NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A001400030006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 272
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 Arailable on loan frOI the CIA. Library is a transcript of the proceedings of the 25th
Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation5 kakullajafala pn4
Zgeopalisp 4sie,._ Chicago. Illinois, 25..29 May 49. (ilotAg
MI 0
0
Tabeofcontents is
follows&
South Asia in the World.
J. S. Etrnivall
25X1
Eliatalz Lecture
odaym
Round. Table Basic Economic Factors
Introdnction
%Th. Resource Pattern of Southeast Asiam
Karl J. Pelser
mThe Economic Demography of India and Pakistanm
Kingsley Dario
General Discussion
Round Table Developmental Economic PactQra
mAgricultural and Industrial Plans and Problems in South Asia
B. M. Piplani
V'ostwar Pattern of Mewls in South Asiam
Henry Brodie. 62
General Discussion 74
1
17
18
26
43
87
IT
ru. Jo Lectume
mOultural Fazets of South Asian Regionalise
Cora DuBois
CLASSIFICATION
25X1
99
-
STATE
NAVY 4 NSRB
----'
DISTR I Eit5TRT NI
ARMY
AIR FBI
,
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Round Table: Cultural Patterns -. Toward Unity or Diversity?
mTraditional Differences and Similarities in Culture Patterns%
David Mandelbaam 111
?Recent Developments of the Malay Language and Regionalism in
Southeast Asia"
Ooedjatmoko 115
?The Indian Film ... A Survey
Amiya Chakravarty 119
General Discussion 123
VI
Round Table: rolitical Forces
%Problems of Nationalism in South Asia
Harold R. Isaacs 141
*Commaniem and Regional Unity in South Asiam
Milton Sacks 150
1?A Statement OR Political Analysis')
Charles 3. Merriam 155
General Discussion 157
VII'
rublic Lecture'
moc*operation, Competition, and. Isolation in the Economic Sphere
J. So Turr-11
11.1.1.6
Round Tables &prices Stake in South Asia
172
United. States Aid to the Tar Eastm
Henry Brodie, and others 187
mThe Truman Point Tour Prograe
Chester Chart rand., and others 190
Malted Nations Agencies and South Amite
B. M. Piplani, and others 198
mThe Begionality of South Asia and its Contributions to the World%
Jan 0. M. Brook, and others 199
mOommunisa in South We
Soedjatmoko, and other. 201
mA, Policy for the United States in South Asiam
Harold R. ;sous 204
mAmericals Stake
Werner Levi, BRAS J. Morgenthau, 001, T.H. Zierath,
Harvey Perloff and others 209
rublio Lecture
Nationalism, Communism and Regionalism in South Asiam
R. SA Ambassador Carlos P. Mommlo
RESTBIOVID4
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X
Round Table: Eummau...Aaa_ARArgieJal
gAincy Wright, Amry Vandenbosch, Horace Poleman,
0. Barr. and others
XI
&ots of lacLASD_EIL.1
Nationalism and. Regionalism in South Asia:
Cultural Considerations"
John Embree
"Economic Considerations"
Daniel Thorner
"Political Considerat iOne
William L. Holland.
Concluding Statement
J. S. Eurnivall
Adjournment
end.
224
255
241
247
253
255
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SIMMS
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ehiedv.YrnieraoTORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, e4;011 Ihst,teite,/7?17,
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PROCEEDINGS
of the 25th Harris Institute
//NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA/
Phillips Talbot
Director
The University of Chicago
May 25 - 29, 1949
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THE
NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUND .TION
The Twenty-fifth Institute
The Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have
been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait
Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be
known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923.
The letter of gift contains the following statement:
"The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of
a better understanding on the part of 1merican citizens of
the other peoples of the world, thus eEtablishing a basis for
improved international relations and a more enlightened
world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate
information, not to propagate opinion.'
Annual Institutes have been held at the University of Chicago since
the summer of 1924.
Committee of the Harris Foundation*
Quincy Wright, Professof of International Law, Chairman
Bert F. HoSeiitz, Associte Professor of thc Social Sciences,
Executive Secretary
Charles Carlyle Colby, Professor of Geography
Fred Eggan, Professor of Anthropology
Cyril O. Houle, Associate Professor of Education
Lloyd A. Metzler, Professor of Economics
Hans J. Morgenthau, Professor of Political Eicience
William Fielding Ogburn, Professor of Sociology
James Fred Rippy, Professor of American History
John A. Wilson, Professor of Egyptology
which is also the interdepartmental Committee on International Relations
at the University of Chicago.
ii
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The 25th Harris Institute brought together some 50 specialists
of several nationalities to examine the implications of major wartime and
postwar developments in the countries of Southern Asia. As the record of
the Institute's proceedings, this volume contains texts of the public
lectures and of the panel papers that were presented, along with the trans-
cript of remarks (edited in each case by the person who made them) that
were contributed to the general round-table discussions.
Countries included in the Harris Institute's consideration of
"Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia" were: Pakistan, India, Ceylon,
Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The
Institute met at the University of Chicago, May 25-29, 1949. Its agenda
and a list of participants appear on ensuing pages.
In the tradition of a quarter century of Harris Institutes, all
proceedings of the 1949 Institute apart from the lectures were private.
Participants were encouraged to enter discussions freely with the assurance
that their observations would be protected from general dissemination.
While the major papers are eubeequently to be published, this full report is
limited to private distribution among persons partioularly concerned with
the problem herein treated. Recipients are earnestly asked to honor the
classification "Confidential -- Not for Publication."
P.T.
iii
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THE 25TH HARRIS INSTITUTE
PROGRAM
NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN SOIfl H ASIA
Wednesday, May 25:
8:30 P.M., Mandel Hall -- Public Lecture, "SoLth Asia in the World Tod-AY"
Furnivall
Thursday, May 26:
9:30 A.M., P. A. C. H.* -- Round Table: Basic Economic Factors
12:30 P.M., Quadrangle Club -- Harris Institut Luncheon
2:30 P.M., P. A. C. H. -- Round Table: Develcramental Economic Factors
8:30 P.114, Mandel Hall -- Public Lecture, "Cultural Facets of South Asian
Regionalism"
Cora DuBois
Friday, May 27:
9:30 A.M., P. A. C. H. -- Round Table: Cultural Patterns--Toward Unity
Cr Diversity?
2:30 P.M., P. A. C. H. -- Round Table: Political Forces in South Asia
0230 P.M., Mandel Hall -- Public Lecture, "Cc-operation, Competition, and
Isolation in the Economic
Sphere"
J.S. FUrnivall
Saturday, May 28:
9:30 A.M., P. A. C. H. -- Round Table: Amerikals Stake in South Asia
12:30 P.M., Ida Noyes Hall -- Public Luncheon, "Nationalism, Commonism, and
Regionalism in South Asia"
H.E. Ambassador
Carlos P. Romulo
Sunday, May 29:
9:30 A.M., P. A. C. H. -- Round Table: Summary and Appraisal; Reports of
Rapperteurs
Public Administration Clearing House. For details of Round Table agenda,
see Table of Contents.
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M.S. ADAMS, British Consul, Cincinnati (formerly assigned to British Embassy,
Bangkok).
R.O. BARR, Standard-Vacuum Oil Company.
KONRAD BEKKER, Economist Division of Research for Far East, Department of
State.
GEORGE V. BOBRINSKOY0 Associate Professor. of Sanskrit, University of Chicago.
HENRY BRODIE, Special Assistant to the Chief, Division of Research for Far
East, Department of State.
JAN O. M. BROEK, Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota.
41.
CHESTER R. CHARTRAND, Acting Chief, Near East and African Area, Public Affairs
Overseas Program Staff, Department of State.
KINGSLEY DAVIS, Director, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia Univer-
sity.
CORA DU BOIS, Chief, Southeast Areas Branch, Division of Research for Far
East, Department of State. '
FRED EGGAN0 Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago.
JOHN EMBREE, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Southeast Asia
Studies Program, Yale University,
EDWARD ESPENSHADE? Associate Professor of Geography Northwestern University.
J.S. FURNIVALL0 Adviser to the Government of the Union of Burma.
NORTON S. GINSBZOG, Instructor in Geography, University of Chicago.
A.M. HALPERN, Social Scientist, 'Rand Corporation.
FRANK HAYES, Reporter, Chicago Daily News.
WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations.
BERT F. HOSELITZ, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, University of
Chicago.
EVERETT C. HUGHES, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago.
HAROLD ISAACS, Associate Editor, Newsweek Magazine.
MORRIS JANOWITZ, Instructor in the Social Sciences in the College, University
of Chicago.
D. GALE JOHNSON, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of chicago.
PAUL KATTENBURG, Instructor in Political Science and Research Assistant,
Institute of International Studies, Southeast Asian Program,
Yale University.
* AMIYA CHAKRAVARTY, Department of English, Calcutta University, now Visiting
Professor, Howard University, submitted a paper but was
unable to attend the Institute.
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vi
WERNER LEVI, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
DAVID MANDELBAUM, Professor of Anthrepology, University of California.
CHARLES E. MERRIAM, Professor Emeritus of Politica Science, University of
Chicago.
LLOYD A. METZLER, Professor of Economics, Univelsity of Chicago.
MANS J. MORGENTHAU, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.
CHARLES W. MORRIS, Instructor In Philosophy, Univsrsity of Chicago.
HAL 0,FLAHER1I, Director, Chicago Daily News Foreign Service.
KARL J. PELZER, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, Southeast Asian
Program, Yale University.
HARVEY S. PERLOFF, Associate Professor of the Scaial Sciences, University of
Chicago.
B.M. PIPLANI, Food and Agriculture Organization; Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India.
HORACE POLEMAN, Chief, South Asia Section, Orientalia Division, Library of
Congress.
LEWIS M. PURNELL, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State.
EDWIN P. REUBENS, Assistant Professor of Economics, Cornell University.
H.E.AMBASSADOR CAREW P. ROMULD, Philippines Representative to the United Na-
tions,
MILTON SACKS, Foreign Affairs Analyst, Division If Research for Far East,
Department of State.
BENOY SARKAR, Professor of Economics, Calcutta University.
THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, Professor of Economics, Univorsity of Chicago.
ARTHUR P. SCOTT, Professor of History, University' of Chicago.
SOEDJATMOKO, Member, Indonesian Delegation to the U.N.Security Council.
PHILLIPS TALBOT, Senior Associate, Institute of Xrrent World Affairs; Visiting
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago
DANIEL THORNER1 Research Assistant Professor of ?'.3conomic History, Department of
South Asia Regional Studies, Unitersity of Pennsylvania.
RALPH W. TYLER, Dean of the Division of Social S.liencee? University of Chilaio.
AMRY VANDENBOSCH, Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
JOHN A. WILSON, Professor of Egyptology, Universlty of Chicago.
QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor of International Low, University of Chicago.
copoNEZmilaveumviveisathaomIgttaSADFDPIMINPUIANA3Witl, United
4tatee Ar.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Public Lecture
"South Asia in the World Today"
J. S. Furnivall 1
II
Round Table: ds Economic Factors
Introduction
"The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia"
Karl J. Pelzer
"The Economic Demography-of India and Pakistan"
Kingsley Davis
General Discussion
17
18
26
43
III
Round Table: Developmental Economic Factors
"Agricultural and Industrial Plans and Problems in South Asia"
B. M. Piplani 57
"Postwar Pattern of Trade in South Asian
Henry Brodie 62
General Discussion 74
IV
Public Lecture
"Cultural Facets of South Asian Regionalism"
Cora DuBois 99
Round Table: Cultural
V
9 -- Toward Unity or Diversity?
"Traditional Differences. and A.arties in Culture Patterns"
David Mandelbaum
"Recent Developments of the Malay Language and Regionalism in
Southeast Asia" -
Soedjatmoko
"The Indian Film -- A Survey"
Amiya Chakravarty
111
115
119
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General -Discussion
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VI
Round Table: Political Force &.
"Problems of Nationalism in South Asia"
Harold R. Isaacs 141
"Communism and Regional Unity in South Asia"
Milton Sacks 150
"A Statement on Political Analysis"
Charles E. Merriam 155
General Discussion 157
VII
Public Lecture
"Co-operation, Competition, and Isolation in the Economic Sphere"
J. S. Furnivall
Round Table: America's Stake in Soutt Asia
"United States Aid to the Far East"
Henry Brodie, and others
"The Truman Point Four Program"
Chester Chartrand, and others
"United Nations Agencies and South Asia"
B. M. Piplani, and others
"The Regionality of South Asia and its Contributions to the Wad"
Jan 0. M. Broek, and others
"Communism in South Asia"
Soedjatmoko, and others
"A Policy for the United States in South Asia"
Harold R. Isaacs
"America's Stake"
Werner Levi, Hans J. Mbrgenthau, Col. F.R. Zierath,
Harvey Perloff, and others
172
187
190
198
199
201
204
209
IX
Public Lecture
"Nationalism, Communism and Regionalism in South ?eiia"
H.E. Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo 218
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X
Round Table: Summary and Appraisal
Quincy Wright, Amry Vandepbosch, Horace Poleman,
R. 0. Barr, and other,:
XI
Reports of Rapporteurs
224
Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia:
"Cultural Considerations"
John Embree 235
"Economic Considerations"
Daniel Thorner 241
"Political Considerations"
William L. Holland 247
Concluding Statement
J.S. Purnivall 253
Adjournment 255
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THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia
SOUTH ASIA IN THE WORLD TODAY*
J. S. Furnivall
1. The Problem. In this Conference we propose to discuss various
aspects of nationalism and regionalism in South Asia, and you have asked
me to open the proceedings with a talk on "South Asia in the World Today,"
-- South Asia, the vast expanse stretching from Pakistan to the Philippines,
with all its many lands and multitudinous peoples. I appreciate the honor
and I regard it as a privilege to attend the Conference, but, as you will
readily understand, it is only with great diffidence and indeed trepidation
that I venture on so formidable a task before an audience Such as is
gathered here under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Founda-
tion, comprising so many who know so much more than I do about particular
countries of the region. In such a gathering we may assume a general
acquaintance with its geography, the people and the groducts, and my task,
I take it, is to attempt a preliminary survey of the problems that we shall
be discussing in the various round tables. These problems are so manifold in
their variety and so infinitely complex that I can hope to do little more ,
than suggest for your consideration and criticism Certain basic principles
which, so far as they are valid, demand recognition if we are to arrive at
useful answers to the questions arising out of them.
Three things are implicit in the title of this lecture; that the
region as a whole has certain common problems; that it has undergone some
change since yesterday; and that all here have a common interest in South
Asia and these changes. We are here as students and our interest in
affairs is primarily academic. Yet the problems that we shall discuss
are by no means solely of academic interest. The other day, while
thinking over this lecture, I 'heppened to come across a little pamphlet
that I wrote some twenty-five years ago on the first introduction of
quasi-democratic forms of government in Burma. It was entitled "An
Introduction to Politics for Burmans," and in the concluding paragraph
I ran over what seemed to MB already at that time "some of the live
political issues in Burma." Here are some of the questions that I
put. "Should Burma continue as a dependency, with or without home rule,
or should it be independent? Is Burma now capable of independence and,
if not capable st present can it be made capable and in what manner, and
how soon? Must independence inevitably result in anarchy? Or is anarchy
more likely to result from a policy of drift? Would the people be happier
or better off if Burma reverted to anarchy? What end has government other
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than to to stave off anarchy?" I went on to inquire what organization was
needed to ascertain the wishes of the people; what apparatus would best
serve to ascertain the facts bearing on political problems; what
collective intelligence should deliberate on th(se facts. does
this thinking now," I asked, "and where and wher, or is it done at all?";
and finally whose will should decide on policy, on what actually to do -
"who decides what should be done, and how far de officials, the nationalist
party, the large commercial firms and the newspapers contribute to the
making of such decisions?" These were live issue in Burma twenty-five
yeats ago; almost all of them are live issues still not only in Burma, but
over the greater part of South Asia. They are live issues of great
practical importance, and our function, as academic students of international
affairs, is to arrive by dispassionate consideration at practical solutions
for problems which tend only too readily to inflame passion.
Our attention will be directed especially t) the changes which have
taken place since yesterday. The conditions have changed rapidly and
are still changing daily. Yet despite all chang)s the fundamental problem
is the same today as yesterday* the same that it has been from the beginning
of time. It is summarized in the Bible in the first command of God to
man to replenish the earth and subdue it. In moee modern phraseology,
and with special reference to South Asia, the fu.tdamental problem is how
to develop the human and material resources of the region for the greatest
welfare of the world,
2. Today and Yesterday.. The changes since y-sterday are conspicuous
and profound. These changes fill the headlines and strike the eye and the
imagination, so it may be well at this stage to remind ourselves that,
despite all changes, much remains unchanged. Th t turmoil of the recent
past has created new relations in the human spheres, it has put down the
mighty from their seat and has exalted the humble and meek; but no
natural convulsion has transformed the geographical environment. The
Malayan peninsula and archipelago are still the (illy large equatorial
region readily accessible to the outer world, with no part of the interior
more than a few miles distant from the sea. The neighbouring countries
on the mainland still consist effectively of nariow valleys, penetrated
throughout their length by navigable rivers which have contributed to
history by opening up routes to the interior of China; and every day the
newspapers suggest that in the immediate future these routes may once again
play a part in world affairs. The natural resourees too, the soil, climate,
forests and mineral deposits are the same as they have always been, rich
in treasures, oil, tin, rubber, rice, and other wealth that all the world
desires. And the people is still much the sane in point of numbers; even
before the war the proportion of foreigners was nanerically almost negli-
gible, and the great mass of the population, then as now, was preponderantly
mongoloid in racial affinity, with a culture derifed throughout most of
the area from India.
Another matter, quite apart from geography, in which there has been
no change deserves attention on such an occasion ts the present. We may
all agreeethat the fundamental problem is how to develop the human and
material resources for the greatest welfare of the ifice.ld. That is what we
ought to want, and what the inhabitants ?LOA to want. Unfortunately
people do not always want what they ought to want. In discussing the
affairs of other people one is apt to assume too easily that they want what
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they aught to want, and that they ought to want what we want. We may,
at least for the duration of the Conference, attain a high level of abstract
disinterestedness, and study various problems in the clear light of reason5
but the issues will be determined in a world where reason carries much
less weight than sentiment) where people do not know what is good for them,
or know even what they real*y want, and where most people) both foreigners
and inhabitants, have a keen eye to the main chanee. Unless we bear in mind
a living picture of the common man in the villages and towns, the fields
and market places, and especially perhaps the common Man in Western stock
markets, (sir discussions may be interesting as academic exercises but will
be of little practical value to the statesman.
Much then is. unchanged. Yet even where there has been little or no
change the position is not quite the same as it was only a few years ago.
There has been a very great change in the degree of interest in South
Asia. Until recently it was the concern of a mere handful of specialists;
now it has news Value for the public, That is a matter of no little
importande to us here, as it enhances the need for scientific study
that may serve to correct popular misapprehensions. And in the regional
geography, physical, economic and human there have been changes which .
is easier to recognize than to evaluate. South Asia, or at least .Southeast.
Asia as we knew it until quite recently was a child of the Suez Canal.
What will homeen from the new development of air transport? Again, the
natural resources are still what they have been from the beginning of time,
yet the availability of these aesucurcee depends on the human population
which develops them. Before the war commerce and industry were almost
exclusively foreign er under foreign control, -operating almost everywhere
under a foreign government. Now the foreign element is greatly reduced
and the remnant is threatened with expulsion. Numerically, quantitatively
the human material is much the same as ever, but qualitatively the change
tleunts to a revolution, and is indeed the outcome of successive revolutions,
Here certainly we have one main factor, perhaps the dominant factor in
the creation of South Asia in.the world today, It is the child_ of revolu-
tion, of destructive energy, in contradistinction to the South Asia of
yesterday, the child of the Suez Canal and the outcome of constructive
effort. Its natural resources are still abundant, but the accumulated
capital has been destroyed, and the labor diverted from production. The
-nen of business who formerly developed the material resources and out of
their profits set aside the capital for further progress, and the officials
who maintained the public order essential to economic progress represented
the heart ofid brain of the prewar social eyetem; they provided the driving
force and coordinating gaaius. Now the structure whiohthey. erected has
collapsed and they are buried beneath the ruins, On the other hand there
are signs of a new dynallio spirit among masses that were formerly inert.
Why did the prewar structure crash? Should we, essnme, patch it up again.
How, if at all, can we replace it with a new building on more secure
foundations? What part, if any, remains for those who .erected the-, old
building?. How far will the new dynamic sprit suffice to equip the people
with the capital and labcr requisits :or the development of their
resources, and What can be done to help them? These, in general-terms)
are some of the chief questions relating to South-Asia, . But vague
questions invite vague answers. We must try to frame exact questions in
appropriate. terms. This demands an exact knowledge of the circumstances
and a AillittoMPPopki1M6P400167Y2120-biA-Ranitc-OtaAW405:16130tdat-'9 I venture
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to submit for your consideration the following r,.marks. They relate
mostly to Burma; partly because .1 am best acquairted with the:]CircumstanceS
inAluataa.and-partly beau se the:course of.affair6 In Burma seeMe to me
ifor-reasenethat I shall explain, especially instructive and the present
situation there especially important..
, 3.. Burma: (a) Under Burmese E.u.le. Burmai,c.t off from the outside
world by mountains and the sea, farza a natural.rolitical.and econoMic unit.
It has bephAieepled by successive migrations from:central Asia bk"tribes
alit/est exAldsively of indonesian or mongoloid orfgin. Some have never got
further than the border hills, or have been driven -back intd tbe hills
after settling in the lowlands4 The most important hill- tribeS-dre-the
Karens, Chins, and Kachins Their social organization is tribal and not
territorial and the chain of authority is basecton the persdnai relations
between chieftain and dependent. In agriculture they haVe barely advanced
beyond shifting cultivation. Their religion is the complex of ?ituar,
and superstition usualli termed animism, but many have adopted 'Buddhism
eepecia13.y amcmg the Karens and Chins; the Karen s too have taken readily
to Chriatianity, which has also made some progress among :the Chins
Often reckoned with the hill folk are the Shane, cloSe oausine of .the
Siameple Shan and Siam are different pronunciations of'the.same:Word They
arc Buddhists; they have made some progress towards substitutinga terri-
torial social organization 2)r one based on kinship, and many, hays settled
down to permanent cultjvation. The other chief p9cple5- are the Mons, who
long disputed Lower Burma with the Burmese, and the Bu-rmese themeelVes,.
fornine centuries the ruling race. . They are alto Buddhiats-and:agricultu-
rists who have definitely crossed the borderline between 'a tribal- and
fterritorial-socialorganization. Burmese, Mon and Shan, all from time to
time made contact with Indian Buddhism and on this basis they 'built up
iii seclusion from the outer world a common Buddhist ciVilization- with
many attractive :features; notably the absence of caste, freedom:of the-
laamen, a wide diffusion of the elements of literav and harmonyibetween
Church and State. The Burmese king was not only the politioal suzerain
of the hill :peoples but the center of the only cir:i.lization which. they.
:blew and which they tended gradually to absorb. '!ret he ruled them indirect4
through their Own chieftains, and ane critical factor in the Social
evolution of Burma has been the imperfect assimilition of the different
racial elements-0
? Another feature of importance is that, even along the Burmese the vestiges
of a tribal organization had never been finally eliminated. The supreme
authority was vested in the king, regarded with a Iperstitious awe, but
assisted by a council of elders which in practice might hold the,reins of
goverment. There was an elaborate central adminatration, organized on
quasi-tribal lines, but this came into contact with the people indirectly
through hereditary local chieftains who representLA government to the common
man, and whose authority over their dependents wa: :personal and, superfi-
cially, had some resemblance to that exercised by a fepdal lord over his
vassals, It was the circle or township under thir local chieftain com-
prising some fifteen to fifty villages which gave permanat,e and stability
to the political organization, The chief bond of social union was the
conservative influence of the Buddhist religious (rder,.with the Crown
as patron and wth a representative in every village. The religious order
observed what might be termed canon law, but Burmins never reached the stage
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where civil .and religious law are sharply differentiated, The whole chain
of authority was based bn personal relations, regulated by custom which had
the sanction of religion, In general customanufficed for the maintenance
of order There *as no regular army, no police force and there were: .
practiaally no prisons, yet the sufficient force of custom is demonstrated
by the fact that for long periods the Country was ruled by hereditary
dynasties; from 1050 to 1300, from 1600 to 1740 and from 1750 until the
advent of the British. The elements of stability .were the religious order,
the hereditary personal authority of the local chieftains and, above all;
the general regard for custom. In normal times these were sufficientto
maintain social continuity. But the organization was not strong enough -
to withstand any great shock, and the government was always in a position
of unstable equilibrium.
Through successive generations the people had learned the art of' living
together and custom ensured a wide diffusion of social welfare in a dis-
tinctive national civilization. In'its economic aspect this national
civilization was self-sufficient and complete within itself. Its activities
met not merely the daily requirements of the common man for food, clothes
and shelter, but also provided the articles of gaudy luxury,that gave a
show of splendor to the court. It was primarily an agricultural economy.
There was little industry or commerce, and the export of goods was dis-
couraged or prohibited. Social welfare would indeed have been imperilled
by economic freedom for it was bound up with the regard for custom. Thus
the Burmese social organization protected social welfare, but at the:
expense of economic progress.
Here then are the essential characters of the Burmese social order;
the racial elements were imperfectly assimilated; authority was insecurely
based onpersonal relations, and social obligations were regulated by custoni
with the -sanction of religion. It was both unstable and unproductive,
and when challenged by new forces from the West, it inevitably, even if
regretably, collapsed.
(b) Under British Rule. The accident of propinquity brought Burma
into contact with these forces in the form of British rule in India. In
the inevitable conflict it waS annexed piecemeal to British India in
1826, l852, 1886, British rule wasbased thn the principle of economic
freedom under the impersonalr46. of law. It was a practical application
of the' liberalism which inspired contemporary liberal philospphy. But in
Burma the results were unfortunate, for it-cut at the roots of the Burmese
social and economic system.- The first concern of the new government was
of necessity to safeguard the security of British rule and accordingly it
disarmed the people and trusted :ler support to foreign tropps, mainly
Indian with a.stiffening of Europeans, The subordinate officials had to
apply Western methods of admilatration and the Burmese officials of the
old regime were therefore replaced by new men, also from India. Official
business was conducted in English (or at first in Persian) and even the
clerks and menials had to be brought over from India. Burmans knew nothing
of Western medicine or engineering and here again Indians had to be
employed. Whatever was not English in the new administration was Indian,
Not only the administration but the whole economic structure was entirely
foreign in practice and in personnel, European, Indian,-. and Chinese
merchants poured in to take advantage of the new opportunities for making
money and Burmans, driven from the.towns and from industry and commerce,.
became even mord than before, mere cultivators, In courSe of time the
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? -6.
government found it expedient to employ Burman 'sin subordinate posts in the
interior but otherwise there was practkally no'oecupation open to them
but agriculture, while various groups of foreigne-s similarly specialized
in occupations for which they had particular apti,ude or opportunity. Thus,
_merely by the working of economic forces there cane into existence a plural
society comprising many distinct racial elements, diffSring in culture and
performing different economic functions and with nothing in common but the
desire for gain. What had formerly been a nation .1 society? was converted
into a business concern.
Three factors, one political, one economic, and one social, contributed
mainly to the rapid diffusion of economic forces and the disintegration of
Burmese social life. The political factor was thG transformation and
eventual abolition of the hereditary local chieftains. These were at first
transformed into nominated officials of the central government; then: in
1886 after the third war, they came to be suspected as centers of resistance
and disaffection and the historic circles and townships were broken up into
their constituent villages. The political structure was disintegrated.
Hitherto custom, embodied in the parson of tha local chieftain, had served
to stem the flood of economic forces but now that barrier was destroyed.
The economic factor was the method of development Most tropical dependencies
are developed by Western planters, and the people continue to cultivate
for home consumption. But in Burma rice, the chief export crop, was
cultivated by the people themselves who were thus brougltdirectly into
contact with the Western market and within the sphere of Western law.
This entailed the disintegration of the village community and "atomization,"
a characteristic disease ofitropical society under Western rule, was
especially virulent in alma, Another result was that many people fell
into debt and lost their land to money lenders, who for the most part
were Indians with no interest in land except as ar investment. The social
factor in disintegration was the decline in the irlluence of the monastic
order, a natural consequence of foreign rule.
These conditions however prevailed only in the plains. In the hills,
where oaltivation yielded no surplus for the market, the people were left,
as in Burmese timesl'Oder their Own ruler- Wheeeas Burma proper was
brought under direct administration on Wb7itecin prf,flaiples, the hill folk
were governed -indiredtiSr,' MoreoVer thd hill triees were recruited for
the arMy, to protect the government against the 1Lrgo,BUrmese majority.
The natural result- of goVerning the.hill'tribes eepAretaly on a different
plan, and admitting them to'..the army. while 'eXcludfx4; the:Burmese, was to -
accentuate the racieldifisions that: fdrMerly had tendedeto disappear.
It was especially unfdrtunate'that, at the instance ,of the Christian
missionaries, Karen Christiana were rebrated to zuppreis the -Burmese :
rebellion in Lower Burka in-1$?6 in connection with the.thirchBurmese
War, as this fostered civil and religiOUS discord Whilihtt;IMelas faildd
to heal.
? Almost from the-:earliest days 06 Br4iSh rult, however, it was found
possible to recruit the Burmese for civil adMinisfration. For 'a generation
or more the Burmese magistrates and judges.receivtd no .fermal:education
beyond that given ,in the monastic schools, and felt except Karens attended
the Western school n eatablished by the Christian nissionarien. These
Western schools, hewerdr'; opened up better el-lancet of promotionand as'2
the Burmese demand for Westurn education grew the gbvernment met it by
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providing lay schools, This was in line with the general trend of Western
philosophy during the nineteenth century in the direction of socialism
and self-government. Here again Britain may claim to have been a pioneer
in colonial administration. But here again the results were unfortunate.
The new system of education accelerated the decay of the monastic erder;
the brighter and wealthier lads deserted the monastic schools for the lay
schools which offered better prospects of advancement. The official
organization gradually grew more elaborate until in 1923 it was crowned
with a local university. Meanwhile, however, the alienation of the monastic
order proceeded so far that during the later years of British rule one of
the chief problems of government was clerical disorder and disaffection.
Alongside education the government endeavored to promote public health:
and other aspects of social welfare. There was no barrier to the advance-
ment of Burmans, and not a few rose to the High Court while one even
officiated as Governor. But outside civil administration the environment
was unpropitious,. There was no opening for them in the sphere of industry
and commerce and therefore no demand for a training in natural science
or econiamics. Hardly any Burmans entered either of these two gateways
to the modern world und there were hardly any Burman engineers or doctors.
They were however given a place in the seat of government. From 1897
they were represented in a Small Legislative Council, and in 1923 a quasi-
democratic form of government was devised, with popular election on a wide
suffrage. But in a plural society., %stern forms of democratic government
serve only to aggravate racial and sectional antagonisms and, by weking
the executive, they allow still greater freedom of economic forces; instead
of promoting the reintegration Of society they accelerate disintegration.
In the purely economic sphere, however, British rule clearly demmstrated
its superiority over Burmese rule. The country poured forth a growing
abundance of rice, timber, oil, and minerals, and all those connected, as
officials or non-officials, looked with legitimate pride on a notable
achievement. In this rapid economic progress, however, Burmans, exCept
as cultivators, played a very minor part, while even as cultivators they
were declining from a peasantry into a landless proletariat. With every
new extension of economic forces into the native world the first result
was an increase in material prosperity but, where economic forces have
free play, the weakest goes to the wall, and the secondary effect was
gradual impoverishment.
The whole process naturally engendered a reaction against British
rale, although for many years this did not appear above the surface except
in occasional sporadic outbreaks of national sentiment among the peasantry.
Not until 1905, with the Japanese victory over Russia, did the men who
had been educated in the Western type of school venture to voice their
discontent and the modern nationalist movement take shape. The leaders
of this movement had absorbed the prevalent liberal philosophy, of which
economic freedom was one aspect. At first they looked to Western education
as an instrument of liberation. But, in a plural society as in other forms
of social organization, the educational system is conditioned by the
environment, and Western education did not help them. At a later stage,
on the introduction of constitutional reforms, they thought to gain
their freedom by using their large numerical majority to weaken the
executive. This nope also proved vain, for what the country needed was
a strong government able to control and direct economic forces. In the
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economic sphere liberalism leads naturally to capitalism. Burmans,
hover, failed to recognize the connection and, ehile pressing for further
liberal political reforms, began to denounce capitalism as responsible
for their economio disabilities. WWhen confidence in liberal reforms was
shaken, the modern fascist and communist reactions against liberalism
encouraged the younger generation to look to Japan for aid and Russia
for guidance. Meanwhile communal tension betweer Burman, Indian, and
Chinese was growing more acute and the relations between the people and the
government more embittered. Each side blamed the other for maladies
which were in fact merely the logical result of tae unrestrained activity
of economic forces. These could only be brought under control by the
operation of some motive transcending the economic sphere which all
could recognize as of superior validity. The only motive that all could
accept was nationalism. But nationalism could net easily be reconciled
with capitalism. Thus, under British rule, as fcrmerly under Burmese
rule, the political and social organization of tLa country was in a
position of unstable equilibrium. British rule as more effective than
Burmese rule as an instrument of economic progrees, but the neglect
to develop the hujan as distinct from the materiel resources of the
country contributed to its political instability. On the first challenge
by the Japanese the whole structure collapsed.
(c) Under the Japanese. The Japanese made sharp break with the
liberal tradition. On their first arrival in 191_2 they ruled the country
through a nominated Governor, Burmese, however, and not, as under British
rule, a stranger. Then in August 1943 they recornized the independence
of Burma under its own President. Although he had the assistance of an
Advisory Council, he ruled the country on authoretarian lines. On the
British evacuation practically all the Burmese officials stayed behind.
These were reinstated in their charges and carried on the administration
very much as they had done under the British. Bet the authority of
governmLnt rested on the Japanese army and secree police. With their
assistance, and using methods that no British goeernment would have
tolerated, the new regime was conspicuously successful in suppressing
violent crime. It reestablished order.
In many ways Japanese rule contributed to tee political, cultural and
economic advance of Burmans. By granting at leaet a show of independence
it appnaled to popular sentiment as British rule had never done. For the
first time Burma had its own Foreign hdnister ane its own representatives
in those foreign lands to which the Japanese had access. Although its
foreign polecy had to be aligned with Japanese requirements Burmans were
for the first time enabled to gain some experienee in the handling of foreign
affairs. Burma had its awn Minister of Defence eee its own army, which
was no longer, as under British rule, mainly comeoeed of Indian troops who
would support the government against the people,eleng with a few detachments
from the tribal hills to foster racial particularism. For the first time
Burmans were at least nominally responsible for thar awn defence and for
the first time since the final collapse of the Bermese power in 1886 Burmans
were given real chanemto acquire experience of erms and military service.
And, also for the first time, the whole admiiistrative personnel from top
to bottom, general and judicial was wholly Burman; the Japanese were
content to occupy the position of advisors - thcegh in most matters, of
course, and in any conflict of opinion their advice had to be taken. Burma
had n?WgtdiForigeatiet2P2MTPMVM-AiiattP
'2046,48ttimMance of
politic inuepen ence.
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In cultural life it was not only the practice but the deliberate policy
of the Japanese to foster close relatiohs with Burmans. They did not, like
the British, stand aloof from the people but mixed freely with them in social
intercourse. This had the paradoxical result that Western ways of life made
greater headway among Burmans under the Japanese than under British rule.
Economic conditions were likewise favorable to Burman progress. The
evacuation of Indian landlords and money lenders cured most of the agrarian
tumble, and many cultivators, with no creditors to worry them, resumed
possession of their land. At the same time the shortage of imported goods
and the absence of foreign coMpetition stimulated and enabled Humans to
engage in industry and commerce.
Yet Burmans found the new order more irksome than the old. Inflation
robbed the traders of their profits. Local manufactures could not meet
the shortage of clothing and other imported goods. Men preferred unemploymeht
to compulsory labor in the Japanese "sweat corps)" and the harsh discipline
enforced by the secret police contrasted unfavorably with the personal
freedom enjoyed under the rule of law. And although Burmans had formerly
complained that British officials were aloof and arrogant, they did not
fear them as they learned to fear the suave politeness and calculated bru-
tality of the Rapanese. One resat of the Japanese occupation was to
increase the Burmese impatience of authority and to add the term "fascitt"
to the vocabulary of political abuse alongside bumeaucrat, capitalist, and
imperialist. A result of still greater consequence was that Burmans were
encouraged in the belief that they could do much that they had never
previously had a chance to do. This ttrengthened their resolve to maintain
and consolidate the independence which the Japanese had granted.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the new order was the unifica-
tion of the plural society that had grown up under British rule; the
former alien elements vanished and domestic differences of race and class
were forgotten in common opposition to the new authoritarian discipline.
On the other hand the war sowed the seed of future internal tension, for
it divided those of common stock who fought on opposite sides. The Burmese
army included Karens and others but was in the main Burmese, whereas most
of those who fought in the allied armies came from the hill tribes. The
Burmans remembered that in 1886 Karens had helped the British and now
suspected them as traitors to the cause of freedom. During the early
disorder consequent on the collapse of civil rule some Burmans in the Delta
turned savagely on the Karens and thereby inflamed passions that defied
subsequent attempts at reconciliation.
Another consequence of ?Japanese rule was also pregnant with future
trouble. Prom the very earliest threat of Japanese invasion the Communist
leaders were Stalwart in resistance and even while still detained in
prison by the British government urged the other political prisoners to
support the allied cause "without reserve". By thus taking the lead in
national resistance to the Japanese, they taught the troops, the militia,
the underground army and the common man to identify nationalism with
communism.
4p South Asia. Here perhaps, at least for the time being, I had better
stop talking about Burma (=you may begin to think that I have forgotten the
title Agspttuked3Rotfkateasig201145777/421 fea-06064RXVIARA.11alting place
where we may rest a while and survey the wor d ar n"I'MgVeMge sted
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that the course of events in Auena is especially insteuetive as terseeirg
light on what has happened elsewhere. Now I muse try to justify this
statement.
Formerly in Burma nueeroes racial elements were imperfectly assimilated
in a quasi-national societe eehibiting a complex of tribal and territorial
types of social organization, tough in all cases the chain of authority
was based on personal relations which were reguleted by custom endowed with
the sanction of religion. This elaborate social organization was unstable,
because its stability depended solely on the regsrd for custom; and it was
unproductive because economic progress would invelve a breach with custom
on which the social fabric rested. These conditeons seem to have been much
the same over the whole of Southeast Asia, and much the same also in India,
though more so, for in India custom had hardened into caste. If this view
is generally valid we have dug down to the foundetions of South Asia in
the world today e It is on these old foundations that a modern Western
superstructAre has been erected.
This superstructure was erected under Westee
principles. Traders from the West who came to bt
could not do business on Western lines unless the
Western lines. Scattered throughout the region /
orientals but under Western rules these multiplif
there came into exiseence a plural society domine
The conflict of economic interest was in itself t
and Western rulers instinctively if not deliberat
particularism. Even in the native group the imp./
elements tended to fall apart, and this process v.
recruitment for the army of oecupation. In this
nothing to withstand the unceasing pressure of cc
social life on all sides and, as these forces spr
widening circles, native cultural life declined P
order was broken up into a crowd of individuals,
system, and demanding national independence; but
never be a nation, and every fresh encroachment c
the community less capable of eneependenee. Alth
organization was still Instiffi(i: crime, discrder,
the tension between the coe eeene elements grew m
between rulers and ruled were euojected to increa
condiatene seem to have been much the same over a
cies in South Asia.
n influence on Western
y and sell found that they
lands were ruled on
here were already foreign
e and in every country
ted by economic forces.
cause of racial division,
ely fostered racial
rfectly assimilated racial
as stimulated by selective
plural society there was
onomic forces attacking
ead through ever
ed the native -social
reacting against this
A plural society can
f economic forces rendered
eagh pmqii2tlim, the social
and unrese increased,
Dee acute and the relations
sing strain, Here again
el the colonial dependen-
What gives special significance to Burma is shat here the liberal theory
of colonial rale Tean' applied most unreservedly in all its aspects and
carried most deeplv into native life. In other ceuntries of South Asia,
for various reasons and in vaeious ways, the free piey of economic forces
was halted more or less effectually at the thresh id of the native world.
Yet the same forces were at work throughout the weole region, even in
politically independent Siam. Burma however would seem to typify the
ranner of their working and to demonstrate most clearly the result.
Finally, in the third stage, when the plural societies built up under
Western rule collapsed before the onslaught of the Japanese, it seems that
elsewhere, as in Burma, attempts to build up a nev national society gave
some promise of success. But this new society hae to be adapted to
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Japanese requirements and depended on the Japanese army and police eyetem
for supeert, With he defeat of the Japanese, South Asia was brought
once more into political and economic contatt with the Western world;
the new experlments came to a dead end and the old problems came up for
solution, but with new complications in a far more difficult environment.
5. South Asia Today. With the defeat of the Japanese we reach at last
the subject for discussion: South Asia in thie World Today. I hope you will
not think I have been too long coming to it, but for my part I hold firmly
that we cannot hope to build a better world toMorrow unless we understand
the world of yesterday. One fact was obvious - that the whole of Southeast
Asia was in ruins, and nowhere was the devastation greater than in Burma:
But there was a choice of plans, in Burma as elsewhere, for recon-
struction: either to reconstruct a new building on the old model; or to
erect a different building on a new plan and on more secure foundations.
Under Western rule peace had been maintained, the people had increased
in numbers, new cities had sprung up, agriculture, trade, and industry
had flourished, and elaborate provision had been made for education,
public health and other welfare services. The former rulers did not see
how they could have served the people better or more faitAfully, but they
saw very clearly that prosperity could not be restored ivithout their help.
The demonstrations of welcome for their assistance in driving out the
Japanese encouraged them to expect popular cooperation in reconstructing
the old building.
This; however, was a vain imagination. Life under the Japanese had
confiesmed the people in their dislike and distrust of foreign rule. Siam
had prospered as an independent state and, by being able to choose its
awn policy, :lad suffered least damage fraM the war.. Moreover, the
progress of formerly dependent peoples in industry and commerce since the
collapse of foreign rule encouraged them to believe that they could
manage their own affairs quite well enough if left alone. The Wage was
set for a sharp conflict between the old order and the new; between
imperialism and nationalism, capitalism and socialism, between economic
progress as a key to human welfare and human welfare as a condition of
economic progress. The capitalists knew that capital would be needed:46r
rapidd reconstruction and they thought to get their own terms for providing
Wital. But the nationalists did not know what help they wanted or how
much they needed help, and they were char of accepting foreign capitalist
help on any terms. The issues however were by no means clearly cut.
Capitalist and nationalist alike could, appeal to liberal principles; and
the measures needed to restore authority and order Could beddenounced with
equal plausibility and fervor as Communibt and Fascist. Thus, as men
trod warily but blindly along the narrow path leading to the goal of human
freedem, rising gales from either side threatened to engulf them in the
bottomless pit of anarchy...
In Siam the foundations of social life were most secure, for it had
never lost its independence and had been least disturbed during the war.
In Indonesia and Indo-China the weakness of the Dutch and French encouraged
the Nationalists to take up arms. In the former British and American
dependencies, however, the forces of occupation were too strong to challenge
and there seemed hopes of a peaceful settlement. In the Philippines the
Unit edie4,1498d Inst. Rwilugammottimits: -P6861 866 withdrawal.
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-1--
in Malaya racial divisions cut so deeply as to pr.3clude the growth of any
common nationalism, and only in Burma werethe oa:posing forces nicely
balanced. The Btitish government on its return from Simla expected
Burman cooperation in reconstructing pre-war Burrda, but Burmans looked
to the :British, Labor Government, with socialist :.deals and nationalist
sympathies, to grant them -independence.. ,
?
FprtJfo..I:e4rq_Burmans'bad,nnmdnallYAti:leactlk :been managing their
oWntheSipaa government'assumed-that tley Were incapable of doing
so. The,adAinistration had been wholly Burmese-from:the president down
to the office jcpys; not the:old:officials:returned to take the higher
poets, accompanied by a crowd of new subordinateiho kit* nothing of
Durma,or administration, Naturally the:Burthan peliticians and officials
were disgruntled. The Simla plans for economic reconstruction appeared to
Burmansl. not without. reason 40: :plans to: reinstate foreign private
enterpriseldth public funds. .-Foreign:enterprit( was cautious about
investing new capital. ,Most of the.soQoalled ITcreign" capital in Burma
before the war represented the accumulatecLprofits,offireign enterprise
in Burma;.now_thisyould have to be replaced by eutside%capital freshly
raised. on'the lsecurity of_prospective profit6,. ard foreign enterprise
insisted therefore on -safeguards for an adequate return: :-B4 the two
fatal blunders of the new government were the:attempt:to'reinstate
Indian Moneylenders and other absentee landlordd in:the posaeSsion of
their land, and the neglect to provide employment for the many thousand
young men who.had joined the Burmese guerilla Amy during the war. This
provided the communist leaders with propaganda ari recruits. In these
and other ways the Simla government soon wore out its welcome. The
Labor Government in England had to choose betweer facing a nation wide
rebellion and granting BBurma independence. The forMer alternative
-offpked:h0 prospect of success and would certain.27 give a new stimulus
topommnniam. The labor Government chose the lesser .risk and granted
Burma independence.
But nothing 41. ever been done to train the oeople for the res-
ponsibilities of independence. The whole stock of capital and the machinery
Of industry.and,eommerce was in foreign hands, and the rehabilitation of
agriculture would require an agricultural revolution involving the reinte-
gration of,seciallife from the village upwards It was-certain that the
new government,WoAld need a strong .army to. support it but it had no arMy
on which it,eould.rely with confidence. Trouble oegan almost as seen as
the Burmese flag was.
Ekirma
was. in' sore need of:fUnds.: But .within a few days it Was faced
With Olaims.ferm fereign firms an-account of war.lamage, for Which the
rmese Govenment,deniedresponsibility, involving huge sums, which it
ciuld'not possibly disburse.,,Quite apart from thse claim capital was
needed,for,rehabilitatien and development. Burma had to-raise this
capital-either by domestic loans, which would beceSsitate compulsory saving,
or by finding some expedient for raising foreign -.:apital on terms that
would not endanger its national independence. 14o:.7eover, if Burmans were
to find a place in industry and- commerce, the' sta-,e would have to show
the way,' andthe nationalization of natural resouresaand various industries
Was contemplated. This raised delicate and knotty problems with regard to
the payment Of cempensation0-andtension between he government and foreign
enterprise grew more acute.. ?
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Far mon- 30/011S briwe..rer was tne dcni,c,4,1,.. friction in conne .1
lanl problem and unemployment. The two main pillars supporting the
government were the Cultivators' Union and the Peasants' Volunteer Organi-
zation, the former comprising the occupants of land, the latter mainly
consisting of men without land or cattle. Between these two sections there
was some conflict of interest. The communists were bidding for the support
of both sections with promises of land for all, free of rent or revenue and the
government had to counter these inducements by pushing on as rapidly as
possible with agrarian reforms. Unfortunately it could not provide land
for all the landless; the reforms told in favor of the cultivators and
tended to alienate the ex-soldiers,
It was indeed impossible to promote welfare in any direction without
arousing some opposition from interests adverakkyaffected. This put the
Liberal Government in a quandary. It professed democracy and was averse
to All forms of compulsion; at the some time it claimed to be socialist
and to favor strict control over all forms of economic activity. The brand
of socialism which it favored had affinities with communism in recognising
the imasants and workers as the ruling and only class, and differed from
communism chiefly in trusting to peaceful reform rather than violent
revolution, in placing more faith in Buddha than in Marx, and in being
more suspicious of Russia and less suspicious of the Western pouters.
Ideological confusion, however, was not the chief reason for its tolerance
of opposition It was not strong enough to be intolerant. Under British
rule the Barmans had been debarred from military service. The Communists
had. been the spearhead of resistance thd the Burmese element in both the
army and the Peoplets Volunteer Organization were largely Communist in
origin, and sympathy When the government reluctantly decided that the
communist menace must be suppressed by force, the Peope!s Volunteer
Organization seceded, and before long took up arms against the government
Action against the Volunteers led to mutiny of their sympathizers in the
army, This left the government largely dependent on the Karen regiments
for the maintenance Of order. The Commander-in-Chief of the combined
military forces was .a Karen, and so also was the head of the Air Force,
and there were other Karens in high positions in both these services
an4 also in the NaVy. Karens were represented in the government and on
the Board of Directovs of the Central Bank and there were Karen magistrate
in charge of districts where Karens were numerous. But some Karen leaders
incited their people to rebel. Thus within a year of attainingindependen
the country was involved in a desperate struggle against insolvency and
anarchy
The issue of the struggle would seem to be of more than local interes
have suggested that the cabe of Burma is of particular importance. It i
only too probable that similar tveubles will develop in the other countrie
of South Aiia, or at least Of Southeast Asia, and for much the same reason
If we can help Burma to solve its problems, we Can hope for a satisfactory
issue elsewhere. But if anarchy gains the upper hand in Burma, it is like
to spread over the rest of South Asia, Then what will happen in the other
center of colonial rule, the great continent of Africa? And with uproar
in Asia and Africa, what will happen in Europe? Burma is a remote and
insigni.ficant countr,;-7, but is it wholly fantastic to see in the issue of
the present struggle d critics; turning point in world affairs?
6. Isms in Uouth Asia. Once again I feel apologetic for talking all
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;
about Burma. But have:I merely been talking aboe7..p4rma? 'I hope not,
It is through the welter of "isms" in'Burma that 1 have been trying to
blaze a track, and these isms:aTe,much the, same ehroUghout South Asia.
Let us recall them in much the same order ,as the have forced themselves
on our attention :.Animism, Tribalism, Racialism,. BuddhisM, Imperialism,,
Capitalism, Materialism, Individualism, Liberalim, Natinnalism, Socialism,.
Communism. Going outside Burma we might add Hiniuism, .Mosiemiem, Con4
fucianist-and perhape, Chnistianism and Humanism. Is not this a list Of
the forces which in varying degrees of intenpity ace ,boiling and bubbling
over throuthont. South -Asia in fi.he. ifPrld today? rhey 6ye'made South Asia;
one might say that they". South Asia, and tie are listo them':
summarizes its, problems, 4nd the solutions attemeted in the past. ? :Even if
each ism in succgssion has been found to lead doen a.biindalley, it is
instruntive'tb,ascertain'what checked further pr)gress.' '
. ? , ?
The fundamental.prOblem, I have.suggested? es to develop the human
and material rebources of the region, far the gre.test welfare of the world..
This statementof it carries two imPlioations. ne implication is that we
are all living in one world. Now it is true enough that; apart from a few
remote and backward peoples, we are all living ie one ebbnomit world, but
we are verysfar as yet from success in building up ene'aocial world. If
we are to 'achieve that we Must incorporate the poopres of South Asia as
citizens of the modern world, This carries the 'Urther,implication that
to solve the problem we require the assistance aad active consent of the
people. Mere acquiescence will not au/Tice; it has been tried and failed.
With mere' acquiescence we may develops the. materiel, b'ut' not the human
resources. '
Consent implies some mae*is of popular conteolOver'government by the
people; it implies some forM'of democracy; But this need-not mean the
introductiOn or imitation of Western forms of denocratic machinery. Experi-
ence has demonstrated repeatedly that although d(mOcratic institutions on
a Western pattern fortify still further a: strong social organization
feeble:societies ccIlapse. under the strain, Onll too' often Western demo-
cratic forms of government have been adopted in lhe hope that they would
function on democratic lines, and the result baa been very different from
that intended. Gradually, however, it is coming' te bere:ognized that in
. social. as in civil engineering form does not determlne funetion, but, function
determinee forme-That is a principle which dema-de close, attention in those
parts cf South Asia-where subject peoples have jtet attained or -are on the
point of attaining independence. Under foreign ,ule the people thought
to direct economic forees in their favor by conleol over the government
through Western political-institutions, but in.pactice these institutions
served only to weaken government and allow still !,reater power to economic
forces. At the present time the countries of Sotth Asia need a strong govern-
ment in order to build up a new:social organization on stable foundations;
the people hold rightly that government cannot clE strong or stable unless
based on popular consent, but fewehave yet appreciated that in' the circum-
stances of South Asia democratic institutions in their Western form are.:
incompatible with either stability or strength, end that they must design
their awn pattern of democracy, looking to functim rather than to form.
Unfortunately, many in the West who eympSthize meet warmly with such aspir-
ations and ideals are themselves heirs of the great liberal tradition and
fail to appreciate its limitations in a social ervironment other than their
own.
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In Bnzma and I think thn other parte of Soljth Asia, men look to libera
-foms and catchwords as aKmeans of achieving socialism. This is rather lik
taking a ticket from Chicago. to New York and setting out in the direction
of San FranOisco.- It may seem to be very much what has happened in England,
where socialism has developed out of liberalism.. But socialism Of this
type demands an instructed -electorate with a strong social sense, and in
SouthAsia these pre-requisites are absent. Socialism in the West implies
conferring great power on the state as the organ and image ofsociety. But
in South Asia it implies the reintegration. of disintegrated society. For
so formidable a task leadership is essential, and socialists -in Burma tend
therefore to favor government by one party that shall instruct and lead'
the people. Again society needs to be rebuilt from its basis in the
village, the commune. Thus in an Eastern setting socialism tends- to absorb
the more constructive elements of communism.. MUch of the so-called, communis
in the East might in fact be more appropriately termed communalism, and
if called that name would be robbed of half its terrors.- This, however;
is a matter which will come up for discussion in, one of'our-round
Here in this preliminary survey it is enough to note that in the East
neiher socialism nor communism has the same connotation as in the West,
and that in dealing with the problems of South Asia we must have regard
to facts and functions rather than to words and forms.
Among the isms that we have noticed racialism is a fact and nationalism
is a fact. Both represent a reaction of the human spirit against the purely
material economic conception of life implicit alike in capitalism and
communism, But racialism divides; nationalism unites. It is important to
note that in South Asia nationalism does make for social unity: Racial
ties help to hold society together, but they exclude strangers as outcastes.
A social organization of the territorial type,' based on common residence
provides much richer material for social evolution. In the West nationalism
is suspect, partly because it is often confounded with racialism, and partly
because it sets up a barrier against a still higher form of international
social coopeation. Nationalism then, like socialftim and communism, has
different connotations in the East and West. Even in the West national
units may still make a valuable contribution towards a world society, and
in the East it is difficult to 6uggest any motive other than nationalism
that every one can admit as of superior validity to purely economic motives.
The peoples of South Asia are turning instinctively to nationalism for
protection against the disintegrating influence of foreign capitalism and
against the devastating attack of foreign communism; they desire passionately
th achieve and maintain their national independence. They need our help
and, if the conclusions indicated by this preliminary survey are valid, they
deserve our help. For it is only on the basis of nationalism that we can
develop the human and material resourdes of South Asia for the greatest
welfare of the world. .Dotibtless special cases will require special trettment.
backward peoples for example and cities like Singapore. But it should not
be impossible to weave these into one general design. How then can we set
about building up a new world in South Asia on the principle of nationalism?
It is a stupendous problem, and we are unlikely to achieve success: if we set
about it by drawing blue prints of political machinery before deciding what
the Machinery will have to do...
For forms of government lettfools contest,
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What then are the conditions of national independence in the modern
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world, the conditions without which political ind pendence is a mere
shibboleth? The first condition is that the nation shall be capable of
milittry.independencerit nmst be able to maintaie its independence against
all probable external aggression, and able also t) maintain theadealuatedenee
-dgg*netoflintmahallsocatiApaind order without ru)port of foreign troops,
exCept possibly such troops as it may hire. Seco idly, it must be capable
of economic independence; It must be able to exiet without foreign doles,
except possibly as a,temporarYmeasure; and it nm;t be able to develop
its human and material resourtes Without foreign .7.apital, apart from loans
on fair terms that it will be able to repay, and Althout foreign aid in
the management of ecesiomic enterprise or in the provision of technicians
and of skilled 'and unskilled labOr except on terrs compatible with its
eelitical independence. Thirdly, it must maintain such a mihimum standard
of human welfare, especially ip the control over infectious disease among
men?,eattlee and crops, as the conditions of the modern world require.
eFinallye but 4ost'important,there nmst be adequtte provision for ascertaining
add giving affect io tha common social will of tle community so far as this
is consistent with social and economic progress.
If we-tranelate these conditions into concrete terms the task may
well seem impossible: 1100 can'e,newstate replaxe the former army of
occupation with .home'fdOta on which it can rely How Can it raise the
e,pital it needs without' imperilling its independence? What is to be
done about the foreign capital with which it has hitherto been developed?
_where is it te obtain'the guidance necessary to lelp it develop its
resources, and the necessary supply of manageria- skill and technical
assistance? What about labor, to replace the forler immigrant or tmported
foreign labor? How can we establish a governmene on popular consent to
maintain standards of welfare that the people do not appreciate by methods
in which they do not believe? Haw can'we Providi the element of continuity
in government that in' the West we take for granted and that must in some
way be created if government is to be effective )r even to survive? How
caanwe adapt democracy to such conditional How, above all, can we convince
popular leaders who know little of the modern mead and little perhaps
even of their awn land that these and other likc conditions are indeed
conditions of maintaining national independence' One might go on asking
such questions almost indefinitely but the people concerned do not for
the most-pareeeven recognize that there is any reed to ask them. Siam,
they say, is independent; then why not Burma, Irio-China, Indonesia? India,
again, although so long dependent on Britain now appears capable of
independence; then why not other countries of Scuth Asi. But in Siam the
Crown provides the necessary continuity; modern India grew up with the
modern world and has been held together by the 1..otective bond of caste.
In thise tWo countries social and'economic prog-ess.on democratia princi-
ples may pcissibly be immune against the vote-ca%ching slogans, of the
demagogue; elsewhere conditions are more difficelt. ?
.
Here then'are.some of the tangled problems that we shall be discussing
in this Conference. I have tried to suggest that they are common to the,
whole of South Asia. From this it would follow that some form of international
cooperation between the various countries of. th'...! region is required to deal
with them. How far is such cooperation possible,,and.what part can India
play as a major partner in such a combinatidhl And this perhaps is as far
as I can venture in this preliminary Survey. 2 am?pnly top conscious of
its iAilittgleldtFobxRelbalsepani1017/24:1-34csikblphRiO
.0i.jb._rating with
some precision some of the major probrems confront g t e roun. tables in
which we shall conduct our deliberations.
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-7
THE NORMAY WeJT HARRIS MAMORTAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Rezionalism in South Asia
II
Round Table It BASIC ECONOMIC FACTORS
Thursday morning, May 26, 1949
Presiding: Phillips Talbot
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen, and welcome
to the 25th Harris Institute.
We have with us this morning, representing the University of Chicago,
Dean Ralph Tyler of the Division of the Social Sciences. Mr. Tyler.
DEAN TYLER: It is a, great pleasure on behalf of the University of
Chicago to welcome you to this conference of the Harris Institute. For
more than three decades the problems of international relations have been
having top priority of all problems of social science. During much of this
period the Harris Institute has provided an important medium for discussio
and for expression_ of views on the part both of scholars and of practi-
tioners in world affairs.
The University of Chicago is proud to have the opportunity to serve
as host to such a significant gathering. I feel sure that this year's
Institute, dealing as it does with an emerging area in world affairs,
will be of great value to all the participants and on behalf of the Univer
sity I welcome you. We want you to be comfortable here. We are very glad
that you are here with us.
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Thank you, Sir.
In opening the 25th Harris Institute, on Mationalimn and Regionalism
in South Asia," I may say that my chore has been very considerably eased
by Mr. Furnivall who last night laid out before you a complete justificati
for holding such a conference. He detailed the new situation in South Asi
and described its various roots. We know how the Japanese intrusion into
much of the area shattered the European colonial systems which had, much
earlier, imposed themselves upon and often twisted out of recognition the
indigenous social, economic, and political systems.
Japanese aggression ended, it is very clear, in bitterness and ruin
for the Asian peoples who felt its weight. After the collapse of Japan,
World War IIIs more general effects augmented for South Asians the problem
of what was to come next. None accepted European efforts to return to the
colonial system. In country after country, as Mr. Furnivall so ably
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restraints.
0
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But it is one thing to resist the reimpositaor
authority, and another to achieve a new balance an.
true in what appears to be n bi-polarized world,: a
that have occurred since 1.9.J9;where does South Asia
going? What are its new relations with the rest on
Two considerations have guided our planning fc
first is that, while the countries of South Asia ha
outside the purview of major American concern, botl.
in the area and various developments elsewhere in ,
now vastly increased its significance. India, Pak.
the Philippines are politically independent and hav
into world affairs. Struggles in Indo-China. and In
those countries but Western Europe and the Atlanic
enlarged its international personality, and. events
earner for the sterling realm, have had broad repe:
press the point that the area of South Asia requir(
has yet been given to it, expecially in this count
of unloved external
order, This is especially
fter the radical changes
now stand? 'Where is it
the world?
r this Institute. The
ve historically been
internal developments
ala and the world have
stan, Burma, Ceylon and
o brought new voices
donesia affect not only
community. Siam has
an Malaya, a major dollar
cussions. I need not
s much closer study than
Y.
The second consideration that went into the,pnanning of this Institute
is regionalism. Traditionally the countries of Sonth Asia have been
divided by scholiars and statesmen into two regions the Indiaasub-centinent,
and Southeast Asia. Individuals iah(5 have become kiowledgeable'ae,to-India
and Pakistan. rarely consider themselves competent relation to Southeast
Asia, and vice .versa. Mr. Furnivall, whose: career has embraced?bothethe
Indian Civil. Service and close study of Indonesia, is a shingni-exeeption.
Yet leaders of the peoples of South Asia have come to recognize the problems
and the objectives .that they hold in common., They -Al either have recently
emerged from alien rule or are seeking to do so.. .Their countries .are all
under-developed, in terms of the modern industrial age. They all see the
need to improve standards of living and of educatian. .To a degree they are
beginning to think of their area as a region, and--as the Asian conferences
at New Delhi have shown--to consider their situatiens in regional terms.
Perhaps this is largely valid; perhaps only slightly so. One of the
subjects for our study this week will be an assessnent of South Asian
regionalism and its prospects.
You will have seen from the agenda that we are approaching these
problems of nationalism and of regionalism from several directions: the
economic approach, the social approach, and the-political approach. To
open cnnsideration of economic aspects of our subject, with special
emphasis at first on basic economic factors, Lshaal call on Professor Karl
Pelzer, of Yale University, to read the first paper of this Institute.
Mr. Pelzer. -
TRE RESOURCE PATTERN OF SOUTHEAST tSIA
Prof. Karl J. Pelzer ?
Southeast Asia has a predominantly agriculturfl economy. Industriali-
zation is still in its. infancy, and mining industries are not ,important
enough to alter the agricultural character of the.region even in countries
like Malagybroindvins4tAie yikvi
0
Asia produeed a ost
? ? IMOV6
IRPO3060birt=t,
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and cinchona, at least three fourths of the tapioca and coconut products,
over half of the palm oil, one-third of the sisal, plus a substantial
share of cane sugar, tobacco, tea, spices, natural resins, gums, essential
oils, and such minerals as tiA, iron ore, chrome, manganese, and petroleum.
Despite the fact that Southeast Asia is one of the key economic region
of the tropics and serves as a source of both agricultural and mineral raw
materials, greatly in demand in the highly industrialized countries of the
mid-latitudes, the decisive characteristic and the most pressing problem of
the region is poverty. This characteristic Southeast Asia shares with many
wader-developed areas in the world. It is poverty which is largely respons
ble for the tension and unrest that we observe in Southeast Asia today,
both in independent and dependent countries. Poverty manifests itself in a
great man P ways, such as extremely low average income, widespread tenancy)
large-scale rural indebtedness, and low nutritional standards, which cause
poor halth and low resistance to disease.
An analysis of the resource pattern and the agrarian structure of
Southeast Asia wil throw light on the causes of this poverty. It i not
the fault of one particular racial or social group or of a single pentica
or economic instILution. A great many cultural, economic and environnental
factors play tLeir part.
Whereas quling the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries the various Europao.
nations actiye in Southeast Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to
trading and clle acquisition of high-priced non-bulky commodities such as
spices, th,, Psonomic policy of the 19th century called for large quantiti-
of bulky )eds such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra, Since
the pestry of Southeast Asia almost without exception raised only
subsie crops and had only limited surpluses, it became necessary for
the r-uial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done
into /ays: (a) through the application of pressure on the peasantry to
produa for export and (b) through the development of large-scale plantati n
agriaature.
erom 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced to cultivate crops
and turn them over to the government in order to meet their tax obligation
In other areas the introduction of taxation to be paid in money forced the
peasantry to raise crops for sale. In one way or another the political
and economic penetration of Southeast Asia during the 19th and 20th centuries
replaced the traditional subsistence and barter economy by a money econon;
This waseof course a slow process that began in different places at diffelent
times. But as varieus regions became linked with the outside world, peop-e
gave up the old pattern of raising crops only for family consumption and
began to cultivate export crops, Inssome instances this meant that they
increased the production of traditional food crops, for example rice or
coconuts; in other instances they began to cultivate crops that had been
introduced by the Europeans. However, the basis pattern of production
remained the same as before: little or nothing was done to evolve new an
improved types of agricultural implements suited for small holdings; the
size of the agricultural units was not increased; nor did the yields
increase generally.
To the contrary, in the densely populated regions the farm units ten ed
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to shmink_Ansize-and the_f2a?tilitsr to decline.__ The 014Pg from
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to money economy found the peasantry unpreeered to make the necessary tech-
nical and psychological adjustments to cope with tt-e new situation or to
benefit from it. It is true that in Indenesia and Malaya in particular the
peasantry was engaged in the cultivation of new crcps for export, but since
their land holdings were so small often they could do this only by reducing
the area allocated to subsistence crops and by usirg the proceeds from the
sale of export crops for the purchase of food that had to be imported. This
proved at times to be extremely profitable but it also exposed the peasants
to the great price fluctuations that characterize uDrld trade.. On the whole,
however, we can say that one of the chief reasons for the backwardness of the
native agricultural economy of Southeast Asia is that it still has the .
tools, cultivation practices, and small farm units ..)f the days of the closed
subsistence economy. Where would we in the mid-latitudes be if we tried
to carry on the type of agriculture that was practiced in the 16th and 17th
centuries?
The transition from subsistence to money econony brought into the
affected areas a new woup of peoples, the traders, Almost without exception
the retail traders and middlemen of Southeast Asia are either Chinese or
Indians. The Indians dominate Burma, while the Chilese control the rural
trade in Malaya, Siam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Almost invariably
the Indian .or Chinese traders act also as money-lehders. During the
agricultural year they make loans to peasants at exeremely high interest
rates, which may run as much as 50 or 60 percent, ad then collect the debt
plus interest by buying the crop at harvest time. It is to the advantage
ofothe trader to extend unreasonable credits, prefeeably not for prcductive
purposes but for the purchase of non-essential goods - in order to tie the
peasant so that he has no bargaining power at harvest time. A slump in
prices, a bad harvest, or some other event over whilt the peasant has no
control, causes hopeless indebtedness, loss of the land which had been
pledged as security and it reduces the peasant-owne- to a tenant.
Even when a peasant wishes to obtain credit fo:' productive purposes he
is forced in most countries to turn to a usurer bec_use of the Jack of rural
ex-edit institutions. No city bank will give him a ILoan because he is too
poor a risk, his productive capacity is too small, trid often he has no title
to his land. He is caught in a vicious circle - he who needs aid most
irgently in the form of credit at reasonable rates interest, say $ to 10
percent, has to pay the excessive rates that he caztot afford and he gets
hopelessly in debt to a person who isctf different re.cial stock and may not
speak his language. No wonder that there exists so much tension between the
rural masses of Southeast Asia and the foreign midd:ement.from either India
?31- China, The spread of a,money ecenamy, brought alout by the economic
lemands of the metropolitan powers without the deve:opment of adequate
credit institutions and usually without legal restrections to curtail the
oredatory activities of the middlemen, caused untold harm and suffering
throughout So4theast Asia, bringing in its wake widcspread liquidation of
)easant holdings, and creating the tenancy problems which has become extremely
-)erious in many parts of our area.
I am of course aware of the fact that such practices as the pledging of
Land as security, followed by the loss of land and the necessity of working
es a share cropper, were recognized by the customarz- law of pre-European
lays, but such arrangements were the exception rather than the rule.
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The Philippines is ene of the few areas of Southeast Asia where tenancy
on a large scale preceded the growth of a money economy and did not result
from foreclosure proceedings Igainst a heavily lidebted peasantry but from
the Spanish agrarian peliv of creating large landed estates.
A peasant who has lot; his land and has to eke out a living as a share
cropper is still more eas,4 exploited than one who still owns the land tha
he tills.
It is frequently overlcoked that the average agricultural yields of
Southeast Asia are very lcw compared with the yields of other countries.
During the period from 1934 to 19380 62 quintals of paddy, or rough rice, p
hectare were harvested in Spain, 53 quintals in Italy, and 36 quintals in
Japan, compared with only 15 quintals in Java, 14 in Siam and Burma, 12
in Indochina, and 11 in the Philippines., These striking differences are du
primarily to the intensive use of fertilizer and of improved varieties of
rice in Spain, Italy, and Japan. The peasantry of Southeast Asia use
insufficient quantities of animal and green manure and almost no commercial
fertilizer, and usually plants a poor quality of seed. Still more striking
would be the differences were we to compare the production of rice per man-
hour in Italy, Spain, am the United States on the one hand with that of
the Southeast Asian countries, The small holdings so characteristic for
Southeast Asia -,split up into tiny parbels, tilled by hand or at the most
with simple tools pulled by draft animals - require a great deal of human
labor and produce such low yields that any other result than poverty should
surprise ue.
Such Praetices as transplanting rice and harVesting Mee by hat& with
sickle or even with a small knife, and cutting one stalk at a time, demand
large quantities of labor Curing brief periods, while most of the time only
a small part of the population is actually usefully employed. Where double
cropping 14 feasible underemployment is not as pronounced au in areas where
only one eftp is raisea each year.
The degand for a large labor force during harvest tae is strongly
felt in co44tries where we have service industries or factories and mines1
since a large percentage of the laborers will leave their jobs and return.
to the rural districts to help their relatives with the harvest and to
participate in the festtre period that follows. This pattern presents quit:
a problem for the manageuent of industry.
. The creation of large-scale plantation agriculture was the second meth d
used by Westerners to increase the production of tropical crops in Southeas
Asia. Indonesia, Malaya, and, on a much smaller scale, Indochina proved
attractive to Western end other foreign capital. As a result, at the out-
break of the war "Aalayal, Indonesia, and Indochina had large plantation
industries which employed:hundreds of thousands of wage laborers, most of
whom were recruited at some considerable distance from the plantation areas
and could be sent back to the native villages whenever their services were
no longer needea. The structure of the haciendas in the Philippines, on the
other hand? differs from that of the plantations found in Malaya, Indonesia,
and Indochina because of a differentOlistorical 'background. The haciendas
created by the Spaniards consist of conglomerations of small tenant farm
units wyairifirevialkbeRkideta@adM21002$11CIAllkargd-ONNAVO2adiFititabliffl9 The
American administation prevented the growth of the plantation system in the
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Philippines -by placing severe restrictions on the .avount of public land which
could be acquired by individualsor companies. The lack of a sizeable
rubber industry in .t 'Philippines, for example, is to be attributed to
legal restrictions. Firestone, U.S.Rubber, and Gooeyear could not. obtain
the amount.ofjand they wanted for their plantations, so they had to turn
from Nindapab- to Liberia, /vialaya, and Indonesia)
%any. features of the plantation industry in Indonesia .can only be
explained as results of the agrarian legislation that was .developed in the
second half of the 19th century. This legislation aiade it impossible for
non-Indonesians to acquire land for agricultural pu:pcsA8 oxeept under ?
lease arrangements. No plantation owns the landjit is working. Wet-rice
land owned by Indonesians, could only be leased:for -arief periods by foreign
planters.. The additicnal rule that. the planter.couad not cultivate more
thanonea:.third-of the land leased frame. village:and, furthermore, was not
permitted to use the same landtwice'in pieces-Sion, forced the sugar
plantations to intensify their operations to such A degree that Java surpassed
all other capesugar-producing,areasbf-the world id yield .per acre. The
planters were forced to:batd'IOgether to finance eXperiment stations in
order to preed betterpanei,VirietieS,--since the',1aw forbade them to raids
ratoon eane.aThenecessity'of'planting sagarcam anew every year increased
their COSts.ofprodubtioni;and for this the planters of Java were able to
compensate by higher yields. Here again,we,beve an example of the effective-
ness of legal restrictions on agriculture. It.wouli be completely mis-
leading to attribute the high yields of cane sugar anly.or even -primarily
to the fertility of Java's soil orate the climate cf the island. The
-political climate can be gore decisive for, an agricaltural industry than
the physical environment.'
The iack.of a large plantation industry in Slam is due mainly to
Siam's independent political status rather.tbamto'geographical factors.
Foreign CapPtal preferred the political climate of Malaya and Indonesia
to that of Siam, 'where the government seemed.lese.:Sta7gie and predictable.
In 1940 Indonesia, the largest and physically most varied country of
Southeast Asia, had the most diversified and efficient plantation industry
of Southeast Asia or of the tropics as a whole. Ttis industry, almost
1 In 1928 Goodyear. did,. however, acquire the amount of public land permitted
by the Philippine land law-, and used this small plantation primarily as a
repository for bigh-yjeding clones outside the jurisdiction of the Dutch
and British colonial gciernments - a piece of foresight which proved extremely
valuable in the -1930s when the exportation of rubber clones from countries
participating in the International Rubber Restrictfon-Scheme became anIlwful.
2A future Indonesian-dominated government of the Urited States of Indonesia
has the legal possibility of either reducing or ei:cting the plantation
industry, should this seem desirable, byt not reneving the leases.
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entirely owned and controlled by non-Indonesian entrepreneurs, shared with
Inaonesian peasants in the production of the large quantities of export
crops. A comparison of the two, the plantation industry and peasant export'
?agriculture, is revealing and gives clues as to the direction in which
economic development may move in the future.. The plantation industry
was responsible for the total production of centrifugal sugar, sisal, and
palm oil in Indonesia) whereas such commodities ,as pepper and copra are
practically exclusively raised on small peasant farms, 'Capital requirements
for the processing and preparation of the product prior to export is. the key
to the understanding of this division. The processing of 'sugar cane. into un
refined or refined white sugar, for example, is such a complex process
and requires such an expensive industrial plant that centrifugal sugar will
never be processed by small peasants. The processing of coconut into copra -
is so simpleand requires so little capital that this industry is perfectly
suited to peasant communities. In between these two extremes lie a number
of crops which can be raised and Processed either by plantations. on a large
scale or by individual peasants on a small scale because the processing
techniques are simple and do not involve costly equipment and the supervisio
..*6fa staff of technicians and scientists. Rubber Offers the best ilIds4ra
tration. The industry got its start in Southeast Asia as a plantation
industry, but in the 1920's and 1930ts the accumulative effect of the
rubber production of literally hundreds of thousands of small Asian rubber
growers presented the planters with a serious problem. Had it-not been for
the International Rubber Restriction Agreement of 1934 there can be little
doubt that Asian peasant producers would- have further increased their
share of the worldls output of natural rubber at the cost of the plantation
industry. P.T.Bauer3 has presented a large body of evidence showing that th
restriction scheme favored the planters and was definitely unfavorable to
Asian peasants, with the result that the trend of natural rubber becoming
more and more a peasant crop was stopped.
The tea industry of Java proves that the Western entrepreneur and the
Asian peasant can work together and divide the industry so that the peasant
raises the crop and the Western entrepreneur then processes it in his factory.
The pineapple industry provides another example, this time from the Western
Hemisphere. The Hawaiian Pineapple Company recently erected a cannery near
Vera Cruz, Mexico, The company does not raise the pineapples because the .
agrarian laws of Mexico prevent it from awning land; instead the company
buys the pineapples from the Mexican growers.
A general introduction of such a division of labor wherever possible
do a great deal to reduce the tension in Southeast Asia and to assure its
peasants a greater income.. It would be in the interest of the factories
to aid the growers by supplying them with technical guidance and credit for
the purchase of fertilizer.
In its 150 million peoples Southeast Asia possesses a very large poten ial
resource. At present the efficienby of these peoples is low. But that no
3 Bauer, POT.: Tjailn,121.221:_ladasIa. A Study in Competition and Monopoly,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948.
Report on a Visit to the Rubber Growing Smallholdings of
Malaya. Colonial Research Publications No.1, London 1948.
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inherent factors are involved in this inefficiency A brought out by the
performance of Indonebians, Filipinos and umbers oe other ethnic groups of
the area who: have received adequate education and technical training. .The
efficiency is sc low because the people's Lre poorly educatedl.pdorly
nourished, and often weakened by chronic disease. Their tools, production
techniques, and farm units may have been perfectly Aequate for a Tubsistance
economy, but they are entirely inadequate for a modern economy. Instead.
of benefiting from the cOmmercialization of agricule,ure the people are too
often the victims or exploitation .by middlemen who erofit more fromthe
export Ofeagricultural.comModities than do the predecers.
YThe strength ef'Southeast Asia lies mainly in ets agricultural resources,
howevere are at present only partly utilized- Exteneivc areas. which
are arable are stillawaiting the pioneer. The productivity of the eultivated
land can be greatly increased through the application 9f the 'results of
scientific agricultural- research in the form of impeeved,and disease-resistant
seeds, and in the form -of proper fertilization and Lmproved cultivation..
Such an intensification -of agriculture leading to greeter production per
unit of land and unit of manpower:would:be far Itosolle profitable that an attempt
to raise production by a further increaSe in the nuether Of man hours
devoted to the tillage of each unit of land.
The history Of tommercialeagriculture in the tropics shows that this
industry is unstable and Subject to sudden declines and shifts which may be
brought about either by natural causee such as plan; disease or cultural.
forces such as political Changes, competition from ether parts of the tropics,
or the development of aesynthetic product. At this moment the agricultural
economy of Southeast Asia is about to suffer aeseveee setbaek through the
loss of its practical monopoly on natural rubber.:
Tree crops like rubber are of great value in tropical areas of high
rain-fall and relatively low soil fertility and have many'adVantages over
annual-crops?.beeause trees. protect the soil againee,excessive heat, heavy
rains, and accelerated erosion - provided-they are;e9t planted too far
apart:andprovided that the spaccs. between the trees are COVered with
leguminous or.othercoveraropse ?The.ducayoffall4n leaves preventa An
exhaustion of the humuscontent in the topsoil.. Freim an ecological point
of view tree crops are thus -far better than annual. 2reps, since the latter
require repeated aultivation.
The decline Of the market for natural rubber wall therefore be a
serious blow to Southeast Asia, but,such a developm,qt could be offset by
the creation of an integrated forest industry4 tha, would make Ball use
of the cellulose and lignin, which are produced by ,rees of the tropics at
aefaster rate than, for example, by-the southern piae forests of the,
United States. Timber, wood pulp, cellulose, plastics, and all the other
materials that can be extracted by a modern integraeed forest industry, can
offer a more diversified economic basis than can-rueber, It would be possible
to create pure stands of commercially valuable fast-groudng trees. After all,
----
"Integration of Forest Industries", Unasylva, Vol. 2, 3 1948, pp.120-121.
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the extensive rubb(Jr forests grew up in ikruas once covered by the tropical
rainforest with ite hundreds of different species - a nightmare to the
forester and until, now a stumbling block to the wood chemist, who has not
yet devised a meas of feuding many different kinds of trees into the pulp
mill at the same time.
Fortunately Southeast Asia on the whole does not have the population
problem that co:Ifronts India. Certain parts of Southeast Asia such as
Java, Tonkin, Central Luzon, and Cebu suffer from high population pressure;
but Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines possess A considerable acreage
of unutilized arable land and there is room for expansion and for the
creation of nw farming communities on the pioneer fringe.
Agricultural colonization alone, however, is not enough. What South-
east Asia Puede is a multiple attack on the enemy, poverty, through fuller
utilization of natural and human resources and through the introduction of
such measures as agrarian reforms, where required. Only if agricultural
colonization goes hand in hand with agrarian reform, agricultural intensi-
fication, and industrialization can we expect a real improvement. There
is no siagle solution. Agrarian reform by itself is not enough, since it
cannot add new land nor can it reduce population pressure. Even if the
Philippine government were to make every tenant in Central Luzon an owner
of the land he now tills as a share cropper, poverty would not be eliminat do
since the population density of the central plains of Luzon is too high
to m,ke the farms large enough. Furthermore, unless the laws of inheritanc
should be changed within one or two generations the farms will be sub-
div-:.ded and will shrink to a size to which a hacienderO would never reduce
tenant farms. But if an agrarian reform should go hand in hand with
aricaltural pioneering and industrialization to drain off the surplus rural
population then the farm units could be increased in size so as to permi
.tull utilization of the remaining rural manpower and the application of
more efficient production methods, Elspeth Huxley has said that the Afri an
woman wielding the hoes must give way to the African man cultivating the
land with tractork,drawn machinery, in order to increase the productivity
of the African tropics. Similar changes are needed in Southeast Asia-.
Thy will not come overnight and will not cane without aid from the outsi au.
aid in the form of technical guidance and assistance of the type that
President Truman called for in his Inaugural'Address in January 1949
Only a "bold new program" will bring about a diversification and
intensification of the economy and a better utilization of the human
and natural resources for the benefit of the peoples of Southeast Asia.
Only a "bold new program" will end poverty and create the economic and
political atmosphere in which Communism cannot flourish.
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Thank you very much, Mr. Pelzer. Before I invite
discussion on Mr. Pelzer'e paper we will hear the next presentation, a pa
on "Th!i,Ecenomic Demggrapiayof India and Pakistan" by Professor Kingsley
Davis, of Columbia University. Mr. Davis.
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er
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THE ECONOIIIC DEN. (-7SAPPY Cr
AtiD eUISTANI
irof. idxgsley navis
No one can read the recent literature from Indi
ippreciating its buoyancy and hopefulness. 'a ..ora
,o these two nations after a long struggle. Its cu
ehie dramatic juxtaposition of unexampled goedwilI an
the-tactful emancipatien of an empire by Lord Mount
uld the bloody uprooting of millions of people on th
triumph of the Asiatic against the seemingly invir
aime at a time when new economic and social ehanges,
ereS4ng for expression.' The Indiang. and Pakistanis
JromiSinge they feel reledsed from the past because
ahey haVe no past.
Pisillusionment, however, seems Sure. Actually
)1:f the paet:0 or hope substitute fat pt0ability.
-eality lies the demographic situatioh, not only
ere important:bdt also because they are slew and dif
:pliowing-dis'dt*idn attempts the unwelcome task of
oPulation trende south of tee Himalayas and assessd
he future development of Pakistan and the Union of
el.lows, reference is also made to the rest efjoulth
iemography of India has many features in common with
Territory and People
Including the Netherlands Indies and the Philir
red Pakistan and India on the wast, with everythinS
,mbraces a land area of apprey?imately 35 million squ
population at theeprasentemoment of about 63C mill
ent'of the WonlcOs land surface, it hae e four
torlileYeariulation.,-If it wore an indes?ei',.._
ittla importance; :Ou't since it is primaeelf sarioul
lgh average density t184 per L'eetare mile 0 'mpare
f 44) raises a Serious problem.4 One of the ehroni
s
' From the Division of Population Research, Pa:ptoan c
olumbia.University,. (Publication No.A 112 of the P
Among schelars trained in. the humanities it ie ,7a3
emographic statistics for backward areas. Actually
sia,:we are relativelyfortunate in ,bpth the quxati-
opulration data. The colonial poWers'rhave consider*,
ensuses;, sc theamast'Oarts of tha_region have been
ensue?This dee6 not mean, of course, that our k,
3 completely accurate. It never is. Mere are cer-
.hat have either had no censuses or have been very p,
orneo and Indo-China. And since censuses are taken
ince obviously the whole region has never been censl
tatement about the population as of a given date mue
ensal or postcensal estimates for particular countre
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e and Pakistan without
independence has come
eination was marked by
unanticipated tragedy
edtten on the one hand
other); ittepresented
sible European, and it
already in ferment, were
now find the future
, as independent nations,
the future cannot shake
ne source of sober
)ecause populati6n trends
eicult to alter. The
iescribins the major
their influence on
:ndia. When space
Lsia, because the
the rest of the region.
eines on the east side,
)etween, South Asia
ire miles and supports
ion. With only L.7 per
'Al (28 per cent) of the
his fact would be of
easel and extractive, its
i with the world average
!i difficulties of large
Aorlied Social Research,
abIs? to ridicule
in the ease of South
-.1 and quality of the
it necessaryc take
soyered teVeral
owledge ofthe population
areas of South Asia
arly censused, such as
only occasionally, and
,sed at any one time, a
et, be based on inter-
es, just as would be the
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eeetiens of the region is too many people in relation to developed resource
In comparison to the rest of the region, Pakistan and India stand out
not 60 much with regard to population density as with regard to their
se The Union of India, with approximately 355 million inhabitants, is
today the second most populous 'nation in the world. Pakistan, with about
79 million, is sixth, with probably slightly more inhabitants than the
Netherlands Indies; it is also the world's largest Moslem nation. Both
countries are big in territory as well as population. Pakistan has slightly
less area than Texas and New Mexico combined, and abaut twice the area of
prewar Germany. The Union of India, without Kashmir g has slightly more
than-aethird as much territory as the United States. Kashmir itself, the
territory still in dispute, is half again as large as New York State, though
it has only four million inhabitants.
