U.S. CAPABILITIES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100160010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 3, 1952
• Content Type: MISC

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3 March 1952
U.S. Capabilities in Southeast Europe
1. The Problem
a. To examine U.S. capabilities in southeast Europe which affect
1J.S. cold war strategy in that area.
b. To determine, concisely and objectively, the principal factors
at work in southeast Europe so far as they contribute to the formulation
of an integrated U.S. global cold war strategy.
c. To determine priority courses of action with respect to the
area as part of a general approach to the development of a national strategy.
II. Basic Assumption
The Kremlin, without recourse to general war for the next five years,
will seek by all available means to consolidate and improve its position
in the Balkan Peninsula and, through vigorous development of the cold war,
to extend its control over the entire area.
III. Conclusions
a. An examination of prevailing conditions in the area which favor
the consolidation and strengthening of Soviet power reveals that the
relative position of the USSR has improved more rapidly and effectively
than was formerly thought possible.
b. On the other hand, all cf the factors favoring the Soviet position
in the area have their counterpart in weakness, a fact which is impeding
the achievement of Soviet aims. These weaknesses are susceptible of more
effective exploitation through intensive application of Western capabilities
for cold war activity.
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c. Sufficient assets are in being and currently in process of develop-
ment to permit the intensification of cold war activity during 1952
and 1953?
d. U.S. capabilities for conducting intensified cold war activity
would be greatly enhanced, by the improved coordination and integration
of such activity with a view to obtaining maximum effect.
IV. Discussion
1. (Isolate and define the major issues of conflict between the Soviet
Bloc and "The West" in southeastern Europe.)
The USSR, despite its claims that it would not interfere in the
internal affairs of its neighbors and was interested only in having "friendly"
governments along its borders, has subjugated and modified beyond recognition
the countries under its control. The integration of the Balkan satellites
into the Soviet Orbit has been accomplished with calculated disregard of
all national and human rights, by a process of accelerated denationalization
and the brutal transformation of their political, social and economic orders.
Wiestern efforts to check the imposition of Soviet control through diplomatic
action have proved futile. This in turn has raised the question of what
courses of action should be undertaken by the West, short of war, to prevent
the complete absorption of these countries and counter Soviet capabilities
for aggressive action based on its satellites. The latters' rising potential
for aggression against adjacent non-Communist areas of strategic importance
to the 'West increases substantially Western interest in the area. The
Western position in the Eastern Mediterranean is such, however, as to be
able in turn to apply increasing pressure against the Balkan outpost of
Soviet power. As a result of this conflict, the following developments have
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oc urred wh' a e t bot nd
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a. Non-concurrence of the West in the legality of the Soviet position
in the Satellites, or the legitimacy of their Communist regimes.
b. Soviet efforts at total elimination of Western influence in the
area.
c. Direct Communist aggression in Greece, which retained its
independence only through U.S. military and economic support.
d. Western economic and military aid to dissident Yugoslavia, with
an implicit encouragement of national Communism as a counter to Soviet-
dominated Communism.
e. East rdest propaganda offensives.
f. Infiltration of agents and increasing subversive efforts by both
East and West.
g. Economic warfare, manifested in the Western denial of critical
goods to the eastern satellites and in the Soviet economic blockade of
Yugoslavia.
h. The Soviet military buildup in the satellites and the corresponding
U.S. military buildup of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, with the inclusion
of Greece and Turkey in NATO.
2. (List, in order of their importance, the prevailing conditions which
tend to improve the Soviet's position with respect to these issues.)
With respect to the above issues, the Soviet position in southeast Europe
has steadily improved, but with two outstanding exceptions, namely Greece
and Yugoslavia. In both these countries, however, there exist exploitable
elements of weakness. The following factors are significant in evaluating
this overall improvement of the Soviet position in the Balkans:
a. Jlithin the Orbit (Albania, aulgaria and Rumania)
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underground and is considered virtually impotent under existing
conditions. There is, moreover, no unified national political
organization in exile which can now satisfactorily compensate for
and fill this void. Political control within the satellites is
entirely equated with the security control exercised through the
repressive organs of the Ministries of the Interior.
