MACHINE SHOP #2 OF THE NKMZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A004900020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1A
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
25
r SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
Machine. Shop #2 of the NKMZ
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE Ia. SECTIONS 793
AND 794. OF THE V.S. CODE. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE.
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY AR T R PROD TIE OF THIS REPORT IS PROHIBITED.
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THIS Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS. 2
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SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
1. Machine Shop #2 of the NKMZ (Novo Kramatorsk Machine Factory) is one of the
principal manufacturing shops of the plant. Its main purposes are the machin-
ing, assembling, testing, and completing of manufactured items. Machine Shop
#2 works in conjunction with other production shops of the plant as a servicing
shop.
2. The following items were manufactured by Machine Shop #2s bridge cranes (assembly
and special) for various purposes. Their lifting capacity varied from five tons
up to 350 tons; mining elevators with one or two drums. The diameters of the
drums varied from three meters up to six meters; coke pushers; gas generators;
coal disintegrators machines for cutting station tunnels for the Moscow subway;
tubing and tubing rings for subway tunnels; gear reducers (spur, bevel and worm,
single-step and multi-step, standard and special types including reducers for
rolling mills of the largest sizes); ball mills for making coal powder; single,
production conveyor belt (a very large "Bandwagen"); excavators; hydraulic presses;
winches, etc; the shop also, did the machining of separate machine parts.
The volume of output of the shop in 1936-1937 was 1000-1200 tons per month or
12000-15000 tons per year. the operation of NKMZ was 25X1X
recognized . to be a profitable one for the first time in 1940, and for that year
25X1X product n to have been 1000-1600 tons per month and 12000-19000
tons per year. egarding the, production for 19)40, I lalthough th2e5X1 X
quota per month was 1600 tons the production never actually reached that figure.
The total number of workers and epployees in the shop was approximately 1600.
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The dimensions of the shop building are approximately as follows:
(a) length, without accompanying building and annex, 185 m; width, 100 m;
(b) total length, i e length including accompanying building, 193 m;
(c) area of shop building, 18500 sq m;
-(d) area of accompanying building, 800 sq m;
(e) total area of the shop, without the small side addition, 19300 sq in.
'6. The shop had six working bays, the names of which are as follows:
Bay #1 - small machine tools
Bay #2 - medium machine tools
Bay #3 - boring machines
Bay #4 - large
Bay #5 - gear-cutting machines
Bay #6 - assembly bay
7. The elevation of bridge crane. tracks above the floor level was about eight
meters for the machining bays, about 12-15 meters for the First floor crane tracks
in Bay #6, and about 18-20 meters for the second floor crane tracks in Bay #6.
8. T]-e office of the shop was situated in the accompanying building. This was a
three-story brick building, which adjoined the shop. along the end opposite Bay #6.
,On the first floor of the accompanying building there was a room called the "red
corner" (for recreation hours and meetings). The left wing of the "accompanying
building" was occupied, by the "PVKhO" - Anti-Aircraft and
Anti-gas-Defense. There was also a lateral addition to the shop which was brick,
and served as an auxiliary compartment of the shop. Some auxiliary wooden struc-
tures of a light type were in the bays of the shop building. 25X1 X
The framework of the shop building was of reinforced concrete,
The (inner) supporting columns, beams under crane tracks, and constructions sup-
porting the roof were steel. very large glass-covered area of the walls and
roof-windows provided good daytime lighting from both sides and overhead. 4indow
casings and frameworks were of steel. The non-glass-covered area of tfse roof was
covered with tar paper, The shop floor consisted of a concrete
base, covered with hexahedral woo en pieces soaked thoroughly in creosote. The
floor was covered by a thin layer of tar.
10. The electric supply of the shop was a step-down transformer substation, which was
located next to the shop on the same side as the accompanying building. The main
disconnecting switches were oil switches. There was automatic protection. The
wiring system was of a closed-cable type. There was three phase current and a
voltage of 380v. The overhead main lighting was from small wattage bulbs under
reflecting shades. It wasp quite insufficient for work in the bays. At the working
places, additional bulbs were. used.
11. There was hot air heating in the shop. Hot water was supplied by the electric and
heating power plant.
12,, Water supply was from the plant water supply line. Drainage connections of the shop
were connected with the master drainage system and all the waste water was drained
off to the river Toretz.
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13. Transportation of materials and equipment to and from the shop was performed
by the intraplant railroad on flatcars and gondolas, drawn by switch locomotives
or motor railroad cars. Bridge assembling cranes, driven by alternating-current
electromotors, were the main intrashop transport facilities of Shop #2.
Each machine bay had two cranes. Bay #6 (assembly bay of the shop) had three
cranes, which were located on two floors. On the bottom floor there was one
crane with a lifting capacity on the main winch of 40 tons. On the top floor there
were two cranes with a lifting capacity of 10 tons each.
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Lifting capacities of cranes of the other shop bays were, from
15 up to 30 tons. Battery powered trucks were the shop's second means of
transport. The shop owned some of them. They were of 112 ton and 22 ton capacity.