But like most of South Asia, Pakistan and the Indian Union are not so
big in territory as they are in people. Embracing together only 3 percent
of the worlds land surface, they support almost a fifth of its population.
With less than half the land area of South Asia, they bWre 70 percent of its
people. They are thus disproportionately populous in comparison both to
the world and to South Asia, but the first disproportion is by far the greater.
As between Pakistan and India, the former is not so densely settled as
India, though the difference is not great (Table 1). Pakistan, however,
is a bifurcate nation, its two dividions (East and West Pakistan) being
separated by more than 1000 miles of foreign territory and distinguished
by differences in language, culture, and economy. Whereas West Pakistan
is a predominantly dry region heavily dependent on irrigation, East Pakistan
is an exceedingly wet region. The former grows wheat and cotton primarily,
the latter rice and jute. As a consequence of the difference in climate
and economy, the population density is extremely different. West Pakistan
has six times the territory but only two-thirds the people that East Pakista
has. Indeed, the latter is one of the most densely settled areas of the glo e.
It is only slightly largerthan Java and has almost as many people.3
The territory that is now India (excluding Kashmir) exhibited in 1941 a
density of 277 per square mile. This may seem low compared to the density
at the same date in England and Wales (718) or in Japan (496), but these
are small countries. Indiats average density should be compared only with t at
2 continued)
ase in Europe or in North America. Fortunately, the areas that are most
poorly enumerated are generally those that have the fewest people, so that
the error they introduce is not so great as might at first seem. In the
case of India, a census has been taken every decade beginning in 1871-7a.
Using government personnel as enumerators and building up over the years
a census tradition, the administration of these enumerations has been
excellent 'and the results have proved extremely valuable.
3Javels population is Currently estimated at about 54 million as compared
with our estimate of 47 million for East Pakistan Estimated densities
would then be 945 for Java and 870 for East Pakistan.
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of other large areas., For instance, the average-densityAin India,isover
six times that of the United States; over twice that of China proper;
about 17 times that of prewar European Russia; over Il times that of South
Africa; and more than 2i times that of Eurppe.
-Table 1
AREA, :POPULATION* AND_DENSITYi? 194/ and 1950
Are92.1
(,000isT
Population
Persons per Square Mile
( 001s)
1941L2 ,
19500
1941
1950
PAKISTAN
361
70,135
79,000
194
219
West Pakistan
307
28,169
32,000
? 92
'104
Last fiakistan
54
41,966
47,000
777
870
UNION OF INDIA
1,220
318,863
355,000
261
291
Kashmir
82
4,022
4.1400
49
54
Without Kashmir
1,138
314,841
351,000
277
308
SOUTH ASIA
3,411
554,187
628,000
162
184
Afithout India
or PaRtfiLan
1,830
165,189
194,000
90
106
1/For India-and Pakistan, adapted from O.
of India and the Prospects of Pakistan," GeTgx
(Jan. 1948), pa?. For South Asia, Statosman:
.2/Figures for India andPakistan compiled
1941, 7o11(Summary) pp, 56ff and 116ff; Vol
Vol, 6 (Punjab), pp, 58-59; and Vol, 9 (Assam)
d,.-3tricts were split oy the new boundary, it u
Muslis went to :Pakistan, all Hindu and Sikhs
otheiz'bere split according to the proportions
S!rkhs,:-3J the district population. Figures for
primarily from census figures and estimates gi
such as the Statesmanls Yearbook and brought u
extrapolation.
H.KSpate, "The Partition,
v?1-0-0
s'Year-Book, 1:948r
from !;&IT1; of India,
(Biu4. 44-47;
In capes where
Is asarmc., all
Weilt.to'Tndit., and the
ot a7d Hindu-
South'Af-._a are taken
sc:ocndary sources
:1. to 1950 by rough ?. -
?Estimated for India and Pakistan by assiming that the average
annual.growthrate prevailing in a:given_area,oetween 1921 and 1941 will
?
characterize, that area between 1.941 and, 1950. For the rest of South
Asia, the latest census figure for each, countr7 (in some cases quite
recent figures) were advanced to 1950 by roughly taking account of past
growth trends. When there have been many years since the last census,
the estimates may be considerably in error -- eipecially.the mortality
effect of World War II is not fully known.
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Ps7-0-ala47,.on Growth and Functional Density
The high average densities of India and Pakistan mean little in. them-
selves, But when we realize, as in the case of South Asia as a whole, that
both countries are pw.itax.ily agricultural, the densities take on added sig-
nificance. Since in the latter case land is the primary Anstrument of pro-
duction, a scarcity of it in relation to people spells pnverty, Whereas an
indUstral country can support a dense population, at a high level of living
an agricultural country cannot do so. Even among industrial countries, how
ever, those with a smaller rationof people to resources are proving more
prosperous than those with a high ratio; and _although no country with over
50 percent of its people engaged in agriculture has a high living standard,
those having the most good land per capita seem to be the most prosperous -
so prosperous, indeed, that they tend to climb out of the agricultural clas
rapidly.4 As long as an agricultural country still has a sparse population
it has today a good Chance of industrializing rapidly. This can be seen in
Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and NewsZealand, for example. But relatively
few areas in South Asia are this fortunate. Burma, which is often thought
to be sparsely settled, has about 70 persons per square mile, which is
half again the number in the United States (48).
Since the Indian sUbcontinent is One of the oldest regions of Neo-
lithic. culture, its good agricultural areas have virtually all been long
since put to the plow. The village type of subsistence agriculture spreads
with extreme slowness, and there are still a few parts of. India not yet or
only recently penetrated, but there is evidence that India was already ratier
fully settled before the ChVistian era ,5 Up until 1600 its population harwly
grew at all, being held down lirfamines, warfare, and disease, After the
British came the number of people_ began to increase sharply. In 1871-72
the-census, when corrected for areas not enumerated at the time, shows a
population of approximately 255 million. By modern standards the growth
was still not rapid, however, because mortality remained very high. However,
after the influenza epidemic in 1918, the subcontinent was free from major
disasters, with the result that the Indian population grew by 32 million
(11 percent) between 1921 and 1931 and by 51 million (13 percent) between
19:31 and 1941, This 83 -million increase in two decades gave the country
in 1941 a total of 390 million, and for 1950 our estimate places the total
for Pakistan and the Indian Union combined at 434 million, an estimate that
should not be in error by more than 6 million.
4 An "agricultural country" is here understood to be one whose male labor
force is more than 50 percent engaged in cultivation, forestry, fishing, and
herding. By this definition such, a country as Denmark, for example, is net
agrioultural although it is commonly thought to be. In 1945 over 65 perce t
of the Danish population lived in towns, and 23 percent lived in Copenhage
a city of nearly a million people. In India in 1941 only 13 percent of the
population was defined as urban, If more. than 50 percent of the populatio
is engaged in agriculture it is a sign that the per capita yield is very
low i,e, that the standard of living cannot be high, This may be due
tapocr techniques and low capitalization, but it may also be due to over7
population with respect both to land and capital,
5Pran Nath, A. Study in the Edenomic_Condition of Anoient:India. (London :
Royal Asiatic Society, 1.7929), dRap, 5, estimates The population around
300 BA00641
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Since much of the subcontinent is dry, the hu :e population means great
concentration in certain areas. The districts hav.ng more than the average
density virtually all fall in one solid belt that tegins on the irrigated
plains of West Punjab, descends the Ganges valley, comes down the Eastern
Coast, goes around the tip'of India, and ascends tle Western Coast to the
Gulf of Cambay. Here, in an area that is only 32 lercent of all India,
are found 69 percent Of the people. In 1941 the Gnges valley (as large
as Germany and four times the size of Java and Madtra) had an average density
of 686 per square mile. Lithe Bengal portion it everaged 829. If the
districts having a density of 500 or more are groujed together, they included
nearly half the population but less than a seventh of the-area of India.
Those with 700 or more contained nearly a quarter if the population but
only one-eighteenth of the area. Sucirbonoentratior is not due primarily
to cities. The results are much the same when the cities are eliminated.
The high densities represent the piling up of agrir ulturalists on the land.
In some almost purely agricultural districts the g6neral density rises above
1,000 per square mile. India is like Java, Egypt, Japan, and China in
having large areas of extremely heavy rural ccmbereration.
If density is measured functionally in terms f the number of farm
people per square mile of cultivated land (Table 2:1 it can be seen that
the British Indian figure (432 in 1931 and 535. in a941 was higher than the
figures for EUropean countries having a comparable percentage of their
population dependent on agriculture, but lower than the figures for some
other Asiatic countries. India and Pakistan therefore exhibit two basic
conditions associated with extreme poverty -- firs.., a preponderance of
their people dependent on agriculture, and second, a large number of agri-
culturalists per square mile of cultivable land. ';hese circumstances
explain why, in an area rich in agricultural resources, millions of people
are close to starvation.
Effects of Population Pressure in'Agrieulture
For a rural economy, some of the major consequences of an already
excessive and- yet increasing agricultural populatien are as follows: A
reduction in the average size of farm unit below the point of optimum
efficiency; a consequent inability to, save, aocumueate capital, and improve
the land; a resulting failure to increase productivity per acre; an inability
to use efficiently the increasing number of farm people, with the result
that there is underemployment and unemployment; an finally the development
of certain rural problems such as chronic indebtedness and elaborate sub-
infeudation, which help to strengthen the circle o poverty, inefficiency,
and debility.
In the case of the.indian region it is possibee to document certain
of these effects. For instance, with respect to size of farm unit, there
has been in British India a steady diminution in tee number of acres per
farm person. The number fell from 2.23 in 1891-92 to 1.90 in 1939-40 --
a 15 percent decline. This drop in the amount of arm land per farmer
would have little significance if agricultural proauctivity had risen
correspondingly, but it did not. The statistics of yield per acre indicate
that the average yield has not risen much since the turn of the century.
Some of the commercial crops, such as coffee, tea) and sugar, have shown
a substantial rise, but the big crops such as rice, wheat, and cotton have
not improved. A weighted index shows arise from 190102 until 1920-21,
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Table 2
PERSONS PEL1i
Korea/c
Java and Madura/d
Philippine Islands/e
Puerto Rico/f
BRITISH INDIT/a
Yugoslavia/h
Rumania/i
Chile/.j
Maxico7k
United States/1
Argentina/m
ACICULUE hi S13A113 MILE
Pcent?.of.
Population
Dependent on
Date Agriculture/a
OF CULTIVATED LP.ND
Persons Dependent
on Agriculture per
Square Mile of Cul-
tivated Land/b
981
826
573
- 533
422
344
240
162
88
48
32
_
1930
1930
1939
1930
1931-
1931
1930
1940
1930
1930
1930
79
63
70
66
68
76
72
38
74
25
30
2/ Figures on occupation distribution are hard to standardize. -Many of thee
are estimated in one way or another and are only roughly accurate0 in
many instances the percentage of all occupied males engaged in agricvlture
has been used, by moans of a regression line, to estimate the population
dependent on agriculture.
h/ 11Cultivated land" is defined as that actually sown or lying fallow, It
does not include raw pasture, f--rest, or land that is potentially Culti-
vable. Again, however, standardization is difficult,
2/ StatesmanTs Year-Booja 1933, p.1074. Re'sum6 statistioUe de l'Emyire du
Ja2on, 45 annde, 1931, p.4.
A/ Indicich Verslag, 1937, Parts 1-2. Netherlands Indian Report 1937,
Statistical Abstract for the Year 1936, pp. 221-223, 229.
2/ Census of the PhilimIa22, 1939, Vol. II, pp.53,_ 496, 906.
f/ Fifteenth Census of the United States, 19301? Outlying Territories and
Possessions, pp. 1831 207.
g/
Census of India, 1931, Vol.1, Part II, pp.3, 206, India, Department cf
Commercial Intelligence, Statistical Abstract for British India, 15th
of New Series, 1927-37 (Delhi), p.458. .
Iv Yugoslavia, Statistic G6n6rale dtEtat. Annuaire Statistue, 1934-]935
PP. 74-75, Statisticki Godisnjah, 1937, pp. 18ff.
1/ Census of Rumania, 1930, Vol.X, pp.xcvi-ciii. Estimated from number of
persons not engaged in agriculture. Institut de Statistica Generala,
BulotinuT Statistic al Romaniei, 1931-1932, pp,60-63,
a/ Chile, Ministerio de Agricultura, Almanaque 1940, pp.17, 310, and Anexo ool.
11/ International Institute of Agriculture, The First World Agricultural Cen
1930, Vol, IV, p391. Mexico, Direcction eneral de Estadistical WIETZ
Censo de Poblacion, 1930, Parts 1-9, 11, 14-19, 1-22, 24-27, 29-32, OusOto
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-39-
(Table 2 continued)
Iaternatfonal Institute of Agriculture, op.cit. p,136, Unitei States,
Census,cf_1930, Population, V62,V, General Rept on Occupations, p.39.
pyi Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura, Almanagae_ 1940, p.310. Percent
dependent on agriculture estimated by writer.. Thtal population to which
percentage applied is an official estimate.
Not only has there been a failure to improve 1,
is well known that these yields are below those fol
suggested by Table 3. India's comparatively low at'
is not due to any natural deficiency in the land it
includes great tracts of rich alluvial soil; rathc
the land is handled -- to the low proportion of cat
er-acre yields, but it
most other areas, as
ricultural productivity
self, for the subcontinent
r it is due to the way
ital invested in it.b
The deficiency of capital inveStment ia farmirg is shown in numerous
ways -- in the primitive techniques utilized, in tht. nonuse of both natural
and artificial fertilizers, in the failure to imprcve the breeds of plants
and animals. In order to help his land. maintain ias fertility, the Indian
farmer takes the way that requires least immediate capital but which in the
long run is watteful: he lets the land lie fallow. In 1930-3l nearly
a fifth of the landunder cultivation was nurrent aallow; fields.were taking
rest to regain their natural fertility. 7 Even so, there are evidences that
the quality of the Indian land is deteriorating uncer continued use without
compensatory investment. Nearly all of the subcontinent has a tropical
climate with alternating strong sunshine, torrential rains, and wind.. This
kind of climate is hard on cultivated soil. 8 Pasture land is overgrazed.
Few forests are left. .What saves the region from cisaster is the fact that
most, of the erosion is taking place in the high. Himalayan mountains, the,
silt of which is deposited in the heavily peopled river valleys. Yet the
soil is in a depleted state.
In spite of the increasing Use of improved seeds, the yield per acre does
not seem to improve permanently--e-Jt has beer a common experience that -
after a few year,sathe yield per acre from imp/ eyed varieties begins to
decline rapicfly.9
?
6The low average yields may also be due to the inclusion of more maeginal land
under cultivation than in the case of many other'ccuntries, but this again
is an expression of India's poverty and the tendency to use land intead of
capital.
7D. Ghosh, Pressure of Population and Economic Efficiency in India (New Delhi:'
Indian Counail of World Affairs, 197), p.29. ?
8See Wm.Vogt, Road to Su v
rVaal (New 'York: Sloane, 2948), pp.225-226; and Sir
. _ _
Harold Glover, Sob. Eros:Lon Oxford Pamphlets on Irdian Affairs, No.23
(Bombay: Humphrey Milford, 1944). .
9Ghosh, op.cit., p.46
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Table 3
INDICES OF COMPARATIVE YIELDS IN SIX CROPS,
VARIOUS COUNTRIES (BRITISH INDIA = 100)
Rice
British India 100
Siam 116/b
Egypt 241/7
China 293/c
Japan 256/b
277/7
Italy 337/b
361/7
United Kingdom ...
Australia 292/a
Canada 4..
155/a
United States 161/b
181/7
Wheat
100
112/b
saal
152/c
180/b
154/b
313/a
116/a
109/7
141/a
150/7
1.40/a
1335
131/7
Barley
100
? . ?
? .?
SP.
a?
?? ?
257/a
...106/a
153/a
131/a
Maize
100
? .?
???
?110 ?
?111
.? ?
..?
189/a
241/a
230/a
Potatoes
100
ISS
???
???
ea ?
I..
276/a
134/a
142/a
146/a
Cotton
100
? ? .
500/2.
???
la?a
? ..
. ? ?
? . ?
? ? ?
10/2
2/ Figures marked with "a" indicate percentages calculated on the bas
of data given in Baljit Singh, Population and Food Planning in India (13e711..
Hind Kitabs, 1947), P.59. The data were computed from the Statistical. Y3a
Book of the League of Nations 1942-44 and refer to the year 1943-44.
YFigures marked with "b" indicate percentages calculated from D,Gbos
Pressure of Population and Economic Efficiency in India (New Delhi:
Council of World Affairs, 1936), p.29. The data on rice production rpfer
to an average for the years 1931-32 to 1935-360-and those for wheat produc
tion to an average for the years 1924 to 1933.
C/Figures 'marked with "c" indicate percentages calculated on the basis
of data given in P.C. Malhotra, "Agricultural Possibilities- in India,"
Indian. Journal of Economics, Vol.25 (April 1945), p.559. Malhotra took
his data from a report of the Post-War Reconstruction Committee of the
Government of India, entitled "The Technological Possibilities of Agrl.cultviral
Development," by W. Burns.
Y:
Heavier-yielding varieties remove nutrients from the soil at a higher rat
Unless the soil is reinforced somehow, the net result is to reduce ite
fertility to the point where the new variety no longer .yields a greate2
return than did the. old,variety.10 In short, the productivity of the Indi n
soil cannot be increased Without investing capital in the soil itself,
10 Cf, Balgit Singh, Population and Food Planning in India (Bombay : Hind
Kitabs, 1947), pp.
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-)4-
With per-acre productivity in a static conditton, Indian agriculture
cannot produce enough'ef a surplus to finance an eodus from agriculture.
In countries that have made the fastest economic avance, a shift in the
occupational structure has occurred, An increasing proportion of the. people
have found their living in manufacturing, transpor7ationmerchandising, -
and professional services. This shift.has enabled thee countries, even:
when their exports remained agricultural, to exper_ence a,rapid growth
of population without increasing the ratio of farm people to farm land.
Hence there is today an inveNe correlation betwet the density of ag14-7
cultural workers on agricultural land and the per apita real income?
At the'bOttom of the scale are.countries like Indii and Pakistan where,
without any change An the occupational Wucture, he farm population has
grown as fast as the ganeral pbpulatiorr" and:wher no corresponding'
expansion in the. total supply of cultivated land hts occurred. The
inevitable result -1.$ an oversupply-Ogthrmers who ,re Only partly employed,
with a consequent tendency for per capita producti:ity to decline. Between
1920 alld'1941 in British India the population e-.; by 27, percent while
the net area sown increased by only 8 percent, . kat expansion of agri-
cultural land isstill possible in India and-Pakit-i.an by opening up
remote areas (such as still exist in'Assam) and by extending irrigation,
but not at a rate that will match the growth-of po)ulation. Because of
deforestation, overgrazing, and water-logging from irrigation, future
losses may almost equal future gains .' the;meanAme the rural villages
have far mbre,farmers_thanthey needjefr-efficient
?
The elimination of the surplus agricultural plaulation would increase
the per capita product without seriously reducing he total agricultural
output. Haw big the surplus is depends on how =01 capitalization one
assumes. Under present conditions of low capital tnvestment, the surplus
can be roughly estimated by assuming the average'S',ze holding to be one
conveniently tillable by a. farmer and his family, '.sing one bullock team
and one plow.14 Let us say it is half again as gr3at as thepresent holding.
This would mean a one-third reduction in the populAion dependent on agri-
culture -- that is, in 1941, a withdrawal of:sometling like 91 million
people fromfarms.over all.of India. Iri the United. $tb.te8 in 1940 the -
average per capita number of farm acres for the -farming, popUlation was approx-
imately 35, as Compared:witn Indials,approximate 2. This suggests that the
India-Pakistan area might, with a high degree Of cpitaiization, do without
some 200 million of its farm population._
II Colin Clark, The Edonomicsof 1960 (London: MacW,11anp. 3?944), C.W. 4.
1213,G. phate? Changes.4AMILLIksmational Distribution of the Population,
(Delhi.: Manager of P4b]dations, 1940, p.21.
1.3MUch of this increase was at the expense of cultvabli waste and fallow,
for the total cultivable land increased by only 4 percent.
14The economic holding for an Indian farm family ii discUased-in-G.B. jathar
and S.G. Beni, IndiarCEconomics (London: Oxford Un_verSity Press, 5th ed.,
1937), pp.217-221. .
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Since the average Indian farmer tills a plot too small to live on,
he can accumulate no capital and is forced to borrow. Since his collateral
is poor, he must borrow from a money-lender, who, perforce, must charge him
high interest rates. The farmer borrows for non-productive purposes --
weddings, funerals, pilgrimages, litigation, and feasts -- because if he is
to live socially as well as physically, he must find the money that his farm
does not give him.
With a rising agricultural population on a limited area, agricultural
land tends to increase in value. This means that proprietary rights
become more valuable and that the possessors of these rights can get a
return by letting someone else work the land. Everywhere in the Indian
region there have been complaints against subinfeudation, or the multipli-
cation of subtenancies. It is said that in Eastern Bengal "proprietary
rights are quite commonly. found seven and eight deep. and in some eases
12, 15, or 17.17 In many areas the .ryot, the "legal peasant," has been
transformed into a petty landlord or middleman. In samindari areas, the
powerful landlord class has managed to increase its revenues from the tenan
by exacting illegal rent through nazarana (payment in kind), begar (payment
in labor), fines, fees, etc. It 11E7= encouraged sublettiUr tenants.
In spite of the exactions of the zamindars, the tenants' rights have been
of sufficient value that they could sublet the land, and the subtenants cou
sublet it again. Nothing illustrates so clearly the bottom man's desperate
necessity of finding some scrap of land on which to try to make a living)-
In short, the general picture in India and Pakistan is that of an orie
agricultural people long settled in its territory and exploiting that terni
tory intensively but inefficiently. The most fertile areas are filled to
capacity by peasants who, despite the soil's richness, barely eke out a
livelihood. As the rural population has grown, plots have diminished in si
underemployment has become chronic, indebtedness has gripped the cultivator
and eubinfeudation has increased, The .pcverty of the farmer means under-
capitalization, and this in turn means low productivity.
Industrialization and Population
The agricultural situation, for which the Indians were not chiefly
responsible, represents the bootstrap by which India and Pakistan must now
15Radhakamal Mukerjee, "Land Tenures and Legislation" in EconaillinProbll:ems
of, MederneInqia, Vol.1 (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp.237-38. Cf.C.GaChevi
Trench, "The Rural Community" in Sir Edward Blunt (ed.), .Social
India (London: His Majesty's Stationery-Office, 1938), pp, 93-94
16Theoretically? if landlordism led to the accumulation of capital in the
hands of landlords and this in turn were expended on agricultural improvem nt
and industrial expansion, subinfeudation would do no economic harm, But i
practice it seams to lead to neglect of the land, because the landlord is
short-sightedly interested in revenue .for consumpteLane pleeposes and the
tenant has no incentive to improve someone else's property.
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pull thFlms'alvos out of thrA s.tuatton Rcth ccuntr .7!b. are in much the same
teat alaa6(,, of Pa'ants nof:maj. food lilroius, but future
oopulaton growth eRn -3az,Ely abLorb any :00.ei rp.Lu tnat may now exist.
East 3ena1 ha z lor been one of India's most impewrished areas, just as
the Punjab has long been one of its richest; the baLance of the two does not
give Pakistan a favorable point of' departure. The Thion of India has not
been greatly changed by partition. Although She ha: lost part of her bread-
basket, she has retained most of the indastry and most of the industrial
resources. Both nations must now accomplish a belaaed and herculean task of
industrialization. They are feverishly planning that task, are making
some progress, and will surely eventually succeed, at in the meantime the
obstacles are many.
A puzzling historical fact about India is tha it was "the first of
the oriental countries to feel the impact of industialism"-aand yet never
completed the industrial revolution, whereas anothe oriental country,
japan, starting later and with fewer resources, did complete it. The
reasons seem to lie in the nature of British contro:,. and in the character
of Indian culture. But whatever they were, independence now finds both
India and Pakistan with little industry in comparisan to their large
populations. This is true ?despite the fact that praor to partition indust-
rialism was gradually moving ahead.
Evidences of past industrial growth are many. Despite foreign trade
setbacks during the depression and World War II, the per capita volume of
both imports and exports tended to rise. Also, the character of the imports
and. exports was changing. Manufactured goods playei an increasing part in
exports, a decreasing part in imports (Table 4). Thre was a large increase
in the importation of machinery and chemicals requil-ed g.y industry.-1 Indus-
trial production itself grew faster than population, as did cities and
literacy.19 Between 1920-21 and 1943-44 in India as a whole (excluding Burma)
the output, by weight, of cotton piecegoods increas3d 223 percent, and of
cotton yarn by 152 percent. Between 1920-21 and 1939-40 the number of
textile looms (cotton, jute, and woollen mills combined) increased by 66
percent and the number of spindles by 47 percent. Iron ore production
gained more than 300 percent after 1921. Almost atly other index of economic
activity, such as freight-car loadings, postal receipts, urban growth, will
show the same upward trend.20 The impetus behind industrialization is shown
17HUbert Heaton, "Industrial Revolution," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
p.9.
18John Matthai, Tariffs and Indust, Oxford Pamphlats on Indian Affairs,
Mo,20 (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p,18.
19Kingsley Davis, "Demographic Fact and Policy in iadia" in Dem2gEaphic
Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid_Glpyth (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund,
1944), pp. 52-53.
20Econamic Advisor; Government of India, Statistical Summary- ni? the Social
and Economic Trende in India (1ashington, D.C,: Government of India Informa-
tion Services, 1945), pp, 15-17. See also Daniel II', Buchanan, Deve120ent
of Capitalist Enterprise in India (New York: Macmillan,1934), espeoially
Chapst, 7-13i and P.S.Lokanathan, ...idistrk1,114.1tima Oxford Pamphlets on
Indian Affri3iravapApiitsem
:268,RAPtuakiiii8crabhArolio*3c109cgi?
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Table 4
COMPOSITION OF INDIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS /a
Before World
War I
Exports Imports
After World
War I
Exports Imports
1940-41
Exports
Food, drink and
tobacco 29%
15%
21%
20%
22%
Raw materials
47
7
50
33
33
/b
Manufactured articles
23.
76
27
43
43
1h'
Miscellaneous
1
2
2
4
2 -
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
a/ General Motors India, Economic Survey of India (New York: l945), p.115.
12/ Articles mainly or wholly manufactured.
by the "remarkable fact that while industrial production in most countries
showed a heavy decline during the period of the great depression which
started in 1929, the output of the principal industries in India showed a
steady and, in some cases, a marked increase."21
Despite the transitory character of much Indian labor in the past,
there is now growing up a settled working population in manufacturing citi
like Jamshedpur, Madras, Nagpur, and Ahmedabad. This new stability has
facilitated the growth of skills and a modern type of vertical social mobi-
lity.22 It also appears, though on incomplete evidence, that the habit of
industrial investment is growing among the Indian people.
The evidence appears clear that industrialization has moved ahead in
India. Yet no one seems satisfied with the rate at Which it has moved. Tha
feeling arises from three considerations: First,. the urgency is gree,'?
andPakiStan needindustrialization as badly as any countries in the world,
and they need it quickly.. Second, the 'potentialities of this region fo:-
industrial development are enormous, so that the actual Performance seems
tragically below what could be expected. And third, comparison with recentI7
industrialized countries -- Japan, Russia, Australiar Argentina 7- suggest.;
.that India's rate has been abnOrmally slow.
2IMatthai, op.cit., pp.12-13.
22Tulei Ram Sharma,. Location of Industries in India (Bombay: Hind Kitabs
1946)1 PP.. 191-193.
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IT India's populatiOn had not grown during her relatively long period of
gradual industrial growth, the economic prospects o- Pakistan and the Ind:Ian
Union might now be brighter Actually the population grew more slowly than
it would have done with rapid industrialization (as comparison with industrial
countries shows),23 but its growth has borne a higher ratio to industrial
growth than in most countries, and its period of growth has been prolonged.
The same factors that retarded industrialization aleo kept fertility high,
yet at least one of these factors -- a colonial economy -- also helped to
reduce the mortality below what the actual industrialilation would-normally
have reduced it to* - Ass-a consequende,we find that the Union of India and,
to a lesser degree, Pakistan are at the threshold ce7 huge potential industria-
lization with a population possibly more crowded than that of any country
of. thenp,asetewhigh. subsequently achieved the,induetreal revolution.24 This
fact means not only., that Complete industrialization will be more 'difficult
to achieve than it otherwise would have been, but aeso that when industria-
lization is achieved it will net raiseethestandard of living as much as it
did in the Western industrial-nations.5 -
How does population pressure ebstruct.industridization? The question
is not an easy one, but the f6116wing points seem raevant: (1) Popt4ation
pressure tends to focus economic effort. on consumptnon goode rather :In
produetion goods, The awollen-masses are-so deptiend of immediate necessi-
ties that eheer maintenance becomes the dominant ain As nen-) neeeaaities?
are met, the :population continue S to grow and to relujre more neceseitees.
This makes difficult the accumulation of an econominzurpinsefor einve:,stment
in long-run heavy industries, even though illtilute17 the hpavy industries,
if inctalled, would yield an enormously increased oetent of zonsuleen good's.'
One concrete expression of this difficult, as alreA noted, is that the
ordinary individual is so near the .subsistence penne that he cannot Save
but mustborroW for consumption purposes. Even whe' he can save, he often
prefers a high liquidity to a modest return thncegh inveetment. The business
firm finds the demand for food and clothing so insietent that there is
greater profit in immediately .satisfying thiaedemahe.withineffiCient-eqnip-
ment.thanfin,making long-run exPenditireS'onetiagic equipment. Finally, the
government feels the same pressure; .if.democraticeet ?cannot.ignor.eethe
sustenance needs of its citizens'in'order'to-build a heavy industry for the
future. _
(2) In a primarily agricultural count.ri the.means for industrialization
have to be paid for by agriculture. An excess population,- as we have seen,
leads to agricultural inefficiency, by producing linderemploymento'unprOductive
23Davis, "Demographic Fact and Policy in Indialm-lca3Aoit..,pp! 37-39.
2.4.1.Japani2. the only poesible exception,Atthe'beginning of its industrial
expansion.(SAY 187) JaP4n,?Avitin approxsmately?35'.zillion,?had a density of
about 235 Paresquaremile* This is less than that in the Indiantnionteday,
but the ratio of farm population to agriCUlturaleland.Was probably greater
.e
than'in'the latter country. e. ?.
25Again Japan affords an illustration. She started with an initial handicap
of high population density and'opritillued:t0:heplauled byepopulation.growth.
..!
As a consequence she had to Use more ingenuity and' control than Western ?
countriesPinikowe31Fert14?445g440C47617/2441610340454i213AeOVIAMOWASe got
less out of it. , ?
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indebtedness, small holdings, low capitalization, subinfeudation and low
productivity. Being caught in this vicious circle,, the crowded farm 7npu-
lation is in no condition to furnish the economic surplus for building an
industrial system, despite the fact that this system would help the farm
situation more than anything else,
(3) Rural population pressure means that most of the land is devoted
to food crops for sustenance rather than to commercial crops for the accumu-
lation of an investment surplus. The country thus has few exports to pay
for the importation of machinery, technicians, and other necessities of
heavy industry. Also, it cannot compete successfully in world markets with
other agricultural countries where the amount of land, of equipment, and of
developed technique is much greater per worker. The situation reaches its
ultimate futility when the food requirements become so great that the
agricultural country becomes an importer of agricultural produce -- that is,
when the total value of agricultural imports exceeds the total value of
agricultural exports, This condition cannot be reached except through
charlty from the rest of the world. The Union of India has by no means
reached this point and Pakistan certainly not, but the Union is an importer
of food, which is a danger signal unless industrialization is hastened.
(4) In an overpopulated country labor is thought to be cheaper than
machinery. "The results for the economy as a whole are poor; the low amount
of capital employed per labourer reduces output per head and lowers national
income, and the low wage, in its turn, reduces the efficiency of the worker,
..."26 Mechanization is apparently fostered When labor is dear?e.g. under
frontier conditions, as in the United States, Argentina, and Australia--
not when labor is plentiful.
(5) A population whose growth is due to high fertility and a high but
somewhat lower death rate, has several disadvantages. First, it wastes
much energy in reproduction, because its women produce millions of babies
each year who will die before reaching a productive age. Second, the high
mortality of such a population--high, but not high enough to cancel the
traditional birth rate--is necessarily associated with excessive morbidity,
which tends to reduce the productivity per worker. And finally, as a resul
of both the high birth rate and the high death rate, this type of populatio
is characterized by an unusual burden of young-age dependency. Comparing
the 1941 age distribution of India (estimated on the basis of returns from
certain provinces and states) with that of the United States for 1940, we
discover the following fact: although the total Indian population was three
times that of the United States, it had only the same number of people aged
65 and over, and approximately six times as many children aged 0-4.47 The
net result was that only 47 percent of the Indian people were in the most
productive period of life (20-60), whereas 55 percent of the American peopl
were in it. In the absence of a high living standard, an excessive pro-
portion in the young ages means child labor, poor education, and less epono ic
efficiency.
260hosh, gp.. cit., p. 40.
27This was true in spite of the fact that there is much more under-
enumeration of children in India than in the United States.
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The preceding five paragraphs summarize what Lppear to be the main ways
in which heavy density combined with potentially 1-pid, population growth
impedes industrialization. 28 Such a situation is not confined to India and
Pakistan alone but is characteristic of several otLer.areas as well, Particu-
larly, there is a general drift in this direction:in:all of Sputh Asia,
primarily because this area has so long had a colonial economy. Our argument'
is not intended, however, to claim that population alone impedes industria-
lization. The demographic aspect is only one variLble in a complexaquili-
brium; it is as much a consequence as a cause, nor is the argument intended
to suggest that industrialization in.India, PakistiAl, or the rest of South
Asia is impossible. In the case-of India and Pakivtan, we have already ,
cited evidence'that industrialization is on the way. Such industrialization
will come, however, not because Of Indies dense aud growing population but
in spite of it. In fact, the question-is not-eo arch whether or not India
and Pakistan will eventually become industrialized, but how soon. The ,
quicker industrialization comes., the greater will e its long-run benefit., .
Even at highest speed it will probably tend to double the population. At
a slower paee, it might triple the population. How fast the process of
modernization can be accelerated depends on the roLe of :India and Pakistan. .
in the world edonOmy, on the ruthlesSness and effectiveness of the economic
controls, and on the absence of political strife. It seems doubtful that
the industrial revolution can be accomplishedin t_me.to stave off a ,
population .growth that will takeuthe fruits of industrialism less beneficial
than would otherwise be the -case.
Population Policy
Any attempt to compensate indefinitely for perpetual population increase
by using economic measures alone is bound to fail, because human beings live
in a finite world. Unless the economic measuresP,,entually cause. the growth
ofpopulation to decline-- that is, unless they eventually have a.demographic
effect --they will in the longrun prove incapable of raising-the.leVel of
living.
The question naturally arises as to whether a faster-and greater rise
in the level of living would be achieved if, along with economic measures,
direct demographic policies were also adopted.. In otheryords,. should not,
a program of rapid industrialization be also accomaniedby other measures
designed to reduce the rate of.population growth that normally accompanies
industrialization?
28A redundant and growing population, is sometimes lleged to aid industria-
lization for two reasons: (a) it provides an abuntince of cheap labor to man
new industrial-_enterprises, and (b) it affords- a large and expanding internal
market that encourages heavy investment and therefore an increasing tempo of
economic activity. While there is probably some validity in these contentions,
it is nevertheless worth noting with reference to he first argument .that a
cheap labor supply is usually an inefficient one; uld with reference to the
second argument, that in a region such as the Indian subcontinent the growth
of population is aggravating an already unfavorabl-,! situation: It tends to
make the business outlook pessimistic rather than optimistic.
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In this mtter there seem to be only two possibilities, neither of
which will be adopted or pushed to the point of effectiveness. One is masi)
emigration, which is not feasible in the modern world. The other is birth
control, which no government has yet found the courage to pursue in an
all-out and effective manner. Ideally, in order to maximize real income,
these demographic policies would be pursued along with rapid industrializaJ-
tion. Emigration would be encouraged with a view to losing as little as
possible in terms of skills and capital and gaining as much as possible in
terms of remittances. Birth control would be diffused with the help of
films., -radio, ambulatory clinics, and free services and materials; aided
by research on both techniques of contraception and methods of Mess per-
suasion; and linked clearly to the public health and child welfare movements.
The skillful and vigorous pursuit of all three major measures -- rapi
industrialization, strategic emigration, and family limitation -- would
probably mean that the demographic transition would be acoomplished earlie
than otherwise and thus make possible a higher standard of living ibr
future generations.
Ironically, the one measure that has the best chance of being pushed
is rapid industrialization, but not for demographic reasons. Both Pakist
and India will try hard to improve their economies without encouraging
lower fertility or greater emigration. The irony comes from the fact tha
,although economic change seems more accpptable than birth control measures
because it interferes less with the mores, the truth is that any policy
that would rapidly industrialize Pakistan and India would be a far greate/4
shock to the basic social institutions than would any policy that attacked
fertility directly. Fast industrialization would sweep both the ryot and
the zamindar from their moorings, transforming them into workers in a
collectivized, mechanized agriculture utterly foreign to their habits,
The people would not undergo this transformation willingly. Judged by
events in Russia, the cost of this transformation and of resistance to it
would be tremendous in loss of human lives, loss of livestock, and loss o
food production. Also, the existing industrial and business organization,
with its vested interests, would have to be completely overhauled. Pro-
duction schedules, prices, profits, wages, raw materials, location of
industries, flaw of capital, and mobility of labor would all have to be
controlled. How otherwise could a retarded agricultural region be rappll,
industrialized?
When, therefore, it is said that rapid induttrialization is an easi
policy than direct birth control, all that is meant is that the statemArt
of policy is easier. It cannot mean that the execution is easier. 14 th
execution of the policy, a program of forced industrialization would viol
far more taboos and arouse more resistance than would the dissemination o
birth control education and propaganda. This suggests that a good bit of
the talk about rapid industrialization is just talk. It sounds good and
elicits a favorable raaction. But whether enough official action will be
taken to speed the industrial process beyond that ordinary capitalistic
laiseez-faire would bring is a moot question.
te
It seems likely the two countries will eventually succeed in industria-
lizing, but because the obstacles are so great (including excessive popul
tien) they may not succeed until they have established totalitarian regims
acquired almost completely planned economies, and experienced sharp
tempo PiWrcrvtalfilokRelifitgithi2/074$?tlIkbikliketPla50 (ke_9it fast
or slow, the conditions of life for the individual should,as in Europe,
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Iorth America, Auatralia, end. Japan, be of eaca type as to give a powerful
eersonal incentive .for limiting ,births. A modern demographic balance should
chen be achieved. Theultiaate pcpulat-ion will likely be much larger than
ec would have been. had a. full-scale population policy been carried out in
aee first place.
Thus the effect of a full population policy woLid be not to -prevent ,
perpetual:population growth (si,ich growth is impossiLie anyway)but to balance
he demographic books at an earlier time. Induatrielization does not
everyWhere yield the same -standard of living. The contrast between Japan
and Europe, between Europe and America, suggests thieL teal income in indUat-
vial countries is strongly influenced by the point et which demographic
erowth is stabilized with reference to resources. even if the whole world
aecomes industrial, the countries with excessive nalabers will still be
eenalized.
in short, if we look candidly at the probable euture,ye must admit that
Lhe demographic situation in .Pakistan and India wil get worse before it
gets better. The current discrepancy between birthL and deaths -which is
causing the rapid populat!on growth is artificial. Eventually the birth
rate must drop or the death rate rise. Strife, fain e, and epidemic disease
are an ever-present threat in the Indian'peninsula. They are capable of
sending mortality suddenly back to its pre-modern level. With a high density
in relation to developed resources and with the viraual impossibility of
solving the problem quickly by sheer economic measures or by emigration, the
two countries an achieve the maximum standard of laving and national strength
which their situation allows only if they control fertility by a specific
programein that direction. The fact that they probbly will not do this
does not detract from its advisability, Their unwielingness will ?t?
necessarily result in perpetual poverty for their citizens or in absolute
catastrophe. But it will result in greater poverty than would otherWise be
the case.
What is said here about Pakistan and India applies substantially to the
rest of South Asia, but with one important qualification. .QUitting Java,.
the rest ef the area has net yet reached' the degree of population pressure
that the Indian subcontinent is under. The poverty ofethese ether areas
is due primarily to other causes. It follows that, if extremely effective
economic measures are undertaken soon enough, the population factor may
be controlled before it becomes a formidable cause ef stagnation in its own
right. India, Pakistan, and Java should serve as werningsof whet is in
store for the rest of the region if a policy of drifting eagriculturalism
is pursued. Fortunately; the end of colonialism in the region may speed
a change from suoh drifting agriculturalism, but perhaps'not.without poli-
tical and economic disturbances of shocking dimensions.,
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Thank you very much, Mr. Davis...,
I. am sure that no one can accuse us of having organized a conference
that would avoid hard problems. May I make a comment or two, before We
begin our discussion.
In order to reduce overlapping as much as posLible I should appreciate
your taking care to direct your comments to the sueject of this round table
session. Ofiretlelfil*SieliketelasV21)(4/6714411.44-1(19'8YMOMABH466'656806-9
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Some members of our group are offitials of governmental agencies; for
them and for everyone I want to say that the conditions of this disuussion
are: There are no members of the working press present, and there Will be
no report in the press of what is said at the round table sessions. A
transcript of our discussion is being made but eaoh individual will have
the opportunity to edit his own remarks before they are published. So I
ask all of you, the officials as well as the nonofficials, to feel
completely free to participate to the fullest extent in this discussion.
And now may I ask for your questions and observations on the papers
given by Mr. Pelzer and Mr. Davis.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
MR, HAROLD ISAACS (Newsweek Magazine): I would like to ask both
gentlemen, whether they think that taking India and Southeast Asia as
a region means that we simply would multiply and accumulate those problems
or whether we would thereby through the pooling of the problems possibly
arrive at some channels that would ease their solution.
MR. DAVIS: It seems to me the answer is this: If there were any way t
an economic integration of the area could be achieved, I think it would ma
much more sense. The great calamity of India in my opinion is the partiti
simply because there are now two economic and political systems with their
resultant difficulties and conflicts.
PROF. FRED EGGAN (University of Chicago): The splitting off of Burma
had the effect of making one instead of two.
PELZER: No doubt we are confronted by the fact that although in
Southeast Asia the problems are very similar, historical and other factors
have created aufficient differences so that I donet think one can work out
a plan which would solve the problem in all of Southeast Asia. I think
within an overall plan one would have to permit of sufficient variations
to take care of the specific situation in the various parts of Southeast
Asia.
at
n,
PROF. BERT F. HOSELITZ (University of Chicago): I think that in order
to intelligently approach. the problem we might subdivide it in the fpilovi g
ways: First; I think, it becomes quite clear from the two?paPers that what
is needed in the whole region is an importation of two things - capital an
skills. Capital is easier to import than skills. Second, the question th t
arises in the whole region is the necessity of exporting people from where
they are now, either into industry or into the other parte of the various
countries, The population densities, especially if we had them subdivided
by districts, would show great differences, For example, the outer.parta
of Indonesia are considerably much less densely populated than, let us sayj
India. and Pakistan.ent he one hand or Java on the other, One of the questions
we might possibly ask is whether the problem .of migration within the area
offers any solution whatsoever, and if it does, .whether it is feasible so4ally
and politically.
So the general question is: (1) What is the relationship of all the
countries with the rest of the world as concerns importation of capital an
skills, (2) what is the relationship with the rest of the world as far as
concerns exportation pf goods and people_,_ and y eo
lwhat are theos il
sibitie
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of readjustment within the area, either by means of trade or by means of
migration?
PROF. :EpwiN P. REUBENS (Cornell University): lir- Chairman, this
matter of establishing regional entities has a, greae vogue nowadays but there
is serious question as to whether the region will be' properly chosen or not.
4e have addressed ourselves to Southeast Asia which is one kind of neminal
eegion, and to India-Pakistan which is another kind of nominal region. Now
the question is whether it is possible to combine teeseinto an economic unit.
If we ask Ourselves' what is
integration? I would suggest that
is to be founded on similarity of
It $reeMS to me that the countries
in the sense that they are mainly
products to the Western world, at
India 4 a considerable extent is
?
a proper geographi area for regional
we inquire whethe: a regional organization
its components or upon complementarity.
of Southeast Asia particularly are similar
engaged in export. ng mineral and agricultural
least outside the .r own group of countries.
engaged in the sane sort of thing. Both
of these gcoups of countries impoet eapital goods,.earious cheap manufactures
and the more highly fabricated products, as Well as investment capital and
foreign teehnicianx. It appears, then, that the edentries of Sontheast Asia
are not complementary among themselues, and Pecletae closely resembles them.
India as related to Southeast Asia shows some compiementarity on certain
foods and teeteleee bub by and large these countrie7 tco are similar. In
fact, the similrity.leads not merely to parallelneen but often also to
competition fee the dame market:or source of supply, Therefore .complementa-
rity MUT', be senght in larger spheres than these coentries themselves. We
must think of them in the world-wide network of trane We must particularly
think in this connection of the trading role of Jape.
MR. PELZER: And Australia. Japan, Australia ead India are the three
areas one can think of first when one thinks of thie point ef complementarity.
I think India may develop very rapidly and change ies economic structure.
She has a great demand for food, and in .order to pa e for th6. fOcd she may
have to export at et rate which may not permit a rai3ing of the consumption
levels.
MR. REUBENSe One Of the:interesting .implicatiens of that is the fact
that in the attempt to build a regional integration, whiCh in itself might
offer hope of raising the levels for everybody ultieately, it is probably
necessary to.impoee verious kinds ofnrestraints on he level of consumption,
and to require'a.uniform degree of "austerity" amore the participant countries.
Thie will-raiae further political difficulties in countries which are clamoring
Tor raiding the level Of consumption. Particularly Would that be true in
the case of India.
PROF. T. W. SCHULTZ (University of Chicago): fou may wish to examine
the latent advantages of the regional grouping of the people of the countries,
but the thesis you have just stated, it seems to m, is not valid. To foster
this region as being self contained I think runs squarely against fact. The
opposite is probatay..true .aid it will be neeessary for this area to find its
. . ? .
complementanitywitn.other parts of the world.
? This raises a question which has two or three aspects. One aspect I
shall leave aside; that is, the sources of capital available from cutside
of this area. I would put the two remaining aspects as questions. The two
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questions are these: How are the people of these areas to acquire capital?
Can they get loans from the outside in order to acquire capital goods, or
will they have to propose an export surplus to acquire the capital goods
from the outside? To acquire capital from the outside are they not very
poor economic risks? In considering the political question you will have
to face up to the question: Will they id_order to acquire the capital they
need, find it necessary to fomptheir national political independence:?
It all comes back to this -- how important is it to push forward a bit
by acquiring capital. How are you going to acquire capital externally in
view of the unsettled political situation? Who will furnish capital from
the outside, or must it actually be raised on paying-as-you-go bases by
exports? Secondly, for a long time to come there will exist a high premiuM
for developing enterprises which absorb a lot of labor, or to put it the
other way around, which require little capital.
Mr. Pelzer has emphasized the development of forestry. Forestry in
this context has a very low rating because forestry as an economic pro6s8
rec:Jires relatively little labor whereas it involves considerable capital
tied up for a long, long time. It is the kind of an enterpriae tet dues .
not belong to this kind or a population Should India proceed to glia
wood for the world rather than letting the Finns, the Suedes, the Norwegians
and Canadians do this? It simply does not make sense to import capital
to grow wood in India!
Some enterprises in this region that have absorbed a lot of labor
are playing out, for example, the growing of rubber. This is also true
of fats and oils, and possibly of fiber and sisal. Where are the enter-
prises that can be taken on which will absorb a lot of labor relative to
the amount of capital required? This query focuses upon the necessity
under which people in the region find themselves. I don't see how they
can escape it. It is dictated by their economic.envirenment.
Mr. Chairman, I have formulated two questions: First, how are people
in this region going to acquire capital? I might say that it is my own
belief that for the most part additional capital is going to come by a
further tightening of belts, which seems virtually inconceivable in view
of the low standards of living. Second, which enterprises will be financed
in view of the high premium on capital daving combinations in that region?
MR. DAVIS: Demographically, you translate this into higher mortality.
MR. PELZER: When I was thinking about my paper I realized that perhaps
I was asked to give the first paper beeause I am a geographer and a geogra-
pher ought to know the facts, but geographers are usually not expected to
give the answers....(Laughter)....I also noticed that this afternoon's
session is devoted exactly to the problem Mr. Schultz raised. I was really
in a dilemma. I tried to say something which might set the stage for a
discussion without stealing the thunder fromthe speakers who are going to
give the answers this afternoon.
With regard to your point on forestry, its slowness and so on, are
you not impressed by the fact that oak forests in these latitudes may require
120 to 150 years to mature, and some ether kinds of forest may take 180 years
before you can get a return? But I had in mind somet.ta e t- ndifferent.
I had ilAppaosethFMR/Ilmt WP711.24,i-RNWPAYPIPPMY
0 g been
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impressed by by the dimension of trees that one can cu7
!fears. in other words, I am concerned with the uti:
which renews itself at a much faster rate than fore:
are accustomed to. Furthermore, i had in mind the 7
some of the fastest growing trees and I was trying -
that a spread of annual crops at the cost of rubber
exactly the thing we do not want-.
MR. SCHULTZ: Why?
MR. PELZER: Because we are dealing here with
in most instances, erosion is a terrific problem.
after eight or ten
ization of a resource
ters in these latitudes
gssibilliv of utilizing
o point out the fact
for example may be
reas of high rainfall.
MR. SCHULTZ: But you have lots of labor to stip this.
Ni. FELZER: That is the point: you do not ha
areas where you have the bulk of the erosion. WTher
rubber? Western Malaya, Western Borneo, large part
But i for one think it might be a serious mistake t
or Western Malaya the population densities and abu
we have in Java, I think this was the basic weakne
scheme usee by the Netherianes government in Suriatr
in Sumatra the very conditions that they were tryir
think to establish farm units of one hectare, or 2,
approach to the problem of South Asia, tareer unit
larger reern for labor, ant the eoesibality of hi
newly de-re-loped areas, which in turn will g*ve empl
in the old areas Tram where the settlers had come.
ja,raneee economy oi the creation of new settlement
marked. For example, exports of batiks, cigarette
manufactured in Central Java rose very markedly.
is the labor inithe
is the bulk of the
5 of Sumatra, Ceylon.
create in Sumatra'
adance of labor that
35 of the colonization
? in which they created
e to cure in Java. I
;71_ acres, is the wrong
? are what we need, a
eer consumption in those
eyment possibilities
The effect on the
1-.eas in Sumatra was quite
, and other goods
MR. SCHULTZ: Your goal is excellent.. Ta get the productivity per
head up you have to prov?de more capital, ana it wculd be fine if the same
amount of capital per peraon were available as exiets in Australia, New
Zealand, Canada ane the United States, but you haw to begin and move
through a series of processes at which at,least at the outset and for
decades you will have to operate with a much higher ratio of labor to
capital. To bring in any technology 'which would nct absorb labor.would
create an unbalanced and indefensible situation. ail this is quite evident
from what Kingsley Davis has said, namely that if . (Al were to achieve a ratio
of labor to capital that now exists in this countr.. it would be necessary
to transfer 20C million people now living in the aericultural sections of
India into industry. If you put it that way it he: in the short run
fantastic. It seems to me that all the, time you heve to ask where are your
jobs, your enterprises which will use a little more capital, a little better
technology to get each of them to absorb a lot of aabor in its own right?
PROF. QUINCY 'WRIGHT (University of Chicago): Mr. Chairman, I was
impressed by the differential in the population density in these different
areas. Kashmir, for inetance, has a relatively'smell density, 49, and it
is looked upon as an area of expansion. Suppose Keahmir is integrated.
with Pakistan or India. It may presently be just AS badly off as they from
the standpoint of population. One could raise the question whether Kashmir
ought not to be saVed from this sad fate. The policy of developing types
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of industries in Kashmir which could produce a livelihood for the four
million people, raise them to a higher standard of living, and keep out
the flodd of population that would tend to move in from the surrounding
areas might be a good thing. I thought that was in Mr. Pelzer's suggestion,
that perhaps some areas that were not quite as seriously affected by the
large population as others aught to develop industries like forestry where
they can maintain their population and at the same time keep other populations
from coming in.
That raises the question that Mr. Hoselitz referred to about internal
distribution of population. Instead of having the effect of elevating the
standards of the entire area, might not a more equal distribution have the
effect of lowering the standards of the entire area? There may be an argu-
ment for making dykes in this area against the distribution of population
so that those sections within the entire area which are the best off will
not presently be reduced to the general low standard.
Fundamentally, is not the problem that you have a potential of
population increase which, no matter how much skill you develop or how much
capital you introduce, can keep living down to the very lowest level of
subsistence? Haven't you got to tryto save those areas which are capable
of being saved, first?
DIRECTOR TALBOT: May I ask whether Mr. Barr has a question?
MR. R. O. BARR (Standard-Vacuum Oil Company): On the question of
India's capital - I speak only of India, because I speak from personal
knowledge - I think Professor Sarkar will go along with me on the statement
that India does not need capital; she has plenty of capital at the present
time. What she needs is dollars, or foreign exchange, any way you choose
to put it, and her problem is that she has to spend all her foreign
exchange on her present food imports, which are estimated at six million
tons for 1949, and that is where the money goes. Were it not for that
she could import all the capital goods she needs. She does need know-how,
and she is getting know-how as fast as she can. But the capital is there.
DIRECTOR TALBOT: We will carry on with that a bit later.
MR. DAVIS: On the migration question, I would agree perfectly that
there is not much point in simply transferring people somewhere else to
practice the same kind of life they have led 'where they were before. Moving
people around in the region would not be of any great advantage, and might
be a disadvartage not only in an economic sense but also in a political
senT, from the standpoint of creating new minority problems. But if I
were in India, if Iwere thinking of an integrated population and economic
policy, I think I would give some consideration to "strategic emigration,"
That strategic emigration would have some incompatibilities in it. It would
be so organized that a maximum number of remittances would come from the
emigrantR while a minimum number of skills and a minimum amount of capital
would be removed from India. It would not help much. I think this would
be just a drop in the bucket to India's problem because it is such a big
problem. .In small countries, from a demographic point of view - in the
case of Porto Rico for example, emigration coming at a strategic moment
may help the economy get over the hump so that once it gets started on the
modern level then the demographic problemwill really solve itself. For
big cou04.
84edirelreTea?g401092MPF2,f MAIROPM044215A0081100i33000t
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PROF. BENOY SARKAR (Calcutta University): What you mean by "strategic
migration"'hae been taking place for the last thirty or forty yearsi:. as
linternal colonization" it has been a featurefof-IneianeConomy._EVen in,
Oig cities it-ocoursa.Bengal has been .receiving a'cry Iargeanumbv of PeOe
pie from thwentire'area Oef India, from *Delhi and Lam Madras. So strategic
emigration- or What'We call -internal colonization IS a reality.
MR. B. M. FIPLANI (Food and Agriculture Organi
Agriculture, Government of India): Mr. Chairman, th
by, Prof. Kingsley Davis which-I would like to quest
with Kashmir, I d6 not think it is at all a true s
Kashmir iS today the only unexploited area in Indi
the cultivable areas in-Kashmir' are relatively ver
the total area.
at ion; Ministry of
re are a few facts made
.on. Firstly, to start
eatement to make that
i'and Pakistan; in feet,
; small in proportion to
Then Professor Davis has forgotten that in India itself there are very
large areas previously within Princely States whieh have undergoncea process
almost of complete :integration. You must remember ;hat the Princely States
in the Union Of-India 'represent one-third in area of land, a fact which is
not perhaps welIlknown outside, and areas. which have very vast potentialities
of development las 'compared to the other provinces. It is in those areas
that the government of India is likely to concentrete its future land re-
ciamatien programs and development of certain factcries.
This was just to controvert the statement thaa Kashmir remains the
only unexploited ? area and because of that, both th Dominions are anxious
to have it.
MR. DAVIS:. I feel morally confident that I d.
was the "only",.but "one of the few remaining", un,
if you want' to put. "relatively" there you can. Af-
sity figure alone the story is pretty elear. Kash
bit greater than the United States; WQ know it is
can not have Much agricultural acreage. Therefore
rich land at'present, but it has potentialities.
ei not say that Kashmir
exploited areas, and
ler all, from a sheer den-
lir has a density a little
a mountainous area, it
it is not a.vacant or
MR. PIPLANI: ' I happen to belong to the area 4hich is very near Kashmir;
I am from the Indian Dominion. There are certain eeecial demographic reasons
for very low population preseure in Kashmir and tate reasons are of a socio-
logical character. - Kashmir is an important place enly from the point of
vie* of earning some exchange from touriat traffic future, and so far as
its going to one Dominion or the othereis concerned, it is largely a
queetion of poIitice - I mean we need not at all scuss it here - but from
the economic point -61T view, in fact, Kashmir from every point of view is
going to be a future liability to the Dominion, wi.ichever way it goes.
MR. DAVIS: I dispute that. Not only do you lave potentialities of
water power there but you have mineral resources lready which probably exceed
those of Pakistan,- at least West Pakistan. It is I pretty unexplored area
geologically but there are indications of more coaa than is to be found in
Pakistan. .
MR. SARK.AA: Mr. Chairman, I should like to confine myself to these
two. papers. On the whole, both of these papers er I with slight doses of
optimism and I think -this position Gan. be substantiated.
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The indices indices, generally speaking i of the entire area are those of povnrty
as well as of social, cultural and political backwardness. The fundamental
problem consists in trying to detect the indices of progress within the
framework of poverty and backwardness. And perhaps, if we proceed from 1885
down to 1915, it is possible, decade by decade, or. at.leastevery :Lhifty years,
to detect slight improvements in the indides. These improvements dre so
small that for all practical purposes, especially from the standard and in
an atmosphere like that of Chicago, these indices are likely to be oVerlooked.
But in any case the indices of progress are there and it May be said at
least that statistically ther are mentionable, although factually, and from
the standpoint of human values they are inconsiderable:
In regard to the paper of Professor :Pelzer, I think his fundamental
thesis of Multiple attack on the problem of poverty is very acceptable.
In regard to the question of fact, is the transition from subsistence economy
to money econoMY to be regarded as an exclusive or peculiar feature of the
South Asian region? I should think no. It is a universal phenomenon in the
evolution from the mediaeval to the modern, down to 1850 and even 1870, in
very many regions of Europe. In the second place, Professor Pelzer contrasts
the subsistence economy with money economy. I should rather say that money
economy ought to be contrasted with the barter economy, as is usually done,
because money economy isreally market economy. A subsistence economy might
be contrasted really, if we are to be very precise and logical, with diversi-
fied economy fora subsistence economy is in reality equivalent to a domestic
autarchic economy. In other-words, .1 should not make any special case about
the explanation of the poverty of Southeast Asia on the score of transition
from subsistence economy to money economy, to Use his language. In any
case the emphasis on money-economy appears to be rather too monistic.'
MR. PELZER: In the first place, I wou1d not deny for a moment that the
same development occurred in other parts of the world; that is, subsistence
economy was of course the original type of economy in all parts of the world
and so the fact that a subsistence economy is today still important in parts
of Southeast Asia is no unique problem. What I tried to bring out was that
a great many of the difficulties teday are due to the fact that the modern
situation was superimposed over an old structure. In Western Europe or in
North America or other parts where a similar development has taken place the
striking thing that has occurred are the changes in the strUcture. The system
of production, the size of units, and so on, have undergone considerable changes,
and these, changes have made it possible for the people participating in the
economy to benefit fully from the new possibilities. I think the problem
in Southeast Asia is really one of a carry-over of ancient tools, practices
and agricultural units into the modern day.
MR. PIPLANI: I have a very simple question to ask Professor P175.9 which
I think is basic to the whole demographic study because it ignores something
which is fundamental.? How does the Indian net population grOwth rate compare
to, the same rate in this country today?
MR. DAVIS: Currently, the growth rate in this country is pretty high,
but this does not mean much because on analysis of the births by order of
birth one finds it is mainly first, second and third births that are con-
tributing to a relatively high birth rate coming from a recently high
marriage rate. So I would say that our gross reproduction rate - that is
actuallAyiW affq fertimtfigiltatrIzepejaktAitycrahsaglay less
than hairm R,
0 anum?iuu
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MR. PIPLANI: My question has been misunderstced. I did not ask the
reproduction rate. The reproduction rate in India is definitely far higher
because the mortelj4 rate is also far higher, but the net rate of population
increase is about the same in both countries today. That is my basic point.
MR. DAVIS: You sayit is a basic point. What does it mean now?
MR. PIPLANIe It means this: This country ha' been developed over a
period of two centuries, largely with people that ri_grqted from other conti-
nents; vast new areas, uninhabited, have been taken over; whereas.in_the
demographic studies relating at least to countries in Southeast 'Asia this
factor is ignored, that they are nations of two theusand years old, with
continuous eking out of subsistence from the present land with no new
opening of continents that have been experienced in other areas. In fact,
the process has been the other way around, where lerger political units
have become smaller and smaller. It was that aspect that does not apparently
come under proper appreciation in any demographic 3tudies of areas like South
Asia that I wanted to draw the attention of the gr up.
MR. DAVIS: I referred to India as an old arei of neolithic culture where
agriculture has been practiced for centuries. Her growth Tate added to
old and dense settlement without much change in th be:ate economy creates
her population problem.
MR. PIPLANI: MY point is that any demographi2 study must consider
the rate at which new lands are acquired and the rlte at Which the population
growth goes on. One by itself just proves nothing. Nobody denies that the
whole of South Asia is a miserably over-populated area as it stands today
and the consequent low standard of living is true.
MR. SARKAR: --I had net finished asking my questions on Professor Davis'
paper. The density average is hardly to be treated as an economic phenomenon.
To what extent is the density as a category which is purely mathematical
to be treated necessarily as an index to prosperity or poverty? That is
an important question not'only as regards indial tat for other countries as
well.
MR. DAVIS: A Pfunctional". density makes muck more sense than an
"average" density. An average density isn't wort' much; but a functional
density in a country with a high proportion of it population dependent on
agriculture - the number of people in relation to the amount of land, which
is their main instrument of production - is a meatingful figure.
MR. SARKAR: What I consider important is an intensive and diversified
economic development inregard to every region, ne matter whether the region
appears to be autarchic in food supply or not. That should be a fundamental
thesis in regard to the study of agriculture becaese the importation of food
is not necessarily bad economics or a mark of adv, reity. The index of
productivity has proven to be low. But isn't it e statistical reality that
since 1885, no matter how low the indices of prodactivity, the productions
have increased? Take rice, for instance. It is fact that the productivi-
ty of rice in India is one of the lowest in the werld, and countries like
Italy and Spain exhibit the highest indices. But all the same, the output
of rice in India has been on the increase.
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DIRECTOR TALBOT: TALBOT: I think Mr, Davis ha already stated his positi
on economic development,
MR, SARKAR From 1840 to 1910, the growth rate in every country of
Europe was much higher than it ever has been in India. Even from 1920 to
1930 the growth rate of 10 percent for' India - the highest recorded in
India's statistical history - is quite low by the European standard. Higher
thin 10 percent has been the experience of every country in Europe, (excluding
France)... The result is that the total rate of growth from, say? 1870 to 1880
down to 1930 in most of the countries of Europe has been much higher than the
rate of growth in India. That is an actual fact, and therefore the rate
of growth has to be Studied for every region in a .dynamic manner With
respect to objective realities Of the past few decades.
MR. DAVIS: It would be miraculous if the populations of India had grown
as fast as Europe because in comparing growth rates you must have regard to
the kind of economic, political and social apnditions.
PROF. WERNER LEVI (University of Minnosota): I am wondering in all
thee discussions when we think about solutions to the problem if we
have purposely left out the difficulty created by the mentality in all
there areas. It seems to me no matter how much we ship out of that area or
how many capital goods we ship in it is the cultural pattern that makes
possible the use of' machines. Even if these people are trained to know
how to tighten a bolt, which so far moat of them don't know, they may
not want to use machines.
MR. MUER: I think in many instances we have made museum pieces out
of the people. I recall a very interesting conversation with Hadji Agus
Salim. I wanted to know what he felt about the' agrarian laws as they
were developed in Indonesia in the last century, and his answer startled
me. He said: "It was the worst thing that could happen to us to have those
laws passed. Those laws made museum pieces out of us, and if those laws
had not solidified the situation, we would be in an entirely different
position today."
I don't agree with you that these people cannot tighten boltd; they
can do a little bit more; as a matter of fact, I think the French and the
Dutch have learned that Indonesians and people of Vietnam can handle mactelnee
guns and other tools of Modern warfare.
MR. SCHULTZ: We ought to take one useful building stone out of the
exchange between Sarkar and Davis. Let me make hy point by drawing upon
Lattimorets recent book, The Situation in Asia. He compares America7s
industrial absolute level and the little gain that has boon made 17
Russia in coming up to this absolute, He points out however that if you
were to live along the long border of Russia and seethe progrsss 2r.ssia
has made against the static position of most of the people along the
border outside of Russia and were to realize they do not know about the
U,S, performance, the impressiveness of what has occurred in Russia can
be understood.
I think, Mr. Davis, you and I might be missing what is really in a
simple sense relevant when we make the comparison between the productivity
of rice, say, in Russia and Texas and the productivity of rice in China.
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)
What Professor Sarkar is attempting to say, if peoele believe and if people
were in fact during the next decade to achieve. a 5 percent or 10 percent or
15 percent greater output: per head, that achievemert in itself would
properly give.riseta very hopeful expections in economic progress, and it
is this little subtle ohange we have to find and make room for.
MR. DAVIS:. Thatiswhat greatly bathers me because with this gradual
change Iethink yauewillhave an enormous increase cf population, and I-don't
see how this area cantake a doubling ot tripling cf its numbers. MY
feeling is that industrialization can do most good in ultimately raising
the standard of living of :the country if it COMBS rapidly. Obviously, any
industrialization is going to raise living levels..vo= or it could not take
place, but to achieve. the maximum standard it must come so fast that it reacts
on the population and results in a lowered fertility very quickly. This to
me raises some profoUnd questions. It raises theeuestion.ef available capi-
tal, and Try feeling is that only ty the most rigid controls over the economy
can you raise sufficient capital in the country iteelf.
MR. SCHULTZ: You agree with Sarkar that smaL improvements may realize
that?
MR. DAVIS: Sure! I visualize that ultimatelythis area is going
through the industrial revolution, thateitewill have a balanced demography
eventually, and the sole question is how long.it tekes.
Nai. SCHULTZ: The disagreement is that little gain, the 10 percent rise.
MR. DAVIS: A 10 percent rise in the standard of living is nothing that
can be dissipated, it will be there, but the questfon is.this: When you have
finished your industrialization have you had as mueh.riSe.by the slow process
as you would have had if you had done it quickly? I feel, and this is
of course speculation, that youwonit.haVe as much rise..
MR. HOSEL1TZ: Rise of what?
MR. DAVIS: Standard of living, or per capita productivity,if you prefer.
I don't think the pattern is the same in all industriql countries. Levels
of living differ greatly in these countries. One Arong faetor,is how many
people the country finally has when it has completed its industrialization.
MR. SCHULTZ: I have a question, implied in w at you are saying now.
As you have studied the populations of that part oi the world, do. you see
the bending of the population curves under the impect of industrialization
as one has seen it mother parts'of the world, or does it come. slower?
MR. DAVIS: You mean a bending upwards? The erowth rate has increased
since 1918. .
MR. PIPLANI: I would cpiestion that. Pardon mel. Have you seen the
United Nations' statiutics on population growth in India?
MR. DAVIS: I am talking about a
that fertility haeScriou,sly declined
1951 census will very prebably reveal
1941. Approved For Release 2002/07/24
long period, but there is no evidence
or mortality risen in many years. A
a great incrase o.k: population since
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DIRECTOR TALBOT: T think Mr. Dave already stated his positi-:7.
on economic development.
MR. SARKAR: From 1840 to 1910, the growth rate in every country of
Europe was much higher than it ever has been in India, Even from 1920 to
1930 the growth rate of 10 percent for India - the highest recorded in
India's statistical history - is quite low by the European standard, Higher
thin 10 percent hasbeen the experience of every country in Europe5. (excluding
France). The result is that the total rate of growth from, say, 1870 to 1880
down to 1930 in most of the countries of Europe has been much higher than the
rate of growth in India. That is an actual fact, and therefore the rate
of growth has to be studied for every region in a dynamic manner with
respect to objective realities of the past few decades.
MR.. DAVIS:. It would be miraculous if the populations of India had grown
as fast as Europe because in comparing growth rates you must.have regard to
the kind of economic, political and social anditions.
PROF. WERNER LEVI (University of Minnesota): I an wondering in all
these discussions when we think about solutions to the problem if we
have purposely left out the difficulty created by the mentality in all
those areas. It seems to me no matter how much we ship out of that area or
how many capital goods we ship in it is the cultural pattern that makes
possible the use of machines, Even if these people are trained to know
how to tighten a bolt, which so far moat of them don't know, they may
not want to use machines.
MR. PELZER: I think in many instances we have made museum pieces out
of the people. I recall a very interesting conversation with Hadji Agus
Salim. I wanted to know what he felt about the agrarian laws as they
were developed in Indonesia in the last century, and his answer startled
me. He said: "It was the worst thing that coljld happen to us to have those
laws passed. Those laws made museum pieces out of us, and if those laws
had not solidified the situation, we would be in an entirely different
position today.!'
I don't agree with you that these people cannot tighten bolt; they
can do a little bit more; as a matter of fact, I think the French and the
Dutch have learned that Indonesians and people of Vietnam can handle machine-
guns and other tools of modern warfare.
MR...SCHULTZ: We ought to take one useful building stone out of the
exchange between Sarkar? and Davis. Let me make my point by -drawing upon
Lattimore's recent book, The Situation in Asia. He compares Americas
industrial absolute level and the little gain that has been mad 71 ledr
Russia in coming up to this absolute. He points out however that if you
were to live along the long border of Russia and see the progress Rusbia
has made against the static position of most of the people along the
border outside of Russia and were to realize they do not know about the
U.S. performance,. the impressiveness of what has occurred in Russia can
be understood..
I think, Mr. Davis, you and I might be missing what is really in a
simple sense relevant when we make the comparison between the productivity
of rice, say, in Russia and Texas and the productivity of rice in China.,
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What Professor Sarkar is attempting to say, if people believe and if people
were in fact during the next decade to achieve a 5 ',percent or 10 percentor
15 percent greater output per head, that achievement in itself would
properly give rise to very hopeful expections in ecenomic progress, and it
is this little subtle change we have to find and make room for.
MR. DAVIS: That is what greatly: bothers me beeause with this gradual
change I think you will have an.enormode increase of population?.and I don't
see how this area can take a doilbling or tripling ef'dts numbers. MY
feeling is that industrialization can de most good in ultimately raising
the standard of living of7the country if it comes rapidly.- Obviously, any
industrializatiOn'is,going to raise living levels BMW or it could not take
place,. but to achieve the maximum standard it must 2eme so fast that it reacts
on the population and results in a lowered fertilite very quickly. This to
me raises some-profound questions. It raises the question of available capi-
tal, and my feeling is that only by the most rigid eontrols over the .economy
.can you raise sufficient capital in the country itself;
MR. SCHULTZ: You agree with Sarkar that small improvements may realize
that?
MR. DAVIS: Surel I visualize that ultimately this area is gtiing
through the industrial revolution, that it will have alealanced demography
eventually, and the sole question ,is how long it takes. -
MR. SCHULTZ1 The disagreement is that little gain, the 10' percent rise.
MR. DAVIS: A 10 percent rise in the standard ef living is nothing that
can be dissipated, it will be there, but the, question is this: When yeu have
finished your industrialization.have yeu had as,mucq rise by the.slow"process
as you would have had if you had done it quickly? L feel, and this is
of course speculation,.that youvron't have as much rise._ ;
MR. HOSELITZ: Rise of what?
MR. DAVIS: Standard of living, cr.per capita eroductivitereif you prefer.
I don't think the pattern is the same in all industrial countries. Levels
of living differ greatly in these countries.. One etrong factor is how maw
people the country finally has when it has completed its industrialization.
MR. SCHULTZ: I have a question, implied in w17.at you are saying now.
As you have studied the populations of that part of the world, do you See
the bending of the population curves under the impeet of industrialization
as one has seen it in other, parts of-the?WerIci, or does it come Slower?
MR. DAVIS: You mean a bending-upwards? The growth rate ha e increased
since 1918.
MR. PIPLANI: I woUld question that. Pardon met Have you seen the
United Nations' statietics on population growth in India?
MR. DAVIS: I am 'talking about 'a long period, hut there is no evidence
that fertility has seriously declined
1951 census will very probably reveal
19410
Approved For Release 2002/07/24
or mortality risen in rawly 'years. A
a great incr?%se popu1stipn since
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-:3-
MR. SCHULTZ: Let me put it another way. Looking at the Japane4e
developments before the war, the population growth was similar to that of
the U.K. at a certain stage in her industrialization.? Is there a parallel
to the impact of industrialization in parts of India as had occurred in
Japan?
MR. DAVIS: I can't detect any tendency of industrialization in India
to lower fertility yet. There has been some decline in mortality, and that
gives me the feeling that the first stages of what has been in tiv past the
enormous growth of population in the industrializing period is beginning
in India now.
MR. SARKAR: That is quite right; that is the correct position.
MR. DAVIS: That to most of us is rather appalling because, to come
back to my statement, with the possible exception of Japan which had some
advantages at the time when it began its industrialization, this region
has a far greater density of population in relation to its resources than
other countries had at a similar stage of development. If you compare
India's density with that of Europe at the beginning of industriall7qtion
t;x.re; the difference is very marked. Recently, the countries that have
bc.3 developing most rapidly - Australia, Argentina, and Brazil - have
'-):11 these with sparse populations.
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Mr. Holland.
MR. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND (Institute of Pacific Relations): I want to
reenfcrce the point that the great contrast which we face in considering
poDulation problems of South Asia today and those of Western Europe is
th.) absence in South Asia of "turn-around room," the margin in which to
maneuver while long-term forces work themselves out These countries,
to use Tawney's expression, are ''up to their neck in water." For that
'very reason I suggest that we have neglected here- one of the qualitative
aspects of the social changes which come about in improvements of agricul-
tural technique and those improvements which COMB about ttatmgh industrial-
ization. In the industrial process you get in -a much higher degree those
changes in social attitudes and standards of values thich in the long run
produce the new set of "consumer preferences, !1 if you want to call them
that, which make people eventually decide it is better to have a bicycle
or icebox or whatever it may be than a fourth child, however poorly defined
those preferences may be in practice.
In most of these areas where habits (whether regarding size of families
or concerning the social regard which is given to children) are very strong
and deep-rooted in mores and tradition it seems to me that we need to do a
great deal more than simply to provide cheap and suitable contraceptives.
There must be far more than that. There must be a mobilization of
psychological skills (such as we now put to good or bad effect in the
advertising industry in this country) in order to give to the idea of small,
healthy families the same kind of social prestige and esteem which by Asian
tradition now is given to large families in disregard of the fact that
very often three or four children die in infancy. To do that of course is an
immense job, but .unless that social and psychological aspect of the problem
is kept in mind our analysis will go very far astray.
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I note here one -rather ominous .and striking fact. It is a strange ,
oieee of irony ttit Off this one point it so happcno that the *Maio' point
ef view on population and birth c ontrol which is held by the extreme trade
4etionalist groups in, say, India or China happens tc coincide pretty much
eith the view which is held by the Marxists for a tetally different reason.
_overall population policythere is a reluctance Ge the part of bah of
hese important groups to face this problem in what. I think is its stark
reality. The, Marxists dismiss the argument. for contraceptions on the ground
ihat dt la a cover-up for'Capitalist propaganda; the traditional groups
)ften say it is an argument put forward by Western imperialists to disguise
elterior motives. Moreover, the. Western analysts heve Very .often disregarded
he extremely heagy needs'for labor in Asian economic systems, largely
T:xlcultural. In such economies children are a necessity for the simple
elrpose of providing.labor for operating even a small farm. One of the
'3e/dom recognized facts of the Chinese economic situation in recent years has
- eeen that the Civil War 'has withdrawn immense quantities of able-bodied
aborers from agricUlture and probablyproduced an actual decline in agrie
:elltural productivity; 'although to our way of thinking such a transfer ought
ee have been th.a sense an improvement. The fact is that until yoU,adhieve
, psychological and technological and social change the Mere reduction of
'umbers may not effect the kind of advance that we have been discussing here.
MR. SAHKAR: Don/t you think this psychological change has come in
Urope and America as a result of the slow process cf industrial development
overing tem or three generations? Don't you think ;herefore that the same
ind is likely to develop in Asia, South Asia especially, after at least
Tie generation?
MIL HOLLAND: Yes, I think it can, and we have seen that it can be
peeded up as in the case of Japan despite heavy traiitionalism. The big
uestion is, is there time? It happens by the accidcnt Of history that
n Asia which is already densely populated we do not have the time to allow
or these long term developments to operate. There is a real need from the
oint of view of the world, as well as of tha Asian countries, that the
,rocess be speeded up by the most drastic means.
DIRECTOR TALBOT:' Mr. H011and has given us our signal: Is there time?
think before lunch there is just time for a commert by Mr. Purnivall.
MR. J. S. FURNIVAIL (Adviser to the Government af the Union of Burma):
feel that I have very little to contribute. There are just one or two
oints ?that struck me d.11 the course of these papers. Iwas rather surprised
,y some of the figures' given by Mr. Davis, the poor eield'of rice, for
ecample, in India, and especially by the figure he gaVe for Siam - 938 lbs.
,er acre.
MR. DAVIS: I got those from D. Ghosh!s book or. Pressure of Peptilativl and
,olonomic Efficiency in India.-e. .
MR. TURNIVALLeOne point that baa notbeenibrOueht-oUt'in connection with
he yield an places like Burma and:Siam,:especially in Burma, is that there
a whateyou may call large-scale produCtion. Itreimpreasibn is that the yield
J:,,r acre of wheat in Canada-iadonsiderably lower than in England - I am
.pen to correction on that point but that is mylimple:ssion....
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MR, HOSELITZ: That La corre17).
MR. FITRNIVAN,:,,and in comparing Siam and Spain or Burma and Spain
you are making a very similar comparison between an area that has been
rapidly brought under cultivation for export like the large areas of
Canada, and a closely populated area where the conditions are entirely
different. You have also another difference, that in places like Siam
and Burma rice is the one crop over large areas while in countries like
Spain it is only grown on places that are more or less suitable for it,
It is competing with many other crops, so that if rice gave a lower yield
in those countries it would not be cultivated at all.
MR. DAVIg: I agree with you that ideally we should take account of
Noe soil conditions and general cultivation conditions, etc-.
MR. FURNIVALL: When you talk of low yield. in India, rice is from many
points of view such an important crop that it is cultivated on the poorest
land, and, although the land may be potentially very fertile, rice is grown
over large areas where the rainfall is fairly low and it is the low rainfall,
I would suggest, that is largely responsible for the poor yield of rice in
India.
There was one particular point Mr. Davis raised that came home to me
very forcibly and that was the increase in the fallow area. I happened myself
for three or four years to be responsible for the figures relating to the
fallow area in Burma and they went up and up and up. What was happening was
that new areas were brought Onto the revenue map and any area that had once
got onto the map remained there even if not cultivated again, so the growth
in fallow was artificial.
MR. DAVIS: I did not mention it as increasing, I meant one year as to
the large amount of fallow, but there has been much less expansion of agri-
cultural land in India than in Burma,
MR. FURNIVALL: Another thing is that those statistics, especially in
regard to the cultivable area, have to be taken with a very considerable degree
of caution. My impression is that as regards land under revenue survey in
PArmaj apart from land classified as forest, everything except rivers and
railways is classed as "cultivable .fl
There have been many suggestions this morning that the great cause of
poverty in these areas is the increase of population in relation to the area
of land available :with a continual decrease in the area of holdings, But in
the rice area of Burma the size of the holdings has gradually increased.. In
1880 and 1890 they were 10 or 12 acres; now they are 30 or 40 acres. I -
imagine the same conditions apply to a considerable extent in Siam and possibly
in Indochina, though I am not certain about Indochina. But the point is that
that part of the world was brought under cultivation in relation to the
export market. In other parts of Burma and in India as a whole the population
had already taken shape before it came into contact, really, with the outside
world,
You have got a very marked contrast in some parts of Burma. Arakan in
the west of Burma came under British rule in 1826. In some parts of Arakan
the holdings are very minute though probably one family owns several of these
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Little plots all scattered about? That is because
was brought undercultithon before the opening o.
nave a similar condition in .rte of the richest are'
is the 'granary Of Upper Burma; there again you.havc
In geheral, however, holdings in Burma are not ver5.
me that much too MUch weight is often attached to t
relation to the connection between population and
to believe that there had been an increase inthe
Burma such atDr. Sarkar has noted in India. But 2
such a view. The figures I do laiow tend in the otY
the land in such places
the expert market. You
s in Burma, Kyauksel which
very Small holainga.
small. But it appears to
he size of holdings. In
overty, i should be glad
ealth of the'peopIe in
know of no data to, support
er direction. ,
MR. DAVIS:': How small would the average plot 1.
to worry about its size? It i& down pretty low in
that does not worry you, what Would?
MR. FURNIVALLf That depends pretty largely ox.
it. Within my own personal experience there was or
of one or two acres that yielded 120 baskets and eL
lbs. an acre. It was cultivated in turn by differer
family, and the ether members, while awaiting theiI
else; but just a few miles away you .had a holding
infrequently cultivated.that no.one knew the exact
or thirty miles you have these extreme contrasts.
ave to get for you to begin
India It seems td me. If
the use that is made of
e plot of rice land
oh basket 50 lbs., 6O00
t members of the same
turn made money somewhere
which was. so large and so
boundaries. Within twenty
But the point I am particularly interested in,
usually laid on the size of population in relation
It is suggested that poVerty is due to. the inereasc
parison with the land available. Particularly in..,
can be done?". These people will go on .increasing,
where the increase in population is comparatively c
and where the holding: .areas have been increasing,
tural.povertY. You have very similar problems arie
different conditions of population.- I quite agree
the size of holdings must have some bearing on the'
I feel that a great deal too much attention is give
problem. There are other aspects that I thinkwil:
this afternoon.
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Finel
We will proceed to luncheon.
The conference recessed at 12 o'clock nom,
is the:emphasis that is
to the area of holdings.
in .population in com-
ava the Dutch say, "What
n numbers, but in Burma,
mall in relation to Java
one alao finds agricul-
ing in Burma with entirely
that beyond certain limits
problem of poverty, but
n to this one aspect of the
perhaps be more relevant
? ? ?
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THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia
III
Round Table II: DEVELOPMENTAL moNamm FACTORS -
Thursday afternoon, May 26, 1949
Now' Presiding: Phillips Talbot
MODERATOR TALBOT: The questions raised this morning were very closely
related to the discussion this afternoon. To bring the whole subject of
economic aspects of South Asian nationalism and regionalism into focuso let
MB start immediately by introducing Dr. B.M. Piplani, an official of the
Food and Agriculture Organization and Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
Agriculture', Government of India, who will read the first paper of this
session. Dr. Piplani.
AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANS AND PROBLEMS IN SOUTH ASIA
B. N. Piplani
I am an officer of the Government of India seconded for the present to
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The following
analysis of agricultural and industrial plans in South Asia and the views
expressed on their problems are my own and do not in any way represent the
ideas or policy of my government or my present employers.
