actipa to Date
9. Since 1947 the government has taken important steps against
communism and the sources of its strength in a number of fields. Cc$mnu-
nists have been excluded from the Cabinet and weeded out of the military
and police forces, which have been strengthened into a force capable of
dealing with any large-scale attempts at direct action. A large number of
communist arms caches have been discovered and seized. The CGILts formerly
exclusive control over organized labor and over government employment
offices has been broken, and the government has taken some steps in
support of the non-communist unions. War-time damage has been repaired
and industrial and agricultural production has been increased over pre-war
levels. A slow but significant beginning, now accelerating, has been made
in adopting and implementing laws for land reform, including land redis-
tribution, and for tax reform.
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10. A number of developments outside the government have had an anti-
communist bearing. Two non-communist trade union federations have
emerged since 1947. The CISL (officially non-denominational and non-
n.. av
mat`
Christian Democrats) and the UIL (created by the moderate Democratic k COfA, 0,
Socialist Party) have emerged to contest CGIL supremacy. But neither con
stitutes a formidable opponent. The Cucohi Magnani defection from the
PCI in 1951 raised the possibility of further nationalist deviationism.
The democratic parties have gained experience in political activity.,
although they still do not match the communists in discipline or "agit-
prop" capabilities. An anti-communist federation of cooperatives has
been formed but is not yet a serious challenge to communist domination of
the cooperative movement.
CQonmunist Capabilitiea
11. The communists command great influence and power and are doing
Italy tremendous harm. Through the impact on public attitudes of their
propaganda and the fact of their existing power, they are a major factor
in preventing a real revival of Italian confidence; in discrediting the
government's policies and narrowing its.field of political maneuver; in hinder-
ing the development of a democratic parliamentary tradition; in impeding
economic recovery, enterprise, investment, and repatriation of capital; in
maxAmizing popular discontent on socio-economic and "peage" issues; and in
preventing the emergence of a democratic political and social force effec-
tively representing the worker's interests. The maximum capability of the
PCI-PSI bloc in a 1952 national election is estimated at between 35 and
40 percent, raising a,serious possibility that communists will get more votes
in the next election than the Christian Democrats, though not more than all
the democratic parties.
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12. In terms of immediate capabilities, the communists are now
capitalizing on the rise in prices, the lag In wages, and the strain on
the Italian economy resulting from the defense program. Thus, although
unable to launch widespread political strikes, the communists still command
the voting support of a large segment of the working class. In recent
months many non-communist unions have been forced to enter into united
action with the CGIL unions or risk the danger of losing their supporters.
The widespread disillusion of Italian workers with the government, with
their employers, and even with their own trade unions is potentially very
dangerous, for it is susceptible to easy exploitation by a disciplined and
purposeful communist movement. The possibility of serious and large-scale
disorders in Italy which could be put down only by major military and
police action cannot be ruled out.
13. Under war-time conditions the communists could constitute a serious
threat to tie Security of Italy,.
Vulnerabilities
14. PCI members remaining in influential posts in government and the
national economy are subject to removal by government and private-industry
action. The PCIIs propaganda.-and-agitation apparatus and its capabilities for
sabotage. are vulnerable to government administrative and legislative action.
15. CGIL domination over the trade-union movement is vulnerable to new
legislation and to changes in government and industry practices attacking the
CGILrs right to pose as a bona fide trade-union organization and hence its
dominant position in wage bargaining, its: control of labor-employment ad-
visory boards, and the basis of its financial support. The most important
actions that could be taken to reduce communist power in Italy would be for
the government to give positive support to the democratic unions in their
struggle against communist domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing
the communist unions and stop dealing with them, and to work towards a more
equitable share of the national income for labor. Concurrent development of
a united anti-communist trade-union-movement,, without ties to any political
party, is of equal importance in reducing the power of,the CGIL.
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Meanwhile, non-competitive development of CISL and UIL, development of
aggressive OISL organizing and propaganda campaigns to attract the one-
half of the labor force not now organized in any union, as well as some
now in CGIL; and a more favorable management attitude toward non-communist
labor would all strife major blows at the CGIL's power. These blows would
be even stronger if the CISL and UIL were to merge. Strengthening of the
democratic cooperative movement would effectively challenge the communists
in this field as well,
16. A number of vulnerabilities exist in the sphere of ideology and
public attitudes. The anti-national, foreign-dominated character of the
communist movement and its totalitarian implications in a country with
a fresh memory of Fascism expose it to propaganda attack and to the
possibilities of a revolt by the majority Socialist rank and file against
the captive leadership of Nenni, and further nationalist deviatiibns of the
Cucchi-Magnani type, Continued action such as the build-up of NATO
defense forces, progress toward European unity, and the strengthening of
the Atlantic Community will help to reduce communist influence by stimtt-
lating popular confidence, Individualistic conservative traditions of most
of the agricultural population impede consolidation of communist influence
in the agricultural communities,
17. Fullest exploitation of the above vulnerabilities can. be ob-
tained if basic improvement is begun concurrently in productivity, wages,
and labor-management relationso Such a program, if it can be launched with
broad labor and industrialist support, would strike at workers' grievances,,
thus reducing the force of the communist appeal and seriously embarrassing
the bomuaunists if, as their propaganda already indicates, they elect to
oppose it as they did the Marshall Plan,
kimiting Factors
18. The prospects for success in exploiting many of the above
vulnerabilities are limited by democratic organizations' lack of funds and
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by the heavy tactical dependence of the de Gasperi government on in-
fluential groups, many of them right-wing, to which it owes much for its
electoral victory of 194$. Faced at every turn with the necessity of
adjusting differences through the vehiclep' of compromise, the government
cannot politically ignore the real or imagined injury to vested interests
which many such groups would see in the courses of action mentioned above.
19. Some specifically anti-communist steps would disturb certain
industrial elements which find it profitable to maintain a modus vivendi
with CGIL trade unions. Efforts to consolidate and davop the free trade
unions and cooperative movements would arouse opposition from various
producer interests whose typical attitude toward organized labor is one
of general hostility. Finally, basic social and economic improvement
programs would inevitably meet with opposition from many industrial and
agricultural groups which have long felt, rightly or wrongly, that they
have most to lose by reform.
20. These considerations all point to a sensitive relationship between
the vigor and pace of all types of actions that may be taken to reduce
Italian communism, and the stability of a moderate Italian regime. While
radical actions would endanger certain vested interests supporting the
present government, the United States must consistently support social
and economic reforms which are essential to the development of a stable
Italy. It is equally essential that tb^ details of such measures and
programs should be of Italian conception and execution.
21. In pursuing measures directed toward basic social and economic
reform we must likewise bear in mind the possible long-range impact of such
measures on the trend of Italian foreign policy. If success in reform should
lead to a shift of the balance of political power in Italy in favor of
leftist elements, Italy's identification with the West in international
affairs may be much less dependable than that of the present government.
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