IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080053-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: April 18, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT: IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE
1. The Problem
1. To examine the value, content and our means for waging effective
ideoi.ogi.cal warfare against the world-wide Communist apparatus.
II. Definitions
2. a. Ideology The basic beliefs motivating a social system.
b. Ideological Warf'e; A planned attack against the basic ideology
of a hostile system.. (Should be conducted concurrently with a vigorous
effort to gain acceptance or tolerance of basic ideas of our own system.)
III. Analysis
3. There is general agreement that the ideological aspects of the current
conflict are extremely vital and that we have as yet done very little to de-
velop our on capabilities. The Soviets Wave been conducting for 30 years
a well planned campaign aimed at inspiring the world to win among our own sup-
c~ 25X1A
25X3Wrters new converts sapping the strength of opposition"
Thus far we have done little to defend against this ideological
invasion or to attack it at its source. One cannot fight an ideological war
without ideological tools. It is ideology which organizes harc'ess and unites
and gives directions about directives. Yet we are still badly confused about
the true nature of the communist menace, and many of our leaders differ about
the character of what we are fighting.
1.' Human activity follows this sequence: emotion, ideas, organization,
and action. In our struggle against the Soviets we have organized and acted
without developing a positive synthesis of our own ideas and without develop-
ing ideological. shells to disrupt the basic concepts of the enemy. Communism
everywhere tends to be guided by theory, whereas Americans tend to be oxtremely
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pragmatic rather than theoretical in their approaches to problems. It is for
this reason, perhaps, that we have overlooked the advantages that can accrue
from a well designed ideological campaign.
5. The Soviets, in contrast, have made ideology a prime weapon. The basic
25X1A
strategy of Communist ideological warfare, contends simple.
"They are throwing the book at us. Long ago they adopted the sound principle
that ephemeral types of propaganda, such as radio, pamphlets, newspapers, are
ineffective unless they are related to a philosophic frame of reference em-
bodied in a permanent literature. They have recognized that this literature
must be in book form, scholarly in tone, that it should refer constantly to
philosophy and history. . . By its very quantity, this permanent literature
creates the impression of validity and growing strength. By vigorous promo-
tion, it gains the glamour of inspiration and enthusiasm. A Soviet broadcast
may be pegged to the news, but it is intimately related to the basic philosophy
developed in the permanent literature of Communism. The fact that our radio
broadcasts are forced to reply to this without reference to any universally
available literature of our own, only adds to the significance of theirs. It
is proof to the world that we are on the ropes."
6. The shattering effect of the Titoist propaganda line is a good illus-
tration of Soviet vulnerability to ideological attack. What Tito has been
doing is to throw the original book back into the Kremlin, using all channels
including the Kremlin's own networks to get it across. There is a good deal
that can be learned from an analysis of Yugoslav propaganda beamed both at the
Kremlin and at the other Satellite parties in Eastern Europe. An indication
of the ideological inroads which the Titoist heresy has made in Eastern Europe
was the arrest of former Minister Clementis and other Communist leaders on
charges of trying to turn their country into "another Yugoslavia." Likewise,
the abortive split in the Italian Communist Party was primarily an example of
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ideological defection, and had there been a proper ideological base for the de-
fectors to go to, the chances of this split being magnified would have been
considerable. These examples indicate the necessity of giving proper place
and respect to the power of ideas in the current struggle. It has become com-
monplace to attribute only strategic and military significance to the Yugoslav
struggle against the Soviet leaders and to dismiss as unimportant the great
and profound struggle of ideas which has shaken the Communist world. Those
accustomed to guaging policies purely in terms of alliances and airplanes have
little stomach for what they believe to be a debate between the Yugoslav and
the Stalinist Communists.
7, In order to place the iddeological. weapon in proper focus, attention
should be paid to the high regard with which the Kremlin has always regarded
the ideological factor. To the Kremlin, the ideological theory behind an
event is a matter of vital concern --- as important in the.frauing of their
political decisions as a formula for designing a span is to a bridge designer.
