INSPECTION OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00948A000100020012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 19, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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19 Septedber 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Directorof Central Intelligence
SUBJECT ? inspection of the Office of National Estimates
and the Estimative Process
1. The objectives of the ONE inspection we. (a
determine the views of the intelligence community on the quality
and. usefulness of national intelligence estimates, and (b) to
appraise the efficiency of the estimative process and the Office
of National Estimates.
2. The inspection team was not qualified to weigh sub-
stantive conflicts revealed during U3IB drafting and coordination
of specific estimates. Many ONE participants in estimating cited
examples of apparent deficiencies in estimating as, for example,
foreseeing the impact of the Communist Chinese Agricultural crisis,:
or assessing the operational capabilities of the Royal Laotian
Army. However, the inspection team heard no proposals for
modification of the existing authority and structure of the
estimative system. The inspectors concluded that a national
intelligence estimate undergoes as widespread, continuous and
intense an evaluation as any other document produced in the 14URVCDF
intelligence community.
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al estimates are receLvi
ning and policy-rielOng
Is is Shawn in the attac
eful coneiderati
s of the
znoranda covering
discussions with Mr. Walt W. Rostaw, Counsellor and Chief, Policy
Planning Council Department of State, and Mr. William P. Bundy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. Equivalent testimony was obtained from spokesmen in
the offices of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to
the President, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
I. These sources were consistent in their praise of the
current estimative product dealing with the Soviet Union--
particularly that on military subjects?and with alternative
courses of action in various contingency situations, Less
interest was expressed in the scheduled estimates an specific
countries, but there was general agreement that these estimates
had improved in usefulness by evolution from their earlier
encylopedio approach toward better focussed analyses of key
issues.
5. The inspectors principal findings are summarized in the
following paragraphs. In general, this survey proposes measures
In our opinion would tend to increase the flexibility of
O and. MIS management within existing patterns of operation.
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6.The
of National
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?minces of the indi members of the Board
/mates vary in quality dJpeDdtnS on the experience
of the indiv5.dual in intelligence analysis and writing and on
his aptitude for the estimating ;raceme. this fact in no way
discounts the quality of his previous accomplishments in other
fields. The survey recommends that there, be a continuing effort
to upgrade the quality of Board meMber performance by establishing
a tine 34prit to the initial assignment of new members. Similarly
merbers of outstanding talent acquire seniority, attention
must be given to aebbatical assignments.
TheNit/setae etaff
es staff of ONE has yet to determine whether
7. The
the (dented drafter of estimates Should work on a career
evening attitude of the otaff is to reject reassignment
the DOI area unless this involves clear advancement. /be DWI
is now moving to promote a freer flow of senior personnel among
his offices. This survey recommends measureS in support of ONE
career planning
The Princeton Panel of Consultants
8. The use of a panel of outside specialists
frequently at Princeton University to provide an
on the adequacy of estimates vas an Obvious need and safeguard
al check
S 11-1 fje
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dgr1n the early years of the present estimative process. With
the growing professionalism of the ass performance,. review of
by a panel of outside consultants has lost its vitality
in the ss13y unanimous opinion of the ONE atitee Staff.
The D)/NL however, eontinues to see utility in the panel sessions
both as a check for fresh views and to promote a heat thy relation-
ship between intelligence and academie communities. The
p?eaant survey recommenda that the needs of the Estimates Staff
be governiag in this area. The present panel approach to
nsultng should be discontinued as a regular practice in favor
of more individual contacts with a greater variety of cleared
specialists of agreed interest to tatinmtes Staff personnel.
ONE Contact with Policy Mere
9* tXhere is too little contact at present between ONE
pema3nel and nt policy planners. This stems in large
doctrine of separation of intelligence
were and users. The inspeotore concluded that the profea-
sionaliaz of dAy estimators insures ageinst the :du%
of 1isan involvements. The estinstors need more guidance from
policy ere an the context of estimating problems. The survey
recommends regular face-to-face discussions at the start of
each estimative effort between OMR representatives and senior
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policy making personnel. Notes from these &lscussionia should
be included in the terns of reference for each estimate.
USIB Contribution to the Estimeive Process.
10 The The USIB organizations contributing to estimating were
described in CIA as a loose confederation in which each
participant decides what resources he can commit to the estimating
effort. Present contributions are widely uneven in quality, and
some participants are not substantively qualified. The inspectors
have proposed that the USIB undertake periodic assessments of the
performance and program commitments of the participating agencies
and recommend standards of staffing and levels of research effort.
U. Specialized USIB committees; such as the Scientific
Intelligence Committee; have explicit responsibilities in their
DCI'D charters for contributing to national estimates. The
coordinating and publishing procedures emp oyed by the Scientific
Intelligence Committee are not consistent with those of the
Board of National Estimates. The inspectors have recommended
that the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination be charged with
investigating through the US1B and recommending action to meet
this problem.
12. The inspectors suggest that the senior command of CIA
stimulate reaction to the estimates by direct dissemination to
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appropriate consumers, e.g., an Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs at the Department of State in the case of an estimate on
an African subject. Such dissemination should be accompanied by
correspondence requesting comment on leading issues.
Attachments
/ J. 5.Earman
J. S. larman
Inspector General
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Ii-E-C-rift
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$ECR ET
$132111ANDUX PM THE RECORD
SUBJECT Discussion of national est
prooess with W. Walt W.
State, 16 August 1962
August 1962
the estimating
rtment of
EVROA who handles coordination of
eetisting for thetepartment arranped for us to see Mr.Bosto
in connection with the inspection of the estimating system now
in progress in the Agency. Mr. Rostow very generously gave us
more than an hour of his time and cormented freely on many
aspects; of the objectives and contributions of estimates to
the national security.
2. Or first question to Mr ? oatow was whether he reads
the estimates himself. Ee answered promptly that he reads them
He added that he finds them to be of high quality in
organization, clarity, management of background information, and
in soundness of the judgpents presented. (This reeponae
paralleled an earlier statement from W. Parrot of General Taylor's
office that General Teylor while at the White ROJA0 also read all
of the estimates.) W. Rcetow also believes that the estimates
on specific areas and subjects are read in the Department by the
appropriate operating officials. At a later point be dhserved
however, that operating officials probably still make most of
their decisions without close utilization of formal estimates).
He doubted further that these officials employ personal staff to
provide them withsmything approximating professional intelligence
suPPort.
3. Mr. Rostov then spent approximately fifteen niutes
developing what he sees as two critical areas of weakness or
Challenge to effectiveness of performance by the present-day U.S.
estimating system. The first of these was a speculation whether
the estimating system is not prone today to a too even treatment
of all of the facets of the given target country under estimative
analysis. He thought that the effect of this tendency would be a
failure to isolate and highlight areas of impending critical
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4. His second point was perhaps more speculative and con-
cerned the capability of the estimating apparatus to fuse its
findings on each segment of a target country?economic, political,
scientific--into 04 effective appreciation of bow
these perts interact to produce events and trends of strategic
significance,
5. W. Rostov cited the estimating problems facing the
.kited. States in dealing with Communist China in his discussion
of each of the above points. Se returned repeatedly to the
prdblaa of estimating the appearance and effects of the Chinese
agricultural crisis and its far-readdag implicatioes for other
parts of the Chinese economy, defense system and current political
posture.
