REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND THEIR ADEQUACY TO SUPPORT THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 3, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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rLCU Ti tarsi anM.AT103
3 October 1952
SUBJECT : Review of National Policies and Their Adequacy
to Support the Clandestine Effort.
REFERENCE : Top Secret Document #82885 dated 30 Sept 52.
1. Comments on this paper are difficult to make because the
purpose it'serves is not easy to ascertain, If the purpose is to
make a critical review of many of our national policies, it will
reveal that they are at best but statements concerning desirable
objectives about which few can quarrel. Rarely are they spelled
out in the detail required to guide the development of programs
to attain them,
2. This point can best be made if a few terms are first
defined and then illustrated. Most of the National Security Council
papers are concerned with objectives, that is, the interest we have
with respect to a given area or country in the light of the over-
all international situation. Policies, on the other hand, are
thought out courses of action for achieving national objectives.
To illustrate our objective in the economic field with regard to
Japan is to "facilitate the achievement by Japan of an economy
which is self-supporting, expanding and capable of maintaining
adequate living standards, supporting the defense of Japan, and
contributing to the defense of the Pacific area." This statement
does not offer CIA any guide to the actions it should take to gain
that particular objective. In other words, the objective is
stated so broadly that it would be possible to attain it by one
of several different policies; namely, (a) encourage rather than
restrain Japanese trade with Communist China, (b) facilitate the
expansion of Japanese trade with south and southeast Asia by
financial and diplomatic support, (c) lower U. S. trade,barriers
25 ainot Japanese goods.
Corr, ,,~, 1 o .3
K' 1,10' 114Y INFOSU441KII
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4. This illustration indicates the type of analysis which
would be required if a review of the efficacy of existing govern-
mental-CIA policies with respect to the attaining of already adopted
US objectives is to be of any value.
5. What follows are some general observations concerning thei
formulation of policies which will facilitate our work:
a. They should permit maximum utilization of the
existing critical but favorable factors in a given
situation. They should conversely mitigate the influence
of adverse critical factors in a given situation.
b. They should lead to actions acceptable to both
the US and to the objective country even though the motiva-
tions leading to the action may often be dissimilar.
c. US statements of long-term policy toward a given
country should not act as a roadblock to the attainment
of short-term goals. (Example: US advocacy of a perman-
ently disarmed and pacific Japan made some years back has
returned as a ghost to haunt.'our endeavors to build up
Japanese security forces.)
d. US short-term policies should lead to actions con-
tributing toward the attainment of long-term objectives,
but they need not be absolutely the same as long-term
policies. (This requires that US policy be developed to
unfold in a consistent pattern. This requirement should
likewise discourage the US habit of ad hoc polio formation,
a habit currently virulent in too many quarters.
6. In conclusion, it is gratifying to be able to report that
(a) the obvious requirement for a new national strategy will be
partially filled with the presidential approval of NSC 135/2,
Subject: Re-appraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy
for National Security, and (b) there is presently in the mill a
draft revision of NSC 107/2, Subject: Position of the United
States with Respect to Iran.
7. It is hoped
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7. It is hoped that the foregoing comments and advisements
meet in some measure your request for comments on your paper, and
that with the issue of our own checklist opus covered in conference
2 October 1951, we shall be able to develop concise and specific
policies on which effective programs and operations may logically
be based. 25X1A
WRK JL GLK db
Distribution:
Addressee - orig.
PPC - #2
RI - #3
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To 1:
1. The attached comments, prepared
by Colonels King and Kintner, as well as
those of Earl DeLong (which were trans-
mitted separately) cover the waterfront
quite well, except possibly for certain
points which I think deserve particular
accentuation.
2. Our basic problem in fighting the
cold war is that national policy is
always stated in such broad terms that
no one will disagree; but when it comes
to reduction of these policies to specifi
programs of action, the trouble begins
It is at this point that our whole col'=
war effort breaks down for unless the
key individuals in the government who
must participate in any successful
program are completely agreed upon both
ends and means, no effort can have the
faintest hope of success. The NSC has
thus far only produced ends of a very
general nature. The PSB was largely
designed to galvanize our instruments of
national policy into effective proseeutic
of the means to these ends. It has thus
far failed to do so. Whether it will
continue to fail remains to be seen. The
point is that somehow policy must be
translatable into effective national
action--which it is not now. Nor will
NSC 135/2 change this situation.
3. How to bring this to the minds of
the policy makers in such a way as to
improve the situation--particularly in a
election year--is the $64+ question. At
any rate, I don't think we should miss a
single opportunity to sound off about
what seems to me to be the No. 1 Problem
in getting ourselves rolling.
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