SOVIET RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004300550004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 25, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
Soviet Relations with Foreign
Communist Parties
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
Ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized petson is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPO
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
25 June 1954
3
REQUIREMENT NO. RD 4' k1 401 963
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. Within the apparat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Central Committee was turned over to the Foreign Directorate at
the time of the liquidation of the Comintern in 1941.
the Soviet Union there is a Foreign Directorate, which is responsible
for the control of foreign Communist -parties. Aleksandr Semenovich
Pan shkin headed this directorate
The covert policy direc a gn communist par es' by 25X1
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ere, may -have
and,when the Foreign Directorate took over the Comintern's functions, such
a foreign section would have been raised to a directorate level.
n a roreign section or the central Committee prior to such dissolution;
2. The Comintern's revolutionary ie subversive) activities were soft-
pedalled as a sop during World War II.
After the war, as the international situation deteriorated, they were
stepped up again, but under the-aegis of the Foreign Directorate of"the
Central Committee of the CPSU.
3. Whereas the covert control functions of the Comintern devolved on the
Foreign Directorate of the Central"Committee, the other paramilitary
functions fell to the organs of the MGB/MVD. and,possibly, the GRU
(Chief Intelligence 'Directorate) of the Soviet General Staff.
4.
the Foreign Directorate of the
central Committee does not have any permanent representatives abroad. In
special cases a representative may be' sent on a flying visit;'but,
normally, liaison with foreign Communist parties is effected throug~
the re ids ur of the foreign intelligence directorate of the MVD.
Traditionally, the GRU of the Soviet General Staff served as the liaison
World War II and the dissolution of the Comintern.
and communications link with foreign Communist parties, even before
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maxi officers of the foreign intelligence directorate of the former MGB
felt that this directorate was amore appropriate instrument for dealing
with foreign Communist parties than the GRU.. In 1951, by a decision of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,the responsibility
for liaison with the foreign Communist parties was taken away from the GRU
and turned over to the foreign intelligence directorate of the then MGB.
This decision was communicated to Soviet missions throughout the world in the
form of a directive. In at least one Soviet mission abroad ,the GRU rezident
attempted to continue his activities with the local Communist party after
receipt of this directive, but was summarily ordered by Moscow to sever all
connections with the local party at once and for all.
5. As some contact-men between One local Communist party and the Soviet mission
had precise advance instructions on the mechanics of establishing contact
prior to the turnover from GRU to MGB control, this
indicated the existence of separate clandestine channels of communication
between the local Communist party and the Foreign Directorate of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. However, no additional information
on the possible existence of such channels.
6. Correspondence with Moscow on Communist Party matters is given special
security handling. The foreign intelligence directorate rezident abroad
personally enciphers and deciphers the more important cable traffic
dealing with the local Communist party. Even within the foreign
intelligence directorate re identura there is an effort to conceal the
existence of any liaison with the local Communist party. With the exception
of certain highly trusted ambassadors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel
are kept ignorant of the existence of liaison with local Communist
parties. They are, furthermore, strictly forbidden to have any covert
dealings with local Communists.
Directorate of the Central Committee rarely sends special representatives
to foreign Communist parties. When it does, however, the representative
is likely to be an MVD man, because he can be expected to have greater
familiarity with the tradecraft of covert contact than a member of the
Central Committee. If a Central Committee man should be sent, he would
rely on the local foreign intelligence directorate rezidentura to make
.secure contact arrangements for him.
only the most trusted Communist
.Va y members are used for intelligence work; ordinary Party members
are exploited on an unwitting basis. .it is possible
that .local name-checks are sometimes made through Communist Party facilities.
When this is done, every effort is made to conceal the interest of the
foreign intelligence directorate. However, every effort is
made to avoid involvement of local Communist parties in Soviet intelligence
activities. "Legal" representatives of the foreign intelligence
directorate abroad are categorically forbidden to recruit Communist
Party members without special permission from Moscow. Although their
recruitment is not formally forbidden, it is at least seriously discouraged
and there must be strong operational justification. for their recruitment.
the MVD could give permission to effect the recruitment
of a foreign Communist if he were not well-known or important and just
inform the Foreign Directorate of the CPSU. On the other hand, if the:
foreign Communist were at all important) his recruitment would have to be
cleared by the Foreign Directorate.
9. The Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPSU does not have
any intelligence functions. in the normal sense of the term. It does not run
agents. On the other hand, both overt and covert elements of foreign Communist
parties collect information in the course of their activities; this information
is passed on to the Foreign Directorate through MVD liaison channels.
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intelligence derived from the operations of the intelligence
services is given only to the Foreign Directorate if it concerns the
activities of -foreign Communist-parties; there - iano reason for giving
military or sciexrtifdc reports to the Foreign Directorate.' However;
the question of whether or-not the Foreign Directorate receives
intelligence reports from the-MVD is, to a certain extent, academic,
since the Central Committee of the CPSU is the primary customer for
all important intelligence reports in any case.
10. Subsidies given to foreign Communist parties are
for general financial support. The local MVD rez en ura turns over -the
money to the local Communist Party liaison representative, who executes
a ,receipt for it; the local Party then decides how the money will be
allocated. F- I
the Chinese Communist Party once requested $50,000
for certain purposes in 19+7 or 1948. When the request reached Moscow,
Stalin personally directed that $300,000 be given to the Chinese
Communist Party rather than the $50,000 for which it had asked. This
money was paid through the MVD rezidentura in China.
11. The Soviet press and radio give the general policy line to be followed
by the foreign Communist parties; specific tactical direction is given
through the MVD liaison chapnel. In addition, foreign Communist party
members are briefed when they visit Moscow. no
information on Comintern training schools or current facilities for
training foreign Communists in the. USSR. The fact that the recommendations
of the Central Committee of the CPSU are a weighty factor in the
selection of foreign Communist party leaders acts as another control.
12. International front,organizations are envisaged primarily as a.means
of educating-, the non-Party masses abroad. These organizations are not
exploited as organizations by Soviet intelligence organs altho h
individual. members are recruited. $owever, such
individuals are rarely recruited. This is because, by and large, in virtue
of their identification with the "democratic" movements, they usually
do not have access to worthwhile targets. The MVD does not mix into
foreign political 'matters; its job is to inform the Soviet Government,
not to execute policy.
1.1 Comment: Under the old.NKGB, the First"Directorate was
responsible for foreign intelligence. In 1946, when the NKGB became
the MGB, the First Directorate became the First Chief Directorate.
Since the merger.of the MVD and MGB in 1953, the foreign intelligence
directorate has been the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD.
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