A. NSC POLICIES (GENERAL)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 1, 2000
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 3, 1952
Content Type:
PAPER
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020019-5.pdf | 337.71 KB |
Body:
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Working Paper
Policy Additions
3 October 1952
A. PNSC Policies (General)
The U. S. is of making significant progress in the psycholo~:ical
field toward its jjective of reduction and rf-traction of Soviet power
as laid down in NSC 20/4. Further progress toward the development
and im;:lementation of an agreed overall strategic concept for our
national psychological program, an effort can take place only in con-
junction with a corres ond' development of capabilities and resources
and an ac
companying adjustment of aszc na ion po icier an programs
designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. The distor-
tion and exploitation by Communists of anti-American propaganda are
occasio-ing resistance instrumentalism and charges of aggressiveness
of our psychological effort.
(Middle east)
desp' e a stated cy of impartiali ,y.
An edim nt to U. S pabil'ties in the e East
?,d
in the isparit, of o titudes to and I and the Arab States
(Eastern Europe)
A U. S. policy on Czechoslovakia is desired. Policies on Czecho-
slovakia are tenuous and not substantive.
(SR)
Policy clarification A required concerning U. S. position with
respect to the future status of the peoples of Russia.
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3 October 1952
e4'
B. Inter-Departmental Policies (General)
Headline publicity about U. S. atomic prowess is a very question-
able line of policy. The most that seems to be required at this
time is an occasional guarded but reassuring statement to the effect
that U. S. national interest, with respect to atomic weapons, is
being effectively safe-guarded.
The Department of Defense raises two major points for resolutions
(1) It requests clarification of the role and obligations of the
military establishment in psychological operations, and (2) It states
the opiaion that the nations military establishment can render more
effective support to the national psychological program; if its war-
time potentials are exploited to the maximum during the cold-war period.
An appropriate authority is suggested for a reexamination of the
entire question of inter-departmental coordination mechanisms for
achieving national psychological objectives.
(Far East)
25X1A
CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and mili-
tary authorities in the field of psychological as inadequate
in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism was set up,
for example, but failed to include the operations of USIE services
in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field
on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However,
a completely effective coordination of two major strategical plans
with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to command
and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy the
situation.
The U. S. Government should provide a firm and clear policy on
s ecif~ c
(General)
The excessively aggressive and militaristic tone of some of the
statements made by U. S. Government officials which play directly
into the hands of the Soviet Peace offensive calls for the establish-
ment of a strong policy on this matter.
p issues relating to colonialism because of the exigencies of
-/~ the European alliance system.
(Eastern Europe)
The State Department has indicated reluctance to countenance any
activity which could be construed to support a separatist tendency.
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25X1A
"IOPC~-, k/,44t7
tr~ Ot W Z~F-O/~ ~~, ,~ - , j
OV4--~
i a tquir - - within the Agency
T?1
%M 4
for the deli* _It 'an with the psycholo-
gical warfare aspects of the , with specific divi
sion and assignment of responsibility for more effective utilization of
25X1 C
M 4 w
TOP SECRET
D. International
5/1
8.28
Copy of 17 Copies
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Policy Additions
3 October 1952
.,
q Pat-
Policy .
coordinat' and delineation of responsibility4
USIE, MSA, and CIA
,, 4 - 01TTT1i QJ, -z- tat in@ p l @--e from overt U. S. information activities in
MSA and State Department, aitd 44 corresponding development of covert
propaganda activities in the gray fields. State and MSA feel that
they can handle the gray field securely, and for that reason, CIA
should not be involved in these activities.
Policy guidance to deal with the exploitation of the racial
issue in the U. S. by the Communists is needed.
Policy guidance on tariff structure to expand international
trade and expand the ability of foreign countries to export to this
country.
(General)
Policy modification is requested on NSC 10/2 with respect to
broadening its utilization in reference to attribution of our govern-
ment with respect to certain aspects of CIA operations, so that
during high-level operations, discreet reference may be made to
indicate some measure of U. S. support.
Tunisia
The U overnment uld to e a fi
specif' issues to colonial , ch as the Tunisian case.
Southeast Asia
25X1 C
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Policy Additions
3 October 1952
D. International Policies (General)
Because of Burma's disapproval of Americas present policy of
laying the foundation of effective guerrilla activities in the event
that this country may be overrun by the Communists, some leaders
in Burma are reluctant to cooperate with.the U. S. fully. CIA is
governed by a policy limitation which precludes any action which
would seriously prejudice U. S. relations with the government in
Burma.
Satisfactory progress has been impeded by the lack of overall
national policy and by State Department policy toward personnel
support of developmental projects which has precluded sufficient
staffing for programs laying the ground work for future operations
in Burma.
Indochina
CIA has been unable to lay the foundation for effective guerrilla
activity because it has not received a policy authorization to do so
and because the French have been unwilling to cooperate in this
matter.
Even though there are severe policy limitations, considerable
progress has been made in s chological warfare activities and
some progress in the
25X1 C
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SECURITY INFORMAT104
FAR EAST
General F/2-X1 C
There is need fora a -e t statement of olicy,, and implementing
directives as to the relocation and exploitation fore/5 purpose of
refugees from the China Mainland. /
FAR EAST
There is. need for a qata -cut statement ofoverall and psychological
Vbjectives with respect to and the Overseas Chinese,
S o #
I --r' S8 BET -
SECURITY iNFORMATION
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