OUTLINE OF MEANS PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 15, 1952
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS
Priority and Desirability
AnnED. I,. Points of Conflict
Mime.- 2 ; Vw,i rabiii.ties
6 869/2 Series B
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DRAFT #4
BOAC i O P LOP g OF A,
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
(Means Paper)
j : This. is the second of three papers which deals with an
approach toward the development of a national psychological
strategy with principal emphasis on an appraisal of the most
effective means (courses of action).
1. THE PROBLEM
To determine and evaluate the most effective courses of action the
U. S. Government could rntrsue, unilaterally or with its allies, to achieve
the reduction of Soviet power and to foster a stronger orientation of the
free world toward the U.. S.
II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
From a CIA/ope point of view with respect to desirability and priority.,
the courses of action listed should bet
A. Initiated or implemented within the near-term future (by
the and of 1953); and
B. Considered as the type of actions which will have the
greatest impact toward advancement of our national objecttives,
irrespective of existing capabilities or policy problems,,
In. am~mRAL 1u1ALyS
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DRAFT #4
III. GETS LIIALYS34
CIA/opa has approached the problem of selecting actions which would
be most effective in a national strategy by placing Principal emphasis on
those efforts which will give the greatest support to the attainment of
U. S. objectives. The range of choice has been narrowed to those major
efforts for which coordination of overt rnd covert measures of the U. S.
Government can best be achieved. One failing in our covert effort to date
has been the inability to concentrate limited resources on priority actions
and our failure to prevent a wide dissipation of swnh. resources. (trained
personnel., money, and materials). Necessity initially required the adop-
tion of a,containment policy to counter the Soviet threat. We need now
to proceed to undertakings that will permit us to be responsive to NSG 6$,
which envisions the wresting of the initiative from the Soviet Union.
The continuing buildup of strength is a pro-requisite to the achieve-
ment of our principal objective, national security, and to the establishment
.of a durable world order to keep the peace. issential, therefore, to the
undertaking of a national strategic plan is a reaffirmed declaration to
free and subjected peoples of our principles and purposes. It must have
as strong and ringing an appeal as the "four freedous,'r and be understand.-
able in the terms of aspirations of individual human beings living under
many circumstances.
The courses. of action discussed in this paper are placed generally in
a group category of the USSR, the Soviet Orbit, the Free World, and the Far
East, rather than discussed as a geographical complex or individual country.
The paper has intentionally avoided discussion of courses of action for
p Southeast Asia
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DRAFT >#4
Southeast Asia or the Ilddle East, since these are parts of a separate panel
study of the Psychological Strategy Board and are considered primarily areas
of holding action rather than areas of offensive action. Certain of the
The means selected were those which would. fill. gaps in our present
foreign program and could become the strong supports of a revitalized national
strategy. Due regard must be paid to the practicality of keeping our actions
within feasible limits and as consistent as possible with the interests,
influence, and objectives and capabilities of our major allies. Desirable
as it may seem to capture nationalism for Western ends, practical considera-
tions make this goal problematical for the imr diate future.
The liberation of the Russian people is not considered to be a feasible
undertaking for the next several years. The chances of effecting the
detaob ent of one or more of the satellites is regarded as more feasible,
but barring
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but barring developments not presently foreseen,, this is not considered a
likely near-term possibility. If the successful integration of Germany
into a Western European organization can be achieved, some basis may exist
for the ultimate evolution of a Eastern European political and economic
federation which would not fear the resurgence of a militaristic Germany
on one side, and, at the same time, maintain a compatible relationship
with the Soviet Union on the other side.
Our principal actions, therefore should be the continued build-up
of strength and the application of increasing psychological pressures
against critical targets or areas where dividends are foreseeable.
It should be recognized that it is difficult, at best, to estimate
the effectiveness of isolated covert actions without knowing the over-all
framework into which they might fit and the amount of mutually related
overt effort that will be applied to the same general target.
Although not germane to the immediate problem, we need to take prepa-
ratory actions ahead of time to establish our influence in areas of future
contention. Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent are areas
which should be considered in a long-range strategic plan, rather than wait
for developments which would require us to take hasty or opportunistic
actions.
Just as the destruction of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese imperialism
were the objectives of 1 orld War II,, and the elimination of Kremlin-directed
Comn,misra is the objective of the current cold war,, we must be prepared to
forestall and prevent nascent racism from being the issue of struggle for
future generations. With perspicacity and understanding, we should Jay
the groundwork now which will prevent the issue of racism succeeding the
current ideological struggle.
Accepting the philosophy,,
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DFUM #4
Accepting the philosophy, therefore, that the struggle for world
power will extend over the next. ten to twenty years, it behooves us to
lay the foundations of a strategy which will be most rewarding to us at
the time the Communist vs. Free World struggle reaches its climax.