(2) Social - The populations have been reduced wholly to dependence
upon conformity and obedience in order to survive. The liquidation or
neutralization of social elements capable of resisting the regimes has
already been effected to a large degree. The denationalization of
each satellite, and its reorientation toward soviet patterns has been
accompanied by a progressive elimination or containment of 'Western
influences. The entire social process is directed toward the creation
of "new people" whose advancement is due solely to the existence of
so-called Popular Democracies which owe their existence to the Soviet
Union.
(3) Economic - The Communist regimes of the satellites are in a
position to enforce compliance with their programs and procedure.
Complete control of the distribution system has ensured the economic
bondage of all categories of workers. Ruthless eyploitation of the
labor force enables the Communist regimes to maintain relatively high
productivity and in fact to increase it in the case of specific key
items. The extent and efficiency of security controls also permits
almost total indifference to the consumer needs of the population and
allows the siphoning off of large surplusses of agricultural, industrial
and raw material production to bolster the overall economic potential
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of the USSR. The economic activity of the satellites must be
considered to be on a war-footing, and increasingly integrated
with that of the USSR.
(4) Psychological - The helplessness of the satellite peoples
to resist the daily pressures of the Communist regimes steadily
increases their pliability and reduces their capabilities for moral
as well as active resistance. To them it appears that no alternative
to submission to Communism is in sight, as hope in an early war of
liberation between Jest and East is being steadily dissipated.
Through daily manipulation of all outlets of propaganda and indoc-
trination, the Kr mlin is able to befog basic issues, exploit national
or religious sentiment when desired, and create an illusion of
dependence on the USSR for protection against "predatory" and
imperialistic western countries. Lack of contact with the West, more-
over, promotes popular acceptance of a belief in Soviet preponderance
,over the Wiestern Powers. In addition to the negative pressures of
fear and coercion, the Communists fully exploit feelings of social
solidarity based on mass displays of strength. Opportunistic
desires for self-advancement in an apparently irresistible movement
are encouraged. Special incentives, training and treatment for the
young ensure constantly growing reserves of "new" people who have no
ties with the past or the outside world, and owe their position entirely
to their loyalty and service to the regime.
b. Greece
(1) Political - The Greek Communists have succeeded to some
extent in reorganizing their underground apparatus after their defeat
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in 1949. Despite the strong anti-Communist sentiments of the
Greek people, there exists considerable opportunity for political
maneuvering among large segments of the population, which is
frequently unable to distinguish between legitimate progressives and
crypto-Communists. The task of the Greek Communists is facilitated
by endemic weaknesses in the central government.
(2) Social - Fundamental social inequalities coupled with
evidence of corruption and political ineptitude on the part of many
of the political leaders tend to nurture the resentments of the laboring
classes and increase their susceptibility to Communist manipulation
and penetration.
(3) Economic - In spite of considerable progress in the recon-
struction of Greece after the devastation of the war and postwax period,
the living standards of the Greek people are precariously low. The
deficit economy of the country, still requiring significant outside aid,
is aggravated by the government's failures to follow through with
positive economic programs. Increased defense requirements are met
by reductions in economic aid, and unless available funds are efficient
handled, some increase in popular disaffection over lowered living
standards is likely to facilitate greater political inroads by the
Greek Communists.
(4) Psychological - Greek morale has suffered as a consequence
of continued difficult living conditions and lack of any firm
confidence in the Athens Government. Recurring crises and a general
spirit of war-fatigue increase the apathy of large sectors of the
population. The disaffection of both peasants and workers, although
latent in its manifestations, is extensive and provides a fertile,
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terrain for recruitment and exploitation by the underground
Communist organization.
c. Yugoslavia
(1) Political - Despite a highly efficient Yugoslav security
system, the Soviets have been able to organize and carry on clandestine
activity within the country. Both the Yugoslav Communist Party and
anti-Communist opponents of the regime are susceptible to such activity.