Loads were also carried on hand carts and by hand. The transfer of heavy machine
parts between the bays was carried out either by the cranes of Bay #6 or by railroad
flatcars in the front part of the shop. In the first case, the cranes of the
machine bays would go out on console parts of crane tracks, and lower loads into
Bay #6, which was serviced by itw own cranes. In the second case, loads were let
down on a railroad flatcar, and the latter was either driven to the necessary bay
by a motor railroad car or, very often was pushed by hand.
14. The basic equipment of the shop included the following metal-working machine-toolst
Lathes
Turret lathes
Horizontal milling machines
Vertical milling machines
Keyway milling machines
Stationary drilling machines
Radial drilling machine
Movable drilling machines
Planing machine
Shaping machine
Vertical boring and turning machines
Boring machines
Grooving machines
Broaching machines
Lathes for boring center holes in cylinders
Disk saws
Hack saws
Surface-grinding machines
Cylinder-and-cone grinding machines
Emery grinders
Vertical gear-cutting machines
Horizontal gear-cutting machines
Gear planers.
Gear slotting machines
Gear-cutting machines for bevel gears (Bilgram type)
Gear-grinding machine
Case-hardening machine for pinions
Press for fitting on gears
Relieving lathes
Some special tool-grinding machines
Surface-grinding machines for fitting keys
Some electric welding and gas welding (portable) apparatus
About three stationary forge hearths
Inductive furnace for heating up gear and other tires before setting
The simplest pneumatic instruments (drills, hammers).
Some portable forge hearths
The number of units of machine tools per bay in Machine Shop #2 is as follows:
Bav #1 - 120 units
Bay #2 - 80 units
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Bay #3 - 30 units
Bay #14 - 30 units ?
Bay, #5 - L units
Bay #6 - 10 units
Sharpening Division and
Tool Workroom - 20 units
Shop Mechanic's v orkroom - 10 units
Total - 31 units
The types of machine tools installed in the shop were determined by the types
of products which had to be produced by the shop.
The number of machine tools wg.$ determined by the volume of output planned for the
shop.
15. The production program of the shop was considered to be an extensive one both in
volume and in variety of manufactured objects.
16. Machine tools were quite up-to-date at that time (the middle of the thirties), very
often of he most modern design. All of them without exception had one oar more
individtdrives. With the' exception of a small number of Soviet manufactured ma-
chine'tools, all the machine tools were purchased abroad from well-known foreign
manufacturing firms. The majority of machine tools were supplied by German figs, but
th re were English and American machine tools At
I remember the following firms
which s~tpplie machine tools to Machine hop #Z:
ltsquit boring machines, movable drilling
machines
Niles
Schiess-Deffries
Craven
Farrel
Lorenz
Buttler
vagner
Reinecker
Pf auter
Krasny Proletary
boring machines, radial drilling
machines
gear-cutting machines, vertical
boring and turning machines, plan-
ing machines.
lathes
gear-cutting machine
a gear planer and some gear-cutting
machines
planing machines
planing machines and milling
machines
milling machines and gear-cutting
machines
gear-cutting machines and turret
lathes (?)
English firm in Manchester vertical boring and turning machines.
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17.
The most interesting units of equipment were the following:
(a) The "Farrel-Sykes" gear planer of the Farrel firm was installed in
1938-and used for-cutting teeth on gears up to eight in in diameter.
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the maximum width of gears was 2.2 meters; and
t e maximum posse re cut module was about 50 millimeters).
(b) The "Lorenz-Sykes" gear-planer of the Lorenz firm was installed in
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1934_or 1935? the maximum diameter was about
2.5 meters; the maximum wi , one meter; and the maximum module 18 mm.)
(c) The vertical boring and turning machine of the Schiess-Deffries firm
with the face chuck 10 meters in diameter, and multimotor electric drive,
was installeEd in about 1939.
(d) The gear-cutting machine of the Schiess-Deffries firm was installed in.
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1938. the max diameter of a cut gear was
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five or six meters.)
These machine tools, which were unique in the USSR, made it possible to perform
many jobs, which had been impossible in the USSR before their purchasing.
18. The technological job of machining machine part was given to the shop, as a rule,
by the Technological Development Division of the Shop (BTR) for all the machine
parts, which were controlled by the shop. A time quota (norm) was given together
with the "plan", since all work on the fulfillment of a program of output in the
shop was done by the piece. In reality, "the technology", that is, the technolo-.
gical process prescribed by BTR, would be'violated in. the Shop everywhere and in a
very wiac rante. x consiaerable number of violations of the "plan" resulted in
incorrect use of,machine tools. The latter was a cause of increased wear of machine
-tools and even breakdowns.
19. The long delay in operation of the Roughing Shop, (Machine Shop #3,) was one of the
principal reasons for the burdening of many machine tools with cutting jobs which
were'too heavy for them. Machine Shop #3 was put into operation in approximately
1937, while Machine Shop #2 began its work in 1934. Machine Shop #3, which was
equipped with heavy and tough machine tools, was supposed to be employed on
preliminary machining (roughing) of a large bulk of machine parts entering the
machine shops. It was done comparatively late and not to a full extent. Many
'machine tools of Machine Shop #2 were already pretty well worn out by that time.