I. In spite of considerable differences in social institutions, economic
conditions and political developments of the countries in this region, it is
quite possible to analyze their development plans and discuss the major
problems in an integrated manner, We must start with the basic: prewar.
features of the economy of these countries:-
1. Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, Indonesia and the Phi2ippine-1 had a highly
specialized foreign trade - tin, rubber, rice, tea, petroeum and sugar.
They had an aggregate adverse balance of trade with Europe offset by an ex-
port surplus to U.S.A.
2. India, Pakistan Burma and Ceylon was a large free trade area export-
ing chiefly jute, rice, oilseeks, tea, rubber, manganese ore, and hides: and
skins. Over 1/4 of its trade was with Europe with whom, alike with U.S A.,
it had export surpluses.
3. Japanese trade imports of raw materials and exports of consumer
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goods and small scale papItal equipment - was an important element in the
economic well being of these countries, and provide the basic balance in
reeional economy.
Mecept in India, Pakistan and Ceylon war dostrved a good deal of
production equipment in aericulture, industry, and transport. But nearly
everywhere equipment was aver-worked, replacements aad to be deferred, and
import of production materials severely restricted. '21-ie conduct of the war
also brought inflation all round. This has retardel recovery of production
all over. The regional index of food 'production, t3xtiles, and forest pro-
ducts for 1947-48 was 95, 710 and 68 respectively. The index of export trade
is still lower - for India it is about 66e Imports generally exceed exports
in the whole of the region, and excluding Philippins and Pakistan - former
because of special U.S. grants - the region has a carrent deficit of about
1/4 billion dollars in the balance of payments, abolt half of it against U.S.
transactions. Alone for maintaining life and avoiding starvation deaths,
the region imported in 1947-48 about 2 millien ton3 of cereals over and
above its rice exports - the cost being some 1/2 billion dollars. This is
something similar to the phenomenon that explains 4) percent of first years'
Marshall aid to Europe being used in focidstuffs and fertilizers.
II. The reconstruction and development plans cf the countries have to
be examined in this background.
A. First with regard to the scope and natare of the specific
projects:
1) In agriculture these countries have schemes for increasing the pro-
duction of rice and cereals, oilseeks, fruits and vegetables. Some, although
few, schemes cover tobacco, tea, silk and rubber. he specific projects
cover irrigation including minor works in flow irrigation, and ground-water
projects, drainage, land reclamation ; fertilizer di3tribution and the develop-
ment of indigenous manures, better seed varieties and improved tools and
implements, control of crop and livestock diseases, Improved transport,
processing and storage.
A number of important points arise from the nature and scope of agri-
cultural projects. Firstly, the agricultural plans relate almost exclusive-
ly to food production and ignore the ieternational raw materials. Food
production and distribution has, in view of large imports and the.consecleent
effects on the balance of payments and national eccaomyobeen the4Lost impor-
tant question since the end of the war in India, Gee/Ion, Malayaeend the
Philippines. In the rice exporting countries of Siam, Burma, Indo-China and
to some extent Pakistan, rice production offers the most lucrative field be-
cause of high prevailing prices. Further with dwindling marketsefor raw
materials like rubber. and copra and the uncertainty about their future,
countries like Ceylon and Malmo, preter, in spite of higher ultimate real
costs, to increase local food production. Secondly, even in food production
the plans are inadequate. In one of the publications of the FAO it was
calculated that on the basis of a maximum energy velue,in caloleies per
person per day an increase of 40 percent in per carat food supplies was
necessary in underdeveloped countries. This is-without takingeinto account
the needs of the increasing population (at a minimei rate of 1 percent per
qnnum). With about 85 million tons of rice and cereals productipn in the
area the feRfacIPArrikeleirel 2i0f021./681 rumi6obt_ ()Tata) 4otie3co0toh6e9 basic
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r c
food grain production by more than 10 percent. Moreover, the deficiency L.,
milk and meats, tuber crops and fruits and vegetables will continue to be as
large as it is today. Finally, is the question of the effects of the above
mentioned increase in food production on the rural and industrial sectors of
the national economies. The per capita national income of countries in this
region varies between $60-90 per annum. A ten percent increase in food
production, even with the existing low standards of nutrition, can only be
absorbed if real incomes in the area rise about 12-1/2 percents This under-
lines the urgency of developing industries and agriculture simultaneously.
In the absence of large capital equipments, industrial development cannot
be carried out unless large labor force is freed from the land by the use
of improved agricultural technique. From the point of view of some edonomic
stability and of guaranteeing the basic industrial commodities of common day
use, diversification of economic life, however limited in scope, is the only
safeguard for failure in international arrangements in ensuring the disposal
of the staples of world commerce. Judged on the basis of real costs this
may be condidered as a backward step. But unless common problems are resolved
on an international basis it is difficult to envision any other alternative.
Moreover, these developments are obviously of transitory nahnreineeestitated
by structural adjustments, and the benefits clkf international exchanges on an
expanded basis should accrue in due course under different settings.
2) The industrial projects either cover the replacement of worn-out
plants and equipment or envision the setting up of new production units. They
include transportation, electric power, textile production, fertilizer manu-
facture, iron and steel, coal and other minerals. The smaller industries
covered are sugar, glass, cement, paperIchemicals, tanneries, rubber goods,
etc. The latest plans in India also include some advanced manufactures, e.g.,
machine tool, telephone manufacture, ship-building, manufacture of electrical
machinery, pre-fabricated houses, and production of penicillin and sulpha
drugs.
B. Now the magnitude of the finances involved to accomplish the
projects. For the agricultural plans the information available shows that
the total expenditure for the next 3-1/2 years will be about 3/4 to 1 billion
dollars. Most of this will be incurred an local materials and resources. I
estimate the extent of foreign equipment at 1/3 of the total. For the
industrial plans the Industrial Working Party of the Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East made an estimate end of last year. Expenditure for
industrial reconstruction and development for the next five years is' likely
to be some 0 billion, of this, foreign exchange requirements are $3.8 billion.
These figures do not include costs of industrial plans in Siam and Pakistan.
Making a rough allowance for them the total cost of agricultural and indust-
rial plans in the South Asia area for the next five years can be taken at
some $845 billion, with less than half of that being in terms of foreign
currencies. This latter will be shared between the dollar, sterling, guilder
and the franc.
III. Three separate seta of problems have to be considered in judging
the feasibility of these plans:
The basic conditions of political stability and the soundness of
socio-economic institutions.
The supply of technical and managerial ability.
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The supply of capital.
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? Establishment of peace and the. continuance of Law and order under strong
governments is the most urgent need in Indonesia, Irdo-China, Eurma.and
aalya. In the remaining cDuntries the- basic condetion of political
stability has been established. Above 'that, howeve-, creation okethe climatic
conditions- is neceesaryeto provide2.4eal..and foreign enterprise With suffi-
cient incentive for new induetrial'ventures. In tit s connection recent
sbcio-economic policy needs examination.
. ,
i) In some countries there was a'tendency for .4 time to modify by.
legislation the ownership rights in land'andsome industries. On_the whole,
enwever, there has recently been a more realistic aeprociation of economic
needs. In industry and in central banking organizaeion, the form, pace, and
the limits of state ownership or regulation have been clarified pr are in
the -proces.s of clear definition. Policy regarding abolition of land-lerdipm,
though acceeted, is being followed graaually bocaus? of the need to ensure
payment of adequate campensation.
ii) Heavy taxation imposed during the war by super-taxes, exces profits
?and capital gains taxes, and the limitation of dividends has affected the
growth of industry and trade over the lagt couple of years. latest
budgets in India, Pakistan, Ceylen and Siam seem to appreciate this fact and
due concessions have been made to private enterprise.
?
iii) Owing to a variety of reasons the labor f)rce has been'hather
restive since the war. The wise and firm f-egulatiOr of laborowners.rela-
t,phship so fir' in Most of the countries provides god ground for future
lptimiam in this connection.
iv) Most of the countries have been battling aeainst inflation. In
the countries named above, through food distribution subsidies, general
economic controls and import restrictions, -prices heve beun prevented from
rising further. But the urgent need is toincrease agricultural ad
. .
industrial production.
To conclude. socio-economic policy, Oring the east 11:1/2_years.has,
on the whole, attempted to provine thel'eSsdntial coliditititis of cenfidence
? .%
for private enterprise.?
* R6garding technical ability standards in agrideltftre, industry.4nd
transport are poor in comparison with Europe and thes country. But there
has been a considerOle improvement since this war, and with extensive
arrangements for:tedhnical training abroad chiefly under government scholar-
ship schemes, furthWprogrees can be envisioned in the near future'in
raising general standgrds of technical efficiency: The problem or highly
experienced technical experts at the top in differeelt Wes muh-be solved
by direct government employment or by.negotiations witS the interested
foreign-Tiros. There has been a certain amount 'of eonfusion ofthought in
this country regarding the proposed application of !oint 4. Some amount
of technical advice is being furnished by the United Nations specialized
agencies. -Hundred times more, however, is being furnished concurrertiy by
experts invited by governments to report or advise Dn specific projects.
Hi_eh level technical aid and development of project3 under conditions
satisfactory both to the aided country'and the fore..gn enterprise are two
facets of the same thing. This point has only receetly been cearifiee for
the firstAripeantignorille2402/07/244,CPPAigkieletkiSAUDedefOIM Chaieber
of Commerce.
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Winagor41 ahility tp my mind is not much of a problem at this stage ce'
eeenomie develelmeht in most of these countries.
, Lastly, capital supply. Total requirements for the next five years are
8-'4/2 billion. 4212re than half to COMO from internal resources. The projects
which are moetlY ePverneeat schemes represent the basic minimum needed to
prevent current standards of living from deteriorating. Available data on
internal saVirria Shows thet throughout the area capital formation and invest-
ments during the last couple of years have been most inadequate. For one
thing during the last 15 years, but particularly since the end of the war,
large savings have teen used for taking over fereign industrial assets
(some Tv4-5 billion). Moreover, some million dollars of national savings
have been iemobilised in sterling balances. Further, since the war most of
the countries in this region have worked with very unfavorable terms of trade,
though eamewhat less so recently. For example one ton of foodgrains imported
in India in 1938-39 was paid for by the export of 1/4 ton of jute manu-
factures or 100 lbs. of tea. Today it is necessary to export for it 1/3 Lon
of jute manufactures or about 300 lbs. of Lea. The among other reasons
explain the present state of internal savings. In spite of incentives recently
offered and the efforts that are being made to encourage local capital
foreation and to canalize savings for developmental purposes, local savinee
are eeing to be inadequate for the magnitudes mentioned above leaving alone
the ianancial requirements of an accelerated rate of development.
"Jae position though serious is capable of a solution. Prewar flow of
fn? 'enents from Britain, France, and Holland ceased SOMQ 10 years ago.
LH eeetioned above large funds in fact moved in the reverse direction. There
aeu some evidence ?of reflow of foreign investments into Ceylon, Pekisten,
Ina Malaya, Siam, and the Philippines. But it is chiefly the extent to
wieen their sterling credits are made available during the next 2-3 years
thac, will determine the pace of economic advance. Sterling balances which
are their hard-earned savings during inflation, have been available since the
war only at the rate of 1 percent per annum for developmental and reconstruct-
ion needs. With rapid progress in British recovery larger suppleue of
capital equipment have become available since mid-1948. Under the Sterling
Group Agreement, Japanese industry is also making its contribution, though
its scope is limited by the supply of raw materials. For certain eLejeete
of argent nature, however, - perhaps up to :a2e1/2 billion, physical equipment
can only be obtained from this country. The problem thus narrows down to
whether some arraneenents can be made immediately between Britain, U-S,A,,
India, Pakistan and Ceylon whereby against sterling balances equivalent dollar
funds could be made available for financing the required capital equipment.
The mechanism could be something along the following lines. Sterling balances
transferred to U.S.A. in payment of supplies will not be convertible for
say a 5 year period. Part of the supplies could be supelied through the
Japanese industry which will to some extent reduce SCANS expenditure. Unless
arrangements of this character are made quickly, there is a real danger of
temporary trade measures undertaken to meet dollar balance of payment
difficulties developing into permanently detrimental economic alignments all
around. To take an example, India has during the last couple of months
entered into bilateral trade agreements with Argentina, Belgium, France,
Allied zone of Germany, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
Egypt, Siam and others. Now most of the import equipment negotiated is to
overcome dollar payment difficulties. But manufacturing costs being generally
higher in those countries, the terms of trade have moved further against
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ndia. What IS tlio soluti)a ur1:13.1,ta?_,itions ;hen the choice for ,a
euntry is either to reduce the pace of development ar to pay aihigher price
.n terms of real effort to atbaia aome!-14o-fress?
IV. My analysis so far has been confinecrto minimum goveramentalpro-
ects. The rate of clevelopment of this area will t3 much quicker and the
tole picture' differentAf flaw of investments on prtvate account booiro .
in the basis, of straight assurances given by more pragressiVe of the younger
lations regarding adequate arrangements for earning ind transferring of-
arofits as the normal reward of risks, and regarding orderlyrepetri;etion,
If capital if necessary at a later stage. Since the war; tot world ?
nveetments in foreign Countries have been of the prier of som10:1D141i9n
15 of it being, from this country. With the end of the seller's market',
Ields for internal investmentsAo maintain.the currant high levels of pro--
'action are going.to be restricted in the,years to c)me. There is also the,
.ikely re-emergence ,of countries ,like Belgium, Switzarlarid, and Britain once
vgain as creditor countries. It is to be hoped that in the interest of
eneral economic expansion and international peace tae next fgw years will
moo the resumption of the 19th century free international flaw of capital.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you, Dr. Piplani.
Dr. Piplani has, come in spite of a grievous coli which bight have kept
tha in bed or at home but for a sense of obligation, to be with
The second paper thiaafternoon is to be read., Mir,. Henry Brodie,
;pecial Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Research ler the Far East
41 the Department of State. Mr. Brodie will state tae substence of his
prepared paper on the:post-war pattern of trade in SDuth
lhe full textof this paper, including tables, 18 here reproduced. (Ed.)
POSTWAR PATTERN OF TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA
Henry Brodie
?The extensive war damages, postwar economic ma',,adjustmeats, and internal
political disturbances that afflict most countries of South Asial in varying
legrees have brought about significant changes in tle levels and direction of
the foreign trade of the area as compared with before the war. The usual
pattern of South Asia's foreign commerce has been alfected'further by Japan's
reduced economic position in the Far East and to a iesser;Aektent by the civil
war in China. An additional element making for charg?as been the impaired
economic capacity of centinental Europe, which has cut Sbuth Asia af. from ,
traditional and important sources of imports. This paper attempts to examine
statistically the over-all effects of these factors on South-Asia's foreign
trade.
1-South Asia is defined to include India ,(including ')2114444t, Burma, Ceylon,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya a? Siam, and Indac
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For the purposes of this analysis South Asials foreign trade is ccillp:re_
for 1947 and 1936, in value terms. Reasonably accurate statistics for ?948
are as yet available for only a few South Asia calatries. Even the 1947
official trade returns for some countries are incomplete and the gaps hai to
be filled in by estimates. Accordingly, certain of the 1947 statistics
presented in this study are only approximately correct. The year 1936 was
selected as a fairly representative prewar year. By that time South Asials
trade had achieved a considerable measure of recovery from the depression
lows and had more or less adjusted itself to the widespread currency depre-
ciation of the 19301s as well as the various systems of empire preferences
that were introduced during the first half of the decade.
1. Ma nitude of South AskIt_s_naleil Trade
As a result of belated prices, South Asiats total foreign trade in
1947 of $6.5 billion was' more than twice the 1936 figure. 2 (See Appendix
Table A). Imports of 3,,,6 billion in 1947 represented almost three times
the value of imports in 1936, while exports of $2.9 billion were one and
one-half times the prewar figure. India, to an even greater degree than
before the war, dominated the trade of the region, accounting for more than
40 percent of the total. Malaya, the Philippines, and Ceylon followed India
in that order of importance. Indonesia, which before the war had only
slightly less trade than Malaya, ranked below Ceylon in 1947.
In real terms, however, South Asia's foreign trade in 1947 was substan-
tially less thrn before the war. As a rough approximation it is estimated
that the value of the areats 1947 trade expressed in 1936 prices was 70
percent of the 1936 figure. &ports were off more sharply than Imports,
equaling 58 percent of the prewar amount when expressed in 1936 prices.
Imports in 1936 prices were 95 percent of the prewar figure. Estimated
exports and imports of individual countries in 1947, expressed in 1936 prices,
and the percentages that these estimates represent of the prewar amounts
are as follows:
2The difference between the 1947 and 1936 values is magnified by the fact
that in 1936 India and Burma were treated as a single trading unit.
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Country
Enportsa
Implirtsb
? Value .Percentage of
Value
Percentage
of
(in 1,000, 000 196 Exports
(in 1,000,000
1936 Imports
US $)
US $)
Philippines
-79 54
169
? 167
Indonesia
93 29
96
52
India
Burma
349
34 ) 51
483
54
116
Ceylon
115 122
96
119
Malaya
340 92
213
.72
Siam
42 50
23
46
Indochina
26 25
46
73
1,M=9
17-180
? From the above figures it is apparent that, with the. exception of
Ceylon and Malpya, all South Asia countries had conaiderably Smaller quantities
of e7Torts in 1947 than in 1936. In the case of imports, only the Philippines,
India (including Burma), and Ceylon showed larger vplumes in 1947 than in
1936.
In 1947 South Asia had an aver-all trade deficit of $675 million, in
contrast to an export surplus of roughly the same ahount in 1936. Much of
the deficit was with the United States. Only aim showed a positive balance
of trade. Before the war all South Asia 001' tries traditionally exported
more than they imported. Their trade surpluses 1)1-elided the mans whereby
they financed their invisible obligations to the me-,ropolitan wrers. In
1947, the Philippines finanaed its trade deficit ou', of US aid and other
payments, while the other South Asia countries met ;heir deficits hy drawing
on foreign exchange holdings or by means of contribltions from the Western
European metropolitan countries.
aDerived by deflating 1947 =port values a unit 'tame Wan of export
prices computed for each country, except India, and designed to measure the
relati7e price changes of its principal exports fraa 1936 to 1947. For India,
the oi:4cial 7.ndex of the unit value of exports was used. Individual price
relatives used i computing the indexes were weig:,:t.d by 1947 quantities.
Acco?dingly. to the ex'-,ent that the composition of -xports of some South Asia
':..oun-,,ries in 1947 differs from what it was in 1936, the indexes do not
?accuiately measure over-ail changes in the value of their exports.
'3Derived by deflating 1947 import values for each c,untry by the increase in
India's unit value index of import prices between l'36 and 1947. India is
the only South Asia country that computes a unit va_ae import index, and it
La believed that the index is reasonably representaAve for other countries
af the area. Although food, which has had a relati-ely greater increase in
once than most other imports except textiles, reprsented a greater pro-
sortion of India's imports in 1947 than t,f Burma's, Siam's, or Indochina's,
this distortion is probably offset by the fact that the latter three countries
had a larger proportion of textile imports than Ind_a. Textiles experienced
roughly thitpessagetkaatigetepte.00121704asCW4108861610%9111140114084.706116-g1936.
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20 reAeerae!hi
DistriW of Trade.
The geographic pattern of South Asialt foreign trade in 1947 showa
marked differencee from the prewar pattern. Those differences are reflected
primarily in South Asia's trade with other areas rather than in tree:, among
South Asia countries themselves. As before the war, trade within South Asia
represented only a mall percentage of the total trade of the reglon, 16
percent in 1947 as against 17.5 percent in 1936. In 1947, 18 percent of South
Asia's exports and 15 percent of its imports were intra-regional, as compared
with 13 percent and 25 percent respectively in 1936. Even these percentages
exaggerate the importance of trade among South Asia countries because they
include oonsiderable entrepot trade, particularly in rubber and tin through
Malaya It is apparent, therefore, that South Asia is not an integrated
economic region in the call? sense as the European Recovery Program countries
which before the war conducted 44 percent of their foreign trade among
themselves, The percentages of their total trade that the individual
countries conducted with other countries of South Asia in 1947 and in 1936
were as follows:
Country
Philippines
Indonesia
India
Burma
Ceylon
Malaya
Siam
Indochina
,Exports to other countries of
South. Asia as a Percentage of
Total Exports
19AZ 1V6
Imports from other countries
of South Asia as a Percentage
of Total Imports
12,2k
6 1 2
47 16 12
9 ( 7 (
77 ) 8 37 )
5 6 21
19 15 38
51 63 18
17 11 4
6
16
6
47
62
30
14
The percentages that exports with South Asia constituted of total exports
for individual countries in 1947 ranged from a low of 5 percent in the case
of Ceylon to a high of 77 percent for Burma. Countries with high ratios
either were large rice exporters, such as Burma or Siam, or else had, saetan-
tial re-exports throegh Malaya, like Indonesia. ?The percentages that imports
within South Asha conetuted of total imports for individual countries in
1947 varied from a low of 2 percent forthe Philippinee t0 38 percent of
MaIesga, The high ratio for Lalaya reflected large Imports for re-export.
The percentages for Burma and Ceylon were primarily a result of the fairly
considerable imports of these countries from India.
The relatively limited amount of intra-regional trade results from the
fact that exports of all countries in the area consist predominantly of
.raw materials and foodstuffs. Since South Asia has little industrial devel-
opment, most of its raw material 'exports go to markets outside of the area.
Exclusive of re-export traffic,trade within South Asia consists principadly of
rico shipment from the surplus areas of Burma, Siam, and Indochina to the
rice and cereal deficit countries of Malaya, India, Ceylon, and Indonesia.
The limited intreegional trade in intlteenous finished manufactures was
re presAivida4texi-Or Oterleliviii2602/0915244C14R13080 aosixam fat kokiela fabrics
and manufactures.
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One of the most narked changes in South Asia's
las been the reduced role of Japan both as a market
Aupplier of imports,- In 1947 Japan took less than
Asia's exports, as compared with almost 10 percent in
-m3f1ected in part Japan's diminished need for South
oecause of the low level of its industrial output at
aility of South Asia to supply Japan with needed fo:
)n anything like the pre-war scale. On the import E
only slightly more than 1 percent of the value of it
in 1947 as compared with almost 15 percent in 1936.
Asia' s imports from Japan was particularly marked ir
and.to a lesser extent in capital and consumers go.
post war trade pattern
for exports and as a
percent of South
1936. This decline
Asia's raw materials
d in part the ina-
dstuffs and raw cotton
ide, South Asia obtained
s imports from Japan
The decline in South
the case of textiles
ds.
Alb.loss significant than the reduced importance of Japan in the foreign
trade of South Asia since the war has been the increased importance of the
United States. In 1947: a percent of SoutA Asia's total trade was with the
United Statos,, as against 18,percent in 1936. Al]. af this increase was
accounted for by greater imports from the United States. In 1947, the
United States supplied South Asia with more than 30 percent of its imports
as against leas than 10 percent in 1936. South ABU'S imports from the
United States would have been even larger than they were had not import '
controls been imposed to conserve dollar exchange. United States' inroads
ttito South Asia markets were particularly marked in extilea and capital
aquipment, two major categories of imports for the area.
The relative importance of South Asia's trade rith-the United Kingdom
Ln 1947 remained roughly the same as before the war, accounting for about
lne-fifth of the total. South Asia's trade with tha Netherlands and France
4as somewhat less important than before the war, although Indonesia and
Indochina traded with the metropolitan powers at roughly the prewar pro-
oortions.
3. Terms of Trade
In 1947, South Asia's terms of trade were less favorable than in 1936.
a, rough approximation, it is estimated that the index of the terms of
rade (ratio of the average unit value index of expert prices to the
Average unit value index of import prices) for Soutt Asia as a whole in
047 was. 87 (1936=100). In short, every dollar of eaports from South Asia
purchased 13 percent less imports in 1947 than in 136. The terms of trade
lf individual countries differed widely from the avirage, as indicated
oy the estimates shown below:
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(1)
(2)
Country
Index of Export
Index of Import
(1) as a Peroe.
Prieesa
Pricesb '
of (2-
(1936=100)
(1936=100)
Philippines
335
303.
110
Indonesia
210
303
69
India
365
310
118
Burma
420
303
139
Ceylon
227
303
75
Malaya
180
303
59
Siam
288
303
95
Indochina
260
303
86
The terms of trade were most adverse for areas such as Malaya, Indonesia,
and Indochina, the exports of which in 1947 consisted largely of rubber and/
or tin, and for Ceylon, which exported principally tea and rubber. The
average export. price of rubber in 1947 was only 113 percent of the 1936
price; of tin, 162 percent of the 1936 price; and of tea, 227 percent of the
1936 price. Prices of such major imports as textiles and grains, hoWever,
were roughly 400 percent and 425 percent higher in 1947 than in 1936k The
favorable terms of trade of the Philippines reflected the high world market
prices for copra and abaca; of Burma, the high export prices for rice; and
of India, inflated prices for ?Nte,
4. Composition of Trade
a, Exports. A comparison of South Asia's exporta in 1947 and 1936 (see
Appendix Table B) shows only moderate changes in the relative importance of
the principal categories of exports for the two years. In 1947, as in 1936,
foodstuffs (including tobacco) and raw materials accounted for approximate).*
35 percent and 30 percent respectively of the value of all exports. Textiles
(chiefly raw cotton and industrial fibers and products).0 which represented
roughly one-quarter of the value of all exports in 1947, were slightly
more important than before the war. In 1947, South Asia's exports showed
even greater concentration on a relatively few commodities than before the
war. Rice, tea, copra, rubber, ores and metals (chiefly tin)1 raw cotton,
and industrial fiber and fiber products accounted for 70 percent of the
total value of exports, as compared with 65 percent in 1936. For most
South Asia countries, this dependence on a relatively few export products
was greater than the over-all figures for the area indicate.. In 1947,
copra and abaca accounted for 84 percent of the value of Philippine exports;
rice for 78 percent of the value of Burma's exports; tea and rubber, 96
percent of the value, of Ceylon's exports; rice, rubber, and tin, 58 percent
of the value of Siam's exports; and tea, hides and skins, raw cotton, and
jute and jute manufactures, 64 percent of the value of India's exports.
aSee footnote a to tabulation on page 72
bSee footnote b to tabulation on page 72 . The figure 303 is the arithmetic
average of India's monthly import index of unit values for calendar year
1947; the figure 310, the same average for the period from April 1, 1947
to MarSiNtksvel9garNklealset2002/1170t:iCtIAMETPaNDOIMMOM40603000S-9trade
statistics are for fiscal year 1948.
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Foodstuffs. A major change in the foodstuffs category in 1947 was
the reduced relative importance or rice and cereal exports. Rice and cereals
represented less than one-fifth of all exports of foodstuffs, as compared
with more than one-quarter in 1936. This decline resulted primarily from
the fact that, because of reduced production and increased domestic
requirements, Burma; Siam, and Indochina, the rice surplus areas of. South.
Asia, exported only about 1,3 million metric tons pf rice (rice and paddy.
in terms of milled rice) in 1947.-as compared with ipproximately 6 million
metric tons before the war. The negligible value of sugar exports in 1947
as compared with 1936 resulted primarily from the sharp reduction of com-
bined Philippine and Indonesian exports to about 1.) percent of the 1934
amount. Tea exports in 1947 increased to one-third of the value of all
exports of foodstuffs, largely as a result of the increased supplies
available from Ceylon and India rather than favorable prices. The sub-
stantial relative and absolute increase in the vale of copra exports in
1947 reflected in part the very favorable export prices (3* times 1936) and
in part increased physical exports (10 percent aboae 1936).- :a. a
ii. Raw Materials. Raw.. material .exporta in. i47 were distinguished
chiefly by the substantial:increate4in;.the,relativ importance-ofirubber.
The value of rubber!exportsain-1947 represented 64 percent.ef,the value
of all raw:material:exports, as-compered with 46 parcent in1936. A 40
percent rise iarthe physicel-vOluMe,of 'exports of rubber largely accounted
for its increased relative importande.-"Ctes and metals, the next most
important raw material exports,,weremuoh less imp)rtant both absolutely
and relatively in 1947 than in 1936, largely becawe of lower Indonesian
and Malayan tin exports and reduced Philippine goli exports.
iii, Textiles. The substantial reduction in tae absolute and relative
importance of raw cotton exports was a major chang.) in the 1947 textile
export picture. The decline-in raw cotton to 16 vircent of the value
of all textile exports in 1947, as compared with 4) percent in 1936,
reflected the drop in Indian,Cotton exports. In 1947 India exported less
than one-third of the 1936 amount of 3.3 million btles.' Part of this
reduction in exports was a result 'of increased conaumption by Indian cotton
mills, but even more important was the reduction 11 plantings of cotton for
purposes of increasing food production.- Industrie'. fibprs and industrial
fiber products (mostly Indian .jute). accounted for YO percent of all textile
exports for 1947, as against lets than 50 percent. .n 1936. .The improved
relative position of fiber exports reflected both ,ery faltiorable export
prices and relatively favorable export volume for
Other 2as_or_ts. The postwar. decline in the absolute and relative
importance of fuel exports was due largely to the. Iimited recovery of the
Indonesian petroleum industry. Exports of petrolem products from Indo-
nesia in 1947 aggregated less than 8010.$000 metric -,ons, as against more
than 5.5 million metric tons in 1936.-
b. Imports. In 1947, as before the war, foods,uffs, capital goods,
and textiles accounted for the bulk of South Asia! imports. (See Appendix
Table B). Approximately 70 percent of the total vaaue of imports fell into
these three main categories in 1947, ea compared w th 62 percent in 1936.
The most significant change in the over-all South asian import picture was
the increase in the relative imPortance of imports of foodstuffs. Food-
stuffs represented 30 percent of the value of all imports in 1947, as against
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22 percent in 1936. As in the case of exports, numerous changes occurre-
in the relative importance of individual imports within the principal
commodity groups.
1. Foodstuffs. The increased relative importance of foodstuff imports
in 1947, as compared with before the war, was accounted for almost entirely
by the expansion a rice, flour, and cereal imports. India, with net rice
and cereal imports of more than 2.5 million metric tons in 1947 as compared
with 1.3 million tons before the war, was responsible for most of this
increase. The increased relative importance of imports of rice and cereals
was reflected principally in a large increase in imports from outside South
Asia. In 1947 South Asia derived 70 percent of its imports of rice, flour
and cereals from seurcee outside South Asia, as compared with only 15 per-
cent in 1936. Reduced production in the principal cereal-growing countries
of South Asia and population increases accounted for this increase. Rice
and cereal production of South Asia in 1947 was roughly 5 percent below
the 1936-39 average, while the population had grown by about 10 percent.
South Asia's increased dependence on outside sources for foodstuffs in
1947 was reflected in a large expansion of imports from the United States.
In 1947 South Asia derived 25 percent of the value of its food imports from
the United States, as against 6 percent in 1936.
ii. Capital goods. Capital goods imports in 1947, as in 1936, accounted
for roughly one-fifth of the total value of imports. As before the war,
the United Kingdom was the principal source of South AsiA's capital goods
imports, supplying half of the total. The United States filled in most
of the gap that resulted from the inability of Japan and Western Europe to
supply capital equipment to their former markets in the area. In 1947
South Asia obtained 36 percent of its capital goods imports from the United
States, as compared with 17 percent in 1936.
iii. Textiles. Textile imports represented about one-fifth of the total
value of imports in 1947, as before the war. No significant changes occurred
in the distribution of imports as between different types of textile pro-
ducts. Most important were the shifts in the sources of imports. In 1947
South Asia derived less than one-tenth of the value of its imports of textile
fibers and manufactures from Japan, as against 50 percent in 1936, The
reduced importance of Japan as a supplier of textiles was accompanied by a
sharp increase in the importance of the United States. In 1947 South Asia
obtained 44 percent of the value of its imports of textile manufactures
from the United States, as compared with only 4 percent in 1936.
iv. Other imports,. Imports of fuels, principally petroleum products,
representing 6 percent of the value of all imports in 1947, were somewhat
less important relatively than in 1936, However, South Asia was much more
dependent on other regions for its fuel in 1947 than in 1936. In 19472
more than 80 percent of South Asia's imports of fuel came from outside of
the area, as compared with only 40 percent in 1936.
The reduced role of Japan as a source of South Azials imports is
significantly marked in the ease of other consumers' goods as well as
textiles. In 19472 South Asia obtained only a negligible share of such
consumer ek goods from Japan, in contrast with 20 percent in 1936.
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5. Commodity StlEpluses and Deficits
The most signifiaant nostwar change in South Asia's net trade position
has been the area's sld.fk from a food surplus to - food deficit area. Before
the war South Asia not only was self-sufficient ie the production of all
essential foodstuffs but also had substantial export surpluses of rice and
cereals, pulses, fats and oils, and sugar. In coatrast, in 1947 it had a
large rice and cereal deftdit, a sugar deficit, and only a small pulse and
oilseed. surplus. The rice and cereal deficit alore accounted for more than
half of the total trade de2icit of the area, Ohly it thecase of copra, tea,
and vegetable and fish oils were South Asia's fooc surpluses equal to or
greater in value than in 1936.
Whereas before the war South Asia's fuel experts and imports roughly
balanced, in 1947 the ar,ea had a large fuel deficdt. As in 1936, large
export surpluses were slown for raw materials and a moderate over-all sur-
plus for textiles, despite the usual large deficit for textile fabrics and
manufactures. South As: was a large deficit aro t for all types of consumer
and capital goods in 1947 as in 1936.
6. Future Trade Patterns.
It is not the intention of this paper to give careful consideration to
the question of future South Asia trade patterns. Nonetheless, certain
broad generalizations can reasonably be made regarding the outlook for the
area's trade, at least over the next few years.
The physical volume pf South Asia's trade can be expected to show
continued limited expansinn above present levels. However, recovery of
trade, particularly exports, to even prewar quantiaies will not be possibe
as long as civil disorders inhibit production over much of the area. The
indications are"that South Asia will remain a. rice and cereal deficit
area unless major efforts are taken to step up outeut to compensate for
population growth.
Certain significant postwar changes in the ge)graphic distribution of
South Asia's trade are likely to be of fairly long-run duration. While a
gradual growth in South A41als trade with Japan from the present low levels
is to be expected, trade an the prewar scale appears unlikely for sode time
in the future. As long aa South Asia is limited ie its ability to supply
Japan with needed foodstues? raw cotton, and petreleum products, the
possibilities of expanding trade between the two eases necessarily are
limited. South Asia's trade with the United States, particularly its imports,
has already declined in relative importance from tae postwar highs of 1947
and is likely to decline still further as Japan other prewar-suppliers
expand their trade. However, it is reasonable to expect that the United
States will retain a sUbstantial share of its postvar gains in South Asia
markets. Factors supporting these gains are the changes in the colonial and
debtor status of much of South Asia and the conpetttive advantages that
accrued to the United States as a result of its being able to exploit the
markets of the area ahead of other sellers immediately after the war.
The prospects are that trade within South Asia will remain at existing
relatively low levels until greater economic complunentariness among the
individual countries is achj_eved by increased induetrialization in the area.
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CD
-71-
APPENDIX
Table A. VALUE AND DIRECTION OF SOUTH ASIA!S TRADE, 1947
(In 10000,000 US dollars)
Country of Origin or Destination
TOTAL SOUTHERN ASIA OTHER FAR EAST
AND 1936a
JAPAN
UNITED STATES
OMR '4'
UNITED KINGDOM 00.113?
CD
ountry
thiiippiries
1947
Value
1936
Value
1947
Value
1936
Value
1947
Value,
1936
Value
1947
Value
1936 1947
Value Value
1936
Value
1947
Value
2 &ports
265.3
147.7
14.9
1.1
6.2
10.0
2.1.
8.4
150.5
118,7
8.4
'CI Imports
-
. Net
511.3
-246.0
101.1
46.6
11.9
3.0
6.4
- 5.3
14.8
- 8.6
17.0
- 7.0
-1.0
1.1
13.3 426.0
- 4.9--275.5
61.5
57.2
1.3
7.1
(7) ?
Indonesia
Exports
194.4
346.7
91.3
56.6
4.7
36.1
1.7
19.4
23.9
61.5
3.3
rc'n- Imports
290.9
181.7
34.8
28.6
45.1-
56.1
22.8
48.4
116.8
14.0
22.9
0-
0?
- 96.5
165.0
56.5
28.0
- 40-.4
- 204.0
- 21:1
- 29.0
- 92.9
47.5
- 19.6
1114152
11275.0
748.8
115.5
59.8
49.5
119.7
8.0
112.2
255.0
70.9
330.0
m Exports
4' Imports
1,,500.0
463.4
104.2
28.8
25.8
86.0
9.4
78.7
435.0
30.2
400.0
ce Net
o.
-225.0
285.4
11.3
31,0
23..7
33.7
- 1.4
33.5
-180.0
40.7
- 70.0
4Burina
Ir7R5Orts
140.8
?
108.2
22.3
---
0.4
6.5
8 Imports
162.6
59.9
3.2
6.1
4.4
75.2
o_ Net
o_
- 21.8
48.3
19.1
- 6.1
- 4.0
- 68.7
:Ceylon
Exports
259.6
94,0
12.5
5.8
33.4
2,0
0.1
0.7
36.3.
-14.9
93.2
Imports
29(%4
80.4
60.4
38.0
44.8
9.3 .
1.9
34.0
'1..8
51,0
Net
- 30.8
13.6'
- 47.9
- 32.2
-11.4
- 7.3
- 1.8
- 4.5
2,3
13.1
42.2
1936 1747-T9T6
Value
4.2
2.5
1.7
17.6
14.3
3.3
246.1
177,8
68.3
Value Values1
9.
8503 137 so_
57,3 13.7
28.0 O. ?-)
(7)
71.2 17;?-. 9 gi
71.3 68 ?
- 0.1 106 ,.2
0
C?1
525,0 252-3
535.0 140,6 ?
10.0 111.7 cr.2
u_
3.4 -a
0
19.9 >
o
- 16.5 I_
o__
0
<
II!d) 118
28,1 - 16,0
Cougtry
TOTAL
1947 193
Value Value
Mal a
612.5
646.8
- 34.3
364,1
.294.7
69.4
arts
orts
0
Siaf
Thwarts
120.0
81.7
Iworts
70.0
50.0
50.0
33.7
Ind4hina
EVorts
68.1
105.9
Itports
139.1
62.9
71.0
43.t0
Tots
--Wrtp
2,935.7
1,890.9
Ifports
3,611.1
1,234.2
Not
- 675.4
656.7
-72-
Table A Continued
(In 11000,000 US dollars)
Country of Origin or Destination
'S0UTK-7 ASIA OTIF,R FAR FAST
1947 1933
Value ? Value
115.2 54.0
243.5 181.5
-128.3 -127.5
41.q
12.7
49.1
c17,
15.2
38.0
-,11.4 11.2
6.2 8.5
5.2 2.7
530.8
533.6
- 2.8
241.7
307.0
- 65.3
OTHER
JAPAN . UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM COINIMIES
1947
Value
19
Value
'
1947
Value
1936 .1947
Value .Value
1937- 1947
Value Value
. 1936
Value
191,/
Value
1936
Value
34,9
30.3
6.4
27.0
201.6
171.4
98.5
31,3
156,3
77,1
98.3.
35.5
3,2
l8.9
65.6
5.4
131.7
44,7
107-7
27,6
- 63.4
- 5.2
3.2
8.1
142.0
166.0
- 33.2
- 13.4
48.6
49.5,
77,)4.
I
Z.;
2=2.7
0.0
15,4
31.3
21.8
7.0
12.8
15.2
1.8
7.4
5.1
3,4
6,1
- 3.9
- 6.8
- 7.0
- 74.5
7.5
- 1.5
5.3
-- 3,3
? 2.6
7.3
16.9
16.0
4.7
5,4
6.4
0.1
0.9
34.3
71.4
13.5
10.6
- -
26.7
1.4
4.0
1.4
88.7
41,0
3.4
5.4
.;;.6
21.3
- 5.0
7 3.9
- .0.5
- 54,4
30.4
195.3
.229.1
-18.3
174.7
701.8
444.1
542.1
347.0
965,.7
629.0
276.8
236.3
51.4
179.41,123.7
116.1
693.5
262.8
983,5
312.0.
- 81.5
- 7.2
- 33.1
- 4.7 -421.9
328.0
_
-151.4
84.2
- 17.8
317.0
01400030006-9
0
CD
0
9
0
Co
CI
"
?zr
CNI
0
CNI
0
0
CNI
71)
a. Me figures shown inthis table-for-1947 are based only partly on the Official trade returns of individual countries.
Bees:Lase of certain obvious gaps in the official returns --i.e.,India's food imports and Indonesia's rubber exports
numeous adjustments in the official data were made largely on the basis of more reliable second country figures. Since
the a9 adjustments involved some element ofguesswork, the figures in the table should be considered only approximate, A3.3 >
exp ts are on an f.o.b. basis, and all imports except those of the Philippines are on a c.i.f. basis. Exports include
re orts. Bullion and specie transactions have been excluded as far as possible. Data are on a calendar year bas execT:.t a.
for dia and Burma. India statistics for 1936 cover the fiscal year ending March 31, 1937 and for 1947 the fiscal yea-
endig March 31, 1948; Burma data are for the period from October 1, 1946 to September 30, 1947. Except in the case of 51
offitial rates of exchange. were,used in converting local currencies to US dollars.
b. Includes estimated value of rubber shipped from non-Dutch-controlled territories to Malaya, which is not shown in off
cial Indonesia export returns but is given xn official Malayan import returns.
co India statistiop for 1.936 include Burma. Imports for 1947 have been adjusted to take account of cereal imports not
shown 2n official sustf.stics.
d. ,Asted for liscrepangy be weer free market rr7Iffir4 7 rn
r
ext11 1.7.r7c,
ApliffategFoRsilgtylpiR4dRATRIDSM-00Ag9Parl4RIKM006-9
POSITION BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES, 3.947 AND 1936
(In 1,000,000 US dollars)
Commodity
Exports
1947
1936
Foodstuffs and Tobacco
1,017.5
703.7
Rice, flours, and cereals
188.8
184.0
Pulses, oilseeds
28.3
57.1
Vegetable and fish oils
58.3
42.7
Sugar
6'03
85.4
Vegetables and fruits
23.7
9.5
Tobacco
35.1
35.1
Alcoholic beverages
2.3
0.9
Tea
341.3
160.3
Copra
233.4
66.6
Miscellaneous
100.0
62.1
Raw Materials
850.4
604,2
Ores and metals
111.7
178.2
Chemicals
9.9
5.1
Rubber
544.3
280.5
Wood, lumber, pulp.
20.6
20.1
Hideo and skins
70.5
58.8
Fertilizers
2.7
13.5
Miscellaneous
90.7
48.0
CaRitall Goods
35.5
9.2
Steel mill products
6.2
0.6
Other metal manufactures
1.9
2,0
Transport equipment
16.7
3.3
Machinery and motors
7.3
1.3
Building material
3.4
2.0
Fuels
43,3
94,0
Petroleum and rToducts
37.7
87.9
Coal
5.6
6.1
Consumers' Goode
17.4
13.6
Metalware
3.2
1.3
Soaps, cosmetics, drugs
10.8
9.7
Machines (clocks,radios,etc)
04.2
1.2
Paper
2.0
1,1
Glass and pottery
1.2
0.,3
Textiles
769.9
414,7
Raw cotton and waste
119.7
167.5
Raw silk
0.3
042
Raw wool
9,6
12.0
Industrial fibers
129.6
88.8
Industrial fiber products
404.4
111,2
Clothing yarn
1.1
2.1.
Fabrics and manufactures
105.2
32,6
Miscellaneous
201.7
51.5
Imports
Net Surplus
or Deficit
1947
1936
1947
1936
1)079.2
267.1
-61.7
436.6,
108.9
545.7
75.1
-356.9
22.1
10.2
6.2
46.9
19.1
7.4
-39.2
35.3
36.9
10.3
-30.6
75.1
65.2
20.7
-41.5
-11.2
84.7
23.6
-49.6
11.5
45.9
18.9
-43.6
-18.0
8.0
2.6
333.3
157.7
8.0
6.3
225.4
60.3
243.6
92.0
-143.6
-29.9
304.8
177.6
545.6
426.6
26.5
36.6
85.2
141.6
119.9
41.9
-110.0
-36.8
87.3
56.9
457.0
223.6
17.1
7.0
3.5
13.1
11.1
3.5
59.4
55.3
24.3
11.5
-21.6
2.0
18.6
20.2
72.1
27,8
688,3
224.4
-452.8415.2
87.4
49,0
-81.2 -48.4
67.6
18.3
-65.7
-16.3
209.8
64.1
-193,1
-60.8
303,9
84.4
-296.6
-83.1
19,6
8.6
-16.2
-6.6
210a
96.8
-166.8
-2.8
198.1
89.4
-160.4
-1.5
12.0
7.4
-6.,4
-1.3
2832.
112.2
-266.5
-98.6
37.4
10.1
-34.2
-8,8
88.6
27.6
-77.8
-17.9
L.,47
32.8
-44.5
-31.6
84,3
27.7
42.3
-26.6
2869
14.0
-27.7
-13.7
72.47
272.5
45,2
142.2
100.2
24.0
19.5
143.5
4.8
4.0
-4.5
-3.8
966
2,2
---
9,8
4.0
6.9
125.6
81.9
30,3
10.9
374,1
100.3
67.5
268
-66,4 -24,4
508.3197.7
-403,1-165.1
_212 . -118.4 -32,1
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Approved For Release 2002/07/24: CIA-RDP80-00926A001400030006-9
GENERAL DISCUSSION
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much, Mr. B
' Now we'have had the problems laid but. We we
of 'the preSeure of population'coupled with basic p
described this morning'as the lack of,turn-around
hate been tad of agricultural and industrial plan
organized, and if they go well, may just barely ke
Mr. Brodie turned to the trade situation, the chan
status, and the effedts of order and diSorder on e
Dr. Piplani strUck a note which wthdoubtles
discussions, a note of urgency. I suggest that we
general economic propositions by the end. of the at
us to future sessions when we consider social and
Who has the firat question?
rodie.
ne started with .a statement
Yverty -- what was aptly
room. This afternoon we
3 whieh,:a!a at Present
A) pace with the needs.
--7,e in colonial and debtor
)onomic relations.
I be repeated in our
try to organize some
ernoon to carry with
lolitical factors.
MR. LEVI: What was the pUrpose Wind your n)t mentioning Australia
1n this picture, hr.'Brodie? Australins themselves have very great hopes
for arranging new and flourishing tradt with South)ast Asia and with India.
Of course they are small for the time being, but tney hope to grow and
to industrialize very greatly. I wonder if you th)ught it was insignificant
or if you felt it doesr.hot belong hero.'
MR. BRODIE: I had not given it tee much consideration but the possi-
bilities of expanding this trade I believe are limited at least over the
near future because of the difficulties that India is experiencing in raising
the level of its exports. India now has a favorable world market for its
products and can quite readily sell almost anythin: it can make available
for export. The physical quantities of India's ax)orts are now only 65
percent of prewar And -until they can be stepped up the prospects of stimulating
Indian trade with Australia or elsewhere for that natter are limited.
MR. LEVI: Would you foresee, at least as the Australians themselves
hope, that the Australian industrialization will r)place trade that had taken
place before with Southeast Asian countries?
MR. BRODIE: That is a possibility, but a long-range one.
MR. N. S. GINSBURG (University of Chicago): On that very point, in 1936,
if I-remember correctly, 6 percent of Australia's ,,verseas trade was with
Southeast Asia. Even thirteen or fourteen years a.,;() there was a great deal
of concern about expanding Australian trade. in tha7 part of the world; it was
believed also that Australia had the.industrializa%ion to handle demands for
some manufactured geods in exchange for vegetable Als and petroleUmfand so
on. I think the point made by Mr. Levi should not be glossed over.
MR. FEUER: Isn't Australia's great disadvam,age that,she-i?n
exporter of agricultural commodities herself and she offerS.pay a limited
market for commoditiescoming out of Southeast Asi? She.ith'obviously not
going-to buy sugar from Southeast Asia, or furnish a great rice market.
Japan and Korea ceitaiai offer-gieater 00sibilitj..es for Southeast :Asia
than Australia does.
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MR. BRODIE: I would agree that the possibilities of expanding intra-
Asiatic- trade are much greater, particularly if Southeast Asia can step
up its food production so as to meet the needs of major food deficit areas
like India and Japan which since the war have had to draw on non-Far East
sources for the bulk of their import requirements of cereals. India and
Japan in return could 'supply Southeast Asia with needed industrial equip-
ment and consumers goods.
MISS CORA DUBOIS (Department of State): Are you suggesting there a
three-way picture of Australian surpluses to Japan and Japanese manufactured
goodseto Southeast Asia?
MR. BRODIE: No. Southeast Asias food and raw materials to Japan and
Japan's industrial equipment and other manufactures to Southeast Asia.
MR, LEVI: Certainly Mr, Pelzerls point is very important; nevertheless,
the Australians already have establisheda considerable number of new
industries. They say they have created forty comparatively new major
industries, and that may open possibilities anyway in spite of the fact
that, as you say both areas provide the same type of raw taterisIsG Never-
theless, they have great hopes to replace, almost, Japan as the industrial
country in that general area and that. is why they. are so opposed to the
reconstruction Of Japan along the lines we are pursuing in Japan.
? MODERATOR TALBOT: Australian industrialization developed, did it not,
out of the Eastern Supply Mission- activities during the war? -
MR. LEVI: Partly; and partly through transfer of industries from
Great Britain to Australia, and partly through rather considerable invest-
ments of American firms in Australia; There are a large number of American
firms that have established new industries in Australia, some of them
I know of apparently with a view to taking Australia as a base for doing
their trade in the Far East rather than from here direct,
MR. MILTON SACKS (Department of State): Both Mr, Brodie and Mr. Piplani
have totaled up the figures for the whole area and treated them on an area
basis, indicating certain patterns that emerge. However, I don,t detect
one of the problems that we are concerned with. What can be done on a
regional basis with these trade patterns and further developmental schemes
to deal with the area in question?
For example 2 price .fluctuations and other economic problems were
discussed this morning and now by Mr. Brodie.. Is there anything whicn-already
established and emergent States can do, acting regionallee which will make
possible better steps towards industrialization and. the solution of some of
their problems? It is One thing to add up the individual totals; it is
another thing to discuss the problems from the viewpoint of what can be done
collectively and on a regional basis. ?
MR. PIPLANI: My own feeling is that the question of developmental
plans can be approached if you take two or three groups .of countries within
this- region, 'Take,- for example, - a more or less co-ordinated group of the
Indian subcontinent, Pakistan, Ceylon and India. As I pointed Out in DT
paper,. the future feasibility of. their plans largely depends on how .far and
how quickly their blocked creditS?become available in order to enablethem to
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finance the increased capital equipmert, or if the
available what international financial machinery c
whereby against those credits at least some accoma
That will strictly apply to this group only, India
On the other hand, take countries like Siama
own feeling is that the degree to which the actual
projects have been worked out could probably be ex
more minutely. The amounts, as I have shown, are
two countries are concerned; Siam and the Philipp
covered under the Point Four arrangements as envis
a very important group of countries still further:
Burma, Indochina. I am afraid I am not in positio
On the immediate developmental potentialities in t
the problem to my mind is largely of political sta
couple of years. Unless the, Whole position clarif
to talk about the actual implementation of some pa
bility of their financing and so on.
MR. ISAACS: Isn't it true, though, that the
problems is 'directly related to political clarific
I was very much struck by the fact that both paper
on the new 'situationswhich have been created, bot
time perspectives to go backward. Mr. Brodie Bugg
of the moment required returning to some of the pa
Returning Japan into prewar position is not.someth
countries in,Southeast Asia would relish. Mr. Pip
him correotly, saw a Tree flow of capital. He cit
and I assume he could only be talking abOut India
in the matter of nationalization, landlord compens
would permit the free flow of capital in the 19th
also went se far as to Say that there are grounds
management relations. I have just come back from
and I failed to see any grounds for such optimism.
blocked credits are not
es be brought into motion
lation is provided for.
, Pakistan and Ceylon.
ed the Philippines. MY
agricultural and industrial
slored a little further,
rery small so far as these
'.nes could probably be
Loned so far. This leaves
Malaya, Indonesia,
to pronounce very much
lose areas because there
Dility during the next
Les I think it is futile
per plans or the feasi-
s
luestien of meeting these
ltion in those areas?
3, instead of concentrating
1 appeared in different
sted that the necessity
'terns before the war.
mg many of these
Lard, if I understood
id in that connection -
- a rotUrn to policies
tion and taxation which
;entury. manner. He
ror optimism on labor-
trip around the area
. MR. BRODIE: I agree that what I am saying. salnds very much as you
interpret it but I'believe my views are consistent with the realities of
the situation. South Asia is probably going to haee trouble mobilizing
capital, either from domestic or foreign sources f)r development purposes
and therefore should for the time being concentratDon those economic
projects which will yield the largest and quickest return per unit of
investment. If foreign capital on a considerable scale is forthcoming this
pattern of investment can be changed; but in the ase of India, for example
- this was a point that I wanted to bring up this morning .e I cannot see that
country making much progress on the read to industeialization as long as
it is a major food deficit area. I know of, no 'country that has undertaken
an effective program of industrialization starting on a large food deficit
base and until India makes considerable progress in solving its present
food problems I think it is unrealistic to talk of large-scale industriali-
zation programs for the country,
MR. ISAACS: Isn't it aauch larger problem ii our thinking than going
back to either 1936 or to the 19th century? It seems to me that all these
problems, innluding the food deficit, require the multiple attack on the
problem, which was mentioned this morning, This saeusto.me to for
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bold r and more heroic measures than we have heard about so far.
Prof. Jan 0.M. BROEK (University of Minnesota): Until recently these
areas have been largely dependencies. The baffling problem is now that they
are, or are going to be, politically independent, but that their economic de-
pendence is still there. The colonial powers have been severely criticized
for what they have done or not done in South Asia, but practically all
suggestions I have heard here regarding future economic development can be
duplicated from enlightened proposals or actual policy of the colonial
regimes in the past twenty years. I am thinking of the points raised by
Mr. Pelzer this morning. For example, that the peasants should grow the
crops and the Western enterprises should process them; whether that would
bring a higher return to the peasants is doubtful, but it certainly is not
a new idea. Then the question of capital resources. Of course capital
is needed, but how are we going to provide it in new ways compared with the
past? As to industrialization, it was tried in the past, perhaps not
enough, but I cannot see a really new approach to this problem in the
remarks made here thus far. The matter of migration has come up, but again
the proposals contain nothing new. In short, it ueems that the different
political situation has not changed the fundamental economic problems
one bit.
The great question is therefore: Can we think of new ways in which these
now or presently independent countries can meet their problems in a different
way than one which makes them practically as much dependent as before on
foreign capital, foreign management, technology etc.? Frankly, I do not
see such a new and entirely different solution. These countries -- at least
Southeast Asia -- will remain for quite a time "dependent" in an economic
sense, the question being on whom they will depend. From the Western
point of view, we must obviously strive for creating a system of co-operation
with the West.
MR. PIPLANI: I will try to answer that question. I think my thesis
has not been properly understood. I have tried to show that sinoe the
beginning of the war these three countries at least, Pakistan, India and
Ceylon, have accumulated very large credit balances outside, It is true
that they are now separate political countries, but that fact by itself
does not completely sever the old economic ties. The amount that is in
my head for India, Pakistan and Ceylon is of the nature of $8 billion; it
is an amount that would finance for the next five years all their needed
foreign capital requirements from abroad,
MR. HOLLAND: Is it 99 percent in sterling?
MR. PIPLANI: It is all sterling, Besides that and as Mr. Brodie has
mentioned, since 1936 for most of the countries from this area the export
trade that has gone out has gone out at very unfavorable terms because of the
inter-world price relationships, I do not think anybody has tried to
estimate how much in terms of dollars those areas have lost; nor would there
be any purpose to do any estimate of that charaoter, But the faot does
remain that for the last twelve years the whole area has traded with the
world at very unfavorable conditions.
MR, SCHULTZ: May I interrupt there because we are putting this in
different time sequences? Mr. Brodie in a sense has thrown us off, as your
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'comment now may, if we-denTt think of it. in its rieht timing. Durieg the
period ween In aceeiree Leese :large assets in s-erling the terms of trade
were highly favorable to India:
MR. PIPLA4: They were not. That is the whe_e point. ?
ER. SCHULTZ: ,Just a moment! The services an
sold were largely agrfcultural. You see we have I
now when the manufacturing sectors of the world ha
the war they found their terms of trade very adver
transferring of income from urban to .rural people'
Great Britain, Germany, and within the United Stat
MR. PIPLANI: I quite see the point that for
years at the beginning of the war probably the ter
favorable from the point of view of the sterling p
fact'a good deal of evidence available in governme
on the basis of some questions in the Parliament e
was appointed in the United Kingdom to inquire int
purchases - in India, Pakistan and Ceylon - that p
at exorbitant prices,, and the. report of that come
against those allegations. ?
the products that were
eyed through a-decade
le been squeezed and during
)e.- There has been a
- in Japan, within.
1 period of two or three
as of trade were not so
Irchaeee, but there is in
it reports; if I remember,
a Inquiry Committee
) the allegations that
irchases were being made
Ittee was completely
MR. SARKAR: With regard to the fair prices tiat were alleged to have
been charged by India for goods: delivered to Englaed during the war, I
happen to have a rather different view. Even the British committee which
sat in judgment and whieh said that the priceS eharged by India were lair
was perhaps more a political committee than econaMic. That iermy impression,
but of course lam here as elsewhere in'the minority Of one. .erhaps one
would be justified in rejudging that whole probler, from the standpoint of
international finance,
MR. SCHULTZ: I do not want to becIeudthis iesue but I want to take
the discussion now over to where it was when I interrupted. It seems to
me that in considering the realities you haVe to see the.shift'in supply
in the different parts of the world. It is true, the U.K. including
Western Germany. and Japan are coming into the production of many manu-
factured goods including capital goods', the 'volume is increaeing at 'a very
rapid rate. This has an implication to all the Ccintriee that want
capital goods, and'it seams to me, Mi. arc:die; you have to consider not
enly, Japan but also.the impact of the surplus Of' eueh products of the U.K.
on Japan and of the total supply on the rest of tte world. In this sense
you may say that a buyer's market of capital gob& is coming raPidly.
Then there is the question: Which are the ccentriee that have surplus
capital? Certainly the United States; it mak be true also of Sweden.
She may dind Ways of extending credits: At that yeint I do think we
should not think any more of the region as a whole, we have got to think of
the difference between India on the one hand, which it seems to me is
a completely different situation than the countries in between and perhaps
until you get to the Philippines. Isn't it true, taking the point of view
that goes along with the loaning of capital, partieularly if it is on
private account, that India is almost a "perfectetetupv to get capital from
the outside? The government is "conservative"; it is trying to protect
property rights, it looks like it is tryIng to hold Iscbcir in aback. Whether
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-79-
you look at these developments as being either good or bad, they aro an
open invitation to capital. Isn't that almost as different as black
from white until you cross over and get badk to the Philippines?
MR. PIPLANI: I think what you have said applies equally to Indt.a,
and Pakistan, not to Burma. Personally, I think Siam has also fairly
favorable conditions for foreign investments. -
MR. FEUER: The impact of the changes that Professor Schultz and
Dr. Piplani were referring to may mean a great deal for the area in between,
that is, Southeast Asia. We may see the development of a Grossraumwirtschaft.
On the one hand you have Japan; on the other hand you have a rapidly
industrializing India, competing at a rate greater than before for the raw
materials and food surpluses of Southeast Asia. Europe for one reason or
another may shift, and I think the indications are there, shift at a much
faster rate than before toward Africa, and SOMB American capital, too,
seems to prefer the political climate of Africa and may want to keep out
of Southeast Asia. But from a Southeast Asian point of view you have the
chance of utilizing the marketing possibilities represented by an inner
ring formed by Japan, Australia, and India; in the outer ring you have
North America and Western Europe. I think a great deal will depend upon
the political development in Southeast Asia. Development in Japan seems to
be rather stable, development in India rather stable, but Southeast Asia
is really the area in which a great many of these ideas will be fought
out. I have the impression that because of the proximity of the area to
Communist China part of the capital will notpin following Truman's Fourth
Point, go into Southeast Asia but will go into Africa - Tanganyika, and
so on.
MR. SCHULTZ: But go into India and Japan, by your own argument as
you Just put it.
MR. PELZER: One may put it this Way: There are too many tropics.
There is always the possibility.of shifting if the price in on area is
too high. If a certain area tries, to hold up the world you promptly get
a shift. Take the sisal monopoly of Yucatan in World War I; the answer
was sisal production in EastAfrica and Sumatra. If Southeast Asia tries
to hold up anybody, the answer on the part, let us say, of North American and
Western European capital will be economic expansion in Africa.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO (Indonesian Delegation to the U.N. Security Council):
I would like to take strong exception to Mr. Piplani's statement to the
effect that what is needed in South Asia is a 19th century's free flow of
capital. 4 remarks will also refer to Mr. Pelzerls reply to Mr. Isaacs'
question.
It should not be forgotten that the flow of capital such as has happened
in the 19th century and the function of capital in the Social and economic
structure of colonial Asia, while raising the total production in comparison
with previous centuries, at the same time has brought about one of the worst
aspects of colonialism.
Under the impetus of this flow of capital, protected and stimulated
by the colonial government, the production was so organized that it resulted
in an uneven distribution of the social wealth and national income. It was
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-80-
this organization of production that was one of tin foundations of the colonial
structure of which the colonial people have been tie victim.
The fundamental problem faeed by the:Southeast Asian countriesnow.
is the raising efthe general, standard of living. . Among the most important
means to achieve that objective are industrializatien, intensification and
divdrsificetion of agricultural production, development of transportation and
communications, and even distribution of populatioe. In view of the-heritage
of a colonialestructure, all this would have eolee done within the framework
of an active government pone:5e of a just disteibuti)n of the social product,
of social insurance and, in wry cases, of a solutien of the landlord prOblem.
Fundamentally, all these problems are common to all the countries. of Southern
Asia. Therefore, it seems highly advisable if not enperative that.the
countries of Southeast Asia find a common approach tn their efforts to overcome
the difficulties of the present and the. futureand ee avoid the danger of
chaos and unnecessary competition as economic develJpment progresses within
the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, the difficulties Western .
;Jterope has had in dealing with regional arrangement3 is a clear warning against
the oversimplification of the problem of regionalism in Southeast Asia.
The accumulation of capital on the basis of4neernal savingemilI prove
to be very, difficult in view of the fact that the pepulation lives :on a:bare
eargin of subsistence. The dependency, therefore, ef this region.upon .
foreign genital will probably continue to exist, deseite thetransitionefrom
colonial status to political independence. Hence, he basic issue is to
find a balance between the function and remuneration of foreign capital
and the economic and social development of Southease Asia.
In this,concept, 'there. can never be a 19th cen,ury free flow of capital
oecause the function of capital and capital investml nt in the future will
lave a somewhat different character, although it continues to work on the
easis of profits and reasonable compensation.
Capital in the production and development of S(utheast Asia should be
iirected to those fields mapped out in the regional planning, with the
tltimate objective of raising' the standard of livine of the people involved.
Ilithin these limits the conditions can be set forth which will make it
enducive to foreign capital so that it find a remunerative scope of
operation.
I do not think that India could with a reasonatle prospect of permanent
euccess follow the direction as indicated by Mr. Pipiani. It may very
eell prove to be impossible for any country in Souteern Asia to set its
economic pattern independently of other countries jr that area, if harmful,
eompetitive and disruptive tendencies are to be aveited. Political and
conomic stability in Southern Asia is one and indivisible. The conditions
under which foreign capital will have to work will b3 set by the general
eolitical climate in that region. Transgression of 'he boundaties set by
ehis political climate will inevitably create pout! al instability and
eolitical opposition to the extent that foreign capieal could not operate at
eU, to the detriment of all concerned. After All, it should not be
overlooked that this question cannot be answered from theoretical considera-
Lions only, but that Southeast Asia is a political arena in the great changes
J1 the world, and ?Especially in the areas north of ie1 will make their
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1, ^
MODERATOR TALBOT: You are working on the theory that outside capital
is required in Southeast Asia; that the countries of Southeast Asia will
set the conditions on which that capital would be admitted.
MR, SOEDJATMOKO: They would have to set them in accordance with the
general political temper in order to maintain their political stability.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Does that include the possibility that outside
capital won't offer itself for that region?
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: Also taking that into consideration, although I have
not here specifically dealt with what seems to be a reluctance of private
capital, and maybe especially American private capital, to invest abroad.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Would that not require consideration of a certain
amount of encouragement?
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: Certainly. That encouragement could be given on
the part of the Southeast Asian countries, for instance, by commitments
against overtaxation and partial convertability of profits. In the long
run, this will be more beneficial to the interests of capital itself and
of the highly developed countries from which the capital is derived. Abe
development in the underdeveloped countries progresses, a larger volume
of trade and exchange of goods can be expected between these areas and
those countries already industrialized. Experience and history of
industrialized countries has proved that trade between highly industrialized
parts of the world does not decrease but increases although there is a
shift'in the kind of goods being exchanged by the countries. But it should
be realized that such a balance of interests can only be worked out on
the basis of a full recognition of the political temper prevailing in
Southeast Asia. And certainly-not on the basis of a 19th century free
flow of capital.
MR. PIPLANI: In reply to this question, we in India have gine through
that process for the last ten or fifteen years. The whole question of the
foreign investments is obviously bound up with the question of national
prestige and international politics. There are obviously very clear-cut
phases in this question in any new, young nation which has just come to
political independence. As I said, we have gone through that process and
I am convinced more or lees that as newer and younger independent units
come out in Asia they also will go through the same process of evolution.,
because if there are going to be any responsible governments worth the
name in those countries they will have to ponder hard on hoe to recoecele
the needs of political independence and national prestige with the most
imperative task of raising the standards of living, and some solution will
have to be found somewhere in between. I have absolutely no doubt that
as the other younger nations come up in stature and political maturity
they will have to go through the same process of evolution.
MR. LEVI: I noticed this morning and now again once in a while the
term of "regional" pops up because that is supposed to be our topic. All
the regional organizations that I can think of offhand have been created
as a result of outside political pressure and not primarily as a result
of economic factors, and I am just asking whether there is any evidence
in this whole region that the leaders or the peoples in Southeast Asia
think at all in terms of regionalism because of economic reasons. I know
they
me that
21*eco(ngoemcieciceacir lpyo speaking they are a41 8ptrrene2gr6 epatc0 on14g.0 #3e6e6r6.6% to
own lines
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and they they are not thinking of the desirability ,or en possibility of economic
regionalism.
MR. SCHULTZ: The group has all argued that tlere is a distinct loss
if you force this into are eeonoMic regionalism, th.t the only motives are
political. I think that was said this morning.
MR. LEVI: As the gentleman saysethey have to offer a common inducement.
MR. SCHULTZ: It is political.
MR. LEVI: He talks about capital. You canna separate the two.
MR. BRODIE: Ithink there is a basis for a s
regionalism than we have been discussing. I refer
involving all of the Far East as Mr. Felzer has br
for the possibility, as I previously stated, that ,
capital will flow to the Far East, that such capit
to India and Japan, and that the basis does exist
trade betWeen India "andJapan on the one hand and -
on the other hand, involving primarily, the exchanea
capital 'equipment for foodstuffs and raw materials
will be dieappointing to some of the countries ot
entertaining ambitious industrialization se-Lames, 1
limitations of capital in the area it 'appears to UK
in the direction of their gradually developtng more
mewhat broader type
to the sort of regionalism
ught out. We should allow
nly veryli ted foreign
1 will. go principally
or developing . considerable
tie rest of the Far East
oefenished manufactures and
This sort of arrangement
outh Asia which have been
it in view of the
to be the first step
diversified economies.
MR. SARKAR: I have a question for 'Mr. Brodie; a very elementary question.
The modest picture that. Mr. Brodie eXhibits of the Southeast Asian economic
potential agrees so mUch. with mi statj.qtica1. intereretatiens that I want to
know what he' thinks Of the twnew transforming ageets. First, to what extent
you believe that Australia, which has assumed a part of the positioe that
England used to have during wartime., to what,. extent is this ppsition, going
to reain'when Ehgland:reVertee!to her PopitiOn in tee Southeast Asian
market? The other question i'eaebout'india, How de you appraise the
presentpbsition Of India as a SUPplier for finisheiemanefactures, and,
eay, manufactures with Southeast Asia as an,acCOMpliee? These are considered
to be two new-teansferming, agents. '
,
MR, BRODIE': If I understand your first questim correctly, I would
say that the position of the United Kingdom in Soute"Asia Markets does not
appear to have changed very much, the .United .Kingdem has maintained this,
relative prewar position and may have iMprevedlit seightleia
On the secondluestiOn,, I can onlyesay.that In ha is a long, way rprqpted
from becoming a great supplier of finiahed manufaeteres and industrial
equipment.
MR. PELZER: Why do ,you say.that?,
MR: SCHULTZ': This ought to be challenged, thoegh, the idea that India
eannot pay fnr her food:,eurplus by some of these lieht manufactures as Japan
did. I dont see the 'babes for it.
? MR. PIPLANI: Your own statistics will EhOW th t increasingly during
the laat ten years we have been importing more and'ore food just because we
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have been able to export more scmi-manufactured commodities. Then the7e
is another point which I, think Mr Brodie has ignored: Our program is a
multiple program of combining the agricultural and the industrial develop-
ment simultaneously. It is not only with a view to saving foreign exchange
for import both of foods and industrial manufactures,_iraexchange for
industrial manufactures, but also of meeting a large, and expanding internal
market for industrial manufactures. The.whole thing has to go side by side
in order to be properly effective.
MR. PELZER: Great Britain, toe started her industrialization without
being self-sufficient in grain.
MR. HOSELITZ: Oh no, Great Britain when she started in that industriali-
zation waa self-sufficient.
MR. BRODIE: It alldepends entirely on the availability of capital.
MR. PIPLANI: You examine the development of our cotton textile industry
and the import trade in textiles; you examine the amount of coal in Indiats
export trade to Siam, to Burma, to Egypt now, to Finland, etc., some semi;,.
manufactured goods, and all under the bilateral trade agreements that I have
mentioned, and you will agree with me completely, and it is through that
semi-processization that it has been possible for us to maintain life by
importing those large quantities of food.
MR. BRODIE: But you have a terrible imbalance now because of the food
problem. How are you going to solve it?
PIPLANI: I don't know if you are aware of the very.recent plans that
by 1951 India is going to be self?sufficient in food grains. They are projects
of land reclamation, fertilizer distribution, irrigation, and the very recent
thing is the possibility for which a grant of 0300,000 has been placed at the
disposal of a special committee for the evolution of a synthetic cereal, they
call it, which is actually this: a combination for the normal daily bread
of certain quantities of ground-nut flour, of wheat and a certain amount
of tapioca, a combination of that in order to grow more of the tuber crops
like sweet potatoes and ground-nuts so as to save on wheat and barley and
maize imports, I am just mentioning that for your information.
MR. ISAACS: I think there is an astonishing disproportion between the
urgency and magnitude of the problems outlined this morning and the solutions
that are b6ing discussed now. Nationalism itself, which we are confronted
with as a political phenomenon throughout the area, is essentially anachroni-
stic and this is a major part of the problem. We heard this morning that a
5 percent increase in production in,a decade was not going to help any.
Certainly minor adjustments in trade balances between countries aren't going
to help either. A bold new plan, in small letters and not in capitals, is
obviously required. It does not seem to be present. We have yet to come to
grips with the real need for the regional approach if we are to work out
solutions capable of meeting the problems which have been outlined here.
MR. DAVIS: I was struck by the statement a moment ago about "weak
governments" and the necessity of bolstering political stability. It
strikes me that weak governments breed strong governments and perhaps we
could get more clarification of an issue that seems to be coming to a heads
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and I think it ie.a.freitful issue, if we thought in terms of what is likely
to happ:o j.rdc,-,,endertly o2 What we would like to h.,:ere happen-. Some people
-feel that the eraduaiism that is apparently favorel by the two Speakers,
both of whom hev-.; heavy ,responsibility and in that situation are likely
to be more graeualiStic, does not looleas though:i is actually going to
work, and I think it won't.
The next question concerns other alternatives. It seems to me that if
gradualism does not work, a major amount of instability, catastroPhe.and
disorganization in this area may .result. This may prove precisely the
situation in which strong governments wUhestrong Aeasures will emerge,.
Such strong governments may attempt to solve the cipital deficiency by quite
eother means1. eIn other words, I can well -Imagine that this whole area, if
left alone by us, not necessarily left alone by oteers, will have dictatorial
governments, and that these may figure out ways of extremely rapid industria-
lization.
would ask, for example, what has happened t
India,. the Bombay Plan and the other plans, by whi
standard of living would be doubled or tripled? I
has happened is that when people got down to the d
what such great plans would really mean if carried
an economic, eocial and religious revolution. The
not faee and we cannot face it because that is
ized, but still I think it might occur.
the brave new plans of
h in fifteen years the
seems to me that what
tails; noy tealized.
out. They would mean
pr:ople in power could
fiot the way we ate organ-
MR. SACKS: I would like to comment on an ear ier remark of Professor
Broek's. he said, 'Told: are going along the well tr dden peth that enlightened
colonial policy tried tio frzlow," It seems to me ihat enlightened colonial
policy is to some ext'ent respensible for the type ef political ceiese we
have now. If it had been adequate to meet the proelems the present situation
would not have arisen. However, past experience ie important and I wOuld
like to raise SOMB questions. Is there anything werth retaining from the
experiences of prewar years when the colonial pewees made ae:railable to the
world market raw materials through combined boards - tin boards, rubber boards,
etc? Is there not room for such collaboration between the emergent states
to mitigate some of the difficulties that exist in the international sphere?
Would it be easier for these countries, instead of developing on an individ-
ual basis the scientific plane necessary for a big,, bold advance in indeetry?
in raising agricultural productivity, and so on, te co-operate with each
other and expand: their efforts jointly in view of their lack of facilities
and available capital? Are there things that can te done, again envisaging
this problem on a regional basis, which would not ts possible if handled
individually.by the new national states, which a cenference of this sort
could point out as possible aids for dealing with the problems that they
now have?
NR. HOLLAND: One of the feir'agencies who haw 'tried.to deal with it
in eesmall way with inadequate powers is the Econor_ic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. One of the possible areas Of con non interest in which we
expect some limited progress withoUt.rurming too Ii into yested'interests
is in the ff.ild of fisherics, which ilasjorth.erly 1...64f-A1T.cor,tolifed by Japan,
especia:i.ly the off-shore fisheries. But even therc 141s-1-you ge:; dowirto
workthg cut1 the cc4ai q.for PAP
a a *ipa:411.WRbiSybti:509acitd4-666-bThas to t,14.-t, the
a only
national twEgruiVil p at in a e D wa7
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stop and look at the well-meant efforts of UNRRA to supply a modern finhing
fleet to China to see how what appears to be a beneficial program can be
stymied by powerful vested interests.
When you get beyond that it would seem to me that the areas where
maximum benefit could come from common action on the part of a number of
countries here would be largely in the field of research and the elaboration
of specific projects say, in the technical field, such as hydro-electric
works, and certain types of trop improvement. It has always struck Ile in
the past that South Asia has suffered from the amazing lack of contact
and exchange of experience between the different colonial administrations.
I suspect, however, that such interchange is not going to come very easily,
but Will need a great deal of pushing. That leads me to my final point:
however distasteful the concept of an externally created economic regionalism
may be, if we are looking at this problem in terms of trying to find the
theoretical conditions under which maximum economic efficiency could be
achieved I think you are almost driven back to the view that some form of
"co-prosperity" under any new kind of label:, is probably one of the answers.
. MR. BROEK: I fully agree on this economic form of co-operation. What
I would like to add is this: It was suggested a moment ago that politically
this area is interested in closer regional relationships. It seems to me that
economic cooperation may be the surest road to future political integration,
I am not thinking here- of South Asia as a whole, but of the peoples between
India on the west and China on the north. There is a basis for social
economic regionalism in this area. of Southeast Asia, not in the sense of
complementing each other's resources, but in having a number of problems
in common. Collaboration, then, should start along functional alines, such
as research on resource development, exchange of ideas and possThly ,71arDa21:9nt.3
of transportation, trade, migration, public health, and education. W
way of this functional approach a firm foundation can be laid for future
political federationor whatever system appears desirable, Some :rem of
political integration of Southeast Asia seems necessary .if these countriss
are to have the collective strength to stand up against future Ireasures
from larger and more advanced neighbors on the west and. north.
Wishing for something does not mean that one actually believes that it
wal happen. I may add here that I personally am quite gloomy as to the
future of Southeast Asia. The whele region is at present -characterized
by political instability, lack of domestic capital and native e3onorlAi and
technological leadership, Add to this the rising competition iTh etSer
tropical areas and with synthetic materials, and you can see tlalt Couteast
Asia faces terrific problems, India seems to be in mo,ny ways in a Irc;r,
favorable position than Southeast Asia, If we speak of a new aproon to
the problem it would seem that for Southeast Asia the application of
regionalism is the most promising.
MR. VANDENBOSCH: I have the impression that .India is not developing
an integrated economy, Since Indian agriculture produces so little, it
has practically nothing to exchange for the goods which the cities produce.
The cities are in India but not essentially of it economically, as SOIlle
of the raw materials and even considerable amounts of their foodstuffs must
be imported. Is not this social as well as economic imbalance:
MR. PIPLANI: I really don't know how to answer that question. Probably
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your criticism: is quite a
know if Professor Schultz
I happened to be working
question of food imports.
mate effects of food subs
it was largely for' the be
year have been expendedi.
-
to push further on to you:
created between the town
a sort of different life.
sidization policy since 1
keeping down inflation by
in costs, cc:art of product
I am frankly not-clear in
of the new-sort-of co-ord
likely to be pushed forth
different levels of life .
become smaller.
-86-
vlicable for the last couple of years. I do not
will agree With me On that but when he was in India
is Under Secretary'itrthe-FOod MiniOry on this -
If one does analyze a little in. detail the ulti-
iodization, then the conclusion is inescapable that
lefit of the Urban areas that some 0 millions a
the form of subsidies; and probably from there
1 argument that some kind of an imbalance has been
ievelopment and the rural areas and as such becoming.,
But ,I am not quite sure, because the food sub-
42.43 ha S had the majorfUndamental objective of
trying to stabilize food'Obsts as the basic factor
.on in manufactures, and otherwise all-around. So
my own mind. But My-feeling is that, on the basis
jiated plant for agriculture and industry that are
in the next couple of years., the margin between
J3 the cities and.the'rural areas is bound to
MR. SARKAR: As to tiese subsidy items in the Indian budget, during
and since the war, I want .d to know of the Food Department specialist on
what basis food shortage e calculated: on the nutritional minimum basis,
or exactly what is the ba is?
MR. PIPLANI: Oh no, Professor Sarker, you have lived in the country
and you have noticed how :ram month to month the ration Scales are changed
from one big city to the ,ther, and how in fact the composition of that
small quantity is changed in the light of the availability of Stocks,
stocks which come firstly from internal procurement and secondly from imports
here are absolutely no crlculations in the Food Ministry so far as the
optimum nutritional level E are concerned; there are some in the Agricultural
Ministry which has doce.scme planning from the produotion point of viewo'but
they are all theoretical.
MR. WRIGHT: May I asL Mr. Piplani what the criteria were for determining
the projects to which appAcation of capital should be applied. He said
that some billion of cpital expansion Was contemplated. One would supposf
that if youlut capital irto different things it would have a different
social effect. This mormng Mr. Holland called' attention to the population
problem. and the need-oftcleating,a different psychological atmosphere
if that problem mere to bf 'met. I wonder whetherAhe consequences of one
type of capital 'investment as against another in creatind'a neWrpsychological
and social atmosphere which might have a tendency'to,meet the population
question has been thoughba at all in determining where capital Should be
applied. For instance, I believe that you spoke of using some capital
in diversifying agriculture, other capital in industry of one kind or another
I should think, if there is anything 'in the gradualistic approach, that it
would urge making careful and accurate estimates as to what the social as
well as the economic consEquences of the Various types of capital investment
will be. Has that aspect been actually considered in determining the criteri,
for choosing the type of capital investments to make?
MR. PIPLANI: So far as the agricultural projects are considered I think
I generally answered that question, that the projects that are immediately
being contemplated by mnet governments have the aim of-increasing the total
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"1 .
pr-)6.Lctdon by about 8-t million tens, whieh is about 10 perent
te tie present production; but I think there is a certain amount of
misunderstanding on the sociological effects of that amount of investment
It is not realized that the $8 billions that I have cited both for agricul-
tural and industrial projects forms a small fraction of the total capital
equipment already working in those areas. It is a very important fact to
get hold of. I cannot give any estimate but in India, Ceylon, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Siam, and so on, there. are huge transportation services,
there are these types of industries: cement, cotton, oil, steel, -chemicals,
ship building, assembling, sugar, and oiimillS, etc. People don't realize
that these areas already are more or less semi-developed areas, that -
there is vast industrial, agricultural, ,transport equipment already keeping
Common life up somehow. Part of these 4: billions are in fact for replacement
of the worn-out equipment during the war for which no replacements were made.
Professor Schultz knows how weworked the whole Indian railway system almost
to death in the interests- of food distribution from 1943 onwards.
We have been able now to gradually start manufacturing the wagons
inside the country. We have been placing orders for locomotives in the
United States and Canada since l943, and a part of the first consignment
has just recently come. That story applies to additional cotton textile
equipment, to tractors, to crawlers, to tube wells, boring machinery,
to ammonium-sulphate for fertilizers, to setting up a penicillin plant
for the health of the workers, and so on.
So I am talking a little too bluntly, shall I say, but it is not
saffe:lently realized that $8 billion will be a small fraction of the total
caratal equipment already working in that area.
MR- WIGHT: But the general direction may influence the later social
devel-,p-oent of the country. If you put capital into agriculture wouldntt
it he 2'kely to stimulate the growth of the agricultural population,and
cai y:.111 to be just as badly off as you wore before? On the other hand,
you put it into industry, might not that tend toward urbanization,
felowed by the usual effect of decreasing the rate of population growth?
That is the kind of problem I had in mind; whether it would be better to put
capital into industry than into agriculture.
M. ISAACS: May I supplement that? It was said to me in India
recently that regarding the capital they hoped to get from the United States
the major question would be how that capital was secured and how administered.
Would it be private capital moving thorugh the private capitalist combines
in India, which would have one effect on the social-political-labor picture;
or would it be government-to-government projects, with a different set of
consequences in terms of labor organization and labor reaction?
I think we have been giving India a little too much credit for being
too stabilized in its social relations when actually it is uncrystallized
to a large degree. The fact that India was more developed industrially
and therefore had a class of industrialists of some size and power, and
that they have at this moment taken oVer the reins of power in India) does
not mean that the solution of social problems in India is taken care (If.
Quite the contrary. I think we have a long history of turmoil ahead of us
which will be influenced prifeasely by such questions as thisi
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MR. PIPLANI: I think a part of that. I have c
I said that the plans which I have ;mentioned and t
of which I have made a description are strictly gc
the last paragraph I went ever to the other quest:
investment. I am not prepared to accept the state
larger industrial interests happen,to be the prese
If Mr. Isadcs has at all studied the history of ti
under the Congrese I think he would :net have made
think I should say anything more than that because
it is largely politics.
nswered in my paper when
he magnitude of 'finances
vernmental plans, and in
on of foreign private
it saying that the
nt Zovernment in power.
Indian political movement
that statement. I dnnJt
it is not economics,
Professdr Davis ventured in the realm of proTaecy on which I have no
basis to talk, but I would like to tell him that s. far as I personally
am concerned I am not interested in that gradualnEss the way he has described
it, but I can tell him that India is at the moment manned by a vast admini-
strative civil service and the majority of them derive their ideologies
from Hinduism, which we are not ashamed to confess is conservative in
philosophy. We hold to that conservative philosorly.
AR. SCHULTZ: I want to pick up Professor Wright's question and comment
and tie it back to the answer that the speaker galie. To get perspective in
India one can draw a- greatdeal from. the history cf Great Britain. If I
were to venture a guess on India for the near future at would be that they
are moving into a period which has been characterized sometimes in speaking
of.Great Britain as the )!Hungry Forties"; and due to the way they are going
-to acquire capital - this bears on. the question of Professor Wright --
India is embarked on a policy right now of accumulating a great deal of
capital inside, despite the poverty of India,and it ie going to come out of
the rank.and-fi/els standard of living, actually, Ind the amount they will
save is likely to amaze some of us.
PIPLANIi 'Particularly Professor Davis.