6. Questions on the adequacy of intelligence research in
support of estimating brought forth several interesting observa-
tions. Other observers with whom we bad. talked had expressed the
opinion that there are important gaps in intelligence research
today including, for example, economic research in free world
areas, analysis of defense systems, and appreciation of
political problems in Africa. W. Rostov cemented that there
is a wealth of good. background intelligence analysis being
produced today and that he depends on it in geingbehind the
estimates into critical problem areas. Se recalled a conversation
with AU associate from the joint Chiefs of Staff in which he
speculated that 75% of intel-ligence is wasted in terms of
utilization by operating officiale amd the friend felt that 90%
was a more realistic figure. Se expressed little fear of
duplication of Analytic effort and seemed to feel that an intel-
ligence organization that senses a deficiency in analysis should
move in and try its band at the problem. Se suggested that there
is a basic vsakness in the present U.S* system of collection of
intelligence. Diplomatic representatives are schooled in the
collection techniques evolved in the advanced Western countries.
In African eountries association with that might be called the
standard diplomatic circles is quite inadequate as a means of
appreciating the forces of change in tribal, labor and political
groupings.
7. Mr. Rcetow had many ideas for dealing with the problems
of estimating. Se spoke of his own efforts to build up the policy
planning apparatus of the Departnent and the executive branch of
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the Oov&rnment but did not o into detail on speoifio iaeurea.
Nearee4 that there is a distinct need for close qoication
between pL era and estimators and paid that he would welcome a
two.way excbanse of staff between Ur* Policy Planning Council and
the Board and Staff of O.
8. Re was particularly interested in increaatn cozunica
between estimators and operating off iciale.. Preeent roce
setting terms of reference for national e d be modified
to include early face-to-face discussions between operators who
retest estimates and ONE estimators to explore iseues and agree on
research and estimating judgments most likely to be of eisnificance
to the operators. Re thought it might be useful to append the notes
of such discussions to the formal terms of reference.
9. W. Rostov spoke of his own visits to Ong to sot acuaintd
withONE pereonnel and the estimatiag system. Be felt that it is
'very important that room be maintaimtd on the Board of Nationel
Estimates for several members who would be qaite unorthodox in
background and outlook and who would help thereby to introduce reel/
challenges to Board thinking, (Nis own suggestions on Board member-
a-hip in the future would be of interest.)
10. On the subject of evaluation of the esti.ating performance
Scetow again emphasized the need for fresh views and suggested
that validity studies should be undc7taken by outside professors
wbo? might spend a summer in ONE examining the preparation, quality,
and impact of a series of estimates on a particular prOblem.
U. Late in the meeting Nts. Rostov referred to 4 forthcoming
book on Pearl Harbor of which be had an advance copy. (CIA Library
located a copy on friday and will notify the Deputy isspector
General when it is received.) A paragraph in the preface of this
book discusses the problem of systems coping with surprises.
Mr. Roetow said he had read the pertinent passages to his own
staff And proceeded to have the book retrieved from a colleague
and to read them to us. This resume by no means doee justice to
the freshness of Mr. Rostow's thinking and conversation. It
would be most appropriate to invite htm to set down his ideas on.
estimating problems for pthlication in Studio in nt011iaenCe.
Director
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6 Septeether 1962
of enrrea eettes
is now a bigger customer of e
saw estimates have a definite impact and. influeece on
decisions. All Soviet estimates are read with great interest by
the highest levels at the Department of Defense, and the moo
important ingxedients of these estimates are highlighted for the
Secretary of Defense. Mr. Bundy referred to contingency papers
as being "top-use item" by his office.
2. Aside fres eseuring closer contact between eatimatora
and policy plahners, Mk.. Bundy had no suggeatione for 1mprovessen4
of the estimating Prooese. Sa considers the estimatee to be
well written and well organized, and, if there is any fault with
the system, it lies with the frmming of the rowatioae.
3. XV. Bendy remarked that the Survey of NIS Dissemination
and Use completed in 1956 was a useful exercise and would be
worth repeating to stlemlate a wider use of estimatee.
4. w. Mundy-evuld welcome the detail of altimeters to his
offic. for a tour of duty as well as the opportunity to detail
of his people to
le our diacuesien on the Bd of National Retleates,
commented that each military service at one time or
au outstanding representative eft the Board. It is
o judge beforehand whether a particular military
succeed as a Beard =Aber. The solution might be
military man for a specific wind, of time, saject
If his performaaoe VOTe uotevorthy, be could then
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re. Be was
, a Farsisa Qin* COI offi
appoimtment of
a waste of talent for
to continue writing estimates
Ward. Be said that he often
t Board, and he relied that
did so.
7. A4 rrs careers for OMB staff personnel, be believed
that these psople should be rotated through other D1)/3 components
and, on occasion, serve in the DP/P. Sxceptions should be rAde
for those talented estimators who prefer to spend their entire
Agency career in estimating.
Mhscutive Director
Mir
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DAT VIEWER
2ot o
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TABLE op' commus
A*
E.
SCOPE ? a 4 ? 4 ? ? * * ? 4 ? * ? ? ?
nis =we= mum . ? * a a ft * a ? a ? ? At
?
? 1.
. 5
Components . . ..... . to ? ? ? ? ? It ?
6
Estimating Pr edures . .. ... ? ? ? . ? ? ?
. 10
C.
OPERATING Imps AND PROBLEMS . . ? . .. ...
12
General ? ? ? ? 4 * 4 ? ? ? . ? . . ?
12
Staffing PdlicY. - . . . . a a 11?
?
17
The Board of National Estimate; . . . . . . * a ?
? a
29
Consultants .... . .. . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 4
It
36
Miscellaneous Problems . . 4- ft . 4. it .4 ? ilt ? lir 4
4, 1
39
Administration, Support and Space , , . ,
Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations
. .
39
and Regional Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . .
?
41
Priority National intelligence Objectives . .
.
44
Poet Mdrtems and Validity Studipn
?
45
e A
1 .
.
47
xmg tne use or Eatimatas . . . . . . . .
.
49
ONE Guidance on ORR and OSI Research Programs
.
49
Estimating Relationships between ONE and the
USIB Agencies ... . .. . . ? a ? 0 4
DD/P ONE Relations
? ?
50
ra a
54
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happens to a government, is
bureau.cratic
ot responsibility, but
y so poorly defined or so asibiguously
action gets lost. It includes gaps in
also intelligence that, like a string
of pearla too precious to wear, is too sensitive to
bo need it. It includes the alarm that
k but also the alarm that has gone off so
disconnected. It includes the unalert
the one who knave he'll be chewed out
he gets higher enthority out of bed.
contingencies that occur to no one, but
eryone assumes somebo4 else is taking
care of straightforward procrastination,
but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement.
It includes, in addition, the inability of individual
human beings to rise to the occasion until they are ware
it is the occasion--which is usually too late."
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B Z C R E
A. SCOPE
1. The production of national inteUigene estimates as a
coordinated effort of the United States intelligence ccmmunity
ham been under way since the establithment of the Office of
Rational Estimates (ONE) in the Fall of 1950. The structure
fOrmate and the principal procedures in estimating have shown
subetantial continuity down to the present time. At its present
stege of evolution the estimating process constitutes a
remarkably small eveluetive effort at the apex of the broad
collection and analytical efforts of the intelligence community.
A guiding doctrine in the shaping of the system to date has been
the separation of estimating from policy in order to assure the
preeentation by the intelligence community of unbiased core
mp
hensive judgments to the policy makers. In this climate few
zerticipants in the estimating system will hazard a, guess as
to the influence of estimates on policy declaims.