20. Unskilled machine tool workers and so-called "Stakhanov working methods"., directed
officially "to squeeze out of machines all they can give", were the main reasons
25X1X for the extremely high wear of machine tools and the large number of breakdowns.
21. plans were made to carry out three grades of machine tool re-
pair work: maintenance work; planned-preventive repair work; and overhaulings.
The plant had a large and well-equipped Repairl'achine Shop (Machine Shop #l.) and
a large..fi:hief Mechanic's Division. T':e latter had a notable number of personnel
of the Shop Mechanic's-Division in each shop, and in Machine Shop #2 as well. The
Shop Mechanic's Division had in its staff: fitters, mechanics, electricians, and
electromechanics, both shift and repair. It had at its disposal a shop fitters'
machine room and electrotechnical room. In spite of this, quotas of planned-
preventive repair works and overhaulings in the plant were not fulfilled.
By the time of the evacuation of the plant, that is by the end of the third quarter
of 1911, a large number of machine tools were badly worn out and needed repair. The
reasons for this were as follows: violations of the "plan"; a large volume of rough-
ing jobs; unskilled machine tool workers; "Stakhanovite working methods"; lack of and
poor quality of repair work; and, in particular, lack of spare parts.
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22. The lack of spare parts was due largely to the fact, that the Repair Machine Shop
for a long time (about three years) was engaged in the regular factory production. A
considerable part of its equipment and personnel therefore, was not used for rM)ft
jobs.
25X1 the tTSSR purchased equipment together with spare parts.
the same was true with the machine tools of NKM too. Possibly, it was
this circumstance that caused the Director of the plant to order the Repair Machine
Shop to work on the regular program of output. However, from a practical viewpoint,
this part of its work was performed to the detriment of the plant equipment. It
must be taken into consideration also, that there were numerous breakdowns of such
machine tool parts, which normally were not regarded as wearing parts. These broken
parts would have to be replaced, that is, to be manufactured, in the shortest time
possible. The *bsen of many special tools and materials, which were necessary for
the manufacturing of many spare parts,was a very important circumstance. In
particular, the Repair Machine Shop would often complain about the lack of a series
of pitch mills, the absence of necessary superstrong bronzes, and the fact teat it
was impossible to do case hardening, and to increase resistance to wear on wearing
surfaces by means of other modern processes. Lack of experience among repair 25X1X
workers had little effect on the situation. NKMZ did not get
spare parts from outside, but manufactured them itself in its shops. The exceptions
were such special spare parts as ball and roller bearings, and sets of spare parts
received from delivering equipment firms.
23, Machine Shop #2 had available all the required types of metal working, measuring,
25X1X and fitting tools. the shop only used cutters with "Pobedit",
"Rapid" and "Widia" types of carbide tips. There were a few exceptions: mills
''^ of normal types; twist drills; screw taps; broaches; countersink reamers; cutting
segments of disk saws; gear cutters; and cutting insertion pieces of all possible
types, and the 'like. Cutting tools were made, v of high-speec 5X1X
steels and carbides.
2. The shop possessed large tool storerooms; a good sharpening division; and a tool
work room. They all were united in the so-called Shop Tool Division, which was
headed by the Chief of the Tool Division.
The individual nature of the manufacturing in Machine Shop #2 determined the extent
of supply of the shop with the different kinds of attachments and special tooling.
25X1X those attachments which were not integral parts of machine
tools and, therefore,-were not supplied by machine tool manufacturing.
In practice, the shop used attachments to still less a degree than was planned by
technologists. The explanation might be that manufacturing of attachments and
special tools -very often was delayed. This was due to serious defects in planning
and in the general organization of work in the shop and in the plant.
Attachments were often not manufactured until requirements for their use had passed,
or their manufacturing would be stopped in view of the fact that their actual delay
was becoming evident. It is obvious that this caused deviations in the "plan";
loss of time; and, very often, a change for the worse in the quality of manufactured
machine parts.
25. Fitterst tools were chiefly of Soviet manufacture, Their quality, as a rule, was
not sufficiently good and Soviet manufactured files and hack-saw blades were
especially bad. Besides, there was a continuous shortage of files and hack-saw
blades. The shop was well sup-
.~lied with measuring tools, especially during the
first period of its existence, some of which are as followss_ some complete sets
of limit gauges and limit internal gauges of the second and third grade of accuracy;
a large quantity of precise micrometer tools (including those manufactured by
"Zeiss"); combined slide gauges; slide gauges; tooth gauges; comparators; thread
gauges; feelers; steel folding rules; steel graduated tapes; rulers and tape
measures; Johannson gauge blocks; protractors; inside caliper gauges; micrometer
gauges; and so on. It is characteristic, that such rough measuring tools as outside
calipers and inside calipers were almost absent, and it was one of the most serious
reasons for increased wear on precision tools. The unqualified and careless use
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and treatment of all kinds of tools led to their premature wear and mass
spoiling. Restoration of tools was slower than their.spoiling, and a lack of measur-
ing tools soon resulted. Most of the precise measuring tools, which the shop used
during the first years of its existence, were imported from Germany. Machine Shop
#2 (and the whole Plant, as well) got cutting and measuring tools from foreign
firms (during the first period of the existence of the Plant) from Soviet tool
plants, and from the Tool Shop of NKMZ.
