SALE OF POLISH BANK IN ARGENTINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A002601010013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 26, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002601010013-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SUBJECT
25X1 C
Argentina/Boland
Sale of Polish Bank in Argentina
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
25X1A
26 October 1953
25X1A
25X1X
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OP CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. Julio NOWINSKI,l president of the Polish Bank of Argentina,l has received
orders from Warsaw to sell the bank. The price asked is $1,000,000 (US)02
Ownership of the bank is ostensibly divided been the Polish Government
(55% of the shares) and private stockholders in Argentina (45%), but, actually,
all of the stock is held by the Polish Government. Warsaw would like to sell
its acknowledged portion of the bank for dollars, and that portion which is
supposedly in the hands of private individuals for the free-market Argentine
peso equivalent of the balance, or $450,000. If no one can meet this offer,
the Poles will accept the entire amount in pesos at the free--market rate.
At the present time the bank has no means of remitting to Poland its earnings,
'which are frozen in Argentina.3 These earnings include a 1/2% commission on
all financial transactions between Argentina and any of the Iron Curtain
countries. Other types of earnings, such as those deriving from savings and
checking accounts# have dropped off considerably since the end of World War II'
as an ever-increasing number of the old depositors, unwilling or afraid to
associate themselves with a banking institution so clearly identified with a
Communist government, have withdrawn their deposits. This decrease in the
bank's income, and the difficulty of getting money out of Argentina, are
responsible for the decision to sell.
L. One group currently investigating the purchase of the bank is composed of
four or five anti-Communist Poles and other Slavs who feel that depositors
would flock back once the stigma of Communist management had been removed
from the institution. At least one other group, composed of Polish Jews,
has looked into the purchase of the bank, and decided against it.
NOWINSKI, who has Polish citizenship but is of White Russian origin, will
probably receive a commission on the bank's sale. He has been remunerated
well for his services as president. For example, under the bank's statutory
profit-sharing plan, NOWINSKI made 180,000 pesos in 1952, entirely apart from
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Approved ~or Ikelease 2002/0!/22: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA002601010013-7
 Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002601010013-7
SECRET
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his salary. Taking into consideration also the fact that the presence of
relatives in Poland makes him susceptible to pressure from the Polish
Government, it is'unlikely that he is in any may working against Warsaw's
intention to sell.
25X1A
6. Meanwhile, since around June or July 1953s the bank has donated 3,000 pesos
a month to the Polish Communist weekly, O iwo. This marks a return to the
bank's earlier practice, abandonedarvmd 1919 or 1950, when Argentine government
control. of the bank wale tightened, of donating openly to Communist causes.
Recipients of overtly acknowledged contributions from the bank during this
earlier period included another Polish Communist newspaper (since that time
shut down by the Argentine Government) and the Soviet-controlled Russian
Orthodox Church.14 The flow of such donations has probably continued uninterrupted,
in some camouflaged form, throughout the period in which they were not openly
attributed to the bank.
7. Sra. Ludmila SCHOSTAKOVSKY de CORTES, a Communist who was brought into the bank
under the NOWINSKI regime, plans to leave the bank during October, and to take
a job with an unidentified printing firm which prints a number of Communist
publications.5
2. Comment There have been no indications that another bank will be
shed ixo.,Argentina by other Soviet Bloc interests, and it is not
probable that Warsaw will establish more politically pure banks elsewhere
in Latin America in view of the difficulty of obtaining bank charters
in Latin America.
3.
Comment. It is possible that Poland's frozen.assets in Argentina
Ingy use '9 connection with the USSR Argentine trade agreement, but
there is as yet no concrete evidence of this.
Comment. The flow of such donations has probably continued
they were not openly attributed to the bank9
nug~ec in some camouflaged form, throughout the period in which
5? Comment. The Polish Bank is probably subsidizing this establishment,
wholly or partially, through some devious channel not visible to the public
or to the Argentine authorities.
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002601010013-7