2. The critical nature of the estimating function has made
the system the object of relatively frequent top-level Government
review and evaluation. The /Waver Commission Report of 28 December
1948 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa COmmittee Report of 1 January
1949 examined the subject in detail and laid. much of the groundwork
for the establishment of the Office of National Estimates. The
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tnspector General conducted a "Survey of the Office of National
Betimates" in April of 1954. A Task Force on /ntelligence
Astivitiss under General Nark Clark isaued a report in Nay 1955
dealing at length with estimating. Background material in the
Clark Coelattee files dealt with most of the key issues brought
to our attention during the current falspection.
3. Another medium for more general discussions of the
poses and problems of national estimating haa been the
eearterly Studies
in *anima
now in its sixth year. Many
meMbers of OM of the Board of National Ettimates, and of other
eomponents of the intelligence community have contributed
firsthand accounts and judgments .zn. important aspetts of the,
sUbject,
4. 7ins'iiy, in the past 12 eonthe the joint Study Group on
the Frei ga letelligence Activities of the United States Government
and. the present Director's Ad Noe Conmittee on Organisational
Natters both chaired by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick have completed
studies with implications for the estimating process. These were
explored orally by the inspectors with W. Kirkpatrick,
5. A three-man team from the Inspector Geneeells staff spent the
months of July and August 1962 reviewing primarily the orgenizetioe01.
and management aspects of the national estimatiug process. The
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bulk of the 0 was concerned with the Office of National
Batimatea which provides most of the apparatus and the day-to-day
coordieation of the community's effort in national estimating.
Discusaions were held with all meebere of ONE tuvi the Board of
National Estimates, with maw other senior officials of C/A and
with selected, contributors and users of estimates in the
Government.
6. An Aemney inspection of this intelligence community
system necessarily stopped. short of a detailed examination and
comparison among the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
member oreenizationa of their levels of efforts quality of
performance, and standards of manegmaant. Sech review would be
essential to a occedinated USIB effort to appraise and improve
the estimating protess. The USIB community approach to estimating
was freqpently characterized to us by its participants as a loose
federated cysts= of very uneven qgality and performance. The
US/B does not maintain a formal management group to analyze and
propose soletions to non-substantive community problems, for
example, in estimating. in the peat the excellence of the
example set by the sr estimators appears to have been the
principal stimulus to loved commuaity performance.
3
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7. This
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of the estimating prate a vou1, 143t be
complete vithout xuntjoi of the continued presenee at the helm
he Office of Ma tonal Estimates of Sherman Kant, who has
prdbably made the Jar t individual contribution to the present
highly respected statuxe of his office. We encountered a wide
range of warm pe Atonal tributes to NV. Kent.
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d. OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
(1) MISSION. The Assistant Director for National
Estimates Is charged with the production of
notional intelligence estimates.
FuscrIoNs. The Assistant Director for National
Estimates shall:
Direct the production of national intelligence
estimates. This includes the setting of
priorities and the assignment of production
responsibilities among the components of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and among the
intelligence Agencies of the Federal
Government.
Prepare national intelligence estimates for
issuance by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sit as Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates.
Provide CIA representation and intelligence
sport at the Staff Assistants level of the
National Security Council Staff.
(f) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence
research agencies.
(g) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence
collection agencies.
KES1CF';-E
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8.
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Directive (DC
and 5 whiob establish under the United
the Joint Atozic Energy Intelligence Committeei AIM)/
the Oui4e
Missile end Astrceisutics Intelligence Committee (ONK1C), and the
Scientific Intelligente Committee (SIC) incorporate a stard
paragraph providing for the participation of these Committees in
national estimating. The inspectors encountered no concrete
proposals for the modification of then* direetivee.
9. Within CIA the Office of National 3st1mates iie a s designated
amponent of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligencep and
Hogulationr---lpecifiee that the Deputy Director
) (DD/I) is "responsible for directing And
the activities of the Office of. .tit.National
." The relationship between DD/X and Assistant Director
/mates (AD/N2) has varied with the incumbents
psrt on the relation desired by the Director of
with his AD/NE. The is an evident need for
spin the DD/X f3.3.r and promptly informed on the programming of
SYSTEM
productien of natjj,
n National Secur C
Director of
I and 4 and
ecord
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10.
of
d
time of 12 *era eels
on indefinite temre to
vet/lance to the natioz
been selected for their
NET
the LD/X clearly will need to oversee
his staff in ONE and in other DOI
ecocjijatiei or full identification of
wean hineelf and the Board of National
tywoblems.
Convege#fiL
law% Effittmktea
bee the Director of Centul ntellivence
both sulketentive and procedural
imating process. Present members hee
Wan or military experience in academic
etittoulr or intelligence pursuits. Ito Board is thoroughli
integrated into the ONE structure but its members are freed of all
administrative duties. The AD/NE- Is Board Chairmen there is a
deputy chairmen, and the Deputy Assiatent Director f onal
Estimates (DAD/NE), who- is responsible- for the administration of
the- Office, is also a nether of the Board.
U. The Board's existence rests on the authority
rhere is no eognizseee of its existence and reactionsin the
-
ives of the National Security Council. DCID 1/1. spells out
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BBC i T
Board ftcticn
in setting terrn of referencein
final presentation to the IflL.
d wee an integral
IL
of the national e timatingprocess.
comPcsition and purpose were visualized, ver, as an assemblage
of independent authorities of the highest national reputation,
acting in a corporate capacity, to develop the stbatantive produt
of the estimating effort. This concept has been substantially
modified through time with the growing profess onalism of the
Istimetes Staff. The Board enjoys the services of many gifted
individuals, but the demands of coordination have restricted their
contributions in the strictly creative sense of conceiving estimates
and highlighted their skills in criticism and negotiation.
13. A secon4 feature of the eNvaution of Board functions has
been the sharp reduction in the functioning of the floardes
eorporate body In coordinating estismtes. The given estimating
project is today steered through the system by a panel of two or
three Board mothers, one of whims is designated chairman with wide
'Muds to impress his personal views of coordinating procedure
on the community effort. 2fficionqy in coordination has risen
through the years end the pedal approach with the use of strong
ark on estimates,
ting estimates for
or
early years its
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Chairman has enabled. the Board to handle * larger volume of
business without community complaint concerning the ob4eativityen
fairness of the process. Questions concerning the selectionA
career nenegpmento and alternative uses of Board talents are
discuseed in detail in Section C of the eurvey.
14. imq piptUpass parr is s group of iteUtnce officers
maintained in ORR to perform the final drafting of national
estimates. nose men are responsible first of all for keeping
themselves comprehensively informed on the areas or sUbjects for
which they have assigned responeibility. Their effectiveness at
drafting derives from personal commend of a alibJect field and tram
utilisation of the estimative contributions from the intelligence
communit . Their product may in tura undergo substantial
modification at the bends of members of the Board of Malone'
actimates and during the interagency coordination of the draft
prior to its submission to the usu. The growing =potence of
the OBE staff boss been a notable feature of the evolution of
to date and has oontributed to a relatively autonomoue status for
the staff vie a vie the Board it OW.
15. The measure of s staff man is his ability to wish
events and trends tm the given area or subject field, to make
perceptive judgments of their significance for intelligence and
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caiarni.cate these ideas effec
variedorally or in writinS to the ranks of Government officials.