The Soviet leaders never ignore theoretical principles. The following brief
quotations from Soviet publications illustrate the importance the Soviets at-
tach to the ideological foundations "The superiority of the Soviet krorld outlook
over the 'bourgeois world point of view is a manisfestation of the superiority
of Socialism over capitalism. The unfailing faith of the Soviet people in the
rightness of our great effort, in its final victory, comes for a correct, scien-
tific understanding of even-ts..... There can be no breathing space in ideolo-
gical warfare. On the ideological front we must and we shall fight not by
passive resistance but by an active and unceasing attack on our enemies; this
is what the Party of Lenin and Stalin teaches. This is in accordance with our
traditions.,. Let the enemy consider us nasty people. From the mouth of the
enemy this is praise.... In teaching and training youth, it must never be
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forgotten that every science and its teaching cannot be separated from the
policy of the Party, which forms the vital base of the Soviet regime... The
objectivism and apolitical character of the work of certain teachers must be
resolutely overcome. This first commandment of the Soviet teacher is to be
guided constantly in his teaching by the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of the
Party character of science and ideology, not forgetting for a moment Lenin's
statement that 'the school outside of life, outside of politics, is falsehood
and hypocrisy'."
8. The validity of their ideology is a matter of crucial importance to
the Soviet regime. In the first place, many of the top believers actually
believe in the basic theory, Some of them may be purely power seeking oppor-
tunists, but even these cloak their actions with moral justification derived
from their ideology. All of them are to a very large degree conditioned by
it, whether consciously or unconsciously. This more true of the Soviet elite
than it is of the mass of the Soviet population. Moreover, the Soviets are
stuck with it. The validity and justification of everything they do is tied
to an ideological foundation.
9. It is impossible to believe that the Soviet leadership would so severely
curtail the effectiveness of scientific research, which is vitally important to
their survival, unless they felt that maintenance of the validity of dialec-
tical materialism was of even more crucial importance to the regime. In none
of the basic theories of modern science -- those of natural scientists Newton,
Maxwell, Gibbs, Einstein, or Max Planck ... is matter exhibited as obeying the
dialectic. There is no question but that on this point, Communist theory is
unequivocally false. Yet unless this false concept of nature is insisted upon
as truth, one does not have the basic factor in Marxist philosophy; namely,
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dialectical Materialism. In these and Many other ways basic Communist theory
and various deductions from it can be shown to be false.
10. Any discussion of any part of the re;iue's basic theory will be of di-
rect interest to the Soviet elite and will affect them in Many ways. If the
ideological foundation can be shown to be false -- as it can be -- it will stimu-
late gailt complex among the Soviet leaders. It will create the impression
that the whole cruel fantastic experiment may have been in vain. A fundamental
tenet of Marxism is the historical inevitability of the dialectic process. For
this reason the validity of the concept must be maintained at all cost or other
wise all sorts of fears of failure will enter and undermine their faith in u.'L-
timate triumph.
11. Are we exploiting this ideological weapon? In fighting the cold war
we have carefully examined every single possible, available tool for coping
with the Soviets. We have tried agent operations into the Soviet and satellite
areas. We experimented tentatively with economic warfare and have done enough
in this field so that we know that the technique is difficult. The broad propa-
ganda offensives addressed to the mass of the Russian people have so far made
only a slight dent in the problem. The reason for these failures is that these
techniques of non-military warfare rely on our organizing entirely by ourselves
a communications system which will extend into the USSR. Unfortunately, the
Soviets have been able to prevent us from effectively doing this. It is neces-
sary to try to find a technique which will utilize, at least in part, their com-
munications net and their communications systems. The only technique of non-
violent warfare that we have not tried is the ideological tool which fortuitously
is the very one which does not demand that we organize a communications system.