Much confusion undoubtedly exists within the political hierarchy of
the regime with respect to Tito's progressive orientation toward the
West. The Kremlin probabl=y has potentially important assets among
the numerous elements of the party who owe their position solely to
their party affiliation. This position is under increasing threat
as Western influences penetrate the country and give scope to expression
from the anti-Communist population of Yugoslavia. Any effort by the
regime to win greater popular support at the expense of party
prerogatives thus raises the question of alienating influential
segments in the hierarchy. In addition, convinced Communists in
the regime are vulnerable to ideological arguments that Tito has split
the international Communist movement and abandoned its principles.
(2) Social - The Yugoslav mosaic contains other serious elements
of exploitable weakness. The latent but bitter feud between Croats
and Serbs, the centrifugal tendencies of ,all national minorities
deriving from profound religious, political and cultural differences,
and the traditional antagonism between rural and urban interests
must be considered potential assets of the Kremlin, even though
diametrically opposed to Communism per se.
(3) Economic - The precarious condition of the Yugoslav economy
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resulting from the continued overemphasis on capital investment
to the detriment of overall economic equilibrium creates a situation
of considerable internal weakness.
(4) Psychological - Both the inner-party divisions suggested
above and the split between the regime and the overwhelming majority
of the people create an atmosphere of latent internal conflict
which directly affects the unity of the nation andiits capacity to
resist in a period. of crises.
3. (Conversely, list those conditions prevailing in your area which
significantly impede or menace the Soviet program).
All of the above factors of Soviet strength have their counterpart
in weakness. Moreover, although the two anti-Soviet countries in the
Balkans also have numerous elements of weakness exploitable by the Kremlin,
both are bulwarks of the destern position in the area and are capable of
being strengthened steadily through wise application of `e stern power. A
review of conditions impeding or blocking the achievement of Soviet aims
in the area reveals the following:
a. ; ithin the Orbit
(1) Political - The Communist facade of total control has
been hastily constructed out of elements which leave much to be
desired from the standpoint of reliability or endurance under
serious stress. The,:,satellite Communist parties, despite their
surface subservience to Moscow, are a composite of elements ranging
from a relatively few hardcore doctrinaires to the large mass
of opportunists whose final and complete commitment to the regime is
improbable. Except for Bulgaria, which has a sizable rewar Communist
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party, neither Rumania nor. Albania could count more than a few
hundred convinced Communists at most, until the Communist
seizure of power led to a vast mushrooming in party strength.
The Communist political machine, however, has tended more and
more to divorce itself from the people, whose antagonism is
kept alive through the relentless imposition of Communist programs
and procedures. In carrying out their programs, the regimes have had
to contend with this popular reaction and as a result frequently have
been forced into temporary retreats on ideological and economic sectors
considered vital in Communist doctrine. Failure to perform according
to schedule has had serious repercussions on the party structure,
leading periodically to the purging of the top echelon. The cohesion
of the Communist parties in the satellites is apparently becoming to
an ever greater degree a matter of immediate self-interest, cemented
by fear of deviation or failure and therefore essentially lacking in
idealism or political conviction.
(2) Social - The national differences between the Balkan peoples
and the USSR are varied and deepseated. The process of remoulding
these populations into the rigid patterns of Soviet culture is unpre-
cedented, and although the Communist approach is to maintain a fiction
of national and cultural autonomy, the Balkan peoples have few
illusions that.they are anything except satrapies of the Soviet Union.
Such tenacious Balkan traditions as the family group or the Albanian
clan system are likely to remain bulwarks of national resistance
despite all efforts to undermine and abolish them.
(3) : _conomic - The basic economic strength of both Rumania and Bulgaria
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is probably lower now than in prewar days, even thourrh some types
of production have increased. As a self-contained entity, more or
less cut off from exchanges with the western industrial plant, the
orbit is forced to develop its economic potential through overconcen-
tration on a few vital sectors and the use of inferior equipment
on others. The effects of violent integration of the southeastern
Europe satellites into an orbit-wide complex, which disrupted the
normal economic activity of the area and transformed the satellite
countries into colonies of the USSR, are, however, being overcome
to an increasing degree.