Jectivity of analysts is of the essence both in the preparation
of a draft estimate, a commissioned memorandum or a self-initiated
appreciation of a foreiga situation, and in its defense before the
Boerd of National 4stimates? and sUbseseently in the market place
of the intelligenee and policy emagemity. The characteristic
influence of such experience on the individeel cannot yet be fully
appraised, but there is an evident premium on initiative and.
forcefulnesa. There is a distinct pall on the most aptly suited
individuals to move from this arena of evaluation into positions
of =amend both in crA and elsewhere in the Government.
16. The_SuRport Staff provides for the administrative needs
of both the Board of National Sat/mete* and the Metleates Staff.
se activities include maintmnance of an Information Control
t reading Pini reference rooms, a atlicatione and Reproduction
unit, and research, secretarial and clerical services. There is a
sUbstantial volume of pUbliehing and dissemination of revised
drafts of estimates, much of it occurring outside regular vorkinS
hours. The skills and dedication of the staff were eidely
commended by ON3is professional members.
9
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17. The etimative product may
&mending on
nature and urgeney
ke any one of nany
the problem being
ith by the policy 'salters of the Government. The majority of
e papers are oommdssioned by the DCI, the Mite Nouse
taft, the policy planning ns lam of the Department of State,
olicy task forces, the joint Chiefs of Staff and other rUitary
authorities. There is a substantial demand for
stitivememoranda by the DCI and the USIB and, final4
of self-initiated GBH staff and Board memoranda.
henne1s forat in estimates are informal and vary from
between outside re questers and webers of OM to
asninta delivered either directly from the DCI or
via the /I.
18. The USIB or the DCI on its behalf awt apprOve the
ached ins of a national estimate. The USIB approveseach
quarter a program of national intelligence estimates for the
succeeding six months which is prepared by the Board of National
1etinateeThe next step is the preparation of
for the 'mate which define the subject to be covered, and pose
the quest one to be answered. The terms of reference drafted
in OWS and eUbmitted to the USIB agencies for revise. ftpre-
tstivos Ueignated by the UDIS aaeneies to coordinate the
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SEC113 T
ibility
Ibut
ar delivered to tbe Betimates
etiritea teas
cnsieation.
The dtatin8 of estimates is b d lar the
rGrGtive of ORBami is the source of sometenton on the
art of tributors to eetirntea in other agencies. The problem
a to a cohesive estimate written in =effective styae.
uch on uazat oce in the last analysis, as the performance
f one tn4iiri&i*i It yes fras the individual drafter
of pertinent tion bdm ability to focus ai
sential problemai and his skill
presenting then lucitly en4 conviacingly. The authors of
ntrtbutton fran the otherageneies inevitably tend to
Uen8e the. style, if not the judgments, in the final druft
UI to 5ti: the 4iseard of their ovn conscientious and
ds to draft the est
of referenees nrv to
production of
one from all sources.
and & designated
to for Board
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WO'
2sena.
ettarta ak of osastinent mons the participants far radicai
change in the basic foetuses o the grates. There sr* a =dew
help to sec for this stability. One of the
et i,oa?tazrt is that Oat las Wen able to attnert hiIoclibefr
4th the wrking stensphere. Mt is
it offers both the freelloss se* the
perfornance by perceptive
partindpent to relex in costrortehle
3IY imtriglged., to prove a relatively
A
responsible? for the areas
eat constructim and sty
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A
is
handl 1 facto and background
garded as immorally setts.
Its en the Ixthereert limitations
h in more dotal belov. litzt
xpressims of renact and
92 A
te record. or etthetentive eeoculaishment Particular satisfaction
esivressed 'with the demsnstftted asipadaur or Olit end the ZOVI
in deueral to he *e so veil as coordinate the
tive judgments on, military subjectsies sometime* involvia*
that the ailitery had failed to analysis or coordinate
ly themeelme* Zedependent civilian analysis or
p.Obleme wee considoriktlar et least onothe st observer
significant current contributtm oft*
yst to the notional security* kleuVr intiviftal*4 the i*zs
always an Intangible one as to concrete
e, thet the ci,trcommitments otithe othertheir WU
estimative judgawntscat ea2*nc . *Wow*
the objectivity mad usefulness of
11J U*djjOb3 produgted tor CIA.
0
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.reiW
114Prease4 Win billow
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C I It 1!
COPpersci orb present biii
ey tins pm:some' in the
black or vats and such
be inceof late. The dame
tea regular
?
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of use
livelY ambling* 4)f
ee protossionel moottlignoers
ttOfl to the sUbstentive questions et
investments in the research
d 'trees of responsibility
vorld, geo.4poli+4cal
military werPons
cm
ettieb, community
OW. %commendations
of Us survey.
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S 3 C
Po:Li.
28. We interviewed all profeseional and clerical personnel
on the ONE staffs. The staffs currently havorThro
personnel on board out of a Tb 0 of. Without exception
were favorably impressed with the dedication, intelligence, and
intellectual curiosity of each of theOprofessional officers
we interviewed. It is significant to note that each of these
officers admires and respects all of his staff colleagues, both
professionally and personally. Morale except for the oVererowded
working conditions, is excellent throughout the staffs.
29. Each nember of the Board oflational Estimates (UE)
rates staff personnel as high-auslity and outstanding. The
reputation of the staffs is also high with other CP ocmcnents
as well as with outside departments and agencies.
30. The backgrounds, experience, and intereeta of staff
personnel are to a large extent, remarkably similar. Almost
every e did undergraduate ne/or graduate work in a social
science at one of the better known universities. Many have had
teaching experience, and there seems to be a continuing desire
to write for academic journals. Interest in an academic career
has never completely waned, and currant job satisfaction is
attributable in no small measure to the academie and intellectual
atmosphere pervading ONE. A large number of staff personnel
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served in OCI and/or ORR and a few in the Deputy Director (Plans),
/P) before coming to ONE. The other staff personnel were
recruited directly from the universities. All employees inter-
viewed felt that the blending of Agency and university people is
an ideal arrangement for ONE.
31. Despite the fact that the miteffs are only three under
professional strength, ONE has had considerable difficulty in its
recruitment efforts. At the univervities, ONE has encountered
stiff competition from the academic community, business world, and
other Government agenciea. Since OM has had only limited success
in university recruitumnt, it would seem that most of its people
in the future will again have to be recruited from other CIA. comPo-
nents. Many able employees in other CIA components aspire to work
in ONE but their supervisors are naturally reluctant to lose
these good people, particularly since they too have serious recruit-
ment problems. To avoid animosity and friction with these compo
nents, OXE should begin to develop a program wherein the careers
of its employees should include rotational tours in attractive
positions in other parts of the DD/I as well as in the DD/P. At
the same time other components should seriously consider and plan
for the assignment of promising talent to ONE for a tour of duty.
These components would be more willing to release people to ONE if
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they were assured of getting ONE people on occasion for a specific
tour of duty. (See Recommendation Ro. 1)
32. ONE staff personnel today expretia little interest in work-
ing elsewhere in the EIDA area. This attitude is at least sympto-
matic of a condition of overcoapartaentation in the DO Offices.
These ONE personnel now view the other DWI Offices as offering only
routine assignments and limited headiroomfbr advancement. Sharper
delineation of a ED/I career service with assurances of opportunity
to we with mere freedom through mere areas of DD/I operations
should tend to remove the present scuewhat parochial attitude. At
stake for the IINNJA is the cultivation of a corps of officers who
appreciate eutimating in relation to other DIVI programming prob-
lem* who bring versatility to their assignments, and who regard
the entire DIVI as an exciting place in which to 'work.