-MR. SCHULTZ: It can only be done by a strong central government, and
that is the for* of government that is emerging ir India.
My guess is that the capital that is thus acefired, whether it is used
outside to buy goods or the capital that is formed inside, will contribute
increasingly to industry and nct be used within agriculture. India is
entering a period like thatwhen-Britain was hungrr and formed so much
capital, looking back, we are prone to eras all toe fast. India by its own
:volition And decision is deciding to save a very great deal despite the low
standard of living. India .is not going to use this new capital to buy or
produce More foOdlout'will.gradually shift, toward industrial kind of equip-
ment. This ie'really what seems to be ahead for India in the next five,
seven or ten .years:
MR. LEWIS A; PURNELL (Department of State): Does Mr. Piplani think
that the force of Hiniima is sufficient in the present philosophy of the
peasant Mind to eliMinate the desire: for the elimination of the landlord?
NR. PIPLANI: When I made that remark in a rather outspoken way I did
not mean that the Hindu conservatism is completely blind to the realistic
state of affairs; basically that philosophy is there but it is adjested
in parts, as and when needed, in the light of political and economic
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are being planned and envisioned as and when necessary in various direi'DnT,
MR. HOSELITZ: We have been talking about industrialization and I AM
afraid we have been talking about it a little glibly, some of our frird3
also have been talking about the industrialization _potential. Mr. Davis
gave figures of ruralpopulation (I think it was 87% la India and 9371?Li
Pakistan). Certainly on the basis of such figures) and although India has
a certain familiarity with capital equipment you cannot say that it is an
industrial nation. India has a? transport and communications system but India
is certainly not industrialized, and the others, still less:
Are we to expect a repetition of the "Hungry Forties" in India?
England was hungry from the 179018 onward, and certainly to the 1860ts
and the hunger of the 1840's was only slightly greater than in the ether
periods; There is no doubt that the process of industrialization in a
country like England wad attained at the expense of human welfare and human
sacrifices: of a considerable number of English people. The same is true
of other countries that were in substantial Measure agriculturall because
a shift from an economy which is predominantly agricultural to one that is
predominantly industrial requires sacrifices of a large part Of the
population, and especially on that part of the population Which has the
least power and which has the least reserves to bear them'. Thus industriali-
zation is a major event in the history of any country-.
Since it is such a major event) sir= it imposes on a nation such
terrific sacrifices) sacrifices which are much larger even than a great
war) it must be performed with the help of some tremendously powerful
ideals, needs, driving motives. In England the stimulus was given by
powerful moral, economic arid politicalinterests. In countries which
industrialized after England, for example, Germany, there were powerful
forces of nationalism, similarly in Japav.) and in the Soviet Union
today. Look at the type of propaganda and the kind of effort that in
the Soviet Union is used to attain a speeded-tip industrialization program.
It imposes sacrifices on almost all people which we would not want to bear
ourselves.
When Nr Davis talks about the need for India to industrialize faster,
I an that what the Indians have to do in order to industrialize fast is
to use political and socialpsychelogical methods similar to those used
by the Russians now. I wonder whether India can do it under any government -
Hinduism, Communism, or -whatever. If you speak of rapid-industrialization
as alternative to chaos, I wonder whether you. do not really agree with the
gentlemen who talk about pseudo-stability in India. That is' industrialization
or its opposite may lead to that anarchy and that instability in India
which you are. witnessing elsewhere in the region.
It is not'simply'a:question of 'foreign capital import .Even
the expropriation of the wealthy landlords in India is only a drop in the
bucket. The chief problem is sacrifices on the part of thecommon man in
India, These sacrifices," which must be made over years- And pehaps decades)
will show whether the eociel fabric of India and other countries in South
Asia. has enough cohesion to support this ordeal. If it has; we don't
need to worry about the countries; if it has not, then I fear anarchy or
something similar to it is going to be"the short-run solution for a number
of years.
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MR. HARVEY S.-PERIOFF (University of Chicago)
earlier point concerning.United'States repponsibilt
deserves seriqus attention, dt:seeMi.to methattl
accept a certain responsibility;toward the economic
of the wOkld becauseof'the-role- of :politieal and c
it has inherited, and because 'it is.the manor sour
capital for these areas.
?hink that Er.,:tIsaacel
ty toward Southeist'Aeia
.e United States idat
ally underdeveloped -areas
conomic leaders/51i which
e.of outside deVelOeri?ental
Looking back, we cannot avoid the. conclusion,that dUring the .9th and
early 20th century, when England was the chief sup her of foreign capital,
the end result o' the foreign-loansl'investments ari aid to the "backward"
areas was a limited and unbalanced development, whfch involved a great '
increase in population, but little or no increase fn the real levels of
living of the Vast majority of peoplesin these regions. This dis'propor-
tionate increase in population-has itself created Eerious problem& The
characterization of these people, made earlier today, as standing "with
water up to the neck" so that they :Can be hurt by relatively small ripples
is-very apt. -
It seems to me that if the United States is tc meet its responsibility
adequately, the "bold new program" proclaimed by Preeident Truman will have
to be very bold indeed - not Only from the Standnoint of the quantity Of
aid, but of quality as well. It seems clear that tle -foreign developmental
capital which can be made available to Southeast Asia today by the capital=
surplus Countries swould be a drop in the bucket if it were to be granted
and used in traditiona/!Ways. In7eatments and leara of this traditional
type would tend to accomplish little, and wnuld inv.-ilve a high degree of
risk for that very reason. It seams to MR that. bolinesi .is called for in
several directions. '
First, we must get away from the notion of a transfer OE technical skill.
The United States should use its superb technological "know-how" and inven-
tive Skillr n2t.-to teach underdeveloped areas how imitate us, but rather
to sponsor significant new research -- research-chi:b. recognizesthat the
underdeveloped areas'in most.cases do radt have. the resources to duplicate'
the coal-and-iron technology of the West,. and which seeks .out new paths -
in solar and other types of energy, in biochemistry, in scientific nutrition,
in population control, and so on. I believe that a is just at this point
that the United States can make its greatest.contrirution toward breaking
the vicious circle in which the underdeveloped area find themselves.
4 ?
Secondly, our responsibility lies in approachilg this whole problem.
in a politically mature fashion. When we talk abou, "emergent" countries,
almost by definition we are referringto.ceuntries n the throes of a new
nationalistic spirit. It cV make our loans,and inv:stmentscontingent solely
on the safeguards provided private investors -as I heard Senator breftter
suggest in a recent Town Hall program - and,ifwe isist upon.sPecial
exploitative rights for our capital, then we will, -,11 effect?,be forcing
the borrowing countries to &pease between nationalterron the one side and
urgently needed foreign investment on the other. This may be :a good way' to
Ittsh these "emergent ," countries into isolation, bu- it hardly iieemsa4Nxi
way to ensure peace and economic progress in the bat kward regions. ? -
Thirdly, it seems to me that while we must tako account of the economic
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countries, the United States has a responsibility in terms of encouraging
sound regional specialization and freer world trade. These points are not
contradictory. It is a cinestAon of the type of internal development which
is encouraged. At the present time there is a great danger that almost
all of the "emergent" countries will be forced into pretty much the same
sort of internal economic development:looking to industries which require
a minimum of specialized skills and capital and a maximum of unskilled
hand labor, That may mean that a large part of the world will be going
into the same sort of industry - especially textiles) apparel, and cheap
consumer durables, generally encouraged by subsidies and high tariffs -
with little regard for comparative costs and advantage.
It is difficult to see how real levels of living can be raised throughout
the world without a relatively high degree of regional specialization and
international trade. It seems to MB that this can be realized only if the
United States, acting through U.N. and its specialized agencies, provides
a positive leadership backed by the type of aid which would encourage balanced
internal development and freer world trade. That is where boldness in the
"bold new program" seems to be called for.
MODERATOR TALBOT: We have heard several different analyses of the
position in South Asia, One suggests that current government plans are geared
to rush ferward madly in order just barely to keep up with increasing demands
and pressure)with never the certainty of success. Another sees the whole
area dissolving into anarchy, with the possibility either that anarchy will
remain or that strong governments may emerge. A third proposition is that
to accomplish social ends there may be severe repression of the people
and their purchasing power. .In terms of India and its program to attain
selfnufficiency in food that would mean, I suppose, measures strong enough
to hold to the course in spite of inevitable near-starvation.
The question is whether any government is strong.. enough to carry on such
a programa And finally, we are offered the prospect of possible new leader-
ship in the area, which, along with new technological developments, mightpro-
vide a new departure to meet the many pressing problems.
Iva. GINSBURG: I just want to make -one brief comment about the relevance
of historical studies, if you want to call them that, such as the one
Mr. Brodie has made. It seems to me that in looking backward one does not
necessarily eliminate' forward vision, When one looks back, say, to 1936,
he observes a picture of reality in space and time which provides etandards
from which to judge future developments. If trade is to be examined, this
reality must not only be in terms Of value trade, but atbo in terms of
commoditz. flaw.. An understanding of ETie how of -conmoiities is necessary,
it seems to Ms, in order to have some sound standards for dealing with the
future,.
From this area alone - I refuse to call it a region because I don't
.think-there is anything regional about it in 1936, the year Mr-..Brodie.chose,
-there were close to nine million long-tons of goods moving to Japan alone.
In this discussion no one Idlus far has suggested that those nine million
tons cf goods have to be accounted for somewhere. It is true that prices
and 9Tport values have more than doubled, but what has happened to all the
production which was exported at that time?
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My argument therefore is that in planning and making predictions for
the future it is necessary to make detailed quantiaitive examinations of
trade in terms of commodity flow on which policy jidgments can be based.
HR. KONRAD BEKKER (Department of State): I wart to add'a 'thought to
Professor Schultz's remarks about capital formatioa in Southeast Asia. I
have been trying to estimate the extent of possiblal capital formation not
for India because in India postwar conditions may lave changed considerably
as compared with prewar conditions. Limiting myse'l to the other countries
of Southeast Asia, I think it would be a mistake t, guess at the extent
of possible capital formation by looking at the inliVidual peasant and
asking, "How much can this man save out of his pre6ent censumption?" It
would be a much more meaningful approach, if we loiked aCthe surplus that
he actually did produce in the past and asked ourslaresWhather he is still
capable of producing that.
would like to submit that there is no reaso
in Southeast Asia is less capable today of produci
level than it was before the war. There is no cieu
which is over-populated in terms of arable land.
didtricts, such as Java, but none of the countries
over-populated. To make the comparison with India
over 40 percent of the area is cultivated, in the
leas than 10 percent of the area iscultivated. A
trade figures the countries of Southeast Asia in 1
million more goods than they imported. We would f
any previous or subsequent year.
:1 to think that any country
lg exports on the Prewar
atry in Southeast Asia
:here are overpopulated
taken as units is
in India, I believe'?
remainder of Southeast Asia
cording to Mr. Brodie's
:436 exported about $370
had a similar surplus in
I don't think we can simply assume that there was a capital influx
into Southeast Asia before the war because there w re foreign holdings.
Foreign holdings increased from about $1 billion in 1900 to about $4- or
$5biion right before the war, and at the sand) tame the area had an export
su7pLils of omri $10 billion. I wnuld suggest that we would have a fair .
me 3,f the pueail)ilities,of local capital formation during the prewar
periaat at prewar prices if we took the $10 billion export sarplus and added
them to the $3- or $4 billion capital increment, sA that we should double
the total of $I3 or $14 billion for the 40 years 'in order to have a fair
measure of possible capital formation in postwar p -ices. I realise that
I may be speaking entirely out of turn here in injlicting a note of cheer.
MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest t .at this could be done,
but it reauires an incredible brand of ruthless dt tator in each country
in taking it out of the hides of the people.
MR. BEKKER: It is happening in the Philippin,s and in Siam l Burma
has a rice surplus in spite of internal chaos; if -here were no warfare: in
Indochina there would be a very large surplus ther right now., I have no
reason to doubt that if the surplus were not immedaately as high as before
Uhe' war, it might become as high very rapidly becaase there is no other
possible use for surplus rice, rubber and copra thn export.
MR. HOLLAND: Surely there was also tht eleme. t of managerial Ability
supplied mostly by foreigners who in many cases ar, not there any more. This
factor will take time and to reOi4eate. Evfntually it can be done
and India is a good place to show that.
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The other point, and here I would support the general idea that
Bekker began with, is that there are great possibilities of creating c.apAtal
by the drastic method of forcibly curtailing consumption. One might say
that the sterling balances of India today are simply a congealed form of forced
savings which were imposed on the Indian masses by the somewhat high-handed
methods of government purchasing which the British and Indian governments
followed during the war years, but that does involve a degree of dictatoluship,
if you like, or centralized and rather ruthless management, of continuing to
take it out of the hides of the people in order to acquire more capital in
a wy which we have not seen successfully practiced except in Russia, and
only there at the price of famine and extreme hardship.
MR. HOSELITZ: It was taken out
out of the Germans and the Frenchmen
century. The bulk of capital is not
in the backward countries; the bulk
of the people. It may be unpleasant
of the Englishmen in the "Hungry Forties'
and everybody else in the later 19th
accumulated by being imported, not even
of capital is taken out of the hides
but it is true.
MR. SCHULTZ; I would add this note, that the British studies on three
centuries leave no doubt about starvation in Britain and hunger and mal-
nutrition through this period, the counterpart of which you see in some
of these countries you are talking about. So the parallel should not be
lost, It is true that one pays for the accumulation of capital when
you do an industrialization job.
MR, WRIGHT: I suppose if the United States saves more to increase its
capital stook some people would have to get along with one cocktail a day
instead of two. When people are down to the level that the Indians are,
saving must be taken out of the hides of the people. Increasing the capital
stock may mean that millions will starve to death. It is a method of
slaughtering the population.
MR. BEUBENS: I think there is one element in the qconamies of these
oriental countries that we have not been stressing enough when we discuss
the problem of capital formation in these countries. That is the extent
of under-employment. While each country is now carrying its total population
at its current level of subsistence, very little of that population is
fully emp3oyed. That means that it would be possible by a gradual and
careful transfer of population to continue to support that population with
the same total amount of consumption goods, -- food, clothing and everything
else -- at the same time that you would be freeing substantial numbers of
persons for employment in other productive activities. The people left in
agriculture would be more fully employed on the land which is available, and
the people who have been transferred are now partly or fully employed in
net additional activity.
The kind of net additional activity which can be undertaken depends on
whether the countries select those activities which require chiefly human
labor or those which are thoroughly bound up with imported capital equip-
ment. If imported capital equipment is required, there is of course the
balance-of-payments problem again, with its twin pressures for foreign
borrowing and domestic capital formation. But if people are put to work
on things such as irrigation ditches, swamp drainag0 or secondary roads --
primarily manual labor for which there is very little need of imported
capital _eouipment YOU WI 1
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an increase increase in amount of production available for subsistence or other uses,
and specifically an increase in the yield of agriculture. Therefore it
seems to me that the existence of under-employment in these countries
indicatesatleast-one area into which planning oeght toga, especially
in the early stages. el' development: .namely, concentration:on those kinds
of activities-whieh will divert people from.their present employment to .
those kindsfef employment, where, they can:befmoreqroductive and not require
a lot of'capitallAomestio or foreign.
, MR. FURNIVALL: I regret that, after.listenirgto this discussion, .I
feel depressed I agree with almost everything.that has been said with .
regard to the difficulty of-promoting welfare.in rural areas. It seems to
be rather generally agreed that the best way is through agricultural
improvement. And I,entirely agree that, in Burma and neighbouring countries,
any industrialization must be gradual. You haven't the men, you haven't
the money, you haven't thq;know-howi youcan't build Up industry rapidly
on a large scale. But-it_seems: to have.been assumed throughout the whole
proceedings that it was .,quite easy-tO. improve agri:ulture. It's not.
'
Consider agricultural mechanizatien.__About tairty years ago some .Burman
friends of mine with large holdings of riceland ir Lower Burma were experi-
menting in agricultural. machinery and there. have been several experiments
since then. But nooneihascenaged to make a succe5s of it in rice cultiva-
tion, which,i4, the important crop in Lower Burma, The presentTirector
of Agriculture is quite. convinced .that the introdurtion of machinery will
pay. But the only use ler agricultural machinery- in Lowar:.Burma is on
certain flooded areas before the monsoon rains. If yatLare -going to use
your tractor only for a month or two once a year it is not a practical
proposition.
consider fertilizers, some people seel to take it for granted
that fertilizers,would.be profitable. In Burma du-ing.the past year or two
the Agricultural Departmenthas,been.very keen on Yushing fertilizers. But
the question is: will fertilizers pay? Before the war it wet found that
fertilizers would not pay, that on the price of fe:tilizers compared with
the profit they were not a paying proposition. -inderstand that at-the
present priee.eC paddy-one.should' get a profit,frot them. :
.1
(.)ne finds so many of these schemes,recommende
are boosted for a year or two as a great. success.
go back to the older methods. Two or three times
deep plowing in Burma was an excellent thing, and
been found that, after all, the old systemmas the
same experience in other agricultural qimprovenent
improvement of agriculture is -a very difficult pro
t by agricultural scientists
But before long theY -
_t hasIbeen announced that
111 each occasion it has
best. ,There has been the
.." The mere technical
iosition.
Then another obstacle is that any improvement must fit in with the whole
social arrangements. You may find that a particulz method of cultivation-
would be suitable on your experimental farm. But _t may not fit in with
the water supply or.vith.the labor apply. You ha-e-ta fit-in your.improve-
ments with,the social life of the place or else chenge the .social life to
fit your agrioultural Omprovements..
Then?when you have found.tmt thatmachinery w 11 pay, or that ferti-
lizers willo
oav the problem is...hole-to liat
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have long been on order in Burma. Every time I inquire about them I am told
"they are coming next month." It is very mach the same with fertilieers,
I remember the Director of Agriculture placed a large order for fertilizers
and after long delay got enough to treat one field for a week Just at
present there are practical difficulties in importing such goods. That is
only temporary and can be overcome.
But the fundamental obstacle is how to make the people want these
improvements. They will adopt any improvement that pays them. I have seen
new crops expanding all over the country simply because they were a few
rupees more profitable. Only show cultivators that they can get a price for
new crops and they will adopt them.
The most striking example in Burma was the introduction of peanuts.
In one district when I was quite a junior officer, there were only some
800 acres under peanuts; within three or four years the area had grown
to over 10,000 and within less than ten years to over 100,000. You have
only got to show cultivators that they can really make a profit out of some
new crop or improvement and it will spread like wildfire. But it is
difficult to make new crops or methods really profitable.
In Malaya the Agricultural Department claimed to have increased the
yield of paddy by 30 percent, and this was going to bring up the area
under paddy by hundreds of thousands of acres; but during the next three
years the area under rubber rose and the area under paddy fell. The
increase of 30 percent may have been obtained on the experimental farm,
but I doubt whether cultivators really got their 30 percent increase on
their riceland or they would not have preferred to grow rubber.
The other day I happened to come across an old Season and Crop Report
for Burma which said that a new variety of sezame had been tested and yielded
ten baskets an acre; usually the yield is three or four baskets an acre.
With ten baskets of sesame an acre you would have had a great part of Burma
cultivated with sesame; but in a few years' time one heard no more about
that ten-basket yielding sesame. Experts, not only in Burma but elsewhere,
are apt to make extravagant claims for their inventions, but these do not
give such good results in farming practice.
Another instance. A Burman in the Agricultural Department pereuadsd
the people in his area to grow a new variety of tomato. This gave a very
much larger yield than they had had. before. But the flavor of this new
variety though very much liked by Europeans, was not liked by Burmans.
There were no Europeans to buy the crop and Burmans wouldn't buy it. So,
while they got a larger yield, it did not pay them.
Another case was where the Director of Agriculture promised that
cultivators would make an extra five rupees a hundred baskets for a new
variety of paddy. He got SOMB people to grow the. new paddy on those
terms, When the crop came to the market it was discvered that the mills
would have to readjust their machinery to mill this particular variety,
and the quantity available did ig:it justify the trouble and. eypenee. So
the cultivators got less for this crop instead of getting five rupees ?
per hundred baskets extra.
What I am trying to suggest is that the solution to the improvement Of
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agriculture is to make it pay better by improving -
is a very difficult problem. And.you have not onk
stents give larger yields or better prices, but you
the people who grow the crop, who do the work, wile
profit. If a tenant is only going to hold his lane
any increase goes to the landlord in the form of r
to adopt new crope or methods. But if you can trial
cultivator gets an extra profit, thd.problem of Ism
be solved straight away:.
he market, and that this
to insure that improve-
have got to insure that
themselves make the .
for a year or two and
at, it doesn't pay him
re that the actual
roving agriculture will
That is the difficutee that one encounters ev rywhete, but it is the
kind of thing-where:ca-tiperakive research throughoet south Asia should
yield very valuable This problem of impr
interested me 'for several years in Burma, bet what
country? 0,1e learns * the difficulties but not how
international co-operatinn, by some regional arran
at the solution. That is why the discussion rathe
seemed to me that peOple thought it was easy to im
It's not, It is very difficult indeed.
And still more eepeossing was what seemed to
that all these people were tremendously anxious tc
living rasIsed% When you talk about raising the et
do yoa 1W:a by iS? Do you mean more schools? Do
going cronl making the parents send theirchildre
do you :rna.71 by 'oetter hygiene? Do you mean that r
officele shah _ take a few rupees not to see that
to be theee, and all that kind of thing? That is
one is up against when trying to raise-the standar
in the improvement of agriculture, in the imprcver,
problett of ireproving social welfare is to make the
want t,?'e Lame ?cind of thing that we do; they want
better healtil, Bit, as suggested yesterday, n_y-
w'nat thhy ought to want and that the;/ ot
I made that remark yesterday and it has occurred t
this ateernoon,
Aing agriculture has
can. be A6he'in'one small
eo selyethem, By
;?me one one tight arrive
e depressed me; it
irove'tropical agriculture.
ie the generaiaseumption
have their standard of
indard of-living, what
eou mean more inspectors
1 to school? Again what
7re Sulo,ordinate health .
iomething that ought not
he kind of problem that
I of living. Just as
Int of production, the
people want it. They
more money, they want
too apt to asseme that
sht to want what we want.
D mi .two or three times
On the problem of getting people to want these things; I have had some
practical personal experience of it because at one time T was interested in
adult queation,in Burma: Everyone was intensely and enthusiastically in
agreemnt that other people should be better edneeted,.but they were quite
content without any better eJatien inemselve ihose are the little
practical problems, the techneel prchlems, the fendamental problems that
we are faced with in raisiee tee &eneral standardU
Another point has occurred to me with referee
1 quite agree that capital is needed in Burma and
agree that it should not be impossible to raise es
If a tenant can pay ten baskets or fifteen baekete
acre to the landlord and if he ha a to pay ).00 rlip4.
and you relieve him of rent and debt of course he
For the last fifty years Burma has been exporting
that it imported. If it is said that these are p
I must differ. When I started learning economics i was told that the
exports of every country pay for its imports and eherefore surplus exports
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cc to the "Hungry Forties."
elsewhere and I quite
pital in the country.
or t-47erty baskets an
es or so to the money-lend'
will have mcney to save,
about double the amount
renciered,
7men4;s rj services
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simply represented invisible imports, Bilt in Barna Indian money ler,6.cr:-;
were acquiring land and remitting to India the paddy they received.aF, rent,
What invisible imports came in return for it? It is the .sate with other ?
forms of profit accruing to foreigners, If Burma and Other countries
do not export so much rent and profit, :there will be margin for saving,
for capital formation. So I agree with the people who have said that it
should-be possible to raise local capital.
There is another matter thatdeserves attention with reference to the
"Hungry 'Forties". I haven/t heard anyone remark that at that time there
Was a very restricted franchise in England. Now there is adult suffrage in
Burma and a good many parts of the East, and the people would have a good
deal to say. If working men in England during the "Hungry 'Forties" had
been able to vote, I think they would not have been quite content to be so
hungry. And at that time there wasn't the ILO going around and saying,
very largely ?I fear in the interest of trade unions in England, that these
people. have got to have all sorts of luxuries that they don't want. It is
not wholly the trade unions. In Burma people are only too ready to adopt
any kind of welfare project that is recommended as the most up-to-date
practice in America or England. They put it on the statute books and
pay officials to ran it, quite regardless of the fact that many of these
reforms, although very suitable and necessary for advanced industrial
countries, are simply a waste of money for agricultural countries.
In these fundamental difficulties, not only here but too generally,
it is the simple things that We are apt to overlook We are not likely
to solve all our problems in this conference, but it is only by e'-.opera-
tive endeavour,as in the discussion we are having here and tn local
regional co-operation, that we are likely to find soluti7ns- And I do think
we want to bear in mi64 the practical difficulties that undj:rlie the large
problems to which so many of us have addressed so much of our attention
this afternoon,
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you, Mr. Furnivall. Dr. Piplani wants to
make a comment.
MR. PIPLANT: Mr. Furnivall's speech contained much of the positive and
the negative. I agree with certain points he has made about ILO and about '
the possibilities Of internal capital formation through internal reforms
and all that, but by and large I am convinced that I am not so conservative
as I have been made out to be after listening to Mr. Furnivall's speech
because I do not agree with what he has said about the technological possi-
bilities in agriculture. Mr. FurnivalLtalks from thirty years of expeance
of a food exporting country. Agricultural technological developments are
difficult but they are not impossible. I will give you a few concrete
examples.
In India we are importing about 150,000 tons of ammonium sulphate annually,
allotted to us through the International Emergency Food. Ccancil. We do
the diaribution, We have been constructing indigenous wells, 10,000 a year,
and now tube wells; recently we have started a very large program of land
reclamation The United States crawlers left over thee were converted,
repaired, and they are working now, and during the last six months 40,000
acres of absolutely new land have been cleared with the help- of that machinew.
We are crying for more of that type of machinery. The program is two million
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acres of land reclamation from jungle lands, and folr million acres of reclama-
tion of weed-infested land that was previously in cativation but owing to
a number of reasons has gone out of cultivation. Ine same kind of work is
going on in Pakistan.
Having worked with these production schemes, nj own belief is that the
problem is simply one of administration and policy. if a country is driven
by large economic considerations, of balance of payment and other considera-
tions, you just have to do it.' It is,asmatter of subsidies to the people
who do the actual work.
MR. FURNIVALL: I quite agree that 'irrigation aakes it possible .to
extend cultivation, but I was inviting 'attention tc the improvement of
cultivation. We have not got the ammonium sulphatE, and other fertilizers;
it appears that fertilizers would now pAy in Burta but we canit get them.
;ou are lucky with your sulphates. Mb haVenit got anyone quite so high up
and have been unable to get hold of them. We have a huge areain the delta
that has relapsed 'into jungle during the war and wtich cannot, be brought
under cultivation xdept by large-scale' operations, but we cannot, obtain
the necessary machinery. Here again you have been fortunate:.
I don't say that youcan't extend cultivation by irrigation and
reclamation. In that way you may bring another mi) lion so acres under
cultivation but I Was Chiefly concerned to- Stress the difficulty of
improving agriculture on the twenty or more minder acres that have already'
been under Cultivation.
MODERATOR TALBOT: With no feeling whatsoever that we have completed
the subject, I Will close this session of the Harris Institute, ekpecting
to see all of you this evening at Mandel Hall.
The conference adjourned at 5:20 P M
_ ? ? ? ?
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THE NOPMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia.
IV
CULTURAL FACETS OF SOUTH ASIAN REGIONALISM *
Cora DuBois
The cultural factors making for, or impeding, South Asian rapproche-
ment should, I am sure, in your minds as it does in mine, suggest a scholar
of great amplitude -- a person versed in Hinduistic, in Sinitic and in
Islamic cultures. I can claim not one of these aptitudes; much leas the
neeessary three.
My only possible. escape from this dilemma is to give culture the
meaning usually ascribed to it by my fellow professionals, the anthro-
pologists, and therefore to consider my topic not as a cultural one in
the narrow sense of the word but rather as an evaluation of some of the
forces, traditional and current, in the South Asian scene which may work
for or against the formation of regional ties. Since political and
economic factors are to be stressed by other speakers, they are to a
large extent delibertitely omitted. Also, it should be stressed that I
am not attempting to discuss the area as an anthropologist applying the
concepts current in this discipline. This, I am afraid, would serve
only to revealcmr ignorance of the area and to open up research problems
rather than to provide an appraisal of such meager data as we now possess.
Social and cultural forces operating for or against the formation of
a South Asian regional rapprochement might be considered in terms of
historic depth. We might consider in turn the animistic tribal substrata
of the region, the early historical period of Hindu cultural expansion,
the later period of Islamic influences, and finally the period of European
expansion in its earlier mercantile phase and its later colonial admini-
strative phase.
It is my personal conviction, however, that the modern world is less
well understood in terms of systematic chronology than by a selection of
conflicting forces to which historic depth is then added.
Southern Asia comprises for our purposes this evening that vast area
of the world from the sub-continent of India to the Philippines. In the
grosses cultural terms this region can be divided into the following groups:
the Hindu bloc of India; the Buddhist bloc of Ceylon, Burma, Siam and
Indochina; and the broken Moslem bloc of Pakistan, Malaysia,and Indonesia.
On the western periphery lies Pakistan and on the eastern periphery is the
Philippine archipelago.
LeCtAsprOalirorrlefetadiaN61/NW': Mi510i0Onlithoo,M0Cliooge69.
-10C-
ItPfpizinvpstE2-E etfEd2(119MAR4 i-a513[Ifi8t-9?09AVPIR441131Neg9more
heterogeneous group of great cultures flourish. Cie is hard pressed to
discover a single consistency throughout the area.
1 shall therefore discuss the differences witein the area. These are
grossly apparent. But as each difference is raisei, I shall attempt to
assess the degree to which it is an important divi3ive force and what
counter-forces of unity may also be discovered witi the context bf the
difference. .
Geographically, the region varies from the ecu-arid interior of India
to the lush tropical islands of Indonesia. Yet it lies predominantly within
the monsoon belt. The formal transportation facilities of the type studied
by strategists form no binding network between the countries of Southern
Asia.
Nevertheless the very logic of geography help3 to bind together this
region which protrudes on three sides into vast ocean areas and which is
hampered to the north by mountains and /angle from direct and easy access
to China. There is therefore aecertain geographic pressure to turn inward.
Racially, the Caucasian Indians and the predoeinantly veengoloid peoples
of the rest of the area are members of two_distince stocks. In addition
there are innumerable minor racial variants of the 3e main themes. Race,
likeegeography, is.not strictly speaking within th purview .of this evening's
discussion but attitudes toward racial differences are legitimately within
our scope. First of all, we must be careful not t project Euro-American
attitudes toward racial difference 6 upon the peopls of South Asia. Ethnic
particularism does exist. but these peoples have no rationalized their
prejudices in terms of. body forms. 'Therefore the earietiesof pnysique, have
not yet been used to.express.antagonisme' The raciet virus of Europe has so
far infected the region only minimally. I:would n )t predict that racial
prejudices will not develop. But if they do, 'I suspect thatethey may be
directed toward whites and possibly toward the Chinese in the area., rather
than toward each other. Racism, like all symbol formations, has a quality
of irrationality. Just as we.are full of inconsiseencies'in this respect,
so I would expect thateSouth Asians might learn to dislike'whites, but
not the light Indians; or to abhor the Chinese but not.the mongoloid Siamese.
There is no use to speculate at this juncture on sech an unpleasant
contingency. It is useful, however, to point out ehat the marked physical
diversities observable :among the inhabitants of Southern Asia have not
yet been used to rationalize antagonism which may be reoted elsewhere in
social relationships.
Linguistically the.variations in Southern Asi. exceed those commonly
faced even in Europe. The Indo-European and Dravidian languages of India
alone profoundly divide that sub-continent. That variation is further
emphasized by varying scripts. As we progress eastward into Southeast
Asia basic linguistic stocks multiply. Burma, Sian, Indochina and Indonesia
are divided between at least two linguistic families: Sinitic .and Malayo-
Polynesian. These profound language differences aee furthercomplicated by
a borrowing of scripts which bear no relation to Linguistic families. Just
as national entities may bear no relationship to lenguisticolassification
-- as in trilingual Switzerland -- so writing in ScaithernAsia cuts across
languages. Siamese, for instance, which is related to-Chinese, is none the
less written, not ideographically like Chinese, bue in-gAnodified phonetic
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script like like the totally unrelated languages of India, The Melayo-Polynesian
language of the Malay Peninsula is written in an alphabet devised for a
Semitic language..
South Asia, unlike Europe, therefore has no highway to easy linguistic
communication. In England or Italy -- a minimal knowledge of the structure
of your own language will cut a wide swathe in learning cognate European
tongues. On the other hand, a knowledge of Hindi is no entree to Siamese,
Annameae or Malay. To acquire these additional languages means entrance
into a wholly new world of linguistic order and concepts as well as of
vocabulary. There are, however, some words of Sanskrit origin which have
spread throughout the region.
These traditional linguistic barriers were reemphasized to a lesser
degree in the European languages introduced during the colonial period.
English, French, Dutch,- Spanish, Portuguese, and of course Chinese have
all had varying impacts on the region, The postwar leaders of Southern
Asia are fully cognizant of the problems they face. They realise that if
reason were to dictate the answer, English might well provide a common
medium of communication., It is of course already the most widely known
second language of the region and has been the chief medium of communi-
cation in conferences like the Inter-Asian Relations Conference in 1947, the
New Delhi Conference on Indonesia in 1949, and in such international
bodies as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Far East.
However, whatever rational judgments the leaders may hold, there is never
any insurance that reason will prevail where national sentiments are
concerned. Peoples in the throes of developing national status are forced
frequently to relay upon citation and conviction, to summon traditional
symbols, rather than to depend upon the cooler virtue of reason and
efficiency.
Nevertheless, it is perhaps indicative of the present direction that
the eagerness to learn English among the young people of Indonesia since
the war has been frequently commented upon. Their remarkable success
is equally praised. In the Philippines, the attempt to iitroduce Tagalog
as a national language in the schools seams well on its way to being
forgotiOn. In Bangkok there is talk of teaching English in the Buddhist
monasteries devoted to advanced training for the monkhood.
The widespread desire to attend American schools and learn American
know-how may also help to swing the area as a whole toward English.
Furthermore, the difficulty, the cost, and time required to translate
textbooks in South Asian languages has already proved a real obstacle.
This is particularly true in rapidly dhanging scientific subjects. When
Urdu was made the official language of Hyderabad, teaching in Urdu at
Osmania University was required. The cost aid difficulties of providing
texts alone was a clear demonstration of the practical problems involved
in shifting to another language. Despite the use of Urdu as the official
language for over 20 years, English was still used for teaching plarposes
in technical subjects.
Thus the very 'veal barrier to intra-regional linguistic communication
may be overcome by the adoption of a common second language which may well
be Engleish.
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And on the subject of education we have anoth,r factor to consider.
Where are South Asians to turn today for the advanced work in technical
disciplines that they realize they SQ urgently need? Certainly'the US
has much to offer in this respect, but our college3 are crowded, d011ars
are in short supply, and local.tvaining is often inadequate t9 meet the
adraae.. requirements of our geaduate and undergradeate schools. Parene
thetically I should like to iescet that the hope that our large univer-
sities would apply themselves to this problem n)t only in term of
fellowships but also in special courses and special counselling, perhepS
in their extension services, so that there might be provided 'an additional
preliminary year to compensate for deficiencies it subject and language
training. Simultaneously the new arrivals might s.rve as assistants in
departments of oriental languages, el' anthropology, of .sociology or in
Far Eastern area programs.
In any event, many South Asians will have .to gratify' their desires
for advanced training in lees expensive and more accessible institutions.
India and the Philippines offer the most promising opportunities, no that
Japan and China are no longer in the running., But these two countries
also have their problems. In both countries .higher educational
institutions are overcrowded, .and understaffed. In India, housing and
dietary restrictions are often additional,difficuleies. In the new
quarters of the University of the Philippines at Elliman the lodel
disorders are a source of concern. In addition, tee high exchange rate
of the Philippine peso offers difficulties In Baeavia the Indopesiahs
are boycotting for political 'reasons competent put.:11 faculties.. The
scientific facilities of Indochina are inaccessible and deteriorated.'
The Siamese faculties are inhibited by local difficulties both political
and economic, yet Bankkok'has a good school of agriculture and might
attract South Asian students. Civil War has tempeparily closed down
the University of Rangood.. The new University of eal.aya is only now
beginning to take shapeleut the Medical. Scheol has a good reputation and
. ?
vigorous leadership.
Despite handicaps it seems probable that Indiee and the Philippines and
eventually Singapore may come nearest to offering entra-regional facili-
ties for advanced education dild that Seuth Asian seudents willehave more
opportunities to know each othr in the .future than they have had an the
past. In fact, there has recently been establishei a Southeast Asia '
Association at the University of Manila,which.compeises Philippine,
Siamesel-KOreane Chinese, Indonesian, Malayan and Indian students.
Everywhere one turns, differences and difficulties are of the essence
in Southern Asia; Yet for each difference and difficulty some small
countering symptom can be, discovered if one is determined to find it.
As. I have previouslyeindicatede the recent colonial experiencesof,--
Southenn Asia have served in many ways to emphasize Old differences abs1:
develop new ones.
The nine major countries of Southern Asia todar in at least the last
four centuries have axperienced the expansive impac, of eight nations
whose cultures and pattern of colonization were as iifferent as those of
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, England, he United States,
China, and most recently, Japan. During the last cintury alone these
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South Asian countries have been tied-by separate:dords to distant and
different nations. India, Pakistan, Burma, and Malaysia through varied
channels have been oriented to the United Kingdom, Indochina to France,
Indonesia to Holland, and the Philippines to Spain and the United States.
The wipsternizing influences, the lanauages in which these influences have
been transmitted, and the inetitutional and administrative forms which have
been introduced have been not only varied but have profoundly altered the
indigenous cultures and often subtly diversified the direction of the
countries to which they were applied. Land could be preserved for the
local cultivator, transferred to foreign enterprise, or lost to immigrants
from other Asian areas'. New occupations emphasized the coolie rows of
plantation agriculture, the urbanization of factory work, the profits
of money lending and of small enterprise. It everywhere undercut, but
did not entirely eliminate, traditional artisans. Legal systems might
be based on Roman, on common or on local customary law. The Dutch, for
example, were particularly scrupulous in their study and observance of
native customary laW. The diversity and complexity of these varying legal
systems has done much to preserve ethnic differances among the Indonesian
peoples. Despite instances of this sort, traditional behavior and needs
have not everywhere in Southern' Asia been profoundly revolutionized.
Nowhere, however, did they go unscathed. The countries of Southern Asia
for over a century have experienced a profound ferment and an ever
accelerating rate of change, but each nation has been manipulated by a
different puppeteer. Thus, the indigenous leaderships which developed
were oriented to several different European nations and not toward each
other. Before the war it was the rare Indian leader who knew Bangkok
or Batavia as well as he knew London or Paris. The educated Indonesians
were better acquainted in the Hague than in Saigon or Rangoon.
However, to counterbalance slightly, but only slightly, this type
of division) another- Asian nation, Japan, has mostrecently appeared on
the scene and gave great impetus to that desire to turn toward each other
which we now find in Southern Asia today. The Japanese military occupation
aftdedte fillet reasonably consistent administrative overlay which
Southeast Asia, at least had experienced. Peoples were moved by the hun-
dreds of thousands from their traditional home environments. The overt '
aspects of westernization made marked advances under the Japanese But
most importantly Japan fathered ideas and slogans which took root, however
much the Japanese themselves came to be disliked. Asia for the Asiatics,
the Co-Prosperity Sphere are ideas which had deep appeal even though the
Japanese interpretation was repugnant. Ever since 1_90 travelers in
Southern Asia who have interviewed the leaders of national movements report
consistently the interest these leaders express in each other and the
problems they are mutually facing, Taruc inquires about Ho Chi-Minh;
Pridi is interested in Sjahrir; Nehru wished to meet Soekarno and Hatta;
Datu Onn wantedto know what manner of men lead the Philippine Republic.
Just before the outbreak of World War II, Romulo mentioned the
desirability 'of a Pan-Malayan League. Even earlier, the Indonesian
Communist, Tan Malakka, propounded his regional union which he called
Aslia since Australia Was also to be included. A short-lived unofficial
association called the Southeast Asia League Was established in Bangkok
in 1947 with a Central Executive Committee consisting Of Siamese, Vietnamese,
'Laotians, Cambodians, Malaya and Indonesians.
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In January of this year nineteen Asian nationE gathered in New Delhi
to support -- within the framework of the United Nations -- the cause of
the Republic of Indonesia. Romulo conferred with lehru during these
meetings and, subsequently, at Lake Success, gave leadership to those UN
nations which had participated in the Delhi meetinf.
It was the young Burman leader, Aung San, who has been credited with
first suggesting the Asian Relations Conference which was finally held at
New Delhi in 1947 by invitation of the Indian Council fdr World Affairs.
Nehru in the inaugural address of that Conference etressed the isolation
of Asian nations during the period of imperialism etating that the
countries of Asia even culturally looked toward Europe "and not to their
own friends and neighbours from whom they had dwrived so much in the past."
He then continued with his usual eloquence, "Today this isolation is
breaking down. ...the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each
other again and meet as old friends long parted." It appears therefore
that the separatism of the colonial era is betng coMbatted consciously and
and actively by the new leaders of South Asia.
I should like to add that the leaders of Southern Asia, preoccupied
as they are with internal difficulties, are showini, if not a powerful, at
least an unprecedented, interest in their common problems.
It was this sense of common problem which seared to dominate the minds
of some two hundred and thirty delegates from twenty-eight Asian nations
who gathered at the Asian Relations Conference. It also dictated the
organization of the Round Table discussions.
Obviously political freedom and the ratiomaization of their economies
took a high place. Since these do not come within the scope of this paper,
I shall confine myself to listing briefly some of he social and cultural
questions which were discussed. Although these questions by no means
represent the full array of common problems, they nevertheless are of
particular interest as a guide to the preoccupatiors of the Asians themselves.
In the field of education the desire for adeqeate scientific research
and equipment was stressed but largely in terms of pracedcel needs for a
-competent technical corpa. The need as I have already indicated is indeed
urgent, The Tee!"nieal AerAstance Program suggestse in the President's
inaugural addreen hee aroused expectations in. South Asia that it behooves
us to implement quickly before the opportunity is Lost to us,
The vast illiterecy of the region which rangee from 90 percent in
Indonesia to 51 perent in the Philippines was nen-ion:1d, and hopeful
suggestions were made by various delegates fer guidance from the USSR
which has reportedly done so much so quickly in .eeeecing adult illiteracy.
So far as I know, the USSR has not responded to these appeals,
The status of. women was a vigorously discussed topic although their
status was.clesely linked with the need for social seryicep including
tedical care, puhlic health and housing. Such programs,. if4mpleMented,
should reduce death ratee. Since it has been estimated that birth rates
are in any event at the maximum biologic level. a decrease in death rates
could mapOseierdeFeareRsilepasee2002/07/24relaPeeRDAS6t091264001.001MONP
nothing short of catastrophic unless technological and social adaptations
are made along many lines quickly and simultaneously.
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Lastly, the Asian Relations Conference was seriously concerned with
what it termed Racial Problems and Inter-Asian Migrations. Essentially
this was the problem of the Overseas Chinese, although migrant Indians
were also mentioned with some acrimony by the Burmese delegation. We have
so far made no mention of this facet of South Asian regionalism, yet it is
an important one. The overseas Chinese in the area number some 6 million.
They have been singularly impervious to acculturation and tenaciously loyal
to political issues in their homeland. In addition they have been on the
whole more adaptable to the European economic demands than many of the
indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia. Need I add that they are widely dis-
trusted and often disliked. The dangers of a serious minority problem
are real and recognized by the leadership of the southern countries. The
recent turn of political events in China cannot have lessened their
concern.
Despite these discussions of common problems, it is true, of course,
that the leaders of South Asia are today greatly preoccupied with the
tremendous internal difficulties facing their own countries. Leadership is
limited and must spread itself thin. And lastly these emergent nations
are naturally sensitive about the dignity of their countries. Nevertheless,
when these countries turn outward I would expect them to be enthusiastically
international in their foreign relations. There are many reasons for this
supposition. For one thing, political nationalism in Southern Asia is not
an indigenous growth of many centuries as it is in Europe but a recently
imported concept whose principal dynamic has been, or still is, resistance
to political and economic exploitation. Secondly, the weakness of these
emergent nations would also suggest affiliation with the outer world.
And lastly, the national aspirations of Southern Asia are appearing on the
international forum in a period of history which has tacitAy admitted that
at least aggressive nationalism is -- or should be -- moribund. The
United Nations is an experiment in reducing rampant individualism among.
nations. Regionalism is in the air. As for Communism -- whatever its
immediate tactical gains from the encouragement of nationalism in
underdeveloped areas -- it is fundamentally international in philosophy,
and wherever possible in practice, anti-nationalistic -- at least for
non-Soviet countries.
EVen tactically the USSR has vacillated during the past year and a half
in the kind of national aspirations and national leaders it will support in
Southern Asia. This vacillation reinforced by the successes of Communist
China have revealed to moderate South Asian leaders more clearly than ever
the dangers of Stalinist Communism and the Wisdom of seeking common support.
The unpopularity of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia may afford addi-
tional support to consolidation. There is some evidence that Thakin Nuls
government inn.13u.rma may see some virtue in forgetting old grudges toward
the Indian chettyars in favor of closer contacts with the Government of
India.
However, if these emergent nations find themselves in a world which
demands that they take sides between two opponents, and that war will soon
be their lot, it seems to me that their impulse will be to say "a plague
ol both your houses" and that they will try to find their affiliations
among like minded neighbors. Soetan Sjahrir has already clearly expressed
this viewpoint and was supported in it by his Partai Sosialis Indonesia.
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It is not my function this evening to discuss political matters in
any detail, but since political forms are but one expression of cultural
forces I should like, very hesitantly, to make som3 suggestions concerning
the temper of religious philosophy in Southern Asil which I believe is
not totally unrelated a:also to the developments whieh can be anticipated
in its political forms.
I realize how vague and inaccurate are broad generalizations about so
heterogeneous an area. I confess the imprecision 3f phrases like religious
and philosophic temper. Nevertheless, for our purposes this evening it
seems to me that there may be some use in reminding you that the major
indigenous religious philosophies of the area have been characterized as
inclusive rather than exclusive.
The two great proselytizing religions, Christianity and Islam, are
essentially exclusive in mood. The Christian or Poslem must cling for his
salvation exclusively to his faith. The temper of Hinduism and Buddhism
is to absorb and reconcile differences of faith, rat banish them. In
Southern Asia there are approximately 230 million Hindus, 52 million
Buddhists, 163 million Moslems and 24 million Christians. The animists
probably outnumber Christians but these peoples, still essentially tribal
in their mode of life, represent only a series of disparate and minor
factors in the main stream of cultural forces now shaping Southern Asia.
In these figures members of the inclusive incigenous religions outnumber
members of the exclusive religions in a ratio of about 3 to 2. Further-
more, the weight of the Chriellan population lies in the eastern peri-
phery of the area in the Philippines while the wefght of the Yoslea
population is largely on the -1.-stern perphery of 'no .7.3son in Pakistan.
However,Idonesia which is so important in the Sotth Ar:ian region and in
which the Moslem faith is in the vast majority feems a solid Islamic bloc
in the center of the South Asian area. It should be meted, however, that
the Moslems of the Malayan world, faithful aw they are, neve less fanaticism
and austerity than the Arabs of the Moslem hearth and.
In addition to a considerable body of scholaely studies supporting
this thesis there is the conciliatory statement of: a Malayan delegate to
the Asian Relations Conference when discussing reaigious education in
schools. It was the Malayan delegate's opinion that the common principle
and points of agreement between all religions shoidd be stressed. Love
for the ultimate and the universal is the common basis of all Asian
religions, he said, and by pressing this point home it should be possible
to create mutual understanding. It is as though aong contacts with the
traditional Hinduistic and Buddhistic worlds had eomewhat softened the
edges of Moslem exclusiveness.
Furthermore, if we may judge from the writinas of recent great figures
in India -- the inclusive spirit of India, at leaet, is still strong.
Rabindranath Tagore has said that it was Indiats 3bligation to offer to
others the hospitality of her best culture and India's right to accept
from others their best. Sir Shri Ram in the Welceming address of the
Asian Relations Conference in 1947 said, "India ta particular....has been
an important meeting ground....of different cultures and has made her own
unique contribution in synthestzing seemingly antlgonistic cultures.
Where arcklE9giliclkostit21:M/DiMbtalA-REIRE1609926A00314QMItMet-en to
the local cultures, India has generally shown great tolerance to the element
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and allowed it to exist side by side, and survive, if survive it could,
on its awn merits."
Certainly in our survey of divisive forces in Southern Asia, the great
religious antitheses might seem an insuperable barrier to union. A super-
ficial glance at the recent communal riots of India might seem to reinforce
the impression that there can be no unity in such diversity. Yet with the
Pan-Islam movement moribund, with the renascent vigor of an inclusive
India, and with all the other factors we have and shall consider tonight,
it seems possible that the inclusive quality of indigenous faiths may
prevail. If this quality of inclusiveness should persist and succeed in
pervading the South Asian scene it may well affect national solutions also,
It has in fact been specifically voiced in respect to nationalism by Nehru
who said, "We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each
country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become
aggressive and COMB in the way of international development."
We have so far mentioned and weighed factors which are, at face value,
divisive. I should like to continue with a series of factors whose face
value is unifying. There is a complexly interwoven fabric of extremely
old traditional affiliations in the midst of the many divergencies of
Southern Asia. And I should like to stress at the outset that the admira-
tion for, as well as the strength and persistence of, tradition is greater
in Southern Asia than among ourselves. We have admired change and have given
it a positive value judgment which we 001 progress. The South Asian leaders
utile recognizing the need to adapt their countries to a Western dominated
world, have prized, but by no means slavishly, their own ancient and
consciously held values and are today ready to reemphasize traditional
cultural bonds. This emphasis is not phrased in terms of imperial aspira-
tions but in terms of mutuality. Let us examine briefly the nature of
these ancient bonds.
India, with the beginning of the Christian era, was expanding its
cultural influences in Southeast Asia. It carried the whole complex of
vigorous Hindu culture including Viehnuite, Sivaite and Buddhist cults
which flourished side by side or alternately in Burma, Siam, Cambodia
and Java. Although Buddhism today has all but disappeared in India, its
basic traditions, like those oeHinduism, has its roots in the Upanishads
and the more ancient Vedas. Traditional Indian epics, particularly the
Ramayanal hahabaratta, and Panchatantra are still part of the sacred and
folk resources from India to Bali. These themes and their heroes every
village child hears and sees in the folk drama and arts. Indifferently,
he stares them as a common Buddhist or Hindu tradition with the majority
of South Asians. Rabindranath Tagore said of Siam that it had preserved
what India lost. The aptness of the statement could be extended to all
the Hinayana Buddhist countries. And yet it is a statement of only partial
difference since through Buddhism the Southeast Asian peoples are firmly
rooted in the universalist philosophy which underlies diverse Hindu sects.
The spread of the Buddhist and of Hindu traditions was accompanied
by relatively small but profoundly influential movements of Indian
population. Traders settled on the coasts, married the daughters of local
chieftains and established dynasties of city states whose conquests and
whose decline constitute the historical chronicles of the region. It is
evident that not only the religious philosophies but also the architecture,
seulptiffloY81011gREtifilisIPIROVirttata,rlikeliDgE11600821BMID14000S0tratised.
For almost a millenium the mission eivilizatrice of Indian culture
dominated Southeast Asia. Under its influence these areas themselves
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developed philosophic schools greatly admired by (hinese scholars.
While India was continuously influencing these areas, the Indianized
states themselves launched on their imperial advertures. The Srivijaya
Empire of Sumatra in the eighth century extended fora time its suzerainty
over Cambodia. Kingdoms of East Java not only invaded Sumatra but in the
13th century twice raided Ceylon. The last of the great Javanese empires,
the Madjapahit of the fifteenth century, dominatec not only Sumatra and
Borneo but also the Malayan peninsula. Siam, Burma and Cambodia expressed
in their frequent wars keen awareness of each other. The first European
observers testify to the cosmopolitan character of the court of Ayuthia
in Siam where even Japanese mercenaries were to be found.
Although the historic contacts between Indianized states should not
be overstressed for their bearing on the modern s(ene, it is well to
remember chat such contacts have not ceased nor have the traditions they
left died out.
For example, Ceylon, although a Buddhist country, is not only culturally
and linguistically predominantly Indian, but at the same time maintains
its long intimate religious ties with the theocray in Burma and Siam.
A visit to any of the great shrines of Buddhism in these three countries
will testify to the extent of intra-regional pilvimages which still occur.
Treasures in the Temple of the Tooth at Kandy havii, been presented by devout
travelers from Burma and Siam.
Similarly Burma today is not only bound to Ceylon and Siam by
religious ties, but we must not forget that as recently as 1936 it was also
tied administratively to Indiatand that Indians flrmed a large if
unpopular minority in Burma.
It should also be remembered that there are 3ome 600,000 Indians in
Malaya; that many Jaffna Tamils from Ceylon served in clerical positions
in the Melyan civil service and that it is not uncommon to find Malay-
speaking Ceylonese in Ceylon today. In the Neilaynn speaking worldlIndian
immigraAs are still often called Orang Kling, a 3urvival of the name
Kalirga by which the people of Orissa were known -Alen, from the 3rd
century onward, they laid the foundations of Indian and Indianized States
in Southeast Asia, The Coronation formula of the Sultans of Perak is still
today in either Sanskrit or Pali undecipherably transcribed in Arabic
characters. The mythical genealogies of the present Sultans of Malaya
include account of Mt. Mahameru from Indian cosmclogy.
In the same fashion that the Moslem Malay aristocracy has created a
confused web of Hindu and Moslem traditional elereants so today the ties
between Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan cannot be severed by communal riots,
political structure and disputes,over Kashmir. The bonds are ancient as
well as modern. The Moslem tnvation of India began some 1200 years ago.
The British Raj fora time reinforced and extended political union. In
1949 the Commonwealth maintains it. Some 40 million Moslems still reside
in India and some 14 million Hindu are citizens of Pakistan.
Just as Buddhism, rooted in Hinduism, ties India to some of the Southeast
Asian countries so also Islam has become inextricably interwoven with
Hinduism and in addition helps to maintain at least Sympathies between the
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government of Pakistan and the predominantly Moslem peopleof Indonesia.
So also the Philippines, belonging as it doe in. its tribal roots and
linguiatic affiliations to the Malayan world, is nevertheless allied through
SOMB 800000 Moros of Mindanao to the Moslem tie-in between Indonesia
and Pakistan.
These intricately woven and intervoven threads of Hindu and Moslem
tradition cross and re-cross each other in the Malayan world. The intricacy
of the pattern is in part due to the fact that throughout its known history
the Malayan culture has .had groups of ardent seafarers who have done much
to provide cultural contacts between countries. Even today the amount
of traffic in small craft of five tons or less is seldom appreciated by
persons who do not know the area intimately. The degree of this trade
and of these contacts rarely appear in the official statistics and govern-
ment reports on which political scientists and economists are forced to
depend. This does not prevent constant contacts between the Sulu Archi-
pelago and Borneo. It does not inhibit the Buginese of Celebes from
sailing with the Monsoons to and from the ports of the peninsular
mainland of Southeast Asia. It baffled Netherlands East Indies officials
when they tried in 1.947 to impose trade controls between Indonesia and
the peninsula. The last complete census from Malaya showed that 26 percent
of the belays in what is now the Federation were either Sumatrans or
Malaysians from other areas.
Avowedly this complex web of traditional ties and of uurrent contacts
between the little people of the area does not add up to a convincing factor
in tough Western minds accustomed to deal with the generalizations of
economic and political systems or with immutability of power politics.
We have so far this evening considered a series of overtly divisive
factors -- geography, race, language, colonial tradition, nationalism and
religious philosrphies. In each ease it was possible to indicate that
the fragmentations implied was not necessarily insuperable. We have
reviewed as overtly unifying factors the intricate web of current and
traditional ties. We have stressed the growing interest that Asian leaders
evince in each other, their sense of common probam, and the emergence
of South Asian nations into a world predisposed toward international
affiliations and the formation of regional ties.
If one judges with the mentality of real politik the cultural forces
drawing together the nations and peoples of Southern Asia would appear weak
indeed. From such a viewpoint the narrow interpretation of cultural factors
making for South Asian regionalism are of no account whatever. Even the
broader interpretation of cultural factors which I have allowed myself this
evening is not of great significance. And therefore from this viewpoint
I have not had a significant topic to which to address myself this evening.
Perhaps both you and I by now share that feeling.
However, the dangers of such ethnocentric judgments must always be
guarded against. In appraising cultural developments and international
relations it is essential not only to understand clearly one's own position
and motives, but also the motives and position of those with whom, one
deals. It is not without significance that international affairs, in
their active aspect, are referred to so frequently as relationships. The
essence of a relationship is the interaction of two or more non-equivalent
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factors. Modern scientific thought clearly indicates that actuality lies
in a study of relationships and that projections dnto the outer world of ones
personalized structure does not give a complete pfcture of reality.
Therefore it behooves us in judging the &mt./ Asian scene to try to
stand outside of our awn skins; to try to understand the value systems
and patterns of sentiments meaningful to peoples 'hose motives and goals
may not be identical with our.i. I suspect that if one were to speak
from the viewpoint of the values and sentiments of some South Asian leaders,
the forces making for a South Asian regional unit, are in the next decades
irresistible. And certainly, sentiments tpday arc nearer the surface in
the East than in the West. Leaders speak more freely in idealistic and
emotional terms. They are planning for the future. They hope for a
cultural renascence which will be neither an arid revival of their awn
past achievements nor a sterile imitation of the Vest. It is in intent
rather than in fact that their strength lies. Peihaps that is why they
seem to have the ring of youthful vigor, of men wYo are going somewhere
and why all of the middle-aged forces of disillusdonment and reasonable
experience feel challenged to weigh their plea.
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THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia.
V
Round Table III: CULTURAL PATTERNS -- TOWARD UNITY OR DIVERSITY?
Friday morning, May 27, 1949
Presiding: Professor Fred Eggan
MODERATOR EGGAN: During the last session we very carefully stuck to
economic topics, and basic economic topics at that, but every now and then
a social or political or ideological or psychological note has entered into
the discussions, and, while we have pushed those back, I think with Dr,
DuBoist paper last night we can consider the gates as opened and can begin
to Consider those features which to an anthropologist at least, if not
primary) are considered to be all-important. I refer to the basic cultural
patterns in South Asia, which of course as an anthropologist looks at them
also encompass aspects of economic, political and social life as well.
To begin with, we have a statement of the traditional differences and
similarities in cultural patterns as a further facet or as a further approach
toward the problem of?unity or diversity with regard to South Asia. Prof,
David Mandqloaum, who has had extensive experience in India, and who is
Professor of Anthropology at the, University of California, will start us off.
TRADITIONAL DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
IN CULTURE PATTERNS
Professor D.G. Mandelbaum
As I understand the subject of traditional differehces and similarities,
our main purpose is to asesrtain what forces in the cultures of South Asia
make for regional integration and what forces tend to resist integration.
mly "cultures" we mean the whole way of life of a community, of a group of
people.
It is Ay impression that there are major cultural forces which can foster
regional integration, that these forces are mostly of what we might call a
negative kind, although positive ones can also be discerned, that the disaimi-
larities among the cultures of South Asia need not in themselves make for
regional disjunction, and that India is of special importance in this con-
sideration of the cultural facets of South Asian regionalism.
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only speak from impressions and not from good evideece. We are here dealing
with something like a quarter of all mankind and to depict one fourth of
mankind in such bold strokes can only be done in terms of impressions. This
is especially true for the cultures of South Asia b,:cause then is an astoni-
shing paucity of good evidence on them.
Since we must speak from impressions, we shoul
carefUl of our assumptions. The promise of regiona
terms at least, be no more than a misinterpretation
guity. Two peoples may live side by side and yet h
cultures. The mere fact of geographical contiguity
necessarily mean any strong cultural alliance. It
similarity but it does not inevitably mean that,
map and so should not assume blithely that geograph
regional cooperation.
A contrary assumption, but one which can be ec
arise when speciel attertion is given to details oJ
cultural elements. In concentrating on difference
to overlook broad and important similarities which
The cultural diversities are perhaps plainer t
unity wAilth South Asia. Dr. DuBois has discussed c
religion, and history. As a matter of fact, withir
vast range 'in many ethnographic categories.
One of our graduate students who has studied t
India reports that in India alone he has not only i
marriage that had been previously recorded in the 3.
but many more that have never been reported elsewh(
considerable diversity in detail, but this diversit
One of the
collred movfres,
there simply is
differing from
professional travel lecturers has -
entitled "There is no India". He t
no India; it is only a collection (
the other and having nothing in cce
I be particularly
I. unity may, in cultural
of geographical conti-
We quite differing
of itself does not
does imply cultural
e can be misled by the
ic propinquity creates
lally misleading,
the distribution
in detail, it is
bo exist.
may
of
easy
Le the eye thah is the
ifferences in language,
South Asia there is a
he forms of marriage in
ound every form of
iterature of ethnography
re. There is then,
y need not spell disunity.
talk, illustrated with
teadfastly maintiins that
f little commnnities, each
mon one with the other.
However, the fact remains that there is an Incla, and one which promises
to cont-nu e politically united and economically in-egrated. The existence
of Pakistan emphasizes that forces for unification may override differences
in cultural dritalls For Pakistan is not by any mans a horogenecus,
cultural3y moncr_thic state; within Pakistan there are notable differences
in language, considerable diversity even in religin. Contrariwise, there
is in Burma a relatively higher degree of cultueai homogeneity than prevails
in India and perhaps within Pakistan, and yet at tie moment there is poli-
tical disunity.
It would seem, then, that a mere list of diff rences and similarities
in customs can tell little of the potentialities f-r regional harmony in the
spheres of politics and economics. If the leaders of South Asia desire
regional unity, then they must ask: What aspects )f the various cultures of
South Asia must be festered and which must be ham n sed in order to achieve
the goal of regional unity?
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village cultures and have been affected, by the impact of Westernization.
It it, net clear from the published descriptions in just what degree village
societies have been basically altered by Western contact. Not infrequently
an account may say that village life in Siam or India or elsewhere in South
Asia goes on today much the same as it did two hundred years ago, and a
few paragraphs later in the same work we read that the impact of the West
has shattered the village society, has disintegrated the village economy.
4To be sure, the power and prestige structure of a village has been
.altered. Thus the money-lender generally has a much more important position
.now than he formerly had. There have been changes in land tenure and in
other economic matters. Yet there has also been a considerable stability in
village life of the past century. In most villages the family and family
relations are still very important. Primary allegiance is still owed to
the circle of kin. The life goals for the individual have remainedpretty
much the same, the rites of passage have not been altered greatly. Tech-
nology is not much changed and mechanical power is still produced by animals
and humans and not to any significant extent by machines. The deities are
still the combination of the scriptural gods and local godlings that they
were a century ago, Concern is still largely with local events. National-
ism is a fairly new idea but one which has taken hold.; regionalism is
hardly known,
In such villages throughout South Asia there is commonly a knowledge of
and a desire for consumergoods produced by-Westernized industry; and there
is now very widely the belief that these can be obtained without paying the
price of European overlordship.
- These simple and well known motifs?of village life are also shared by
the upper, Western-educated classes of each society in Southeast Asia,
This numerically small but politically potent class rejects any total
acceptance of Western ways. The desire of these Western-educated people
is to integrate Western technology into the indigenous way of life, to
have cultural continuity.
A number of the leaders believe that such integration. may best be
achieved under some socialist form of government. -Andellany of these
leaders have expressed the hope of effective international cooperation
in the region of South Asia.
This expression may well be more than a pious sentiment. In some part,
it may only be a reflection of the current fashion in international relations
wherein regional pacts and regional conferences have high .prestige value
B ut there are other, and potent factors as well, which impel toward regional
cooperation e Most of the South Asian -poples have orfly just reached
political independence or are in the proeeas of struggling to do so. As
each comes close to independence, its leaders become aware of the serious
problems which lie beyond the nationalist victory, or which must be met even
while the contest or the negotiations with the metropolitan power go on.
Such problems as those of economic reconstruction, of raising capital, of
building an efficient civil service, of education, of sanitation are every-
where pressing problems which must be met with slim resources. Hence there
is a tendency to look to the neighboring and nearby nations, also new, also
plagued by similar problems, to note how they are doing and whether they
have any better solutions. And out of this awareness of common problems
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India seems destined to play a leading role in whatever achievement or
ion-achievement of regional unity comes about in Saut:h Asia. This is true
because of her sheer size, because of her head-start in politics and economics,
because of her military pcwer and strategic positic:, among other factors.
There are certain disadvantages, as We all know, in India's position. There
is more than a little ouspicion of India's motives emong some of the peoples
of South Asia. Yet India's lead in the Asian Relatfans Conference and in
the Indonesian Conference may--Ja an indication that she will be able to
allay these Suspicions and. tLice the initiative successfully toward molding
an effective regional grouping.
Dr. DuBois said in her talk that for every div rgence and difference
in South Asia there is some countering influence if one is determined to
find it, and it is significant that some of the leacers of South Asia
rountries seem so determined.
There is no inherent cultural reason which wouLd prevent regional
integration. Regional integration may well be blocled, if economic depri-
vation, as felt by the people, is intensified. The'. the differences may
re magnified and may become issues to be fought over, but the differences,
of themselves, need not obviate regional cooperation.
In brief, we cannot assume that because there es a great multiplicity
of sect and dialect within South Asia, a firm coope:-ative alliance is not
Ceasible, just as we cannot assume that because the region can be encircled
OR a map such cooperation must inevitably come about. Underlying the great
variety of custom in the area, are certain fundamental likenesses which are
mainly those of a predominantly village population, whose way of life has
been affected but not yet deeply altered by the Western power-science
culture, whose political leaders - most of them educated in Western fashion
desire some kind of integration of Western technology into the indigenous
eulture. Such similarities offer an opportunity for a broadly conceived,
eooperatively enacted program of positive measures. But as yet whatever
tendencies toward regional effort exist, stem main) z; from more negative
factors, from the awareness of common difficulties, common shortcomings,
Ind common opponents.
MODERATOR EGGAN: Thank you.
I think Professor Chakravarty is not here. Mr Talbot, do you want
to read his paper?
DIRECTOR TALBOT: His paper has just come by at-mail, special delivery.
I shall ask his colleague at the University of Calcytta, Professor Sarkar,
to read it, but he might like a chance to skim throegh the manuscript while
Mr. Soedjatmoko is reading his paper.
MODERATOR EGGAN: Fine: We shall then next hear from Mr. Soedjatmoko,
menber of the Indonesian Delegation to the U.N.Security Council, who will
say something about typical recent developments in the field of cultural
patterns, particularly with reference to linguiatice, and perhaps anything
else he wants to add.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MALAY LANGUAGE
AND
REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Soedjatmoko
It is with marked hesitation that I address myself to my topic today.
This is especially so in view of the immensity of the problems of South
Asia as was indicated in yesterday morning's session and the urgency of
a bold and new approach to that area, as will very certainly come out in
our discussions this afternoon.
And it is with definite reluctance that I shall draw your attention
from these much more acute problems to the discussion of a very limited
topic, which at its best could be a little vignette, a little window on
a particular development in a particular field of an area with many more,
and atute, problems.
Malay is one of the Indonesian languages, a group which forms a
branch of the Malayo-Polynesian linguistic family. This Malayo-Polynesian
linguistic family covers the territory extending from Madagascar in the
west, through the Indonesian Archipelago, across the Malay Peninsula to
the borders of Burma and Siam, to the Philippines and Formosa in the north
and across the Pacific to Melanesia and Micronesia, even to distant Hawaii.
It comprises, apaftfrom the Indonesian language geoup, the Polynesian,
Melanesian and Micronesian languages. The Indonesian group is the largest
branch of this group. Malay, a member of this group, is the language
originally spoken in Middle and South Sumatra and later in the states on
the Peninsula of Malaya.
The inter-insular trade, which flourished in the fourteenth century,
brought about the extension of the use of this language to the coastal
areas of the islands in the entire Indonesian Archipelago, and when new
foreign influences came to the Indonesian Archipelago, it automatically
became the medium for the expansion of these influences. Three times it
was the language used.in such a process. First, by the Indian traders who
brought the Islamic religion with them, then by the Portuguese with whom
the Malays of Malaya first came into contact, and finally the Dutch. The
situation is now such that the Malay language is spoken and understood
everywhere on all the islands of the archipelago except for the most remote
rural areas. In many sections it has even replaced the original native
tongue as in West Borneo, Batavia, and most of the islands of the Moluccas
between Celebes and New Guinea. It became the language spoken in the ports
and the bazaars of the Indonesian Archipelago, the medium of the Dutch
colonial administration, the Islam and the Christian missions. The enormous
expansion of the use of the Malay language outside the regions where it
was originally spoken cut it off from the continuous rejuvenation enjoyed
by a language which finds its roots in the vernacular of a people. At
the same time, subjected to the impact of foreign users, it became removed
from the classical Malay as spoken in the courts and literary circles of
Malayan feudal society. Thus, with its orienal basis lost, the Malay
language as the lingua franca of the Indonesian Archipelago reached a very
chaotic state, to the extent that the Dutch linguist Berg refused to
consider the Malay language as a language, but preferred to call it a.,r
tlanguagelike phenomenon'.
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The development of the nationalist movement I
greatly strengthened the position of the Malay lel
the pattern of its develcpment towarde a fully acl.
The Indonesian nationalist movement, which was boy:
1908 had, by 1929, finally overcome the more or
elements of its initial growth. In that year it
and politically unitarian movement comprising the
the Dutch East Indies. At the same time it adopt
thereafter called the Indonesian language, as its
Nationalist propaganda and agitation and nationalf
from then on were almost exclusively carried out f
This was generally accepted by the Indonesian peoe
30 million of the 70 million inhabitants of the aa
which in many respects was better developed and he
past, that is the Javanese language.
m Indonesia, however,
guage ard definitely set
quote culeural medium.
n in its modern form in
ss separatist and regional
merged as a culturally
entire territory of
ed the Malay language,
national tongue.
_A political education
n the Indonesian language.
le despite the fact that
eehipelago spoke a language
d a longer cultural
it was this decision which gave the developmnt of the Malay language
a tremendous impetus. It was this which changed alay from it, status
of an unorganized handmaiden for all foreigners aid for widely varied
ethnic groups, an ancilla used rather locsely without a strict observance
of either its classical grammer or its idiom, to e modern language which
had to serve as the medium between Western culturE and the nationalist
renaissance. Rigorous adaptation and development was necessary in order
to make the language a suitable vehicle for the expression of modern
political and social thinking. Furthermore, in the literary field, the
nationalist renaissance created the desire among the people to free them-
selves from the frozen and rigid forms of literary expression, from the
epic and from the pantun, the Malay quatrain, and it was at that time
that the first attempts were made to find new fortes of literary expression.
The process of individualization which took place as a part of the general
nationalist reawakening in Asia was reflected in the emergence of the
novel and of modern forms of poetry.
The Japanese military occupation and the com
Dutch language precipitated the full development (
a medium which could adequately cover all fields c
then that the first language commission was set ut
developments and became the vanguard of further ac
of the Indonesian language. This process was acct
the fact that, during the Japanese occupation, al:
on the higher levels, was shifted over-night from
The new and sudden requirements, especially in th,
and as a medium for higher education forced the
too quickly. This process was further acceleratec
lebstern educated intelligentsia started using the
while they did not command the classical Malaya
elements of Dutch syntax and idiom were brought ir
sometimes to the extent of corruption of its own
time, however, there grew a strong tendency to che
and terms against the classical Malay. But this
although it may have oorz.ued r.ome of the clasetc
about a greater flexebil;t; tr_ larger deecree
necesnary for an adeqeate Pc: modern cuIi;u:
equent discarding of the
f the Malay language to
f human activity. It was
which codified the new
aptation and renovation
1? rated even more by
education, especially
Dutch to Indonesian.
field of modern science
lay language to grow
by the fact that the
Indonesian language,
n this situation many
to the Malay language,
rammer. At the same
ck all these new forms
recess of adaptation,
3:1 purity, brought
prywe,- which is so
e and science.
The Indonesian revol::.or confirmed this development and since this
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revolution expressed' the self-assertion of the people, actually of a new peo-
ple and their assertion of a new life and a new sense of living, this modern
Indonesian language emerged as the medium of expression of this new sense
of life. The alien elements and changes in structure and substance were
accepted in their own right. Conformity with the structure of original
Malay was no longer gonsidered obligatory, since the Indonesian language
was to become a new language, the language of a new nation now in the process
of being born. The revolution, in terms of the develbpment of the Malay
language, means a breach with the past in this respect as well as in so
many others.
The literature created in this revolutionary period reflects the
attempts of the younger generation to define their newly-discovered indi-
viduality, their newly discovered "I". In our modern poetry the search
for that definition of the uniqueness of the individual and his relations
in life and society, a search reflected in the poetry of men like the
Dutch poets Slauerhoff and Marsman? is its central theme. It may also
account for the popularity of T,S. Eliot. Thus it is clear, merely from
a superficial examination, that the Malay language and especially the
Malay language as spoken in the Indonesian archipelago, is a reflection
and even an expression of the nationalist development. Therefore, its
role is closely connected with the political development of Indonesia.
The question then arises, since the modern Indonesian language is
an expression of Indonesian nationalism, what will its role be in any
regional thinking on Southeast Asia. In order to clear the way for a
- consideration of this question, it should be remembered that outside
Indonesia the Malay language is spoken in the Malayan peninsula, in
British West and North Borneo, and that Tagalog, one of the Philippine
languages, is a member of the Indonesian linguistic group. Apart from
small Malay-speaking minorities in Burma, Siam and Indo-China, the
languages of the countries around Indonesia have no relationship to
the Malayan language. It is possible to go even further than that.
Several of these countries have not solved their own linguistic problems.
In Indo-China there are three totally different languages; Vietnamese,
which is the most widely spoken; Cambodian and Laosian. In Burma there
are also three languages; Burman, Karen and Shan,
It is equally important to realize that colonial nationalism and,
therefore, Indonesian nationalism has only a limited objective and only
a temporary and interim character. Colonial nationalism has no aims
beyond the attainment of political freedom as the only possible basis
for a life of human dignity. Certainly colonial nationalism has no
claims whatsoever for a universal application of those values and
standards, spiritual and political, by which its adherents live. In
that respect it differs fundamentally from the kind of nationalism which
arose in some of the free countries of Europe in the 20th century. In
short, colonial nationalism as such has no political or cultural expan-
sionist elements. It is a rejection and a reaction and thus it can be
expected that, after having attained its political aims, colonial nationa-
lism will die down and that the other elements of revitalized energies
of the peoples will come to the fore. Therefore, a deliberate expansion
of the Malay language beyond the boundaries of the former Dutch East Indies
is out of the question, It remains possible, of course, that as a result
of Indonesia's. emergence as a?free natilm-the Malay -speaking territories
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outside of of Indonesia will seek closer ties with Indonesia. This may prove
to be the case, particularly for the Malayans in lealaya who would like to
safeguard their position in their own country especially vis-a-vis the
Chinese. It is even theoretically possible that, with the necessary stimulus
from the Philippines, the dream of several leadees in those areas of a
Pan-Malayan Federation will be revived. Current thinking in regional terms,
however, is much more along the lines of Southeast Asia regional alignment.
In fact, it is a constant preoccupation of ttie leaders in Southeast
Asia. The solution to many economic and political problems and even the
answers to the question as to how much political strength can be generated
by the entire Southeast Asian region as a whole, will depend on the ability
of these newly emerged and emerging nations to approach these problems
on a regional basis, rather than a national one. On the other hand, apart
from the fact that the interest of the people of the entire area is for the
moment focussed on their own individual national problems, there remain
strong potential elements of political and economfe isolationist thinking.
It is impossible to say at this stage what directfen the developments in
these countries will take. In any ease it is likely that a development will
take place on the basis of political and economic factors pertinent to the
individual situation in each country and to the mttual relationship within
that region and the position of Southeast Asia as a whole vis-a-vis the rest
of the world. In working out the mutual relationships in such a regional
alignment, the question of cultural relationship coos not arise and certainly
the question of language does net figure aluirori in this question. The
question of which language will repoken predomieantly throughout these
areas, if such an alignment doce erf,Irga, will not be determined in the
first place by factors of cultural kil;.ahip or by deliberate choice. It
is a question which will be determined much later by the factors of political
and economic development, by factors based on the power relations within
such a regional alignment, and even by the changing political scene in
Asia outside Southeast Asia.
Scutheast Asian regional thinking is a product of modern political
reasoning, based on a rational approach to economic and political problems,
It is the thinking of the politically articulate leading groups and
commercially active parts of the different societies, those groups which
have broken away from the past and have in common the modern rational
approach to the problems of today. The common ceitural elements of the
past will most likely play no part in such a development and certainly
not for some time to come. The question of a commen language or even of
a predominantly accepted language therefore does rot arise.
It should also be realized that in the develcoment of such regional
thinking the question of language is not of primary concern, at least if
no desire for cultural domination exists in any of the nations concerned.
This is illuatrated by the fact that neither the Congress of EUrope nor
the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi raised this problem. Therefore,
in the development of regional thinking in Southeest Asia the development
of the different languages of the nations concerned and the questiiJn of
cultural kirirdlip will play no role. It is highly probable that for the
time being the question will be left entirely to eeneiderations of practi-
cality, that the present situation will be continued and that the English
language will Wear am. im'port2A/691,24i.bae_pbeteinize'61igAViittiffitbitig9in
these ar Arovea tor Keiease VidUAYU
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MODERATOR, EGGAN: We are aware of the profound cultural influence -
sometimes we put the term "culture" in quotation. marks or add a question
mark after it - of Hollywood motion pictures in America or even western
life. We should, therefore, consider the role which the motion picture
in India and in Southeast_Asia is playing and will play. Professor
Sarkar will read the paper of his colleague, Professor Chakravarty- of
Calcutta University,
MR. SARKAR: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: This is a paper
of 7 pages. If I follow the American tempo it should not take more than
21 minutes, but if I follow the British tempo it should be managed in
about 12 to 13 minutes. (Laughter).. ..Professor Chakravarty is Professor
of English Literature and he is a scholar from Oxford.
THE INDIAN FILM -- A SURVEY
Dr. Amiya Chakravarty
India's film industry is reported to be the second largest in the
world, and yet we must admit that this enormous output is not correlated to
a high level of creative excellence. The science and technique in this
case, have followed the line of commercial growth, and the main initiative
has come either from a desire to replace foreign enterprise by indigenous
organization or from an earlier phase of competition between rival film
magnates and corporations with financial commitments both at home and abroad.
Individual producers looked upon the film world as a potential field for
large scale profit, and already their predictions have been more than
justified. But though films produced in India have been thoroughly
Indianised excepting for the continued dependence en overseas suppliers for
technical equipment, the profit-motive acquired from outside, when the
films were more completely dominated by few large power-groups, -still
retains its early associations. Even the propaganda motive, which prevailed
to some extent during the last great war and made the Indian fiIm an
instrument of British policy in India, failed to affect the central hold
of commeroial power. The more legitimate and often very stimulating and
creative type of national propaganda that an be occasionally witnessed in
the Indian film is rather an exception than an established form of art.
The Indian film, generally speaking, has not yet acquired an Indian
cultural soul in its inner motivation, though, of course, Indian topics,
Indian actors, Indian scenery and the general pattern of superficial Indian
life almost entirely give the film its obvious Indianization. It is
when we compare the Indian film, as a medium of art, with other arts such
as those of Indian music, literature, painting or sculpture that the
basic difference is unveiled. The profit motive, or power motive does
not prevail in those great expressions of India's culture to any large
extent. The initiative remains creational and linked with traditions of
India as well as with individual talent in those other forms of art.
Obviously, art must at some point find its safe economic anchorage
and it is not intended here that any dichotomy between artistic and utili-
tarian or profitable values should be enjoined. But the primary initiative
must vile fro ar4ith liars actors., and artistic producers, not from
?r e
busineff 1;1 7 'agikkiRETc691)91.fiAiNg 406980110 Wan world
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a aaite of the giant controlling hands of financ the original artistic
aurpose still runs strong. That is so because tha film in the West began
as an art-form and not as business. In India it -Jegan as a commercial.
enterprise organized by foreign distributors and is only now after many
failures painfully acquiring an artistic purpose.
Not that great talent is lacking in India eiaher in the realm of
histrionic genius and stagecraft, or in the initial production of the play
or story. And, certainly, scientific skill and ingenuity in all fields
of photography and production have made enormous trides, sometimes even
out-reaching Western competence. But the fact rellains that all great art
is rooted in tradition, and the Indian film, so far, has failed to link up
with deeper soil. Indications are already there that such processes are
at work, but we hamaomutain initial handicap in ane fact that the drama - the
acting-drama - and the theatre had languished in :India under foreign rule
and the normal link-up between a great dramatic tradition and the new medium
of the film was not immediately possible. The fo:j( drama, or yatra, in
India still preserves its vitality and the open-afr performances in the
villages offer a living and sometimes a high levei expression of art but
they have been ignored in favor of sophisticated and derivative urban dramas
on the stage where excellence has been rare and tt.e main incentive has
been display and declamation. With the solitary exception of Tagore in
Bengal, the modern age in India has produced no great dramatists. The art
of film-acting which demands a very high level of artistry has thus been
largely absent. Talented producers like Uday-Shankar have, therefore,
rightly gone to Indian folk art, to the provincial and varied motifs of
folk dance, rituals, ceremonies and traditional rural acting: this may yet
produce an art-form in the film which would be genainely Indian and therefore
also universal in its appeal. His recent venture I(alpana" is a great
attempt, perhaps unique in Asia, but as Uday-Shanklr himself is more a
dancer and dance producer than a film producer or lramatist, it lacks the
necessary integral approach. His comparative lack of literary or dramatic
power, as well as his inexperience in the filmetecanique itself invests
his attempts in that field with an importance that lies in the domain of
pioneering rather than in great achievement. But we have now an indication
of the true destiny of the Indian film as a cultural medium, as an expression
of the Indian artistic consciousness.
A discerning critic, Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, urges in a recent issue of
March of India that Indian films should be exporteta to the Western world
even though they may not have reached the top leve:, of artistic achievement.
His argument, which seems valid, is that such expovure to international
scrutiny and appreciation would deepen the Indians" sense of individuality
by way of criticism and self-criticism which a wider awareness would bring.
He also points out that Western art-lovers would be sure to discover new
motifs, values, and cultural initiatives from such films even while they
had not attained but were progressing towards great expression. As he says,
"Comparatively speaking, India has had practically no opportunity of
exporting her culture through the medium of the cirema but there is nc
reason why an attempt should not be made to secure at least a specialized
and select audience abroad for the right type of Iniian films. Some of our
Ambassadors have already taken steps to secure good Indian films for exhibi-
tion in their Embassies. Film societies, cultural acganizat- jd educa-
tional ineWndrinhEotEctikaiseoliMaiglireMARAPAPAQMAOs
A s
les of
seeing, from time to time, a representative selectim of Indian films."
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While hr. Abbas rightly emphasizes that Western audiences should
acclimatise themselves to Indian films and find artistic inspiration
in the slower tempo of Indian life as depicted in sun-drenched, tropical
scenes with an unfamiliar pattern of acting, music and behavior, I contend
that his emphasis on the naive and indigenous elements of Indian film-art
should be kept clear from extravagances and simulated "Indianism" which
derive from artistic inexperience in this field.
It is true that "the very drabness of the average Indian's life makes
him susceptible to filmic glamor as an escapist medium: social realism bores
him, for he is all too familiar with it." But it would be risky to analyse
"Indianism" on any fundamental level of art; greater technical mastery
alone may indicate where the "universal concrete" Might be found in character-
istic and different forms of Indian film-art which are rooted in national
character and are representative of human values. Uday-Shankar's "Kalpana"
is neither artistically integrated nor genuinely "national" because
excessive display and "Indianisms" become their own motive. But there
are sections in that film where the new rhythms of Indian life are portrayed
in dynamic scenes of laboring population. The rural context as well as
the city life show unmistakable evidence of an Indian civilization which
is modern, traditional and also artistically "universal" in its significance.
