ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION, 1 JULY 1951 TO 30 JUNE 1953 FOR OPC STRATEGIC PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100120060-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: June 29, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

Aplroved t~or Releas~2003/06/1~~ 80-01065A000120060-8
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G~NT~~L I1~~E~L~k~~~'CE ~t~~IIC~
S t~' 1~A~t ,"
29 pia i953.
~~~~ ~' THE ~ ~'t T~l~C~~
1 ~ 195. to ~ a 1953 foxy aPf~ ~t~t.~ P
~ISSD1Cl4
~.a esti~.te ins bas?d a~ t~ h un that
theme ~crx73 not be ~, ~. ram t t15S~i ?d t~
idsrrn ~ within this Q
~a 3 ?.T~i?,~
~.r~ ~ ~ $~l$ '~ 117.tiu~'te s5'a~.!!t a~t~et3td,'ee is 8
wa~~ damatne~t~ed '!x~/ t~ II:~3R and tit the ~ its
ss~i~' aen be assut?ed aroe~ the ~a~ aster try the elm
tiara a~' aii its it ceamot aant~o,1~ w~sr tie
meta s e$ tho t~ a~ dis~ldent t to s'uoh
as ~ugoals~.eo Ws ~ bo3ie~ro that a+~ the shoat ~ the
S.ia laoks. ~ te37.#.t? csanmct~i?~s ean, tfie baacdm~ of tie
SoR3,et omit as aa~-s to be hit ruder aaviet aa~lrroa:. then
~~~' at~l~e.~ as ac~~ ttte~f~ans. t~,,9~t~3ate'~
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~~ 5~'
oc~atries ts~ break S+,e~t o~t~l~, ae pote~-t
~ for ~t tai Sa~r3et Ito ~9 ~ ~a~et
Foic~,r mad ~tior.~ ~~ it~o~,'~~ onq We be3.3~-+ag
th~~~'oa~s t~iat # t3, w~a
~~.~ s to ant ~~ d ~ ~ ~ to
the ~s3,~ a~ DE~~~ aac txa Sov~e'E~ ~.tro~. of ~a S ata2~
~3.tea;
~b~ ~~ ~ ~~, I3arifi~as ~' t
~~ oacb~.t$
raj S~1s to u~der~ae aid aeao~~ ~antr~ol of g~ern=.
ate not met dt't~.r~~,
~d,j :~ t~ c~~~ o~ fire old to
rapt e. po~.c~w off` ~utioy 3sa ~Iho t~sett stye and
tri ~ the~.r ~aaux~es,~ 3~at~nd3x~ rao a~~a$ to
~ a ita s.to~~
2~, Is`~e ~ fi~atg ~ the ~.t off' t,~ge ob~ec~ti:~a~,
~t i~g d ~ r~..ak of , ~
nth tbam ~Q At t'~ t ~ tha ~`rra~tlxt mfr s~1.1 eat3,~ett~
tlant the ~or~,d dt.~ae~t~.~ ors ec~naf~de~,ble a~p~ttiea for
was met ob~eett~as ;ait~ta nc r!~#.ah~ rJCa& o~ wrer
wit~a tyre ~Q .~ eat~r~tte o f'i ~.ts ba.e?e rat ' 3a t~
exerting o~I~oe Sor st rresa9 ~t ~1sa ~n t't~
tangy oi' thy, US to rol~cl ~ c~, ~e t
~~ S~R~
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~P' S~A~`
~ ~' s off' ' ~ ~ '~. fix~9
fees ~i].~.t~,e~s agar ait~I ~ a ~ ~- ~ t ~'Ss
3~ ~ ~ off' a cast ~ ~
~1 ~a the a tit' ~s't31,.~ tae ~ w2~
ffi~~ 3a merry ~ 'hav~+ eozplA3.1 ~ a ~ ~
ts.ly ~ t~ ~, ' ~ 7a~ o#' ~ of
~a way ~ sn ~~ ifi.~ m ~$ bad.