33 ogS has had a large turnover of staff personnel over the
years. At the tine of the 1954 IG Survey, there were 29 officers
serving on the ONE staffs. Six remain today, of whom four are
serving in supervisory or specialized capacities. There is an un-
written philosophy in the office that personnel either go up or
out, and we believe that this is a mound philosophy. When we
**insider that the national intelligence estimate is one of the
moat important studies produced in the United States Government,
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it is Obvious that ONE must be stared with t
people. The caliber of the pre
and when an estimator dernontrates outstanding talent and. interest
in this type of work, a career service would preebly take
these factors into account in career planning.
34 it is generally recognized that four to five years of
estimating for it people should be followed by a
change of scenery to permit the development of fresh approacheu
and nay as and to prevent stagnation. A periodic change of
scenery would be rewarding if it involved rotation to another
stimulating assignment, a sabbatical at a university, or an
overseas tour. An overseas tour, wherein be would acquire area
twkaround and experience, would be refreshing and invaluable to
the individual as well an to the Agency. The individual would
return to ONE with added knowledge and expertise, and his overseas
performance may serve to eliminate some of the barriers and
prejudices that exist between DD/I and DD/P personnel. We are not
suggesting that the DD/P fill classical clandestine positions
overseas with ONE personnel, although we believe that some of them
could serve with distinction in such positions. Nowever, do
believe that ONE personnel as well as other DD/X personnel, could
make significant and valuable contributions as substantive intelli-
gence advisors to chiefs of station.
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g CERT
a. The DD/I end .AD/: develop a long-term e
pogrsn or 0113 staff personnel carefully artissIsted
with the DD/I career planning policy.
b. The DO negotiate with DD/P the establiiflt
of at least five slots--to be furnished by the DD//-
at major stations in critical areas of the world and
staff these positions with DO officers assigned to
render close sUbstantive support to chiefs of station
in the respective areas.
a. ONE vacancies be announced in DD/P staffs and
divisions and the DD/P regularly nominate qualified
officers for each vacancy as possible candidatee for
staff service tours in ONE.
35. ONE seems to concentrate its
t efforts on the
selection of people with specific ares bacIgrod. and knowledge
tn certain areas) such as Africa and Latin America it has been
virtually impossible to find these specialists. We have been
repeatedly advised that an area backgrowid may not be as essential
to the drafting of good estimates as the ability to think clearly
a write with facility. Experience over the years has demonstrated
thatmagy of the best estimators bean their ONE careers without
any specific area background. Althsugh ONE should not abandon its
search for specialists) it should devote more attention to filliag
existing vacancies with top-flight 2nnerslists who are clear
thinkers and facile writers.
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36. During the past two years there has been an increasing
number of requests for special estimates and memoranda emanating
from the White Nouse and other high echelons of the U.S. Govern-
ment. This has resulted in an increased workload on some ONE
staff*, particularly EB and FE. There is no evidence that this
workload, which has required considerable overtime, will decrease,
especially since we have learned that the ONE product is respected
and read with great interest by the highest levels of Government.
Under these pressures it would be infeasible for ONE to recruit
generalists to fill certain existing vacancies, since even the
best generalist would require some training in the estimating
field. We believe that the problem can be resolved by increasing
the ONE staff T/0 by six professionals. These officers, while
eerving in an on-the-job training capacity, could also assist with
some of the workload. As they pick up more and more of the work-
load, the other professionals will presumably have more time for
reading and thinking. Some 0311 staff personnel have commented
that they sorely miss the opportunity to read the literature and
reflect on developments in their area field of specialization.
They consider the knowledge acquired from a review of this liters-
ture to be a vitally important part of the estimating job. Addi-
tional staff personnel would also permit more flexibility for career
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p].annii parpcaee and rotational tours as well as assure OR
of adeeyatemanpower to fill as during emergencies. Da view
of the tine money and effort that goes into the entire estima-
tive process and the importance of the end product, the addition
of six professionals, one for each staff (see Recommendation No.
4), in a temporary training status e a vary small investment.
Zt is recommendedithat:
The DWI initiate neaeesery stepe to
increase of six 7rofessional ositione in
'Intimates Staff to provide incnvesed flexibility for
the AD/NE to arimtnister his personnel progrmm.
No.
37. ONE staff personnel commented favorably on the profes
1 competence and cooperation of the CCI and ORR personnel
vith hat they work. The assistance, support, and contributions
provided to ONE by these offices aro considered tote very good
Way staff personnel previously served in these offices, and
this has helped. ixemaeurably to develop the excellent rapport
relationsand which exist between them. The entire present cle
nt of the E Staff, for example, all came from either OCI or CRR.
other hand as is critical of OBI. Specifically,
I contributions as being too generelised and
dng facts 051 believes that ONE should be more specific in
tin tar of reference . It seems to us that the two offices have
a &L. icult time communicating with and understanding one lino her.
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has ever served e. tour of duty with ONE, and we suspect
that his mei be acontritjng factor to the lack of understand-
ing between them. We believe that a resolution of the problem
cod begin with the aesignment of an able OBI officer to ONE to
York on papers dealing with military-scientific problems. Papers
of this type have accounted for a considerable part of the overtine
work required of some staffs.
!eccnez54 that: No. 3
pt a policy of fiL1in one of his
th an officer fram OSI serving on
Ottj0nal basis.
39. In the organization of the ONE staffs,
of Latin America and Africa in one staff seems i
unrealistic. This combination may have originallybees a matter
of administrative convenience. However, in view of the increasing
Vor
ldly importance of each area per se, we believe that the Latin
America-Africa Staff should be divided into two separate staffs
one for Latin America and one for Africa. We do not feel that
the nunber of people working on any given area should necessarily
determine whether that area should or sbould not be a separate
et afr
mat ion
ble and
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It is reconded that:
The AD/NX divide his present ice
Staff into separate staffs for the two regtone and
pureue as a staffing objective the maintenance of
three or four estimator specialists in each of the new
units.
No.4
4o. ONE apparently views elevation to
ship on the Board
of National Estimates as the only financial method of rewarding its
best estimators. Many staff personnel do not necessarily aspire to
the Board, since they feel that the Board has insufficient oppor-
tuntty for creative work and they would much prefer to continue
drafting estimatee. Staff personnel respect many Board mem:hers
and they feel that Board guidance and suggestions often strengthen
the final estimate. However, when excellent estimator* are
promoted to the Board, their talents and value to the Agency are
diluted, aad they are truly not doing 'that they are best wall.
fled to do. The importance of the estimate by itself should
require that the estimate be drafted by the best available elan.
We feel that the DD/I and the AD/NB together Should determine the
worth of aperticular estimator. If he is considered to be tops
in his profession, the DD/I and AD/NB should be permitted to
'remote him up to the 0848 level without changing his position
or altering his responsibilities.
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a reonmended that: No. 5
th the Director of Pereorinel devise a
permit the promotion to super grade
d estimators without changing their post-
tions or responmibilitiee. This should be done with
the utmost discretion and only in those cases where
it is determined that it is in the best interests of
the Agency.