With this technique our material will be picked up by the Soviets themselves,
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put in their channels and funneled to their collating machinery, which is proba-
bly located directly under the Party Central Committee. Their intelligence
net far exceeds ours in the number of collectors. But because they do not trust
their people they use few intelligence collators and these are located close to
the top Hence the ideological attack will be delivered where it counts}.
12. The implications of this analysis can be seen in a comparison of psy-
chological and ideological warfare. Psychological warfare must always concern
itself with concrete ev?nts and is therefore circumscribed by our lack of con-
crete intelligence and our media. We cannot, for example, promote friction be-
tween the factory foreman and one of the workers in some Russian city unless
we know all the internal details of the particular plant operations and have
some means of getting our message to the people in the plant.. But in the ideo-
logical field we can be certain that our message will always reach the heart
of the Soviet system. A discussion of Lenin's and Stalin's views on the na-
tionalist question, for example, or of Lenin's concept of the Communist state
operating without special apparatus for compulsion would certainly strike home.
In effect it does not matter what medium we use if we can be certain that they
will receive it. The gradual insertion of ideas designed to promote ultimate
doubt in the Communist elite as to the validity of their whole system can be
accomplished by a gradual process. Since in the ideological offensive we are
not trying to reach the masses, we can deal in abstractions. Why have they
veered so far from pure Leninism, for example? Such questions could be made
very disturbing to the elite and if raised and insisted upon could create pro-
found clevages.
13. Every society ultimately rests on a moral foundation. If this can be
undermined, the whole order will tumble. Beck and Godin's book,.RUSSIAN PURGE,
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vividly portrays the Russian fear that their "faith" in Communism may be faith
in a monster. "The loyal or 'convinced' Soviet citizen, as he calls himself,
may be dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hurt by it, but losing faith in it,
would mean losing faith in himself. In his faith lies his salvation. Every
Communist must sacrifice his conscience, his natural moral feelings, to the So-
viet ideal. What would become of a believer in Moloch who lost his faith In his
idol after sacrificing his only beloved son to it?"
14. Can we undermine Communist faith in their religion? According to
Truman Smith we can regard "the Cominform as the organized expression of the
'Communist religion.' This religious aspect of Communism has been generally
recognized by students of Marxist and Leninist theories. The fervor and fana-
ticism with which its adherents have propagated its doctrines, are strikingly
similar to the fervor and fanaticism with which the early followers of Mohammed
propagated Islam. History teaches us, however, that religions have an Achilles'
Heel. They are one and all subject to schism. Mohanmedism suffered severely
from the Shiah e hisu, Roman Catholicism from the Lutheran, Calvinist, and
Anglican schisms. Communism too has shown the same weakness. During the tht-.t,,
years which have passed since Lenin gained power in Russia, successive heresies
have developed within Communism: the Trotskyite, the Zinovief-Radek, and moot
recently, the Titoist. Though to date of these heresies only the Titoist has
made its effect in a power sense, there is no reason seen why it should be the
last of Communist heresies. Already we are hearing rumblings of a Nosaka heresy
in Japan which, indeed, may be but a double echo of a Mao schism with the Comiin-
form."
15. Our task is to deepen these ideological rifts within Communism, to
strengthen the heretical forces. The problem of attacking ideologically
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Communism at its world-wide ideological voice, the Com.inform, must be treated
differently within and outside the Soviet orbit. The difference in between
"contained" areas (the Soviet Empire) and the "free" areas. In the contained
or closed areas the masses are pinned down and our job is to free them. In the
free areas where the masses are on the move for reforms, good or bad, the Krem-
lin seeks to exploit them against us; our job is to channel their notions toward
us and against Bolshevism.
16. If we succeed in unchaining the masses of the Soviet Empire, history
will pronounce a death sentence on the Kremlin. On the other hand, "Bolshevism's'. '
ideological and organizational infiltration into the free or "open" world to
the extent that it weakens, neutralizes or paralyzes our efforts, weakens the
whole effort.