~ t a~' eta n,~~ ~I 3s~ x~~~ ,~ '~t3rro
3n o~ ~
~w ~d~ azui 8 #,~- a~o~ra'~3.e~ o~E' ' FAi~ ~
r~~,r maa~ ec~d,~d, ~o t a~cr~~ 3~c~. cn~`
~ aoam~ris~ ' t~3atea~ C ~ man b~ cc~saict ~,
lx~eeib$1~,~' v3~si neon ~ ~ In t~ aba~noa
~ ~at~1. ~rrr~ai.~t~ tea ~s~ ~'~s w3]3 at 3.ee-~t
st~tt~,a ~ ~ of ]tel. Ca~mis~ ate p 7G`h~ ~.
~a~' ~Ltdaer air ~vt& of tba$e ~tt~~ ~o C+oa~miat oon~+o~. Wca~d
~~''~- ~ ao7m.ea to +~t~..
~~
~P S~C~
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sud intertia3. Comnaanist pressures, and thus would facilitator a
Cornmux~ist advar~e fihroughout 5outhaast Asia, Although me
cannot estimate the likelihood of an attack aver a two year
period, we believe that for the next year,, or at least than
duration of the Koreas war, an inQasion of either couatrg is
u~,ikely bec+a~.se of the present]y limited Chinese Coma~znist
capability to 8itpport sustained operations, the Communist awglc?e~?
Hess that open interrreratioa might provoke TeTesteru intea~ntioa,
and the prospect that is the long rue the Conm~ists might win
a victory in H~i.rma amd Indochina without ovrert Chinese iavasion,
We bel3.sve, therefore, that the Rrorml.in and Peiping ~a~11 seek to
atrength~ the Co~ist parties in these countries and w311 use
the threat of Chinese Communist imrasion in an effort to prevent
effect$ve counf~ra+ation aga3,rtst local Commaan3stso
5o Elsewhere in Scni$heast Asia, the Kremlin and Peiping
will, aont3x~ae their efforts to gthen 3ocal Commaanist partiesp
using th+err-, where possible, to disrapt the economies and admin-
istrations of the 'govsrnments8 The Kremlin in this respect tiail3
eonti~e its efforts to ggiri Commmw~ist leadership of natioaal.ist
elements and will. play heavily oa x~nti-~Testern themaes tv reduce
Western influence?
6ti 7Cn Japan, the Kremlin will pxrabably depend an the Japanese
Com~ainist Party is its ?fforts to disrupt Japanese political. and
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economic life, During the initial portion of the next two yearns
the prn~ected Japanese Pease Treaty will be a principal tearget of
the Japanese Coaamruniats Prom within and the USER and Communist China
f?aram xithouto The threat of Soviet and Chinese military nation Will
be used in an effort to intimidate the Japanese and present the close
alignment of Japan with the We~~ powerao Japanese x'e~t Wes,
~ vigio~>ualy oPPo~d ~ the USSR and Communist China and also by
the CamYminist Partie$ throughout the world, particular~r in the Paci-
fic countries Which Fought Japan in World War IIo
?o A Chinese Conmwniat attack on Formosa would i'equ3.re ar:tive
Soviet participation to have a chance of anccess in the face of
esiating U3 policy to defend the inland, Thus, ao long ae thin polim
cy remains unchanged and US fleet units are available for the defense
of Formosa, the USSR is unlikely to assume the risks of War introlved
is participation inF or encouragement of, an attack on Form~saq
Chinese Communist subversive efforts wi7.1 be continued, and the quenw
tion of Formosa will be exploited as a focal point of Chinese Coma
monist anti?American propaganda,
$~ Hong $ong and Macao in Western hands are presently of value
'Eo the USSR and Com~niat China for eco~omio reasonso These advan?
tages wilt pabbab],y decrease an embargo measures against Communist
China become more effectime, and the likelihood of Commttaist neisur~e
of these territorien gill, ~='easeb The Chinese alone have the capa.+
bility to seise them and the risk of gexx~ral War would ire slights
?5~
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 ~~~ ~~ J
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Such action must be considered a serious possibilitcp during the
next tao yearsa
9o It is impassible at present to predict with at~r aonfider~e
either when hostilities in %res may come to an end or what form a
settlement, if made, might takeb Current diacnesions of a cease..