,W. PROPOSED GOURSES
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security Ir crrrn.tion
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B. (USSR) Inten a_f- t hea ycarli restrictive and embargp
;ri,10ns laid, or, Easter :rest trade to reduce the rr potential of the US M
25X1 its Satellites,
1, PrinciPal Advantaves:
a. Limits consolidation of an economy not fully recovered
from ;:iorld War I1,
b. ?lakes available to the free world, arterials which might
otherwise be diverted to the Soviet bloc.
c. Develops economic strength of free world,
d? After establishing sufficient control of economic fences
between the ':est and East, it may be possible to negotiate economic
adjustments between the power blocs favorable to the 'Vest, area
by area., as opportunity arises.
2, , ...-.ltyZ Faac :
a. In the international community of NATO, it causes economic
and political stresses and strains.
bo Deprives certain NATO countries of markets ane -supplies?
25X1(.;eraby causin internal instability,
30,_eas&bili.t rA M h :s s
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Feasibility, jakhMk, and Pace:
Economic factors and conditions play a vital role in world
affairs and are a strong support pillar of politics. The shrinkage
of. the free circulation of goods - t hrough economic blocka4e, rigidly
enforced and subscribed to, is an intangible power factor and element
of pressure which may modify the hitherto intransigent attitude and
position of the Soviet Unions Its effetct can be gauged to date by
the Soviet reactions, which include their efforts to ameliorate this
pinch through such devices as the Uoscoww Ecomomic Conference,
The basis for extension of economic blockade exist in the form
of current prohibitive international lists I, II, and III, *ich have
been successful in reducing the Soviet r 'otential ;nw increasing
the economic and political difficulties of the satellite .retri,: os.
Increased pressures in concert and agreement with our allies should
further reduce the flow, of essential goods and commodities,
Consistent with policy determinations and the adoption of cen-
tralizedguidance, the emphasis should be placed on unexploited
economic warfare techniques, more precise selectivity of targets,
and methods with an emphasis expanded on covert methods.
For the balance of 1952, the preliminary arrangements for
applying maximum pressures against the Soviets and satellites in the
st .n cf 1252 should be made a priority target o
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MF ~FtEET '" DRAFT #4
SECURITY INFORMATION
D. (SOVIET ORBIT) Undertake to accelerate the economic deterioration o
satellite countries, and especially Czechoslovak.ia9 in order to reduce their
usefull!ness to the economy of the USSR and the Soviet orbit,. and to create
ir.e.~ rr.wr .sr ^u.ar~y
conditions which result in political defection of individuals and ossib
even governments.
1. Principal Advantsep
a. Preakdown industrial potential.
b. Deprives USSR of. military and economic supplies.
c. Bolsters the morale o' the anti-Communist'Czechs and
Slovaks by ;'.vin them something useful to do in behalf of their
liberation.,
d. Disrupts the Communist hierarchy with purges and executions..
e. Defects or undermines key personalities, including scientists
technicians and managerial talent.
2. Limiting Factors:
a. Requires some agreement and action by pro Western powers. -
b. Limited accessibility to area,
c. Degree of Soviet integration into its own economic structure.
Jeasibillty? _Ihphasis, and Pace:
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S j URT Y IPdFORMATION
Czechoslovakia is economically the most vulnerable member of the
Soviet orbit,
There have beon recent indications that Czechoslovakia is ex-
poriencin~ difficulty in neotin,- quota recuiraonts and the pre-
conditions oxist for economic penetration and divorsions3 The
industrial potential of this country is of key importance to the
2 t war potentialQ Failure to contribute more to the Soviet
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DRA"
#
Ie (Fra World) Reco sir the evolving status of India and
P tan in morld a a f f ,rs u r t a k a a ste wh ch will load io the
orshi~ trt ptt~graam~ dsdl to atrehen their orientation toward
2 5 -
Q P .xacipaal Advaantaa ;ee;
a.. Contribute to the political stability of tbo arae
(Trams Ir inesiaag etc,,) and decrease soc.l discontents
b, Red time effectiveness of Co=Lnitst propaganda in
an area of social and political iraatabi1ityo
c? Stan the advance of Communism.
do Strengthen the Asiatic bloc of nations opposed to
Co unist aggression.
e a Add Indians manpower potential to boMxter the defence
of Asia.
to ' Show tdo So interest in the well-being of Indian peoples
25X1 Cg, Assure Pakistani influence in the Moalom world.
Li~ L-na Factors s
b?
AntaMnism toward Western influerxeo
Unpredictable qualities of political leadership.