17. Ou7 zaemyzs strength is based on organized ideological warfare. The
l re (idealism) he holds forth is the abolition of all "eviLtii past and
present and the economic salvation of the "have note" and hence the salvation
of humanity as a whole. It is by "'ideology" based on material interest that
the masses are hooked onto his chariot and eventually led to disaster. "Il-
lusions are the children of our dreams," and civilizations from time immemorial
have built on great illusions, but never illusion, based on materialism. Rather
they were based on the inner urges which constitute the enobling elements of
man and make civilizations possible. Bolshevik ideology is inferior, and a
successful attack against it can soften up, disintegrate Bolshevik organization
-- the keystone of the whole enemy structure.
18. The ideological factor is the Achilles' Heel of Bolshevism, a system
put together to impose an artificial ideological pattern. Communism is vulner-
able to a counter-ideological attack because whe-tever moral sanction there is
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behind the "elite" of Bolshevism is based on ideology. The more we puncture
that ideology in the minds of men, the easier the rest of the job we have set
ourselves to do. If we do an effective ideological disintegration job, mu
that now looks forbidding may become easy.
IV. Possible Content of. Ideologic-1: WarfA.re.-
19. Our basic aim is to neutralize and ?rtralyze the effectiveness of Soviet
ideology without at the same time doing harm to our own. We should not release
ideological forces that might in the long run be destructive of our basic spiri-
tual and social concepts. This guiding principle implies that we should have
several ideological campaigns in process simultaneously with a varied treatment
given to each major offensive.
20. Against the Stalinists our ideological warfare should be entirely nega-
tive in aim, although not in character. We should hit the essential weaknesses
of their ideology; i.e. those aspects which are in contradiction to the very
deepest human desires and aspirations as demonstrated by their historical vali-
dity. Two chief forces that Soviet ideology has attempted to muzzle are: (a)
a belief in some sort of a Divine Being and hence a purposeful moral universe
beyond the material (the Soviets, system actually has a moral imperative, but
it is based on a material rather than a non-material foundation); and (b) the
Soviets have tried to throttle the basic and instinctive desire of human beings
to own property. It is this instinct which Lenin suggested the Communists had
to "beat to death."
21. John N. Hazard makes these two pertinent points about this latter as-
pect of Communist ideology:
The first, and most important, is that production can be maintained
at an adequate rate only if planned. Csnitalism is wasteful because of
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the duplication of effort.
b. The second basic tenet is that planning is impossible if property
is privately owned. Only after production is adeouate can there'be any
extension of individual freedom.
22. These so-called necessities of Communist ideology run counter to the
beliefs, sentiments and urges of the Russian people. These, in turn, are the
accummulated product of generations, if not centuries, and it takes equally
long to modify and uproot them. The basic craving and "belief" of the peasant
to have his own?land and work it in behalf of himself and his family cannot be
aAken by "decrees" no matter how "clever" they may be. Nor can his "belief"
in certain simple spiritual values which have been with him from the dim past
and which he associates with his other beliefs. To shake these beliefs, even a
little, the Bolsheviks would have to come forward with something demonstrably
superior. Mere words, no matter how "intellectual" could never do it. The
same thing in different degrees holds good even for Communists whose subconscioi
urges are in line with those of the masses and htence potential deserters from
Stalin's rue. Following their instinctive and ingrained "belief" the Russian,3
wont to "call their lives their own" and not the State's. The Russians, of
course, also want the tools that go with it, which we call "rights" ..- property,
etc. That does not mean that they want the old factory or land owners back.
Not at all, and we would make a capital mistake to in any way associate our
ideological attack with such notions. On the contrary, these ghosts of the
past must be laid to rest. Death, attrition and Communism have cleared the
tables for us. Hence the forces of today that must be encouraged, individually
and collectively, to own and possess what has been created.