26. Each worker of the shop had "tool tags" (five or seven of them, =)_.25X1 C
and he could get necessary tools in exchange for them from a tool room. Sharpen-
ing of cutting tools, including cutters and drills, was performed by the Shop
Sharpening Division.
27. Planning of production appears to be one of the weakest and most vulnerable fields
of activity of every Soviet enterprise. This maybe explained by the existence
of a series of required actions, which are determined by the top planners, which,
in their turn, are regulated by the soviet system. These actions in their sig t
and most essential part, are extremely binding and mis-direct in many respectsnhIze
activity of any Soviet enterprise. Machine Shop ,J`2 is no exception to this common
Soviet situation. Machine Shop #2 used to get production plans,
each quarter, from "PPO"- the Planning-Production;Depgrtment of the Plant. The
latter worked them out on the basis of the Plant.Department of the Plant. The latter
worked them out on the basis of the Plant Chief Engineer's directions (theoretically),
and submitted them afterwards to the G;ief Engineer's for approval. Then, after
getting the Chief Engineer's permit, "PPO" passed them down" to the shops. In
addition the shop used to get a monthly Program of Output that is a detailed plan
of production for every month in question. As a rule, the Program of Output was
not given to the Shop beforehand, but on one of the first days of the month for which
it had been prepared. This, alone, is an error as it puts the shop in a very
difficult situation. A Program of Output used to be developed by the "PPG" of the
Plant on the basis of the following starting points; production plans;. alterations
which came from the top planners; the latest directions from them; and, to some
extent the actual status of production was taken into consideration
Directors of the Plants would get, in turn.,, detailed plans from "MTM" - iilinistry
of Heavy Machine-Building, yearly plans divided according to each quarter, and
quarterly plans divided according to each month. Every deviation from these plans,
developed on the basis of directions and plans which had been received by "MTM"
from the government, was regarded as a violation of the law and was punished in an
appropriate manner. These plans, of course, used to be "passed down" to the Ministry,
of Heavy Machine - Building and last of all to NKMZ. Besides, in the course of all
the period of time'which they embraced, they used to be repeatedly subjected to
corrections by top planners, and to practical "post factum" alterations, which rose
mechanically during the course of work.
Breakdowns in the planned program for Mach.ne Shop #2 were caused by the following:
(a) Impracticability of the volume of the plan
(b) Impracticability of the variety of items in the plan
(c) The tardy delivery of t'=e plan
(d) Frequent alterations and additions
(e) Lack of advance scheduling of production plans for foundry and forge shops
in comparison.with those of the Machine Shop
(f) Fixing of a complicated and unorganized system of prices, nomenclature,
working hours and quality appraisal, setting the plan and preventing its
fulfilment.
(g) Planning the production of the shop for each month and its bureaucratic
interpretation
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(h) The general inefficiency of the system of planning itself, striving for
foreseeing, discounting and prescribing for subordinates all to the
smallest details. The initiative of subordinates was suppressed and
their activity was retarded by petty custody and control. Impractic-
ability, absence of flexibility and a formal, absolute inviolability
of plans, also existed. Further explanations of this problem are
unnecessary, as a mere examination of the above-mentioned facts, which
are the actual original causes of all the principal troubles and defects
of the shop, is sufficient to point out the manner in which they
influenced the activity of 11PRB" (Planning-Distributing Division of the
Shop), and all the administrative-technical board of the shop or
practically, the operation of the whole shop. It can be affirmed, that
plans of production and programs of output, brought about nervousness
and disorganization in the operation of the shop. However, the shop
management used to obey directions, as it had no other choice, and
alwqirs used to "pass down" this program to the shop. The Chief of the
Shop would deliver the "program of output" to the "PRB" of the shop which
would then prepare the necessary documents and deliver.them to the shop.
These documents were the basis of work in the bays. Besides, the "program
of output" used to be read at a meeting of foremen and other leading
employees-of the shop. (The Chief of the Shop used to call such meetings
several times a month).
M. Machine Shop #2 was one of the principal manufacturing shops of NKMZ. T1,e supplying
of the shop with necessary production materials, basic and auxilary, and with
fabricated articles bought from other organizations was. the duty of the Supply
Department of the plant. These materials were delivered to the shop from ware-
houses of the Supply Department, and were put into-the intrashop storeroom. Being
a "production" shop, Machine Shop #2 used to get the main bulk of intermediate
products and unmachined machine parts from the "preparing shops" of the plant. All
kinds of forged pieces, steel, cast iron and non-ferrous castings, steel structures
and wood were included in these intermediate products. Machine Shop ##2, in its
turn, delivered to the other shops: machine parts, machine units and finished
products and components of machines, manufactured by these shops (for exam le:
gear reducers, compressors for mine elevators, stopping devices, and so on).