The first phase of Indian film-art, which is already being transcended, was
derivative, self-conscious, and commercial: but as in the so-called "new"
Indian literatures and in the fine arts, a perennial element, which is neither
old nor new, is asserting itself in our films. And that element makes it
possible for an art-movement to save itself from cosmopolitanism which is
so often the reverse of the truly universal in art. Indian films seam to be
moving towards an interior balance between the regional, indigenous and
traditional on one side and the truly modern on the other-- this can only be
achieved through technical experience and through the growth of dramatic
talent both in the field of writing and of acting. As I have tried to
indicate, India's supreme and consistent level of achievement in other art-
forms, where tradition and talent were available, cannot easily be rivalled
in the film because of the failure to contact any genuine tradition in the
realm of the drama. May be, the emergence of a new dramatic literature and
of national theatres which India is awaiting, will fulfill the necessary
conditions for the growth of the Indian film as an artistic medium.
III
Some facts and figures regarding the Indian film-industry may, at this
stage, be introduced.
The Indian film industry, which is now 36 years old, can well claim to
be the largest of the medium-scale industries se the country.
The first Indian film "Harischandra" was produced by Mr. D.G. Phalke
in the year 1913, and since then the development of the industry has been
both extensive and rapid. With the coming of talkies in 1931 the pace of
progress substantially increased. Early development took place in Bombay,
which today is the "Hollywood of India". It is estimated that about two-
thirds of the total annual production of Indian films comes from Bombay
studios. From Bombay the industry spread to other provinces, and it is now
well establishaa i 44 141
A ?'71(1
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The Indian film industry consumes about 2000)00,000 feet of raw film
annually, produces between 250 to 300 full-length pictures and employs
about 100,000 persons. More then $60,000,000 is invested in the industry.
In 1913 when the five, movie was produced and screened in Bombay it
was considered a miracle. Today Bombay is looking forward to the production
of color movies this year.
A further expansion of the industry is, howc.,,er, handicapped by the lack
of theatres. There are only about 2,000 cinema halls in the country. The
construction of new halls comes under the Government's ban on non-essential
buildings.
Epics and mythology were largely drawn upon for subjects for films in
the early period. Today social, historical and educational films are pre-
ferred. Nearly 60 per cent of the urban and ten per cent of the rural
population are estimated to be regular cinema-goees.
While Bombay caters for all-India audiences, making pictures in several
languages, studios in other centers produce pictures in the respective
provincial languages. Next in importance to Bombay is Madras with an
ennual production of more than 50 movies; Calcutta's output is about 40,
mostly in the Bengali language.
In spite of the large number of country-made films, Indian audiences
see on an average 350 foreign pictures every year.
Indian films have a good run in countries like Ceylon, Burma, halaya
end South Africa where there is a large Indian pcpulation. A few Indian
films with English titles have been shown in Eurcpe and America.
MODERATOR EGGAN: Thank you, Professor Sarkar. I might mention that
your tempo i3 just halfway between the English and the American.
SARKAR: I congratulate myself!
MODERATOR EGGAN: In these three papers we heve had a number of
important points raised. Professor handelbaum ha3 emphasized not only the
lack of data, which clearly means that there is a great deal more work to
do in terms of gathering raw materials and organieing and integrating them,
but he has emphasized the importance of the villaee cultures not only
in India but throughout the Far East. Too often E think we forget as we
too at the large cities scattered around that these large cities for the
most part are not indigenous t 3outh Asia or eve e to East Asia; that they,
in part at least, have been pasted on to the edge5 of these countries as a
result of commercial, economic, and political contacts with the West.
eo that one of our failures to understand these regions from a cultural
standpoint has been that too often we stop at the edges of these countries
in the cities where there are statistics and conveniences and hotels and
30 on. The interior regions, the provincial capitals, the rural areas,
the village life, - too often its massive charact3r does not get into our
thinking in terms not only of its stability but also of the nature of the
changes which have gone on.
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I think Professor Aandelbaum has rightly called our attention to the
importance of these village cultures as a basic type of life of these areas
and directed our attention to the question as to what extent this village
life has been affected by change. He also dealt briefly with the elite,
the educated classes of these areas, which in terms of giving new directions
and new emphasis, new ways of integrating the old and the new, are of crucial
importance. He pointed out too the very important effect in the past of the
pressures from outside which have been integrating these areas and mentioned
-perhaps he did not mention but we migitmention - that we need to take into
account what Will happen when these pressures are released and therefore
certain features bringing about integration have been modified. He noted
also the caste system which may come in for a good deal more discussion.
The paper on the Malay language is important in showing the factors
by which a lingua franca may spread over an area and some of the limitations
as to the continuance of that spread.
The paper on films in India raised the important point, to quote this
paper, whether a genuinely Indian product can have universal appeal over
this whole area, whether Indian films can make a genuine aploeal and act
as an integrative force over areas outside of India. We might if we had
time have had papers on radio, which obviously is another modern feature
of mass communications and is important here.
Perhpps that is enough in the way of summary to recall some of these
points to your attention and we are now open for discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
MR. HORACE POLEMAN (Library of Congress): I would like to ask two
questions, with a few prefatory remarks. Mr. Mandelbaum and Mr* Soed5atmoko
both ended their papers on very optimistic notes; to-wits that the leaders
of South Asia are building soOial compatibility; that the cultural differ-
ences will not play so impertant a part but practical consideDations will
lead to regional cohesion.
I would like to return to the pessimistic note of yesterday and remind
the group that we have had the most shattering example of what can happen
in this decade in a very short time through the play of traditional diff-
erences, namely, the birth of Pakistan.
I would like to ask Mr. Mandelbaum, granted that there were political
and economic differences which led to the growth of Pakistan, whether
he feels that the traditional cultural differences played the more prominent
role in bringing about the birth of Pakistan.
I would like to ask Mr. Soedjatmoko whether a study of the basic
factors which resulted in Pakistan might conceivably have any bearing on
similar disunifying factors in the rest of the area.
MR. MANDELBAUM: If I understand your first question correctly, Mr*
Poleman, it concerns the relative importance of formal differences in,
dogma between Hinduism and Islam in bringing about rivalry as contrasted
with the importance of general economic depro I tried to deal with
that problem in a paper that was published a year or so ago in The Middle
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East Journal. MY conclusion there was that differences of dogma between
Hinduism and Islam were not causes but rather were symptoms which were
seized upon as a result of large-scale frustratione.
There are many parts of India where Hindus an.
perfect amity for centuries, where there has been r
rivalry, and, on the other hand, there have been f.)
between Moslem and Moslem, as between Sunni and Sh.:
end caste; as a matter of fact, it was not so long
In India were between Hindu castes, especially in e
between Hindu and Moslem.
Moslems have lived in
.o shred of inter-communal
eroe and bloody riots
Aah, and between caite
ago that the severest riots
,he South, rather than
So in answer to your question, I don't think the formal dogmas of
Hinduism and Islam were the prime reasons for the eutbreaks that occurred.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: With reference to Professor
would like to point out that the history of colon!
that much of the separatist tendencies which devel
from deliberate manipulations of dormant conflicts
nationalist movement itself had already successful
be said of the initial development of the Muslim L
this movement later derived much of its strength f
antagonisms in the country. It also holds true fo
There the nationalist movement started on a 1
Javanese, Sumatran and Celebesian organizations,te
which immediately transgressed the local boundarie
however, all of these organizations had dropped th
into a nationalist movement, covering the entire t
East Indies, aiming at politice, freedom for that
the political and cultural unJty of the Indonesian
was established. This unity was never questioned
ents up to the return of the Dutch colonial admin!
the Allied victory.
lfandelbaum's remark, I
:a nationalism has shown
Jped in its course resulted
and tensions, which the
overcome. This could
)ague in India, although
nem existing social
e Indonesia.
Jeal basis; there were
;ides the Moslem movement
Within twenty years,
,er lceal bias and fused
xritory of the Dutch
Jntire area. Ey 1929
nationalist movement,
lgain by any of its adher-
rtration in the wake of
Then the primary need of the Dutch was the coltainment of the Republic
of Indonesia. This could only be done ky deflecting nationalist sentiment,
in the areas which were under Dutch military contrel, away from and against
the Republic, by playing up ethnic differences, puAing in control the
old feudal rulers in those areas and setting up a 3ordon sanitaire of puppet
states around the Republic This so-called Malin:-policy, initiated by
Dr. van Nook, however, has not met with the succes3 the Dutch had hoped
for, since the larger of these states gradually refused more and more to
be used in a power play against the Republic.
However, as a result of this policy it is to 3ome degree likely that
there will be a subdivision of a free and nationalist Indonesia somewhat
along the lines of ethnic differences.
MR. BROEK: In the first place, on this matter of unity of South Asia,
I still have very much the feeling that the difference between India and
Pakistan on the one hand and Southeast Asia on the other is greater than
the unity which was suggested last night by Miss ElBois and by Professor
Mandelbarc;pililicagiancl*AeasZ tirrOr dfflbtAttd4
features. or instance, as o? no 6 eFftlriMatm's i us ra ions,
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it is very interesting to note that the houses in Southeast Asia are almost
everywhere built on piles, while in India as well as China they are built
on the ground. For our purpose here it is a minor matter, but it gives an
indication of the fundamental cultural unity of this region and the difference
in that respect from India.
In its higher forms the culture of Southeast Asia is largely del!ived
from either India or China, or indirectly from Arabia. It is a cultural
dependency, one might say. That is in a sense a negative unity, but again,
it sets off this area from its neighbors.
To take a more vital feature, consider the middle class. India: has
a considerable middle class which has formed the basis for its modern develop-
ment, and that is one of the reasons why I said yesterday that India is
in a different position than Southeast Asia. In the latter region there is
practically no native middle class, except for the newly formed group of
Western educated civil service people, and professional men. As you all know,
the middle class of these countries consists of Indians in Burma, and Chinese
elsewhere, with to some extent Arabs. I give this as an example of an import-
ant difference which is bound to have its effect on all questions of social
and economic progress.
I do not deny that the peoples of South Asia as a whole have certain
features in common, but these are so to say negative in character, such
as the struggle against Western colonial rule.Onewthab fight is over,
there is little of a positive community of interests left.
One particular question to Mr. Soedjatmoko. When you spoke about this
matter of unity you used the term Southeast Asia. My question is, does that
indicate agreement with my thesis, or wore you including India and Pakistan
in that term, in other words did you mean South Asia?
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: That specific question on Southeast Asia. Yes, it
was a rather inaccurate term I used. I meant Southern Asia including
India. That will answer the first part of your question which you addressed
to both of us. I feel that the development towards a closer integration
of the Southern Asian region is not a product of the past, has no relation-
ship with actual existing cultural kinship or cultural disunity; it is a
product of modern political thinking, it is a development which will be
brought about by pIlitical and economic factors which work on that area
and where the question of cultural kinshiik or cultural diaaffinity does
not arise before that political alignment takes shape or has taken shape.
MR. MANDELBAUM: I think Mr. Broakts points are very well taken;
however, there are these considerations also to be borne in mind on the
matter of house form and kindred matters: It was pointed out well over
a hundred years ago that there is a certain cultural similarity which
extendp from eastern India deep into Oceania: That is undoubtedly
true, I think, and yet we would hesitate to bring Oceania into the
purvi4 of our discussion.
As to the middle bless, Mr. Broek rightly points out that the existence
of an alien middle class in many of the Southeast Asian countries was
brought about under the aegis of the metropolitan powers. Now that the
metropolitan powers have relinquished some of their control I think the whole
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--ecnehip of the alien midi!_e class to tha ineegenous population, will
eheft ?11 the direction of Mere complete assimilation and cultural and social
integration with the bulk of the population.
MR. POLEMAN: Mr. Brock has clarified a lit le bit what I had in mind.
I was not thinking so much of studying Hindu-Moslem dogmatic differences
as the actual psychological basic divisive patters which operated there,
and whether they could be applied and studied witn relation to similar
patterns elsewhere, not in terns of Moslem versus Hindu.
I must confess that I am not in complete agr
He referred to dogmatic, superficial differences
rather think that those dogmatic superficial di
imagination of the peasants and finally put the P
At the risk of seeming facetious I would like to
i. C. Smith on what was the basic suecess of the
wrote it down last night. I will read it to you:
,ement with Mr. Nandelbaum.
tn a rather scoffing way.
fferences captured the
Aistan movement across.
quote an observation of
pakistan movement. I
"In the end they (the Moslems) pictured themselves
all debilitated by enforced effeminate 'vegetarianism
and disintegrated by imposed defeatist oblivion.. and
bowing down to worship dirt and atones the
mangy 'sacred/ execrated cow marched in triumph over
the prostrate land."
That may be dogmatic.
MR. TALBOT: We have been talking about culteral forces as they are
observable, and it was suggested that perhaps they are also manipulative;
that perhaps the reason Pakistan came along when it did was because a
group of people took a situation which had been dormant, as Mr. Mandelbaum
said, and manipulated it into a political force. 'Jr. Soedjatmoko mentioned
that differences had been manipulated into an Indonesian sense of unity,
and they had been re-manipulated into a divisive situation in the more
recent political situation.
A question we might eventually consider is wh:ther there are attempts
in South Asia now to manipulate a sense of regionalism or a sense of non-
regionalism, and whether such attempts look as if they might be fruitful.
MR. VANDENBOSCH: Mr. Chairman, are we not deaing with two overlapping
regions rather than one? I must confess that I haee always regarded
Southeast Asia more as a part of Eastern Asia than of South Asia. The
impact of both China and India is felt in Southoas-. Asia, but until recently
the penetration of Chinese influences has been muce the greater. Singapore
is a Chinese city and Malaya very nearly a Chinese country. There is in
the whole region a not unnatural fear of China and India. In Burma and Ceylon
the fear of large Indian immigration is acute. Probably the chief reason
why Ceylon chose to remain in the Commonwealth was the hope that it might
give her some protection against India. In the other countries 6f the region
Chinese immigration and influence are feared.
I am surprised that so little has been said ateut Islamism as both
an integrating and a divisive force in the region. Between Moslem countriee
there is a strong bond of union but Mb
Islamism 41:KonficEgr R9MsSrPfkigZgs4fa -.; 013-M 0 01114a Ale OV 143
power as a uniting
and a dividing force was clearly evident in the Palestine issue in the United
Nations and at the New Delhi Conference.
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MODERATOR EGGAN: I think the problem as to whether we have two regions
or one or whether this area is in transition from two regions to one is one
of the major problems which we are discussing here. There is no point in
asking me to answer that question but my own feeling is that as you take At
at different time periods you get different results. If you take the 10th
or/ 11th century, the Hindu influence was almost up to the base of Southern
China; if you take it at other periods you have a reverse trend. You would
really need a series of cultiaval maps or political-social-cultural maps at
different time levels and you would find it oscillating back and forth between
these two major poles. The problem is new, I think, in which direction is the
oscillation going at present?
MR. VANDENBOSCH: Do we not have in Southeast Mile a situation like that
in the Caribbean and Latin America? The militarily weak, capital-importing
and primary-commodities-exporting countries of Latin America, feared and
distrusted the United States and yet followed a Pan-American policy. Indeed,
they used Pan-Americanism as a means of controlling the United States. We
may expect the countries of Southeast Asia to adopt both an anti-China and
anti-Indian and a Pan-Asiatic policy.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: I would like to address myself to the point raised by
Professor Vandenbesch, the point dealing with the role of the Islam.
I think one could say that the days of Pan-Islamism are definitely over.
Moreover, two recent events in the Middle East have shown the political
weakness of alignments based merely on the ties of a common religion.
On the other hand, I do not mean to say that the idea of the Moslem
brotherhood, the sense of kinship which links the adherents of the Islam
all over the world, is not a strong force and a factor in international
politics which could safely be discounted.
As far as Indonesia is concerned, it should be remembered that this
archipelago, and especially Java, has always been a melting-pot of a great
part of the religions of the world; that this has brought about an
atmosphere of great tolerance and an approach on the part of the people
emphasizing the personal direct experience of religion - a mystical approach -
rather than in a dogmatic, orthodox sense.
Islam in Indonesia has therefore never been able to establish the
structure of society and of states in accordance with its precepts, exclOpt
maybe partly in those areas outside Java which were dirlactly ruled by
local Moslem princes.
In any ease the Nationalist movement in Indonesia, after its initial
spread on the wave of Islamic revival, has quite definitely severed itself
from the Moslem-state concept and developed along lines of secular political
ideas.
It certainly is true that in the Republic of Indonesia the Moslem party
is still nimerically the largest party, but on the other hand, because it
embraces a wide range of political shadings, from socialist to ultra conserva-
tive and reactionary, it contains many inner aontradiatione, both on the
political and the religious level. So that it cannot be expected that this
party as such will, as a single factor, be the main determinant in the
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MR. HOLLAND: Thowt I am no anttroeolcgist, 1 was etfteewhat sureyieet
that neither of the two previous speakers har refered to some of the more
generally observable manifestations of cultural ciange. I wanted therefore
o ask how far, despite the strength and pursisteece of tradition in these
ancient and sophisticated civilizations, there is observable in the everyday
village and small town life of Southern Asia some of the same adoption of
the superficial aspects of Western civilization wlich one finds in other
changing cultures of the world. I am thinking of such obvious things as
the aping of Western clothing, of bobbed hair, of the influence of modern
schools and school teachers as againet the traditeenal type of family authori-
ty and all of the other well known aspects of Wes-ern civilization, which we
know to be one of the great disruptive forces of Eost other traditional soci-
eties, particularly the smaller and more primitive societies.
should think that Hr. handelbaum must have had ample opportunity to
observe some of those changes. To what extent wiLl they be the deciding
forces in the modernization of these South Asian :Jocieties, or to what extent
are there powers of resistance and renascence in Jeldian traditional civiliza-
tion or Chinese civilization or Indonesian civilization which will transform
this modernization into something different from Alat one has seen in other
parts of the world where the aim of the new elite has often been to wear a
Western suit, or bobbed hair, and generally be Eueopean-looking.
MR. MANDFTAAUM: I think, Mr. Holland, that is certainly true, and that
Western patterns that have beenttaken on have bee to some degree disruptive
of the older way of life; however, it seems to me that the trend at the
moment is quite in the other dir9ction. There is what I like to call by the
fancy term "reintegrative renforcement," by whice I only mean the process
observable in situations such 7?,3 ih the Indian viLlage where the Congress
movement has been preaching anc Oc,hgress follower and a great many people
who have been exposed to Western ways have somewhvt rigorously gone back
to the simple life and to the old life. I think :hat is true not only for
India but it is true fairly widely in Southeast kiia, so there is less of
the rush to take on everything in Western life, feam ffiAintheh Twin has the
Toni?" to forks and spoons and knives. I think ie will swing back again.
How disruptive the adoption of Western techrelogy will be, of course,
can only be a guess at our present state of knowlAge. Disruptive it
certainly will be, but then most societies in mose stages of their career
are continually being disrupted, are continually ahanging, and we have no
reason to believe that there was ever anywhere ir South Asia a sort of
Golden Era of the past when things went smoothly Ind everything was in a
state of equilibrium. There were constant changes in the history of South
Asia, even as there are now. I certainly think tnere are going to be shifts
eventually in the pattern of the joint family in India, but as yet the pattern
of joint family for the bulk of India still holds.
Have I answered your question?
MR. HOLLAND: Yes, in part. I would like tc hear later on from
Professor Embree.
MR, LEVI: I would like to pursue a little tit more what Mandelbaum said
under the title of regionalism because it seems t) MB we are beginning to
see a gArit?VelPFaRdleigecita2401:1743319/11M124436L00?260/01WOOVJAArefes3or
Broek said it seems to me if there is anything actually regional developing
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it is among the Southeast Asiatic areas on the one hand, as against India
and China on the other hand. At the moment I can see the same result that
you have in every other part Of the world with regions developing, namely,
that they develop as a reaction against a real or imaginary fear caused
by political or national considerations. If there is any regional dtvelopmeht
Outing it isnit coming in the brotherly spirit of "let's all get together,"
or the l"one world" idea, but it is simply a reaction against threat. From
the statements of what is actually going on we should strictly keep India
apart from Southeast Asia. The cultumal factors may or may not have some
influence on parte of the East With which Southeast Asia may 'create a region,
but that is a secondary factor as far as present realities are concerned.
MR. ISAACS: I think this has opened up a new and iMportant point, but
I woad like to stress a. point that was made a little farther back on the
question of the manipulation of these cultural and social factors and their
differences. I think the main stress belongs on manipulation if we want
to determine the relationship of these things to real politics and what
gots on in the life of the country. We have had the example of Pakistan,
the end result of fifty or sixty year& British manipulation of Hindu and
Moslem antagonisms in India. The Dutch have long been adept at keeping social
groupings apart. The French have tried 1t in Indochina, keeping the country
artificially divided. Manipulation more than anything else has determined the
relationship of Cambodia and Laos both to Siam and to the countries of Indochina..
Wherever these cultural differences have intruded into the political scene,
it has usually been in the form of direct manipulation by foreign influences.
Experience has almost always shown that they could co-exist peacefully if
the power factors would ailow them to do so.
MODERATOR EGGAN: I think from our standpoint that the crucial question
might be whether there has to be a sound base for that manifplation in the
culture or whether it can be, as it were, artificially created by that
manipulation.
? MR. VAINDENBOSCH:, In the case of Indonesia that is reenforced by
geographic insularity. Particularism needs very little artificial stimu-
lation. I have taught American Government for many years and rarely have
I had more than two or three students in a class who would agree with MB
that equal representation of the states in the Senate is an atrocity. Who
instigated that sentiment? There must first be some basis for these things
before they can be exploited.
MR. FEUER: On the point of insularity, the effect of the insular
character was only sharpened by creation of K.P.M. monopoly, the chhrging
of very high rates and so on. You are very familiar with what I am referring
to.
MR. VANDENBOSCH: Surely you do not think that the unwillingnoss of
Nevada and ether states with little population to surrender their constitu-
tional right to equality of representation in the Senate can be ascribed
to high railway rates, er the instigation of railroad companies.
MR. PELZER: I was giving an Indonesian example.
MR, VANDENBOSCH: Suppose there had ben no charge at all for trans#
portation betweenthe islands, would there have been no feeling of insularity?
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MR. PELZER: No, I was ecieting nut that thele was a possibility of
manipulation, and certainly the eossibility was fully utilized.
MR. DANIEL THORNER (University of Pennsylvania): When Mr. Poleman
referred before to the creation of Pakistan I think he called our attention
to something which might have COMB up a little earlier, namely, that part
of this entire area looks as much to the Near East as it looks to Southeast
Asia. Just as Southeast Asia to some extent derives from China and to some
extent from India, so India and Pakistan look to Eoutheast Asia and have had
considerable influence in Southeast Asia; but else they themselves have
been influenced from the Near East, and Pakistan in particular is oriented
toward the Near East.
When reference is made to Pakistan as an artificial creation of Britain,
I think it is well to bear in mind that Hindu-MUslim antagonism goes back
a long way. The Arabs invaded Sind before the time of Charlemagne, and Mahmud
of Ghazni, practitioner of "Holy War," came down ff.om Afghanistan into the
Punjab, (and some of his successors went all the ww to Bihar) before
William of Normandy crossed the English Channel ani conquered Southern
England. So we cannot say that they were figures Df British power.
The antagonism of Hinduism and Islam, then, hes a very long history
which nobody should deny, and it erupted in rather acute form in the days
of the declining Mogul Empire, at the end of the seventeenth and the early
eighteenth century. That antagonism has been lateet since the time of
Aurangzeb, who died in 1707. The question to whicn we perhaps should
direct ourselves for the moment is the circumstancs under which that
antagonism came to the fore in recent decades. Ane there I think we
have to turn to problems created initially by the eocial and eoenomic
disruption of Indian society when India became par of the metropolttan
economy of Great Britain. This gave birth to very genuine issues, not
simply "cultural" issues, which in themselves may ne genuine, but also
very serious economic and political issues which heve divided Hide
from Moslems in India. In imeertant areas the lanelords and money-lenders
have been predominantly Hindu and the peasants chiefly Moslems; whereas in
other areas you have had rich Moslem landlords and poor Hindu tenants.
The basic reason why imperial policy affected Hindu-Moslem relations
is that for purposes of imperial rule it is not sound to permit all groups
to line up against you. There are ways or making eure that they do not
all come together against you, and there are ways et making sure at least
that they do not all come agelpst you at the same time. This was very
frankly and publicly discussed in reports on Army Tolley in India in the
1850s and '60s and 170s, where the value of utiliz:ng cultural antagonisms
was stated in the public record and is there in particularly blatant
form.t The best example of this is the public statements of Lord Elphin-
stone, the Governor of Bombay.
Similarly, as to communal representation. While some justification
can be offered for it, the way in which it came forward and the way in
which the organization of Moslems as Moslems for pelitical purposes developed,
the assi:tanee to that from the imperial authoritiet, is something worth
reviewing. I eeink it is fairly clear that with the eise of nationalism
in India, forces which might help to counteract nationalism were strengthened
and helped to COMB into beina....dge-or.
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iri sophisticated way. I think it would be inappropriate to say that the
seed of the Muslim League was taken by a British official and put in the
ground and water poured on it and fertilizer added. Not all of those thihgs
were dope, but Aa good deal of imperial assistance was given in the nourishing
process.
It is worth remembering also that these things are subject to rapid
change. That demand for Pakistan itself was put forward less than ten years
ago, and not 'before then by any important political party in India. Pakistan
itself, then, is less than a decade old and it is worth oar while to
consider the implications of such rapid change in that area.
? MR. PAUL KATTENBURG (Department of Political Science, Iale University):
I would like to address myself to the question raised here of taking
Southeast Asia and India as a bloc. Certainly I will verge on the political
and perhaps in doing so retrace the steps of the New Delhi Conference on
Cultural Relations which found it impossible to keep political considerations
out of its debates in 1947, thereby perhaps giving some evidence of the
fundamentally political nature of the forces for regionalism emerging.
We are in danger of not recognizing a phenomenon already impressively
on the world scene. The central factor it the seversfte of this region froim
subordination to centers of power located in the Nest, and the emergence
of indigenous considerations to paramountcy, Our former thinking, for
example about the role of the Indian Ocean ban in woM4politics, must in
large part be revised. The ideas of Panikkar, expressed toward the end of
the war, for instance, the notion of India and Inddneeia as twin pillars
of a common security zeta, are becoming of great relevance. Expression
of this has been given more recently after the first police action of the
Dutch in Indonesia, by Nehru, what has been called Nehruts "Monroe Doctrine,"
the idea that the imposition of force on the part of the West in this area
will be resisted. Of course this cannot yet be translated into effective
political terms, but nonetheless the phenomenon, as has been seen even
more recently at the Delhi Conference of 1949, is impressively present.
Not only are the fundamental security considerations for emerging nations
involved, but these are reenforoed by oonsiderable unity of purpose among
the elites in an ideological sense, by the common characteristics of the
nationalist struggle, and by the present balance of forces in Asia, which
ie in the way of radical change due to what is happening at the present
time in China.
I would like to add one point on the vocation of Islam. It is remarkabIs
that India and Pakistan found unity on the Indonesian question, Apt, as
Mr. Vandenbosch has pointed out, that they tot* opposite positions. This is
one of the rare instances where Pakistan oriented herself toward Asia.
Earlier, at the New Delhi Conference in 1947 Pakistan had manifested a
marked distrust of Hindu imperialism.
? MR. WEIGHT: Perhaps this discussion of the relative importance of mani-
pulation and the things you manipulate will come into our discussions at a
later time. It seems to me, however, that any large-scale region, or nation,
consists of somebody actively manipulating and of factors that can be mani-
pulated.,
I was in Germany in 1934 and talked with the Japanese ambassador to
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Germany, Japan was coming into the Axis which I tnink most people will say
was a manipulated rather than a natural group. The Japanese ambassador)
however, emphasized the cultural similarity betweel Japan and Germany. He
claimed certain recent discoveries about the relationship of Germany and
Japan across Siberia. The manipulators found it extremely useful to discover
that there were cultural ?relationships, even thou most people wouiskfted?
to say the least, these relationships very obscure- Such a discovery Iftuld
serve as a builiing stone for the new manipulative structure that the Japanese
ambassador was at the time trying to make.
A point emerged in our conference yesterday which seemed to MB to
indicate a certain cultural similarity among people in the area we are dis-
cussing, differentiating them from Westerners. Yesterday in viewing the
economic situation in SotalseAsia, all of us who wese brought up in a Western
culture felt a profound pessimism. On the other hsnd, in our disaussions
today on culture we all feel a little leas pessimistic, and I think in both
cases that the members of this conference from Soueh Asia itself felt even
less pessimistic.
I wonder if that does not indicate perhaps a profound cultural difference
Which exists. In the West we are inclined to thine that the major goal of
human effort is to make it possible for all indiviluals tho are born to
live out their span of life with enough to eat. It occurs to me that maybe
in the scale of values in South Asia that value is very much less important.
It may he that most people there, while they would like to have enough
to eat, feel that the opportunity to be born into a culture is more important
than the opportunity to live out a normal epan of life. Consequently, the
problem of population, the Malthusian differential between population
growth and food supply) leaves the South Asians mash colder than it leaves
the tetsterners. They are less impressed by the evils of a.high birth rate
and a high death rate and low standards of living than are we Westerners.
Consopusntly they are not as pessimistic as we are about this area where
it seems extremely difficult to meet the population problem.
I am wrndering whether that profound cultural difference isn't the
most important thing we have to deal with. It may be a major factor in
the anti-imperialistic drive which has been so manifest in South Asia.
After all, it is perfectly natural that the imperiel powers from Europe
should assume) as Mr. Furnivall said, that the people in the area should
want the things we think they ought to want. Maybe they don't want those
things and. it was the continual pressure of the imperial powers, unconsciously
assuming they ought to want those things, that was the basis of the conflict.
It may be that in this whole area you have that basic cultural difference and,
if that is true, that way provide something out of which to manipulate a
unity 24 the area in opposition to the different velue system of the West.
I might link this up with what W. Holland said about Western types of
dress, hair-cut, clothes, etc. Those things cost money. It may be that if
you have an aspect of Western culture of that kind filtering into South
Asia it will mean that the South Asians will take 1 greater interest in
having purchasing power so they can get those things. It may be that graduaiLy
this philosophy of economic welfare which I have teought of as the basic
cultural standard of the West will filter through. The result may be that
there will develop in South Asia so great a concern about building up a
standard of living that they seal then_see the_ ,8 qm
4ou03ou Itt Wit
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They may become aware that the relation of population growth to food
supply is such that the problem can hardly be faced and the whole area
will become extremely unhappy. If the people do not have our cultural
ideas and do not care so much if a large number of people are starving
and dying perhaps they will be less unhappy, especially if the economic
problem is so great that it can not be solved for an indefinite future,
MODERATOR EGGAN: One comment on that. Despite Professor Sarkar's
statement with regard to the caste system the other evening, that it
was only to regulate marriage, one of the things which the caste system
did was to provide this cultural life and take care of it, not only here
but on ad infiniturryand that was one of its great strengths.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: I do not think it is correct to speak of Eastern
culture and Western culture in terms of absolutes, and I think it is a
mistake to put them opposite each other. And certainly I feel lb uvula
be wrong to derive anydefinite conclusions from such an abstract procedure.
Of course one could point to several differences. For instance with
regard to the particular point raised by Mr. Wright, one could argue quite
effectively and philosophize quite impressively about the different position
of the concept of charity in the two cultures, the concept of one being
his fellow man's keeper; but to assume that the consequences of the Mai-
thusian doctrine, the effects of excessive population pressure would be of.
no concern to the leaders of Asia, is in my opinion too rash a statement,
and certainly incorrect.
MR. WRIGHT: I meant the relative degree of the two things.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: It is of course correct to sayt hat at the present
moment the problems of this kind do not figure as problems of an acute
nature in the minds of the people, since their primary concern is with poli-
tical problep, especially in those areas where the attainment of political
independence is still an issue. On the other hand I don't think that
any leader in Southern Asia is unaware of the importance of the population
problem. To come back to the division of the world into Eastern and
Westdrn cultures, Iwould like to point to the emurgence of nationalism
in Asia as an indication that such an abstract division is incorrect and
impractical. The emergence of nationalism in Asia is due to a development,
many of the sources of which could be traced to the West; that is, the
emergence of the sense of individuality, the sense of personal dignity which
is now pervading the nationalist upsurge in Asia and which is, I would say,
one of its most important motivating spiritual factors. Therefore, I don't
think that we could fruitfully deal in.absolute terms with "the East and
"the West".
I also want to make a remark on the statement made earlier by Mr. Holland.
The tendency to ape some of the superficial features in which Western culture
presented itself in Asia has only been of a very temporary nature in the
development of Asian nationalism. It was a feature which was predominant
when the pain derived from the feeling of inferiority with regard to thWist
and its power was prevailing; but with the gradual growth of vtrength cf ir
nationalist movement, and its grcwing self-assertion, that factor lcst
importance. The general attitude now is much more matter-of-fact and caqual.
When we look for_diyiding er uniSyin-
tf` $8iEgoPeggfi6146#80g80-e9a" As an
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regionalism in the cultures of the villages in the individual countries, I
think we should remember that in this development eowari regionaltsm the
culture of the villages and therefore the culture ef our part is static;
it has no expansionist elements because a feudal society has no expansionist
elements except in cases of outright military conqeest, which is here completely
out of the question. The factors influencing regioeal development are to be
found in the politically articulate minorities of he individual countries
and not in the villages.
The cultural patterns in the villages will th3refore have no bearing on
the development of regionalism. On the contrary tlose patterns will be
influenced by the conditions created by such regiolal alignments if and when
those alignments come into being. We should re?e that Southeast Asian
regionalism is a modern movement.
MR. CHARLES W. MORRIS (University of Chicago): I just wanted to make
one remark in connection with Mr. Wrights statemeet. I don't think this
negates what he says completely because there is al element of subtlety
in this sense of self-respect which I think constieutes a difference.
I have been studying the acceptance of value patterns or ways of life among
some 500 young people in China, India, Burma and Jepan. With respect to
India and the United States, the most surprising teink was the relatively
great agreement among the young people in the relative appeal of different
ways of life -- the number of Indians that wanted to live a certain way was
about the same as the number of the United States -- I found no noticeable
difference in the motilation with respect to how people would like to
live among the young people in these two cultures. There were some
differences but they were not very great. I tried to connect that up with
problems of distribution (types of temperament, tyees of physique, and so on)
in the different cultures and the problem gets more complicated. But just
in general I have been impressed by the fact that eoncerning the relative
strength of the acceptance of the various thirteen value patterns I have
been working with there is very little difference eetween the Indian young
people and American young people. It does raise doubt as to whether the
psychological motivations are really essentially different.
MR. WRIGHT: The question whether these psychological motivations may
be the same in any population?
MR. MORRIS: China is quite different in many respects from the United
States.
MR. WRIGHT: I was raising the question whether the prevailing culture
may not have certain standards which developed frcm conditions quite apart
from the individual attitudes of the population ir which the culture exists,
and consequently it is mainly the culture which is a matter of tradition and
education. It wasn't the psychological motivatior I was concerned with.
MR. MORRIS: I was very much impressed among the Indian young people
and some others, but among the Indians partiaularly? by great psychological
scars and wounds and the desire to get a certain kind of self-respect, and
that is another factor that would not be involved in what I have said. It
might tie in with what you are saying. I think the psychological struggl,es
among theeeoune Indians are
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MR. HOLLAND: I wanted to ask whether in desoribing the goals or the
value patterns it could be said that they were essentially Western. Did
your subjects have the opportnnity of choosing whether they would want the
kind of goals that we Westerners would think desirable; or mere they also
offered a choice of old-style traditional Indian types of satisfaction,
fdr example, a feeling of &moony with one's partnts or a position of
traditional prestige in the village community and so on? In other words,
were the values essentially a Western pattern or were the people given an
opportunity of choice between them and the old style?
MR, MORRIS: That is always a problem. The endeavor was to not make
these Western, and the students had a chance to formulate alternatives to
these thirteen value patterns if they found none of them satisfactory.
So we endeavoured to avoid that problem, but that does not say actually
that we did avoid that problem. At least an endeavor was made to give
each individual an opportunity to form alternatives and there were not
many radical proposals.
MR. HOLLAND: My point in raising the question originally was precisely
because I also had the feeling that there were appreciable differences in
kind between the relative strength of the Western appeal as between India
as the one extreme and China on the other. It is a legacy of history, the
impact of English ways, English language, English institutions on India
probably having been relatively much greater than the Western impact on
China.
MR. REUDENS: On this question of the Western impact on Asiatic
values, I think we have given too much stress to physical values. Mr. Holland
re-rtated the anthropologists' position chiefly in terms of consumption
values; of clothing and hairstyles, and even food. This is valid and
impootant, but perhaps does not go far enough. If we think of the point
that Mr. Mandelbaum raised regarding the effect of introducing Western
technology into the Asiatic societies, then there is 4 question whether these
societies can or do in fact absorb and integrate the new elements to ellY
great degree; or whether, on the other hand, these Western technologies
mean Various kinds of Western procedures that are incompatible with the
values of the given Asiatic society.
think we must consider the transformation of occupations the people
are engaged in; the transformation of agriculture, particularly as it shifts
from subsistence crops to more cash crops; breaking down of the self-suffi-
ciency of the village; impairment of various features of native law; you
get a shift in the supreme importance of land-owning as commercial and even
manufacturing operations get under way; you get a class shift as to the
role of the money-lender, and you get in addition to that the role of the
city bank,"the role of the foreign money-lender, and the role of foreigners
generally as entrepreneurs. Even beyond that you get a shift from the old
values of stability and tradition and persistence and familiarity, to a
readiness to accept change and novelty, and a greater emphasis perhaps on
rational calculation. New alternatives are now presented: "Shall you use
this crop or that?" - "Shall you use more fertilizer or a new and expensive
kind of seed?" There are new possibilities as to what you can do with a
piece of land or a given amount of labor-time, and this forces upon the
traditional system of production the klind of choices which people face in
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choosing between alternatives, a certain amount f pulling themselves away
from the traditional matrix, and begin to consithr these things in a broader
frame of calculation.
I submit that since these countries are already engaged in economic
modernization, they are in the course of it and they are obviously not going
to rabraco their steps; that introduction of thie new technology creates
very basic clashes with the old culture; and that the question arises as to
what extent it is possible to integrate the Western technology with the
traditional culture. Mr. Nhndelbaum assumes that it is possible. I wonder
if we ought not to address ourselves to the question of how far it is
possible.
MR. MANDELBAUN: I certainly agree that theee are now more alternatives
in village life than there were before; however, I don't think that there
ever was a time when there were no alternatives. It is a matter of different
kinds of alternatives and perhaps a somewhat greater number of them being
presented. I don't think any one of us can say whether this integration is or
ie not possible. In a sense I don't think that es an answerable queotion
because some kind of integration is going to come about. It may come about
with greater or less friationip. but I seriously doubt whether there will
be a total rejection of Western technology in an one of these societies
with which we are concerned this mornigg.
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: I don't think that the ineroduction of Western tech-
nology in the societies of Southern Asia will create insurmountable
difficulties in this respect. The introduction of Western technolggy,
together with the spread of Western elemeef-econoire-, is bound to bring about
the further disruption of the closed village structure; this in turn will
lead towards the destruction of many of the frozen attitutes of the people,
creating the necessity for the people to find a new orientation and outlook
on life.
Different from its historical developmekt ir the West, Western technology
will be introduced to the underdeveloped areas of the world from the outside
and from. above. The peoples of those areas, therefore, will have to face
the introduction of completely developed modern technology. At the same time,
the old security provided by their villages and their customs and outlook
on life which was so closely related to the old feudal social structure will
have broken down.
Under those circumstances, therefore, I do not think that one coed
speak of a fundamental incompatibility of the twe ways of life on the bass
of abstract theory. The people will have to adapt themselves to the existence
of the apparatus of modern technology in their daily life, and in that process
I am quite sure many of the problems which, from a viewpoint of theoretical
deduction look incompatible, will cease to be problems at all and will
vanish, because the answers will be fOund on an entirely different level.
All these answers in the end will bring about a basic change in attitude
and create a new outlook on life. In many respects,therefore, there will
be no such thing as a deliberate choice on the part of the bulk of the people
between two or more theoretical alternatives. This process of adaptation
of such magnitude will not take place without shecks and violence. Ita
consum9a+4
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difficulties one would run into in introducing modern technology among the
hillbillies in the U.S.A. or alrig the peoples of any backward area in modern
Western states.
This of course by no means explains away the size of the difficulties
we will run into, There still remains the question as to hew to develop
among the people that acquisitive urge beyond the search for the bare
necessities of existence, which apparently is such an important element
in the full development of the popular resources of a nation.
MR. SARKAR: I want to ask a practical question. It is not speculative.
Suppose you were asked to help Washington, D.C. with a scheme for the training
of American diplomatic officials or consular agents and commercial attaches
with regard to some of these areas, wouldn't you attach special importance
to the linguistic and tribal or racial diversities? Secondly, to which kinds
of unities or uniformities would you attach greater importance? To the old
traditional Sanskritic or to the modern, Eur-American, technological, scien-
tific and administrative? Thirdly, are the so-called opponents of Southeast
Asian peoples really common or unified? You used an expression like that.
Mr. Soedjatmoko, I shall ask a particular question. Does every
Javanese gnderstand Malayan or Indonesian without attempting to learn it
in a special manner? You have used an expression "safeguarding Indonesia
vis-a-vis the Chinese." What does that mean?
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: I must start with a correction; I did not say
"safeglogiding Indonesia vis-a-vis the Chinese"; I was referring to the
particular situation in Malaya where the Malayans feel a great deal of
insecurity with regard to their political and economic future, vis-a-vis
the Chinese particularly. The fact is that in Singapore the Malayans
are outnumbered by far by the Chinese and that in Malaya proper the Chinese
are equal in number to the Malayans.
After this correwtion, I think I could address myself to the question....
MR. SARKAR (interposing): Does every Javanese understand Indonesian
without attempting to learn it?
ER. SOEDJATMOKO: I suppose every Javanese gets a sufficient mastery
of the Indonesian language as far as is necessary to conduct a regular
conversation with any other ethnic group in the Archipelago. Of course
there is a difference between the ability to use common, everyday language
and the full mastery of a language in a trained manner. Here of course the
question of education in the Malay language comes in.
MR. SARKAR: Normally, all Javanese do not understand Malayan?
MR. SOEDJATMOKO: Except for the peasants in the Demote inlands, yes*
MODERATOR EGGAN: In regard to your first question, I don't think our
State Department is quite that far advanced on applied anthropology, althoggh
they are training the Foreign Service officers in general cultural matters
and in linguistic matters. I think they have made a good start in that
direction. I assume from the way that you stated your question that it
was perhaps somewhat rhetorical.
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MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I calld take up the point Mr.
Soedjatmoko made which I thought was very importlnt. He said that the
Southeast Asians would not develop their resources until they got an
acquisitive urge. I would raise this question, whether even if they get
an acquisitive urge they will be able, considering the population and
resource balance in Southeast Asia, to satisfy i. Therefore, may it not
be best to avoid giving them the acquisitive urge.? Maybe the most cruel
thing you can do to a people is to give them values which under their
conditions it is impossible to realize. That, i-, seems to me, is the
question raised by the extreme pessimism which I observed among the Western-
ers in our yesterday's conference.
MR. ISAACS: I confess m7self completely baffled by notions I never
encountered before. Mr. Wright previously painted for us a picture in which
he suggested that people in Asia are not as inteeested as we are in living
a full life with enough to eat. I have never ma-,, except for a few mystics,
any individuals who answer that description, either in Asia or in the
United States or anywhere else. I am thinkink in terms of the basic
attitudes of people and the lives they lead in whatever culture. I am
surprised to hear Mr. Soedjatmoko say that one of' the necessities of the
transition in Southeast Asia is going to be to g:s.ve people there an acquisi-
tive urge. I would not exactly place the acquis:tive urge on the same
plane with hunger, sex and other basic drives of the human animal but I
place them pretty close to it, if we understand by the acquisitive urge the
impulse on the part of the individual to get the things he needs to live.
Al]. over Asia, the primary fact of life is the fact that millions of people
are working intolerably hard to acquire the minirum they need to live, and
are trying to live as long as possible with as much as possible in their
stomachs. If that isn't an acquisitive urge, I don't know What is. I
don't know what kind of people lack it.
MODERATOR EGGAN: What they put in their ethmachs is pretty well
determined by what their culture tells them they should put in their stomachs.
ER. ISAACS: I think this reflects a lot of our thinking about Asia. We
tend almost to place them in a different species from ourselves. As a friend
of mire put it : many of us seem to think the peo le of Asia are people
who don't defecate, who don't fornicate, who some how live out an animal
existence on a sub-human basis.
MR. WRIGHT: May I explain what I think are the differences between
culture and individual attitudes? As Mr. Morris says, individuals are a good
deal the same all over the world but I think cultures set value standards.
The Catholic church of the Middle Ages had a set of values similar to those
which I ascribed to South Asia. These valeus let, them to oppose birth
control, to emphasize another world, to say that in this world we are all
going to be miserable and so we should pay attention to another world, and
to preparing for rewards there. That is a cultural set of values. It goes
against what every individual, whether he is a Catholic or South Asian or
anybody else, thinks as a biological specimen, yet it is a culture which grew
up in the Middle Ages because in Medieval Europe you had the same diffi-
culty of satisfying the acquisitive urge, of satisfying the population with
the productivity of the existing technology that you have in Asia today.
The values of the Catholic church may have been well adapted to that situation.
in otheAppez*ed
o r iRiSIghteg10412107/24 YelAeRDR60-130926A13131410103660/3149.e for them
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to achieve, and to suppress their natural desires which most could not satisfy.
Are not the cultures and religions in South Asia ones which cultivate
values which it is possible for most people to realize? There, people cannot
achieve the high standard of living which can be achieved in America. I think
we must recognize as basic, the difference between what the individual wants
and what the culture says he ought to want.
MR. HOSELITZ: I think that part of the difficulty between Mr. Isaacs
and Mr. Wright and others arises from the fact that we do not distinguish
between ideologies, on the one hand, and the predominant personality types
in various populations on the other. I have been trying to study the
development of capitalist society in Europe and I think that an analysis of
personality may provide a good explanation of the changes of attitudes,
dominant i,eologies, or ethics.
I think that the talk of Miss DuBois has thrown considerable light on
the unity of slow-chanartng primitive civilizations. But I think some adapta-
tions of this theory throw light on civilizations in which you have patterns of
faster change.
think that the fact to be looked for is that you find different kinds
of personality types predominant at different times in the history of a people
with changing culture. Thus with the development of industrialism in India
personality types there will tend to survive .which have little survival value
in more primitive, more agrarian society, and I think Mr. Morrist findings
in India can be based on such an explanation to SOMB extent. I think for
Europe a hypothesis along, such lines could be proved rather nicely. This
theory acknowledges the basic human drives for food, for sexual expression
and so on, but it recognizes also the modifications in all behavior patterns
which are being made through the impact of ideology and environment. In a
changing society we must go beyond reachIng for one predominant personality
type, (basic personality if you want to call it that) and must look for the
simultaneous existence of different personality types in the same society and
their relation to changes in the social and economic development of the
society.
MODERATOR EGGAN: I think we have to bring this session to a close in
order to get something to eat and satisfy that wbasic urge" of our society.
Let me say a few words from an anthropological standpoint.
The question of basic or derived culture factors, from an anthropological
stqndpoint, are not very important because if you want to take cultures apart
and distribute the origins of the traits or patterns around you May find 70-
or 80- or 90 percent have COE4 into every culture from somewhere else. If you
look at what happens in history and what the people in the villages or in the
towns think happen in history, these may very frequently be two different
things, so that it order to see the influence. of Asia and of India on the
Netherlands India; for example, you have to find out what selection out of
those past influences still affects modern life.
As anthropologists look at culture change, from the long point of view at
least, they stress contact. Contact is from that standpoint the great
leveler, and contact I think we would all agree is increasing, if not in
geometrical proportions, in at 1 .P ? Ah?d-TRA&&ms of
transpoiVIVIIMMEerMeMFACHRIu6 4 :
that divide these areas, as they make the Malayan Peninsula not a jutting
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geographical division between East and West but gossibly an isthmus or
a transportation point across, and, as in areas Euch as Indonesia (and in
other areas) lingua francas develop, as radio anc other mass media of
communication reach these further areas new ideat will become much more
common, much more apparent.
So, in the long yiew, I thf.nk there is going to be a cultural leveling
here, whether you are interested in it or not, wYcther you try to foster it
or not, whether you try to stop it or not, ar whcther yru try to manipulate
it or not. Once you get larger groups of peoplc in _bantletshir t4th.. .
each other, they begin to structure those relaticnships, to develop forms
of social integration. We have had a number in the past and I think perhaps
in this area we may get some new ones developing, because as these needs
"develop" somehow or other the societies begin tc, organize institutional forms
which will bring these groups of people into relttionship.
Hence, I think we are going to have, in the
series of new socially integrated structures devc
across it and tying it into other areas., as well,
give a considerably greater degree of unity to ti
present. Whether the ties with a neighboring ref
Middle East or with Europe or with America will t:
larger picture and blur it, or even take portionz
something for a much further future, but I think
or twenty-five years we are going to have on the
more unity than we have at present. I believe it
direction, and onee it starts it is irreversible.
Soc,theast Asia have the capacity to develop the i
all other societies from Adam and Eve up to Westc
have shown a capacity to develop.
long run at least, a whole
loping in this area and cutting
which will in the long run
is region than we have at
ion such as China or with the
ltimately come Lao this
of this area away, is
in the next ten, fifteen
cultural level a great deal
is going to go. in that
These societies in
ntegrative structures which
rn federations of today
...Follotakng a current announcement by Dircator Talbot, the conference
recessed at 12:10 P.M.
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THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATIO
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism intouth Asia
VI
Round Table IV: POLITICAL FORCES
Friday afternoon, May 27, 1949
Presiding: Phillips Talbot
MODERATOR TALBOT: Ladies and Gentlemen, we are moving ahead this
afternoon. Having yesterday morning posed heroic problems, and yesterday
afternoon proposed, as some thought, rather less than heroic solutions, and
having considered this morning the cultural and social forces in various
guises, we come now to these questions: what can be aone in respect to
nationalism in South Asia; what are people doing; what would they like to
do, particularly at the political level?
Mr. Harold Isaacs, of NEWSWEEK Magazine, will open the discussion this
afternoon. Mr. Isaacs.
PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
Harold R. Isaacs
Mr. Chairman, I think it is a good thing that we have finally
come down to the political aspects of this problem. In terms or the multi-
ple attack that Dr. Pelzer referred to at the outset, I think it is
obviously true that the forward prong of that attack is in the political
sphere. Ware confronted in South Asia with a vast political transition
comparable, I think, to the great political transitions that took place in
Western Society at the time of the emergence of the capitalist social order.
We are witnessing the breakdown of the system created by Western capitalism
in Asia and the beginning of a long and tortuous process of change. I think
we can only begin to understand these problems in this context.
When I was in Java just a matter of weeks ago, a Dutchman said to UR:
"Now really, don't you agree that all this has come much too early?" and I
said, "No, I am afraid it has come much too late." He looked at me rather
blankly and I am afraid I did not make much progress in explaining to him
what I meant. To a Dutchman engaged in the rather desperate effort to retain
some degree of control in a rich former colony that was, I suppose, a rather
unexpected way of putting the problem. But neither is it a simple matter for
the nationalists themselves to measure what they are, or to understand where
tIley are going.
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Triumphant nationalism or emergent nationalesm in South Asia is caught
in a very cruel paradox. It is coming to its tiLe of triumph in a time when
nationalism as such is bankrupt. These countriee are only now gaining their
opportunity to create their own national states, when the era of the nation-
state is obviously coming to an end. They are receiving only now the
opportunity to begin to build national political economies when it seems fair-
ly obvious that the national political economy ae such is a diseased and
dying thing in our world and does not have much cf a future. This fact
obviously is not readily evident to the people ergrossed in these nationalist
movements, stubbornly fiehting against their immediate enemies to achieve
immediate objectives. These are considerable.
Thanks to the declining power of the old emiires and the blows struck
by Japan, the nationalist movements in the former colonies of South Asia
ean throw off, have been able to throw off, and ere in the process of
throwing off Western rule. They can achieve and are achieving now the
elementary victory of political independence. TinTer can restore to this
extent the self-respect which subjection denied them. They can put an
end to dependency and to the kind of exploitatior designed to serve
foreign investors rather than the well-being of teeir own people. This
is still a goal that commands immense force and can marshal great masses
of people under the nationalist banner. It is a 7oal that must be Bought
and, as the French and Dutch have shown in Indochina and Indonesia, it
involves bitter struggles that cannot be avoided.
But to the wide and crowded realm of new proolems that lies beyond the
victory over the Western ruler, simple nationalise brings very little that
is usefel or promising for the future. It is lat in the sense that
national sovereignty in the 19te eentury sense is no longer capable of
giving people the means of solAthe their most urvnt problems of production,
livelihood, health, education, end security. Eaci.1 of these countries can
quickly assume the external treppings of national independence, complete
with diplomatic missioas, armies and seemingly aitonomous economic policies.
But they enter a world that is inhospitable to ineividual nations, especially
weak and backward nations. They enter a world in which the nation is no
longer the effective unit of political and economee life but IS, on the
contrary, an anachronistic form of social organization which is retarding,
almost more than any other single factor, the foreard progress of peoples
everywhere.
It is not necessary to labor the point that we are living in the era of
decline and disappismancs of the nation-state. Every major event in world
history in the last forty years has shown, convuleively as a rule, that the
world has outgrown the national form of organizatfen. Out of two world
wars and a major depression we learned that the old system no longer
functioned fruitfully. We have witnessed the gracual whittling down of the
number of contending nations in the shrunken sphere of world economy and
we have discovered that the prime problem of our time is the reorganization
of our society into units larger, than the nation, into a unit, indeed, as
large as the world itself. Hitler's attempt to ccnquer Urope, Japan's
attempts to mold. Asia. into a single .sphere under its control, the creation
of the United Nations, the emergence of huge spheres controlled by the two
surviving conteaders for world power, have all bean, in their various ways,
attempts to corns to grips with this demand of our time,
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Py now all the great empires that rose in the epoch of the nation-state
have fallen, or else have declined gradually. to dependent status, In
world politics it is no longer a matter, as it wau before 1914, of a mad
scramble among rival groups for pieces of the worlds territory and wealth.
It is a matter now, between the two emerging titans of world power, the
United States and Russia, a matter of organizing the world itself, In this
struggle there are combined both the elements of a struggle between
national powers, on this enormously enlarged scale, and a profound conflict
between contending sets of politico-economic institutions. Today every
lesser country in the world is subject to the conditions created by this
world power conflict. None is independent. None enjoys national sovereignty
in the older sense of that term. Even Russia and the United States them-
elves cannot any longer ensure their internal progress and their external
security as self-contained national entities. They are forced to try to
erect new systems of supra-national dimensions into which every smaller
country is drawn.
No new nation can in these circumstances hope to emerge and grow by
the old means previously open to independent nationalities. Even the
simplest kind of national economic development is now subject to world
conditions. The world power struggle and the conditions inherited from the
war determine all the principal limits of international political life and
the terms of internal economic change, industrialization, and participation
in the world market. Virtually every country is in some degree a dependent,
a pensioner, or a victim of the larger power sphere into which it falls,
either on the basis of subsidy as in the case of the nations participating
in the Marshall Plan, or in the form of satenites feeding a planned central
economy as in the case of the Russian sphere. Older European lands like
Italy or Czechoslovakia, France or Poland, illustrate this fact in
different ways. A tiny new nation-state like Israel can make its way only
on foreign subsidies. New nations like India or Burma or the Philippines
face the staggering problems of internal transformation without any
immediate prospect of fitting into a world system that will allow them to
begin to thrive. China, the buffeted victim of a hundred years of imperialist.
rivalries and depredations, emerges in the Russian totalitarian sphere and
cannot hope to repeat even the limited achievement of nationalist Russia
in the sphere of industrialization. National sovereignty is a myth and
those in South Asia who emerge with it as the prize of victory find them-
selves facing the guture almost empty-handed.
Such is the real political context in which we now have to place the
countries of South Asia. It perhaps can be said that India has the size
and the potential strength, possibly, to go farther along the road of
developing as a nation than any of the others. This may be debatable;
but the Southeast Asian nations are without exception immediately and
mortally subject to these conditions. Burma, Siam and Indochina, all
bordering South China, are in a state of uncrystallized conflict. They
are confronted with the early possibility of having on their northern
frontiers a very 4ynamic force indeed in China.
Chinese influence in those countries will be decisive, both in its
effect on the development of Communist movements within those countries
and/or in the sense of direct Chinese intervention in their affairs.
Their prospects of prolonged independence as 19th century-type sovereign
states are very veer dim.
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Malaya is a separate case by itself. It his even less of the makings
of a nation with any chance of prolonged surviwl than any of the others.
This is partly the result of the historic circurestance of its plural
population, more or less evenly divided between Malays and Chinese.
In Melva you find a rather pathetic attempt gofng on to create a Malayan
nationality, to which the Malays are a little allergic and to which the
Chinese are certainly indifferent. You find in Malaya soberer people
thinking of the future of the country much more in terms of the ultimate
extent of the direct Chinese influence on the ore hand from the North
and the possible effect of the Indonesian influence from the South.
A great many people foresee the possibility of e division of the country
between those two spheres. The nature of the relationship between them
will be determined, I suppose, by whether or not the Indonesian federation
by that time is in a hostile relation to China cr in a cooperative relation
to China. Either is possible.
All of these countries have to solve staggering internal problems,
many of which have been touched upon and described in the sessions we have
had here. They have to increase their food production. They have to
rebuild and build transportation systems. They aave to begin to industrialize
on a non-colonial basis, that is, they have to begin to reorganize their
economies in a may that will provide them with a more balanced system of
production instead of leaving them wholly depend-nt on one or two major
raw materials supplied to foreign processors.
These tasks obviously cannot be accomplishei in this day and age by
each individual country, acting for and by itself. The alternative goes
right to the heart of our world-wide problem. Teese new countries, wisely
and necessarily winning their political independeece and putting an end
to colonial rule, must find the way of breaking eat almost at once from
the confining barriers of obsolete nationalism. They can thrive only if
there is a new world order into which they can fit. They can begin to
solve these problems only if they can reaction within some larger fremework
providing opportunities for common planning, eomeon work, pooling of
Capital resources and of needs. In the absence' 3f such an order - and there
is no sign of it as yet - they are domed to stifle, each within its awn
boundaries, or to seek lesser expedients in the eope of getting along
somehow until broader opportunities offer themsYeves.
Since 1945 there has been a growing awarene s Of the need to break
out of the purely national arena. In 1945, when these struggles were just
beginning in wake of the Japanese surrender, there was very little
consciousness among the nationalist leaders in South Asia of this aspect
of their problem. I remember what must have been one of the very first
moves made in this direction when Ho Chi-minh of 7iet Nam sent a message
to President Soekarno in Batavia asking him to jcin with him, first, in a
common declaration of purpose in their common steeggle, and second, to
form a preparatory commission looking forward to future cooperation among
all the countries of Southeast Asia. The Indoneeian Republican leaders
rather scorned that proposition, laid it aside and would hot have anything
to do with it. They believed that they were goine to achieve their national
independence without great difficulty and did not want to. admit any new
complications. -Within a comparatively short time, in fact, by 1947 when
Sutan Sjahrir came to Lake Success to plead the Indonesian case in the
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greatay changed. By then_Sjahrir was greatly interested in the possibility
of cooparation or joint action in some form with the other countries of
South Asia.) Obviously this change was the result of direct and rather
bitter experience.
Some other developments reflacting the impulse to find a broader
framework have been mentioned iu this discussion. One was, the Asian
Relations Conference in 1947. It was designed more as a demonstration
than as a political act and had no direct political consequences. The
Southeast Asia League that was formed in Bangkok in 1948 was an abortive
affair which was put together largely under the auspices of certain
Siamese, especially Nal Pridi, who was at that time Prime Minister. He
saw in it, in the first place, the opportunity to aid his own effort to
get the neighboring territory of Cambodia out of French control; and,
secondly, being a politician of some imagination, he saw a great deal in
the possibility of organizing the beginnings of a federation in Southeast
Asia. If he had not been thrown out of power by a coup-dtetat last
November, he probably would have made Bangkok an important center for
this effort. With the downfall of Pridi and the coming to power of Marshal
Phibun, the whole idea was abruptly abandoned. There was even an attempt
to depict the League as a Communist conspiracy, which it was not, although
several Vietnamese Communists participated in it.
The next major devdbpment along this line was, I believe, the Delhi
Conference on Indonesia in January, 1949. The headlines at the time spoke
of the creation of New Delhi of an "Asian bloc." ?biliously no such bloc
was formed there, although even as a diplomatic myth the very idea of such
a bloc stirred and startled the chancelleries in London and Washington. The
truth of the matter, however, was a good deal less substantial than the
appearance. The conference was the first joint political move by a ?group
of Asian states. But it was a very halting first step indeed. It produced
no permanent results.
The conference was called by Pandit Nehru, the prime minister of India,
two weeks after the Dutch army perpetrated its second "police action" in
Java. Nehru had long seen the possibility and the desirability of
solidarizing India with the Indonesian nationalist movement. India, almost
alone, extended material aid to the Indonesian Republicans during the long
and tortuous struggle against the Dutchaiter1945.It seemed to Nehru that
the Dutch were enjoying the tacit support of the Western bloc in the United
Nations and his first impulse, after the Dutch attack, was to open a full-
blown diplomatic offensive which would compel a Western retreat.
Nehru is a man of great attainments who is not really at home in the
hugger-mugger of politics. He is still moved by a broadly socialist
outlook. He is still suspicious of the Western imperialism he fought
all his life. As a leader in the Indian freedom movement, his inspirational
and emotional qualities outweighed his indecisiveness in specific political
issues, Now, as a leader in power, he is forced to make constant compromises
both in domestic and international politics and to trust less than ever
to his instincts and impulses. This happened very clearly in connection
with the Conference on Indonesia.
When the invitations to the conference had already gone out and before
any rep4ar,Admteerbzeceivakije,1247 on Janogib2 at
Ahmedabar`Aienhatidrgrat'afetiini sacrificing
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the struggle of the Indonesian nationalists to tie Evropean concerns of
the Western bloc. It was a bitter and outspoken attack which appalled not
only the British and American embassies but also the group of professional
diplomats and ex-civil servants surrounding Nehri in the Indian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Between January 2 and January 22 when the conference
convened, a very considerable change took place. This change was not
unrelated to skillful pressure applied by both tie British and Americans
on N.ehru and on his principal foreign affairs ad/iser, Sir Girja Bajpai.
The result was that the con2erence was wate-ed down and turned out to
be a rather tame and docile e.ff-ir The Western powers were relieved.
But people in India and in o,ael 6outh Asian countries were disappointed.
There had been a swift electric response to the 3onference call among
most South Asian nationalists. They came to Delni with great expectations.
They left quite empty-handed.
In the first place., the chances for South Asian organization at this
conference were dimmed by Nehru's invitations to the Arsi nations. He
wanted obviously to stage the broadest possible lemonstration of U.N,
members. He also doubtless wanted to impress ury-xl Pakistan and on the
Moslem minority in India that his government was closely alignud with.
the Mosidm nations. But the net result was to limit the agenda of the
conference and to silence all those who wanted t.) take advantage of the
opportunity to go beyond the toPie- of Indonesia. The Arab delegates were
anxious for a chance to talk about Palestine as 4e11 as about Indonesia.
But while many of the other delegations present nad other topics they
would have liked to introduce, few were willing to be drawn into the Palestine
issue, which was at that time before the U.N.. Tie result was that the
agenda was strictly confined to the single item If Indenelia. On that
single item, the caution dictated by the Indian eaders, assisted by
Australia, eliminated all proposals for direct a'Ld. to Indonesia by the
conference states. Instead the program was redued simply to the drafting
of a resolution for submission to the U.N. Security Council. Even the proposal,
made and strongly seconded by some delegations, -1c) set up permanent
machinery for future consultation was watered down. It emFrged as a vague
resolutie41- calling for future discussions without any implementing
machinery. It was not meant to have any concret?, result and, indeed, as
the sequel showed, nothing came of it.
One consequence of the limitation of the avnda was the fact that
amid all the to-do over the Dutch war in IndonesLa nothing, literally
nothing, was said about the French war in Indochina. There was a delegate
present from Viet Nam. He had nct been invited, He was politely received,
given a visitors badge, and permitted to attend the public sessions.
But the Viet Nam issue was carafuliy kept out of the speeches and delibera-
tions of the conference, except for a single obL.que reference by the
representative of Burma. Aside from the desire -,c) avoid the touchy Palestine
issue, which would have been admissible if Viet Jam had been discussed,
and aside from the desire to keep the conference within strict limits,
Nehru and his advisers also showed signs of being afraid of the Communist
coloratl5n of the Viet Nam nationalist leadershi2. They were antious to
impress upon the Western powers the total respectability of the conference.
They managed only to disappoint several delegati)ns which were anxious for
a broader discussion of Southeast Asian affairs. The7 also disappointed
the ineftekrA1,4 car& 4cav ehWamig, a CrititfcaliN-oi, Vt0WWW-9solidarity
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and were asked to be content with the draft of a resolution for the U.N.
Philippines Delegate Carlos Romulo said at the closing session: "We have
effectively championed the cause of Indonesian independence without offend-
ing or antagonizing anybody." This, if true, was the most notable
achievement of the conference.
Another significant regional development affecting South Asia has been
taking place within the context of the British Commonwealth, or more
correctly now, the Commonwealth. Great Britain has been trying, ever since
its withdrawal from India and Burma, to work out some new form of maintaining
its position in Asia, It has begun to shape up with the devising of the new
formula which kept India within the CommonwealthaS a Repuhlic. The
ultimate ob,lect mculd be to create a new band of participating nations
linked u Sritain, including India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon,
and possibly even Burma, although Nehru's attempt to organize "assistance"
to Burma under Commonwealth auspices in Februany this year backfired rather
badly, Part of this project is a somewhat more distant dream of creating
a new Dominion ont of Malaya, including Singapore and the other Straits
Settlements, British Barneo, and perheps even Hongking if it can be kept
out of Chinese Communist hands. This British design moves slowly and
against great obstaoles but is by no means to be ignored in sizimg up
the regional possibilities.
The other arena in which an attempt is being made to deal with South
Asia as a whole lies in the U.N. Economic Commibsion for Asia and the Far
East, known as ECAFE. This commission has held several uniformly
unproductive conferences. For one thing, it includes Russia and the United
Statec and every question that COMBS before it is affected by the cold war.
For another, it is dominated by the Western powers. Until last year, the
Dutch spoke in its councils for Indonesiaahough after a bitter struggle
the Indonesians.; were finally admitted, as associate members. The French
still speak for Indochina, the aritish for Malaya. The Asian delegations
defensively act as purely national units, each with its own plans
and it own hope of securing dollar credits u The organization as a whole has
up to now served a little more than an agency for gathering statistics,
frequently of dubious value, and. adearing house for information, which
is often quite irrelevant.
At the ECAFE conference held in Bangkok in March this year, all these
wenknesTss were painfully apparent. Each delegation came armed with only
the narrowest kind of nationalist thinking. Only the Indian delegate
gave a flicker of a broader spirit when he informally indicated that India
might be willing to share with some of the other countries its own limited
and badly-needed supply of steel.
But the most remarkable and most paradoxical thing at the conference
was the prescription offered by the Soviet delegate, He characteristically
pandered to all the narrowest nationalist conceptions and managed to sound
remarkably like an American of the McKinley high tariff era. Each new
Asian country, he said, had to concentrate solely on developing its own
resources. How did they think, he argued, the United States hadachieved
its industrial power? Once it broke from England, he said, it began to
develop its own economy, set up high tariffs, and by the end of the 19th
eenlyany had established its economic as well as its political indepmdnnce.
InteresAaifaYealMeklalisAWerA2V81k2g15KnegiglA81fibil MQ re henvily
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than that of the Soviet Union itself, which achi
degree of industrialization, by throwing up barr
the world and proceeding to exploit its own labor
converting a very considerable portion of it int
the purpose. But there were gaping mouths arount
as the Russian spoke, He made the British and ee
sound radical by comparison.
ved its own relative
ers against the rest of
force ruthlesely,
plain slave labor for
that conference table
en the American delegate
In any case, all the forces operating at thc conference, all the currents
of thinking uniformly tended to press these Asiar groups back into their
own narrow nationalist confines. The result was total futility. There
was not a single serious impulse to shift ground from the national to the
regional scope and from the regional scope to the world scope. Until that
impulse develops, South Asia will continue to suffer from economic as well
as political incoherence.
None of this can be regarded separately fror the internal social
problems in each of these countries. I think enc ugh has been said around
this conference table about the magnitude of the eroblems of South Asia
to make it quite plain that these problems are meter going to be solved
by old ideas or old solutions. This will be true, whether you speak of
individual nations, or a region, or two regions, i.e., India-Pakistan-Ceylon
and Southeast Asia. None of the so-called normal, old-fashioned, traditional,
or conventional methods make any sense. On the lontrary, only the most
heroic kind of drives and the boldest kind of new thinking is going to
result in any effective growth. The crucial questions therefore are: Are
the nationalist leaderships in South Asia capable of producing such drives
or of generating new ideas? Do they represent the kind of social forces
capable of assuming leadership over the whole pecele and of carrying out
the drastic programs that are obviously called foel Have these nationalist
leaderships any effective alternative to the Cannenist totalitarian method
of coping with the problems of backwardness? The ceruX of the political
problem in South Asia lies right here.
Each of these nationalist groupings represents in some degree the upper
classes. These upper classes vary in character. Only in India do you have a
very well developed capitalist and middle class. In the other countries
they emerge from the landed class, the landed arietocracy, the intellectual
aristocracy. They are usually tied to existing archaic land relations.
Very few of them have any real impulse to revoluteenize land relations, which
would be the elementary beginning of an approach eo the agrarian problem.
Although most of them call themselves socialists cf some kind, many still
suffer very heavily from narrow nationalism and economic conservatism.
That kind of outlook is not the kind that is goine to be able to face up
to the problems that demand solution. Sooner or Later such leaders are going
to give way to other forces which are going to offer some other, more
dynamic answers.
I think it a great mistake to fall into the eind of thinking which I
fear has drifted into this room, which sees the pceple of the backward
countries as inert masses to whom things simply 1-eepen. They are also in
motion, and it is not a question of whether they vent what anybody thinks
they ought to want; they obviouslx,ypntjemt4bi,pg
center of t they've
nu eue
got or ve4PARINKIngeriitkPaalERACRAMYAbieriffeWTulYe e en er of the
present political turmoil in these countries. It Ls not a matter of free
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choice and free movement of small groups of leaders. These leaders are
responding or reacting to profound impulses that come from very deep in the
mass of the people, and if they are unable to come forward with a program
that can begin to solve the peoplee' problems, then somebody else is going to.
The Communist movement in Southeast Asia is already a significant
political factor. I believe that Mr. Sacks will describe it in SOMB detail
in his paper. The fact that 011-:_na is moving swiftly into the totalitarian
sphere, with all that portends, means that the pressure on all these
countries is going to be enor,Jous. If there is any alternative to the
organization of Asia along totalitarian lines, it will have to emerge soon.
We are left with little time. Somebody here said, speaking of the
more population problem, that we are "up to our necks in water" and that there is
no space or time in which to move around. It is no less true to apply
that figure of speech to the political picture.
Neither the Western nations nor the nationalist leaderships in South
Asia can afford to delude themselves into thinking that it is going to
be possible to repeat there the 19th century pattern of developing national
sovereignties and national economies. The real issue is whether the West
and the new leaderships in Asia can develop a 20th century program of
coherence in which these backward countries can fruitfully find their place..
We have to remember that the so-called "chaos" in Asia is largely of
the West's own making. We fought our wars there. We left the continent
with a legacy of ravage, backwardness, poverty, ignorance, preserved through
one, two and three centuries while the West enriched itself at Asia's expense.
Today the emerging ex-colonies face gigantic tasks of reconstruction and
construction. The real question is whether there is an alternative to the
totalitarian methods, which were first exemplified in Russia and which
we shall see unfold in China. These methods call for creation of a police
state and putting great masses of the people to work as virtual slaves.
These methods are not so fundamentally different, after all, from the
essential framework of imperialist exploitation in Asia, only they would
now be applied for major internal developments rather than for the benefit
of overseas investors, and would be applied on an infinitely larger and
more brutal scale. Have we an alternative to offer the people of Asia,
a way of building a new life on the basis of expanding freedom and through
the construction of a new world economic system? That is the question that
lies before the Western world and the time given to us to answer is not
unlimited.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much, Mr. Isaacs.
I think it is clear that we should look into the totalitarian Communist
role at once. I will call on Mr. Milton Sacks, of the Division of Research
for the Far East, Department of State. Mr. Sacks.
MR. SACKS: I am not going to discuss directly the general role of
the Communists in South Asia. In my paper I have confined myself to the
specific problem of Communism and regional unity in South Asia. I assumed
that our interest would be focused on the question as to how the Communists
view the problem of regional unity in South Asia. I have tried to trace
the general over-all_oicture of the Communist attitude and to detail in
some mea?alr yfigiFroVeM122.904fRatleaCitiRlaRpagg2MONAMMOoniky.
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COMMUNISM AND RIMICNAL UNITY IN soini ASIA
Milton Sacks
The convulsions racking South Asia in the aftermath of World War II
have yet to run their course. Although the breakeown of colonial rule is
apparent, the pattern of the new order that will replace empire domination
is not clear. Coincident with the rise of indeperdent states representing
the realization of nationalist aspirations is the tendency to develop regional
collaboration. This movement toward regionalism displays dual characteristics.
On the one hand, it is designed to accelerate the withdrawal of such imperial
rule as remains. On the other, it seeks to provice a means whereby the new
national entities may establish their independence on firm foundations.
Parallel to and connected with these developeents has been the emergence
of Communism as a potent political force in South Asia. Since World War I,
Communists in South Asia have built organizations in India, Ceylon, Burma,
Siam, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philirpines. Some of these
organizations have survived years of illegal existence. In providing
answers to the problems confronting nationalism, the Communist movement
itself has developed dissident wings in India, Ceylon, Burma, Indochina,
and Indonesia. The strategy and tactics employed have uniquely contributed
to shape and direct the evolution of nationalism Ai South Asia. In
considering the prospects for unity in the area, et is necessary, therefore,
to evaluate in some measure the role played by the Communist movement.
Communism and nationalism found a common soie in which to flourish in
South Asia in the period following World War I. 3y this time, colonial
rule had begun to alter the character of indigenous social organization,
infusing it with new standards and concepts derived from Western civilization.
The basic two class structural division of societ- remained relatively
unchanged, but the native ruling class, at an intermediary through which
foreign domination maintained its sway, underwent transformation. From
the small reeducated urbanized population, an emb yo nationalist leadership
emerged. Some of these elements were attracted t) the recently formed
Communist International, which, deriving its preseige and authority from
the Russian Revolution of 1917, called for world eevolution and the libera-
tion of all colonial peoples. Thus, from the ver- cutset, some of the
nationalists were presented with a body of doctriee that professed to
illuminate the only sure path to national indepen ence- Communists colla-
borated with other nationalists in the struggle acainst the metropolitan
powers but competed with them for leadership of tee awakening dependent
peoples.
Early Communist doctrine had little bearing en the question of regional
unity. The "Theses on the Natl,'.nal and Colonial Question," adopted at the
Second World Congress of the Communist International in 1920, did call on
Communists "to combat the pan-Islam and pan-Asiatic and similar movements,
which are endeavoring to utilize the liberation a:ruggle against European
And American imperialism for the purpose of strenethening the power
of Turkish and Japanese imperialists, of the nobility, of the large
landowners, of the clergy, etc." The theses further made it incumbent on
Communists "to continually expose the deception f,-)stered among the masses
of the tPe idPJ2pg2Ttiltov. 6-1h-y1508*Vin Nlairopae90 ?-he
imperialiK powers aiae e pr vilege c asse o ,e au jec countries,
in creating under the mask of political independence various government and
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state institutions which are in reality completely dependent upon them
economically, financially and in a military sense." These commandments
had little practical meaning ir the inter-war period, but were to reemerge
as basic Communist doctrine fel lowing W,rld War II.
The influence of'1/47tommunism as a factor making for regional unity
arose out of its international and inter-racial program. In the period
between the two world mars, these factors were completely offset by the
general political and eeonomic partition of South Asia. Regional unity
was largely an academic question, since the essential pre-condition for
voluntary union in a federation is national independence. One of the
principal concerns of Britain, France, and the Netherlands was to gain
such advantages as would benefit their own home national economies.
Consequently, they tried to limit penetration of their private domains
by competing powers. Internally, imperial rule attempted to develop local
and particularistic political entities among the subject peoples. The
Communists were forced to adapt their organizational forms to the specific
area they sought to penetrate. Communism was able to develop only insofar
as it provided leadership for peasant and nationalist revolts.
This situation is seen clearly in the actual history of growth of the
Communist movement in South Asia. The efforts made in the early 1920'5
to build a "League of Oppressed Peoples" and an "Intercolonial Union" as
regional organizations to develpp national revolutionary movements in South
Asia were failures. These organizations soon broke up ditto their consti-
tuent nationalities. They were succeeded by the "League Against Imperial-
ism," which was created in Brussels, Belgium in 1927 by the indefatigable
Muenzenberg, builder of Cpmmunist front organizations. The League
developed into little mora than a propaganda and Ueieenagency for the
European and Asiatic Commanist parties. It was on national soil alone that
Communist and nationalist movements thrived.
The Indonesian Communist Party was formed in 1920 as a separate
entity. The Indian Party was founded in 1924. Communism was introduced
in Indochina, Malaya and aam through the Chinese Communist Party's
South Seas Committee, established in 19260 which maintained liaison with
the Indonesians in Singapore. By 1927, it had grown sufficiently to take
on the title of South Seas Commullst Party, but was still under the authority
of the Chinese Communists. This organization was dissolved toward the end
of 19300 and parties on a coequal basis were established in eadh of the
areas through absorption of indigenous quasi-Communist organizations.
During this period, other international front organizations operated in
the area-- i.e., The Red International of Labor Unions and its Pan-Pacific
Trade Union Secretariat, The International of Seamen and Harbor Workers,
The International Red Aid, etc, These organizations had little effect on
the activities of the Communists within the nationalist movements except
insofar as they provided a network for dissemination of Communist Inter-
national propaganda.
It must be noted that by the time World War II began the Communist
movement in South Asia had undergone the same evolution that featured the
transformation of the Communist International into a disciplined instrument
at the disposal of the Soviet Union. The South Asian parties dutifully
changed their line at Moscow's beck and call. Those who failed to go
along WililitoVillai*cRaleasLul01/21/0/24REIFf6ti-OtiAtrilibolt4S6613Mbit0 groupings.
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Among those expelled in 1927 was Tan Malakka, a founder of the
Indonesian Communist Party, who originated a schere for regional unity
which he named "Aslia." He called for the construction of an all-inclusive
"South East Asiatic Revolutionary Party" whose okactive would be the
establishment af a federation embracing the entirc South Pacific Area
including Malaya, Indonesia, and Australia. This ambitious scheme achieved
little support. Tan Malakka is today an important dissident Communist
leader in Indonesia, heading his own faction within the nationalist movement.
Australia's present active interest in the Indonesian problem indicates that
he was not as far from the realities of South Asian politics as one might
suppose.
World War II completely changed the power structure in South Asia.
Except in India and Ceylon, British, French, and Ditch rule in the area
was smashed by the Japanese. The nationalists ane the Communists were quick
to profit from the new situation. On the one hanc, the Japanese, primarily
concerned with conducting the war, needed a native leadership to help provide
a stable base in the newly occupied territories. On the other, the Allies
were anxious to develop an anti-Japanese movement as an adjunct to their own
military struggle. The nationalist movement was the only force that could
fulfill the requirements of either side. The individual nationalists made
their choice with the same goal in mind-- the acquisition of ind&pendence.
The Communists, who supported the Allied Nations cut of loyalty to the
Soviet Union, were among the chief organizers of the anti-Japanese guerrilla
movements. When the war ended with the victory oi Allied arms, they were
in a strategic position in many areas of South Asia.
In Indochina, Communist Ho chi Minh was President of the new Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. In Malaya, the Communists headed the guerrilla movement,
which actually governed many of the towns for a brief interim period. In
Burma, the Communists were an influential componert of the Anti-Fascist
People's Freedom League, the major nationalist political force. In Indonesia
they were part of a coalition supporting the Indor-,isian Republic. Elswwhere,
as a result of chaotic conditions attendant upon tne deftat of the Japanese.
they had unprecedented opportunities to influence the pattern of events.
At this time, international Communist policy attempted to utilize Great
Power cooperation through the medium of the United Nations Organization to
achieve their objectives. Such steps as would alter the world balance of
power were subject to negotiation and compromise 13ading to attempts at
collective agreement between the Western powers ard the Soviet Union.
Similarly, national Communist tactics operated to oreate coalition regimes
in which the Communists would participate. Throughout Southeast Asia the
Communists joined with nationalists in demanding that the provisions of the
Atlantic Charter and the new United Nations Organization be implemented.
In this vein, they welcomed the occupying Allied forces and hoped to nego-
tiate agreements that would grant them recognition. From 1945 to 1947,
the Stalinist Communists of South Asia generally f)llowed a policy of
compromise, even indicating a willingness to establish a new basis for
union with the former colonial powers, Britain, France, and the Netherlands.
The Communists further functioned within the framework of the established
governments. In Indochina, the Communists helped suppress dissident
Trotskyist elements. In Indonesia, they disavowed Tan Malakka's Indonesian
Communist Party, established in 1945, and supported the Republic agOnst
attempts 14513061)4014? Iltimonellao Tanaka divitudosononbmbssadasoavoaer the
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direction of Alimin, a new Indonesian Communist Party was formed in 1946
which upheld the Republic and the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement
with the Dutch. In Burma, the White Flag Communists(Stalinists), as opposed
to the Red Flag Communists, generally cooperated with the Burmese Government.
During this two-year period, the policy of the Communists in South
Asia favored regionalism in an effort to maintain the gains of emergent
nationalism. As early as 1945, Ho chi Minh attempted to join with Soekarno
in Indonesia to carry on a common struggle for recognition by the United
Nations. The Communists also supported movements that aimed at achieving
regional Asian solidarity. Communist Tran van Giau was one of the delegated
from the Vietnam Republic to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference in Delhi
in 1947. He was also elected vice-president of the Southeast Asia League,
a private regional organization formed in Bangkok in September 1947 to pro-
mote an official Federation of Southeast Asia that would include the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Siam.
When the international situation changed and the international Communist
movement embarked on the course formulated in the decisions of the Eurppean
Caminform, set up in September 1947) a complete readjustment took place
in Communist colonial strategy. An article entitled "The Crisis of the
Colonial Systemit which appeared in the Soviet periodical Bolshevik of
December 25, 1947, explicitly detailed the policy changes later adopted by
the Indian Communist Party at its Congress in February 1948. The artille
set forth a new platform for South Asian Communists. The former coalition
course was abandoned and replaced by a revolutionary program. This policy
gravely affected the position of Communism as a factor for regional unity
in the area, Communists became in effect an opposition force; on the
basis of international considerations, they fought the activities of their
national governments that held promise for regional unity.
The new colonial policy was a restatement of the ideas contained in the
1920 "Theses on the National and Colonial Question."It characterized the
developments in India, Burma, Ceylon, and the Philippines as devices of the
imperialists designed "with perfect safety and even profit to themselves,
to grant formal independence to certain of their colonies." It attacked
the imperialists for "deceiving the people with the mousy squeakings of
corrupt parliamentary parties and with playing with 'freedom of expression' by
means of a thoroughly mercenary bourgeois press. This is an attempt at
ideological disarmament by means of constitutional-liberal illusions, trade
unionism, and other pretty charms of bourgeois 'Civilizationt." Opposition
was expressed to "demands for the 'voluntary, entry of the 'freet colonies
into the British Commonwealth of Nations, the French Union, of the !Union'
of the Netherlands and Indonesia." The "English and American colonizers"
were further attacked for their support of pan-Islamism and pan-Asianiam?
defined as reactionary ideologies that "serve to block the development of
the struggle for national liberation." Clearly, the only kind of unity
that would now meet with Communist favor, was one that would place South
Asian states in the camp of the Soviet Union.
This conception of unity was underscored by an attack on the theory
"now fashionable in Europe,of the thkird power." The article specifies:
"According to this theory, the countries of the Orient should maintain strict
neutra]ity in the struggle between the two forces, Communism and Impe,-iajim.
It is significant that the theory of the third power has especially wide
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currency and success among the Indian bougeoisie.
point out that the long ears of the Laborites stic
of this theory. The meaning of this whole theory
imperialists and their helpers seek to calumniate
end place her on the same level with the American
theme has since pervaded Communist declarations ce
It is needless to
k out on the authors
amounts to this: the
the USSR, and to this
imperialists," This
ncerning South Asia.
The meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a Communist
front organization, in February 1948 at Calcutta, India was the occasion for
the public unveiling of this line for South Asia. The conference was
attended by representatives of youth from eleverecountries of Asia-India,
Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam., Ceylon, China, Philippines,
Nepal. and Korea. Far from contributing to regional cooperation by creating
a feeling of regional Asian solidarity, the confeeence mdde invidious
declarations concerning its host, theIndian Goveeement, and alleged that
imperial powers in Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon had changed their direct
domination to indirect domination and "with the unreserved collaboration of
the ruling classes; were seeking to create confuseon among the popular
masses by giving them a hypocritical gift of flik?e, independence." The
conference called on the youth of Southeast Asia eo "cenelnue their implacable
struggle against world imperialism" and warned them against "the danger
of being seduced by illusory slogans" that would divert them from the
struggle for the "complete defeat of imperialism end its allies." It
was following this conference that the Malayan Communists engaged in
guereEaa warfare, as did the Burmese Communists in April 1948. In their
turre the Indonesian Communists moved toward a break with the Republican
Government, accusing it of capitulation to the Dutch, and then embarked
on open insurrection in September 1948.
The most recent activities of the Communists directed against regional
unity hare been manifest in the intemperate attaces launched against the
Indian efforts to organize a bloc of nineteen Asietic countries to deal
wieh tbe Indonesian situation. A typical article is that contained in the
haLch 2_949 issue of Political Affairs, the Americen Communist magazine.
This article echoed the line taken by Radio Moscow. "The Asian conference
queetiened the imperialist tactics regarding Indonesia, but did not offer
propeeels that would weaken imperialist domination. On the contrary,
folLr'q nz the line of proposals by the Indonesian Republic, the conference
sur ed methods by which Dutch hegemony might be strengthened through
creeeen of a United States of Indonesia under Dutch control....The Conference
cciT,Ye:-rieJ itself primarily with the establishment of an Asian bloc aimed
agar-Jt ;he colonial liberation forces and the anti-imperialist struggles
led 1-iy democratic China. Its aim was to present the United States with
the foundations for an 'Eastern Union' as worthy 3f Marshall Plan 'aid'
as the Western Union. The significance of this conference lay in its
efforts to consolidate the present leadership of the Asian countries against
the militant demands of the people, particularly th0 workers and peasants,
and their consistent anti-imperialist leaders."
It is apparent that Gmmuunism in South Asia favors regional cooperation
only if such a movement takes place under its leadership and is tied in with
the world policy of the Soviet Union in its struggle with the West. Barring
a major change in the international situation there is little reason to
believe that the Communists will change their position. They can bo
expected to oppose any move toward regional coopc:ation if it is beeed on
existineKtratiO EffraggPefielaUtinatiecliCARLIPa8A-0999412atleUVO300963c9ea.
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Lastly., the Chinese Communist regime has already given new expression to the
traditional concern of China for its own nationals in adjacrmt areas. The
victories of the Chinese Communists, therefore, have profound implications
for the whole problem of regional unity in South Asia.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Before opening the discussion, I wish to ask Mr.Merriam
whether he may have any particular comment to make in reference to what has
been going on. Mr. Merriam mentioned one or two days ago that he wanted to
observe our concepts of nationalism and see whether we stayed on the right
track.
A STATEMENT OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Charles E. Merriam
Mr. Chairman, God Almighty did not set me out as a terminological "court
of last resort." You may be on the right track. I thought the road was a
little bit bumpy at times, and sometimes I thought you were making the road
as you went along.
The word "nation" seems to have a very definite meaning to many of you
gentlemen, and the word "sovereignty" seems to have a very definite meaning.
Far be it from me, the author of "The History of the Theory of Sovereignty" in
the year 1900, to say that the word "sovereignty" has quite such dogmatic cer-
tainty as some of the other gentlemen assume or that it is always "absolute,"
or the United States started out with indivisible sovereignty. Is that what you
mean by sovereignty, or do you have some other notion? I wrote an article on
"Government and Sovereignty" in Common Cause. Either I am unorthodcx or the
frequent use of the word as connoting absoluteness is unorthodox.
"Nationality" or "nation" - sometimes I noticed that you used the word
"country;" well, by these definitions is Russia a nation or not? They started
out making vigorous assaults on nationalism some years ago then they suddenly
switChed around to become favorable to nations? That does not disturb me any.
Being a student of Machiavelli and Aristotle and a. great Indian authority on
the c;ame cubject hundreds of years ago. I draw a line between what you call a
strategic move, so to speak, and a fundamental purpose. The Russians are very
good a', chess One of my good friends in Chicago said a number of years ago,
':you knew? some people regard politics as a game of chess, some regard it as
a game of poker the fact is that pelitics'is chess and poker combined; but
when you play with a fellow who seems to be playing chess, look out, because
he may kick over the table, put out the lights and begin draWing his gun."
Is the mark of a nation the fact that it iserge? Belgium is not a very
large nation, neither is Costa Rica, nor is The Netherlands very large by
itself. When I saw those staggering figures you have on that wall map there
about India I began to think, well, he has three nations there, but one has 4
million and one has .00 million and another one has 50 million. Does size
have so much to do*th nationality?
The word "country" is a word that has been used for a IOng'time. We deal
with states in politics, in political science, but then we speak about a city-
state or we speak about a family as a, state unit, or we speak abOut a coral-try-
state, as a nation if you like,_a
seems topeoximuivalietsawatmi
L*111101gInit anyone as mentioned
600tAdtillt$6-9 Nobody
that until now, although we have an Institute of world Government down the
street.
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I am presumed to be writing an article on "The ;rinciple of Representa-
ion in World Government." Believe me, that is a toagh one for it involves
,ationalism and regionalism and the "countryalisml" that Mr. Purnivall gave us
ehe other night.
Then of course we hear it that the big lanilords seem to be in
ravor of nationalism in some parts of the world. Of course it is elementary
that it is the big landlords who were the ones who feught nationalism in the
readal days most vigorously, When men battled for nationalise in Germany
end France they fought the big landlovds, Then we also hear it said that
aationalism is identical with some unity that is of an economic character,
that economic systems are national. Well, I wonder if they are. Some of
them might be, of course, and some of them are not. Or we used to be taught
that a nation was a compact, contiguous territory. Well, is England a nation
mrky more? It seems not to be so compact; it hasnle been for a good many
years. and the United States is not as compact in ets contiguity as it was
a good many years ago.
What I am trying to say is, that you are letting a word slip by here
as if nationalism were a concept you can define as IOU Can the Preamble of
the United States Constitution. Perhaps that isn:t so very good an eeemple
becauce that is seblect to an interpretation, sontettmee five to four. I
think nationaliem in the court of politics would often get a four-to-four
decision, enless you have some authority in the field of semantics likelaw
frxend Morris here.
Someone mentioned, inadvertently it seemed to me, the United Nations
as a means of bringing about some sort of world orter, But that seemed not
too serimsly taken. I would say you could not rightfully throw that oat
of the discussion here.
The United Nations, I would think, is something that must be considered
in relation to Asia, Southeast Asia and all of Asil and all of the world.
Forming these blocs, of course, is another way. International trade unions
you may get, or international capitalistic unions, international scientific
unions and many other types, not to speak of religion.
I hate to mention Merriam again, but in 1930 er thereabouts I studied
ten countries under the head o ni4kLr1g of Citizers." We broke up the
various elements of political aggregation, territery or region, religion
or symbolism, and vitat not. Our conclusions are rot much considered by
some who are busy getting their new nationaliem or getting their new
Communism, if Communism is not nationalism. Origenally it was international
and cesmopolitan, but now it may become something different day after
tomorrow; depending on the political advantage is, it might become
either.
I haven't heard much discussion of the kind if unity - as long as
Prof. Morris is here I might as well recognize hie properly - dealing with
the unity of science, not a political kind of unity and certainly not a
religious kind of unity. I noticed in the last report of the Rockefeller
Foundation the vast emphasis placed on the role cf communications in the
future world of ours. Isn't it worth considerine I realize, of course,
the many difficulties involved, but nevertheless aren't they not perhaps
as important as the price of rice or the number cf bowls of rice we will have?
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You are not going to escape them in the long run. They are going to come
creeping in. The regionalism of the old type is out.of-date. With
telescoping of time and space, what happens to the old region? What
constitutes physical isolation now with modern aircraft systems? Means of
communication, the telephone, the radio, and the aeroplane,have revolution-
ized the whole structure of politics up to a point. No discussion can omit
them.
Nor was there much consideration, though that camp up yesterday, of
application of science to the activities of these smaller countries as well
as the larger ones. Let's take, for example, atomic energy, not as a
military weapon but as a weapon of peace. I realize that the mention of
that is the subject for war among scientists where they don't agree on how
far they are going in industrial application of neutronics, but they are
moving. How do we know how that may revolutionize not only the territory
before us on the map but revolutionize the United States as far as that is
concerned, or any other domain? What will the relation of atomic energy
plus the aeroplane plus the telephone be to the kind of economic and poli-
tical order you are going to have on any one of these islands, big or little?
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much; Mr. Merriam. I will ask not
only our speakers but some of the other experts around the room to come to
these points as we go along.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
MR, HOLLAND: I would like to ask Mr. Sacks whether the new Moscow line,
the "international" line, since 1947 has been. as successfully applied in
Indochina as in other parts of Southeast Asia. If not, what are some of the
reasons?
MR. SACKS: Indochina represents somewhat of a deviation from the
pattern, -- I deliberately avoided raising the question in the paper because.
I knew it would come up. Its significance for evaluating the Communist
movement within the country is not clear. The statements that Mr. Isaacs
has collected from Viet Nam certainly indicate deviation. On the other hand,
aside from Ho Chi-minh, former members of the now dissolved Communist Party
have certainly been pressing for the application of the international
Communist line. That has become apparent through radio broadcasts made
recently, the sending of delegates to the World Peace Conference in France,
and the fact that Communist spokesmen like Nguyen Van Tao, the Minister of
Labor, are the ones who make these declarations. It is not a pimple picture
by any means. It is evident that there is some major difficulty involved
there. I might underscore this by saying that the Moscow radio has been
referring recently to the Communist party in Viet Nam as the leader of the
present struggle, without qualifying the statement in any way. On the other
hand, HoGhiquilh said recently that the Communist party was dissolved in
1945, which it was infect. I might say also that the French maintain that
the party was reconstituted only aphort while ago, although. no substantive
evidence, such as of statements by an Indochinese Communist party through
the medium of the Viet Nam government radio, has appeared. If you talk
about communism as a force in the area, there are sufficient indications
that the Communists are attempting to align the activities of the Viet. tira
government within_the.World uoramaziat fa-amew-szk
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MR. BROM: Mr. Sacks, hew do you explain in tre light of your paper
that the Soviet Union never raiece the question of tiet Nam in the United
Nations while of course on ineeeeeia the U.S.S.R. tcok a very strong stand?
MR. SACKS: I see your question but I really dentt feel that it is
within my competence to discuss, i think it would lead us pretty far astray,
why the Soviet Union did not raise the question on he Vietnamese. I would
prefer holding that off for personal conversation later on.
MR. ISAACS: I would be willing to venture an enswer, not being a member
of the State Department staff. I would say that the most likely explanation
would be the relationship of the French Communist Perty to this situation.
The French Communist party has taken a wholly equieocal stand on the Viet
Nam issue. Right after the war the French Communists still had high hopes
of conquering France. The French Communists, Ho Che-minh told me in 1945,
are colonialists first and Communists second. They want to keep their
empire intact. Only a month ago I submitted a list of questions to Ho by
radio and asked him whether he thought the French Communist party had
effectively championed the cause of Vietnamese independence. He replied
evasively: "It is the duty of all Communist partie5$ in colonialist countries
to champion the cause of independence movements." My next question: "To
your knowledge, has the French Communist party done anything to hinder the
war in Indochina?" His flat answer was, "No."
I think the strategy has been to keep Indochina withinthe French orbit
in the light of the possibility that it would be a part of a Communist-domina-
ted France. In 1945, I know for a fact, the French Communists in Saigon drew
up a statement, obviously on instructions from Pares, asking the Vietnamese
Communists to check their intensive effort toward endependence because the
election was due in France in October and the Commenists were going to be
victors and everything would be settled satisfactoeily betweenthem. The
Vietnamese position has remained very equivocal. ro this day Ho Chi-minh
does not demand complete independence. He still slys he is willing to
form part of a French Union if the terms are satisfactory.
MR. SACKS: I might contribute this bit of faetual information. Soviet
materials, written for the edification of Soviet nationals, inAiscussing
the Indochinese situation clearly do not talk of the Vietnamese movement
as a struggle for independence. The books and pamphlets always end with
the theme that the struggle in Indochina is an attempt by the Vietnamese to
win a place within the French Union on terms whict would allow them inde-
pendence while maintaining a relationship. There is no e ffort to explain
the struggle in terms of a pure and simple struggle for national independence,
to break away from the French Union. It is a question of the democratic
elements in France reaching some reasonable solution of the problem, and
dealing with the Vietnamese.
MR. ISAACS: I might add one further point oL information. The Vietnamese
have been very leery of having their case brought before the UN. They have
steered clear of it. They maintained this policy consistently up urtil
this March, when inthe first effort of its kind they formal],y applf.c,.. for
admission to ECAFt. At the meeting I attended in Bangkok tbe:,-a12,7)Jf,3J for
admission as an associate member on the same ba3i3 ab Irldhic, the firct
time thtekairtNATIRMWMgt2thel22rdilY brPti
-IR trQsa in the U.N.
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MR.BROEK: The Dutch had a little bit of bad luck because they did not
have enough Communists at homes
ER. WRIGHT: Hasn't there been equal ambiguity in the Communist line
on Indonesia? I understand the line in Western Europe has been against the
United States government because, they say, we support the Dutch cause and
do not give sufficient assistance to the Indonesian Republic. On the other
hand in Eastern Europe, the Indonesians are castigated because they sponged
out the Communists.
MR. SACKS: I tried to point out in my paper the actual time sequence
in that particular situation. Actually, it wasn't until after 1947 that
the line changed toward the Indonesian Republic and its leadership. The
Communists switched over, domestically and for foreign consumption, to an
attack on the Indonesian Republican leadership and favored guerilla type
warfare against the Dutch and repudiation of negotiations. From 1945 to
1947, I don't detect anywhere in Soviet broadcasts any real attack on
the Republican leadership. The line was general sponsorship of the Indo-
nesian Republic's demands in the United Nations. It was only with the
formation of the Cominform that you began to see the Communist change in
attitude to the Republican struggle and an attempt made to link that struggle
with the "anti-imperialist, democratic camp."
MR. SARKAR: 'Mr. Isaacs shows that China is in the totalitarian sphere
of Communist Russia. Are you quite sure of that?
MR. ISAACS: I am afraid the preponderant evidence is to that effect.
ER. SARKAR: In regard to Indonesia,' are you quite sure that last
February, Nehru could function at all without the moral support of England
and the United States? ? '
MR. ISAACS: You mean, could he have called the conference?
MR. SARKAR: Are you quite sure that he was functioning without the
support and without the backing of England and America to a certain extent?
MR. ISAACS: Do you mean that England and America inspired him to call
that conference?
M? R. SARKAR: "Inspired" is another word; some sort of moral support.
MR. ISAACS: To the best of my knowledge, it did not happen that way.
It is always possible to figure out any number of Machiavellian combinations
in that kind of deal, but Nehru isn't much of a Machiavellian. Nehru started
talking about the conference when he was in London and in Paris last year.
When the DutCh police action began on December 18, he quite suddenly decided
to go ahead with the conference. Right after the invitations were sent out,
and, much to the dismay of his own foreign office people, he announced it
in a speech on January 2 before there had been any time for. reaction from
all the invited countries. '
Intervention by England and the United States came after that, By a
cu-eAous coincldence, Sir William Strang happened into Delhi just at that
time, Just before the conference convened, Sir William Strang and Loy Hender-
son, thepA5PdvaPosrekilfeW Aamsfi4.0eiksf6a6V9216eRgii4orthii,0660 Nehru and
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Sir Girja Bajpai and I have reason to think that those talks had a distinct
effect upon the tenor of the conference.
MR. SARKAR: Haw far was Communism raised to tfte present position in
international prestige by England. and America during World War II? To
what extent did it become a wo,:.1c1 force on account of the propaganda done
in favor of Soviet Russia by th2, Lilies after 194r
MR. ISAACS: It is an ironic fact that many W.layan Communists, all
Chinese, were trained and armed by the British as anti-Japanese measure
during the war. Arms were dropped to them and were cached in the jungles.
The leadership of the Communist guerilla movement in Malaya today is vir-
tually a creature of the British in a technical sense. The same thing was
true in Burma, as the British have since also had occasion to regret.
MR. SACKS: I indicated that in my paper when I said that one of the
characteristic features of the war period was the fict that in their effort
to create an anti-Japanese base, it was necessary ter the Allied armies
to utilize such forces as they could find in the area. In many cases,
because the Communists did have a clandestine apparatus that had maintained
itself for a long time, they were the force that was used to conduct and
carry on guerilla warfare. The importance of the :ommtlnists in th area
does not arise merely from the fact that the Cammu:tists were given arrilti.
That was just an additional weapon in the arsenal hat was provided them
by ,he conditions that existed in the area. They rad previouSly functioned
in the nationalist leadership and won much prestige and authority as fighters
for national independence in theii own right.
MR. SARKAR: It seems to me that Americans should make it a point to
study this question in regard to their attitude tc and their c0.4operation
with Communism during World War II. That is a very important problem for
research.
MR. THORNER: I wonder if Mr. Sacks would surplement his analysis on
one point, and that is: Where in the sequence he has given us do the Bombay
naval uprising of February 1946, the severe strike. in September 1946 on the
South Indian Railway, and the agrarian movements of '46 and '47 in four
different areas fit in?
MR. SACKS: This is the kin j of problem that gr. Holland raised before
with respect to Indochina. ].?e difficulty with the Communist party in
India in the same connectir)%, i have given th impression that it was
all a matter of a very sim7AepLL.:4n operating from a single director who
organized these things and ;niched them from 1945 on, I would like to mitigate
in part this impression, I think that what you 11L,..d at the time the war
ended, given the way in which the Communist movemnt internationally and the
Soviet Union were working within the framework of this Allied struggle,
was a certain amount of general leeway for the various Communist novements.
The Cominform itself stated in 1947 that the reasm it was set up was because
a number of difficulties had arisen in the relatinships between. Coumunist
parties, They had not been co-ordinated sufficiegtly, and were going to be
co-ordinated from then on.
Aeeinian p4kit,R,R4 does diialwc-7.e differences in 1945
and
: 19467.1=InHaneFPFL4i1914- WRCAPP MONO 06.9solve
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things by guerrilla warfare as in the Hyderabad situation. When the Indian
Party actually met and discussed these questions, it was set straight by
adopting the line of JoshiaAgreement was reached and you had a change
leading to support of Nehru in the whole period up to the end of 1947. The
Communists adopted a very conciliatory attitude and collaborated with the
nationalist leadership. In February of 1948, at the same time that the
youth conference met in Calcutta, the Indian Communist party also held
meetings. A difference of opinion arose and a new line was adopted. An
'opposition policy was taken toward the Indian Government, as I have indicated.
India does not follow the pattern exactly, but, when there is pressure from
the international Communist movement, you have at distinct intervals the .
regulation of the line along the general pattern that I have drawn up.
MODERATOR TALBOT: The crux, as put by Mr. Isaacs, is whether what we
have been saying up to now suggests totalitarian solutions to the problems
of the area, and whether there is any alternative to a totalitarian solution.
May I ask for further discussion and comment?
MISS DUBOIS Mr. Isaacs has been singularly helpful throughout this
conference in bringing us back to the main line. As I understand his position
he feels that the urgency of the situation is so great in South Asia that
we cannot delay much longer ani that we need radically constructive solutions.
He has in his talk cast some doubt not only on the ability and the vision of
the Western nations that are concerned, but also on the ability of local
leaders to seize this opportunity for a constructive solution. Do you see
any alternative leadership that might arise, which is not this rather
narrowly, self-interested leadership you describe in South Asia, and which
is not Communist? Do you see any middleroad group which might seige the
opportunity for a constructive solution?
- MR. ISAACS: Yes, it does exist. It is not strong as an organizational
factor but it certainly is strong in terms of the possibilities of the
situation.
In India the Socialist party, in opposition to the Nehru government,
withdrew from the Congress party after the transfer of power. This party
now regards the Congress government as a government which is ging to run
India into the ground by attempting to erect a capitalist regime on the
conventional Western pattern. The Socialist party has been gaining in
strength. It is engaged in organizing a trade union federation and has
under-cut the Communist position in the labor movement.. The Communists have
their own independent labor federation and it has been considerably weakened
by Socialist activity. The Socialist, on the other hand, have been
weakened by the government which is setting up a union federation of its own.
The Socialist movement in India however has a very considerable following
and great vitality. It is by no means close to winning power. It has to
contend with what might be described as a stronger development of political
forces on the Right. Extremist solutions are not at all confined to the Com-
munist variety. You also have in India; as in the other countries, a very
considerable reservoir of extreme Right wing reaction which can create new
forms of tyranny.
In Burma there is a Socialist party which until recently was strongly
represented in the government and which is non-Communist, for the right
reasons, and which has been making a rather desperate attempt to pursue
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an independent leftist program. It is an anti-capStalist, anti-imperialist
program against which the Communists have been fieting. Internal squabbles,
however, resulted a few weeks ago in the ousting ol the Socialist ministers.
They remain an important political factor in the ccuntry.
I believe that in Viet Nam, as Mr. Sacks has said, the precise shadings
in the political spectrum are not too clear. Nobcdy has had direct access
to the Vietnamese government since just after the fighting began in Hanoi in
December 1946. One possible explanation of the equivocal attitudes taken by
Ho Chi-minh could be that non-Communist elements are sufficiently strong in
the government to require him to be cautious. I have seen some information
tending to support this theory. I, myself, don't know enough about it to
say.
In Indonesia there is every significant Socialist movement. Sjahrir,
who is today out of the government, is a Socialist Ind is one of the few
in the area who is a Socialist in the European sense of the term. He has
a very considerable following. Like so many Socialist parties, the
party in Indonesia is not very effective organizationally. It does have
considerable influence over sections of the armed ferces, bnth the regular
Republican army and some of the irregulars like the Student Youth arreyand
some other independent units. The Republican leaders in the government claim
for themselves a Socialist orientation. But they are subject to very strong
pressure from the Moslem Right wing, which is very 3trong, very fanatic, and
arch-conservative. One section of it has its own military forces in the
field, in West Java, organized under the name of Daeoel Islam.
In Malaya there is a Malayan Nationalist party which, like so many of
these organizations, is split into two groups, one of which is rather
sympathetic to the Communists and one of which manta to maintain an inde-
pendent leftist position. That istraie in Burma toe. The Malayan
Nationalist party is a relatively small and weak organization in comparison
to the main Malay organization which is headed by Deto Onn and which is a
straight conservative body based largely on the preeervation of the old
Malay Sultanates.
These forces are not strong but they are devoted to the idea of
eompletely transforming social relations in a way wtichwill enable them to
socialize their countries. I believe there are forces in each of these
countries which, given a point of polarization and an opportunity to move
ahead, could possibly grow into something very constructive.
MR. VANDENBOSCH: Is this action sufficient to transform a society?
The Social Democrats do not stand in a very strong tositionwith their
socialization program, for the reason that there is little in those countries
to socialize. The first problem is to create sometYing that can be socialized.
MR. ISAACS: Unfortunately, the situation has Tresented the colonial
sowers with the problem of doing both of those things at once.
MR. PIPLANI: Mr. Isaacs suggested that the only possible leadership was
srobably provided by the Socialist party apart from Communism. One point has
just been made that for the greater part of South Asia the basic economic
sroblems today are of increasing production and increasin very rapidly. If
ita..t is thAppreavealfddiEgrieaSe 40247124 ARARKINrOgRinit ' 090499 CO be
eadel the fundamental question arises: Even if granting the Socialist parties
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do COMB into power within the next couple of years in some countries, how
are they in fact going to tackle that problem any differently than, for
example, the present government of India is doing? Don't you agree that what
is required is not any socialistic, ideologically-minded new governments
with some kind of theoretical programs but a strong government that can hope
to maintain law and order and push through With great drive at least a
greater part of the plans, however limited in scope they may be?
MISS DUBOIS: There seems to me to rest in Mr. Isaacs' suggestion a
further danger and that is if the Socialist element should attempt to
assert themselves with drastic reforms in mind it would only serve to split
three ways the very thin layer leadership that does exist in the area and
further throw the countries involved into confusion and disorder.
MR. ISAACS: The Socialists are out of the government in Indonesia
and are in a sort of loyal opposition at the moment since the fight with
the Dutch is still proceeding; the Socialists are out in India; the
Socialists in Burma have just been dropped from the government, although
they are supporting it, trying to follow a limited program of keeping
the ship afloat.
On your point, Mr. Piplani, my conteDtlon is .j what has to be done
in all these countries cannot be done on the basis of purely private
capitalist enterprise. I think obviously you are going to have to have
in all of these countries mixed economies of many different kinds. I think
there are endless varieties of devices and forms which will have to be used
by any of these regimes to begin carrying out any of these programs. But
fundamentally I believe first it must be a state-planned and state-controlled
system. Secondly, there has to be a regional approach combined with an in-
telligent partnership with the West. Ibelieve that it is absolutely futile
to think of each one of these countries embarking upon an independent
program of industrialization wherein each one wintry to achieve the kind
of self-sufficiency or relative self-sufficiency that characterized the
development of the 19th century state. What we have got to do under forced
draft is try to approach it a little more rationally and say, "In what
spheres and by what means and along what lines can each country develop so
as to create a broader mutuality in the area?" Not only in production,but
in education, technical assistance, transport, public health, etc., you will
have a more rational approach to the problems of each country, avoiding
wasteful duplication and increasing rather than decreasing mutual dependence.
I say they have got to develop an economic programj I don't mean down to the
last bolt but at least in broad principle and subdivision, which will enable
the region to embark upon economic construction in some coherent manner.
Moreover, the region cannot do this by itself. It has to be carried out in
some sort of an equally rational relationship with the advanced countries
of the West, which in this case means especially the United States. Only in
this way can these countries begin to solve their problems without having to
go through the gruesome experience of the totalitarian solution.
MR. PIPLANI: If I followed you correctly., you have made three points;
firstly, that" the development has to be of a mixed character. I don't
know to what extent you have been able to study in detail the present plans
in countries like Ceylon, Pakistan and India. I have been doing some work
these last three, four months and if you very broadly spread your view on
the whole sector of economies there is already nationalized transport, there
is al AWY:tesikkgc/RS,?2PSeggeWidkhkraleialitPlii991f49,2$140140.063QQ.QeetOdy a number
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of large basic industries which are state-owned and state-operated. If you
examine the whole system oft axation under the hadgets today, it is true
that here and there certain efforts have been me in order to correct
certain economic maladjustrkents, for example, with a view to enonuraging
internal formation of capital, certain concessicas have been given to
private enterprise in respect of old-time, war-time taxation, and so on;
but, by and large, if you do jtudy the budgets you will find that the present
governments, under their limitations, under their very greatlimitations,
are trying to work that mixed kind of economic program that you have suggested.
That is point Number One that you have made.
The point Number Two you made was that any program of development and
of improving the standards of living has to be coviously in co-operation with
the West and primarily with this country. I thcaght one of the major points
of my paper yesterday was that out of a total investment of' billion in the
area for the next five years at least $2 billion has to come from equipment
which can only infect be supplied from this country. I thought I had made
that point fairly strongly, so there is hardly ea that point any difference
between Ni'. Isaacs and myself.
Finally, the third point which if I remember correctly he made was that
there must be some kind of original framework in which these young and new,
unsupported economies have to be integrated if tney are to hold their own
in the future in the world. I must frankly admit that I am a little
confused on that idea. Do you seriously expect this of countries like
Ceylon, Pakistan and India, who have not even yet completed two years of
political independence, or of countries like Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina
and Burma, where there is still fighting in order yet to attain their
political freedom? Do you seriously think that it is at all the time,
particularly for a region which has for centurie3 continuously depended
economically and politicaliy, for good or for bai, on certain metropolitan
powers, or is it at all feasible? Isn't it far ;leo premature, even though
highly necessary? I don't deny the necessity of some kind of possible
arrangement which would just eilablu these new, ypung nationaliat states to
survive in the new world orde,-, but on the basis of the history that we have
all learned, on the basis of these political chaages, the cutting of the
fetters that have taken place after centuries, hpw is it at all possible?
Isn't it far too premature to think of it?
Finally, I have seen the working of the speaialized United Nations
agencies. I suppose one can talk here quite fraakly. Ply own personal
feeling is that they are doing very little, that they are not scratching
the surface, and there is no doubt in my mind that probably within the next
four or five years after the failure of the greater part of the work of
these specialized agencies has become patent the real basic need for some
regional integration will arise. So far, my own feeling is that what little
could be done in the form of regional framework las been done in two Asian
conferences only by way of demonstrational value, that is all, but no more
than that.
MR. ISAACS: I don't only think it is prema..are, as I tried to make
clear in my paper, I think we are very late. Th 3 fact that these countries
are still engaged in fighting for their independnce is the responsibility
of the Western nations. Thyy should never have allowed the situation to
deterichmtirPWKI ftPrklii%leMegiNaffiaftargATRgagQriV926PiOck1 lificaWfit-9po "icy
114U VUld4141GU 11.J. ?74) VILA WVU.1.41 1I4Ve 4 WIAA.41.-14
that we have had more than three years of additional destruction and bitterness
makes anew nailer all the more.diffioult_hui makes _it even more imperative.
ApprovearorKeleasezuuz/ot/z4:um-Kuv80-09926A001400030006-9
With respect to the earlier point, I am not going to try to specify
what industry should or should not be nationalized. I know that in India the
government is under intense pressure from Indian capitalist interests to
drop the natimalization program. Nehru in January assured them that there would
be no more nationalization for ten years. One heard on all sides, both in
the government and out, of the extreme difficulty that was being created in
economic planning by the fact of the big Indian capitalist combines. They
moved-in on many of the sectors vacated by the British and were held chiefly
responsible for the black marketing and corruption that was going on in
food and textiles. The government seemed to be yielding to this presSure on
all fronts rather than resisting it.
I don't mean to say that the Indian government is not making an attempt
to breast some of these problems. But it is a government in which the
main political power rests in the hands of Patel and his wing. This means
that it does not only cater to the get-rich-quick requirements of the
capitalist combines but also shelters the extreme Right elements.
MR. SARKAR: England and America, are these two countries going to furnish
capital, machinery, as well as technically trained personnel?
MR. PELZER: I should like to ask Mr. Isaacs how he feels about the new
interpretation N.A.M. is giming to the "bold new program." I cannot see any
boldness in the type of thinking that I find on the financial pages ofthe
New York Times. If, as you pointed out, the Socialist parties in Southeast
Asia offer a solution, then I think N.A.M. and other groups are missing their
chance. I wonder whether you cared to express your views on that.
MR. ISAACS: I understood from Mr. Talbot that he was planning to devote
tomorrow morning to narrowing this thing down to the problems of American
policy in this situation but if he will rule it in order I would glad to
make a comment on that. I have not gone into Point Four in any detail, Dr.
Pelzer's quotations from the financial page of the New York Times suggest
Point Four is viewed as a means of providing American capital on terms of
political and economic guarantees that no nationalist government will grant.
The fact that it is presented this way simply helps bolster Communist propa-
ganda about the United States and the role of subject countries of theworld.
MODERATOR TALBOT: We will hold that subject right here until tomorrow
morning.
MR. BERKER: I am wondering if we could pull together some of the comments
that have been made with regard to the character of the indigenous leadership
of Southern Asia. Professor Broek suggested that India was the only country
in the area that had a middle class somewhat similar to the Western type. He
also stated that the countries of Southeast Asia had nothing of that type
at all, and I think he was referring to the fact that native participation
in the management and ownership of modern enterprise have been insignificant
or small. Mr. Soedjatmoko insisted that the leadership group which he did not
define but in which he placed his confidence was very small; it was not
subject to democratic direction from below, although it was responsive to the
needs and demands of a wider group.
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We could draw additional suggestions from looking at some of the countries
whose social structure is reasonably familiar. We find very strong leadership
coming in the Philippines from a civil service aad professional group and of
course from traditional land-holding classes. We find it in Siam, coming
again from a civil service and professional grouo, and also from a military
group, which is absent from most of the other cointries.
If we consider that practically none of the indigenous peoples with
the possible exception of tlie Iadians have a stale in private capitalistic
development, and if we also consider that the creation of a middle class
along Western lines is certainly not something tnat can happen within five
or ten years and probably not in twenty years, waat sort of political
direction and what type of responsibility can we expect to evolve: Is the
national interest effectively expressed by that group which has been privi-
leged to attain a higher education? It seems to me that was part of the
implication of Mr. Soedjatmoko's statement. What are other types of
leadership which it is reasonable to expect and which could be successful?
MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I am certainly lo prophet but I suggest
that there is much greater danger than has appeared from our discussions
here that this leadership will in fact gravitate into the hands of something
which is quite different from the rather mixed gsoup of idealists, intellect-
uals, former civil servants mixed sslatf,a few professional business people
and representatives from rather wealthy landed interests, who make up most
of the leadership today. I suspect that in facs, the leadership will get
into the hands of personal dictatorships, very often the deciding point
being the ability of one man or a very small gras.p within the present
nationalist parties to get sufficient personal cuntrol over the key officers
in the armed forces to be able to keep themselve3 in power. The analogy
will not be exact but there should be some resemblance to what has happened
in many republics of South America.
Putting it in rather exaggerated terms, I vsspect that one of the big
problems we have to look for in India, where the situation is much more
complicated, is the point at which this present Leadership, let's say the
Patel group, will find that it can most effectively establish a rapproche-
ment with key leaders of the armed services and thus insure an absolutely
invincible combination of power. It is all too easy of course to make
analogies with what happened in China (I think that is a rather misleading
one) or with what happened earlier in Japan, but certainly it would be a
great mistake to ignore those two key elements: the group which is able to
command a reasonable amount of support, whether by bribery or legal means,
from the more flourishing business interests, anc command the support also
by the same variety of means from the key figurel in the armed services.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Mr. Furnivall, the other night you made reference
to the fact that the Western form of democracy wculd have no meaning except
In relation to its adaptation to function. I worder whether you had something
like this mind when you spoke of the traditional personal authority
notable in the social structure of the community and whether you were
suggesting that something like this might come ott of it rather than a
democratic or socialist form.
R. FURNIVALL: I should find it rather difficult within two or three
minutesARPTY1Pde6maidewelfaNtgAiscA4-1WPMagO3?0911,PB-m.90?6-zia.9ppen in
the way of adapting Western democratic situations to provide a solution.
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There are just one or two points that have cropped up in the course of the
afternoon that I would like to discuss a little further.
As regards the point made by Mr. Isaacs about the substitution of
Communism for Socialism, I won,:li-2r what the Communists could do that the
Nationalists aren't trying to i and can't. A further development of that
is the point that Mr. Holland has just raised about the dictator who would
by some means or other form a combination with business interests and the
army. In Burma, and I imagine in most of Southeast Asia, the chief diffic-
ulty will be to find, an army for such a dictator to rely on. I think many
people in Burma would rather welcome some kind of a dictator, working either
on Socialist or Communist lines, but the problem is, where is he to find his
army? You cant have a dictator withoutiA. an army behind him, and the Burmese
and Shans, 70-80 percent of the population have never been trained in mili-
tary service except as guerrillas in the last war. Directly a dictator
supporting business interests uses them to suppress a Communist rising he
will find that half of them are quasi-Communists themselves and they will
immediately go over to the opposition. Then the Communists will come along
and take advantage of his weakness. There is no element of force on which a
dictator can rely in Burma, and I imagine the same thing is true generally
in Southeast Asia, In Java the Dutch relied on the Ambuynese and Macassarese.
Foreign rulers have relied on foreign troops and the minority peoples. The
majority peoples have not been recruited. That seems to me the difficulty
in accepting what otherwise is a plausible and possible solution.
MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I would not presume to suggest that this
oligarchy would capture control of the whole army, or even a majority of
it. That is not necessary, usually; it is sufficient, judged by experience
in various parts of the world, to get control of a reasonable fraction of
the army, often a key section of it, the air force, to take one obviouS
example, or of certain elements of the artillery. Once having done that,
even though you may then have a very dispersed and anarchic condition of
civil war for a period, the authority and the power of the central group
is sufficiently well established to enable it gradually to expand and to
suppress these other elements.
MR. FURNIVALL: In '86 it took the British five to ten years to suppress
the Burmese when the British hz:.d all the troops and all the guns, so for
a small armed group to obtain command of Burma is a difficult proposition.
The other countries may be different but I cannot see a solution along
those lines until a dictator can gain entire control over the army. But
he first has to gain control over the army, and what is going to happen
meanwhile:
MR. ISAACS: Mr. Holland has stressed one possible variant, the deve-
lopment of political power on the Right. The number of forms it could
take are endless. The classic South American pattern could very well be
combined in different parts of South Asia with various kinds of more or
lesq popular movements capable of mobilizing a very considerable mass
backing for dictators. Certainly in the Moslem countries, certainly in
India, there is a great reservoir of political reaction. Given continued
frustration in these countries, given a continued situation of drift at
a time when the needs, problems and pressures are so great, the cue may
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very well pass to internal reaction. Much will cepend on the impact of
pressures from the rest of the world. The Chinece pressure is the most
immediate. If beyond that lies the possibility of a third world war,
obviously there is not much outlook in South Asi, for sane and desirable
solutions. I believe one of the major areas of possible action to avert
such a war lies in South Asia. I think there is time to see what can be
done to create a semblance of a world order in wIlich the backward countries
can be brought into a more mutually beneficial r_lationship to the advanced
countries of the West. This is the central prob_em of our time.
MR. FURNIVALL: Why should dictators emerge They will be quite happy
going along.
MODERATOR TALBOT: You suggest a sort of Ga Idhian anarchy -- though
probably not nonviolent?
MR. FURNIVALL: That's it, extending from 41rma over Southeast Asia.
MR. ISAACS: You could have a long period of internecine struggle in
which various parties will emerge and have their day. That may very well
be what will happen there. I repeat, there are at the moment two basic
possible polarizations and before either one becomes wholly effective anything
could happen in this uncrystallized political interim.
MR. FURNIVALL: I quite agree with the urgency in trying to prevent what
I regard as an unfortunate course of events.
MR. WRIGHT: Isn't there some analogy to China? There was a long period
of war-lordiam, then a Nationalist government with a Socialist thesis. They
failed, and the Communists come in. It seems to me that if the prime objec-
tive of South Asia is to be economic progress, there may be a similar history.
It is going to be extremely difficult to prevent Communists from taking
Over in either the short-run or the long-run. You have a situation there
where rapid economic progress requires the most drastic methods, methods
which only the Communists will take.
If you consider the three great areas of t e West, the United States,
Western Europe, and the Soviet Union, all have teen inspired by the re-
naissance idea that economic progress is the great value. The United States
had the best opportunity to realize this value. We have had a great deal
of economic progress. As a result of two world wars, Western Europe is much
less able to realize economic progress and it hs gone to Socialism. In
Russia, where technology was most backward and population growth most
rapid economi:progress was most difficult. The l went to Communism.
I think our discussions suggest that the problem of developing higher
living standards is more difficult in South Asia. than in Russia. Even more
drastic methods may be necessary, and the Commulists ready to make unlimited
promises and to discipline populations may be taerated if the objective is
going to be economic progress. May not the one hope of preventing South
Asia from going in that direction be to prevent the people from becoming
acquisitive-minded prematurely, to encourage them to maintain their tradi-
tionakODAN1PFoliitasIdA9213647/Nn.dalibsPanaff6eAkiraYag8Oggugh the
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impact of technology and capital. Possibly in that way order can be main-
tained for a time and gradually in certain cases, in certain special areas
where there are opportunities for Oevelopment, economic progress can begin.
I fear that if all the people in the area become inspired by the notion
that the one thing they want is rapid economic progress, conditions for
Communist revolution will be at hand.
MR. SACKS: I cannot agree with Dr. Wright on his point. Apart from
the question of imposing the acquisitive instinct, it represents a complete
misunderstanding of the area on both the cultural and political level. The
problem right now, in concrete terms, is how to stop these totalitarian or
authoritarian forms from crushing what little residue there is of Western
leadership. The problem is to halt the tendency, which seems almost unstop-
pable, toward the formation of totalitarian governments. The chief diffi-
culty lies in the fact that at this particular time you have theemergence
of China under a new authoritarian government which may decide to influence
the events in Southeast Asia. In addition there is the fact that the
Communists have favorable prospects merely because the desire for the
acquisition of good things is already present The only reason they can
promote agrarian disturbance is that the agrarians do not have all that they
need to eat and live and construct a functioning society.
I think it is a mistake for us to attempt to inculcate these people
with old standards at a time when the old order has failed. Everybody in
the area is trying to orient in a new direction taking account of the fact
that the mass of the population is in motion toward some new kind of stabi-
lization, toward some new order. I strongly urge that we recognize that
the only reason one can evell cLnsider that the Communists may win is
precisely the fact that theya., aware of the profound changes that have
occurred in the area, and are acting on that knowledge.
MR. WRIGHT: A good many of our anthropologists this morning seemed
to question the extent to which the basic social pattern of 90 percent of
the peasants of South Asia has really been vitally changed. That is a
question of which I know nothing; I defer to people who do. I think if you
are right that all of the 90 percent of the peasants in this area have got
this acquisitive instinct and want to better their economic condition, that
certainly is an ideal situation for the Communists. But, I ask, how much
is the archaic custom actually smashed in Southeast Asia?
MR. ISAACS: The problem is not that their mode of life has been
materially changed. The fact. that they still worship their same gods is
not material. The material fact is that the social economic system under
which they lived in the past has broken down. The system under which they
worked their land and got back their meager return will no. longer yield
them eventhat much and will yield them increasingly less. The pressure
isAipon. them, and in one way.or another they are seeking a change. That i$
true throughout the area. It is true throughout Asia as-a whole, and is the
source of the great convulsive movements with which We are faced. Our
problem is the form that these take and the role that they will play in
building the kind of new. world that we too obviously have to build. Our
own system, you knew, isn't working so well that we don't also face critical
problems.
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MR. CHARTRAND: I understood from Mr. Isaacs that the steps he thought
were necessary for the devc1c t of South Asia were nationalism, regionalism
and world co-operation. ViT1 London and Washington attempted, and perhaps
succeeded, in modifying Nehruls views between Jaruary 2 and 220 were they
shortsighted in eliminating the regionalism? Thet was their purpose. I
believe, because of their concern for the formation of a South Asia bloc,
rather than emphasizing the U.N.and keeping within the larger framewerk.
There will be regional problems which can be solved within the region
and these should be dealt with locally while thove issues which can't
be handled regionally should be referred to U.N. For example, the Common-
wealth of Nations, which represents regionalism nay come to the assistance
of Burma and help to support what may be the best government within the
country. The U.N. on the other hand may be called upon to solve the Kashmir
problem.
Is it time for the U.N. to take a strong sand in such instances and
say, "This is what has to be done"?
MR. ISAACS: It has long been the time for ,he U.N. to take a strong
stand.
MR. SACKS: I realize that the bulk of the discussion did not touch
on the question of the Communist role and this may be due in part to my
making no real estimate of their present strength in the area. Therefore,
I would like to indicate that the most distinctive thing to me, as far as
the Communists in South Asia are concerned, and their greatest asset is
their recognition, whichisnewlof the linking up of their own future with
that of an agrarian movement in the area. That means that they are no
longer addressing themselves solely to a small Vesternized political group.
They are evidently interested in sponsoring a revolutionary peasantry,
or at least in trying to utilize or spread the things they have learned in
China throughout South Asia. I think that is a distinctive feature that
emerges in part in the Hyderabee situation in 1946 and 1947. The character
of this agrarian movement, I think, is in part eisible in the Burmese
situation. I think it is also in part apparent in the attempts the
Communists are making with respect to the guerrilla movements in Indochina,
in Malaya, and the Philippines.
It is well to keep in mind that the CommunIst reorientation toward the
great bulk of the population in the area is an Attempt to utilize local
customs at the village level and to revolutionize them. This itself con-
stitutes an important factor for change. It leads to the necessity for
radical solutions that we are discussing. Great efforts have to be directed
towards the agrarian problem itself if we wish to stop the authoritarian
answer to the problem from becoming the only dcminant and clear one,
MR. GINSBURG: This is asking for a kind cf summary and I think it is
in order. Do I understand correctly that there are two different, if not
opposing, points of view as to the nature of the situation today? Everybody
seems to agree that initiation of action is desirable, but thereafter
there seems to be a parting of the ways on the part of one group which
says AlnetoOlati laSitklelkiNA0bei/OrtekRaititig92 AnyiRleqtA and another
group which says the change nue 'e slower, 'leggdargiglfias Dr. Piplanils
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point of view. Is that correct, or have I misunderstood? I am just trying
to clarify the broad range of opinion which has come forth this afternoon.
MR. ISAACS: I would like to specify that just a. little more sharply.
I think that the difference lies between those who think that this area
with its emergent nations has the possibility of developing along more or
less classic economic and political lines as we have known them in Western
history in the more or less recent past, and those like myself who say that
that perspective has absolutely no validity whatsoever and that what is
needed is a truly bold new program which would enable the emergent nations
of South Asia to find their places in a new and larger framework and to
proceed with the problem of their reconstruction and emergence from backward-
ness on a 20th century basis rather than a 19th century basis.
MR. PELZER: I should like to Comment on the last point that Mr. Sacks
made; that is, pointing out no possibility of utilizing agrarian tension.
In 1941 I had a long talk with Pedro Abad Santos, the spiritual father of
the Huk movement, and I asked him the specific question, how did he feel
about President Quezonts program of trying to solve the agrarian problem
of Central Luzon by taking out a part of the population? Pedro Abad Santos
flew at my face when I expressed admiration for such a method. He was
violently opposed to any migration from Pampanga to Mindanao, he did not
want to lose a single tenant and have him become a land. owner. What he was
after was actually a tightening of the situation in Central Luzon so that
it would blow up, any program that would lead to a lessening of the tension
he was opposed to. I think that answer should give us the key.
I should like to point out the changes in Japan. To me it is rather
surprising -- in a way- it is ironical -- that we went ahead and cleared
up the agrarian problem in Japan but at the same time we blocked a solution
of that sort in the Phildppines. I donft see any indication at this moment
that we are willing to urge the rest of Southeast Asia to follow the example
that we set in Japan, If there is any value in the attack that MacArthur
used in Japan, then it should- be applied to other areas.
MR. HOLLAND: Land reform.
MR. PELZER: Yes.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Mr, Isaacs, do you want to conclude the session?
MR. ISAACS: I think I can conclude with a story. I once sat with
Hadji Agus Salim during one of those discussions of the coming war with
Russia, the implications of atomic war, and so on. Somebody made the
customary and now almost banal comment: "If we do have an atomic war it
will mean the destruction of our civilization." Old Hadji smiled a
little and quickly said, "Oh no Your civilization, not mine."
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.
.1. Adjournment at 5 P.M.
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el72e
THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia
VII
CO-OPERATION, COMPETITION, AND ISOLATION IN TYE ECONOMIC SPHERE*
J. S. Furnivall
I have been asked to offer for your consideration this evening a few
remarks on South Asian economic analysis under the title Co -operatien,
Competition and Isolation in the Economic Sphere In thinking over the
matter I have sometimes been unhappy about the tetle. Is it the wrong
way around? Should it not be Isolation, Competition, Co-operation? That
would suggest and summarize the course of social evolution. Isolation -
the kind of life one can imagine when Sinanthropus called for a cup of
morning coffee on Pithecanthropus with a large club and had to knock him
out before snatching away his coffee; the kind of life that one can still
find in remote hills and swamps wherever stranger is an enemy; the life
of man solitary, nasty, brutish, short, and poor, Then competition -
mainly economic competition that replaced the kneck -out blow of earlier
days by an attack upon the stomach, natural selection by starvation.
Finally, by gradual elimination of the cruder in3tincts, co-operation
in a national society embracing rival groups in i)rdered harmony. Then,
reaching out over a wider sphere, competition between various national
units, such as has marked the recent past, with 3arma, Siam, and Indo
China competing in the ride market and similar cempetition in other
branches of economic lifei And this in turn leading on to combinations,
tin pools, rubber restriction and so on or, we may hope; to the happier
international co-operation of the future. Surely Isolation, Competition,
Co-operation would be a more inspiring title. But Co-operation, Competition,
Isolation - what are we to make of it? What dare future does the title
portend? I was not happy. But our deliberations have gone far to remove
my doubts as to its aptness. During these two days it has become clear
that the order of the wording is correct. My dcubts have been removed.
Unless we can achieve co-operation there will be competition, leading to
isolation and only what I think you call in this country "the tough guy"
will survive. The Conference has removed my doubts as to the aptness
of the title; but not my fears and gloomy appreeensions.
It is the fashion now to remove fear by psychoanalysis. This suggests
that if we are to study the relations between the peoples of South Asia we
must first study relations within these various lands. Let us begin then
with something in the nature of a psychoanalytic study of their economic
and social constitution. It is a fascinating subject which seems to have
received less attention from professional econonists than it deserves.
I am not a professional economist and speak therefore with the natural
diffidence of an amateur. But, as an administrator in Burma, I VW brought
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up against problems for which economic text books appeared to offer no
solution. In puzzling over them I was driven back to the elementary
rudiments, the A B C of economic theory - the nature of wealth and the
fundamental principles governing its production and consumption. Some
writers,suggest that Western economic theory is not valid for the East,
and I hope I shall nottrespass unduly on your patience if I recall some
of its elementary axioms and maxims. These have frequently cropped up in
the course of our discussions. Do orientals recognize our values? What
about the acquisitive instinct - do they possess it, ought we to encourage
it? I remember scandalizing a group of econorgets and administrators in
Java by suggesting that economic environment conditions population; they
were convinced that population conditions the economic environment. We
have heard many suggestions to the same effect. Certainly in Burma
everyone wants a foundain pen a wrist-watch, and a bicycle if he cannot
afford a car; and casual observation suggested that men wanted much the
same things in Java. It is not perhaps exaggerating to say that given
the choice between a wrist watch and a baby most people would choose
the wrist watch. But it is much easier to get a baby. Yet only the
other day a modern Burman, a loyal supporter of the government of Burma,
explaining how hard it is to make both ends meet now that salaries have
been reduced on account of the financial position of the country remarked
that out of what remained he had to support two distant cousins who were
on strike against the government. Their attitude is not quite the same
as ours, and in attempting an economic analysis of South Asia we should
I think be rather careful about terms and principles. skin somewhere
pokes fun at Mill for saying at it is aentroscary to define wealth as
everyone has a sufficiently cle:a-c of wealth. Modern economists still
seem chary of defining it. Doo wealth have the same connotation in Asia
as in Europe? I think it does, I suppose we may define it as the product
of work applied to natural resources in order to produce something rhat
men want and that can be transferred to others.
2. The Factors of Production. It is common usage to describe land,
labor and capital as the factors of production of wealth. But is this a
complete analysis? Conditions in South Asia seem to suggest that one
factor has boon overlooked. Land of course is a conventional abbrevi-
ation,for all the free gifts of nature, soil, re;z1, air, rivers, sea and
sun. Labor also is a conventional term including all forma of work intellect-
ual as well as manual. Anyone who does work expends energy in the production
of wealth just as the mainspring of a watch expends energy in driving the
hands. Ordinarily in doing work a man can produce more wealth than he
consumes. He may have no use for the surplus and in this case so much of
his work is wasted. In general he stores the surplus and this eupplus
constitutes his wealth which may be regarded as a store of his accumulated
labor applied to natural resources. He may either store it for future
enjoyment, or he may use it for the production of more wealth, and wealth
applied to the further production of wealth is termed capital.
It is, I would :suggest, not wholly fanciful and indeed helpful to
apply in economics the terminelogy of physical science. We may perhaps
regard wealth as an accumulation of economic energy, and we can measure
economic energy by the surplus of wealth produced, the store of energy
accumulated, over the energy consumed in the form of capital, land, and
labor in producing it. Regarded from this impersonal standpoint economic
problems are concerned with
supply aftipRreasy-oottolagtt igkier.icts1Rmlyboinctrotamoves_wit;h
. penaing characteristic of an acquisitive
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society.
In some parts of Burma men who have no cattl prepare the soil for
cultivation by puddling it with their feet. Most cultivators however
use some of their surplus produce as capital by investing it in cattle
with which they can obtain a larger yield. In thb one case the cultivator
used labor only; in the other he uses both labor and capital. But in the
nature of the work performed there is no differen.::e; in both cases the
cultiVator is expending economic energy in the prlduction of wealth,
but in the latter case, in addition to his own labor he is using the
accumulated store of energy represented by the cattle. From another
standpoint, however, there is a great difference between labor and
capital. Labor is embodied in the laborer and, except where slavery
persists, the laborer owns himself and is free to sell his services.
An employer cannot buy the man but only his labor, the economic energy
which he embodies. Capital, however, is disembodied economic energy)
it is not embodied in any particular individual but can be freely
transferred from one man to another and is at thc disposal of any one
who owns it. The distinction between labor and capital is valid, of
course, in South Asia as in Europe, but the accultulation of wealth in
South Asia and the use of it as capital deserves closest consideration.
Scattered about South Asia there are still few small backward
tribes which live from day to agy on the herbs and fruit they gather
in the jungle and the animals and fish they catct. They produce no
surplus because everyday they cens.ume all they gut, and they remain
miserably poor. Some tribes, however, rather more advanced, practice
shifting cultivation in hillside clearings and very often, although
the land may yield a surplus, they do not trouble to reap more than
is sufficient for their needs, so that much of their labor is wested,
Not so very long ago this happened even with set-,:led culttvation in the
plains, and I have often been told that in forme days, when there
was no export market for rice, the surplus produce la s left in the
fields to be eilten by the rats. Similarly mil1e grain in still
abandoned to the birds in years when there is a rood crop of rice,
which men prefer as food to millet. Nowadays, however, mf.,ct cultivators
in the plains store and sell their surplus produ,7e They helra reached
a higher stage of social organization than the bz_11 folk; 4..nd it is only
when mon reach this stage that they begin to ace at.11ate wealth. Bat
they store most of their wealth in the form of g i s11r, or jewelry
and use only a small proportion of it as capital f'7,7 the production of
more wealth. This is very different from the coldillei eaining in
the social organization of the West, where men ripeeit in the bank any
surplus beyond their immediate requirements so tlat it becomes available
as capital for promoting economic progress.
It is true that work is often wasted in the West. The stock example
is the destruction of Brazilian coffee. Even during the darkest days
of austerity in England ens could read hungrily in the papers of fish
thrown back into the sea, and I have myself seen cases of oranges dumped
in the Mersey at Liverpool. But in the West such a waste of labor is
unusual; in many -parts of South Asia it is still usual, It is true also
that in the West much of the wealth is expended on display and does not
contribute to production directly, if at all; but the proportion so
expendegbpirevadtEcingelditse$10000#241PCIA-F111240*0926MOINV001603 the
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waste of of labor and the waste - if one may call it so - of wealth, there is
a significant difference between East and West. But the foregoing outline
sketch of social evolution in South Asia shows that it reflects the
difference in social environment. In primitive conditions there is no
surplus; then a surplus is produced but wasted; in the more advanced
oriental communities the surplus is stored as wealth, but only in the
social organization of the Western world is any considerable portion of
the accumulated wealth applied to production as capital. Surely then
we must reckon social organization alongside Und, labor, and capital
as a factor, indeed the most important factor, in the production of
wealth.
It would of course be absurd to suggest that economists have wholly
overlooked anything so obvious. They have indeed, from the time of fidam
Smith, emphasized the economic importance of the division of labor, which
is only one aspect of social organization. But they have treated the
division of labor as an isolated phenomenon instead of as a process
closely linked up with the general course of social evolution. This is
due probably to their having assumed as normal the economic structure
of the world in which they lived.
3. Capitalism, The system of social organization which most text books
on economics take for granted is usually termed capitalism. On the surface
0 least there is much to justify this term as ageneral description of its
character. For two outstanding features of the modern Western world are
the aggregation of vast masses of capital and the power wielded by the
owners of capital, the capitalists, not only on the economic sphere but
also in the sphere of politics. Yet, if we look below the surface, the
term, if not a misnomer, is certainly misleading. The confusion is
unfortunate. For it tends to concentrate attention on capital as the
essential element in a society and type of civilization of which it is
only one2 and hot the most important, feature. This encourages critics
of the system to attribute to the personal activities of capitalists
results that are inherent in the working of impersonal economic forces,
and on the other hand allows supporters of the system to auim on its
behalf credit for the benevolent activities of capitalists as citizens
and not merely as owners of capital. In South Asia today "capitalist"
is a term of obloquy, yet it is capitalist America that is conspicuous
for such foundations as the Norman Wait Harris Memorial that has brought
us all together here to study ihternational relations in South Asia.
One of these unfortunate results is that many people in South Asia
have come to regard capital as evil in itself; they condemn not only the
use of wealth as capital but even the accumulation of wealth, whether for
production or display, and ass,-,ale that a rich man is a robber. Although
those who are more enlightened may advocate merely the transfer of capital
from private to public ownership, the great mass of the unenlightened are
reckless of destroying capital and wealth in their attack on the so-called
capitalist system. That is a very real danger at the present time. There
is a real danger of a relapse into the dark ages. Yet, if I interpret
correctly the writing on the wall, the attack, however misdirected by
ignorance and envy, is essentially an instinctive human reaction against
the control of economic forces, which must be brought under control if
civilization is to survive.
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Capitalism in its modern form may be regarded as the natural, though
not the necessary, result of the economic reforms advocated by classical
economists who did so much to give a meaning to the modern world. It is
only one aspect of the great Liberal tradition of individual freedom of
thought and action, person and property, includirg the right of individuals
to own property and use it for their individual profit. To the economists
of the Liberal tradition the liberation of economic forces from the control
of customary restrictions seemed a master-key to the wealth of nations.
This belief was largely justified, Nhch as the free play of natural
selection tends to the survival Of the fittest ir the struggle for exiitelos,
so does the free play of economic forces tend to efficiency in the economic
sphere. But natural selection operates by elimirating the unfit, those
who cannot adapt the environment to make it fit for them. Ruthlessness
is equally a character of unrestricted economic competition. Efficiendly
may signify either an increase in production or a decrease in consumption
and, except so far as economic forces are directtd by human will, they
tend to reduce consumption rather than to increate produetton. Unless
restrained by human will they tend to reduce life to its lowest level,
to the margin of bare animal subsistence. So far as capital represents
pRre economic energy it operates in the same manner, and although, strictly
interpreted, Capitalism signifies only a type of social organization, like
that of the modern West, conspicuous for vast accumulations of capital,
yet, in common usage, it has come to signify a type of social organization
dominated by impersonal economic forces, or in Which at least economic
forces are preponderant. I would say that the preponderance of economic
forces is inevitably prejudicial to social welfare, but it is not capital
as such that is responsible for the evils attributed to Capitalism.
In what may be termed the pre-capitalist ag2 economic forces were
restrained by custom. Economic freedom led naturally both to the accumu-
lation of capital and to social disruption. But social disruption was
not the necessary consequence of economic freedom. In the West, where
economic forces were liberated cradually, they had little effect an
the social structure before the industrial revolation. Then, as their
activity increased, measures were taken to control them. The men who
came forward to defend society against disintegration by economic forces
called themselves Socialists. After an uphill struggle with defenders
of the Liberal tradition who rightly valued economic freedom, they forced
the stoutest champion of Liberalism in England at the end of the 19th
centamy to admit "We are all Socialists now". It was however the capitalist
as owner of capital rather than capital as the embodiment of economic
forces that presented the more obvious target for attack. Socialists
accordingly advocated the substitution of public for private ownership of
capital, and the control of economic activities by the State as the organ
of social will. The mere substitution of public for private ownership is
not in itself sufficient to control economic forces; it may result waY
in State Capitalism instead of private Capitalism. Thus parallel to and
part of the Socialist movement was a trend towards democracy as a means
of making the State better able to assert its authority over the anti-
social effects of economic forces. Both Socialism and Democracy are
still on trial, but it may fetrly be said that in the West we are now
living in a post-capitalist age in which co-operation is more or less
effective in asserting the supremacy of social will as distinct from
the capitalist age of unrestricted economic competition, and the still
earlier nre-cauitalist age when economic forces were restrained by custom.
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What, however, is the situation in South Asia?
4. Dual Economy. When Europeans in the dawn of modern capitalism tried
to do business in the East they encountered a society still living in the
pre-capitalist age. Under the local rulers they could not do business on
Western lines or even live securely, and in various wgre they obtained
soncessions where they could live their own life in their own way. Each
little concession was a fort and a trading station, a capitalist nucleus
in a pre-capitalist world. Yet it was *till difficult to conduct business
because the people would not trade on Western lines. In the West anyone
who wants an additional supply of anything can usually obtain it by
offering a higher price. But in the East it often happened that a higher
price did not stimulate production. The wants of the people were few and
simple and when these were satisfied nothing would tempt them to produce
more. The European merchants, as good men of business, did not want to
pay more than was necessary, and they also wanted, if they could, to
obtain a monopoly of the European market which would enable them to gain
as much as possible.
The Dutch in Java found a solution to the problem. They made contracts
with local chieftains who could compel the people to produce the goods
wanted by the Dutch and prevent them from selling to outsiders; as the
chieftains obtained the produce in the form of revenue they could sell it
on terms very gratifying to the Dutch. With the growth of Dutch power
they superseded the local chieftains and obtained still better terms.
But their profit still depended on maintaining the authority of the local
chieftains. Out of this arose the tradition of indirect rule. Even
until the late 19th century the Dutch had no manufactures that they could
sell in Asia in a free market, and they wanted more than over produce,
especially sugar and coffee, which the people would not cultivate in suff4
cientootities except under compulsion. This produce could be suppliOd
by Western planters. These however wanted land and labor which they
could obtain on the most favorable terms thvough local village headmen.
Thus the system of indicect rule still survived though in a modified
form. As an economic system it rested on compuleten and not on economic
freedom.
The planters, the merchants who bought their produce and supplied
their requirements, and the banks which financed the whole process were
living in a Western capitalist world. B ut the people in their villages
were still living in a world that, oulgmardly at least, was .a survival of
the pre-capitalist age. There was a capitalist superstructure over a
pre-capitaliet base. In the Western capitalist superstructure economic
fortes acted freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which
still restrain them in the West. In the Eastern pre-capitalist sector
a check over economic forces was maintained by local chieftains, ostensibly
deriving their authority from the people as the embodiment of social
will, but in reality exercising it as agents of the central government
on which they depended for support. These conditions provided some
Dutch economists with a theory of a dual economy as a distinctive character
of colonial rule.
In tropical dependencies, according to this theory, there are two
distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act
in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier
Liberal economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force
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and Westerh economic nrinciples are inapplicahlo. The one aEator i3 ultra-
capitalist and the Easterh sector is pre .(a:attai,t e%^:bit-,"-, with
prestige carrying more weight than profit. aa.1 now nal influence rta=in-
ing the individual desire of gain. Economists of thic s-hool atteme-too
elucidate the principles governing economic relat_ons separately In the
two distinct sectors and the relations between th-! two sectors. Their work
has thrown much light on tropical economy, and I personally owe a great
debt to them, but their analysis is based on the issumption that Western
economic laws do not run in the Eastern world. Elsewhere, experience
suggests grounds for question!1 that assumption. Still in various forms
it has found expression in tail. Conerence. It may be well therefore to
glance briefly at BOMB of these e:..aentary principles to ascertain which
are valid in South Asia and how far and why others may be invalid.
5. Economic Laws. I have been told that it 13 a mark of senility to
talk of economic laws. I admit the senility, but am not to be laughed out
of my belief in economic laws. They were indeed already out of fashion
when I first began to take an interest in economias. tll had long since
restricted their domain to production, and men were beginning to question
them even in this branch of economics, or rather perhaps to assume that on
production there was no more to be said. Now we are encouraged to believe
that, if any such laws exist, we can over-ride tem by an Act of Parliameht
or, if in no other way, by a revolution. But, "plus v chanae...." The
British Parliament, it has been said, can do are :ling except change a man
into a woman. But men are not really quite so malleable, and even in an
atomic age nature is still nature. We may perhaps classify economic laws
as laws of nature, laws of human nature, and law of social nature, and I
would suggest that under each head there are law no less rigid than the
laws of the liedes and Persians and as universalla' applicable as the laws
of motion. They are valid in a pre-capitalist society no less than in a
capitalist Society, and no less valid in the post-capitalist society in
which we live.
If we consider wealth and nature we find certain laws applicable both
to the natural world and human world in its economic aspect. It is, for
example, a law of nature that all living things tend to increase up to
the limit of the food supply. That certainly is a law which applies to
a pre-capitalist society. It is indeed one of the chief problems confront-
ing students of tropical economy and practical acministrat-ors that efforts
to promote welfare in the tropics are fvestrated by the growth of the
population. "We try" they complain "to provid food for every mouth,
but the only result is that there are more mouth a to feed'. In the West
human will may circumvent the law of population hrough birth control, but
that does not nullify the law L,Iiy dxy:e-than airp_aaes nullify the law of
gravity. Again it is a law of nature that effor is exhausting, that energy
is diminished in doing worka ae may devise mean al- to spur men to greater
effort, as for example by higher pay for overtima, but nature may still
operate to give better results from shorter hours. Or take the law of
diminishing returns. This is inherent in the physical character of the soil.
Perhaps it is nowhere better illustrated than in very primitive pre-capital-
ist society in which men, scratching the surface of the hill side, must
move every year or two on account of the exhauston of the soil. And in pre-
capitalist society the natural law of the survival of the fittest acts
quite independently of human volition. In times of famine men have a better
chance *Fp Orid1T4 glelag26H/OsigVa existenae Onlese food than others.
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Here then are some natural lawe br,ering on economic relations which operate
in a pre-capitalist society; tc quite independently of human will in
conditioning production and J?.JATay valid in the East as in the West.
And unless brought under the of humanwill, either by custom or
by effective legislation, they tend o strip life of ite ornaments and
graces down to a.bare levol of affmal subsistence, or even below that level
to the elimination of the economically unfit., The same laws operate in all
stages of social evolution, and it is only the social organization that
determines the results.
So Mich for wealth and nature; how about wealth and human nature? In
the West in general and .wherever and so far as men are actuated by economic
motives, they want to get as much as possible for what they give, and to
give no more than necessary for what they want. We accept it as common
sense, a law of human nature, that no one will give threepence if he can get
as good a thing for twopence, and that no one will sell a thing for twopence
if he can get threepence.--Human nature however according to the theory
of a dual economy, is different in the tropics. -Economists of this school
arguee with good reason, that in the Western sector of tropical society,
economic motives prevail more strongly than in "capitalist" Europe, that
men more closely resemble the "economic man" of former elaesical economists
and that capital is freer from control by socialwill. But the native in
the Eastern sector, they contend, has little regard for economic values.
It is indeed the general experienceof Western explorers and traders on
their first contact with new peoples that life is ruled by custom and that
the individual identifies himself more closely with the community than in
the West. But general experience shows also that the individual self
lies very near the surface. Men soon learn to value money, and evince
a desire to better their position, and the characteristic disease of
tropical soCiety under the impact of the West is "atomization", disintegra-
tion'into individuals. So far as there is any difference between natives
under Dutch rule and their Western follows, the a:Tiallion would seem to
be that, for good or ill, the Dutch have tried, to shelter the people from
economic forces, and have trusted rather to authority than to the desire
of gain to stimulate productien. The difference lies in the social environ-
ment and not in human natere_ do not wish to say that human nature is
the same always and everywhere, In Burma for example there is a tribe
of which only six families remain because the members are so obstinately
celibate that they will only marry under official compulsion. .But then
in Europe old families die out because of the preference for marrying
heiresses who breed only female children. All I am constrained to suggest
is that the economic motive of the desire of gain is common to human nature
in both East and West, and that it is the social organization which condi-
tions its activities.:
In this matter another point deserves attention. We have seen that the
free play of natural law in the economic sphere tends in the long run to
bring production to a standstill by cutting down consumption. This
tendency is reinforced by human nature. Men actuated by the desire of gain
aim at increasing the surplus of production over consuvtion rather than
at increasing the stock of wealth. The easiest method is to cut down costs.
Only under compulsion or in a congenial environment do they adopt the more
difficult method of increasing output. Self-interest likewise impels them
to restrict and monopolize production. Just as the free play of natural law
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in the economic sphere is prejudicial to social welfare so also the economic
motive of the desire of gain is anti-social, and these general principles
are as valid in South Asia as in Europe. They are not only equally valid but
they operate more actively. In Burma for example Indian immigrants have a
lower standard of living than Burmans. They can afford to pay fifteen
baskets of paddy an acre as rent on land where Burmans can only afford to
pay ten baskets. Naturally landlords prefer Indians to Burmans as tenants,
and the Burman must either reduce his standard of living or seek other
employment. But in the stronger social organization of the West trade unions
protect the laborer against wage cuts and compel employers to increase
production so that he can afford to pay high wages.
These considerations point to a law of social nature that also is valid
both for East and West. The operation of the laws of nature and of human
nature tends to limit the production of wealth and to foster the disintegra-
tion of society. In the struggle for survival between different social
groups it is the economically strongest society which comes to the front,
and only by the operation of some motive strong enough to control anti-
social economic forces can any society continue to exist. In pre-capitalist
societies the anti-social effect of economic forces is kept within due
bounds by custom. In Western capitalist society the common social will,
finding expression in legislation, is a more effective method of controlling
economic forces because it allows them freer play witil,.7ut their getting
beyond control. But in the dependencies or former depPridoncies of South
Asia order had to be maintained by foreign troops, because these societies
no longer possessed sufficient inherent vitality to restrain anti-social
tendencies.
Thus in respect of wealth and nature, wealth and human nature, and weal
and society we find that there is no significant differenee in regard to
the validity of Western economic principles. Yet the same laws acting in
a different environment produce different results, and in attempting an
analysis of South Asian economics we must try to ascertain the nature of
this difference. Despite all legislation, despite revolutions, Fascist
or Communist, nature remains the same and human nture reanins the same.
But what we can do by law, and what otherwise wi:J. be done by re7clution,
is to change the organization of society. The great Liberal economists,
preaching freedom from the bonds of custom and the hampering effect of
mistaken legislation, urged that economic activities might be left to
nature and to human nature. Time has shown that welfare is not won so
easily. In the reaction against Liberalism, Socialists looked to legis-
lation, Communists to revolution. Following Marc, the Communists hold that
nothing less than revolution will suffice, a desperate remedy and almost
certainly worse than the disease. What are we to do about it?
6. The Plural Society. The Liberal answer is "Do nothing, laissez
faire." Right up to the eve of the late war the abundance of rich treasure
which South Asia yielded might seem, on a superficial view, to prove them
right. But one could not probe far beneath the surface witthout asking
awkward questions. Marx accepted their economic principles, but prophesied
that they would lead to capitalism and disaster. Now, I think, if he could
rise from the dead and survey the world around him, he would rub his hands,
his skeleton hands, with venomous glee and, in accents no longer prophetic
but sepulchral, say "I told you so". Looking at the welter of strife and
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or )'x? Marx? But you may remember Lnat Larx did not insist on disaster as the
inevitable result of 1iberatin,7 economic forces; he mentioned England as a
land where the social organization might be strong enough to hold out against
the strain and a possible exception to the general rule. Can we find any
similar exception in South Asia? What about India? Perhaps if we inquire
why other parts of South Asia are torn with war and revolution we shall learn
why India is comparatively stable.
It is true of course that the war was the immediate occasion of the
collapse of the old order. But it was threatened with collapse before the
war. Why did it collapse so easily? And why is it so difficult to recon-
struct the old order or to replace it by a new order? These are questions
we must answer. One feature that has long been common to the countries of
South Asia, and is so obvious that it could not fail to impress even the
most unreflecting sightseer, was the medley of races. What was almost
equally apparent was that the races did not mix. Each race and group
had its own quarter, its own temple or place of worship, its Club or other
meeting ground for social functions, its own liquor shops and so on, its
own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They did not meet in
these places, but only in the market place - and possibly the race course -
to make money out of one another or perhaps, not so often, with one another.
They had no common link except in business. What was not quite so obvious
was that each race and group had its own special economic function. There
was a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural
economy.
Typically a plural society in South Asia comprised three main sections:
the EUropeans constituting an upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian
or Chinese, constituting a middle class; and the great mass of the native
population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals were
temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances,
and the native community was little more than a crowd of individuals. In
the relations between the classes there were no social ties to dull the
edge of economic competition. Uthin each class inherited traditions lost
their force. East of Suez, said Rudyard Kiplingis soldier "there ain't
no ten commandments." Hindus forgot their caste and might even intermarry
with Moslems. Society as a whole was divided into groups; each group was
merely a collection of individuals and in each group life was simplified
to an economic struggle for existence. Social life was reduced to its
economic content, and society was converted into a business concern and
only the foreign army of occupation preserved it from disruption. The
essential and distinctive character of a plural economy is that it is
dominated by economic forces and outside a few partly sheltered oases South
Asia illustrated the capitalist system in its purest form.
.7. Social Demand. This plural society was fundamentally unstable.
Economic forces had been liberated from the control of custom, but had not
been brought under the control of any common social will. It is only as
a member of society that man can satisfy those social wants that are
distinctive of humanity. Education is a social want; so also is the want
for a healthier environment. Civilization is the process in which men learn
to live together so as to give effect to social wants, and they do this by
the evolution of a common social will. Adam Smith and his followers, living
in a stable unitary society, could take social wants for granted; as he
remarked, "defence is more than opulence". But, as a.seared everywhere
througARONNStaPhilaleelfetggWRiiiieNtifigfita-Mele?V '::?W.CAlly there
is no common social will even in a matter so vital to its existence as
defence against aggression. The basic problem of Western economics is how
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best to organize supply to meet demand, and this applier; no leas to sccial
wants than to individual wants. The same problem. eaLls for solutdon in the
plural societies of South Asia. But in a plural .ociety there is a ctill
more fundamental problem. For such a society has no common social will.
The highest factor common to all sections is the desire for individual gain
and the basic problem of economics in the tropics is the organization of
social demand.
Education in Burma provides a useful illustration of this problem. Uhdor
Burmese rule all the boys obtained at least the elements of literacy in the
village Buddhist monastery. There was a social dasand for education. It
had an economic value but that was merely incidental; its purpose was to
teach boys how to live as Buddhists and as citizels of Burma, and it did
not result in the overproduction of lads who couli not turn their education
to account in the employment market. Under British rule education in the
Western schools was merely an economic asset; it did not teach boys how
to live but how to make a living. The schools were for the moat part managed
by missionaries who certainly did not regard education as primarily economic.
But the people appreciated only its economic value, The boys crowded into
the schools which soon began to turn out graduates in excess of the demand
and there was a Narplus of educated unemployables, This of course is true
in general of Western education in the tropics. It is transformea from a
social into an economic asset. Now the monastic schools decay because
monaeie education has ceased to tedi a social asset; it has no meaning in the
modern w)rld, To the general rule however that INestern education is merely
an economic asset there is one significant exception. The Christian Karens
attend the Western schools for the same reason as Burmans formerly attended
monastic schools - to learn how to live. Similarly nationalism seems to
be stimulating a demand for Western education as a social asset, but this
must be regarded as a symptom of a nascent socia: will,
So far as this analysis of the economic strtIture of society in South
Asia is sound it leads to conclusions of great :1ereot end of practical
importance. It raisos problems similar to those c long dirTuted in
political science regarding the will of all, la v:Jlonte_de_tous., and the
general will, lg,volonte Aihirale. In the West inc may peraaps assume
that the promotion of individual welfare will retelt in social welfare, but
in South Asia it would seem that in order to proLote welfare we must aim
directly at building up, reintegrating a disintearated society, as only by
this means can we achieve the social welfare which is a condition of indi-
vidual welfare. On this view we may attribute the comparative stability
of India to the Hindu religion which consecrates the divisions of a plural
society and over-rides their fissiparous tendency by the common bond of
caste. Similarly in Sian a common allegiance to the Crown has hitherto
sufficed to hold society together despite the cohflict of economic interests
between Europeans, Chinese and the various group e of the indigenous inhabi-
tants, and at the present mageent the problem of restoring welfare in Siam
is far less formidable a task than in Burma and other former dependencies
of European powers.
8. Production. If we turn from the problem f demand in a plural society
to the problem of supply, from consumption to production, we find ourselves
on less veaalliar greund.The basic problem as ia Europe is haw best to
organize supply, how to produce the greatest output (q? wealth with the least
consumption of capital and labor in the process. World welfare, no less than
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the welfare of the people immediately concerned: demands that we shall.
harness the whole available supply of human and material resources to
production. But in a plural society what are the available resourees
and how can we yoke them so as to pull together?
At present in South Asia, apart from India, practically the whole
supply of capital and sometimes even a great part of the land is owned
by aliens. Either we must obtain theirco-operation on terms compatible
with national welfare, which may conflict with their economic interest
in immediate large returns, or we must find some way of dealing with
their capital. Confiscate it, say the Communists. But what happens when
we try to confiscate it? It disappears, or so much of it disappears that
the rest is hardly worth confiscating. Confiscation is attractive
but impracticable. Pay it all back, says the Capitalist. But can we
pay it back? Before the war Burma was exporting goods to about double
the value of the imports. If we try to pay back the capital we shall
find ourselves for some years exporting-all--our produce and getting nothing
in return for it. That is no more practical than confiscation. And
when capitalists demand that their capital shall be returned, is it really
going back? Most of the so called "foreign" capital in Burma, as in the neigh.
boring countries represents accumulated profits. They were accumulated in
the country by cooperation between the foreign capitalist and the people,
and represented so much of the profits as could not conveniently be sent
out in the form of dividends. They remained in the country in the name
of and as the property of the capitalists. This could in some measure be
justified so long as the capitalist used them in developing the resources
of the country. But it is a different matter when he asks to take them out
of the country. Very well then, prohibit the export of capital. But how
does one prevent it? How does one achieve a watertight control over foreign
exchange in countries where political experience is so immature and the
administrative machinery so inadequate as in South Asia? Again, vast
masses of capital have already been destroyed during the war. The capital
which formerly accumulated out of profits in the country must be replaced
by capital newly brought into the country. It really will be foreign
capital, whereas in the past the capital has only been foreign because
in the plural society the managerial function was performed by foreigners.
How can we attract it with prospective profits when these wdll be lower and
less certain than under the former colonial regime? Must we then buy out
foreign enterprise, nationalize it? But nationalization is not the same
thing in South Asia as in Enrope. Nationalisation in Europe means trans-
ferring money from one pocket to another within the same country, but in
South Asia it means transferring money from the people to foreigners,
sending it abroad and complying with the demand of capitalists to get
"their" money back. And such capital as the Government can raise, either
by borrowing abroad or from domestic savings, will be better expended on
developing the national resources along new lines than in merely taking
over enterprises already in existence. All the capital available should be
applied to building up new production.
Where, however, is this capital to be obtained? Enterprises already
in the country will probably try to replace capital destroyed during the war
even if they have to bring in fresh capital. Apart from this source who
will risk-fresh capital in South Asia when Africa offers a prospect of more
lucrative employment, and when other parts of the world promise a greater
security for investments? Even if these countries can borrow the capital
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they need, is it prudent at the present time to tly machinery and other
capital goods which will have to show a profit erten prices have fallen?
And can they borrow it without strings visible cr invisible, being attached
to it? Moreover their experience of foreign caritalist enterprise in the
past has made them reluctant to seek capital abrcad.
The problem of raising capital is of course linked up with the problem
of obtaining managerial and technical experience and a supply of skilled
labor. Expensive machinery is useless, worse then useless, if men do not
know how to handle it. As regards foreign capital for large scale
enterprise some form of partnership seems the on: y possible solution.
Apparently some firms, especially in America, wi:1 provide capital goods
and at the same time training for a period of yeers until the local people
can take over the management for themselves. Th ,t seems a promising
solution. But it requires a preliminary investieetion as to the proper
line of development such as the International Moeetary Fund has recently
offered to conduct. In general however the cond tions suegest that the
development of large scale enterprise must of ne essity he gradual and
should be linked up in the first instance with t 9 development of domestic
and small scale industries, especially those con .ected with local agri-
culture. The development of small scale industrs would reel-airs less
capital and yield speedier returns. It would aleo be more affective in
dealing with the problem of unemployment. It is often suggested that
rapid industrial development would provide a remndy for unemployment.
But the unemployment is mainly seasonal and it wal not be easy to combine
large scale industry with seasonal emp]oyment, laless this is borne in
mind unemployment may grow instead of aeclining enth industrialization.
Even with concentration on small scale local. industries the countries
will still need capital; it be difficult fer them to raise the capital
abroad on favorable terms and are apprehens-.ve as to the conditions
which will be attached to fere c What p-ospect is there of raising
local capital? Some, anic Int, could be raised by a
capital levy: on foreign eni-,erpld8c2. ac fsr exenpte by requiring them to
transfer one-tenth of their shares to the Goverrlento This would need
tacteal handling but if combined with a plan imr,sing similar sacrifices on
the native peoples the Government might reasonatty ask foreign enterprise to
cooefeeate in this way in reconstruction dad development. Moreover it would
give foreign enterprise and the Government a coneon interest in industrial
development, and should conduce to the greater security of capital invest-
ment. There is also considerable scope for comrulsory saving. We have
heard a good deal in the Conference about the "fengry Forties", and the
difficulty of inducing starving peasants to tierten their belts still more
closely. But we may assume that steps would be taken to relieve the
cultivators of the burden of rent and debt under which they have been strug-
gling and they would still be in a much better position than before even
if required to save and pay into a National Development Fund a portion
of what they have hitherto paid the landlord am the money lender, while
the accumulation of savings in this form would tend to inculcate a habit
of saving. It is, in the last resort, from the rent and interest paid by
the cultivators that the large surplus of exporis over imports has been
derived in former years and the savings would iv fact come not from a further
tightening of the aultivatorw, belts but out of the surplus of unrequited
exports. Again, it capital were borrowed, some would go to pay for labor.
But if a levy be imposed on foreign capital and the cultivating and income
tax papiogoci4lFsclieR4411a001012447A4 POTARMY616-4692M14448011066W? to
induce the laboring class to mak* a corresponding contribution in the form
of labor. This could be so arranged as to reli've eeasonal unemployment.
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a.? -
Thus the chief obstacle to enhancing production in South Asia is not
the lack of capital but the difficulty of obtaining and training managerial
and technical assistance and an adequate supply of skilled labor, The
first condition of giving the necessary assistance is a survey to see how it
can be utilized to the best account, and the conduct of such surveys, either
by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East or by some other
competent body, is perhaps the most urgent need for economic reconstruction
and development. The actual development of the resources-of these countries
should in the long run be remunerative, but the foregoing analysis of South
Asian economy suggests that any plan for their development should be
designed with the express object of promoting national reintegration and
enabling them to maintain their political and economic independence, in order
to contribute to the fullest extent from their human and material resources
to the welfare of the world.
9. Co-operation a Competition and Isolation. National integration
implies a development of national unity,- the substitution of a unitary for a
plural -Society. One outstanding'feature of new Burma is the growth of
national unity. This statemnt may aeem paradexeal in view of: the obvious
and complicated disunity that fillsthe news from Burma. Nevertheless it
is a fact. One thing that streak uie forcibly on my return to Range=
eighteen months ago after an abJance of some years was that it was no.
longer as before an Indian ci'ca' "ott a Burman city. It was not quite so
Burman as it seemed at first; -tkaTre was still a Chinese- Quarter and an
Indian core.. And it is indeed a collection of Burman villages rather than
a Burman .city. Still, it is far more Burmese. In the papers. one reads
that Venketaswami, a Madrasi, or Lim Hock Chong, Chinese, or John Smith,
an Anglo-Burman will in future be known as Maung Maung, Maung Gyi or
Mating Gale. Probably most of these people are half-Burmess, but formerly
they took the non-Burman name and ramined separate from Burmans? now they
adopt a Burmese name andVairmese nationality. In mixed marriages between
Burmese men and European' women, the men formerly wore European dress, now
the womn often appear in Burmese dress. There seemed to be fewer Chinese
than before. But that was because many had come to dress like Burmans. -
And one found Burmans in all sorts of occupations that formerly had been
reserved for Indians and Chinese. -There was a new national unity in both
cultural and economic spheres. I.do-not-wish to exaggeratethis new
development but it is remarkable and unmistakable; it signifies a new
aspiration towards unity.