41. We discussed the feasibility of the a
Service and military officers to ONE staffs on
ILLEGIB
nt of Fbreign
onal toure.
personnel do not consider this to be a sound idea, since the
development of an eetiaat1rig skill is in many eases a time-co
nsujdx
chore. There are a few examples of military officers on active
duty who in the past served with the ONE Ettimaten Staff, and only
one of these vas considered to have mode a, worthwhile contribution.
FUrther, Foreign Service and military officers mey not consider
such an assignment to be particWerly beneficial to advancement
within their own major careers, which are usually outside of the
field of intelligence.
42 On the other hand, many ONE staff personnel are favorablY
disposed toward a rotational assignment for themselves with a
pDlicy planning group in the Department of State or Department of
Defense. Senior policy officials in State and Defense remarked
that they would welcome ONE personnel on their staffs for tours of
Such an assignment would permit the intelligence officer
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to gain ficant insight into the extent that policy plsnr
is tnfluenced by natio
telligence estimate ilLs back-
experience in the estimative process would also permit
him to mike valueble contributions to intelligence-related policy.
He would be in a position to utilise his intelligence contacts to
asetet the policy king machinery to the MC/ULM extent feasible.
The intelligence officer would retura to ONE with brooder knowl-
edge and experience which would enable Unto draft his estimates
to be more reeponsive to the needs of the
is reccomended that:
DIVI arrange with appropriate State and
officials the assignment of elle ONE staff
officers to their policy planning staffs for
speCific tours of duty. Beciprocol orrangements
should be encouraged.
licy makers.
No 6
43. Over the yearn certain DD/1 positions have been co
to be the excluelve pre
currently
etp.necl to s
of the moot igport
e.g., the DIVI himself, a memloer of the BNE
jobs in the Agency:
DANNE, and the
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DAD/CI respectively. Alt
timating background in the
R t T
recognize the need for some
job, we feel that there are
DD/I men outside of ONE who may also be well qualified for this
job. We have been advocating greater career planning for ONE
personnel but we do not mean to imply that the better DD/I jobs
be given exclusively to ONE. We feel that one of the ways that
other wiz offices may be made more attractive is for the DD/I
to designate all positions as DD/I slots rather than as slots
belonging to a specific office. Within this framework the DD/I
can till assure that the best estimator will spend most of his
oareer in the estimating field. At the sane time morale in
other /X components will be considerably strengthened by the
knowledge that ONE is not getting preferential treatment for the
better jobs. We stress the need to assure that interesting and
stimulating careers are planned for ONE personnel,but we do not
feel that the impression should continue that certain jobs are
available only for ONE men.
t is recommended that:
No. 7
The DD/I insure that any of his ealoyees with
proper qualifications will be considered for any
existing vacancy in his directorate. Care should be
exercised to insure that no position, particularly
those overseas, be identified with any one DWI
office.
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of
h ii ible for the
reference
with the
amettme
ion process. i4es
evoidAer4iont
sbsr gedwith,rewamability
tn
&Auld
it4
*rawermitly as MOerd Chairmen,
Of these 12, two have bum
Etit sinai its inception: four ere
one i* tr4iicr economist **lathe Office
three retired,genorel itati flag
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reekotfieem the thiee services. Of the remaining
two members one has aims& baftrotesd and mei to the Mr a
decade ego fromECAehils hie collesque? *owing *oath* State
Department, joined the group not long after. A senior etation
chief from the Deputy Direetor (Plane) will join the Mbar& in a
few woks. With the exception of the retired selitery and soma
of the DO office alumni, the Datrd outer* have been lap:lace
for over half a, deiced..
46. The ortensl Sowed vita =WeedOf idUSle
asselevina es "outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in
the field* of strategy, political science, economics, and other
social sciences.' V* believe the conoept of haming both out-
siders and insiders, as it mere, on the Board is a healthy one.
The pollitaity of eventual promotion to the Board gives the
semi= staff weiber s goal. The outsiders bend to the AelmaY
free* atigratch aid heir to stifle any tendency towards intellectual
intmeatims-
47. It is ent7 difficult to attreAt
heccsemi-permanent matters of the Doer& The inspection teem
believes the concept of-part-titer or ehopt-tera kelt ere from
the outside is to be eneannete. rOT several years aseiber of
the ?VI:metal faoulty has spent the bulk ofhis eussew balder
30
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selected because of their aver-all skill
t solely because of their past military
The icy of harin a representative from
each of the three military services on the Board be
reconsidered.
49. We would favor bringing one or more senior foreign
service officers and a scientist onto the Board. The nature of
the Board does not lend itself to rigid delineation,of the type
of individa1 desired. Once again, we stress the need to insure
that indivicimal is selected solely because of his outstanding
qu.sJ.iftcations. TO get the high-level foreign service officer
ONE seeks, it will probably be necessary for the DCI personally
to approaeh the Secretary of State with a request for the
services of an individual of aMbassadorial rank and definitely
one who has not retired. In the case of a scientist), since there
are a limited nutber of NIMIs with scientific overtones, we
believe he should be sufficiently broad to be able to deal with
problems outside his own field--possibly the type of individual
desired is a proteeaial writer on scientific subjects.
T
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o apositirn. re
U Una woos.
r opportunity should bet provior the
=hens rsre. in no, tyro 41, to
zti of ormativiV. We aria of the *pinion
inarpoiter availablat l*re Oat id =it
lattellortual.4 and that soot
ia naoessary 4
ti
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Ccnault&Lt8
ly 1952 there hes been a cont
aeeociate leading civilian specialists in international affairs
and former members of 0103 with the CIA &temente of the estimating
process. The roster of consultants now stands at 23, including
two in processing. Nine are former members of the Board of
tionnl Bstimates and three are farmer asters of the CM
ime.tes Staff. Available consultants are assembled periodically
at Princeton University as a panel to consult with appropriate
Board and staff members on current estimates and estimating
problems. The frequency of meetings during the early years was
eight times anntall,y. Currently this is declining to an average
of four meetings per year. Several of the consultants serve
periodically In OltMs and ottani in Government azeigements are in
frequent contact with the Agency on official business.
54. The original objective In establishing the consultant
panelwas to obtain independent expert jud nt on national
seciartty problems and to guard against gaps and deficiencies in
staff and Board analysis. But the increasing professionalism
of the performance and the superior sources of Information
available to ONZ bave combined to alter the nature ce the consuitsi
rlationel2ip. Workin.g staff were virtually unanirsous in their
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judgment that the relationship had lost its principal intended
value. It is now described as a one-'s y relationship on
sUbstantive problems in which the consultants are recipients
rather than genuinely constructive contributors to the ONE
analysis.
55. The potential value of the individual consultant is
by no an ruled out particularly in areas and sUbject fields
where ONE experience is 3knOted or where the pre-eminence or
freshnees of view of the potential consultant practically
guarantees useful discussion. In the case of the Princeton
panel, however, the ONE staff finds the corporate approach often
superficial and time consuming. No satisfactory way has been
found to prune from the panel those mailers who by staff consensus
have ceased to make useful contributions.
56. Panel procedures were also criticized. with respect to
the time allotted participants?usually overnight?to familiarize
themselves with the texts and critical problems analyzed in the
estimates. An inordinate amount of group time is then expended
making up for lack of "homework". Preferred approaches to
consulting would include longer sessions with smaller groups
thoroughly prepared for the discussions, or employment of thi.
consultant at Headquarters to assist in the drafting of the
estimate.