23. What have we in mounting an ideological counter-warfare to offer to
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the peoples of Russia? To the peasants; and most of Stalin's armies are peas-
ants, it is "land and freedom.," To the populations of the cities, who make up
the leadership of those armies and the workers, managers, etc., we offer
"ownership` of the enterprises and freedom. To the individual, every individuw
we offer the freedom and security which have been part of us since time immr-
morial. In short, against the fake Communist concept of "ownership by the ,:c-
ple" we offer real ownership and all that this entails.
24. Ideological Justification for Titoism.
a. The purpose of this struggle is to win Coinaunists from Stalin.
The Communist ideology has three basic branches, two of which have a cub-
stantial theoretical justification. One is Lenin-Stalinism., which contendE
that a historical spread of Communism throughout the world is inevitable,
but that the spread depends upon the effective development of the'USSR as
a base for expansion. Trotskyism asserts that a world-wide revoluti,nary
condition is an essential prerequisite for the complete enthronement of
Communism. The Trotakyites cottend that real Communism is not possible
unless this world revolution takes place.
b. The Titoists, on the other hand, contend -- or appear to contend
that Communism within a given country is possible without either a world.
wide revolution or subservience of that country to Moscow. Theoretically,
Justification for this should have two aims: (1) the encouragement of in-
dependence on the part of the satellite and Chinese Communists from Moscow;
and (2) the severance of the Communist Parties in Western Europe and other
regions from Moscow. There are Yugoslav developments such as experiments
with a quasi-free structure that lend themselves to ideological justifica-
tion,
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25. A third major target is the European Marxists who believe that Social-
ism is attainable through legal methods. They are generally hostile toward
any system of cooperative, free enterprise. In the long run the victory for
this concept in Western Europe might be detrimental to the United States.
Therefore, the task in this area is to show the growing social nature of regu.
lated free enterprise, demonstrating simultaneously the need for rigid Marxict
Socialism to accept a greater degree of privately sponsored productivity.
26. A fourth area of concern is the Middle East and Southeastern Asia,
which at the present time is neither Marxist nor capitalist, although the
Marxists may have their foot in the intellectual door more than we do. For
tlds area we should develop an ideology based on a variation of a communal,
cooperative society in which private enterprise, from the very moment of its
development, has cooperative ownership and is designed lens for me,,ximum profit
than it is for maximum service.
27: Finally, there should be an ideological recapitulation designed to put
in the best possible light the American System, 1952. We are still having to
suffer for the sine of 1850 Capitalism in England, when in reality our system
bears little or no resemblance to the laissez-faire capitalism condemned by Mar.
28. These various ideological weapons should be produced in complete syn-
thesis no that they could be put sid.~ by side and that the net result of all
of them taken together would be to strengthen our society, the American posi-
tion throughout the world, and weaken that of the Soviets. As a possible means
of satisfying this content, attention is directed to Tab A.
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FIVE IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS
The following books might be devkioped as our principle ideological tools
1. A firm, well defined ideology is reruired which must be Messianic and
scientific at the same time -- not purely nationalistic. It is a worid-embraci
ideology we are fighting and not a regional phenomenon. To solve this problem,
a book 500-800 pages, revalidating theoretically the major principles of free
society, must be produced. It must be a book of substance, addressed to the
thinking elements -- not to the masses and while upholding the principles
upon which our society is based, be critical of its faults.
2. Another book based on the broad premises of the first one should ad-
dress itself to the problems of the Russian System, specifically analyze the
inferiority of the system as compared with one based on freedom of the indivi-
dual. The inevitability of its failure and the necessity of its overthrow be-
fore millions more perish and life is reduced to more and more slavery, torment
and hunger.
3. Book No. 3 should address itself to the Problems of Asia, which are
distinct and call for separate treatment -- book No. 3 being based on books 1
and 2.
4. Book No. 4 should address itself to the Problems of the Near and
Book No. 5 should address itself to the Problems of Europe.
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