CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED TO THE CHOICEOF RUEGEN ISLAND AS THE SITE OF A NAVAL BASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001100320006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 27, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
11CLf N9-Ift"RMATION
COUNTRY East Germany
SUBJECT Considerations 'hioh Led to the Ohoige
of Huegen Island as the Site of a Naval
Base
DATE OP INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
9'1}8@ 0?@nm@t~l; Eenlelne In#??ml~llen aAee4ln I:e Nil
Ile11111 O@ten@e e# 61}@ ?}nll:@9 14 ~4ee~ wltlfl 4 e m@*n_
Ing 91 T141@ l8, ?@@13!?ns 9811 and 984, ?411}@ U:@,, 999@1 B6
em@n9@9: Its I;ranem!@el?n of ?@v9leil?n of R e?ninim
to or r@@@!p6 by an 14neul;h??le@9 Roman le p?8111116@9
by law: T11@ rmprg911e6!@n of 61fl 1n?m l@ A??11IRl49:
REPORT
DATE DISTR,
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
THI SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS RIPOAT AA1 DEFINITIVE,
THI APPRAISAL OP CONTENT IS TINTATIVI,
(FOR KIV DI RIV/RII)
27 y 1953
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1. The Soviets requested) I a report which they wished to use in
determining the' feasibility of constructing a Navy port on the Grosser
Jasmunder Bodden on Ruegen Island -- a project which had once been en-
visioned by the German Navy.Qreport, prepared in May-June 1952, "sold"
the Soviets on the idea of constructing such a port which was to be part of
the over-all Ruegen Harbor Froject.
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ANIMC A
Feasibility of
' L
vvaav v; acv v.61. 5; mava L .LAU-0411aTiI, Qnf3 on LuegeXl 10.1and
1. During the rearmament,- period by the Nazi . the former German
N
avy also reoeived d:bfinite assignments `I goals. A great
shipbuilding program was announced for thN buildin
cF.
'iax
g.
:
ge
.ships. (aircraft carriers and battleships).} The ships Gnei a ate.
Anil RAha""U n?n+ r..'{......1 nn ^^^ J_ --_ . \ . Rr w - -. - -
the first part of this program. `):he keels ?' theMships ~Bismarck
.and mirr ittz (about 39,000 tons) were layed 'mown as the.next
type. They were completed and.. saw action i`i -the first years
of World War II. The shipbuilding construction offices of.
the Navy, in about 19350 undertoak:.the deoign of a more advanced
and l
t
arger
ype. battleship. One spoke of ships of about
50,000 tons.. It was readily seen., that launohing of
these
,
larger ships, especially in' Hamburg, could not have'been ao-
complished on the ,available slips. Therefore, the 'Marine-
Hafenbau'" (Naval Harbor Construotion?Offioe) received the
order to, start work on the r aoessary. fca,ollities at once'. `s'he
new
hi
s
pyards should be capable of building ships to about .
60,000 tone. For several reasox s9 espedially strat.egioal
reasons, the new shipyards should be-oz the Noath. and ,Baltic
Seas
B
.
ecause the shipyard Blohm and Voss, in I amburg,was
by far the most ef'ioient- German shipyard
it was ordered
,
that a shipbuilding dock of the requiarc,d dimensions should
be constructed at this site in spite of the great dii'i'i,oultea'
(
a
'
n
rrow
spaom 1be..tunnel.) . This dock was oompxe od' .'before
'World `War II. however, today: it, i.i3 partially bombed' and not
ready fore 'operations. ~L1he' ooxist:ructioh of the it "Gt'~.ealai:
already in progress' was stopped 'key the events Wf ftx and bombing of :the., dook.
The, ship ',a hull is heavily streels'ect auo, u; bo lding; whi'1
e A1'4p
.
ping off the ways and murt bb rsinforodd, for .that o,oraton,
has,its special difficulties (i
olina~tj'on oi'' Wa r
ab
t 1
16,
a
ou
0
n
to 1:2?); the decision was, mode to build a'gravi'ng dock in"'thet
'Baltic sea area. After lei gt'iy?',exami: Lion and inveetige.tion
IR?
(Bi
l
e
, 1
lismar and Stett,in), the "Grosse Jaamun er Bodden" ,on
di
"
Nue,grn
was selected for 'the i,ns'tall4tion 'off' a, nor. re''air
and shipbuilding yard. Who large ' scale projeot plans were, '
finished about the and of 19;58. so that in ' the: spring of ' 1939
the "Marinebaudirektibxa Huesen", in' org'en was? estr~bl~,slse:d.