fire miry result is an armistice and possibly a subsequent settl9~
meat? but, thus far, these efforts camaat be e~raluated aac~suraetelyo
.Should aurarent efforts fail to prochice a asses fire, we believe that
the USSR will aont3.nue to support the Chinese Communists caneri~,3,yr,
If, howstrer, the Kr?mlin corm:luded that the Chinese Communist and
North gorean forces were usable to retain control of North Sores
ar that, as a result of the extension of the area of iail,itarg opera-
tions, the Chinese Cozar~nist regime itself were endangered, the
Kremlin probably would resart to increasingly drastic measureso
These measures might, if necessary, include such t3~inlg?ve~,].ed aommit'?
meat of Soviet farces against US farces that the US and USSR would be
engaged in a de f.~ local war, which, if the US felt compelled to
recognize its existence, might at at~y time develop into a general warn
Ho THE NEAR 1#ND MIIlI~L.E EAST.
14Da Of the countries in this areas Iran is in the-mast
immediate dangero The current Angla~Iranian oil dispute offers
numerous opportunities for Soviet exploitations either directly
or through the Tudeh Partyo The Kremlin maiy hope that at best
the situation will, sa deteriorate as to permit a Tudeh soup and
at leant that it can be sa manipulated as to der{y or to limit
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' TAF 511?
~G,`8o3.~- oil, $~ the W~ata d ~9.~'3ah fora enter t ~ #~
ore off' the t diep~a~ tht~ poea~b~,~,9L'by o~ aaatun3 dirt
~o~ist 3a~toz?v~tdc~ ~1 ~ a~fi ?, 'liter
a~ ~tanoaa~ the ~ft t oona"Lvde that uv~et f
ovn~ eut~ ~n withatt ~erivaa r~.ak oP w~arg For eacamr~lse
ehvutd the Todah Patty ~ixe oontro~. of aoaaa norther a amrd
than anquest svvi?t eaid$" that t
.et foraea into that ate as the tb,~ory thntg ~cter tho c3a~.
tances~ that aot$on vats~d not ctlve u is r3ak e~
rat ~ In ' ~a+ePnt~ the t of met t pa~-,arr
tair,~]. be ut~isoad 3n e? e-~inrt to punt or de~q ~ ~~.s~'asto~r
~ttlarmsnt~ atad~ 3nteaa-~ the Tecteh Pain
a~ac~t to a~p~oit the ait~tfon to ~ to o t~, a e3,a
aca~trol oY` the t iiP thmt op~ac.unit~ ehould nr~.a~d gt
is virtaial~t? iasad,~b]a 4.o pro~~t '-' es,ts bead a ae~ttls~
maaat o!' the esi3. is ~ as ~1a~ dipta v.~,]3.
to a gt~t e~taaatt an the netvaro oS fhrat Bet a
11~ S~.et ~a aoc~nomd?o and grcpt~faaada~ p~8aa~ ~
ih~ce at~d. Ta~,rloa,~ yi.L'!. proly ~ ,~.av~rly 3~ tbo~
oo~rs't~1.ea are tatoe~a into NATO or ao~ d+afao~.me or,~mi,~-
t3.on? Intes~llgg bath ot~aarts~?s t~7. prabab3~ ~ to bs
a4i].e to a?ge Frith the C~amami.st
L?q ~ in th? Neatr axadl a~dd~ Eaat (Zt~die~ Isrne3.Q
TC7~P SI~C?
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e~ the ~.reto S'~~) ~ ~' wiL~ ~' csc~te ~lte
`orb tca arrir~a'~.am + x~ '~ ~ost~
1011. ri.iria~ ~ t ~'!`~ti~ c'~~~ ~~,
5e~ ~c~.et su0~~ a3.ut~ ~ ;~ be ~tin~.~,ted~,
~ia~'~.:s gf..rnzsg e~ a plem~s 'be +~~.t
'~' ~~ it- aen +`art to deter tlne 0 ~~ th~.e ,
t0 West ~ ~ "ems ups t~eee ctr~,e~ ~'0r
~'~ A ~~ diiM..d.L W.SML~p -
V p
i3e~ t~5 yoere 1 araaa~ t[t ~a tie t~.c~ etr
13~tat~. ems, d~ t~~ Weed ~:~ ~~.tn~' ~
$ kl`e~ a ~ ~ ~.