29. Outside coordination,in comparison with that in German plants, was extremely narrow.
Practically it was reduced to delivering separate machine parts, machined by
Machine Shop #2 and necessary to other enterprises for their production and to the
purchasing of fabricated standard articles, which were available in storerooms of the
Supply Department of the plant. As a result, a considerable part of the shop
equipment was not fully used or was used irregularly (the latter applies to the
shop personnel too). For example, the gear cutting bay of the shop was constantly
underloaded. The same applies to some individual machine tools of the shop. On
the other hand, the shop spent much energy and time on the manufacturing of a large
amount of small parts, which in normal conditions would be delivered by small or
specialized enterprises. This circumstance reduced very considerably the shop's
volume of production, increased its cost, worsened quality,athd.led to a general
underuse of the potentialities of the Shop. The collective use of electrical
equipment was one of the few examples of outside cooperation. It was organized
comparatively satisfactorily. Assembly and sup 1 of electrical equipment for pro-
ducts manufactured by the shop, F_ I was taken care of almost2 5X1 C
without exception by a state projecting and assembling organization - "Yuzhelec-
tromontazh". There was an outside coordination division in the plant which wag 5X1 C
25X1 C called, "OZS" (Department of Orders and Sale).
its service inc u e to a considerable extent,delivering of products, .chiefly
forged pieces and castings) manufactured by NKMZ for other plants of the USSR.
Besides electrical equipment,-Machine Shop #2 used to receive from outside such
products as fittings, fastening machine parts, rolled steel, rolled non-ferrous
metal, bronze intermediate products; brass, leads babbitt; paint materials, wood,
leather, ball and roller bearings, acid other standard materials and products.
However, the shop used to manufacture for itself even such special products,,as oil
pumps, compressors, air distributors and regulators of pressure for mine elevators.
This latter was not done in Germany, as it was extremely impractical. There was an
enormous need for outside cooperation (for the plant and from the plant`), but this
was badly organized in NKMZ, and in the USSR in general. The explanation is that
there are some basic tenents, inherent in the Soviet system, and the system cannot
be improved in the USSR.
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30. The actual staff o# Machine Shop #2 included the following categories of workers
and employees:
$ Num-
bers
Total
Category number
of
nn =
I Machine tool workers 800
2 Assembly-fitters
Foremen and assistant
foremen
4 Instructors
Welders
250
Shop Tool Division 60
personnel
Shop Mechanic's Division 80
OTK of the Shop 15
10 PRB of the Shop 40
11 ETR of the Shop 40
12 The Shop Bookkeeping 15
Division
13 Chargers
14 Binding men ' 30
15 Unskilled workmen 100
16 Auxiliary categories 40
of workers and employees
17 Personnel staff of the 10
Chief of the Shop
.Altogether 1600
Notes s
Workers of all qualifications, who worked
on machine tools, and were engaged in works
included in the "production" of the shop.
Fitters engaged in the assembling (and
finishing) of production of the shop.
Among them-senior foremen and chiefs of
the bays.
Highly-skilled workers, sometimes
graduate engineers or technicians.
Marking out machine parts for further
machining.
Electrical welders and gas welders.
Distribution, storeroom, sharpening
division, tool work room.
Fitters; machine work room and shift
fitters; electrical technical work room
and shift electricians; crane operators.
The Shop Technical Control Division.
The Shop Planning-Distributing Division
The Shop Division of Technological
Development.
Bookkeeping, calculation, estimating,
timekeeping, cashier.
Workers (often-technicians), supplying
machine tools and crews with machine
parts and materials necessary for work.
Workers servicing transfer of loads by
cranes.
Unskilled workmen and adult apprentices.
Painters, carpenters, storeroom men etc.
Chief of the shop, chief of the shop
assistants, secretaries, typists.
personnel.
(Notes The above list provides only approximate figures.)
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31. The primary manning of Machine Shop #2 with skilled workers and with engineers
and technicians was done by means of the following measures: Shifting people
from the Old Kramatorsky Machine-Building Plant- sending people from industrial
centres of the'USSR (Leningrad, Moscow, Sormovo) from enterprises and planning
organizations; sending people who had just completed secondary technical schools,
universities and trade schools. Then graduates of the Plant Trade School began
to appear. At first many people were employed for adult apprenticeship, they were
chiefly from the local population. (Some of them were so-called "contractors").
After some time they formed a considerable percentage of workers with low qualifica-
tions. In addition some workers and employees of all qualifications would come
voluntarily from other places, as it was still possible at that time (in the 193015).
There was a noticeable separation of local workers and newcomers among the employees.