The new port installation was to he"ve the name ut uegenhafah"..
A 'considerable, amount of material (riubble, abet pilings, e, ,ch )
Was transported for the building of the mole at Glowe. Dredging
of the canal was also started. Construction was, stopped about
the and of 1939.. The reason wa that' 'the German Naval Coflmand ,.,.'.
at that times aoquirsd a mgdorn port' in the middle Baltic Sea
area, the -former polish port, Gdynia, Data concerning decision
to build on Ruegen are listed below
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ANNEX A
~,Lu Id.. (a.
V TA ES OF CONSTRUCTION 0 NAVAL INST LATIO S ON RUG N.TS
4?
Construction of an effioient'Navy yard and a naval base on
Ruegen presents the following advantages:'
a. Strategic. position, of the Island iii the Baltic Sea area
b. Shorter approach to the open ,sea.
Of, Concentrated:defense against air attacks.
d. Reasonably easy defense against foreign observation-and,
espionage.
e. Protected position of the approaches.'
f. Relatively free of foe.
g. The Bodden may be called a first class anchorage.
? Chains of hills may be used as natural bomb shelters.
ew ours.Kis],-
Soltsnau is the entrance to the North-Baltic Sea aanal.)
g
urgers ly needed in the North. seat
$iel--Holtenau could ' be reached within a f h
i
uao on ae Aalta performs in the 11edi
terransan Sea,. The : exj.t, to the Surd could be 'closed vary
%uiokly byj naval foross from Rusgen.- he distance, betwiin
Kiel and, the; Island is about 140- sea miles. If, heavy units
Stationed at Rue
en ware
if No valuable.agricultural territory will be(lost.
? Existence of railroad and water oonneoti0ns,
k. The different construction sites are dispersed,
l.: Good soil conditions for construction.
M. The site allows the excavation of a second canal.
?A serious disadvantage of this- site is that . the' transportation.
of all. supplies must be made via the "Ruegen dam" (bridge).,
.S_trate612 position of the Island
54 The distance to Tralleborg (Sweden) is about 55,sea miles;
the distance to Copenhagen about' ?5 sea miles. Bu.egen"could
thus have a siailar f t
Shorter Atiro,f !0_."a 0?o?n Sea
ey reach the open' Joao. 'istanoes.
to the o h
en
f
Cav
':and 'therefore, , some distance from the open sea, Depa
rting,
naval ships must?.navigate difficult channel, at reduoe;d speed, i.
AO many hours pass until th
p
saa
orte ports. ind3oated are aid follotr :
Emden
Wilhelmshaven'
Bremen
Bfemerhaven
Hamburg
Cuxhaven
Anuroximata Sea i es'.
40'?, ...
30 '(not counting the looks
70
30
70.
12
raze
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A
L
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Distances to the open sea for the indicated ports
Sea are as follows;.
on
the Baltic
Aot~rox3ma~te Sea ilea
9 .............
Luebeok
11
1/2
Wismar
13
1/2
Rostock
6
1/2
Stralsund
7
1/2
Stettin
37
,Koenigsberg. (Kaliningrad)
Danzig' (Gdansk) out of the
17
1/2..T
question' because of political
oonditione'there
As regards Ruegen, the larger shins would have-to travel about
three sea miles from the mole (la.titud'e off.. tsgard) t.a the:._opem
sea, those from the roads would have to tri*ve1 about tour
sea miles and - the smaller units from the southern port of
the installation would have to travel about six sea miles to
reach the open sea through the north canal. The channel
conditions could be axteneivel,y dred sd to a1l..ow for a rapid
departure of naval units. Strong snits could reach the open
sea in a short time using both oanalae in 'the event of emer-
genoies (heavy air attacks) and disperse. .
Qon_aunt, ate Pitefiee.A, . .r Ate,.