(4) Psychological - The virulence of latent nationalistic
antagonism in the Balkan countries imposes a need on the part of the
Soviets for maintaining a constant defense against potential national
deviationism, not only in the case of the hostile populations but that
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the parties as well. This problem cannot be overcome in the near
future. =ath.ough Communist brutality has to a large extent cowed
and depressed the satellite peoples, the methods whereby this apparently
favorable result was accomplished has in fact rendered the regimes even
more odious in the eyes of the majority. Despite Soviet efforts to
exploit the fear of Western aggression in the minds of the captive
peoples, these efforts are to a noteworthy degree nullified by popular
hopes of a liberating war. So long, moreover, as the western message
reaches the satellite peoples, there will exist an alternative to
Sovietism to which neither the people nor their leaders can remain
totally indifferent. Even the Communist effort to besmirch the dest
through daily propaganda is still, in its own way,, a reminder that
the Western alternative exists. The feeling of hoe is also
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tenacious; in spite of their apparent resignation and discouragement,
the Balkan peoples react strongly to manifestations of Western
strength and determination, as exemplified by the Korean war.
b. Greece
(1) Political - The U.S. position in Greece is probably the
most important single factor of political stability in the country
and one which the Communists are by and large unable to undermine.
Recognition of this role by all shades of political opinion except
the extreme left has overshadowed the vacillations of innumerable
coalition governments and has led to a willing acceptance on the part
of the political leaders of U.S. guidance and aid. This feeling is
reciprocated by the people, who support the government in its effort
to strengthen the national defense against Communism and, despite
the existence of great economic and social inejualities, turn instinctively
away from the left in their search for internal stability. More-
over, in seeking to bolster Greece's exposed position against Communist
aggression, the Greek leaders have subordinated old animosities with
respect to Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia to more basic problems of
national self-interest. This is also true of other issues tending
to plague Greece's relations with the anti-Stalinist world, particularly
in connection with the British position in Cyprus and Greek ambitions
to incorporate the Northern Epirus.
(2) Economic - The U.S. economic aid program to reconstruct and
develop Greece, while it has not solved the country's endemic economic
problems, has succeeded in providing a hopeful alternative to
Communization. Although the amount of aid allocated to economic
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has been accomplished in restoring communications and basic industries,
combatting unemployment, developing housing programs, and maintaining
the economic equilibrium of Greece.
(3) Social - The social organization of Greece, with its highly
centralized government in Athens and well integrated police and
local governing units, affords considerable protection against the
development of Communist activity in the country, permitting intensive
repression of the movement whenever this becomes imperative. The
Greek nation is a generally homogenous race with distinct national
characteristics of its own, differentiating it in many ways from
its neighbors.
(!,.) Psychological - A major obstacle to Soviet plans in Greece
lies in the intense nationalism of the Greek people, their pride in
their military exploits, and in their sentiment that they represent
a vital outpost of the Wiest. Greece's traditional ties with England,
France and more recently with the C.~= . are such that Soviet-Communist
propaganda is of little effect in issues of basic importance. In
spite of their vulnerable position on the periphery of the ,Soviet
Balkan satellites, the Greeks have maintained a high degree of
courage, reaching at times boldness. The fact that Communism is now
identified in their eyes with hereditary enemies unifies and strengthens
their will to resist. Moreover, their experience with Communist
atrocities during the Civil ttiar has built up a profound popular ontipathyr
toward the movement as an instrument of alien aggression.
c. Yugoslavia
(1) rclitical - The Titoist political machine, in spite of or
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has as tight a hold over the country as any of the Communist regimes in
the orbit, Quite apart from ideological considerations, the top
leadership of of the Eelgrade government has evinced a relatively high
degree of competence in a complex situation, It has, moreover, at
its disposal a disciplined and apparently well-integrated political
apparatus obedient to the central direction of the Party. The gremlin's
failure in 19L18 to coerce the Yugoslav Communist Party into repudiation
of the Titoist leadership underlined the essentially national character
of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia and the fact that the postwar
party is, in its majority, a Titoist creation. Under present circumstances,
it is unlikely that the regime can be overthrown by purely internal
subversion.