Lack of strongly established political,, economic,
and sociaal bases a
dt, Conflict of int reste bet en India ani Pakistan
over Kashmir and other matters,
er 1bj =
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DRAFT #4
Ourr program for the sub Conti nt should be initiated
now and phased over a ton -year cycle. Vast expenditures of womy
are to be avoided and the evolving status of India continually
evaluated to prevent India fma becoming a maw of U, S, intervention,
There is reason to believe that Pakistan can be dov loped
into an anti c to pro-U.S. stronghold. Occupying a key position
in the Moslem world, an well as an t strategic position,
PaUstan should not be overlooked
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J. (Free World)
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DRAFT #4
L. (Far East) gnpMrI the Do ti and economic dev o n of
Sagan as an anti-Comrin,nist stro hold inthe Far East thro hind enous
o s
1. Ps?inci a3 1,dvantaF;ese
a. Positive programs for economic opportunity, equitable.
compensation, and individual development within the country will
?
develop an economically stable and self-reliant country
b. Government leaders could take necessary measures to
strengthen their financial positions, increase productivity,
and assist other members of free Asia toward industrial
rehabilitation,
a. Assists free world by cooperating in international
trade in the allocation of strategic materials, in supporting
trade measures against the Soviet bloc, and forming a solid
economic front against Comnunism,
d. Afford a means of supplying free Asia with the neces-
25 armamnts to build up their defensive capabilities,
2. .___ti n dgtorss
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DRAFT #4
In view of world economic conditions favorable to the develop,
went of Asian markets., such a plan should be developed in 1952 and inaugu-
rated in 1953.
M. (Far East)
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DRAFT #14
ANTWEX 1
SP"EIFlC ISSUES OF CONFLICT
1. Refusal to abide by accepted principles of international law
or treaties.
2. Military threat to the peace and security of the world.
3. Vilification of the United States.
. Fraudulent participation and disregard of obligations in the
United Nations.
5. - Retention of large blocks of World War II prisoners of war,,
6. Failure to negotiate and agree to Japanese, Austrian, and
German reasonable peace treaties.
7. Establishment and support of a Nbscow dominated cormmist apparatus
in the free world.
SA Harassment of the free world by unconventional methods.
9. Refusal to agree to any effective control of conventional arena.
nts or atomic energy.
Sow Q : (European Satellites)
1. Integration of satellite countries into the Soviet political
system accomplished by a calculated disregard of national and human rights.
2. Isolation of satellite peoples from contact with the free wor^ld,
3. Build-up of satellite conventional and unconventional military
'forces for aggession?
4. Disregard of
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1+. Disregard of international law and flagrant violation of existing
Balkan peace treaties.
5. Fraudulent participation and disregard of obligations in the
United Nations
Soviet Orbit (China):
1. Liquidation of the West's position in Chin.,
2. Illegal subversive methods and military aggression, which threaten
peace and security of the Far East.
3. Sovereignty encroachnts.
4. Peiping.4'oscow alliance.
5. United 11ations membership for Communist China and conflicts between
de Jura and de facto Chinese governments.
N ra.ls:
1. Yon-appreciation of the militant cost threat and failure to
align themselves with the free world.
2. Failure to take positive steps to eliminate disruptive internal
comrlunist threats.
3. Direct exploitation of East-West differences to their own
advantage.
Confl.iotq WOI. :
1. Divergencies with respect to foreign policy concepts as they
pertain to the Far East, the Riddle East, East-West trade, European unity,
peace treaties, colonialism, and rearmament.
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DR';FT .14,
2. Failure to take stringent steps toward reduction of the influence
of indigenous Con nist Parties.
AIR 2
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DRAFT #4
AIM EX 2
PRf3CIPAL 2001 UNIST VULIERABILITIES
A'. Ideol 2eiga7 a
1. Atheism - Anti..S mitism
2. Disregard for the dignity of the individual.
a. Slave labor.
b. Treatment of political prisoners.
C. IJnreturned war prisoners.
d. Censorship,
3. Contradictions in Communist theories and practices,,.
13. Pol.itigal s
1. treme centralization of political acontroi,
2. Necessity of political. conformity.
3. Communist Party "elite," and frustration of potential now
leaders.
4.. Variable policies toward subject nationalities and minorities,
a> Soviet bloc representatives exposed to Western influences,
C.
Economic a
i. A planned econorw which restricts the capacity to meet changing
conditions, limits productivity, distribution and efficiency; and fails
to exploit the impetus of the profit motive. Certain manifestations of
this planned econoo are collectivization of farms and regimentation
of labor.
2. Certain critical
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DRt `T 1/4
2. Certain critical shortages of strategic materials and skilled
labor and lack of basic facilities such as internal transpo:itation ard
a merchant marine.
3. Certain areas within and without the bloc which are susceptible
to Western penetration and conversion through U. S. technical "know
how" and trade.
4. Potential popular dissatisfaction with shortage of consumnr
goods.
5. Economic strains between Russia and the Satellites,
D. III itarX.-
1. Political influence on military strategy and tactics and
periodical rrwgcs of military leaders,
2. Nationalistic, rather than political, motivation of the mili-
tary.
3. USSR occupation forces,
4. Lines of communication.
En Cut uara1. and Scientific:
1, Subservience of arts and scienrnces to Communist control.
3.
Uncertainty of the entire cultural and scientific base.
Shortage of scientists and technicians.
F. Soaiolaie. s
1. Social status of women,
2. Continuing lack of progress of the individuals life,
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