''~ ~-~~ 9i~t3 +~6~J~2t ~.?SE3 ~e~~* fib' Vii', '~+` ~.
Q '1~.CI~. ~`?ih~q T~Ie'' '~ ~ ~At~t
Ip~1,t ~ "~ ~ p~'0,~8 i~ t$.o 'mss e~ t1~t
thaw t c~all'-~~ . .tats ax
'~ ~ ~ d+~ai~,~a ~ tae ted by US
u~~~3 t08 that ~~ refit
to d~AT'0 e~ ~ ~g ].~.t' ctt tl~.t
e X3.11 1~ tt~ Cott t0 ~ po~r~t ta6-e ~e~n]ia
iLr liked to reach such a decieiao? We aa~aact eatimats whether they wi11
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~P SBC~.?
rsea}~ e~ah s ~S3.~E 'i6~' A953Q Po],~l.~3.c~at tfuar+e9 t~io~f'o~~
~. ~~ b~ t~.t~.,f~ed; t~~ ~,x.~;cxa n w33A bey
p~r~d9 tha ~' of war iat ~e u~.]. bo ?~aloi~ted ~9 axed
the C.st ~er~?~ of Fps o~od I~s~,yr wi~.l. c~~ana t~+
e~'f'orto 1+o ac~!'c~c3, the p~a1.~,u33. oit3.c~t. ~i o'b~ a~'Fe~
~~ g to In i~a t~to ~ t1 ~`
aoent3r~ ~o ~ 3.~ p on #~ia F,~tori Zt~a$ bu.~ ~.~ th?
r . at'pt '~o "~''~ ups t~a'~ '~ott~ opera
off' u.c~~Eo~~ ee:o~ao~fe pr~o,~ ~~o~p ~~,
~ ~ ~~.oas poe+~iM1~,~ tit ~, 5a~,~ ~~
C-lvedn Aal~.~io~. ~~ode ~z ~~ ~o di~~ t.~
T3,~o . +a~ar I,3~Et1.a profit og ~ ~, ~
v3.e~t o~ Wasters ao~rnitit tee Yu~oa3a~L~~~ t3he
33n parob~ua~ ~atso #~t a S~ ~~tt d it~v+o~~a
a1.so would involvt~
~ s,artas r.Loa? of t~ 'be 'q5 or t1~i aa~i 5a1~Cea and/
t~ tit a r~r t deo~a~p Ito ~
bee '~ ~ t~ ~ r~ the ~~ 11~r be~.i.
fd~t $~~ zd.s~ ~sss sao~r text ~- to be
~~ a 3.~ter date srhe? the int1, and ~o~.tio~ of
Stag?sl a~ h~e+ becsa~ era l~c-~ ~ ~'
matte ,~ ~ q~ak and e~~til. aonqueat of 'o~,+a
~ dot #~ a~t3re t~e~terxt detemslve e~orto ~heae
~~t~8 a with e g ~t3.eo of t~
TOP S~~
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` 1C3k
~ete-13dte~ ~o~ ~ctacsh e~ ~~~ the ~ ~ ~
S~tsl~its i~ o~ ~ugc~ o
3.5? Ian. ~~? ,mot t~~ee tal.. prr~beb~g c~~t,a
to be de to .~ ~.~'~ to ~o~'i'sibB,it? tca tlhe
i?t ~b~~r1~3.~ off' ~. s~a~.~a~e bra
G . i~ ~.n ~ tea. p~~C.t3.e~ in
t t $~ ~]. ~'' Sa~,st taro it' t,~
nhatald deride t&~mrt ~tq~ so 3~ to
5ci ~sa~caa~rieB e~ ? t tbai~ ~ as3.ped~.o~
itt Wesf- de~+aa ~ egg ~ that ~
ae~ttre