Local people lived chiefly in Kramatorsk, Slavyansk and in the Belenkaya, Krasnaya
Gorka, and other settlements, located near the railroad line, at a distance of
approximately 30 kilometers from'NKMZ, in Konstantinovka, for example. The
majority of them had private dwellings. Many had been living in the region for a
long time. All of them, almost without exception, had kitchen gardens, which were
very important for their nutrition. Many were emigrants from villages and had
connections with it somehow or other. They traveled by special workers' trains to
the plant and back and lived somewhat better than the newcorPr.s. Many of them
were Ukranians. At the end of the thirties there were somewhat more than a half of
such local people among t're worke, , and less tnan a half amon ~, ei aisors. The
newcomers lived chiefly in Sotsgorod, in the old town of Kramatorsk in plant houses,
and in settlements of private houses which were being'built in the Kramatorsk
region. The 16th Section of Sotsgorod was populated almost exclusively by plant,
supervisers. The 15th, the 17th, and the 18th Sections were populated almost
exclusively by plant workers. The qualifications of the majority of workers and
employees of all categories were very low during the first years, however, by the
time of the evacuation of the Flant at the end of 1941 the Shop was composed of
satisfactory personnel. The rising of the general level of qualification was due
to a considerable extent to acquiring experience during work. However, the
following played an important part too: Graduates of the Plant Trade School; a
permanent influx of young specialists from universities and secondary technical
schools from other cities; different kinds of courses for all the categories of
plant workers and employees, including "courses of technical minimum" for workers
and "foremen courses". It is important-to indicate that the Kramatorslcy Evening
Machine-building Institute in Kramatorsky was operated up to 1936 or 1937. Many
of the Plant employees studied there, and, in particular, some of the technologists
and planners of Machine Shop #2. The total number of graduate engineers working
in the Shop was about 30, and there were about 20 graduate technicians. 11
32. The organizational structure of Machine Shop #2 was typical of most of the sh4V9fX
NKM.Z. The approximate chart of this structure, ZEnclosure (A) was neither
constant nor absolute. On the contrary, it repeatedly underwent alterations -1
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Moreover, many senior employees of the shop,
came to the conclusion that neither of those charts was practically
satisfactory. he necessity of fulfillment of the state plan of production on the
Soviet basis was the' foundation of the administrative structure of the Shop. Because
of this there came about an exaggeration of the part which the planners of the "PRB"
and, partly, "BTR" shops had to carry out. Rights and functions, which were much
more extensive than they should have been, were misappropriated by the "PBR".
Employees of "PRB" constantly assumed administrative functions. This circumstance
lessened the authority, and removed, to a considerable extent, the responsibility
from production employees,from senior foremen and their staff, in particular. In
the bays, orders often came from too many people, and these people were, moreover)
not linked by a direct mutual subordination. Owing to this, orders often were
contradictory and provoked discords and controversies. In the course of working,
the correct procedure even if it did occur now and then, was lost as a rule.
The organizational structure itself, and -ethods of its practical realizations
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introduced series of blank spots into the work of the-staff of the shop. In
particular, the fear of a "functsionalka" (the organizational structure by which
a quite definite and strict distribution of functions between employees takes
place) compelled the administration to force employees of the shop to the mutual
overlapping of functions and caused a destructive parallelism. As the Administration
of the shop saw the poor results of the work of the shop and understood that they
stemmed to a considerable extent, from a degree of imperfection in the organization
of work in the shop itself, the Administration would often strive to make corrections.
As a rule,-however, no serious improvements were seen due to the fact that they
only reflected insignificant shades of view of the shop management, and could not
touch on the faulty foundations of the organization which was basic to the Soviet
system.
33. It-the Soviet system work brings: a plan from above (as a rule, an impracticable
one); forced fulfillment of tl:e plan as a basic method; extreme material poverty
of the personnel of the shop; .a common absence of interest in a real finished
product; a low discipline and a "poor ability to be conducted" of all the personnel
of the shop; the interference of-the Communist Party organization, and some
times of the trade union organization into the administrative functions, and their
constant influence upon the personnel (influence which is misdirected in most cases).
The absolute dependence of Machine Shop #2 upon the preparing shops, which worked
unsatisfactorily, was the special feature of the Shop. The Machine Shop mechanically
reflected the whole sum of faults of the preparing shops in t}.e form of defects of
production and the non-fulfillment of the program of output.
The points mentioned below should be considered the "special features" of the work of
the shop: The above-mentioned unsatisfactory state of the organizational structure
of the shop carried over to the general management of work in the shop; frequent al-
terations of the organizational structure of the Shop; a very frequent replacing
of the management of the shop (for example, four chiefs and most of their assistants
were replaced during the period from January of 1935 to July of 1936); a chronic
non-fulfillment of production quotas; (Machine Shop #2 was considered to be
one of the most'Uifficult" shops of the NKP41Z); low efficiency; the very low level
of the development of outside coordination creating a situation which led to the
irrational utilization of equipment and general facilities of the shop; 'sack of
opportunity for the specialization of people and equipment within the limits allowed
by the type of the manufacture; low quality of production; the presence of first-
class equipment and a very good building; three-shift work on machine tools; two-
shift work on assemblage; a sufficient number of personnel; a work week of 48 hours
(daily) for workers and supervisors officially. However, many categories of
engineers, technicians and supervisors (the latter-chiefly of senior categories)
worked actually many more hours a week, and, moreover, without any supplementary
payment;'the presence of sufficiently qualified specialists and workers. (However,
the general level of ?ualification of personnel was low. By the end of the 1930's
the situation with regard to the .;ualifications of_ personnel improved very much.);
a very low general level- of operating efficiency; the staff of "OTK" (Tecbn.ical
Control Division) (Inspection Division) of the shop was insufficient both in quality
and in quantity; insufficient lifting capacity of cranes in Bay #6; and a common
lack of load-lifting facilities and machine tools in the assembly section.