7?
part on the Kleine 1 .Jasmunder Boddon* `l'he-.airfied for fighter'.
could be concentrated d i,reetl ? -cvar the islands for the maxi-'
hum ,effect. It was a3 So Planned to build.. ,ee renal airfield0, on
Ruegen 'for -protection of the harbor,, Seaplanes wire' to 1~.e,
stationed in the northwest part oar thoa6ire4dV *X .sting ,aiLr
'field at Bug on' the Areeger Boddan' and in than southeaet;vrn,
ports listed above Lin part. , S, all the AA waits inn tuegnn
The Gross er ~y Boddvs is surrounded by 6 line of .hi .' a
(40.00 to ,JO.OO m. high) in the east, south and southwest.
The bay is open only from the north to the southwest The
chain of hills offers the, best possibility for the instal-
lation of antiairorasjt nrtiller uni. vo 'In ooftra5t to tho
planes was pianned south, of.R'quenk,Lrohenw The-Tetzitz L -ke
:could be filled'with dredged material from the o2oavatioAs
to ,extend the airfield. Air raid bunkers could be built
,dam bridge; it is not known how far the bathing traffic should,
of the 'shore, line of the ,Sodden,.' It would not' b-e nsas t4427 mope a great .number of civilians, .,Only the pl.aoes, on the', }orth
coas't' from Olowe 'eastward would have to be everout Ited .ab the
donstruotion, progressed to the p?,artioular, seoti.one. A. control
of the i`irhetmen (espionage) could Aoi be avoided, Control Of
all 'incoming persona to Ruegen oould be+ effected on the, Ruegen
t__ PorsiAm_ Q'h ervatd.o-A.,a.aad_ ov-i
The favorabli geographi'oal position aallc?so satisfactory control
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,,special popition' of the Island.
' on Ruegin could be Organized very efi'ectivei, becaaiee. of:.the. ;..
(as' tunnels) into the hills. Finally, the 'air warning':net
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-Protected Positiozi of the r-Uroaohas
TQ. A peninsula which ends in a steep 45-meter high cliff at
Kap , to. -the northwest of the n i.iinar7 r--i+a,.
U-6- ivx owzxiemuenae' snow 'Swinoupoie;). as, fo1,a,cows (it percent..
lYl,xzuaa.,r aou~tnrn Pra.rt 19.44) on page .1291`
,qi vas thca av?y.nr e f ~.y '.? .
northwest to east (via south). Only winds blowing from 'the
sia.Wuv:G- ruse azzoras,a natural protection' against ?win.de from'
v yr vn aim A 2
N E 8 S SW
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1,1 Al thau, h a strong sand migration, ex:LetM nn +ha Mmi+l, "nrin ti+' ;:~
Dooember-February
March-May
June-August
September-Ngvembe,r
The most froi"quent ,viixd d:1raac,tio'n'a in d' 611 a1rI
6
~3
15
??
1
1S.?
19xx
-.
.9
3
100
13
1?~XX
84'
12,, ?
10
a.2
13.,
10.
. 4 ,
X00;
15.
14
4X
7
7
14
20;97
0 ,C ,
1
14` ?
5'
00
6
7
8
13
1J
19
17
8
5,
1'00
X Infre,quint' wind direction
oe er and,Vies?on.dehl, ohaxira,~1, ('c+Aanhal 'hd. StW-lCt xd]:'. y' tyre"?,
M
C ellexi M+'"M m
~ d
c
Y s aA of Iiddenpue0 wh3:aki jis, lpoatcd-,ctzi I;no wis~+ut~ixa`i
side of Rue j4. The sand wciul.d. 'b:e ite:f l'ectc4,. ~ itr, thy' ll '
h ff
s xooessaa,ryV Th.o M1$,rat;nie-s'and, would, be. Cg1`lee'ted':,
b" +1,. 3 1
i
~
'the proposed port entrra,noe. Very ;e:?penai 'g raaix~i _ntt~~ dr,e gi i'g
would riot ' b
sand drifts at' all., harbor, en ,rancee
this wcriild 'tlot;'aa tax~:
a a ? mo aaea, ovU b + ;t?q~x. pan~it ,a,~.ne wot $ Op, ;p'$; `t?
`dio r ,,t`wth~` 'wary .~# IJWL1Ti,,tl!+'tfW~1yx's ,pI:F {3~1Q'@~', IVY G~7,,1~..