(2) Economic - Without significant economic aid from the 4y st,
Yugoslavia would not have been able to overcome the effects of the
Cominform economic blockade which began in mid-19i.9. As a result
of such aid, however, Yugoslavia is in a position to maintain itself
independently of Eastern Europe and can look forward to a greater
degree of economic development than would have been possible with
Soviet aid along. Further economic warfare measures by the orbit
have lost their significance as a weapon against Tito, and as a result of
continued riestern aid, some amelioration of Yugoslav living standards is
likely to.occur .
(3) Social - The Communist structure of Yugoslavia, despite
serious inherent weaknesses deriving from the hostility of the people,
has the cohesion and impenetrability of the police state. The Party
unity of doctrine, training and loyalty, even though open to question
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on many counts, operates to hold together the disparate elements
in the Yugoslav Federation, which have been traditionally in conflict
and separatist by preference. Although some areas of Yugoslavia, notably
Serbia and Montenegro, have had in the past strongly developed pan-
Slavic sentiments and an attachment for Russia, other important regions
of the country have been strongly influenced by western European
civilization, especially Slovenia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. The majority
of the Yugoslav people, whatever their regional or cultural differences,
are so opposed to the Communist system that any Cominform appeal to
the people on this basis is foredoomed to failure.
(4) P chological - As evidence of J.S. "assistance to Yugoslavia
multiplies in the country, the people's former feeling of isolation
and vulnerability to Soviet attack appears to be diminishing. The
population, certainly, has been encouraged by the growing ties between
the two countries. Many apparently are convinced that such concessions
as have been made by the Tito regime are, the result of U.S. pressure,
and appear hopeful that the regime will have to attenuate further
its policies in the future. It appears too that the J.S. aid program
to Yugoslavia, even as it strengthens the pro-U.S. feelings of the
people may be exerting a positive influence on the more important
leaders of the regime, whose past attitudes toward the lest were
largely conditioned by Stalinist doctrine. Much of the latter has
been discredited in their eyes by Soviet actions against the Tito
government, and this appears to be leading in turn to a reevaluation
of certain basic premises. As Yugoslavia extends its ties with the
.Nest, its breach with the Kremlin acquires finality and the possibility
of an reconciliation diminishes accordingly To the extent that
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these sentiments exist and can be strengthened, the position
of the USSR is weaker in the area.
L.. On the basis of paragraph three above, the following are considered to
be the principal Communist vulnerabilities in southeast Europe:
a. ?Tithin the Orbit (Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania)
(1) Political - The opposition of the majority o the population,
both to the USSR and to its native puppet regimes, comprises a long-
range vulnerability to the too-riet positioh in the Balkans. within
the local Communist parties there are also serious potential vulnerabilities
which result from the sheer opportunism of the mass of party members,
the intraparty maneuvering for position, the lack of real security
for the individual member, fear of popular revenge as much as of
party dicipline, dissatisfaction with operating procedures, peraonal
antagonism toward dussian agents, ano uncertainty as to Soviet ability
to defeat the West.oreover, whatever ideological content may have
existed in Marxism-Leninism for old line Communists has been vitiated
to a large extent by the unabashed exploitation of its satellites by
the and by the realities of existence under Soviet Communism.
The workings of the secret security system and of the public purge
have had a dual efrect, that of enforcing conformity and subservience,
and also that of creating confusion and doubt regarding the member's
personal fate. :ven hard core, top level personnel can be made aware
that they are expendable.