31..
As it is shown on the "Approximate Chart of the Organizational Structure of Aachine
Shop #2 enclosure (Aj7 the shop mechanic and the chief of"OTK" of the shop, together
with their divisions, are not subordinated to the . ;_ef of the shop.` They are
subordinated in their work to the Chief Mechanic df the Plant and to the chief of
the "OTK" of the plant respectively. The "OTK" is excluded from t,e authority of
the chief of the shop for the convenience of the Control of the Direction which
supervises the work of the shop, as the management cannot trust he chief of the
shop under the Soviet system. The foreman of the Expediting Department, together
with his group of supervisors and workers, was occupied with: reception of articles
from the shop which had been prepared officially to be ready for freight hanclling;
packing of articles; preparing transport documents; loading articles into railroad
cars; and delivering; them to the railroad.
o& 6 S . ODOZ 1-~TION 25X1
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This group is not included in the staff of the shop because of the following 5
reasons: its personnel working in the shop was changeable- it was sdbordinat2ea,E
shop as well.
to "OZS" (Department of Orders and Sale) of the plant and was
serviced by the Transport Shop of tine plant; and it controlled the work of the
In the second half of he thirites a centralized dispatcher service headed by the
chief dispatcher of the plant was organized in IIKMZ. There was P Central Dispatcher
Department, which was located in the Plant General Office Building not far from
the plant director's ofice. All the shops of NKMZ, including Machine Shop #2, had
dispatcher posts with their own special system of telephone and system of accounting.
The "Approximate Chart of Organizational Structure of Shop #2" does not reflect the
situation completely. One of the characteristics of the normal operations in the
shop was the presence of a large quantity of scrap (made by the shop itself and by
the preparing shops), "defects", and other unproductive work. The average "commodity"
productive capacity of.a worker in the shop (that is the capacity refered to as
the actual output of "commodity" production) was very low. Accordingly, the output
of "commodity" production by the shop was very low too. Ignorance on the part of
the administration was common. In many respects it was impossible for the administra-
tion to study the operation, and consciously move it in the scheduled direction
(course) by means of the most reasonable methods. In spite of the visible efforts
of the administration of the shop (and of the plant), the operation would constantly
get out of hand and would run as if completely arbitrarily. Anarchy was prevalent
in the shop, a direct result of the general state of the operation and the poor
organization of work. The tendency of the administration to fulfill as many
special orders. (discounting the work of the shop) as possible was one of the reasons
for disorder.
3I. The machine bays always 'ad a choice of machine parts for machining, and used to try
to take the most "beneficial" machine parts for that purpose, that is, machine parts
which were the simplest for machining and lasted the greatest number of machine
tool hours. At the same time, being afraid not to fulfill a plan according to its
machine tool hours, they would place the most convenient machine parts on machine
tools. As a result, the bays and storerooms were heaped up with machine parts,
often only needed in the far future, causing the work of the assembly section of the
shop to be greatly delayed. As a rule, the assembly section had nothing to do with
a program of output of a current month in the beginning of the month and, sometimes,
up to the middle of it. The assembly section used to get a full "loading" only
from the twentieth of the month on. In addition, machine parts, as a rule, had
defects, that is, they required more time for assembling than had been specified by
the "plan". Additional time for assembling used to be up to 20 - 30; of the original
time specified by the "plan", and sometimes this percentage was even higher. It is
obvious that in those conditions, a prograri of monthly production could not be ful-
fi.lled on time with the input of a normal amount of working hours.
That is why much overtime was spent in the assembly section during the second half
of a month. Considering that overtime hours were payed in one and one half time more
than normal working time (and the later hours, still higher, up to doable), they
were uneconomical for the government.
Formally, overtime hours were limited for the Shop. However, actually, the director
of the plant used to get permission for payment of a large quantity of overtime
hours supplementarily, since it was impossible to do without them, in such circum-
stances. As a rule, much work on assembling and completing articles manufactured by
the shop used to be finished only at the beginning of the next month. However, the
"OTK" (Technical Control Division) of the shop and of the plant could pass inspection
on products officially, as if performed in a current month. It would be done not
only at the request of the shop, but at urgent requests of the director of the plant
too, since both the shop and the director were interested in "delivery" of goods, that
is, in a formal fulfillment of the plan. Of course, this practice was prohibited by
law, and in politically important cases, it would be severely punished. However, it
25X1
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was practiced everywhere, and the Ministry knew about it. Nevertheless,
nothing very essential for the improvement of the situation at the plant
could be done.
35: The weakest points in the activity of Machine Shop #2 were as follows:
Planning of production and control of work performance.
General organization of work in the shop.
Operating efficiency.
Quality of production.
Intraplant and outside coordination.
Wear of machine too.s and tools (fixtures and cutting tools),
Mora e. of workers and employees.
LL
25X1
25X1A
ENCLOSURE (A): Approximate Organizational Chart of Machine Shop No #2 of NKMZ
B): Approximate Plan of Machine Shop #2 with Legend.