'dep'th'"oant r ,~ . i~centl::x i~iL off' there
,r oa+ 4w m,ve urr~' vrat~il'iifJ,a. Ti,Q i:l ~ra:l kJ lait~Cl_ CJ"p~1Xir k10 `til ~y"'~tlj' }+~i0 - c,:
a ogzi' +
o~ a ale -'grb:Lonwould Doi 0414d
..,-', - ,cf.,0, .'a
puol0A .1-AT o d.epp~ ? ws,tor'~'~
1e. eeXaom &%'T*,Qted In aaj~y aas,e it' is
'?,: Zxpgrienoe 1 as' shown,. that? 'sv' n''tg '**,y' oold winters' S s`sni 't~~~?.
' '! rno'vc enta~i would, ,4a;rdl ' doo i?rw' In "-unt~pu ,l y, ieew~ +s. ~r ,nter.g
WO' 44 5u r, oly''''be led dxouAd tha .,'entranow by: the gas
SUMP A, Oa4 better. oone .tions will eci,st ~. ~ ,t-;h;ci, pa p; oatle
than any'?port~.in toe `;middle Baltic boa. '. T1'
Baltio Sea 11inuuaal, page 221' xhowp 't at in ve~y' eev.er wi'nter's.
,.:The ohannel would `be Dept open with an ice break'o.', in ,.s e~r, 11 se
winters. The North Baltic Sea-Canal as da soribe ,, in ,the.
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ILl JF ~.J
will be seven meters below. low tide; `phis anohgx'age would be
the beat on the Baltic Bea due to its sheltered pc~siti,on: a'
forded by.the chain of hiller. It would lee proteoted from
winds and have a short? exit to the sea,.' The-'bottom :oon 'jets
of an approximately 8.00 mater think , eglime laye,r.. ? The water
13. After completion of the exoava t1,on the Ja$munde.a, Bodden,
will be opened' as an anchorage The a rcazap a csaaajaai ' d?pth
better than any other German ports available at tho; time. o':
construction.
Anohoragl in Bodden.
to encourage the formation of ice. It is hardly pooeible 'o'
break the ice with ioe breakers,, ' The proposed excavation in
Glove would not have locke. It is not known what effe.ot 'severe
winters would have on-the Bodden (expe.pt for the margin--ioe
formation). Probably only in the:severest winters would ioe
be a hindrance. Finally it may be said that the proposed p:ort..
on Ruegen could be one of the best installations in the Aaltio'.
Sea territory, in respect to winter wea?bhor. In any case much'
s
t
s pping emporarily s to:E~peds 42 days was txie longest ,.in,.'.
of ice. A medium winter might cause a hinderance' to? na-vi- .. ' '.
gation lasting.1-3 weeks but in only 3 of the'laot.25 w.Mtera'?.
wa
hi
no ice appears in the Kieler Forde before the middle of De.-
comber) nor in the canal before Christmas and usually it forms
only in early or mid-January. Disappearance of.the ic.e often
takes plao.e at the end..o' January, in meiuia winters during the
first-third of February, while in severe winters the ice may
remain. until March or..'even the end? of- Mash. (1923x'1924 until
March 24th, 1928 1929 until March 2.9th) . Iaz 11 winter (191 -
1.917--1940; 1941) the Kieler Forde and the canal remained free
depth could be oQmpar:a,tively oastly,, of well ae 'oci id' r'ably,
'
increased by means of suction dr
edgea., The,b'o1tom,i'6 not
good for ?anohoringM Buoyaa, would have tabs uaaud.'
.fat Ea Bomb "&It or'
in ? 1'939 'on the- 'east mole. FSers .a
fuel depot was to ba built in the chalk olifi s adjoii ing and
parallel to the coast, 'affording s, nati, al bomb phel;ter.;,"
above low tide is about 'tne averaj~e height. of the'chalk o,liff'a.')
u.oaus.e the conditions sesame. 'v'e'r rgyoraw.,e. ?I'i ,t1 a so'-oall.ed
a'
a
Sl
,o Hillsaa to tie south, the subterranean bombproof instal-,
lation of commissary depots, nagasines, mj,no ' ohamblera,
?lsry and argmunition' bunkers, torpedo , depo,,ta, etc. R' was planned.
oonatr-LVti'on, the demand on agrieoultur&l tiarritory was hardly,
worth m)nti'oning. Only they eastern edges of the Sodden near
Poelohow, would be affected. This loss ' could be com ensate'd
by a qualitative improvement of uncultivated land. The exoa-
vated mud and clay could be'flushed,on the land in great flush..
bide.' 'These flush beds later produce the, boat agrioAltural
land.'
