RUSSIAN EMIGRES BELIEF IN SOVIET DEFEAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A000500010007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 22, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A
IN FOR A I
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Russian Emigres' Belief in Soviet Defeat
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THIS DOCUMENTCONTAINS INFOAGATION AFFECTING THE MATIOUAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN TOE NEAMINO OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT SO
IS510N OR THE REVELATION
S
M
U, 5.-C.. 31 AND 32. AS AMENOEU. ITS TP.AN
OF ITS CONTENTS IA ANY MANNER TO All UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
NID1TEO BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. HOW
EVER. INFORMMATIOM CONTAINED IN SOOT OF THE FORM NAY BB UTILIZED
'THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
1. Lively discussions take place among the Russian emigre circles in the US as
to the possible future fate of Russia, in the event of another war. The majorl.ty
.of the leaders and democratic Russian intellectuals consider that war is
inevitable and that nothing short of 'mar can stop the Soviet drive to form a
so=called Eurasian which would be a ?a,ort of political and economic organism
with Europe and Asia united under direct Soviet controls
The Soviet presence in the heart of Europe on the Baltic-Adriatic line must
cause eventual Soviet progress as far as the Atlantic This in turn will
provoke a reaction from the western powers who will need to use mili`~.nry force
to push the USSR back to its natural frontiers.
2. All the Russian groups foresee a Soviet defeat, in the event of anot>aer war, and
this is why they are already making plans with an eye to Russia's future The
general tactics of the Russian politicians is to create a widespread belief thct
the Russian nation and the Soviet regime are two very different things,, and the.t
the responsibility for the present state of affairs rests with the Kremlin, which
is not only the' enemy of democracy, but also of the entire Russian rl..ation.
3. Russia should be conserved as a democratic federation within the 1917 frontier.;
its disintegration would be a m9;sfortun_e, from the political and economic points
25X1 of view, both 'for Europe and the wor According to some Russians? the end of
the "Soviet Imperium" is inevitable, is one
of the prominent proponents of this idea. In numerous articles, nucar3di and
25X1 conversationsp predicts the inevitable outbreak of war between
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the East and the West and the defeat or the USSR, w
Democratic point of view, he does not construe as a defeat for the Russian nat=ion.
On the contrary, he foresees anew and brighter phase in the history of Russia,
4, The political and intellectual circles of t h e Russian emigres outwardly,-do'-not iawa
agree with political analysis and his historical vision, neverthele,s
most of them, in their hearts, believe that his predictions are rights
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5a Among other historical theses, contends that, although the majority
of the "~Jielkorusy" (great Russians) hate the Soviet regime, there is ro unity
in hatred amon~* the Russian nations:. The Russian minorities hate the Bolsheviks
and would like Ito part from Russia, where Bolshevism was born. The "real russian"
does not understand it; he considers that all are equally responsible for the
present state of affairs, Bolshevism being the result of common mistakes. Although
the Bolshevik Party has absorbed all the revolutionary and bandit elements from
different nations of the USSR, the so-called "Great Russians" formed the ideological
core of the party. Bolshevi a)a had no difficulty entrenching itself in i`.oscow and
Leningrad. Central Russia had almost no civil war, while the distant minorities
on the outskirts of Russia opposed it violently. There must be somethin+S in the
historical past of "Great Russia," which proves to be particularly susceptible to
Bolshevism, more so than the other parts of the Empire. iiiaybe the autocratic re ise
was the reason for it.
6. It is difficult to see what is happenin behind the Iron Curtain of the totalitarian
regime of lies. There are three factors, however, which indicate the growth of
separatism In the USSR;
(a) According to Russian refugees, the majority of the prisoners in concentration
camps are from minority groups, mostly sent there as spies.
(b) After the conclusion of the world ?far II, the Soviet Goverrraent abolished
five republics for their alleged collaboration with the Germans. These
republics are not large, but very significant. The Germans had no time to
occupy the others. The Ukraine also deserved the same treatment, but it was
difficult to abolish the Ukraine, without much publicity,and shame. It is
very well known that the Ukrainian military organizations fought on the
German side, that a new Ukrainian Orthodox Church was formed, and a new
government of the Ukraine wash in the making.