How far will greater national unity make for greater international
diversity? Haw far will it interfere with the growth of regional unity?
The regional unity of Southeast Asia has been questioned. But to Me it is
beyond question. There is unity in physique. Burmans, Siamese, Malays,
Javanese, Annamese, Filipinos in European clothes -frequently :mistake a
stranger for a compatriot. There is in my view strong regional unity
throughout the whole of Southeast Asia; in racial origin, in ethnology,
in their food, dress and general way of life there is much cammon to the
whole region. There is regional unity even although they are for the most
part unaware of it. A region defines itself and exists long before it
acquires regional consciousness, and now this regional consciodsness is ?
beginning to develop. India of course differs greatly.from all of Southeast
Asia from the cultural and eeonord3 standpoint. But a region has different
boundaries for different pur.dose2 and from certain political and economic
points of view India may usejA111,;, be treated together with Southeast Asia
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as a common region. Th:.8 howevar is a digression, The immediate question
is as to how far national reintegration may conflict with regional unity.
But I would suggest that the question is not divesity or unity. The two
are quite compatible. There may well be diversit; in unity- National
unity of the constituent elements, even if it emplasizes their diversity
may and should lead to greater regional unity. In their political and
economic problems they have so many difficulties in common and it is
obviously wasteful of effort and money for each people to try and work out
its problems by itself.
Burma cannot afford an agricultural service that shall be first class
in all respects. A common agricultural service could help all the countries
of the region, with Burma for example specializing in rice, Malaya in rubber,
Java in sugar and so on. That is only one illustration of a possible
functional co-operation promoting greater unity wile recognizing diversity.
Already in the various conferences that have been held in connection with
such matters one can see the beginning ofco-operation along these lines.
Perhaps the most urgent problem is that of military co-operation for the
preservation of internal order. There is a need for an international police
force. It should not try to direct internal political development as for
example by acting against Communism, But it could ensure that any change
in the direction of either Communism or Capitalism should be effected
peacefully and not by force. One of the most acute difficulties of these
countries lies in the maintenance of internal order that was formerly main-
tained by foreign troops. They distrust outside nelp and no outside
power is likely to do much to help them. But it might be possible to
build up an international police force incorporating military units from
each State that would provide a pool on which they could all draw at need
without derogating from their national prestige. This of course is only
a crude suggestion of a possibl,; line of action. I fear it is impracticable
but I see no alternative if we are to avoid a relapse of the Whole region
Into anarchy.
One thing is cdrtain: that if we cannot build up regional co-operation
we shall have to face regional competition. The rice millers of Rangoon for
the past seventy years have pleaded inability to promote welfare among their
coolies because of competition in the world market with Bangkok and Saigon.
That did not matter much; except to the coolies. But what is going to
happen when Burma, Siam, and Indo-China will be competing in the market as
national units with strong national interests at stake? Already there are
complaints that Siam is making a better bargain for its rice than Burma.
Burma has tried to obtain the co-operation of Siam to present a common front
against the buyers, but so far without success. If we can not have co-
operation we shall have competition, leading to isolation and economic and
cultural decline.
I have long believed in regional co-operaticn in Southeast Asia,. Before
the war I was teaching Burmese in Cambridge and ve had a club to which all
those interested in Burma belonged. There were similar clubs or societies
for Siamese, Malays, etc., and I tried to interett them in founding a common
society for the whole region. At one time I discussed the matter with a
Siamese and a Burman. Both greeted the idea witY. keen enthusiasm until we
came to the practical question of choosing a Prevident, The Siamese wanted
to be President because Siam was an independent country. The Burman disputed
his cla0896340oitk*IgagERM2W0112411MA-F63Wittek9kg06441566t061364t-Je. The
dispute became so hot that I had to close the diccussion before there was
another battle. This is an allegory. And with this allegory I may conven-
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THE NORMAN NORMAN WAIT HAR?1S MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationaldaa and Regionalism in South Asia
VIII
Round Table V: AMERICA'S STAKE IN SOUTH ASIA
Saturday morning, May 28, 1949
Presiding: Phillips Talbot
DIRECTOR TALBOT: Ladies and Gentlemen, before starting our pro-
ceedings this morning, I should like to say that we have in the room the
gentleman who is our host here at the Public Administration Clearing
House, Mr. Herbert Emmerich, who has made available to us this room and
all the facilities which we have enjoyed during these Round Tables. I
would like to introduce Mr. Emmerich.
6.. Applause ...
(Current announcemeats by Director Talbot)
DIRECTOR TALBOT: This morning we shall go outside the agenda to get
a few brief statements on the record to help clarify the meaning of our
discussions. Later in the morning we shall turn to the question of the
United States in relation to the whole area of South Asia. I trust I need
not repeat what I said the fin,,t day, that these discussions are not public.
We will start out on threL or four basic matters. Mr. Brodie, could
you make a statement on the ai- that has g)ne from the United States to
South Asia since the war.
UNITED STATES AID TO THE FAR EAST
Henry Brodie
United States aid to South Asia, as you probably all know, has been
directed principally to the Philippines. Direct aid to the Philippines
under the Rehabilitation Act aggregates $620 million. $400 million of
this is to compensate private individuals in the Philippines for war
damages to their property; $120 million is for the rehabilitation of
public buildings damaged during the war; an additional sum, which is being
appropriated annually but is not a fixed amount, for the technical training
of Filipinos, may add up to another $30 million; and finally, there has
been transfer of surplus property withan estimated fair value of $100 million.
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Actually, the the procurement cost of this surplus pr)perty ran in excess of
$650 million.
In addition, the Philippines received civilin supplies for relief
purposes following the liberation, which had an aagregate value of about
350 million. The other aid from the U.S. included a considerable amount of
military equipment, an RFC loan of $60 million in 1947 which was used to
finance an internal budgetary aelicit, a War Assets loan of $10 million and
a Maritime Commission loan of 0 million.
In addition to this direct aid, the Philippiaes has received large
United States dollar receipts as a result of our military expenditures
out there, payments of insurance claims, payment ef the proceeds of the
coconut oil, sugar and other taxes, etc. The aggregate amount of those
payments is actually greater than the direct-aid payments. I think it
was estimated that by 1950 those payments will have aggregated almost
$1 billion.
As a result of this U.S. direct, and indirect aid the Philippines
has been the most favorably situated dollar countsy in the Far East. As
I pointed out in my paper, these aid payments ha ae enabled the Philippines
to finance a very substantial trade deficit.
MR. SARKAR: Yesterday at General Romulo's reception at the International
House people asked him some very definite questicns. He said he was very
bitter, that the Philippines had received absolutely nothing from the United
States, and it seemed to me very unusual. My imyression had been exactly
the opposite.
ER. PIPLANI: He gave a statement of $4- or $5 million for war damaged
property.
MR. PELZER: May I add that he also pointed out yesterday that these
,)600 million are to be paid back once Japan pays the damages, and the damages
having been estimated at billion. Romulo cla:med that the Philippines
would have to pay back this direct aid of $500 or $600 million once Japan
would pay for war damages caused in the Philippi:es.
MR. BRODIE: That is a slight distortion. he Rehabilitation Act
states that if as a result of reparation payments and war damages the
Philippines is compensated for more than the actual amount of damage it
suffered, then this excess will be repayable to the U.S.;but it was
always recognized that there was little possibilaty that such over payment
would occur.
MR. REUBENS: It seemed to me what General Romulo was saying was
that nothing further was going to be done, that ,t the present time nothing
specific is in U.S. contemplation for the Philip Ines, and that was what
he was most bitter about.
MODERATOR TALBOT: As the discussion indicates, this has a certain
relevance because we are going to be treated thi3 noon to Ambassador
Romulo's frank commentary on American policy in tsia, and partacularly
Americ A3151Well' Ale 28bRili9EA-1M50861tkiff69R60+41) support
to the Zaibatsu and related questions.
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MR. BRODIE: BRODIE: In the case of Indonesia, U.S. assistance has been princi-
pa5.1y in the form of ECA aid and surplus property. credits. The exact amount
of ECA aid escapee me at the moment, but I think outright grants plus
loans amounted to about $70 million. Some of the outright grant was stopped
because of the unsettled conditions in Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia
received from the U.S. a 67 million surplus property credit and a $15
million Commodity Credit Corpovation loan to stimulate copra production.
MR. WRIGHT: I take it that this
government.
70 million was given to the Dutch
MR. BRODIE: Yes, but it was earmarked for expenditure in the Indonesian
territories.
MR. ISAACS: May I interject that I found a good part of that money
in a long line of Ford and Chevrolet trucks being used in connection with
military preparation.
MR. BROEK: How do you know?
MR. ISAACS: I think it is reasonable that when you see brand new Ford
trucks in Java, you can assume that the dollars used to buy them certainly
did not come out of Holland's rather thin pocket. Theoretically that
transport was being used for civilian purposes, but in that kind of situation
civilian purposes and military purposes have a way of getting mixed up.
MR. BROEK: It is impossible to make a distinctions to say how much
was from trade and haw much through loans.
MR. BRODIE: A lot of civilian supplies were purchased in the United
States fel- shipment elsewhere.
to India was limited to a surplus property credit of between $15
and $16 million to purchase trucks and other equipment that were in India.
MR. REUBENS: India has been buying dolLars from the international
Monetary Fund, most of whose funds cane from the United States contribution.
India has been the only Far Ftrn country that has been able to get dollars
from the Fund: last year the: 7ot some $68 million worth, and have obtained
additional substantial sums th-J year.
MR. BRODIE: Burma also got a surplus property credit of $10 million.
MR. WRIGHT: This is to be paid in full?
MR. BRODIE: The proceeds of the surplus property sale will be used to
finance educational exchanges under the Fulbright Act and to purchase pro-
perty for, and meet operating expenses of U.S.Government agencies in Burma.
MR. CHARTRAND: About $4 million is the Fulbright figure for Burma.
MR. BRODIE: The proceeds of the India surplus property sale are to
be used in the same way as for Burma, when arrangements are worked out.
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MR. CHARTRAND: That has not happened yet.
agreements are being negotiated and should be sig
MR. BRODIE: And they will involve this $15
United States does not get very much out of these
Siam was authorized a surplus property loan
used between $6 and $7 million.
MR. BEKKER: Indochina got some surplus prop
property credit extended to France. It was large
as in Indonesia, particularly transportation equi
surplus rather than new.
30th Pakistan and Indian
led before long.
pillion. Actually, the
transactions.
)f $1Q million and I think
arty under the surplus
ly the same sort of thing
pment from the Philippines,
MR. ISAACS: You mean that was stuff that th Frenah bought from the
United States and shipped in frenithe Philippinae. There wasn't any in
Indochina.
MR. BEKKER: That's right.
MR. BRODIE: I don't have the figure on that.
more than $10 million.
It would not have been
MR. BEKKER: I have the figure of $8 millior in mind but I am not sure
enough as to what it relates to.
MR. HOLLAND: Wasn't there a big item of material in New Caledonia?
MR. BRODIE: That is the story on the Unitee States assistance.
MISS DUBOIS: What, not precisely but in miter of magnitude, does that
come to for the whole South Asian area?
MR. BRODIE: Outright aid would amount to out $800 million; loans
to about $200 million, and indirect payments to almost $1 billion.
MISS DUBOIS: All of the latter, however, tc the Philippines?
NR. BRODIE: Yes.
MODERATOR TALBOT: That gives us one startieg point for discussion.
Mr. Chartrand, would you like to talk about the technical assistance
program?
THE TRUMAN POINT FOUR PROGRAE
Chester Chartrand
I came to the conference as an observer. I have been intensely
interested in the presentation of the economic, )olitical and social problems
of the area. You may be interested in what the Jtate Department is thinking
in terms of Point Four assistance to under-develeped areas.
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The Point Four Program may be referred to as economic development
through international co-operation. It envisages the exchange of knowledge
and technical skill and the fostering of capital investment.
The purpose of the program is to promote peace (I am quoting from
President Truman's Inaugural Address) "by strengthening the free world; by
helping the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce
more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical
power to lighten their burdens. In some of the under-developed areas the
economic life now provides only a very low level of living, and consequently
a basic improvement in health and education may have to accompany, or even
precede, the increased production and improved standard of living."
The economic development referred to in the Point Four Program includes
the development of all productive resources, whether they be natural, human
or capital. By natural resources is meant soil, plant and animal husbandry,
forests and fisheries, water power, mining and fuels; human resources refer
to health, welfare and social services, education, with emphasis on rural
and vocational education, and manpower training and utilization; and the
capital resources: industrial technology, facilities and equipment, organiza-
tion of business and finance, housing, transportation, maiketing and distri-
bution.
Some of the means which may be used to aid in the development of these
resources are:
(a) Expert advisers and missions to advise governments and private
organizations or business enterprises; that is, the. exChange of persons,
experts and technicians, the research and experimental centers and labora-
tories, 4emonstration projects, the operations of business enterprise, on-
the-job training, supervision and instruction in the use of sample materials
and equipment;'
(b) Consultation and advising with foreign visitors;
(c) Publication and translattan of specialized reports;
(d) Financial assistance to schools and universities, especially, for
example, the engineering sections of universities, because it is primarily
an economic aasistance program; . 4
(e) EXchange of students and teachers;
(f) Conferences and seminars;
(g) U.S. libraries and film services abroad come into the program; and
(h) Special technical staffs attached to diplomatic establishments
overseas.
The President's program is bold and new only in that it now makes tech-
nical assistance a major element elf U.S. foreign policy.
The introduction of new techniques can advance economic development most
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if capital investment from within and without tales place at the same time.
It is essential, of course, that relatively stab:e political, social and
economic conditions be created and that there be established guarantees of
fair treatment to both the investors and the people whose resources and labor
go into these developments.
So far as the relation to other programs ane illustrating the co-opera-
tive nature of this program, we expect that the people themselves in these
countries will provide the litaf. Pffort. A special objective is to work
together with other agencies, ,ispecially through the U.N., the International
Trade Organization, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements, ECA, FAO, the Internation-
al Labor Organization, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
In other words, the old imperialism, exploi'Ation for foreign profit,
has no place in this program. There should be a positive and co-operative
effort to increase production of commodities tha-c, are short throughout the
world, which will contribute to the flow of international trade and thus
to the economic well-being of all co-operating nations.
The Point Four program must take into accoumt the needs of each country
and the assistance possible in view of the economic and social status of
the people. Balance in programming must be maintained by developing the
human resources parallel with the economic and capital resources. Finally
as our Government is concerned with furthering ulderstanding and developing
better relations between the people of the U.S. and those of other countries,
it is essential that throughout the whole technical assistance program the
motives of the U.S. be fully understood.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you.
There may be a number of questions about this program. Professor Reubens,
would you like to comment on it?
MR. REUBENS: There are a number of features in the gradual evolution
of this Point Four program that might be considered from the view-point of
those who have no official commitments. One of the facts is that the Presi-
dent originally laid his greatest stress on the technological assistance
feature, and then under further discussion, botr within the government and
in private groups, particularly the U.S.ChaMber of Commerce and the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, a great deal more insistence has been placed
on the fact that technological assistance withatt capital is practically
useless. The experts may advise and draw up pins, but these cost money,
they cost capital goods as well as sheer capital funds. So it is necess-
ary to find the means to provide the capital ane capital goods, and in that
the President talked very largely about leaving it in the hands of private
business; the idea was to stimulate the flow of private capital.
Now there are a number of problems involvec in leaving this in the hands
of private capital, which may be insoluble problems if the program is so
restricted in its application to the Far East.
For one thing, consider the tendency to concentrate on individual
projects rather than over all plans. Individual investors are inclined to
lendMItanyoxeidfcnlilerntals'e P003M2ithiftlaVREVOINSDS)263Aitki4003d00434 which
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offers opportunities for a specific profit which they can draw out of a
specific enterprise. Well, so far aa that goes, it is good; but unfor-
tunately it does not go far enough. It does not allow for balance between
one kind of enterprise and another; it does not allow for sequence in
necessary order - first things first; and it does not allow for all kinds
of internal measures which may be necessary on the part of backward
countries to insure the flow of resources to the places where they are
needed, and particularly, it does not provide for this matter of balancing
consumption versus production in order to keep going a continual flow
of domestic capital formation.
If this program is designed to raise standards of living as the
President indicated, then it is likely to lead to a very rapid conversion
into rising consumption levels. Since this will mean, under Oriental
conditions, that the development of substantial domestic capital formation
will be ruled out, the program will come to a very quick and inglorious
end. It would require an additional and continuous supply of capital
from the outside if they try to raise consumption at the same time that
they are trying to increase productive resources.
This brings up a related matter concerning the rules of foreign invest-
ment. The effort to stimulate the flow of private capital has been discussed
in this country chiefly along two lines: guarantees to the investor by the
U.S.Government or by international agencies, and guarantees to be provided by
the recipient country. Almost no attention has been given to the matter of
guarantees to be provided by the investor in the interests of the recipient
country. What I have in mind is undertakings to maintain a given invest-
ment over a reasonable period of time, to plow back a good part of the profits,
to train local personnel and ancillary native enterprises, and the like.
A "suitable climate for foreign investment" is not likely to be achieved unless
both parties contribute to its creation.
MR. WRIGHT: Might I add to that, giving a high priority to public
health would mean a rapid increase of population in these countries. You
would have a great increase in consumption without raising the standards
of living.
MR. PELZER: Improvement in health would also mean improvement in
efficiency, improvement of ability to produce more. I would put the emphasis
there rather than on the increase in consumption. I think that is much more
important.
I was very much impressed by the able statement made by Mr. Chartrand
but my feeling is that this may be the thinking of officials in certain
sections of the Department of State but I wonder to what extent that feeling
is shared by individuals in key positions in other parts of the Department
of State.
I should like to call your attention to two important paragraphs. I
think Mt. Chartrand pulled out one or two sentences and I should like to pull
out some others:
Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to
benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established.
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The guarantees to the investor Lust be balan ed by guarantees
in the interest of the ee 'u whose resource and whose labor
go into the develop;eee,. ne old imperialien--exploitation
for foreign peofit--has ec place in our plan,. What we envisage
is a program of development based on the conepts of democratic
fair dealing.
That is a pious and determined, but vague, steitement. I think I raised
the question yesterday, what type of interpretatim is being given to this
part? Each one reads into this program what he w)uld like to see done, and
you pointed out one aspect. I should like to call your attention to the
other and try to show the slant that has been giv3n to that part of the Point eeee
Four program. I have here one report:
Hostility toward private foreign investors ce the part of
governments in many underdeveloped countries is giving way to
increasing eagerness to attract their capital into ambitious
prejeces, conceived under the "bold new program" of President
Truman's inaugural address, pledging American technical assis?
tance to economically backward areas througheut the world.
I wonder to what extent this really reflects the apinion of planners of
Southeast Asia. This is from the tjaw yp4 Times May 1, 1949 dateline,
Lake Success, Special to the New York 'Lee,. I question this initial
statement very much. I think this is weehful thenking, and of course it
is quite possible that the emewpaperman is responeible for this slant.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Is this supposed to reflect the attitude of the
delegates of the South Asian countries?
MR. PELZER: I don't think that it does. I have tried to discover
whether there is any basis for such a statement. I don't know where it is
coming from but it crops up again and again. I can refer to half a dozen
similar statements. I have here one statement credited to the United States
Council of the International Chamber of Commerce which expresses a similar
philosophy.
As I see it, what private business is askint for is removal of all risks,
but in addition to that they are asking for specaal privileges because of
the risks that are to be removed. Despite the fact that some pecple are
confident that there is a considerable change in the attitude toward the
investment of foreign capital because this questaon was raised by President
Truman in Point Four, other groups within the bueiness world feel differently.
They apparently are not certain that the change es really in existence, and
therefore they are thinking in terms of a shift of investment from Southeast
Asia to another part of the world where the polieical climate may be stable,
at least for a while.
lbws here the report from the New York Tines of May 15, 1949 in which
Charles Ee Began reports that "Africa and the Mi idle East lure our capital,"
that Shiefs the elimate is attractive, and that oeher areas, for example,
Soutkeest Asia, prove increasingly unattractive.
wonder whether the people who have this ptilosophy are not extremely
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shortsighted. I for one am convinced that the political development in
Africa will move along the same lines as it has in Southeast Asia. I think
we shall be impressed by the speed with which these developments will come
about. Parts of Southeast Asia were, after all, under foreign rule for
300 years; others, such as Burma, for a shorter time. I am impressed in
the case of Africa by the crystallization of thinking on the part of a small
intellectual group, which compares favorably to corresponding groups in
Indonesia and other parts of SuJtheast Asia.
It is important that we az ourselves What is our overall program,
what is our overall policy from a long-range point of view? We should not
think in terms of small programs and small policies which will take care
of a situation for five or ten years. We have to look ahead and we have
to think in long-range terms. The officialdom may have been too silent
on a number of key points and this has permitted the development of the
sort of thinking that I have been disoussing. We may be ending up with
a situation wherein the philosophy that I was referring to will get a hold
on the American public and the American public may favor a type of program
which would disturb me. On the other hand, I am convinced that most of the
countries with which we are here concerned would not accept that sort of
approach, and I am also convinced that these quotations that I have here
will be used by the agents working for Moscow, and I think we are giving
Moscow at this point, and a very critical point, the best ammunition they
can want. The type of philosophy expressed by Mr. Chartrand is a very
beautiful philosophy but I am afraid that it may lose out in the end unless
we watch out.
MISS DUBOIS: May I inject a remark here? It seems to me that Mr.Pelzer
has expressed a point of view and a concern about characteristic American
thinking; in other words, we inevitably have to frame aprogram of this
sort in its preliminary phases in terms of our own motivations and culture
patterns. However, I keep insisting - I think it has been an element
somewhat omitted in these sessions - that international affairs are usually
two-way relationships. So, going back also to Mr. Reuben& comments, although
this is the way we see things at the moment, the intention is thatit be
a reciprocal arrangement. By the time these programs reach the areas that
are requesting them they maybe differently shaped, I would feel that it is
legitimate to expect of the recipient areas a certain amount of responsi-
bility in planning for themselves the long-range and consistent and inte-
grated programs which will give them the greatest value from the technical
assistance program.
MR. LEVI: I wanted to uippiement what Dr. Pelzer said by a number of
letters that I got from abroad after Point Four was announced asking me
whether this fits into a statement that was made twice by the Government,
first by Clayton, I remsmber, that the United States will support with
all its power any private investment in strategic materials anywhere in the
world; they wanted an interpretation of the meaning of that statement.
Does the government think, not so'much in terms of reciprocity, as Miss
DuBois tries to interpret it, but rather one sidedly about what itwants
to get hold of, and get that with all the might that the Government has at
? a
its disposal?
t t
MR. SARKAR: Do the British suspect 'American imperialism and colonial
expans io
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MR. CHARTRAND: I don't think so.
MR. ISAACS: I think I can possibly add anoth:r facet to the problem
with which we are dealing Mr. Chartrand referred to the necessity for
doing something to make American motives plain, ant hr. Pelzer raised
the question as to what these motives actually are, A third factor in that
case is: How in South Asia, not 74s result of what we are going to do tomorrow
but as a result of what has been happening in the aast three years, are we
understood now?
I would like, if I may, to call your attentiol to this week's NEWSWEEK,
in which I have attempted a very brief report on tie attitudes toward the
United States in the area we have been discussing. I would suggest to you
that what we have done during the past three years has hardly built up any
political credit. Quite the contrary. Anything wa do now is going to be
looked upon with utmost suspicion.
MR. HOSELITZ: I would like to supplement soma of the things that have
been said about the relative merit and prospects of different forms of invest-
ment in Southeast Asia. In prewar times Southeast Asia had an export surplus
with the United States and to the extent to which me can expect-U.S.private
capital to be attracted into Southeast Asia it may be assumed to go into
those industries producing commodities which we traditionally imported. I
think that the experience with Marshall Plan aid tnd the analysis in the
technical journals of the prospects of European development under the Marshall
Plan tends to impress upon us the conclusion that the U.S. expects a fairly
exact re-establishment of the trade patterns existing before the war. I
think that to the extent to which American private investors are going to
think about Southeast Asia they are going to think about re-establishing also
a similar pattern.
I should like to add something on the source of investment in South
Asia. Not very long ago we had at this University a guest who is a member
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and levelopment. He told us
something which, to me at least, was surprising. The Bank had applications
for a number of loans in Latin American countries L From the United States'
point of view the political climate in Latin Amer: can countries certainly
is a good deal more favorable than in Southeast AEia. These requests for
particular loans were for projects planned and outlined by the Latin Americans
to go predominantly into the kiri of industrial ard agricultural developments
whichtfrom the point of view b?: thnse countries themselves tended to be
most conducive to their economic development. Th E Internattcnal Bank for
Reconstruction and Development has tried to pass these loans on to private
investors in the United States without any succesr whatsoever.
That means, even in a region in which a political climate certainly is a
lot more favorable than in Southeast Asia, the kirds of economic development
which are requested by local governments do not hive much appeal to private
American investors even though rates of interest are not unreasonable and
are certainly higher than one can get in this country.
Hence I think that it is unwise to expect th,t the programs, which are
often on a large scale and which those countries night develop will find much
approval among American investors. Therefore I e.lould like to ask a "bold
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new question:" Are we supposed to discuss whether the application of some
kind of Marshall Plan for South Asia is in order? In my opinion, it is
an inevitable question which is going to come up sooner or later and I think
one of the problems which we might discuss is hcw a plan like the Marshall
Plan might and would fit in the South Asian situation - a Marshall Plan
or Truman Plan or Acheson Plan or whatever you want to call it.
MR. FEUER: I don't think jt is possible to revive the trade pattern.
One important point was and that is the United States' policy on
synthetic rubber. How can :iicu. ?- that the trade pattern can be revived if
we are going to continue to pr:,.,:,u,;e 600 thousand tons of rubber a year?
That is the question I should like to ask.
MR. PERLOFF: The more one studies the problems of underdeveloped area's,
the more he must become convinced of the fact that once a nation has fallen
behind technologically and economically, it is one of the hardest things
in the world for it to catch up, even under relatively favorable conditions.
It is only too obvious that little driblets of aid here and there cannot do
the job.
It may well be that the basic problems of most of the underdeveloped
areas cannot be solved at all short of a thorough-going and carefully planned
world effort -- an effort which would involve creating trade patterns based
on physically and economically sound specialization in both agriculture and
industry, which would create a stable and flexible world currency, and which
would provide for aid to underdeveloped areas in term of sound multiple-
development plans rather than in terns of isolated projects which on the
surface seem to meet private investment standards.
This becomes increasingly important as the world runs short of many
crucial minerals and metals. This calls not only for a freer exchange of
goods -- as an alternative to imperialistic struggles -- but also for a joint
world-wide search for new uses for the minerals and other resources we have
in abundance, so as to free us from dependence on the scarce resources.
It seems to me that one of the most urgent problems of the mid-20th
century is to develop the kind of world organization which can plan for this
type of development and carry it out on a world scale. Considering the
difficulty of the task and the delicate balances which are involved in getting
the under-developed areas on their economic feet, it seems doubtful that
the problem can be solved at all if the advanced nations, which are in a
position to offer technical an ff-Ancial assistance, give aid in the form
and to the areas dictated sol; Ly their own national interests and
national policy. It would be a mlracle if such national policy coincided
with the real needs of the underdeveloped areas. Nothing short of a co-ordi-
nated and planned world effort would seem to suffice.
MODERATOR TALBOT: That carries us forward a step.
In reference to the U.N., Dr. Piplani, will you please make a state-
ment about the aid that is available now through the specialized agencies
and the extent to which that has been drawn upon by South Asia and whet
the importance of this part of the program is.
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UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND SOUTH ASIA
B. M. Piplani
Mr. Chairman, I find it a little difficult tc, tell the group in more or
less concrete terms (on the lines on which either Mr. Brodie or Mr. Chartrand
has done) the details of actual financial aid that has gone to the area of
South Asia from the U.N. or the technical assistance which has been given by
the U.N. agencies. So far as I see the specializA agencies of the United
Nations, like the Food and Agriculture Organizatif:m, the International
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction, the World Health
Organization, and perhaps finally the Children Dmergency Fund, I do not
think that during the last three or four years th amount of assistance
that has been rendered by these agencies has been at all on any really sig-
nificant scale in relation to the problems involitA in these areas. I think
perhaps the best way for me would be to take up the agencies separately.
The Food and Agriculture Organization has held Sow important technical
conferences on a regional basis, such as fisherie3 or forestry conferences.
The delegates discuss problem: and exchange their research work; and no doubt
to that extent the work oft.ho Jernational agency is of mutual benefit to
the member governments. 71-1(., FA0 nas also sent ou; a few experts and one
technical mission, which went to Siam to advise on general food and agri-
cultural problems.
So far as the International Monetary Fund is concerned, besides India,
and perhaps Siam now and one other country, most 31 the countries are not
even members. In any case the functions of the Find are limitedonamely, to
provide exchange accomodation as and when required under special circumstances
to meet a running deficit in the balance of trade, The services of the Fund
which are available against contributions by membr governments has so far
been primarily used by India in this region.
As to the World Bank for Reconstruction, Id i not know of any loan that
has been given to any of the countries in this reion by that Bank at the
moment. I know of a number of loan proposals, on particularly that is
under active consideration having come from the gnvernment of India.
To my mind the World Health Organization has recently started on some
very important projects in those areas, especially the malaria control
operations.
It is difficult for nes as I said previously, to give6r8r idea of the
degree of magnitude of the assistance that is being rendered by these
specialized agencies but I hope it will be clear that in relation to the
immensity of the task involved the real contribution in the nature of actual
technical assistance, advice or by sending out exlerte, is really inconsider-
able.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much.
We shall pass directly to another subject.
MR A. Ifirffikeil: n CRA:PDSriiilmlReffIIET2ticUPAtlfriAect ion
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with this suspected American imperialism.
MODERATOR TALBOT: We are going to get on to that as rapidly as we
can get to it.
Would Professor Broek care to make a statement on the potential contri-
bution of this area to the rest of the world in the new circumstances
and on the question of this area as or as not a region.
THE REGIONALITY OF SOUTH ASIA AND
ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD
Jan O. M. Broek
I am quite willing to say something on that subject, but I would like to
see it in a broader way and link it up with some of the remarks made yester-
day.
I hope you will excuse me for once more returning to the matter of the
region. We can for good reasons discuss South Asia as a unit when we think
of the present day problems. I believe, however, that in a long range view
we do well to make a distinction between India on the one side and Southeast
Asia on the other. Southeast Asia lies, after all, between these massive
and potentially powerful blocs of China and India. These latter areas
dominated Southeast Asia before the Europeans came, and thee may do so
again in the future. I have sometimes compared Southeast Asia to the
Balkans in Europe inthat you leeve here an area consisting of some half
dozen relatively small countries (with many minorities) under pressure of
more powerful neighbors. It ie for that reason that I think we should keep
an eye on potential points of friction. It is therefore particularly
important to consider how the countries of Southeast Asia can be strengthened.
As for Southeast Asia, I see three possibilities. It may come under the
guardianship of India; Ido not think, however, that the peoples of
Southeast Asia would receive the necessary assistance in capital and tech-
nology; neither do I think that they would welcome a domination by India.
Another possibility is that China by way of Communism will gain a pre-
dominant position. There is a strong anti-Chinese feeling in this region.
The Western countries certainly should oppose Communist-inspired regimes
in this area. The third possibility is that the West gives help to these
countries of Southeast Asia, building up their strength by developing
their economic and political effectiveness.
What interest does the West have in South Asia? The West, as I think
of it, is essentially the "Atlantic Community." The interests are partly
ideological, partly economic and partly strategic. Ideologically, it is
the struggle against Communism. The majority of the leaders may not want
the Russian form of Communism, but -- as in China -- a political vacuum or
an economic chaos may open the door to seizure of power by Communists.
Material assistance, not piecemeal or to a few selected countries, but strong
support on a regional basis is necessary. Private capital is not likely
to be available, or only on onerous terms. The assistance will have to
come through government loans, inevitably mainly from the United States.
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Some kind of Marshall plan may be necessary. Thu, a situation facing the
United States in Europe repeats itself halfway ar)und the world in Southeast
Asia. At the same time we should support governm;nts that appear to have
the power to insure order, even if they have stroagly socialist tendencies.
Most of the present governments tend in that dire tion, and they are in
fear of being pushed aside by Communist groups. :f they now receive the
necessary help on a liberal basis I think that co-operation between the West
and the former colonial countries, on a broad regIonal basis, can be re-esta-
blished to their mutual benefit. Several of us h-re have raised the point
that Southeast Asia may sink into anarchy, but Ieel very s trongly that
we should do everything possible to avert such a ,iisaster.
As to the economic significance of South Asi. to the West, most of this
is rather obvious, but one point should be stress d. Before the war Western
Europe paid a good deal of its imports from the Uaited States by profits
made on the sale of tropical commodities to America. Although part of
this trade is irrevocably lost, there remains a sabstantial European invest-
ment in Southeast Asia. If the United States -- for its own protection --
wants a prosperous Western Europe, these investments should be allowed to
produce profits again, a revival that should also benefit the local economies
in Southeast Asia.
Strategically, South Asia through its locatian controls the links
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. With all seapower gathered in the
Atlantic Community this fact seems less important than before, but if South
Asia, or at least Southeast Asia, would fall into the sphere of influence
of the Soviet Union, the consequences for the Wes a would be quite serious.
And what about the strategic commodities? Hare I think it is clear that
Southeast Asia does not have anymore the position it once had. This is so
because of the competition of other areas and of synthetic materials. But
we have not yet reached the point -- if we ever wall reach it -- where we
can do without its products. Natural rubber and Guinine are still valuable.
Consider also the manganese from India, the tin f:rom Malaya and Indonesia,
and the vegetable oils and fats.
Altogether then, it appears that the West has still a considerable stake Ala
in the region. That is all for the good. If subatantial and sustained
help is going to be given it will not and cannot be done as charity, on
a purely humanitarian basis. It will have to be one as a business deal,
be it a farsighted business deal. I may end up by saying once more that
the time is now and not later. The present circulastances are favorable.
The local governments of the area feel the pressure of Communism, and the
West -- after the experience of China -- ahould realize that a determined
stand must be made in the remainder of Asia. There considerations should
lead to a new relationship in which the Atlantic Community and South Asia
are partners in a common enterprise.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much.
A couple of days ago Mr. Hoselitz said he hat been trying for an hour
to get two minutes to talk. I am going to give h.im two minutes now.
AR. HOSELITZ: We engage here as concerns tho theory of foreign trade in
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thinking which seems to me to be terrible. In connection with the possi-
bility of Europe's ever balancing its international accounts again there
are individuals in Europe who have been talking about structural changes
in the world economy which will make Europe permanently dependent upon
the United States. There are people here who think that the resource
pattern in Southeast Asia is such that at least as far as this country
is concerned it never can regain an export surplus. This seems to me quite
wrong.
I grant that the development of synthetic rubber and other synthetics
imposes difficulties, but I think that fundamentally the principle of
international apecialization on the basis of comparative advantages is
still operating, and however much we may oppose its operation by setting
up trade barriers it operates at the very bottom and does so very strongly.
Although I am not a believer in natural economic laws, as Mr. Purnivall
upholds, I will say I am a beliaver in "almost natural" economic laws.
I think that considering the principle of comparative advantage we may
assume that South Asia will have the commodities which it can use for
export and to balance its accounts.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you.
The question of Communism has been raised. We might look into it a
bit more closely than ,we did yesterday. Mr. Soedjatmoko: as an individual
of the area, what is your feeling on the evaluation of Communism?
COMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA
Soedjatmoko
I think that with regard to that question two factors should be borne
in mind: The internal situation in the countries in South Asia, and the
effect of the approach of the Western countries towards the political and
economic problems there. As to the internal political situation, it should
be remembered that the Communist parties in their propaganda in a great
number of the countries in Southeast Asia have made use not of social slogans
but of purely nationalistic ones.
That is especially true in those areas where social tensions were not
too acute, as for instance in Indonesia, where because of the absence of
landlordism no acute peasant problem exists. It is understandable that
in those areas where the struggle for political independence was still the
main issue, this was the approach with the greatest appeal. Especially so
in those countries where the policy of negotiation with the former colonial
ruler did not bear fruit as a result of the unwillingness on the part of the
former ruler to implement its agreements as was the case in Indonesia. And
wherever a mood of political nationalist frustration set in, it resulted in
a tendency to look away from a policy of conciliation and away from the
Western powers, away especially from the United States, and to look towards
Russia as the only hope for the fulfillment of the nationalist aspirations.
And this is the point I would like to stress here. In the course of
our discussions now we have been dealing with Southern Asia in a way that
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would indicate that these nortries are already free in pursuing their own
course. It should not be overlooked that coloniel warfare is still going
on in two of those countries. It is impossible ander those circumstances to
try to take stock of the political potentials in those areas and to base any
political strategy on such an analysis. The colenial problem will have to be
solved first.
Coming to my second point, concerning the e feet of the approach of the
Western countries with regard to that area, them seems to be too great an
inclination on the part of the western countries to approach Southeast Asia
merely in terms of anti-Communist strategy. I think that is a serious mistake.
An approach in terms of anti-Communist strategy would only tend to further
polarize the political elements in that area and it would bring about the
complete disruption of whatever amount of cohereeee there is actually and
potentially in those areas. Several countries wotld not survive such a polari-
zation. The only fruitful approach woul4 be one of a complete acceptance of
the general temper of the political feelihgs there, and that is a complete
acceptance of the fact that the political movemerts in that area are left of
center, and certainly left of what is considered the center in American
political life. Mere seems to be some difficult? on the part of the American
public in realising such a need; consider the difficulties they have had in
coining to an acceptance of socialism in Western larope. But that is the only
possible basis which I see.
In this respect, I would also like to refer again to what has been said
here about Truman's Fourth Point. The remarks which were made then, tend to
confirm the direction which my own information seems to suggest. It seems that
in the development of the thinking regarding this Point Four program, the
emphasis has shifted from the use of public money to a greater role of private
capital. And that that private capital, in develeping its own thinking on
this point, seems to press for conditions of operation and guarantees and
safeguards which none of the countries in Southeast Asia, would be able to
afford to meet, either in the economic or in the political sense.
It should be remembered, as Mr. Isaacs point e:1 out, that the United
States has not much investment in goodwill left ie Southeast Asia. This is
completely the reverse fromthe position the Unitld States had in the minds of
the peoples of Southeast Asia immediately after tee war. The fact is that
those peoples have been puzzled, to put it mildly, by the political stand the
United States took in the colonial conflicts in taose areas and with regard to
several other problems of that area in the past tree years. 'This has not
left much of what was originally present in invesement of goodwill. For
instance, when President Truman announced his Fou: Point Program, the fact
that none of the Asian leaders stood up and embraeed that plan unreservedly
the way the Western European statesmen did when Mershall made his statement at
Harvard is already an indication that the first thing the United States will
have to do is to build up again the confidence of those peoples in the sin-
cerity of its intentions.
There is, on the other hand, a growing realieation on the part of the
Asian leaders that foreign capital is necessary and that conditions should be
created in which foreign capital would be able to function and to operate on
a basis acceptable to the foreign investors. It should also be realized that
with the present speed with which olitical evert e in Asia. an taing place
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will have to move quickly, and above all boldly and with imagination, and
with its intentions clearly understood, in order to approach the economic
problems of Southeast Asia under the terms of its Four Point program with
a reasonable amount of success. Despite the expressions of good intentions
in the inaugural address of President Truman, this entire plan and the entire
approach of the United States with regard to this area will fall or stand
with the actual substance of that plan and the conditions under which that
plan will operate.
I should also like to say a few words with regard to the trend of
thinking which seems to be present both in SOMB quarters of the United States
and in some quarters of Great Britain. People seem to play around with the
idea of setting up a Pacific pact as an extension of the Atlantic pact and
other strategical systems of that kind. I am afraid that such a pact,
especially because it seems to be an approach in what I would call terms of
anti-Communist strategy, would bring about the very, 'polarization which, as
I said before, would be disastrous for the creation of an atmosphere in
which stabilization would be rehed in Southeast Asia.
The approach of the Western countries in regard to Southeast Asia should
be entirely based on a complqte acceptance of the indigenous factors opera-
ting in that area and complete acceptance of the present political temper
and on the basis of the idea that the only possible way of attaining political
stability is by fostering the constructive nationalist elements among the
factors operating in Southeast Asia.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much.
MR. FURNIVALL: May I put in a word? I do most emphatically agree with
what Mr. Soedjatmoko has just said. I scribbled a note here just as he began
to speak, "There is practiaally no Communism in Burma, and almost all the
Communists are anti-Communists." If you regard communism as subservience
to Russia and the belief in violence, that is confined to a very few leaders
of the movement.
MR. SAMAR: I think you are quite right. In regard to India also
you could say that.
MR. FURNIVALL: In communism there are some constructive elements that
are very necessary, certainly in Burma, and I imagine in a good part of the
rest. There is necessary a reintegration of rural life, which requires
strong leadership under a strong government. What communism there is in
Burma derives its strength from the rural population which wants, not
communism but communalism, which is common to Socialists and to a very large
extent to the conservative element.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Doubtless holding in mind many of the ideas that .
have been presented, Mr. Isaacs will new discuss perspectives of American
concern in South Asia.
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A POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN SO!TH ASIA
Harold R. Isaacs
I shall concentrate on what the American per7oective should be in
relation to South Asia, because that aspect is di:ectly germane to what we
have been trying to get at this morning: what is he fruitful approach?
I think the starting point is the fact that -h the past three years
the great opportunity the United States did have, the tremendously favorable
political climate which existed for some kind of laid new intervention by the
United States in the affairs of Southeast Asia has. largely been dissipated.
The fact is that friendliness toward America and hopes of American dollar
intervention are now increasingly confined to rater small groups of self-
seeking politicians or aspiring capitalists who tli.nk that if they can get
their cut of the American pie that they will be atle to profit from it
enormously and to strengthen themselves militarily. That would be particu-
larly true of leaderships like the one you have ncw in Siam where a small
clique of politicians and generals is in power. '.hey dream of the possi-
bility of enjoying American aid on the basis of the Communist menace and they
go to considerable lengths to drum up this Commun:.st menace in.. the hopes
of arousing American interest.
In general, what you encounter among more the
of complete frustration with regard to the United
conscious in the midst of their struggles in thesc
the midst of great changes. They actually believc
which was not directly identified with the imperiL
with its immense power andita immense capacity anc
idea (which meant something to all people at aImoE.
to be a dynamic force, that it was going to introc
going to make possible a real start at the big jot
ughtful people is a feeling
States. They were acutely
- years that they were in
d that the United States,
list structure of the past,
with its new democratic
t all levels), was going
ace a new era, and was
of recOnstruction.
That illusion, to begin with, was unfortunatt
in 1945 could have identified itself with the nati
least to the extent of preventing the forcible ret
masters to the areas that had been held by the Jar
the position that the war had created new de facto
recognized, and sponsored negotiations for fixing
tween the ex-rulers, i.e., the French and the Dutc
leaderships which had taken power in Indochina and
United States reverted to recognition of the old r
the position that French and Dutch "sovereignty" h
colonies before the colonial system could be reftis
while American military equipment and Japanese trc
and brutal attacks on the nationalists both in Ind
a participating ally in the Southeast Asia Command
responsibility for shoehorning the French and Dutc
and for starting the colonial wars which have cont
since.
ly a myth. The United States
onalist revolutions, at
urn of the old colonial
anese. It could have taken
situations that had to be
the new relationships be-
h, and the new nationalist
Indonesia. Instead, the
legalities." It accepted
ad to be restored in the
ed. It stood by passively
,pps were used in cynical
:;china and Indonesia. As
, the United States accepted
back into footholds
inued intermittently ever
That was the critical time. Those were the critical decisions. It may
be that their effects will prove to be irretrievafle, In any case, the myth
about thAriptatealSoitiReiense202/076146V4hRER*909S?fablAP0Mget9in the
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objective situation. The spiking of that myth was, by the same token, a
major political development. It has gone on progressively in the last four
years. The result is that todp7 even those South Asians who most ardently
desire to enter into a partnr7iT) with the United States are dIAappe-inted,
baffled, and confused. Tile list description of the United States as
an imperialist power support own imperialist satellites against the
nationalist movements has won .(le acceptance and is not easy to refute.
But it would be'a mistake to think that the negative attitudes about the
United States are a simple product of Communist propaganda. The Communists
are simply able to exploit the facts and feelings apparent to everybody
and which are shared in no small measure by the most moderate nationalist
leaders.
There is now also a strong feeling, which Mr. Soedjatmoko has reflected
for us here this morning, that any American interest in the area at the
present time or in the immediate future will be determined purely by considera-
tions of anti-Communist stragegy; i.e., that any new interest or initiative
by the United States in the area is directly due to the Communist victory
in China.
People are extremely cynical about this now and it seems quite likely
that their cynicism will be justified. It would not be surprising if the
State Department did not now start casting about desperately in South Asia
in search of anti-Communist allies. It will look for stooges it can prop
U. I submit that if the United States develops such a policy in South
Asia, its defense there against the Communists will be just about as effect-
ive as that wooden fence that was built around Shanghai during its last
weeks under Nationalist control. Given the present political climate and
the total situation in Southeast Asia, a policy based upon armed anti-
Communism alone will lead only to new bankruptcy. If it should ever come
to actual war in South Asia, the United States would find itself with even
less effective support than the British, French, and Dutch found against
the Japanese.
Mr. -Soedjatmoko is entirely correct, in my opinion, in stressing that
the American approach to the area has to be based on more than military or
strategic considerations. I found throughout South Asia that apart from
the most cynical little groups of ambitious politicians virtually every
articulate person is determir- to keep clear of the cold war between the
United States and Russia. Nous policy of neutrality as between the
power blocs gets a big response everywhere. People do not want to get
sucked into another war between the powers. They have had their fill of
such wars. They hope that they can find a non-Communist road for themselves
by their own means. This, to be sure, is not an easy position to maintain
in the present state of world politics and since most of the nationalist
leaderships are not ready for bold social programs in their own countries,
there is a strong impulsqvto fall back on naked force.
What then.could an enlightened American policy be? This is a formidable
question. There is no easy answer. In the first place, any new American
initiative will have to be able to overcome the suspicion and distrust en-
gendered by American acts in the area since the end of the war. This will
make any policy more difficult to carry out, in contrast to the relative ease
with which bold initiative could have been taken in 1945. It may actually
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be impossible. But I still believe, somewhat grimly, that there is still
time, still a surviving opportunity.
As Mr. Soedjatmoko has suggested, the first prerequisite is a political
settlement. The American failure to help put an end to colonial rule is the
main source of the distrust of American motives. Verbally, the United
States has spoken for equitable settlements and expressed sympathy for
nationalist aspirations. It has not, up until now, effectively translated
these pious expressions into active policy. One result has been to worsen
the situations in the two countries directly affected, i.e., Indochina and
Indonesia, and make settlements on desirable terms more difficult.
In general the American attitude has been coriitioned by the needs of
American European policy, an unwillingness to upset the applecart of the
Atlantic community plan in order to deal more satisfactorily with the
colonial problem. A corollary to this has been tta conviction held by many
influential people in the State Department that only the foreign rulers
in these countries could hold the front against the Communists. Both
these ideas have, latterly, been compelled to give way to realities. It
has become plain that the Asian problem could not wait. China has taken
care of that. It has also became plain that an American European policy
that loses the friendship and support of millions of Asians is self-defeating.
As a result the half-hearted pressure applied on the Dutch has grown
a little stronger. The Dutch "police action" last December evoked strong
American opposition. Only the opposition was not strong enough or consistent
enough. Negotiations for a settlement are taking place now amid conditions
of serious division and hardship in Java. It is extremely late in the day,
but stronger American pessamme might possibly still retrieve enough ground
to help the Indonesians win re41 political power from the Dutch and force
Dutch military withdrawal from the archipelago.
In Indochina, the initial failure of the United States to support the
nationalist movement has helped the Communists in that movement to win strong,
and perhaps, dominating positions. The French have traded shrewdly on the
Communist issue to avoid the kind of pressure that has been applied on the
Dutch. But at the same time they have failed, after nearly four years of
intermittent warfare, to re-establish any significant degree of control over
their colony. Defeated politically and all but defeated militarily, they are
attempting now still another experiment in establishment of a puppet regime,
this time under the ex-emperor of Annam, Bao Dais, American support for Bao
Dai has been solicited and has been half-withheld only because of the un-
animous testimony of Observers in the field thatte has no chance of succeeding
and that the future in Indochina lies in the hands of Ho Chi-minh, the
Vietnamese nationalist leader. Ho, a former Commenist, still maintains an
equivocal position in international politics, has shown signs of distrusting
both Moscow and the Chinese Communist leadership, out will undoubtedly now
deal with both of them and eventually lead Indochina into the Communist
Asian sphere. Future American policy, as in regard to China, will depend
on the future evolutiOn of intra-Communist relaticnships, about which little
is known. But it deem span plain, in any ease, that Viet Nam will gravitate
only to strong poles and its future will depend still in some degree on
whether any new center of polarisation is created in South Asia.
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It is in this respect that aorican initiative is still clearly possi-
ble. Once again it is a clue, ,i of whether there is awillingness to take
bold steps, to think in now L,i 3, and to bring South Asia into a new
international structure based on rationalized common effort. We can start
by orienting ourselves to South Asia as a region. Much has been said here
to dispute the practicableness of a regional approach. But I can only revert
to the statement that the need for it is there and it is urgent. Antagonisms,
differences, even conflicts, tend to iron themselves out sufficiently where
there is a common aim and a common need. It is not a matter of accommodating
ourselves to old prejudices but of opening new paths.
South Asia's countries must likewise move far along this road. They
have to develop a concept of mutual relations that goes far beyond the
inadequate machinery of exchanging ambassadors and ministers between separate
nations. It would make much more sense, I submit, to begin, right now, to
set up a radically different structure. Each country could have a minister
for South Asian Affairs. Each or these ministers would be a member of a
Council for South Asia, uniting all the countries concerned. This Council
could employ foreign technical experts and work in co-operation with the
specialized agencies of the U.N.
Such a Council could draft regional plans for dealing with such common
problems as food, transport, education, health, agricultural services. It
could establish machinery for carrying out these plans. The scope is almost
unlimited. It is really restricted only by the extent to which these nations
are willing to go in pooling their resources and their Problems. Working
with such a Council, possibly through the U.N. or in a more direct relation-
ship, the United States could certainly provide technical assistance of
every kind, participate in many of the projects, and make available suffi-
cient capital to get these regional projects underway. These sums need not
be astronomic. South Asia is a region rich with products the West has
exploited for decades and centuries. It has sources of internal wealth
which can be applied to such prorams, provided that these new countries
are not required to shoulder staering burdens of compensation to pay off
the old rulers and old owners. in any case, political returns in the shape
of returning stability, of cow. on effort attracting the vigor and resources
and vitality of the people, of creating a new center of polarization, would
be immeasurable in dollars. A small fraction of America's present military
budget diverted to these purposes would buy more real American security
than any quantity of armaments that will be obsolete and useless almost
before they are delivered.
Incidentally, to anticipate an obvious queetign1 I eertainly believe that
Viet Naa could and Mould be included in this program, whether or not it is
under Communist domination or threatened with it. I believe such an organiza-
tion as this would strengthen the hand of the left-of-center elements in
every country -and these are the only elements which can possibly carry out
the projected program. It would tend to disarm the Communists politically
because it could effectively bolster the kind of revolutionary change that
the Situation so urgently requires without surrendering to totalitarianism.
Action along these lines is one remaining means of making a start, of beginning
to prove that there is an alternative to the' totalitarian method, and a Vetter
one at that.
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Obviously this this is contingent upon a world-wice policy designed to
prevent the outbreak of war, as distinct from a policy that is based on
preparation for war. This is a crucial distinctiJi and colors all policy
thinking. If the calculations are for a war in the more or less near
future, then obviously all bets are off and the oi:tlook is filled with
all forms of defeat and no forms of victory. I think we have to travel
another road. There is areal struggle to be wavd against expanding Soviet
totalitarianism. But it will only serve totalitahian ends if we allow
ourselves to be drawn into a military contest. I think the answer to
totalitarianism is the effective ruorganization o the world, or at least
of those areas still accessible to new experiment. A political and
economic offensive of this kind is the only way to disarm and push back
the expanding Soviet totalitarian power. It is the only way to neutralize
the development of indigenous Communist movements, which are and always
will be the major weapon in the Soviet arsenal. t means that these
countries will be embarked on a heroic program al ,)ng new lines. It
will call for "Hungry Forties" and Hungry Fifties and Hungry Sixties for
a great many people, including ourselves. It will, mean bold use of
scientific methods. It will mean applying to thee purposes of peace at
least as much vigor and sacrifice and technical vnius as was applied to
the purposes of war.
There has been mention here of Point Four, P-:.esident Truman's program
for technical assistance to backward countries. We do not yet know much
about this program or what it is intended to be. But the form it seems to
be taking strongly suggests how little we apprecite the real magnitude
of the problem. It appears to be based on the that private capital
can be encouraged to do the job, with guarantees Ooth on the American
end and abroad, to protect investors' against 1053 of their investments.
This is like trying to put out a big fire with a lup of water. Private
capital has been unable to carry out a single majlr social task in our time
on the basis of so-called "free enterprise." Whe':v such taske are involved,
It has demanded and has been given guarantees and protection and subsidy
to an extent that virtually eliminates the invest)r's risk. This is a
pretty costly way of keeping a system going. Prilate capital, as such,
could not swing the recovery of Europe. It certa:,.nIy cannot do the job
in Asia.
It seems to me we have to start from new and different premises.
Whether we like it or not, we are in an era of statism. The problem is to
create a statist system based on expanding human f'reedoms in opposition to
a statist system based on human enslavement. We 'Aave to be done with the
old shibboleths, the old categories, the old idea3. They are bankrupt
and unproductive. An immense vacuum exists in th.m world. It has to be
filled with new concepts, new approaches to societ.yts problems. If we
abdicate to the totalitarian power in advance by 3tubbornly clinging to
the past, we can only blame ourselves for the inedtable outcome. Our
opportunity is slipping away from us. But it is :till within our grasp.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you.
Mr. Levi?
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AMERICA'S STAKE
Werner Levi, Hans J. Morgenthau, Col. F.R. Zierath, Harvey Perloff
MR. LEVI: I cannot agree with the whole analysis of Mr. Isaacs. I
want to make a few remarks as the devil's advocate on the proposals he has
made and to question some of the positive suggestions he has made.
First, it seems to be taken for granted generally here that the creation
of an area including India and the Southeastern nations is necessarily
desirable from the United States' standpoint. That may be so for the
moment but whether in the long-run it is in our so-called national interest
or from the standpoint of power politics to have a huge, very powerful
bloc established there under the leadership of one very powerful nation
I am not sure. Secondly, the question has always been in my mind whether
the Southeast Asiatic nations would accept such a Council as Mr. Isaacs
suggests when India is in it. I still say that the only concrete evidence
of anything driving toward regionalism politically in that area is the fear
of India and the fear of China. 'would like to hear something on that
point either from hr. Isaacs or from our friends from that area. So if it
is true that the drive toward regionalism in that area is stimulated and
provoked by fear of the power of either India or China, I can hardly see
how they would voluntarily or gladly join some such council. All the talk
that I have heard from the Southeast Asiatic nations was for some sort
of regional organization under the exclusion of India, quite specifically
under the exclusion of India, as well as China, of coarse. So I am just
wondering about the feasibility of that suggestion.
Furthermore, there is also the rivalry between India and China for
leadership in Asia and from the purely, shall we say, power political stand-
point I am wondering whether some of the Southeast Asiatic nations that are
situated closer to China than to India would consider it wise to get off
the fence, join a bloc or organization in which India has leadership when
they know that this obviously will provoke resentment on the part of China.
We do know that after the war China was greatly interested in having some
sort of influence over Indochina, there were even invasions of Burma from
China, certainly there is a considerable amount of indications that China
has expansive intentions, and I for one believe that whether or not the
Nationalists or the Communists are in control of China that aspect of the
foreign policy will remain the same; as a matter of fact, I could imagine
that if the Communists take over the expansionism actually will be increased.
Then United States loans to this region on a governmental basis are
bound to have strings attached also, at least I doubt whether loans can be
granted in a completely altruistic manner. I think altruism is too much to
ask in international relations. If the United States even on.a governmental
basis makes loans it will tie them in with some sort of political policy,
which to me seems to be at the moment to maintain the absolute control and
power that we have over both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and we will
not do anything that might strengthen any actual or potential rivals to that
power position. This would lead back to the first point that I made.
We might very well consider -- not in the near future but nevertheless
at 80,5, 40401w1q6kyaimie0AtvlalAmiiugi omblfveloping
there. om a stan poin hink -woul be impossi e o expect any
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government, whether whether the United States or any other, to make loans without
any reciprocity or anything to expect in return.
That is really the dilemma in this whole diemssion of the economic
aspects, too. It seems to me that we have been senewhat in a vacuum here
because we assume, at times at least, that our irterest would be to put
these nations on their feet, with no particular expectation on our part.
I wish it could be done but I doubt that it can be done. Economics in
the world today have changed to power economics and no matter what we may
have told the other nations and ourselves, I may luote Professor korgenthau
here who once said, "We have become the prisoners of our own propaganda."
That is very applicable to the area in which we d)al.
Furthermore and finally, I have yet to see aly constructive requests
from any of the peoples of Southeast Asia for what we could lend the money
for. To be sure, they have asked us for money, bet that is about as far as
they went. Mr. Soedjatmoko criticizes us for ignering the Socialist forces.
I am in perfect agreement with that, but I think that these forces also
are under the obligation to give us some really c)nstructive ideas on what
they are planning to do with the funds that they get from us.
One more point in answer to Mr. Furnivall. le said, "Well, there may
be some leaders among the Communist forces, among the masses of the people,"
and so on. That is undoubtedly true.
MR. FURNIVALL: I never said there may be; : said there ought to be.
MR. LEVI: You say there are leaders who are Communists?
MR. FURNIVALL: I don't see them. There is t need for leadership but
the leaders are just as absent among the Coinmunis,s as they are among the
Socialists.
MR. LEVI: I may have misunderstood but you 3aid "some Communists," is
that right?
MR. FURNIVALL: Among the people who call thenselves Communists the
leaders themselves do accept the Russian Marxian doctrine.
MR. LEVI: My answer would be, if there are . few that is enough. The
dynamics of that totalitarian system are such tha- if you have a few that is
quite enough.
MR. ISAACS: If I may comment on a few of the points that Mr. Levi
has made: In the first place, with respect to the relationship of India
to such an area organization, there is a real pralem. The way it would
evolve would depend a lot on the internal evoletion of India. I would
agree that if by any chance India does develop into a conservative National-
ist state, and does get the opportunity over a period of years to acquire
regional power, the other nations of Southeast Aa would have every right
to be afraid of India. For this reason I think any kind of regional plan
would have to include checks and safeguards again:et possible Indian domination.
It could well take the form of having a separate LoutteggeAngpoWration
with certan
iliogeFeiraBegeregaPWW4AgliATEd?RaA gegbinaed with
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it on some special basis. My main point remains that the mod to be derived
from it by all the countries concerned would be so great that the diffieulties
could and would be worked out.
On the other hand, I think that to begin to think in terms of the
possibility of great new power loimations taking shape in this area is,
to say the least, premature. a thing is based upon the assumption
that beyond the present Rus6ia1-hmerican power struggle there lies still
a further century or two of new forms of power struggles with great new
centers of power developing in Asia, eventually becoming a threat to the
American position, and so on. That is all pretty hazy stuff. That
conceivably could be the shape of the future world, but I think we aught
to proceed on the premise and on the, possibility -- I am willing to admit
it is a, rather slim possibility right now -- that in the middle of the
20th century we can make a start at creating a structure that is going to
be different. I think if we proceed on the premise that Mr. Levi Suggests,
then obviously we ought to adopt the idea that Professor Wright. suggested
yesterday, just leave these people to stew and do everything possible to
prevent then from acquiring any new coherence and strength in 20th century
terms.
MR. WRIGHT: I strongly object to that statement.
PIR. ISAACS: I will let that pass. But remember that is what Western
Imperialism did in Asia. What Western Imperialism .did in Asia was to
prevent those countries from acquiring cohesion, from developing in accord
with new techniques. If you could accept that perspective and could
agree that what we have to do is to find a way in this century to prevent
Asia from getting on its feet, you will have to say also that it would
fail. Asia is going to get on its feet anyway. If it is going to get on
its feet despite the West, then perhaps a hundred years from now or sooner
we really will have the "Yellow Peril" of William Randolph Hearst realized
on a scale of which even he never dreamed. But I think the 20th century
has hope of something better than that.
By all of this I don't mean to suggest that the situation is not
governed by the power struggle, but again I say that the power struggle is
not one that is going to be determined primarily by military weight. I
say that on both sides, fror Le Russian side and from the American side,
if the power struggle arrives the point of military deeision, then the
result will be catastrophic .02 both.
To think of the Chinese Communists having a strategy in the coming
decade or so which would involve large-scale invasion in South Asia seems
out of the question. They don't need it. If continued frustration
exists in the areas contiguous to China and if the .present situation drifts
along as it is going now, there won't be any need of Chinese Communist
armies crossing these frontiers. As has been pointed out, in each of these
countries there is more.than a nascent Communist .movement with a very real
relationship to the life of those countries. They will automatically'fall
into their places in Communist Asia's new economy.. ..It won't be a question
of invasion. I am assuming, however, albeit grimly,: that we have a period,
of time in which the Chihese Communists will be rather deeply preoccupied
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vi:
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of time in more than years now in our situation -- we still have an oppor-
tunity to embark upon a different kind of politica and social effort which
will possibly create the basis for something othe_- than a Communist totali-
tarian solution in Asia.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Professor Morgenthau, you new book is "Politics
Among Nations"; that is what we are considering. Do you have any comment?
MR. HANS J. MDRGENTHAU (University of Chicag)): I have some comments
which are not directly related to the discussion Abich is going on, comments
which probably are more fundamental than the presult discussion. We evidently 404h
start with the assumption that the United States as an interest in Southeast
Asia, but I have not heard any statement as to whA exactly that interest
is and what priority it has in the hierarchy of interests which the United
States has in the world. A decade ago it was a widely held assumption that
the United States was not involved at all in world affairs outside the
Western Hemisphere. Today it is an even more widAy held assumption that
the United States is universally involved in world affairs and without any
distinction as to priorities.
So the only question which has been in my mind this morning is: What
is actually the interest of the United States in 3autheast Asia, in what
respects are our national interests involved in Southeast Asia, and if
they are, what kind of involvement is it? Is it oolitical, is it military,
is it economic, is it humanitarian, or is it the mere competition of two
ideologies and two systems of ].olitical institutions? If such an involvement
of some kind exists, a further question must be asked: What is the priority
of that involvement in view, let me say, of our commitments in Western
EUrope, or of our interest in the situation in Chnna?
Speaking of American foreign policy with reg ?.rd to Southeast Asia,
I don't think we can take the answer to those queltions for granted, but must
ask ourselves, what is the position of Southeast Asia in the whole framework
of our foreign policy and of its commitments?
MR. HOLLAND: I think we suffer somewhat in our discussions from not
having a hardboiled representative of one of the armed services planning
agencies here. I cannot pretend to speak for any of those people but having
sat in a somewhat similar study group recently in New York where there was
an extramely able member from the Air Force I was struck by the fact, judged
by his remarks at least, that there have been somu very appreciable shifts
in the priorities of what were regarded as essentLal United States defense
needs. In this connection I =struck also in ou' discussions thus far
with our avoidance of the defense needs of South ,Asia for its own purposes.
After all, there are certain limited defense needa which any area must have,
simply to guard against relatively minor frontier problems developing into
more serious things.
We have said very little about the minimum defense requirements of this
area, which we must remember has always depended In the past for most of its
defense for local purposes on military power supp:ied from outside. India
is certainly on the way to acquiring a substantia:, body of military power
itself, but I think it is still too early to assune that, even if there were
the general political willingnesa,_ Indian tailitan-_pcmer would be adequate
to take iamowearisr gpifiew apPaw2hiegiAlfiDgmt9PR
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?213?
To come back to the problem of the place of this part of the world
in United States strategic priorities, my impression from this expert's
remarks was that Southeast Asia-and the Indian Ocean generally, in fact, even
the Southern Pacific, has now a much lower place in the scale of priorities
than it had at the beginning of the second world war. Part of that is
just another way of saying that the experts are now more concerned with an air
war over the top of the world. Compared with such areas as Alaska at one
end of the scale and the Middle East on the other that this in-between area
of India, Southeast Asia, even the off-shore islands of East Asia including
Japan, now appear to have a much lower scale in the priorities. That perhaps
was reflected in Mr. Royall's unhappy remark in Japan some months ago when
he implied that the United States had no obligation in its own interests to
defend Japan, though it had often been popularly assumed that Japan was a
kind of outlying American airbase against the continent of Asia. There
must be a great deal more to this problem than lam able to sketch here, but
it is a factor which we are not sufficiently studying and there has certainly
been an appreciable shift in what used to be the traditional ratings of
these areas as regards their importance for U.S. strategic needs.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Colonel Zierath, I wonder if you would care to make
a comment?
COL. F. R. ZIERATH (National Military Establishment, Washington,D.C.):
I had not intended to volunteer any specific remarks, but since the dis-
cussion has taken this particular turn, I feel it incumbent to extemporize
with a few personal observations.
MODERATOR TALBOT; Because your name came so late it does not appear
on the mimeographed roster of participants. I might explain to the group
that Colonel Zierath has come here from the General Staff.
COL. ZIERATH: We in the military establishment regard ourselves as
the strong right arm of the State Department. Isuppose the left arm would
be the ECA and the Point Four Program, and continuing the analogy further,
the brain power and spiritual guidance would be furnished by the State
Department. I don't mean for it to be aeaumed? however, that the State
Department has a monopoly on brain power, This question of strategic interest
which has just arisen reminds me of hearinga before the Bureau of the Budget
recently in which this term came to the fore, in discussions by an ECA
representative. Actually strategic interest became the primary consideration
for sponsoring this particular program and the case revolved on that point.
Regardless of how his remarks were interpreted, the speaker did not have a
military strategic concept in mind at all. I think, therefore, you have to
define terms; whether a military strategic interest or a general academic
strategic interest is inferred.
I have never been exposed to a formal courso,in logic but many of my
colleagues back the opposition into the corner very easily with, "Why and
how?" I think we can do that very well with propellents of aid to China who
view the situation as one vitally affecting United States' strategic interest
as well as national interest, by confronting them with, "Why and how?"
We classify military strategic interest as "vital" or "essential" or
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the classification of "non-essential" and "non-innortant".
My own belief is that this area of South Asia does not fall into the
category of vital. It cannot because of the lack of homogeneity now pre-
valent in the area which the program outlined by Ir. Isaacs may eventually
overcome.
We place an area or count/7 in the category cf having a military
strategic interest when we cen6i7?:r its war-making potential and its war-
making capacity. Interrelatea r.ry closely with that, of course, is the
availability of strategic materials.
It appears to mo that only after we establish a regional arrangement,
a power bloc to provide some form of equilibrium in the bi-polarized world
later on in this century, that a true strategic irterest really obtains. I
think that a regional arrangement requires plannirg and organization, it
requires programming, and it requires an instrumert of implementation. Mr.
Isaacs' proposal establishes the basis for such ar approach.
agree with the philosophy of Mr. Warburg that the problems of the
world do not lend themselves to being capable of solution by military means;
they should be resolved in the political, economic, cultural, and psycholo-
gical fields.
We have not given a great deal of prominence to Australia in this
discussion, but I think India, Australia and Philippines are the three pivot
points for a regional arrangement. The question then comes up, which is the
focal point, India or Australia? Where is the threat militarily or overall
for Communist infiltration of this area? Is there a possibility of it
coming from this direction (China) or coming from that direction (Middle East)?
MR. PELZER: Isnit that third pivot too weak? How do you feel about
that pivot of the Philippines?
COL. ZIERATH: It perhaps is weak, but there nay come a time when we
could extend it.
MR. PELZER: Why retreat to the Philippines?
COL. ZIERATH: I say that in the future the pivot probably will rest
here. (Indicating on map area of Japan.)
MR. PELZER: Would it not be better to start aigher up?
COL. ZIERATH: It might. I think that is. relative, Professor, based on
the settlement we obtain in the Council of Foreign Ministers in Europe and
based on settlements in the Far East. For the tim being we have to accept
it at this point and eventually look forward to its expansion. There is no
question that Japan is the key to the entire Asian area.
MR. PELZER: General Ranulo, lam afraid, will, have something to say on
this, and if I understand his temper and if his teaper is any indication of
the tempeAr_in the_Philinnines..-IfffiyilialkANI6VomENR4600gotkin a very
rovearorKereasezouz
short tiAMP
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COL. ZIERATH: I think historic and traditional interests will keep
him oriented in the pivot. (Laughter)
MR. FEUER: He was the one who coined the term "Mother America" but
I don't think that we can rely too much on that relationship.
COL. ZIERATH: The question Of reparations, of course, is a very moot
point, and we face the same question elsewhere of the Almighty Dollar being
a considerable factor in determination of policy. I think. the present feeling
will temper and modify as the months go along. We hope
PROF. JOHN EMBREE: (Yale University): Isn't Mr. Romulo trying to get
more money?
COL. ZIERATH: We have to back off and look at these problems long-range
without confining ourselves to the narrow, short-range perspective.
MR. HOLLAND: When you pointed up to the top of the map and said, "The
key area is up there", were you thinking primarily of Japan as an industrial
and power complex or further North, namely, the North Pacific and Alaska?
COL. ZIERATH: Iwas speaking specifically on the complex of Japan,
and how it will play an interrelated role to North China, Manchuria and the
Maritime Provinces of Russia.
MR. PERLOFF: May I suggest one other American interest in this area?
That is the role of the foreign-aid prop under our economy -- a prop consis-
ting of many billions of dollars yearly, making possible the export of many
American products. There is concern in many quarters as to what will happen
to our economy when Marshall Plan aid stops, and I wonder whether the Point
Four program may not have very real significance in terms of our internal
economy - as the economy is now organized.
MR. HOLLAND: You think we can no longer sell the Marshall Plan to
Congress?
MR. PERLOFF: We may have to sell some other plan to take its place
within the next few years.
MR. BRODIE: I would like to correct Mr. Perloff to say that the Marshall
Plan was proposed not as a method to combat communism but as a means of
correcting the economic imbalance of Western Europe.
MODERATOR TALBOT: I wonder whether Mr. Adams has a comment to make.
MR. A.C.S. ADAMS (British Consul, Cincinnati): I would just like to say
that I go along with Nr. Isaacs in his opinion that the Communists will not
hal:re to fight for, it in Southeast Asia, ?but I do think it would take theu.
quite a time. The populations of Southern Asia are largely peasant ones,
and certainly jUdging from the population of Siam, which I know better than
the others, it takes a long time to sell the Siamese peasant any idea.:
don't thereby minimize ,the Communist long-range risk there but I just want
to try to put it into relation to the peoples whom it would concern. The
SiamesfipPvS SateRMaeniittiiiqeolgbonvelt9s26hilamtau6soo6glimmisq-
p
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They certainly have a Chinese Communist populatien in their country, and the
Chinese population is relatiee :it; large - it mae be as much as 4 million
out of the 17- or 18 millien e: the whole country - that it could form an
imperil= in imperie;but even ...IL.nv.st those Chinese, most of whom have been
settled in the country for a long time and have a. stake there, I should
say that the possible Communist element is a small and recently-immigrated
one. It may be paralleled by the Communists in lealaya, I imagine. I
believe that the authorities in Malaya reckon the active Communist leaders
of the present troubles, numberieetween 500 and 1,000 and they, we are told,
take good care not to expose themselves to the rieks of capture, wounding
or shooting.
MR. FURNIVALL: May I just presume one word? It certainly has not taken
long in Burma and I don't think it would take lore anywhere to sell to the
peasants the idea that they need not pay their deets, they need not pay their
rent and they need not pay any revenue. Those are the doctrines with which
the Communists are indoctrinating the Burmese peaeants and they take to it
with remarkable levity.
MR. LEVI: As far as priorities are concernel that Colonel Zierath
talked about, I think perhaps it should not be fcegotten that one of our
strategic interests in the Pacific is related to reat Britain. It has been
our policy for a long time and certainly in World War II days to consider
Great Britain our fortress in the Atlantic. I think the two volumes the
State Department published on Japan 1931-1941 made it quite clear that we
told the Japanese innumerable times, "We cannot permit the lifelines of the
British Empire to be cut." That is one of the reasons why we began to be
tougher and tougher on the Japanese as they moved closer and closer to these
lifelines.
I would imagine this sort of interest would exist today: Great Britain
is still a strong base for us in the Atlantic wherever the future war is to
be fought, if it is to be fought. For that reasol we still have if only a
secondary interest in maintaining access, if not ef ourselves, at least of
Great Britain to South Asia I think an ilIustraeion of the fact that we
consider this as a secondary interest is the fact that the Australians have
been pushing us for quite a while now to sign a P:,cifie pact but we have
refused.
This is an additional comment which I wanted to make.
MR. ISAACS: The fact that Southeast Asia today has low military priority
is shown by the wholesale American withdrawal from the Philippines. The
much-debated American treaty with the Philippines provided for 23 American
military bases. Only two are to be kept in being, one of them at the holiday
resort of Baguio. This, incidentally, adds an iroeic twist to the Filipino
accusation that the United States gave the island e only half-independence
because they kept military guarantees that cut ineo Filipino sovereignty.
But the very fact that the area is given low military priority is an
advantage from the point of view of the possible effort we can make to shape
a better society. It is not necessary in Southeaet Asia to count benefits
in termqkpiEraiieViiitilegarsc42062/Ornilie.?CIATWEVOMOOM900406S066tVink ab out
Southeast Asia in non-military terms, to help in 1 program out there that
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will increase productivity and serve the general well-being of the people
there as well as ourselves. It is an opportunity we are letting slip - to
begin thinking in world terms, to become world citizens in a truly new sense
of the term.
But I would like to offer one reservation to the reported military
attitude: It seems to no quite possible that the day might come when the
Southeast Asian peninsula will acquire in the minds of our military people
approximately the same role as the Aegean Peninsula, a toehold on a continent.
That may well happen. It may happen to our State Department people even
without military pressure. The danger is that we will pursue in Southeast
Asia the same kind of policy that has been followed in Greece, and with
even less effective result. The whole experience of the war should have
taught us that military decisions without effective political and social
changes are of small use in the long run.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you very much. We shall continue this with
our Rapporteursi reports at nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
... Following some current announcements the conference adjourned at
12 o'clock noon ...
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THE NORMAN NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalism d.n South Asia
Ix
NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM AND REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
H.E. Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo*
Asia today is a study in contradictions.
Amidst the conflicts that divide it, we find t work a powerful impulse
towards integration and unity.
With no military power to speak of, it is gradually assuming the role
of a Third Force interposed between the two great rowers, the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Ruined by the war, betrayed after the victory, disillusioned by its
friends, menaced by new enemies, Asia has emerged from her travail as the
most dynamic region in the world today.
Strong winds are blowing across the ravaged face of Asia, sowing seeds
of great social and political changes that may altrr the course of history
and transform the very texture of our society for a long time to come.
It is an historical misfortune that the renascence of Asia should
coincide with the ruthless struggle among the Great Powers for the mastery
of the world. In an era of real peace and a just order among nations,
the immense creative energy generated by Asiats awakening might have been
channeled into constructive enterprises to the lasting benefit of mankind.
There are three main drives behind the revolutionary changes sweeping
across Asia. They are nationalise, Communism and regionalism. Of these,
nationalism is the oldest and still the most powerful.
The history of the Philippines provides the pattern of developing
nationalism throughout the region. During the three centuries under
Spanish rule, the Philippines had won the distinction of having the oldest
and most agressive nationalist movement in Asia. The oppressive character of
Spanish rule had produced uprisings and rebellions once every three years
on the average. Hand in hand with the desire for liberty, this oppressive
rule had developed a sense of common nationality among a people speaking
different languages and divided from one another by strong sectional loyalties.
This growing sense of nationalism and desire for liberty together culminated
in the Philippine Revolution of 1896, and, but for the intervention of the
Address delivered atAarri
SaiSPRN3YefiloOfir, WPM
1144
tiplVd06i5813ffingR0tti4St3tav9 Hall,
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American occupation during the next four decades, would have created a new
independent state in Asia at the turn of the last century-- the prototype
of a simple and straightforward freedom movement from colonial status,
untainted either by the racialist and regionalist appeal of Japanese anti-
Western propaganda or by the ideological appeal of Communism.
On the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a newspaper editor and publisher, I
visited all the countries of Southeast Asia, including China, Burma, India,
Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and Indonesia. In a series of articles written
for my newspapers and for world-wide distribution in the course of my
travels, I warned the Western powers that the regional, anti-Western
appeal of Japanese propaganda had made serious inroads in the region, and
predicted that the peoples there, unlike the people of the Philippines,
would either be indifferent to a Japanese invasion or welcome it with
open arms. Events quickly showed how close to the truth my estimate was.
For I found that nationalism was the dominant force among the peoples
of Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and Indonesia, 'mit was in China and India,
and as it had been in the Philippines throughout the three centuries of
Spanish rule and, in a somewhat less violent gorm, throughout the four
decades of the American occupation. I found little or no tinge of Communism
in the libertarian movements in those countries. They were essentially
nationalist struggles for independence and were recognized as such by the
metropolitan powers, even while they opposed them with all the power at their
eommand. The Communist rising in China was still in the embryo stagepand
was not yet a serious threat to the Nationalist government.
It was only after the war that some of taw nationalist movements in
Asia began to be suffused with Communist influence and to be described to
the Western world as Communist-inspired. To be sure, these nationalist
movements developed strong leftist strains, reflecting the universal trend.
In Indo-China, the leadership fell into Communast hands, not so much on
account of the intrinsic appeal of Communism as because the Communist
party was identified with the nationalist struggle, first against the
Japanese and later against the French, who made the grievous miscalculation
of trying to reinstate their pre-war control of the country through violent
means.
In the Asian countries where the metropolitap powers bowed to the
historical imperative and recognised' the native peoples' right to a free
and sovereign, life of their own -- as in the Philippines, India, Pakistan
and Ceylon the nationalist movements were saved from perversion and found
healthy expression in new democratic states functioning in the Western
tradition.
Even hapless Indonesia, all but abandoned by the Western Powers
to the mercies of the Dutch "police actions," mustered sufficient will and
energy to put down the Communist rising within the nationalist movement.
In Burma, the strength of the Socialist leadership is in direct
proportion to the faithfulness with which it represents the popular will for
social and economic reform.
In China, where the Communists are winning their greatest victories
today, they owe their success as much to the b ruptc of the nationalist
' A
leader shIPPA2v tg FaSrlfaitil?-9?49Zat iiglialFe RE 6 'IA' 14W93130P6Ole
Chinese masses.
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I have no intention of minimizing the importance and the probable
consequences of the Communist triumph in China. Whatever its cause, it
stands forth as the most decisive development in ?Lela since the defeat
of Japan.
It is bound to affect the balance of power not only in Asia but throughout
the world. It has already caused the partial retreat of America from Asia.
It undermines the security of the free states of Aeia and strengthens the
Communist movements within their gates. It opens up the grim prospect of
Communist ascendancy over the entire region. Those are facts that we must
face - bitter and Unpalatable though they may be.
There was a fateful moment after the war when America could have made
all of Asia safe for freedom and democracy. Asia hoped for a new life after
the war. Without exception the peoples of Asia locked forward to a new
dispensation based on the Four Freedoms and the promise of the Atlantic
Charter.
That promise was never fulfilled except in th( Philippines. Elsewhere
America returned to Asia as a liberator and remained -- in Asian eyes
as one of the protectors and preservers of the colenial system.
American guns helped restore French rule in Indo-China against the
wishes of the inhabitants. American tanks and planes enabled the Dutch
forces to carry out their infamous "police actions " And when the United
Nations intervened in the dispute, American sympathy for the Indonesian
cause wastooldemmatand equivocal, to ideoress Asia as anything more than
a pious protestation of an intention already discarded in practice.
What a difference it might have made to the s:tuation in Asia today
if America had stood uncompromisingly for the freecom of Asia. That would
have electrified all of Asia's peoples.
The consequent disillusionment has had a profound and far-reaching effect
in Asia. In lieu of peace, the peoples of Asia fond themselves involved
in new conflicts. The new lite of freedom under jestice for which they
had fought did not materialize; instead, they were subjected to fresh
attempts at domination. They found their interestt subordinated as in the
years before the war to the interests of Europa; tteir wishes disregarded
when these ran counter to the demands of power pol:tics; little account taken
of their fate as they were forced to revert to their age-old role of pawns
in the new struggle for the mastery of the world.
Even their modest hopes for the reconstruction of devastated areas and
a measure of relief from the crushing burden of poverty imposed by the
destruction caused by the war and the limitations of their own feudal economy
were destined to disappointment, as the recovery and uscurity of Western
Europe took prior claim on the funds and resources that might have been
their salvation.
As with economic assistance, so with security from attack or subversion.
Coincident with the grand sweep of the Communist armies to the Yangtze,
A Europe-first policy went into effect. American forces in Asia were
reduced, heightening the feeling of abandonment among those who had looked
to them as tokens, if nothing else, of their own security.
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The crowning touch was the reversal of American policy on Japan, whidh
has confronted Asia, barely four years after the war and before a peace
treaty has even been signed, with the spectre of a revived and strengthened
Japan.
This reversal of policy springs from the same primordial weakness,
This weakness, in turn, springs from the constant temptation of adopting
piecemeal remedies and makeshift solutions for every problem as it arises,
instead of adhering to a set course essentially based on inflexible princi-
ples of right and justice, and embracing the world as a whole.
Japan, in the opinion of a certain_group of influential Americans,
must be rebuilt speedily as a bastion against the encroachment of Soviet
power. Japanese industries must, therefore, be revived, Japanese commerce
must be stimulated, the Zaibatsu must be re-established, right-wing
political groups must be encouraged, and reparations nust be stopped.
Whatever the objections of China, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, and India, the Japanese economy must be revived and Japan developed
as a potential ally. Little or no account is taken of the legitimate
fears of the wartime allies of America and the"Went n Asia, and there is
a tendency not to inquire too deeply into the question of vhether or not we
should. make certain that it is a peaceful and democratic Japan that we are
helping to revive and strengthen. We seem to feel that it does not matter,
although it does matter greatly, even decisively, as the story of Greece and
Korea and China so plainly shows.
The upshot of all this has been to deepen the Asian people's awareness
.of their common needs and problems, and to heighten their sense of common
danger and common destiny. Out of the crucible of Asia's travail is now
emerging a strong feeling of regional kinship and unity.
The dream of Asian unity is an old one. I was one of its advocates
in the Philippines years before the war. In 1945, at the San Francisco
Conference, I pointed up the role that a free and united Asia could play
as one of the stoutest pillars of peace. The formation of a regional
association of Asian states working in equal partnership with like-minded
groups of nations to safeguard human liberty and foster its growth under
a regime of enforceable world law has always been one of the major objectives
of our foreign policy.
It was not until 1947, however, when the Asian Relations Conference
was held in New Delhi, that the ideal of Asian unity began to take definite
shape, At this Conference the peoples of Asia through their spokesmen
recalled their ancient heritage of wisdom, dignity and freedom, and defined
Asia's role in world affairs as an exponent of the moral factor, a
mediator between embattled ideologies, a firm and consistent advocate of
peace in a world divided into hostile camps.
These precepts were applied faithfully in the first practical test
of Asian collective action, The New Delhi Conference on Indonesia last
January, acting strictly within the framework of the United Nations,
brought moral pressure to bear on the just and speedy solution of the
Indonesian problem. The conferees followed this up by putting the question
on the agenda of the recently concluded General Assembly session, and by
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keeping it on the agenda of the forthcoming session, pending the outcome
of the nagctiations between the Netherlands Government and the Republic
of Indonesia.
The New Delhi Conference eL7isaged an association of Asian States
dedicated to peace and pledged to use their combined influence in support
of freedom and justice, This would make the Asian Union conceived in
New Delhi the first born within the United Nations to operate strictly
in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter, without
benefit of military pressure but only with the force of embattled conscience.
The over-all objective is to throw the collective weight of Asia behind
the United Nations effort to establish a workable system of international
co-operation and security.
With regard to the problems of Communism and colonialism in Asia,
it is our hope that the projected Asian Union would develop into an
effective counterpoise against the menace of a rcnascent imperialism on
the one hand and of an aggressive totalitarianism on the other.