(2) social - ::ll remnants of the former social order which cannot
be fully lii.dated in the immediate future are exploitable instruments
against the existing system. Communist reorganization of the satellite
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societies likewise gives rise to new social inequalities providing
terrain for exploitation.
(3) Economic - The extent to which all segments of a collectivized
economy are dependent on centralized planning affords numerous opportun-
ities for. harassment and sabotage, both passive and active. Peasant
resistance can thoroughly disrupt planting, sowing, harvesting and
collection schedules, eliminating agricultural surplusses for orbit
consumption or sale abroad, and creating grave political problems
for the central authorities responsible for total output. Industrial
planning can be disrupted by the prevention of the purchase and
replacer_ent of vital equipment in -estern markets and by forcing the
satellite r;:gimes to meet these requirements out of the orbit industrial
potential, which is limited. The close interrelationships in the
distribution systems of the satellites likewise afford opportunities
for internal disruptive activity. So long as the Balkan satellites
are forced to send their surplusses out of the country to support
the Soviet economy and the productive sector of the economy are
obliged to confom to orbit planning to the detriment of the local
populations, there is every likelihood that the economic situation
in the satellites will constitute a serious political vulnerability
as well.
(~) Psychological -
(a) :;ithin the satellite Communist parties the existing
stresses are such that the strain on the overall structure can
be greatly increased through deliberate exploitation, such as char-
acter assassination, denunciation, bribery, psychological
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manipulation and inducements to defect. Moreover, the satellite
parties are aware of the hostility of the general population
aid this awareness can be magnified to fear oa popular revenge under
different circumstances. The Stalinist doctrine is so compromised
by opportunistic and Great Russian deviation that it is vulnerable
to intelligent attack, especially among the young. Possibly
a majority of the total satellite party membership is vulnerable
to nationalism.
(b) peep-rooted sentiments which are exacerbated by Soviet
procedures are: national pride, attachment to national and regional
folkways, fear of the Russian colossus, and detestation of any
minority being temporarily favored over the majority. Individual-
ism and the habit of personal ownership are also much more highly
developed in the satellites than in the USSR, as is; their social
and cultural awareness.
(c) The experience of Balkan adults with pre-Communist
conditions and with Western civilization has been too recent for
them to believe Soviet propaganda exalting Russian superiority in
the technical, industrial and cultural fields. Even their
recognition of the preponderance of the Soviet military strength
in the postwar period is modified by a faith in the Western
industrial, military, and spiritual potential.
(d) Continued privaticns on the part of the majority
of the population coupled with brutal exploitation of their
productive capacities on behalf of the Soviet Union serve as a
constant irritant
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constant irritant of popular antagonism, which endless Communist
propaganda merely aggravates.
b. Greece - Communist efforts to penetrate Greece can be countered by
the machinery of the Ministry of the Interior, by education on Communist
aims and methods of clandestine operation, and particularly by continued
improvements in Greek economic and political stability.
c. Yugoslavia The continued stability of the Yugoslav regime through
conscious fostering of improved economic and political development is a
primary deterrent to the extension of Soviet Communism to Yugoslavia. The
country's own experience with Stalinism and Great Russian nationalism
also affords an effective defense against Soviet propaganda and sub-
versive attempts, both among the people and the Party hierarchy.
5. (Indicate whether or not there exist overriding adverse factors which
e solved.)
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a. CJYi 1/9 Yi'~~ lY a:o: ON
,? ` ,-tie ,t [
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could be radically improved by a joint statement of non-aggressive
intent by the powers concerned, guaranteeing Albania's independence
and the integrity of its present territorial borders. So long as the.
Hoxha regime is able to )resent invasion and dismemberment as the
inevitable concomitant of liberation, the regime will be able to
count on an otherwise unjustified degree of support from the people.
c. The lack of clearly-defined ~'.S. end objectives with respect
to the Balkans, and with special reference to the Soviet Satellite
components thereof, or of a clear statement as to the methods which
should be employed to achieve these objectives. This lack impedes
the development of phased operations designed to implement any
overall strategic plan.
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