(c) The new emigration of the disaffected is another proof of the separatistic
tendencies within the USSR. There are no Russian minorities among he
various emigre groups; they form their own organizations and do not care
to maintain contact with the rest. No nation hates the Soviets more than
the Ukrainians. whom the Soviets still -wrongly consider part of the USSR.
The era of the last emigration, when the political leaders of all the USSR
nations were co-,.only awaiting the advent of a revolutionary fighv for
our and your freedom" has definitely passed away.
Prognoatica.tions as to the Disintegration of the USSR.
7. It is not very difficult to foresee that in the event of a Soviet defeat the Soviet
regime will not only collapse, but the individual Soviet nations will start a
revolution against Moscow. Economic and political reasons will then assurze
completely new aspects. To be a part of the USSR will mean, in the event of a
Soviet defeat, a share in its responsibility and its tragic fate. On do other
hand the victors will be faced with the same problem, with which they were confronted
.in Germany: how to guarantee a lasting peace and prevent another Soviet a -ressioz.o
8. Bolshevism will collapse, as did National Socialism, but who can say what form
new Russian expansionism can assume. Even if the USSR had no separatiati.c
tendencies at the present time, they would be artificially created. The partition
of the USSR would have to be decided with the co-operation of the individual Soviet
nations, based on a democratic idea of justice. The victors will be faced with the
problem of how to establish order throughout the territories of eastern ':Turope.
The first steps will be made easier by military occupation.
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9. The possibility of war and of an eventual Soviet defeat will profoundl~r
shake every Russian who has not yet severed the last link with his courr ry
and culture. Theoretically there still is a chance that the .:.gar can be
avoided should the Bolshevik regime suddenly co11? hse in the USSR. But
the chances are extremely small, and even this would not chance the :Co ci ci` th-3
Soviet L)npire, and would not stop the process of disintegration.. If th~
Bolshevik regime, which has oppressc>d Russia for the last 30 years c1~anFe
to a sudden end, all the deeply ep.Y:osive revolutionary and separat stir
tendencies of the Russian nations vw.ll at once be let loose. A period cff
chaos will bean, during which the 1.ussian nation will judge Its oppresr;:.ors
and try, as in 1917, to split away from the USSR. Constitutionally :a: IS
entitled to separate existence. Probably a civil war between the two halves
of Russia will start. If Great Ru:?sie (Central Russia) wins the battle,
its victory will be purely temporary. The structure of the present world
does not allow empires, such as th;s former Austrovh ungarian a,rrrpire. 71 f
the world is to be governed by one authority (such as the future UN or Leairuc
of Nations) ? and this would be it j only chance of survival - there cc t
be any nation stronger than most . the others. The liquidation of th^_: teat
("private") Russian h:rrpire would :res a matter to be decided upon by tht~
International Court of Justice and international law. The existence
such a Russian :c :spire would only ?r'ean that hopes for Russian independence are
dwindling, If terror prevails .i one half of the empire, the other half
cannot possibly be free. At the,;,';ime of itussian Tsars the autocratic Sys-[;=
was the price paid for expensionr today Fascism is the regime which cai, extend
the lifetime of the Empire of sl aes.
10. The end of Russia, or a. new pag-; in Russia's history? Of course the last is
certain; Russia oa..nxiot disappear.,, as long as there is a Russian nation, athioh
speak the language and occupies 4issian territory. Central Russia, 4A_th the
possible addition of Uhite Russi;i. and Siberia, will for a long time continue
to be a large, well -populated,: ; -opean nation. 'Russia will probably lose the
lion basin's coal' the Baku oil, t France and Germany. and many other nations
never had such things. Russia w"'.1.". become poorer-, but only potential :.y .
On the other hand, the low st,.nd -1 of living maintained by the Co, 7=a