This would also be its role in the struggle between the great Powers
for world supremacy. I consider it significant tYat no Communist delegate
took part in the New Delhi deliberations. The evolving Asian union would
be non-Communist rather than anti-Communist, democratic according to the
new pattern of a free society, the better to enab.le it to perform the all,-
important work of synthesis in a divided world.
It remains to be seen how long and how effectively it can play this
role under increasing Communist pressure on the oce hand and waning or
indifferent Western support on the other. It wouLd seem to be the
wisest course for the Western Powers, particular].; the United States,
to give every encouragement to the non-Communist r;tates in Asia who are
willing to stand for their freedom in the face of the Communist advance.
In keeping with her own history and traditicals, America should seek
to befriend, influence and guide the forces of freedom and social progress
in Asia along democratic channels instead of trying to contain and stifle
them within the arbitrary mould of a negative ant--Communist policy.
The battle for Asia is not yet over; it has just entered the crucial
stage. Even if all of China should fall under Communist control, it does
not necessarily follow that the rest of Asia will go Communist. China
itself is too vast and populous a land, too massiare and unwieldy, too
heavily overgrown with the mellow traditions of individualism and tolerance
to be recast in the iron mould of a doctrinaire ideology. There will be a
time -- a long time, it is almost certain -- of internal reorganization and
adjustment, of agrarian reforms and reforms in golernment, but the basic
characteristics of the Chinese people will reshape instead of being shaped
by the mould of imported systems.
In the meantime, the free, non-Communist peoples outside China, and the
non-Communist elements within China itself, can still be rallied under the
banner of a strong, positive, uncompromising policy.
The tides of change in Asia have not yet con :eal ed into set patterns;
everything is fluid; and no possibility should b ruled out, including the
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maintenance of a union of free Asian states strong enough to withstand
the Communist pressure.
There is a mighty race for the still fluid and indeterminate loyal-
ties of Asia. Those loyalties have today only one thing in common:
nationalist sentiment and the desire for freedom. The regional spirit
which has but recently sprung up among the Asian peoples is an extension
of that sentiment and desire. The methods and principles of Western
democracy have a special appeal to countries like the Philippines that
?
have had some experience of democracy. But the methods and principles
of Communism have an appeal no less to those peoples who, from their
condition of colonial bondage, may be led to believe that they have nothing
to lose from aligning themselves with Communism which promises plenty for
all and loudly professes its irreconcilable antagonism to the colonial
system.
Asia can still be saved for freedom and democracy; it would be folly
indeed to write it off or to let it go by default to Communism.
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THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
25th Institute-Nationalism and Regionalisn in South Asia
Round Table 71: SUMMARY AND APP iAISAL
Sunday lo May 29, 194)
Presiding: Phillips TalbDt
DIRECTOR TALBOT: As it is Sunday morning, rdhere seems to have been
no protest at getting a slightly late start. Two or three people have
asked a chance to make comments. When they sat here with bland smiles on
their faces I assumed they were agreeing with almost everything that was
said; but it turns out that that was not necessarily the case. First,
Professor Quincy Wright.
MR. WRIGHT: I wanted to comment on Mr. Isaaezt discussion of my
earlier remarks. He said I was advocating a policy of letting the South
Asians "stew in their own juice." I certainly did not intend any such
implication to be drawn from my remarks. I was interested in the proper
relating of the economic and the cultural aspects of Asian nationalism.
It seems to me there is a danger that nationalivm? which, as General
Ramulo said yesterday noon, means primarily liberation from imperialist
rule, either will go the way of proletarian nationalism, demanding revol-
utionary action to better economic conditions of the masses; or that it
will go the way of bourgeois nationalism, maintaining traditional abuses.
The Soviets, as you knows distinguish those two different types of nation-
alism and it seems to Me that either of them hiL7, considerable dangers.
was urging a middle-of-the-road nationalism which would avoid
promising the peasants what was impossible to achieve, ending possibly
in disillusionment and either a police state or chaos, and which indirectly
would also avoid subjecting them to unlimited competition and exploitation.
Rather than that, develop a rationalism which would give them self-respect
in their own cultures and folhwaLrs so as to hold their societies together
while economic activities were iniiated that would start the fotmation
of capital in these countries. The primary proDlem is to maintain a.
certain amount of order and stability in these highly over-populated coun-
tries while the gradual process of capital formation and technological
introduction goes on. It seems to me that the..:conomic goals should be
the increase in capital formation in the countries rather than an effort
at immediate improvement of human conditions.
Mr. Pelzer said the other day that he thought that health activities
should be looked at from the point of view of increasing productiveness
rather than increasing consumption. I would striou9ly question that in
countAillitcPAVFAVelfigggikee7PA elAbRbl -ec n (16241krAia that in
countries such as the Unite Sta es anytninggu db to nVcY Re health
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of the population increases production. In South Asia or any highly over-
populated country where, because of the present very high death rate, you
have a tremendous potential Of population increase it seems to me that work
done in public health will have inevitably the first effect of greatly
increasing the population and absorbing .any improvement which might
be made through an increase in efficiency or through the upbuilding of
capital.
You have here countries which are up to their necks in the operation
of the Malthusian law. When you have those conditions, I think you have
to think of economic improvement in the sense of creating certain oases of
prosperity, certain areas, either particular industries or particular
agricultural areas, where you can begin the process of capital formation
and where you can get a little ahead of the game. But a general effort
at improvement of health Can hardly have that effect.
I remember a good many years ago we had here at the University an
adviser of one of the native states of India. He said he thought the general
conditions of the people in h state were better than those in the surround-
ing territory of British Ind ta:; a condition which he attributed to the lack
of any public health efforts in the native state and the very important
efforts in public health in the surrounding areas. He gave some statistics
showing that in the last fifty years there had been practically no increase
in population in the native state, whereas in the surrounding areas of
British India because of these health measures the population had increased
greatly. He said the result was much more impoverishment in the surround-
ing areas of British India. He, of course, may have been saying this with
interested motives.
There is another point I wanted to say a word on, that is the question
of determining the kind of projects which might be best supported.
raised the question with Mr. Piplani as to what the criteria were by which
the Indian government selected projects to support, We subsequently had
a good deal of discussion as to whether the United States, influenced
perhaps by Chambers of Commerce, should determine what projects should be
supported, and it was suggested that that raised obvious difficulties because
it would look like American imPerialism: Projects would be likely to be
supported that would make returns to the inveatoi-s? but which might not be
the best for Indian or Southeast Asian interests. On the other hands I
think it can be recognized that if the governments of the countries deter-
mine the projects and they simply receive technical aid or capital to support
these projects, under the pressure of democratic influences the projects
are likely to be ones with immediate humanitarian effect. Also, they are
likely to be ones which may not be too productive for the foreigner and
consequently they will have difficulty in attractingtapital.
There was also the suggestion, which I believe Mr. Isaacs made, that
you should have a South Asian organization which would get together and
propose, general,projects-for economic improvement. Well, I can see some
difficulties inrthat. -Personally, I don't see much in the integration of
South Asia. It seems to 'me Our discussions have indicated that there is not
very much complementariness in the various territories there, that eachtone
of them is complementary to some state such as the United States which is
entirely outside theTaTea, and consequently from the economic point of
view tAcipratediFckalte1eaist2002tta124icreAsnoltidglateauoaimeces4i to me that
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if you attempted to have a rather loose council lf ministers of the various
countries there, you would have the projects developed by a kind of log-
rolling process such as is familiar in our Congress in tariff-making, that
each one would agree to support someone else's project "if you support
mine," so the whole thing would be done on a political basis.
It would seem to me that the best initiative for the projects to be
undertaken would be in the United Nations, that -Achnological agencies or
specialized agencies under the United Nations would be in a better position
to deal with projects on a scientific application of certain criteria.
If you set criteria which will maximise internal capital formation, you can get
technologists in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the I.L.O., the
Bank, and other agencies, who could be trusted t) give a fairly impartial
scientific judgment in selecting projects accoriing to these criteria.
Such a selecting agency might be regarded with Liss suspicion by the countries
in which capital was to bd used and also night bi looked upon with leas
suspicion by the countries that are to contribut.1 the technical skills and the
capital.
I may say on this matter of the criteria which should be applied in
determining such projects that I think probably those that can utilize
technological skills should come first, those thlt require great quantities
of capital would come second; but I am inclined *-7,o agree with those who think
that the Point Four project won't get very far unless technical skill has
added to it considerable quantities of capital.
At a recent meeting on Point Four we had some officials of the Depart-
ment of State who were thinking in terms of a few hundred million dollars a
year in providing technical skill. One of the members of the group thought
that you would not get anywhere unless the United States thought in terms
of at least $20 billion a year in sending capital to the area. There seems
to be quite a disparity in the way in which this bold new program is being
thought of.
MR. hERRIAM: Are you distinguishing between capital and technological
skill?
MR. WRIGHT: Point Four emphasizes technological skill.
MR. MERRIAM: But you could have capital without technological skill.
MR. WRIGHT: You would not use capital very well unless you had a lot
of technological skill, but I think the two can be distinguished; you can
educate people so they can be engineers, but they can't do very much unless
they have steel beams to work with.
I want to say a word in regard to Mr. Morgenthau's very interesting
suggestion yesterday as to what are the basic interests of the United States.
I say that we have two: a stable world is the first. I don't think that a
democracy can exist unless you have a stable world. and I don't think you
can have a stable world if a quarter or a third of the population is under
conditions of misery, of unrest, So I would say that that is the first
interest of the United States in regard to South Asia.
Np0P69;d7rogRel4W202APiqta:RMPOP?elft16040f$04030006AF the
dominance of Moscow. It has been said, and I think rightly, that we don't
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want to formulate any policy in regard to South Asia as an aspect of the cold
war. I would agree with that, ')Iit at the same time one can recognize that
the United States has a basic ;, ,,-;:ost in preventing South Asia from coming
under Soviet dominance, even ,c,,zh you say our prime interest is in building
up South Asia. We think that the Communist control of the area would not
be good for the people that live there. Thus we have, I think, an immediate
interest in South Asia if we hope to have a world that is reasonably stable.
Mr. Morgenthau also referred to the priorities among the various
policies. I would probably agree with the State Department that Europe has
a certain priority but I think our interest in the long-run in Asia is
greater. There is a greater immediacy, perhaps, to the European problem
but the two problems, I should say, are fundamentally the same. We say
we want stability in Western Europe because we want a generally stable world
and because we don't want the Soviet Union to take over that area. It is
exactly the same interest in Asia, and in the long-run Asia, being much
larger and also being more liable to being taken over by the Soviet Union,
is perhaps most important. So I don't think there should be any question
as to the vital interest of the United States in this area.
? I perhaps have said enough. Twill simply summarize my general position,
which is that we should wholeheartedly accept nationalism. I agree entirely
with General Ronulo on that. We should recognize that these countries want
to regain self-respect in their own cultures and we should support those
movements and in pursuance of that give no support to the various imperialisms
which have operated there. I think that any development has got to be on
the basis of nationalism, and I may say that I think that is one of the great
dangers of the pending Atlantic Pact. From the point of view of Asia it
would make it look as though the United States has associated itself with
the Western European countries who have an imperialist interest there, and
the result may be that it will be more difficult for the United States to
pursue an independent pqlicy based solidly upon nationalism in the sense
of developing self-respect and respect of others for the traditional
cultures of the area.
I think also that we sheLle. wholeheartedly support the general thesis
of "Asia for the Asiatics" and try to differentiate any policy from that
of simply using South Asia as an instrument in a cold war. I would be a
little afraid that standing for South Asian integration would look like
that. As I say, I don't think South Asia has, any particular economic grounds
for integration. Southeast Asia is certainly as closely connected with
China as it is with India. It may look as though we are trying to make
a bloc of the most non-Soviet areas in order to have a spear point for
attack on the Soviets. It seems to MB whatever regional integration there
is in Southeast Asia should spring from the desires of the Asiatic people
and not from any pressure one way or the other from the outside. It may
be that any of these countries that deal individually with Western cnuntries
will do the best. Maybe Asia will come together as a whole in a New
Delhi Conference, maybe no union other than a world union would be adequate,
so I would let that take its own course.
Finally, I think the United States should show a certain reticence in
contributing projects for economic aid. The bold new program should aim
to build up capital in the area. In developing it we should try not to
break /490b454491-cnalirsv26011004t.tfArifliailikKRMAItif 0
instinct among the peasants, but to give them some oppor uni ylo develop
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on their traditional cultures.
I should think that the oceordination of tecnnical skills could be
best accomplished through aco-ordination of the technical agencies of the
United Nations. I believe there has been some ccntroversy there: whether,
as the Secretary General of the United Nations hes suggested, there should
be a committee that would bring together the wisdom of the various tech-
nical agencies that are involved so they could act together under a United
Nations Commission. It seems to me there would be a great value in that
as compared to the alternative policy of the United States, for example,
dealing independently with each area. I think tte co-ordination should be
in the United Nations.
MR. SARKAR: I would agree with the suggestiens by Professor Wright
as very reasonable and very sound.
MR. VANDENBOSCH: Mr. Chairman, it seems to no that we are confronted
with a number of dilemmas. The magnitude of the problem is staggering.
We are told that the United States has poured nearly two billion dollars
into the Philippines since the end of the mar, with practically no
effect as far as raising the standard of living ca anything like a per-
manent basis. There was great disappointment laet year at Bogota because
Secretary Marshall did not announce a Marshall Plan for Latin America. We
have had a Latin American specialist at the University of Kentucky this past
semester and he talks about the problem of raisirg the standards of living
of that region with the same urgency that we have heard here. The United
States can not extend this program to all the regions of the world which cry
for it. We shall have to select and in doing so we shall undoubtedly
cause more bitterness in the areas that we do not help than we shall meet
with gratitude in the regions which are chosen fel- our help.
The problem is also difficult politically. We want, of course, to
encourage the development of democratic governmerts in the region. If not,
it might have been better if these countries had remained under their
colonial status. But will democratic governments in these countries be
able to maintain themselves under either a long-range or a short-range
policy of improving the standards of living? The example of China seems
to indicate that more than a distant promise of Letter things is necessary
to enable a government to keep in power. On the other hand, drastic measures
on a short-range basis would require the imposition of so many restrictions
and such rigid governmental controls, that no democratic government could
long survive their imposition. Moreover, democratic governments are more
likely to consume such capital as has accumulated than to add to it. It
would take a very strong government to prevent tee outside aid from going
into consumption.
Then there is the difficulty that arises frcm the fact that there are
in nearly all Of the countries of the region bitter political antagonisms.
Aid given to the government in power will be regarded by the other group
or groups as intervention. We had that situatior in China.
MODERATOR TALBOT: I think the subject of democratic governments in
South Asia was handled ver7well by Mr. Furnivala in his first lecture.
Clearly, we in the West an; rm. going to dictate the form of government
in these areas. There are:priortties that the leeals consider. Those who
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have gained independence can now confront some of their more basic problems.
Those who have not gained independence are making, so far as one can judge,
very, very little progress in confronting their basic problems. Once they
rid themselves of colonialism, then they expect to approach these questions.
Next, are we to have oasL,F, o2 prosperity to lift the living standards
of the whole territory? ThG .in a distinction is to be made. There
are certainly some heavily ove,..-populated areas; on the other hand, many
of the countries are under-populated. In those latter countrieS? I think
it has been sufficiently pointed out, the problems of raising the standard
of living and of getting along in this modern world are comparable to those
in the overly populated areas. This suggests that population by itself does
not basically change the nature of the problem that confronts us.
In respect to public health there may be some thinking about Puerto Rico
and its problem of population and resources. From the Indian Princely
States that I know, I would hesitate to -- in fact, I would not -- accept
the argument of a Princely adviser of pre-independence days that conditions
in the State were better than those of the neighboring territory of British
India because the State had no public health program. Not only by Western
standards but even by any Indian standards I have been able to understand,
many Princely States have not succeeded in advancing themselves very much.
Mr. Poleman would like to make a comment.
MR. POLEMAN: On the political side Mr. Wright has very ably expressed
what I had in mind, and perhaps on the cultural side Mr. Embree will do
very much better than I can. I may be wrong but I felt I detected a feeling
here from the beginning that regionalism without regard for the traditional
culture patterns and developing nationalism MRS something we should con-
centrate on more than anything else. There has been very little said about
the importance of the cultural and ethnic patterns and their historical
strength, the validity which they may have in forming nations or in being
manipulated by various persons to form nations. Again I refer you to the
already classic example of Pakistan.
I don't agree with Mr. Isaacs that nationalism is bankrupt as far as
this area is concerned or any :-.art of the world, and if the imposition of
regionalism is to be consider-d, ihho is going to impose it? Mr. Wright
has said that we cannot impoz, that it should be developed by those
countries themselves with to problems as they come along. Certainly
the United States government is not going to foster the Socialist regimes
in these countries in the hope that they will evolve a pattern of regional
cooperation as distinct from nationalities.
In other words, I think we have failed to concentrate more specifically
on the problems that arise from the strong cultural patterns in the various
areas and what role they may play in the forming of nations and in the
interaction of those nations, not only in the countries which are still
harassed by imperial domination but even in those countries in which we
have assumed stable governments already exist: Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and
perhaps Siam and Burma. Within India itself there are still strong forces
which may any day split the country, and I'll go on record as being able
to produce evidence that that is possible. You can pick up almost any
Indiaktpr9metifeerRefeage1102/071240?51AiRlift-6696A1661ftg36a-g ort of thing:
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South Indians are celebrating regularly
the anniversaries of their great noets,
Bharati, Camban ,nd Tiru-valluvar, The
renowned poets who are thus almos%
worshipped by t.,eir admirers, prayed
to their gods in Twail but the adnirere
of these poets, while extolling Timil
with their lips, themselves seek dif-
ferent medium of expression. The: have
forgotten that there is glory in one's
own Dharma, while another's Dharm
brings disaster.
That is the feeling which pervades all of these cultures, has for years, and
if anybody thinks that cultural patterns are not mach stronger than any
political forces you may only turn to the pages of history and see what has
happened in all recorded history.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Many cultural forces are subject to manipulation
and have been manipulated. Some efforts are particularistic; others,
generalistic. There is manipulation in the effort to create an Indian
nationalism; and further, in the effort on the pert of such people as
Nehru and, if you will, Romulo, and others, to create some larger context
in which certain expressions can be made, perhapt eventually certain actions
taken. The question is not whether there is any manipulation or whether
the manipulation is in one direction or the other, but whether the contrary
manipulations will lead toward one result or towerd another result. That,
too, I think leads into the question which was raised also by Professor
Wright.
MR. SARKAR: That contention is to be respected in regard to the
linguistic categories of India; I think it is wry substantial.
MR. POLEMAN: Perhaps you have misunderstooc me. I believe that some
of these cultures have sufficient strength themselves without any manipulation
to give rise to nations.
MR. WRIGHT: Isn't there - question of whetter you manipulate the
cultural environment or whether you manipulate huilan nature? Everybody
wants to have enough to eat. If you launch a new movement, as the Communists
do, based on elementary drives of the biological human being you can create
an acquisitive instinct easily. You can also maripulate the traditional
cultural patterns but I think there is a considerable difference in the
cultural pattern as opposed to human nature.
MODERATOR TALBOT: In India, there is danger that various cultural
groups will split apart unless there is a central control stronger than the
fragmental urges. The Government is now addressing the problem with an
overall educational program, an overall language Program, and, foremost
during this period, a very tight central political control. We need to
watch the comparative strengths of the centrifugal force, in regard to
language, for example, and of the centripetal teniency.
MR. PELZER: Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise the question, are these
tendencivpdcistektftradhatte'20112EWAkeediA-NilligiO-COMEMOMIOWPifir0 same
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tendencies in Germany today? Do we not know that such tendencies exist
in France, in Great Britain? I am just wondering what is the trend of the
conversation this morning.
MR. SARKAR: I just want you to know that the contention raised by
Mr. Poleman is very valid in regard to the linguistic categories of India.
Many of the problems that are likely to arise in India tomorrow will not
arise from political considerations. From administrative, economic and
financial angles the people are trying to unify the country as firmly as
possible. As a matter of fact, India is politically and administratively
more unified than Europe can possibly be in the next fifty years. But in
spite of that, the linguistic difficulties are very solid.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Some of us have been talking about this area without
ever having had to meet a payroll there. As a business executive?Mr. Barr
has been in a different position. I should like his reactions to several
of the points raised during this conference.
MR. BARR: I should like to preface anything I may say with the statement
that my experience has been solely. confinecito India, Burma, Ceylon and
Pakistan, and I cannot speak with any degree of knowledge of the other
countries of Southeast Asia.
For one thing, I must definitely align myself with the optimists: I
cannot see South Asia, and India in particular, going to "hell in a hand
basket". There is a lot in the country and a lot will come out of it, despite
the pessimistic views, many of which I can agree with, but I think they
have been overemphasized.
There is no doubt of Mr. Isaacst view that the West has lost consider-
able face since the war in the Orient, and more particularly in the area
which we have under consideration, but at the same time, while that may
be true of the masses, I do not think that the leaders of the country are
so blind or so ill-informed that they are really misjudging the position
in which the United States finds itself in that we appear to be speaking
with two voices, I think they realize that we are opposed in principle to
the colOnial system. I think they also realize that for other - and which
appear to be more important at the moment - reasons we have to give support
in another area to those same colonial powers, and I do not think that the
thinking man, the reasoning men, is prepared to deliberately misunderstand
that. He realizes, I think, as time goes on that we can make our position
a little less double-voiced.
During the course of the discussion several points have come up, and
while they were not of sufficient importance at the time to interrupt the
general trend I have tried to make some notes. They seemed to pose questions
and then they were left there. There have been no answers to the questions.
I think some of them could have been answered, and answered perhaps more
authoritatively, by some of our fad-.an gentlemen who are here who know the
country better than I do, blit n..i1i I would be glad to speak for them and
I think they will support me
I am sorry I was a little late this morning because I partially missed
Quincy Wright's comments on capital, so I may be confusing the issue again,
but I itibibisivedrFteanaplesse120420074244=000}30-00,24ABOltb0036b0603is capital
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in India and there is a lot Of capital. They alsc need outside capital.
The point is: Will it be forthcoming? Has it been forthcoming? Are the
terms attractive? I think they are.
I cannot give the figures accurately, but it IS within my knowledge
that since the war the Petroleum Industry hae put over $100 million into
Indonesia. That is not "puny" capital. The remark has been made that it
comas in "puny" amounts. That is a fairly sizable amount for one industry.
I also know that the industry has recently made a survey at the request of
the Government of India of the possibility of erecting one or two refineries
at a contemplated expenditure that runs to the bite of $75 million. I
don't say that it will be spent, but I can assure you that the discussions
with the Government of India were not along the 1:nes of placing obstructions
in the way. The capital negotiations have not advanced to the point where
it is a go-ahead proposition, but it was perfectly clear they had an open
mind in the matter and were prepared to accept pravate capital on terms
that were mutually agreeable.
So I think when we say that capital isn't trare or can't be made
available, again confining it to the countries with which I am familiar,
it is not precisely the case. Furthermore, there is a vast volume of
Indian capital which is at present idle. It is idle largely because
the capitalist is waiting, as he says, until the dust settles or he sees
which way the cat is going to jump.
The Indian capitalist is used to a very substantial return, and if he
can say that we as a nation have been speaking with two voices as regards
our political policy in the East, I think it reasonable to say that
various members of the Indian Government have spoken with a multitude of
voices. It is not uncommon to pick up an Indian paper and see that possibly
a person of ministerial rank will say something to the effect that "We
should nationalize all industry in five or ten years." The following day
the statement is immediately denied, again at ministerial level, and usually
it eventually devolves on either Patel or Nehru ta make a statement which
is the answer. I think Patelte most tecent statement, made in Madras in
March of this year, covers this point. I cannot quote it, but in substance
he said: "We have neither the time, the capital los the manpower to
naticnalize at this stage, nor do we propose to do so."
As regards other foreign capital, - not necessarily American - the
Swiss, the French are all making capital ventures in conjunction with
Indian capital on various industrial undertakings at the present time,
Factories are actually under construction. I dnn/t say they are large.
What are they doing themselves? Are they "pulling themselves up by
their bootstraps"? That expression has been used. I say, yes, most
emphatically they aret They have had some of the beat consulting steel
experts from this country advising them on their steel industry at
Jamshedpur. I presume it is common knowledge to you that the Jamshedpur
steel plant is the second largest in the British Empire. It produces one
million tons of steel per annum, and that capacity is to be doubled. That
does not indicate to ma the general tendencywhich has been expressed in
this meeting of "we are dealing with a backward peasantry." I admit that
there is a tremendous block of peasantry in which the standard of living,
health and educgionamust and will be raised but does that not follow as
a naturff re6WR-61qt8iiN'StstriVVIggai: c8 400-240961-144913 309 et 8u n try?
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The fissionary tendency has been brought up on the linguistic basis.
I agree it has great prominence, largely since compete irelecoedeece on
August 15, 1947, but I think it might better be expreseed, 1Te have no
'whipping boy', the British have gone, we have to have semething else
to pick on"; but I cannot for the life of me see that it is going to be
a real issue. I think of one practical illustration of it, The Indian
has a very,very sharp and beautiful sense of humor. The debate in the
Central Legislature at Delhi had attained some heat as to whether a certain
speech could be delivered in Bengali, one of the prominent languages, and
the diseuesion became somewhat more than acrimonious. I think the matter
was brought to a very satisfactory close by Dr John Mathai, presently
Finance Minister, rising to speak to the Assembly.. He spoke in beautiful
Maliyalam. No one knew what he was talking about and the whole house
burst into laughter.
I think everyone agrees it was a misfortune that Pakistan and the Union
of India ever divided, and all thinking nationals of both countrie8 agree
with that, I an sure, I predict they will be back together again, at
least econcmically, Ir. the last year they have rede.appreciable strides
in that direction, You sill not heal the scars ef the unfortunate incidents
of the Punjab immediately fel:ee.eg partition in the core of a few years;
they are too bitter, they are too deep - but I would remind you that it is
only in the last two decades that the expression "damn yarkee" has lost
its currency. It has taken 116 flfty years, and I have no doubt that in
one or two generations on the sub-ccntinent this bitterness will disappear.
They were economically strangled by the impeseible barriers which they set
up at the outset. It simply would not work, and both Governments had
to come to a realization of that. Mr. Piplani mentioned the other day
the joint conferences - the committees that meet every week, once in Delhi
and once in Karachi - trying to sort the issues. You can't have that
situation without future unification. If you have economic unity, the
political, having, been closely allied with the former for centuries, will
come along in time. I don't think many people will agree with MB on the
long-term view of Indo-Pakistan unity, but I will stick to it.
MR. SARKAR: Mr. Barr, you have presented a very good nationalist
point of view.
MR. BARR: The discussion has mentioned the Princely States. I. hope
everyone appreciates that they are disappearing at a peee abeolutely
beyond eonception. ? Theyare,-you might say, aImont nonezistent now.
They are being taken over by the Government under eeentral administration
and this will help the problem of education to disappear autbmatically.
This, contrary to the violent statements that the division of India meant
the Balkanization-of it (and this has not been the case ), has proved its
unification.
The question was raised: Will the industrialization of the country
fit its culture, its customs? I cannot see why not. I have in mind the
"Pujas" occurring in the fall of the Indian year. I am not sufficiently
versed in their religion as to the whys and wherefores of the ceremony,
but essentially it involves the harvest festival and the worship of the
tools with which you make your livelihood. We have a number of factories
in India engaged in the manufacture of various products, and in 1922 I
went tigi
pipavgi Pka Welg&ggiatukapit49t4AtilopTERA062gAbbAbdistbifgi.AU
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the machines, of American manufezture, were sultalAy saZfroned with the
various marks on them. The ceremocy went on normJe,e, and fit right in.
There is nothing difficult about this; they know how to handle these
matters.
MR. SARKAR: A good example for our anthropOeogists who want new
illustrations.
MR. BARR: The question of projects in India has been raised. They
make requests for their projects. They are not d, fined, I would point
to the Damodar Valley Project in Bihar Province wlach in size compares
with T.V.A. That is no idle dream; it is going teecugh. It involves ten
years' work and I hesitate to say the amount of mneye India is going
ahead with it. They would like some help in a monetary way - they may
get it; I think they will. I could go on with ielustrations.
I must say that there is a degree of unrealim in some of their
projects, but remember, it is a new country, only 18, 19 months old.
Give them a chance. We did not ettain our present position as a world
power without making some very stupid mistakes, and I think they have done
extremely well.
An illustration of how they can over-estimat their ideas, again in
the petroleum field: India has vast resources of secondary coal, and it
was suddenly announced that they proposed to erect a plant that would
turn out one million tons of synthetic gasoline, 7rem coal, anruay.
The fact of the matter is that the largest pian + ,n the Ure:_ted states
(not yet completed) will produce only one hundred ';houserti. ,Lrsi of
synthetic gasoline per annum and the cost of this plant ie fabelcee.
This shows a degree of impracticability, but it v .3 peoeeeeee he the
Indian Defense Department, who said: "We TM! Pt heer n inLuee rurce
of moter fuel," so Government decreed, "Th fs is .c Le way w( e' ll de it."
They will not try to erect it themselves. They E thc hest people they
could find - Koppers of Pittsburct - to go out PI, tell them what to do,
and Keppers are doing a pilot plant job for them ime BvL T say it is
illustrative. In their anxiety to get ahead and t:eomplish things they
sometimes over-reach themselves, and it is a natueal misteake that we all
make.
I think Professor Broek has made a point, that this area under study
should, perhaps, be divided, with India, Pakistan and Ceylon as one group.
I don't wanttoseeit divided, but force of circumstance appears to dictate
that this may be the way to consider the problem. I assure you that some
of the problems which appear to be more important in the other areas are
certainly not important in India. It is the comisg country.
I think that is all I have to sal'.
MR. WRIGHT: May I make a comment on one point? Iwas delighted at
Mr. Barrls optimistic view of capital going into India but to give a sense
of proportionality as to how much has to go in I recall in our Institute on
Technology and International Affairs last year thsre were some statistics
as to the amount of horsepower energy available per capita in various
countries in the world. Possibly the effectivenees of capital is illustrated
by its contribution to productive energy. I cermet give these figures
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exactly reil0 #18J/bo YdeFusikeitAftioii0000 argia
there is something less , an a norsepower per man United
States somet:c.i,ing like 20 or 30 horsepower; in other .words, you can think
of every American citizen driving 20 or 30 obedient horses to do his work
and every Indian driving perhaps half a horse, That gives some idea of
the unbalance between population and capital in India. So it is not a
question of putting $100 million into certain oil companies. It is a question
of hundreds of billions of dollars if you 'want to bring them up to anything
approaching what we have in the United States.
MODERATOR TALBOT: We will let our Economic Rapporteur cope with this
question when he gets to it. We have now reached the stage for summing
up.. During these days we have raised a good many questions, followed a
good many trails, and reached a very small number of conclusions. I have
a distinguished bank of specialists here on my right to make the necessary
integration.
First, Mr. EMbree.
XI
REPORTS OF THE RAPPORTEURS
1, CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Prof, John EMbree
Mr, Talbot tells me that the function of the rapporteut is to give a
meaningful synthesis to the proceedings. I am not sure that I will be
able to do that, I am not going to attempt to do it directly but indirectly.
I was a5ked to speak as an anthropologist about the cultural aspects and
implications of the discussions.
On Wednesday night, the night I arrived, after Mr. Parnivall's
opening lecture I was sitting, according to the American culture pattern
at conventions, having a drink and discussing what was going on with other
delegates. I mentioned to Dr. DuBois a paper by a graduate student of mine
at Yale on Southeast Asia studies. She asked me what it was about.
I replied that it concerned the role of the Plaza in the Philippine
community. Mr. Kingsley Davis, who was also present, remarked with some
scorn, "My God, cat's cradleslu
The following evening Miss DuBois gave her talk on "Cultural Facets
of South Asian Regionalism." She was speaking as an anthropologist. After
the meeting I talked with another anthropologist who said to me$ "Where
is the anthropology?"
There is some truth, I think, in the fact that anthropologists when
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when they get involved in meetings on internationcl relations are so scared
of being accused of dealing in "cat's cradles" that they sometimes feel
that they must talk only about international relations and sometimes skim
over the basic facts of culture or the important contributions that a study
of culture can make to such meetings.
Actually, it was Mr. Brook, the geographer, ',to brought up the only
reference to a traditional culture datum when he mentioned house types.
It wasn't until this morning, really, that we had two non-anthropologists,
Mr. Polaman and Mr. Barr, bring in important matters of culture.
In recent years anthropology has been concerred with a number of
interesting problems. One of these is the influeree of culture in persona-
lity development, a study of national character structure; another is the
problem of the processes and products of acculturation; still another is
the problem of cultural evolution. I think all of these researches have
some bearing on what has been going on here - more than has been indicated
in the previous discussions.
During the war a great deal of attention was paid to the character
structure of the Japanese and of the Germans. We wanted to know why
those people behaved the way they did during the ear. .I am not one who
thinks that you can always transfer a study of culturally conditioned
individual behavior to an analysis of national betavior, but still there
may well be some connection between the two, and I am sure that in
Sueeheast Asia some analysis of the national charecter structures of
Siamese, Vietnamese, of various types of Indians and Indonesians would be
of significance.
Acculturation, the study of culture contact, has been referred to
before. I think we need to investigate further tte processes by which
this acculturation goes on and devote a little more attention to an
analysis of cultural responses to culture contact. Here is where "The
role of the Plaza in the Phelippine community" would have some bearing
because the Plaza is a eentra eoint of culture centact between outside
influences and the people in rural Philippine comtunitees.
No one, I think, has defined eet;enee'sm at tis meeting. I am not
going to, but under that rubric there cee:eiee- ce often included one of
the products or several prcducts of e,c11: eeatien: the attempt of a
nation or of a culture, to reintegreee .e:f tete-establish cultural
unity in the face of disintegration reeul'eag from initial culture contact.
Certainly some of the phenomena of nationalism in Southeast Asia are of
this nature.
Cultural evolution assumes that cultures develop in certain directions
and are irreversible. Dr. Eggan mentioned that indirectly the other day.
There is a new interest in this subject. In the old days it was discarded
because it was too naive. Then it was assumed thee cultural evolution was
a simple one line development from "primitive to 19th century British.
That kind of naivete' in cultural studies is no lon2er in existence, and
there is instead an interest in the matter of how cultures develop in
diverse ways, what directions they take, whether tnere are any regular
patterns of cultural development which repeat them3elves. Attention
to suchwriqmpikriffitilautqhdlq&mal.qal 2Abolftkietadr.-9
dictions alTto wlikt is goiAg 'to happen-MY e neN ew genera lo s.
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I say generations because cultural anthropologists think in those terms
rather than in days or months or years. I think any attempts to reorganize
these societies from the outside or to try to mold them according to the
development of American society, are certainly doomed to failure because
that is not the nature of the cultural evolution in the area.
Some mention has been made from time to time of culture areas, but
only in passing. I should like to underline here the fact that there are
a number of very distinct culture areas in Southeast Asia and in South
Asia and that these have a definite political significance. The Islam-Hindu
differences have been mentioned and analyzed by Prof. Thorner. The cultural
differences between the Vietnamese and the Siamese are marked indeed in
Indochina, and at the same time there are cultural similarities between
the Siamese, the Cambodians and the Laotians. Taken together with the history
of these areas these facts of culture area are very important and point,
for example, to the likelihood of future conflict between Siam and
Vietnam concerning boundaries. Such conflicts will not simply be political,
they will have some of their origin in the very existence of these culture
areas.
In this connection I think it is significant that when Mr. Furnivall
discusses South Asia he discusses Burma, when Mr. Mandelbaum discusses
South Asia he discusses India, when I discuss the area I usually talk about
Indochina and Siam In other words, we usually stick to the regions we
know something about at firsthand, and having casual contact with the
other areas we know the other areas are different. There are in reality
tremendous cultural differences in the areas of Southeast Asia.
The possibility of having this cultural diversity at the same time
that an administrative and economic unity is developed has been mentioned.
I think an analysis of that is a constructive approach, but I think that
to have valid conclusions from such a study of haw that diversity can
exist within the framework of administrative and economic unity requires
more attention than has been given to the very hard facts of cultural
diversity.
It has been pointed out by Prof. Wright that the philosophy of life
of some of the peoples of South Asia is such as to lead them to have fewer
material wants than the people of Western nations, particularly the United
States. Mr. Isaacs leapt upon this particular statement as a kind of "let
'em eat cake" remark. I would like to refer to an analysis which has been
made by Stuart Chase in his book called Mexico in which he discusses some
differences between American society and Mexican society. In that book,
you may recall that Stuart Chase took two communities studied by social
scientists, one a Mexican community called Tenoztlan by Redfield, another
an American community called Middletown studied by the Lynds. In diaounsing
the differences between Mexican culture and American culture ha pointed out
what he called the "wantlessness" of the Mexican consumer and what a problem
that was to the American in dealing with the Mexican. Both peoples, of
course, like to eat; but they like to eat different things;they go about
expressing their wants in different ways. It is also possible to make
sacrifices, sacrifices of life, in order to maintain certain cultural aspects
of your life which you want to keep. In our own society we kill tens of
thousands of people every year in traffic accidents. That does not mean
that we don't care for human life but it does mean that taken collectively
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we prefer prefer an industrial life which includes the automobile at the expense
of those deaths.
The Mexican comparison to which I referred raises another point which
was underlined by Mr, Mandelbaum and a point which I think is extremely
important. That is the fact that we do not have ay good community studies
from South Asia, In other words, one of the diffiaaaties we have in
talking about culture areas or the ways of life of the people or national
character structure is that we don't have the dati. The study by Mr. Chase
could be made by an outside man coming in and utilizing studies by social
scientists in. Mexico and the United States. Theee is no comparable data
by which people can go in and draw valid conclusioas about Southeast Asia.
A possible exception would be the Covarrubias stud:, of the Balinese or some
of these special studies like the one on Adat law, but in general we know
very little indeed of a scientific nature about how the poeples of Southeast
Asia live their daily lives.
We do have some histories available. History
in all of the discussions but I think that the tree
and Siam is not an irrelevant fact in discussing t.
Asia, or the historic Siamese foreign policy of Oe
power off against another foreign Western power in
is carrying on that same policy today and S00:11,5 mo7
off one foreign, outside power against anchor than
constructive regional framework within Southeast A....
was pretty well ignored
litional enmity of Burma
e future of Southeast
_Ting one foreign Western
order to survive. She
e concerned with playing
with entering into any
ia,
Speaking of history, Prof. Wright made a passt
analogy between Southeast Asia today and Medieval r
points here which might be pursued by thoee interet
religion in the daily life of the Southeast Asiatit
in some ways to its role in Medieval Urope It it.
educational life, or was until recently. The agric
a preponderant group, cities being commercial trade
capitals; foot and wagon travel being the ordinary
there being a preponderance of illiteracy but at ti
for written material, for learning and for scholars
I don't think that the medieval analogy shoula
Dr. DuBois pointed out in her book Social Forces it
the term "feudal" cannot be used in Southeast Asia
used in reference to Europe. There is another cliff
impact of industrial changes is coming with great e
that social changes of a different type than those
in Europe will probably result.
ng reference to an
enrolee. There are some
ted. The role of
is certainly comparable
very important in the
ultural populatien is
centers and also cultural
way of getting about,
e same time great respect
be pushed too far.
Southeast Asia that
in the way it can be
erence, that the
peed in the area and
we might have expected
I would like to make a note or two about culture as such as a basis for
some other remarks.
Culture as the anthropologist looks at it, is something like soil or
climate or water. You cannot turn it into an "ise like nationalism or
regionalism. This suggests that in terms like nationalism and regionalism
we are thinking about a conscious determinism on tha part of people in the
country shaping these things, whereas culture is net something that is
ordinarily consciously shaped by the individuals whs carry it. On the
contrary, AztPnwejd EttiiiesistnIENPAN&V tigAaPPP410-29PSPW tIRGAEL6e9 the
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behavior of the individuals brought up in the particular culture, always
granting, of course, that you cannot have culture without individuals to
carry it, but culture also has a certain existence, a reality of its own.
Aneehee trait is that it is never static, so any treatment of culture as
being static or as being a museum piece is an unreal approach to it.
Cultural change is always going on, cultural diversity is always developing,
and on any main area such as most of South Asia acculturation is a constant
phenomenon, not something which happens now and not then. Culture also
has a vitality. I think that Mr. Barr emphasized that very well in regard
to India? Culture does not suffer the danger of dying off very readily.
When a social structure or a culture is subjected to rapid change
as the result of contact with another or as the result of various internal
forces, the old structure perhaps becoming too rigid for the new conditions,
there is always a reorganization, a reintegration of the society to fit
the new social needs. With the exception of very small communities like
some of the Polynesians which get swamped by culture contact, this reinte-
gration always takes place and as a rule fairly successfully. It may
take the form of a revolution. It may take the form of the kind of nationalism
you see in Siim todyy. It may take the form of new religious values being
emphasized to bring together new and old eletents of culture. Various
religious movements are often a reaction to strong cultural change.
Stress on national languages is one of the characteristics todgy in
Southeast Asia which is a result, I think, of some of these attempts to
reintegrate the society in the face of some of the difficult disintegrating
factors caused by culture contact. That raises this matter of language
which has been already mentioned several times. I think the emphasis
on national languages in Southeast Aela is very significant. Mr. Soedjatmoko
treated the Indonesian development in this regard, showed the way in which
first of all, the language itself could readjust to fit now needs, and,
secondly, how it apread out to serve the need of integrating Indonesia
as a whale with a single langeage. Tagalog is serving the same end in
the Philippines, Burmese in Burma. Language is not just a means of
communication, it is a national symbol. But ultimately, while these
national languages will servo the short-range function of unification,
in the longer range period it may provide a rather serious handicap to
unity in South Asia as a whole with this great variety of national languages
and with great emotional attitudes attached to the maintenance of these
national languages.
Another cultural point which was mentioned, but not very much, was
the whole matter of religion in the area. There is a tendency now to
regard any serious treatment of religious problems as Minor and to be
tossed off as simply the machinations of colonialists, but I think that
religion is still important and must be considered in the region. The
social importance of Buddhism in Burmese life, for example, is one of the
very important blocks toward the development of Moscow Communism in Burma.
The fact that the United States is a Christian country and backs Christians
certainly has its political significance in regard to Chiang Kai-shek or,
as the French feel with regard to Bao-Dai, whose wife is Catholic.. That
is on the negative side, perhaps. On the positive side there is what
Dr. DuBois referred to as the "inclusive" characteristic of religion in
South Asia. This is rather important because it does point up a rather
signifigant cultural difference between religious attitudes in South Asian
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countries and certain religious attitudes still ex_sting in Christian
countries. It makes possible perhaps an easier in'egration on that
particular level in South Asia, but we should remenber here that the
Philippines is Catholic and that the Philippines s-ands apart from
Southeast Asia in this regard.
Coming back now to national character structue, I think this is
relevant in discussing the matter of "bold new plans" for Asia. Bold
new plans, incidentally, sometimes remind me of Alclous Huxley's Brave
New World - I think we should watch our thinking on that.
The Vietnamese is an industrious individual and he has some of the
Westerner's attitude in regard to the virtue of wci:Jk as work and of labor
as labor and doing certain things over long perio&. Many Vietnamese
'Lave pursued higher studies and have become doctom, engineers, and so on.
There is little doubt that with an opportunity to work out industrialization
on their own they would certainly go ahead with it Indeed, Paul Mils, who
is a French person concerned both with culture and with administration,
proposed in 1945 that the best thing for France to do in Vietnam would be
to establish a series of atomic research laborator:es in Vietnam in
conjunction with the Vietnamese, using Vietnamese technicians and develop-
ing them industrially in that way. He was thinkilv of a culture on which
he was as well qualified as anyone to work. To us that might seem a
startling proposal To General de Gaulle it was sc startling that it
did not get to first base, but it was interesting that Mus made it and
I think that it had some validity and might have werked.
I don't think it would apply to Siam or Cambocia. The people of
Siamese culture are not nearly so concerned with wcrk as a virtue. They
have other attitudes toward life and many a bold ntw plan introduced from
the West has failed dismally in Siam and I think will again in the future.
There is a basic cultural difference right there wien it COMBS to bringing
in Western technology.
The matter of attitudes ices taken up by Mr. Laacs. I would certainly
suggest that everyone look at his NEWSWEEK article on the subject. A study
of attitudes is basic) but not just the attitudes cf these people as a whole
to the United States but also the attitudes of the Siamese in contrast to
the Vietnamese and in contrast to Hindus, etc. Th c attitude of each of
thsee groups is different toward us; it is also different toward each other.
National attitudes within the region have to be coraidered because these
national attitudes are to a degree cultural. Also the attitudes of peoples
toward their own governments and leaders are important. The reason Phibun
is in control in Siam is because many Siamese think he is a pretty good
person. The problem is why they think so.
I will skip over a few points here for lack of time. There is one
point, however, I would like to make. In this matter of cultural differences
and cultural unity there is the importance of the elite in the various
societies. Very little mention was made of that ax2ept to say, negatively,
that there seems to be no middle class in many of these countries. The elites,
the people you find in urban areas in the upper classes, are rather important
in this matter of cultural contact and cultural change in regard to outside
countries. It is through them very often that some of these important cul-
tural chav5ipprotokeFplasdeasit200210Z121bugiAtREIRKW92,6104/1/10011301106xple:
that many new things came into Siam. Today there has been a shift, the royal
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family is out and there is a new kind of elite coming in, an elite which
draws on people in other levels of society but which nevertheless remains
a small elite itself, These elites are important also because there is
a certain cultural convergence among them so that, whereas a peasant
in Vietnam and a peasant from Siam might have some difficulty with each
other, a member of the Vietnamese elite and a member of the Siamese elite
could probably talk the same cultural language a good deal better. Mr.
Soedmatmokois passing remark that the leaders in Southeast Asia could work
together is, I think, based partly on this cultural convergence of elites.
Some remarks in T. S. Eliot's new book, Notes Toward a Definition of Culture
are relevant here.
In coming to a final point I may remark that we here are not concerned
and should net be concerned with administration. We are not here as
administrators, we are not here as government planners; we are here to
analyze the problems involved. The planners are in Washington and Delhi
and Bangkok and London and wherever, busy doing their planning and their
administrating . That is not our job. Our job is to provide some analysis
of the problem so that they can plan a bit less in the dark.
That raises a final question and that is whether or not individuals
can consciously influence cultural change. An anthropologist like Kroeber
in his study of the rise and fall of cultures would indicate not. A
working political peporter like Mr. Isaacs would insist on an opposite
view, I am sure. I would submit to the group an intermediate alternative,
not intermediate, really, but off at another angle, and that is this
concept that you find in South Asia of Karma, the idea that an incalcu-
lable series of past acts determine future acts - the idea of the past
within the future. By this concept an individual cannot singlehanded
change the course of history. History is a result of a multitude of
collective acts. The individual should not feel frustrated because he
cannot turn the stream of history at a right angle, but his small present
effort, an effort also determined to a large extent by previous acts of
himself and his predecessors - i.e., his character structure, - helps
to keep the stream flowing, and this, perhaps, is what counts.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you, Mr. Embree.
Now, Mr. Thorner.
2. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Prof. Daniel Thorner
First, a word on the ground I shall attempt to cover in this brief
report. Our discussions showed rather broad agreement on the way in which
the older societies wore transformed under 14z)otern influence. No one denied
the resulting existence of formidable economic problems today. These
phases of the discussions are sketched - only in their barest outlines.
The question, what should be done about these problems, called forth
several seta of proposalF7-7ai the ease of each set, however, the further
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qaestion, what was likely to be done, (or what actially was being done),
received almost uniform:1,y the same answer, much_le3s than should or could
1..1 done. Li to explain it,
occupies the central part of my report. An apprai3a1 of the economic
discussion brings the statement to an end.
Transformation of Older Societies.
The economic problems of South Asia inthe middle of the 20th century
are the proauct, it was generally agreed, of the eetension of western
influence in the area. They are a legacy of imperialism, not so much of
the older mercantile expansion of the 16th to 18th centuries, as of the
more systematic economic opening up of the chief ceuntries by modern
steam transport (railways and steamship lines) rouehly since the middle
or latter half of the 19th century. This made poseible the extension
of commercial agriculture, facilitated the growth of industrial crops,
the extraction of minerals, and the import of western manufactured goods.
The economies of the colonial countries became suberdinate, dependent
parts of the metropolitan capitalistic economies of the ruling powers --
favorite spheres for the profitable investment of new capital, or rein-
vestment of profits from earlier operations. In tee process, the older
societies were drastically transformed. Formerly ehey had been self-suffi-
cient economies - "backward" economies - SOME notelecrthy for what may be
called "friendly backwardness." The economic Tt'ouncations of these older
societies were dissolved over the years, wibhout providing the foundations
for a new or modern type of life They lost their old world without gaining
a new one.
The present economic position of the peasantrz, throughout South Asia
is very black: stark poverty, heavy indebtedness, :oss of land resulting
in tenancy, and (particularly in India) a formidab:e growth of landless
laborers, a low level of nutrition leading to poor health, and low re-
sistance to disease.
Urbanization in the area has proceeded slowly. The cities have generally
served only as commercial centers. There is little industry. Even in
India, actual factory workers number only one percent of the total popula-
tion; and the strength of the Indian middle class should not be exaggerated.
Capital accumulation in the area is slow and tee prospects for rapid
industrialization on the basis of domestic economic strength were rated as
slight. Analysis of recent trade patterns offered little encouragement.
In a word, those countries which have gained independence or a new status
politically, have remained dependent economically. The population problem
attracted much attention. The growth of India's population in particular
was seen as likely to swallow up increases in food oroduction. Similarly,
the demand of India's multiplying millions for barast consumer goods night
divert attention from the underlying need to expand India's heavy industry
end prevent that development of heavy industry whico alone, in time, could
Lead to an adequate supply of consumer goods.
What should be done?
To meet these grave, depressing problems, seveeal sets of proposals were
put forward. The plan of campaign which attracted ;he most support called
for heroic, if not revolutionary, measures of a socialist sort. The peoples
of South Asia, it was said, had not a moment to wase in the fight for
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economic survival. Their position was likened to that of a man already up
to his neck in water and threatened by a rising tide. Rapid large scale
industrialization under public auspices and broad governmental control
was essential; presumably, it was to be carried through at the expense
of the peasantry. Yet agricultural development was stressed heavily, too.
It was to proceed parallel with the growth of industry as rapidly as
possible. In the agricultural field, stress was placed on sweeping agrarian
reform coupled with a series of techniques and measures designed to increase
crop yields per unit of land, without requiring expensive capital equipment.
To execute such a program, a strong-handed, perhaps ruthless, government,
in some views, appeared eesential. Along with industrialization would go
a broad campaign for birth control. In short, South Asians were called
upon to pull in their belts (Indians particularly to tighten their dhoties),
produce less children to play with at home, and expect repressive measures
if they resisted.
It is relevant to note that most supporters of this rather radical
program hoped to obtain from the U.S.A. part of the funds to finance it.
To this we shall revert later.
Throughout the discussion of industrialization the case of India
naturally received the lion's share of attention. Several speakers
observed that in its relatively large indigenous middle class, India
was quite different from Southeast Asia. In fact, the capitalistic elements
in India were stated to be the real power in that country. Under their
leadership, in the view of some, a capitalistic industrial revolution of
India along 19th century lines was under way. It was frankly stated that
the capital to nourish this process was likely to be equeezed out of
Indiafs underfed population in a fashion similar to the Hungry iForties
of early Victorian Britain.
In another view, both the wisdom and the actuality of such a course
of capitalistic-style revolution at the expense of the masses were doubted;
strong opposition was simultaneously expressed by this speaker towards
anything smacking of socialism. Instead, his emphasis was placed on the
need for the fostering of conditions necessary to provide local and foreign
enterprise with sufficient incentive for new industrial ventures. Hence,
unduly dramatic steps were to be avoided, while law and order, stability,
and gradualism were recommended; thereby, in time, the free international
flow of capital in 19th century style might start up again and could be
tapped for a fairly broad program of development.
As opposed to all three positions just stated, a fourth view was that
it was not easy to improve matters, that industrialization should be gradual,
that the main thing was the improvement of agriculture, and that the mere
technical improvement of agriculture was very difficult. Alongside this
sector of opinion were heard voices which frankly despaired of any progress
at all, while still another view was that none of the proposals put forward
was markedly ditferent from things advocated by enlightereel colonial regimes
a decade or so back. As contrasted to these counsels of despair, a voice
or two spoke up hopefully foe vast new sources of power, perhaps solar.
energy. One lone voice staunchly insisted that the way out was for the
countries of South Asia determinedly to shun industrialization, to block
the growth of a spirit of acquisitivenesc? and to cling to their traditional
cultures. As against this, the point was made that the people of the area
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did not desire to serve as a set of permanent museum pieces, living relics
of a long-forgotten age and society.
During the presentation of the various positiens, the merits of
diversification versus specialization in economic development were debated
inconclusively. On the other hand there seemed emirly general agreement
that the area as a whole did not present the features of an economic "region,"
however defined. Such foundation as existed in thc area for regionalism
had to be sought in spheres other than the economic.
What is being done and what is likely to be done? Ar.aciALIAL.L.g..are_sa_
between these and what ought to be done?
The chief reasons why so much less is expectec to be done than what
should be done lie at first sight in the realm of lolitics, particularly
the conflict between nationalism and colonialism. Here, thigh, we doubt-
less will remember that politics is the sphere where many kinds of issues,
including economic issues, are fought and decided. Colonialism, both as
a heritage and as a live fact, hangs like heavy thinder clouds over the
entire area, obscuring the future of Indochina, Indonesia, and, in a
somewhat different way, Naive. That remark proba,eLy could be expanded.
(Laughter) Little can be expected of the latter co ntries without a prior
satisfactory settlement of the colonial ieeee Inclaa Pakistan, and Burma
are plagued by internal eiseues per-C.7 traceaLle to social and ethnic
differeaces, differences compounded and in pelt ecete because of the way
in which they were inflamed during the per:od of ieperial political
hegemony.
Outstanding in the current scene is the spectacle of both India and
Pakistan spending at least half of their current budgets on military
preparations, apparently each against the other. Juch national jealousies
in the area, in part manipulated by vested interesas, severatrhamper econo-
mic plane and activity, In referring to this in tee course of the discussion,
the ominous-sounding suggestion was made that perhaps an externally created
"co-prosperity sphere" or economic Grossrateil wee needed for economic, effici-
ency.
Turning to more strictly economic reasons for the disturbing gap between
necessity and actuality, one speaker remarked that the task being set for
these countries might be beyond the strength of any government that had over
existed or was likely ever to exist in the area. ..Lf India, for example,
starting from its present position, were to try to do what the Soviet Union
had done, it would pass through the greatest ordeal ever faced by a nation.
In a word, there was no royal road to industrialization. If the most rapid
economic progress was the goal, several speakers oeserved, then teenmunism
seemed to promise the most and bid fair to take over the area.
To the regret of many, the United States appeared to sit up and take
notice only when communism was the question. Ardeat appeals from the area
for help from the United States in meeting pressing economic problems seemed
to be judged largely in such a context; decisions in the past and probably
decisions in the future were.affected by.the.fact that the area as a whole
is not termed "vital" to United States (21litg3r) 3ecurity and that the
chief country in the region, India, is not considered by the State Department
a "sensitive" zone in the cold war. Whatever the possibilities may be for
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the area from the U.S, Government or Government-influenced agencies, and
other bodies on their periphery, I might add, do not seem likely in the
immediate future.
The attitude of U.S. private investors is still less favorable.
Historically, they have been interested in investment in Asia in terms of
individual projects, say for mineral or petroleum extraction or for assembly
abroad of goods manufactured in America. There is not much common ground
between them and foreign governments seeking aid for heavy industry, especially
if that industry is to be more or less under governmental control or super-
vision. The unsympathetic attitude of American spokesmen for American
investors was shown by their cool reception to Nehru's statement in January
1949 that foreign firms would be permitted to operate and invest in India
on a plane equal to that of indigenous firms. The magnitude of Nehru's
concession, when considered in the light of the debate some years ago over
the Government of India Act of 1935, in which one of the largest groups
of clauses was the protection of British firms against discrimination by
any Indian Government, should not be underestimated. In the eyes of some
American bankers, however, India by this statement of Nehru's was simply
trying to make little of the fact that considerable powers had already
been established, or were about to be established, over the operations
of indigenous Indian as well as foreign firms. For their part the Indians
took this as indicating that the United States was in the fantastic position
of trying to get better conditions in India for American houses than Indian
houses themselves had. In short, to conclude this brief sketch of the
economic phase of the proceedings, it would appear as though these countries
for some time to COMB mould have to promote their own economic development
primarily from their own resources, a prospect which, as we have seen earlier,
does not at first sight seem very. promising.
Appraisal.
Reflection upon the position of the United States as brought out in our
proceedings indicates several angles from which that analysis perhaps may
be supplemented. The extent of United States! commitments in Western
Europe under the Marshall Plan and related developments appears to have been
brought out insufficiently. Further, in view of our discussions about the
difficulties of industrialization, it is of significance that Western Europe,
the area which is the subject of the keenest dispute between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R,, happens to be one of the most industrialiZed parts of the
world. From this angle at least, neither power turns out to be so foolish
as it is sometimes said to be. The United States, as has been widely
observed, is now virtually the sole strong supporter for capitalistic or
partly capitalistic economies; does the United States have the economic
strength to take on simultaneously the problems of the South Asian world
and other underdeveloped regions? In this connection, is it not expected
that at the "end" of the Marshall Plan in 1952, the countries of Western
Europe will again have rather serious problems in securing adequate supplies
of dollar exchange?
Perhaps these considerations help to explain the comparative reluctance
'of large American private investors and governmental agencies to extend
capital to Southern Asia. So far as the Point Four program is concerned,
one warning may be recorded about recent demand S for state underwriting of
Point Four loans against risk by private investors. There is nothing new
about such loans in South Asia. The Indian railways, Asia's largest system,
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were founded under ruch risk- free debentere3 a ceneury ago, in 1849. Once
the Government of India erlarenteed those debenture., incentive to economy
was lost and both will eeeteavae;aleee end ehic(jcf.7 coneteuction occurred. For
the cntare second haLf of 4he 194h century preectielly no dividends were
earned by any ef 'hene lines, with one emle)rtant e.eeption. The state
therefore had to put up the money to enable the railways to pay five per
cent dividends; the losses on this score peoved a ::rippling burden on
India's finances. It would be folly indeed for th United States to tread
the same path a century later.
Review of the discussion about the capital needs of the South Asian
countries indicates much vagueness, almost casualness, about their plans
for economic development. It would almost appear as though a few ounces
of fresh data rigorously analyzed were worth tone )f 19th century Royal
Commission Reports and 20th century, all-embracing brochures on planning.
The fact is that there is no census of industrial capital in India, no
solid, up-to-date study of national income, and onLy the vaguest estimate
of capital formation. Haw then does India know whether it needs the $90
billion of capital over a 15-year period as estimated under the Bombay
Plan of 1944, or the billion for a 34 to 5-yea: period as mentioned here
the other day? Certainly there is no really comprehensiVe overall plan
for India, on the basis of which the pattern or tiAing of industrial
development is to be guided. Such overall plennine as did exist in India
has now Riven way to a disco-ordinated series of seecific projects sponsored
by influential groups who find it difficult to obtein capital goods or
technical kncw-how in their own immediate industry or business. There has
been no thorough searching analysis of the extent eo which domestic resources
can be tapped for raising the necessary capital, and it may be that there is
something to be said for the view expressed here in the last few days that
domestic mobilization would yield in time results of rather surprising
dimensions. If this is the statistical picture for India, what must be the
case for the rest of South Asia, particularly if 11, put Indonesia aside in
a category of its own, not necessarily higher than India?
These remarks about the deficiencies of our s7Atistica1 data for the
whole region - involving as they do rather serious consequences for our
capacity to measure its needs and requirements - could be protracted greatly.
I have no intention of doing so. My purpose in raising the subject was not
to suggest that before forming any useful :tudgments about the area we needed
all the data suitable for the most refined studies of the National Bureau of
Economic Research. I did wish to indicate that our knowledge of the area is
quite uneven, and that in some sectors of high importance for our discussions
we are virtually without any solid data whatsoever, Relatively speaking,
the area has not been important to the United States, and only a limited
number of Americans have studied the area serious17.
Seen in this context, it is scarcely surprising that our initial
discussions of economic affairs, particularly on Thursday, seemed somewhat
unsure. Had we been more precise than we were, we would probably have been
running ahead of our data. Among its valuable serrices the 1949 Harris
Institute has revealed to us more clearly than before that our economic
knowledge of the area requires strengthening.
To sem up in a few words. Economic analysis of Southern Asia has
shown thhp.0848446FIRtfeRVIVH/MN1u.g61*-M9P/000420M6i4060SeeDegic change,
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perhaps the the most thorough-going change in its history. The indications are
that a time of troubles is ahead. That should not necessarily incline us
toward long-term pessimism. The character) the pattern, and the outcome
of these changes are uncertain, and carry us over into the realm of politics,
which is the subject of the final report.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Thank you, Nr. Thorner.
And finally, Mr. Holland.
3. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
William L. Holland
Mr. Chairman, partly because the time is getting on and partly because
I am supposed to be an economist by training, I find my position of being
involved in the political aspects of this discussion a little easier than
it might have been. In the true sense, the word "politics" as we should
here understand it, really involves the sum total of all the factors
that come to bear on the decisions made by the leaders of nations, and they
certainly affect therefore the cultural and economic aspects that have been
discussed. For that reason I am arbitrarily going to confine myself to
what you might call the "dregs" of those aspects. That in fact means that
I will be dealing largely with certain aspects of internal administrative
and governmental problems on the one side and then with some of the more
noteworthy aspects of international conflicts or communities of interest
which have been brought out in the discussions, and finally a few words
on some of the more specific political implications of these factors for
American policy and for the foreign policies of other nations outside
Southern Asia.
Running throughout our discussions on the political or economic level
has been the unresolved question of, first of all, whether we are dealing
with one or two regions, or even whether if broken down into two you have
really general agreement on the validity of the regional concept. That
has been discussed from various points of view. There are a number of
theoretical and logical doubts which have been expressed about the validity
of the concept either for South Asia or for Southeast Asia. One of the
obvious points is of course that the disparity in power between India on
the one side and Southeast Asia on the other is so great as to raise
some doubt as to the notion of a "region" even in political terms.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that both parts of the region, India
on the one side and Southeast Asia on the other, do not look merely within
their own boundaries for the major solution of their problems. Both of them
look outside: India, because she regards herself increasingly as a world
power and because in any case she has to look to the West, to the countries
which have their affinities with the Middle East; and Southeast Asia, certain
parts of it at least, because the historic ties have been until very recently
with the Western World, and in the case of the Philippines that still remains
true in a notable degree.
It is further to be noted that, despite these theoretical and logical
doubts AVASAFF6PhiefialecAOVV7Pie.itiA]RbPantiNgAbtlileo0br3Stic2?3 events
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have certainly certainly inereased the evideece thee there is the consciousness of
regional identity. As Mr. Isaacs pointed out, that was perhaps first
symbolized in the calling of the Asian Relations Cenference in 1947, and
then further intensified by the holding of the Delti Conference on the
Indonesian issue. But there I think it should be neted that the initiative
in both cases came, not from the region as a whole or even from a group
of the main countries there, but almost entirely frem India, and that an
Important aspect el the Delhi Confereneewas the fact that it was extended
beyond the region to include Australia and New Zealand and that perhaps
contributed a good deal to its international significance.
I pass now to a brief review of the more impor
factors. We have heard a good deal already of the
exist within the countries of Southeast Asia, and t
in the political sphere. I need not take the time
Perhaps as illustrations we might point to the fact
areae there has been up until recently an acute cor
off of external Western political control, the act&
differed markedly between the different countries,
a totally different political climate in such count
on the one side and India and Pakistan on the other
in which their aspirations toward their independenc
by the former governing power and the less progrest
way in which those same tendencies have been treatc
in the case of Indonesia and Indochina. Moreover,
accident, as Mr. EMbree has noted, Siam having beer
manifested its nationalism in quite the sane forma
and that has a very real bearing on the nature of t
development there.
tant internal political
numerous differences which
hat of course is true
to detail them all here.
that, though in all
cern with the throwing
al methods adopted have
and therefore you have
ries as the Philippines
because of the way
e have been handled
lye and statesmanlike
,d by Holland and France
because of historical
- independent has not
as the other countries,
he internal political
I now turn to see what principal common elemeits exist within the
internal political situations in the countries we ere considering. I would
suggest that in all there is, even on the politica: level as distinct from
the economic aspects, a noteworthy preoccupation weth socialism as a general
political doctrine, however it may be defined in practice, and with
nationalism, involving, as I have said already, a considerable concern with
the elimination of either actual or recent vestigeo of external forms of
control, whether those are explicit in the form of actual sovereignty or
indirect in the sense that a country like Siam feeez itself to he to some
extent under pressure from other nations, as, for Instance, Great Britain
in recent years.
Second, in all of these areas - I regard this as a central problem -
there are serious administrative deficiencies, whieh means that the tech-
nical level of governmental administration constitutes a very serious problem,
all the more so because the problems that have to he grappled with by the
new administrators are so acute and the margin in which mistakes can be made
is suc4 a very narrow one.
That leads us to the next common element. In all these areas there is
appreciable danger of undemocratic trends, partly lecause in some cases the
tradition of democracy, at least in the Western seise, was never deeply
rooted, and even where it has been implanted, as ii India, Pakistan and the
Philippines, it is too early to say that it has taeen deep and healthy
roots. But throughout, the lack of parliamentary tradition and the weaknesses
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of the educational system mean that the ,,anirations toward political democracy
are in danger alwaye of being subverted. That danger is probably most seriou
in a country like Siam, and perhaps in Burma, less serious for the moment
in areas like the Philippines, India and Pakistan, though we have all seen
some of the rather serious tendencies in these countries which may offset
the trend toward democracy.
A tendency in all these areas is for the real control of power to
gravitate into the hands of rather tough party or military factions. That
is perhaps all the more important because in a number of areas those
factions for the moment hide behind more liberalpor more lenient, political
leaders. The most noteworthy example of that is in India today in the
contrast between the personalities of a man like Nehru and his rather tough
henchman Patel. -
Throughout the area I think a significant ,political problem also arises
from the existence of minority problems, some of them being aggravated by
the fact that the minorities are alien groups and not merely internal
minorities. As we see in Burma, the fact of even internal minorities con-
stitutes a very real problem, and we have had discussion on the significance
of linguistic and regional minority groups in India.
Next I would stress, although it has been mentioned in the economic
sense already, the absence or very great weakness of a strong middle class
or of a modern business class, coMplicate?y the fact, as we have already.
noted, that the middle class in many parts of Southeast Asia has been
alien, either Indian or Chinese. A notable exception perhaps is India,
where there is much more of a middle class and where consequently there is
already in evidence a decided conservative trend, not merely, I suspect;
in the economic sphere but in certain aspects of politics as well.
Next it might be noted that all areas here are affected in considerable
degree by Communist movements, though those movements are of varying strength.
The Communist movement has very strong internal roots, largely, based on the
fact that it has been able to exploit not only traditional social and
economic evils but has been able to link them up to the problem of external
colonial control, and furthermore to play upon the rivalries on the world
scene between Russia and the other Western Powers. It is noteworthy there-
fore that Communism has shrewdly expiklated the nationalist appeal, even, as
Mr. Isaacs pointed out yesterday, to the absurd extremes of appearing at times
to favor nationalism and nationalist independent movements at the expense
of what might seem to have been rather desirable co-operative regional
movements, even on the economic level. It is significant, since we often
tend to make the mistake of assuming that Communism is a uniform phenomenon
which operates the same everywhere, that there are appreciable variations
in the South Asian communist movements. As Milton Sacks brought out,
in the Indochinese movement it leads a coalition. In India for various reasons
the Indian Communist movement has had to go through certain devious phases,
some of which were undoubtedly forced by developments on the Indian political
scene.
Throughout the region, despite the aspirations towards democracy and
despite the genuine efforts of countries like Pakistan and the Philippines
and India to adopt the orthodox parliamentary forms of government, actual
leadership remains in the hands of very small minorities. On the other hand
it shoud Povnecatfgr Mataek0A31f4 %IVADITib-Ea9aife*obadbotx-8m the
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point of view of the outside world are the only groeps that probably can
be dealt .with by foreign governments. The minorities, though small* are
in fact able to mobilize considerable emotional and other support from the
mass of the people. The obverse of that and the dangerous aspect of it
is of course the risk that these small minorities can rather easily move
in the direction of the establishment of oligarchies or personal dictator-
ships and police states.
That is a real danger because there exists in, all these countries
what might be called, as it was in China, the fact of an uncompleted social
revolution. Nowhere in this area can it be said that even the mildly
socialist and nationalist governments which have come into control or are
aspiring to control have worked out far-reaching plans for dealing with some
of the survivals of medieval or feudal or at least pre-capitalist social
and econqmic institutions which certainly determine a great deal of the
political climate of the country. That is obviously true in such matters
as the failure to enforce drastic land reforms, or to curb the important
political influence exerted by money-lending and rerchant groups. That
failure has its implications in that it provides tYea Commeniets or other
extremist leadees with a very convenient rallying cry Even though a
Communist movement itself could not perhaps put forward. any ire:7 effective
positive program of its own for dealing with these tntraotable economic
problems, it has a very effective politbal weapon in simply calling for
the overthrow of these Obvious and age-old evile, eed, as the example was
cited, you don't have to work out a new, a perfect ystem of agricultural
credit; it is sufficient to call upon the peasant t to Stop paying rent to
the existing landlords.
That is perhaps best summarized in a statement which was made that
throughout the area the mass of the people, though often described as inert,
unorganized, are nevertheless in a prooess of chanvel confused change but
very real change, and that the one thing they are cure about is that they
want some kind of a change, almost any ;i:L,rge, In that sense, to talk of
restoring something of the old stabillily Gf to,.=; prewar system is unreal
because nertain vital elements in the 0J .i. ytem hve gone forever. Certainly
those vital elements depended directly on the fact of foreign control or
of foreign economic partjcipation, and for the mese part those have broken
down or disappeared. In that sense the djinn is oet of the bottle. To
make an outrageous pun, one of the ironies is that the Dutch, who aught to
know most abcut gin, are least willing to recognize the fact and persist
in the futile attempt to put the djinn back into the bottle.
Finally, I would allude to what was briefly nentioned but which I think
to be a matter of great significance. That is the present, and even more the
future, role of the military in these areas, all the more because through-
out the area one of the significant political facts has been the wide and
uncontrolled distribution of arms into the hands o.7 the people and the fact
that even among the so-called armies of the area the military organization
is so loose that it has proved very easy, whether :Ln Burma or Indonesia*
for small armed groups to break off, to constitute a serious threat to
security and political stability, even against the wishes of the nationalist
leaders. However much we may discount the charges of the Dutch about the
irresponsibility of the Indonesian leadership the Tact remains, as we have
seen in Berme or in the Huk movement of the Philipeines, that the existence
of arms Al1311fteciffirletelenetigtfirst24artibfb-RDES80300926A340140463(renneganization
constitutes a serious political problem.
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In the few remaining moments I want sinply to sketch very briefly certain
of the international aspects of the political side of our discussions. First,
I would stress the fact of the disparity between the power of Southeast Asia
as a whole) on the one side the nations of Southeast Asia, and to some extent
India and Pakistan on the other. While it was not discussed at length here,
it is worth noting that in the minds of a good many of the peoples of Southeast
Asia this gives rise to certain anxieties which can be crudely expressed as
the tear of a certain type of Indian expansionism or even imperialism, the
risk of that being all the greater because India has in Malaya and Burma
colonieaef its own nationals who might conceivably provide an excuse for
intervention.
Notably it was mentioned that, though there has been a change in
administration in China, the Chinese Communists have already expressed
concern for their groups overseas That is most significant in the case
of Malaya where almest all the leadership of the Communist insurrection
there has been Chinese.
It was noted also that in terms of power structure, if UT are trying
to think of this area as a region, it is very difficult to envisage it as
an effective functioning area unless we bring into consideration such
outside areas as Australia as one of the so-called strategic "pivot" areas,
and possibly even Japan, looking ahead and thinking of power in terms not
merely of military power but a complex' of industrial and commercial power.
The question has been raised of who could "impose" regionalism in view
of the great strength of nationalist sentiment here? That constitutes one
of the very serious problems and is at the back of the notion which has
already been expressed by Mr. Thorner on the economic side, namely the
perhaps inevitable tendency toward some kind of system in which a great
degree of Indian predominance or leadership would have to be recognized.
The only alternative would be some new type of regional organization in
which with the guarantee of the outside powers there would be a sort of
treaty of neutrality) in other words, an attempt to hold the ring and
prevent Southeast Asia from becoming an arena for international rivalries.
That in turn would require a much greater degree of self-control and
statesmanship than most of the outside powers have been willing to show so
far. In fact the real danger is rather the reverse, as was noted this
morning; that the great outside powers, particularly the United States
and Britain and Russia, because of their ability to give economic aid might
couple that aid with political demands in the attempt to fight the cold
war and extend the battle over Russian Communist influence into that part
of the world.
I suggest that this concept of international co-operation for a
guarantee of the neutrality or the protection of the area from external
aggression is something that deserves more attention than we were able to
give it here. In that connection we must note that American policy today
is dauble-faced. It is full of serious contradictions because of its appa-
rent decision to give priority to the strengthening of Western Europe, and
that has in turn led to a decided reluctance to go ahead with any immediate
plans for a Pacific pact, despite the effort of the Australians to push that
idea. We saw from General Romulois remarks how the United States has lost
in Asia much of the good will it had at the end of the war, how any attempts
which it might make now to propose regional schemes involving direct American
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political and military support would in fact be suspect and rendered difficult
because of that very fact. I would suggest, howevtr, that we tended in some
of those discussions to overlook the fact that power does continue to exist
in this part of the world. It cannot be wished out of existence and this
part of the world may become an arena for conflict of world power systems.
The important thing, I assume, is to devise means for canalizing those
power spite= so that they will not meet in head-or collision in this part
of the world.
That leads then to *ome of the implieation* of our discussions for the
United States and other nations. The remark which was made most generally
and which seemed to command a great deal of support was that foreign
policies which are merely based on anti-Cemmunism and the desire to check
either Asiatic Communist expansion or the expansior of Russian power in Asia,
will not be sufficient. On the contrary, policies based on that idea will
rather tend to polarize the political situation in this part of the world
and weaken the all-important non-Communist leftist but middle groups, One
might therefore conclude that if we were trying to come forward with an
exhortation it would be that the United States and the other principal
Western Powers aught to give much more attention to the support of the
non-Communist leftist groups in South Asia, and that of course means that
it is dangerous for us to be too obsessed with the mere preservation of
stability, recognizing the need for this in certain respects. A measure
of upheaval in this kind of situation is perhaps inevitable and one might
even say that it is even necessary and desirable. 4hether you can have
such a thing as "controlled upheaval" I dont know eut it is something
which perhaps needs to be kept in mind.
Finally, since we have been concentrating so much on a partioular area
here, I think we must conclude with a slightly chilling thought that by all
the current evidence this part of the world for the moment is not one of the
top priorities in United States overall Far Eastern policy. It may become
much more important, but for the present it does not rate with Western
Europe or even, let us say, with the Middle East in United States overall
strategic concerns. That fact has a very real bearing on the urgency of
American Far Eastern policy-planning.
Quite naturally here we tend to think simply of Southern Asia and the
United States, and that relationship certainly is ilportant. On the other
hand we must remember that there are other important parts of the world
which can influence Southern Asia and the most netaele of those, I suppose,
is still the British Commonwealth. I conclude by simply noting the fact
that here is one case where as a result of the receet decision of India
to remain even symbolically withintee Commonwealth tee international situation
in Southeast Asia remains therefore one in which oteer Western powers can
still be of considerable influence and can in decidedly influence
American policy. Finally, I would note that the one functioning regional
organization with some degree of executive power hae been one within the
British Commonwealth system, namely, the very small but quite important
3outheast Asia organization set up under Lord Killeern and Mr. Malcolm
Kacdonald.
MODERATOR TALBOT : Thank you, Mr. Holland.
We a/413itsgmdIer0laPI9Nalli91qraW4i aiRF22-(19M6WAir ?ainnrining to
eatch early planes; nevertheless, I want to give an opportunity for a word
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to Mr. Purnivall who has come halfway around the world from a place where
his services were very much in demand in order to meet and talk with us
about the problems of this whole area. We greatly valve his contributions
to the conference. Mr. Furnivall.
MR. FURNIVALL: Really, I feel there is nothing left for me to say.
Right from the beginning of this conference I have looked forward, and I
am sure that everyone who has heard Mr. Holland do this kind of thing before
has also been looking forward, to the admirable comprehensive summary and sur-
vey that we have just been lio ;:ltng to. I don't know how he does it. I
have heard him before and he 1C, ,H ?L miracle every time. Whenever I have
felt at all bewildered wondc-h, whether there was more diversity than unity,
not only in South Asia but around the table here, I felt, "it will all come
right in the end, Mr. Holland will tell me just what I think and feel."
On this occasion he had the advantage of the preliminary summaries; but it
was he who wove everything together, and once again I am tremendously
impressedl
One or two points have occurred to me that it might be worthwhile
spending just a few minutes on. There is one point about the dangers of
overpopulation that has not received a great deal of attention, I remember
the Dutch once asked meto talk in Java and I suggested that in Burma
economic environment determined population. It gave them a shock. They
thought that population was the great danger and that population determines
the economic environment. Personally, I am not a bit afraid of having more
babies, but I am afraid of not providing them with a world in which they can
live as useful citizens.
We have had references to the Indian native states; some suggested they
were better and some suggested they were worse than the provincea under
British rule. I think there is no doubt that in certain of the native states,
various statistical analyses of public health and so on, show that in many
ways they were ahead of even the best administered British provinces, and
many of the British provinces were miles ahead of the worst native states.
But in many native states there was a great deal done that the British Govern-
ment could not do.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Particularly in public health, you might say.
MR. FURNIVALL: That is a suggestion. I am not quite certain of the
figures but my very strong impression is that the British Government spent
a good deal more money on welfare activities than the most progressive Indian
states. It occurred to me two or three times in the course of these dis-
cussions, and it has often occ-,A. to me on other occasions, that people
are apt to think that it is suf2icient to spend money on welfare services
to insure that welfare is promoted. It is much easier to spend money than
to spend it wisely, and the example of the Indian states I think suggests
that nationalism may help us to spend less money more effectively. That is
only one argument that I would put forward in favor of nationalism. We have
had the argument for nationalism also put forward on the ground of self-
respect.
There is anOther point that I have not noticed brought out so clearly
as I think one should bring :it out, that in the past nationalism has been
very AtwolveidiFwmeleaise hetturtelopEcuolujirAtmoryggyAmd.e6sdayd__]ay though it
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has now in Europe become a dividing force rather than a uniting force. Right
at the beginning of the conference I suggested the danger of thinking that
these people ought to want what we want. We are els? indanger of thinking
that what is right for us is right for them; and Lla this case almost for
the very reasons that nationalism is to be depreceted in Europe and the West,
for those same reasons it is to be encouraged in the East in the present
stage as a force for internal reintegration.
Then another point that I think deserves rater more attention than
it has received is in connection with democracy. There seems to have been
a tendency to identify Western democratic institutions with democracy without
asking whether the forms of Western democratic institutions are the only
forms compatible with democracy. I expect that mcst of you have read
Graham Wallas and you will remember how he distinelishee the functions of
representative institutions; they are organs of knowledge for representing
the wishes of all the people, and for helping to escertain the facts; they
are also organs of thought for deliberating what te do by general discussion
in the same way as we have been discussing probleme around this table; and
thirdly, they are organs of will. In the West these three functions are all
performed by the sane institution. I would like tp suggest that it is not
essentia] to democracy that the same institution should perform all those
functions. We can expound democratic principles and explain our institutions,
but should leave the people themselves to devise aepropriate democratic
institutions in accordance with the fundamental principles of democracy but
adapted to the circumstances of their country.
Then again there is also the further danger teat nationalism is apt to
develop narrowness. I thought it was quite a good suggestion (I have forgotten
who put it forward) that each country should have 1 ministry of South Asian
Affairs. It is perhaps rather cynical and not entirely true to say that any
neweministry means little more than a new secretare, a new department, new
parliamentary secretaries and other additional expenditure, so that merely
to create a new ministry is perhaps rather dangerees. But something along
those lines would enable leaders from different coentries to meet more often
and to conduct a mutual discussion of their problees. I have already suggested
that one of the advantages of a conference like thA is that we can examine
delicate problems in an atmosphere of dispassionate3 academic interest, but
if there had been representatives of the various sates around this table the
proceedings might not have been quite so dispassionate. I dare say there
might be a little heat generated, quite apart from the climate, in any
meeting of this kind in Southeast Asia; but such meetings would tend to en-
courage the people to take wider and longer views ef their local problems.
Again it has been suggested that they have no commen interest because they
are all complemental to the outside world. That ie one reason why they have
common interests, they are all in much the same poeition with regard to the
outside world. And all of the fundamental problem e of getting the different
racial and other sections together into one nation are much the same and their
history and physical and cultural origins are fundementally the same. Their
present situation is the same and their problems aee essentially the same, and
I am quite convinced that they can solve those prollems very much better
by getting together then they ever can hope to do elone.
There is one other point on which personally feel it incumbent on me
to say sclia/Aladd Fizir Mrefte, 2i1M2/07/24e: CiADREMPAN00926Aaotik100.03P086?4
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Mr. Soedjatmoko probably has come a little bit farther. But the distance
that I have come and also my age entitle me perhaps to speak for my c olleagues.
I myself do wish to express personally my very warm appreciation of all that
has been done for us here, and I am sure that everyone will join me in that.
I must thank Dr. Quincy Wright in the first place, not merely as Chairman
of the Harris Foundation but for so kindly presiding at the opening lecture,
and also for the weighty common-sense contributions he has made to our
discussions. Then there is Mr. Hoselitz, too, he is another person to whom
I am sure we are all infinitely indebted; and of course to Mr. Talbot not
only for helping to do so much to arrange the conference but for the hospi-
tality that he has given so freely. I greatly enjoyed his hospitality. I
think that I can ask you all to join with me in thanking all the members
of the Institute for their hospitality and for the opportunity of taking
part, the great privilege of taking part in these discussions.
... Applause ...
MODERATOR TALBOT: I think I should say, Mr. Furnivall, that many
persons here at the University of Chicago have expressed their appreciation
of this conference and of the contributions made by Miss DuBois and
yourself in the public lectures. Members of the University community have
also been glad to become acquainted with the Institute participants. The
extent of our debt to you is very considerable and we are most grateful
and most pleased to have had you with us.
MR. WRIGHT: I want to add to what Mr. Talbot said that we have had
the experience of twenty-five of these Institutes and I don't think there
has been any one where there has been more discussion on really fundamental
problems. 'believe this conference, due to the presence here of experts
from distant parts, is going to be of great importance in directing the
scholarly opinion in this country to the importance of this area.
MR. SAMAR: From the viewpoint of Asia I should like to offer a word
of appreciation. I happened to be in the U.S. as a traveler in American
towns and villages and suddenly I found myself invited by Friend Talbot
as a guest to this Conference. I am so happy to be in this company and the
only word that I will be sending to my countrymen is to the effect that
America has been advancing tremendously in the matter of amassing knowledge
and building up experts about the different regions of Asia. This is tanta-
mount almost to a revolution of the American mind when I compare it to the
situation in 1914-1920 during my two visits of those days over here. I
thank you for all the opportunities that I have been presented with.
MODERATOR TALBOT: Iam delighted that Professor Sarkar has that impress-
ion. I must say that at the conclusion of this Harris Institute I am left
with an impression of how much we don't know, how far we have yet to go in
this field. As has been said repeatedly, South Asia is not a field of high
priority for the United States. How fortunate that is for us, because com-
pared with American knowledge of the other parts of the world we obviously
are just beginning to know South Asia.
MR. SARKAR: That is an expression that calls for the very high standards
which Americans use in everyday life.
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MODERATOR TALBOT: I do hope very s eriously that what has gone on here
will help stimulate thought on further projects tad further lines of study
of this area, and that if we were to gather agair after a few years we
would come a little closer to what Professor Sarklr suggests is our goal.
Thank you very much for attending the 25th I -1st itute of the ' Norman
Wait Harris Memorial Foundation.
... The 1949 Harris Institute adjourned at 1210 P.M.
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