1'3.. It is a notable fEact that: despits the planning of 'gigantic ;
ds o b xi altar. 1'e it ,r.
BL4 0RET
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-8-
Uil.and Water Connections
16. All planned construction could be supplied by normal-railroad
connections and without undue-%xpenditure'. Furthermore there
is also the possibility of water connection., There is a
connection from Stralsund via dredged channels of about 2.50
meter depth through the Schaproder Bodden'an&,from the sea-
side.through the Libben, further through the Titter Bodden.,
Rossow stream., Reetzer Bodden, Areeger Bodden,, Lebbiner Bodden
to the C?roaat ';'asmunder. Bodden.. The loading or unloading 'of
small ships can easily be accomplished, in:Mart ir s .Port..
Construction Sites
1..7. Since it was planned to start work on various sections .of
the entire construction simultaneously, no hindrance in work
could have occurred because the individual projects: were pro-
vided with separate transportation facilities. On the other
hand,.,trhie-, d'ecentraliwation of ,construction work would natur-
ally cause considerable difficulties in administration:.
Increased administration, increase in construction eupervisi.of
,personnel, more difficult over-all coordination, more labor
camps', etc. Upon completion of the entire installation, the
situation would be much more favorable. In the case of serious.
accidents' such as ,explosions,,. fire or an enemy attack, the
decentralization would;be of stritegio advantage.
8oiilConditions for0 onstr ,oti.on
1e., The ,planning Baas only completed after years of~ x't.searoh'and''1
after conducting countless drill,inge. It s; v~n.rfi..M.m1: ,
that the coil conditions 'ideal and unusually good,
for 'constructing large buildings. 'or ?,netanoe', near Glo
heavy' Marl was found upon' the ' ohalk . layer;. 'The construction'
of the moles,,' could be faultlessly: 'carried out:. On' the, ;east
,side of the. -Bodden, at , ,the ' same height . ap, 'Martin' s Port', .,the
marl is also,very high and, would be a good i olndation for
Marge oonetruotins, such as dry docks, building docks-,' .slips,
*to-* Similar conditions exist on the Mouth'"side where a naval
,base was planned.
?~!t Sf,,.a..,$eoond Canal
In addition to the north, passage, an ,excavation to southe4st
was also planned: Twelve meters under low tide' ,wgre planned,' ,
for the north banal,and 8.O~'.meters' index low tide for the''
second canal. ' In case, of ship damage, enemy attack or other
sooidente,, all units 'except very, heavy ships; oould,'leave
the port' through the ,second canal. During sitrong northwi ds
-the exit to the north'would be very difficult: for pmallex'tenets.
They could then depart through the wind protected Prorer`Wie ,
Again,'almost no first class agrioultural propsrty'wo:uldbe
used. In. order to reduce the movement" of earth, the axis of
t1.,'canal,should extend through the'large and small Woateritz
Pond. The construction ,of two bridges would then 'be. necessary.
There was a parallel:program.to extend the canal through the
',northern part Of . I Jasmunder Bodden to the sea,,but
this plan 'was postpone The exit of- the canal into the; open
sea was planned as far,n ' th an possible so that the J'asmund
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w9
AAfl,
~FPeninsula could afford wind protection during e,torms from the
north.' It wae.assumed that otherwise smaller units might
have difficulty in entering and. leaving.
JUUY.. 15?P.OF , CONSIDERATIONS
20. All supplies would have to brought by rail via the Ruegen dam.
this bridge would naturally be-a main target for enemy air
attacks. Concentrated antiaircraft batteries and fighter planes
would be necessary here. World War II experience showed that
the German shipyards remained operative.to a large extent in
spite 'of perpetual air attacks by all types of ,planes and' bombs.
The shipyards Blohm and Voss in Hamburg, the ,Deutsche Werft in
l'inkenwerder,and the Howaldt 'IVerke A.G., built submarines up
to the last days of the aifax though mostly in, yard bunkers, despite
the fact that all supplies had to be moved over bridges. The
Elbe bridges in Hamburg remained serviceable untia,.the end of
the War in spite of couatlesb air attacks. It was found that
the great majority of bridges were, destroyed by blasting.
l.. If necessary the waterway would have to be.used until the Ruegen
t
e
.and Sa.seni
z
dam bridge was repaired. Traffic between V(arnemuend
could be'ma.intained with large ferryboats but these are lacking
at the moment. Furthermore, a competent ferry eervioe between
Stralsund and Altefaehr could easily be established. In addition
there would be many docking possibilities 'or''smaller supply
'vessels on Ruegen.