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anti
. The coneultents provide- a
lal vales in pronoting favorab
in assisting ORM vith its
prdblema. 3wh bef its are difficult to measure
questionable vbether the present composition of the
penal represents a broad. enough approach to the universities
the matter of eountering hostile attitudes tovards intelligence.
The teem did, not find convieeing evidence that the consultants
had lived up to their potential in either field.
58. In summary, the frame of retreence for the present ORE
ultant program has changed dme to the growing eonPetenoe of
personnel, the lack of flexibility in reahing experts vho can
a significant contribution, and due to growing dissatisfaction
with the consulting procedures.
Mo. 11
Preeti
sue a policy of ccoisultation with
regarded by his staff and Board
tiro coeitributions to specific
drafting phase.
Lit?E4
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Ulapeous Pro*tma
aro, $pce
5R. ONE has succeeded over since it inetian. it keeping
ito administrative? support and ea,retartal elerents to a minimum.
Out of a total on board strength of secretaries
or typists and a Support Staff of nine, The latter group is
composed of an Deformation Control Branch of who perform
the normal document routing and registry functione for the office.
The group also handles document logging for the DIVi's immediate
office. A Publications Drench of iadividuals cuts stencils
on the drafts of US's, proofreads drafts and printer4s galleys
of NIE and rums off such other documents as the Daily Status
Report. The Reading Room Branch with a. staff o dies the
library facilities in the special intelligence area.
60. ONE is having a difficult time in finding and keeping
adeqpate clerical assistance. ONE'e situation in this regard in
not unique but is a part of the leaver Agency problem of
encouraging secretaries to commute to the Headqearters Building.
The teem does wish to record its belief that ONE requires a
high priority for secretaries in view of its alreade spartan
staffing arrangements and if necessary, its clerical grade
structure should reflect this priority.
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d by the
o6.12 who is of ONE s charter ears
responsible for preparing the budget looking
looting and supervising the secretarial.cierical
office. She has no designated assistant or deputy. The team
understands that in her absence the administrative problems that
cannot be postponed until her return sre ied. on a
tch.as-catch-can basis. We are of the o1ninn that ONE
have a designated individual, in the grad, range of OS-7 to 9,
assisting the Administrative Officer and trained to take over
during her Absence.
it is
recommended. that:
Ihe take steps to acvi.re a slot earl recruit an
Assistant Administrative Officer.
6e. The moot serious 'Into complaint voiced to the
tean was the prdblem of crowded working conditions for the
stStee Staff. With the exception of the staff chiefs, the
are two or three to a rCCM6 Privacy for the sodwioi
ful ideas couched in finished prose is unavailable. A
mer of staff meMbers indicated they wrote the bulk of the work
No. 12
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over the weekend eben 4 modicum of privacy ix available. it would
appear to be outrageous economics to house the comparatively
well-pait estimators under these rabbit warren 3-audition*. We
believe the minimum adequate for the individvel is a single room
however small. If space is available elsewhere in the Readquarters
structure other then on the seventh floor, we believe the need for
space outweighs the convenience of being close to OME's front
office.
63. Security is also a potential problem under such close
working conditions. There is a diffusion of responsibility, and
when in a small complex, such as the Et Staff witl "people,
some individuals have special cleeranaes while others do not,
risk of compromise is ever present.
1t ie,receemeleded thltl No. 13
The AD/ME request the DD to make the stremost possible
representation to the DD/S to mike minimal adequate space
availdble for the now badly overcrowded letimates Staff.
Weeirk Survey of Cold Wiiwr Crisis ittions and RegiOnal?SurveYs
64. The "Cold War Survey" evolved ea an OM plication about
a year age. The creation of the weekly is very largely in response
to a re-TWA from General Maxwell Taylor, thee Military Adviser
to the President. It is understood to be for the cemsumption or
top volley level readers and net for the country specialist.
43.
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Sta-Asy preaenta a capsule judgment of crisis
65. The
erea4n eseence almost an OCT handling of crisis situations.
tive quality of ONE is brought into play by the function
of a weekly review of current and potential problem areas and the
decision as to Which merit attention. Ths NU process is brought
to bear by means of a Mnard 0314.111042, interagency coordination and
OSTS approval. The format of the Survey calls for the introduction
of New Situations" changes in areas discussed in earlier issues
and a checklist of watched areas.
66. Normally crisis situation are discusae1 on Fridays by the
Board and Staff eenbers assigned to the Survey aIong with two
sUbstantive representatives of OCT. The OCT personnel normally
draft a third or more of the publication. The Dnip does not
participate in the initial drafting. However," his comments are
solicited on each draft prior to final publication. Prom first
composition through USIB approval takes from Hands4y morning
through Wednesday noonof each week.
67. This plication differs eram the weekly report of the
ifttch Committee in that the Latter covers military- -hot war?situatioas
while the Cold War Survey is more deeply Involved in judements of
political situation*" which in some cases have obvious nilitary or
eoueterinsurgency overtones such as recent Indonesian...West New
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a
been advised that
a
Committees general coverage is probably going to be
to the Sino-Soviet Bloc military threat. Such a development
would throw a greater workload an the small group producing the
Survey and their numbers may have to be enlarged. OCI is probably
the place to look for such assistance.
68. The survey team discovered mimed readership interest in
the pUblication. We were repeatedly assured that Oeneral Taylor
found it very useful and liked the present foembr.t. A senior
State Department official stated he read it faithfully and never
found any eurprises" in it. A senior Pentagon official reported
that it has a vide readership and that it is a 'meta publication.
ONE ?tat generally were of the opinion that the publication is
too costly and adds little to an understanding of the areae
Involved. In view of this mixed reaction, we believe that the
views of the intelligence community should be solicited from time
time.
It is _cainen Ikat:
No. 1.14.
poll the intelligence eozsmznity periodically
the continuing usefulness of the Cold War
of 1962
t native Revie
ed a new publication
This publication
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is designed to provide a general estimative outlook on an area
as a Whole, the kinds of change considered likely to occurs and
the foreseeable contingencies which might precipitate such change.
We feel that such innovations are to be commended. Anamelysis of
regional interrelationships should prove to be of value to
policy n'uore concerned with sueh Obis
lye
70. ID . 1 lays on the DCI responsibility for
identification on a current basis of Priority National /ntelligence
Objectives (PNIO's) and for their issuance to the inteiligSnes
*casualty. 1110's should be valid over a period and limited to
thee* eritieal factors requiring special attention aver and above
normal collection and researdh efforts. The FX101e hems beau
divided into four broad categories or criticality snd disseminated
as per Dom no. 1/3 (Revised 7 arch 1962). 0M3 staffs out tha
PNIO's annually utilising the WEE coordination mechanism.
Submiseione are received from contributing agenele84 an
is coordinated and the final draft goes to US1S for %wove...
suggestions -were proposed for rolifying the xistingsyst
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d Validityudies
71.
rtam is a study prepared after the completion
of a uaticmal intelligenceestimate to record and highlight the
deficiencies and gape in information pertaining to the estinate.
The study is coordinated and approved by the MIR and disseminated
as an official USIB document. Essentially the post-mortem
represents a guide to the collector, but the extent to which the
collector relies on this study per se is dubious. There is
naturally considerable overlap between the deficiencies recorded
in a post-mortem and the regular requirements samitted by other
CIA components and the rest of the intelligence community. The
fulness and value of a post-mortem is questioned by ONE, but
two examples were cited wherein specific collection action vas
undertaken in apparent response to a post-mortem.
