COMMENTS ON THE CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 2, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by 25X1
SUBJECT Comments on the Change in Soviet DATE DISTR. MAR 2 9g125X1
Leadership
NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1
REFERENCES
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1. Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea
of a dictat:br within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on
that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organi-
zation of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers,
was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be
the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders
will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin,so that it will be safer to
assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called
collective leadership, unless Western, policies force the Soviets to stream-
line their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable
from the point of view of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the
death of Stalin:
2. There will not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been
cleaned up and the Party.and,the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's
favorites, there can be expected only a normal replacement of officials in
the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Govern-
ment.
3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920's
when Stalin was ascending to power. There is now no organized opposition
inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers,
and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace.
4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the
secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux.
The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between
national-minded"Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who
think in terms of the more orthodox international line instill going on.
5. No improvement in the food situation can 'be expected. The promises of Malenkov
to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch
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as the Communist leaders were unable to keep this promise, particularly
because of accelerated war preparations, they had to find a scapegoat,
and thus Malenkov resigned.
6. Bulganin impressed those who had worked with him in the State Bank, in-
cluding a famous expert on banking, with his high intelligence, mild
manners, and capacity to learn in a very short time the most special
and difficult problems.
7. It is difficult to anticipate any withdrawal from the Soviet foreign
policy line unless there are concessions from the West with regard to
the ratification of the Paris agreements. There is a possibility that
a continuation of discord among the Soviet leaders may lead to a soft-
ening of the Soviet position and to a recognition by Molotov of his
incompetence in the conduct of foreign relations. The Soviet leaders
however, have recognized that the balance of power has changed in favor
of the West. They are now endeavoring to change this balance as can be
seen from the shift to accelerated war production, and the attempts to
disrupt Western unity. The aggressiveness of the Chinese Communists may
also be a part of thi endeavor.- A stiff position,on the part of the
West toward the US9R probably favors the continuation in tower of the n6rA
stiff elements in the Soviet leadermhin. F
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0