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release e003101 i29 / `I A RD 80-00926A004900020001-7
. ~~r
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% J
55 Boring and Turning Machines
~Z 341 0
39
1
Oj!
30
45
7
F
7
/
1
-J 11
N 5
3
0j
\
U 77
EV
LEJ
4
1
i ~`, I9 /~ 241 26 r'
~4E
54 Casehardening of Pinions
53 'Gear-cutting Machines
52 Gear-cutting Machines
51 !, Press
50 Gear-cutting Machines
of Bitgram.
49Gear-cutting Machine ofLorenz Sykes
4$ Gear-cuttingMachines of less riess
47 ]Gear-cutting Machine Hof Schiess Deffriess
461Gear-cutting Machine ofFarree Sykes
45 AdditionaeAssemBeyAre4'
447ime-keeping Board
43 Shop Gateway
42Shop Gateway
41Paleroad Line
4o;Bonng and Turning Machine
38'Fifters' Benches
378ridgeCraneoFtop Poor Q=lotons
36, ea of Machine7ooes --
35 Brid eCraneof 8ottomfeoor Q'40tons
34 idge Crane 2--LIO tons
33:Fifters' Benches
32 ou8 e-row Fitters'Benches
31 ,
Bridge Crane
Q=25or3otons
Bridge Crane
1 Q=25or30 tons
29
Bridge Crane
I
Q=25or3otons
Movci eeBorin
Machines
27
Beocksforfasten
in m. rts
Cross Passage
251
Bridge Crane
Q-10orI5 tons
24 Confroe Beocks
23IShop Gateway
22
21
20
Layout Beocks
Rate road Line
Shop Gateway
ShoCompressor Room
Intrasho Storeroom
17,
Production Chief s lice
16
Sharbenin Division
15
Office in theca
14
Mechanic's Compartme
13
0Ptice and Storeroom
12
Sho T0
0eRoor
n
Sh
1
op Fo
re R
oom
n,
/0!
Shop La
vator
ies
u' U
9
Bca N-
6
-----
r
r1
r
ii
'
8
B
ay N'
S
^C ^^C] L L 1Li CSC
^
~
^ ^C 1C 1 ^^^ L^^ ~l L~1^^
-
F
L ^
l
-
7
t
i
t
th
Sh
d
I El D
117 ~I it ~I ~i ~i II ~I I.
11F71 1171
I~
En
ran
n
o
ce
e
op
~ LJ J
LJ
I Li
6 ;Bay N-*
4
5_ BaN=
3
Notes.
h Dimensions arein meters.
2Dimensions are approximate.
3.Ex eanations to the specification are 9, yen in the
Expeanatory Report oh the Machine Shop N=2.
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31 Shop Passageway
2 cryN_I
I Ottenu6n Buieding
Num
hers
Name
Scaee
W16-
meter:
Mc
Notes
Approximate Man
oc the Machine Shop N=2
 PechanicsAssis
k ontinMecA.Eq.
Mechanic
foreman
eadsof Fitte
S Crews
Foreman of
Crane Section
Outside
Store s ces
Fitters
Crews
Charger
Heads of
fitters Crews
Charger
Conveying 11 Fitters 11 Conveying 11 Fitters
Workers Crews Workers Crews
Heads of
Fi fters Crew s
Production Chie
of the Shop
Chief
of the Shop
__j I Shift Heads cif
SeniorTooe 8ind.MenCrews
Foreman
Binding
Men
Too? Work
Room Forman
Tooe Work
Room
Cording
Workers
Aosem8t Chief
(Chef%f ay6th]
5eniorAssemeey
Foreman
IDepaty Chief of 7
Ihnic. ContDeparP~~
hied ofTechniarllo
drat Divisionef op
eniorForman filer
Cork?Dir sionofJMp
ShiftInsppeecto-s Shift Inspectors Shift Inspector ShiftInsioecturs Shiftlnspedors
of Bay N:l of 8ayWt of &eyN-3 ~ of of Ns41 of 8ay N' .5
Shift inspectors
of Baydvb
Approved or Release
APPROXIMATE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
of the Machine Shop N=2 of N.KM.Z.
Foreman offx
pedilion of Shop
Section of Expe?
dition of Shop
logicatDevePybm
Senior Forerna
of BayN I
Shift Assistant,
Foremen
Instructors
MnrhineTood
Workers
Shift Foremen
Shift Assistont
Foremen
SeniorForemon
of BayN:e
Instructors) I4eadsoftlochl'I Chargers
lnstrucEors
Senior Foreman
of gay N:5
Shift Assistan
Foremen
Notes
I,The Chief of the$hop,his assistants and the
chiefs of Shop Divisions had secretaries-ty-
pists.
Senior foremen in the Bays had diseou-
ntin ladies.
a.Dis atcher 5eretce fiscal shown onthe
Ch rt,
3. The Machining Bays had ,three-morning,
afternoon and night-shifts.
The Assem8ey SeC'tion hod officiaeey two-
morning and afternoon-shifts.
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Section of Techn.
TimeEsiimati
DistriButors
of the Bays
Technical
Archives
Machine Toot MachineTooe Conveying
Workers Crews Workers