72. Initially a poot-mortem was prepared rwtinely after
the completion of each estimate. Fewer post-mortens were prepared
in succeeding years despite an increase in the nunber of estimatee
since ONE often considers a post-mortem unneceosary and of dubious
value. There appears to be no clear-cut policy pertaining to the
preparation of post-mortems. Today a post-mortem is prepared
only if the drafter or chairmen of an estimate or a MIS
representative determines it to be worthwhile.
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73. The validity study is a review of the last estimate on
a given sUbject to determine how accurate that estimate appears
to be vith the paesage of time. It is usually undertaken about one
year after the completion of the estimate and just prior to the
beginning of a subsequent estimate oa the same subject. The
validity study is coordinated and approved by the USIB and
dsse4'nted as an official MIS document.
74. We understand that initially validity studies were
regularly prepared for most estimates. The number of validity
studies has decreased immeasurably over the years, since OBS has
conaiderei studies to be too perfUnctory. OM feels that
it is more useful and valuable to prepare a study assessing the
validity of estimates completed over a period of several years
On 4 given area or subject. Here again, the policy is
and the decision to prepare a validity study is left to the
am of the drafter or chairman of an estimate or to 4
reet om a USIB representative.
4t LarOc0mos46a4
So. 15
The AWES, in consultation with USIB representatives,
ostoblieh firm guidelines delineating the condi ions under
which a post-mortem or validity study be prepared.
SEM
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te
is read with great interest by the highest levels of Government.
Noweer, it is still dwbions whethex the est1te is read as
extensively as it should be throughout the Oovernt,. In view
of its importance and potential Impact on the making of policy, we
feel that a eampaign should be undertaken to insure that the
ast1ste definitely reaches all appropriate senior officiels. In
this =action, we suggest that a personal copy of each estimate
be sent to appropriate officials in State and Defense e.g., en
ASS tent secretary. This copy should be accompanied by a persona
letter from the Del, DDCI, or DOI requesting am evaluation and
omments on its utility. We feel that a promotional program of
this kind will eventv411y insure a weater use and infitiaa0a of
the timate on the policy-me-1E5ns ar-eratus.
rlooMMaadel,that: No. 17
The DWI transmit a personal copy of each estimate to
lected Govermnemt officials to widen the realerahip and
increase the influence of estimates among policy maters.
Each copy should be accavextmlby a personal letter from
the rica, DDCI, or op,' requosting an evaluation and commenta
on its utility.
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offer
where
natio
can be etre lined
CERT
ve suggestions and call a
ces may be required to pre
to problem areas
contributions for
estinates. In this way the research programs
be more respoosive to upcoming ONR
reqpirements as well as to anticipate and ellmtnate unnecessary
duplicative research. Regrettably in pest years ONE only glanced
at these programs and. reacted in a vary perfunctory manner. Rowerverk
ORE took time and responded in some detail to (RR's latest research
program. ORR was pleased and impressed with ORS's critical review
and sutione. Constructive criticiam of research programs is
a salutary and useful natation and serves to develop a greater
uaderstanding between producer and consumer. ONE should be
encouraged to review these programs regularly in a detailed and
aningful manner.
It is recommended tbe,
latissat
18
AD/RE insure that ONE review and comment constructively
MR and OS/ research programs on a regular basis.
]ionshi,s between cam and
an A
APP4
?rence has been made previously to the limitations on
ction of an interagency process. There are severe
restraints identifying both substantive and management
deficiencies in other agencies and ia making practical
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serckanism or a White
with thie sUbject caeprehens
81. Assiamment of substantive Juriedicttonz to the ETh
les ae provided in =ID L. 3 is regarded by zany MIX
aa unnecessarily rigid. There is no obvious merhimism
for reand redress When the level of research and estimative
effort of egiven USD agency is regarded in am deficient.
Of e obeervers expressed fear of aiueoeaserzr duplication
Of effort. the agencies. Quite to the eontrary, many
the right of any agency to prepare estimative
contxibntiz? on any subject and endorsed the proposition that
the iein agency institute its own research program to
re4 the iW4Oiee it identified in the program of another
agency. CIA research on milltary defense systems and on economic
'abloom in western eountriee were the two examples on this point
ly cited to us.
The V= specialised committee (e.g., the rzcientific
lligence Committee) do not appear to emplgy a policy of
eoarUnatLon of their estimative contributiona consistent with
thedoctrine on this subject employed by the Board of lational
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a
ohs
of eitch other
te be
believe that both
or two *aril discussions of
tha the notes of such discus
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as a major element of
press of business on senior officials ot
AVE and WI provide the leadership in
discussions.
*ccndthat:
No 20
establish the prairy of o1d4n tato4ace
appropriate *et el the ter terms of reference
estimate; that the aotes o
to the ;resent terms of re
stieste.
WTI%
-pm a validity studies 'by
te studies 5OUM take poor
fled. On the end)ject
loess. lave easisentel
xfs timattne are resarded
of performance 13y the
of bringing pressur,-,*e to beer
no standards and no
objectivee coneer
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*election, trax4ng, and career management of estimators. There
Is no formal provieion for community review of the staffing end
progragesing efforts of each member mange, for enforcement of
deadlines, end for correctioa of deficient personal performance
in writing end coordinating estimettee drafts.
1:tjs_rIcamairded that: No. 21
The DD/l in concert with the Assistant to the Da for
Coordination propose to the CB13 a review of management
aspects of the MIS estimating process for the purpose of
recoraimg agreed deficienates in estimating eerformaace,
*proving procedures, eetablishing standards of personnel
selection and career management, and evaluating periodicall.1
the Objeetives and levels of renearch effort in the
intelligence evades.
85. Mere le no formal reviresent that the DD/P provide
regeler contributione to the national estimatiowenveess.
However, DD/P seggeostions are invited on the echeduling of topics
for future estimating and on the terms of reference for specific
estimates gettingtmOer way.
86. Mot ONE staff with Whoa the Object wee disavowed
ocmaidared that their ccammnication with the DD/P was satisfactory
and that the DD/P s becoming ineressingly freak and *cooperative
In deacribing its programs and objectives in as under
estimative analysis. Exchanep of personnel between the two areas
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has been rather limited in the past and this survey has
recommendations on this sUbject earlier In this Section.
87. Apprsisal of the significance of estimates to the
DD/P involved sUhstantive questions which could not be full/
investigated within the scope of the present inspection. An
example illustrating the fact that RIR's and operational programa
are not always in ac4ord concerned estimative views on covert
action projects now under wey in' taffseebers
observed that, in their judement, these projects in the
past have been oriented too narrowly to the support of
political factions hostile to any sonemmodation of their parties
vie a vie th41-7 Without judging the merits of this particular
issue, it would seem essential that wide disparities of view
between the DD/P and the DD/I be recognised and re-examined
frequentler. One =ens of insuring sudh exchange of views would
be to solicit DD/I-ORM comment annuakly on the Related Missions
Directives of the DD/P for foreign cowitries. The DD/P should on
such occasions brief key DD/I personael on the seneral scope of
their covert action programs. Re recommenthttion is offered on
this point sines it applies to DD/I-00 relations in general and
not alone to the ONE-DD/PrelsAdonebip. In addition, the small
size of the OW Estimates Staff ansi the heavy workloads carried by
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major in=
the major Objective here is
Titre a sharp appreolation
it
estimators
operating prdblerm of intelligence oonsumers.
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