Years of survey and investigation were conducted to determine
the decisive location of the main axis. When the ,axis. was
determined-as it has'been described in the proposed plans, it
was discovered that all requirements of a technical, geological
and hydraulical nature had been met in'an exemplary manner.
The three following.poesibiliti.ee for the excavation were
examined and included in the o onsideratiofss
a. About one sea mile south of the former pier of the Baltic
Sea resort, Braege-Juliueruh. No suitable ground for build-
ing',moles.could be found here. b'urther, one would have to'
reckon with constant sand. drifts, thus oorietant interrup-
tions for dredging..'-To obtain a depth of 1,2.00 ' meters
below: low tide the moles would have to be twipq as long as
in Giowe. The determining factor-in rejeoting this project
was the difficulty in channel,oonstruction to the Bodden.
Considerable wet dredgings would.have bien.necessary,
especially on the Lebbiner Haken. In the page of a damaged
ba.ttleshi4 there would have. been greats diffioulties, in
docking.
As was mentioned above, the Breeger Bodden& was planned as
an airfield for seaplanes. This it was.p.l1nned to construct..
Asmall port. where passenger.boati, aircraft. ?ervioe boats,
and air rescue boats,could be aooornmodated.
b..: About two and one-half sea miles to the west -of the present
INDIVIDUAL gO.11STRUCTION, SIZE
o ` t Zx vaj~gjj to the- Ng "t
canal 'exis. Here also the 12.00 meter,,depth oon1pur line
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runs parallel with the coast, but for about double the
distance, thus much longer moles would be necessary.
Tests on a large model in a hydraulio?'testing laboratory
proved that here also considerable sand-deposits can
occur, whereat .this possibility does not exist farther
eastward.'
Furthermore, the marl is in deeper layers so the entire
canal would,have to be wet dredged. This situation is
not particularly favorable for building strong embankment..
,The.apprpsoh line to the large dry docks would not. give
enough straightaway. Large constructions such as moles,
large fuel depots, etc, would cause considerable diffi.
culties because the marl, able to' support a load, is much
deeper than'by the coast of Glows. Also, one would find
fine and medium sand with 14yers,of rubble stone.
o. About.one-half sea mile east of Glows. AM was already
stated, this route was found to be the~beat solution by
the'flydraulic Engineering Experimental Laboratory. A,
view of. & nautical map and the location of the depth con-
tours makes this decision comprehensible. Any accretion
along the bank worth ' mentioning would not be expected
to,oocure
the .geological conditions at this
place cc follows. The diluvial deposits begin at a height of
ten meters above low tide and consist of marl,with limited,
sand deposits, and rise to a height of'about 30 meters above
low tide. Muo.ronated chalk was found on the bottoms this
chalk rises to the north of the shoreline up to'four meters
below.low tide level. No further comment. need be made here
an whether this is solid rook or a chalk layer. The diluvial
marl is firm and stable are all the other marl formations along
the coast. ,The bored chalk may also be considered a' good
firm foundation for large constructions.
this area is predestined for the'
building of largo constructions. The sketched mole was proposed
by the Hydraulic Engineering Office. Roth mole foundations
were to be protected against erosion by leading the current.
'.smoothly around the moles. The heads of the moles should be,
especially guarded'against erosion and the moles themselves
"construct edAn block method. A parapet ' to se .ward was planned.
Guiding; lights' wore to be placed on each molchead. Various
antiaircraft units were to be placed on the mole. A small
harbor was to be built behind the western mole. The harbor,
defense flotilla, ice breakers and tugboats, Were to be berthed
here. Due west of the canal on the mainland, `a buoy and target
s.tbrage,plaoe was to be constructed, A channel depth of 6.00
meters below low 'tide was required in this area. The axis
of the canal should end to the south at the molehead of the'
port installation. The beacons (upper and lower) were to be
installed here. The width of navigable passage between the
molsheade should be 200.00'metera. A turning basin 500.00
meters to 600.00 meters in diameter should be"built in the
protection of the moles so that the largest ships could go to
the fuel depot without difficulties. A channel depth'of 12
meters below low tide was required in the canal and in the
turning basin. The width o f ' the bottom of the canal should
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be 50.00 meters so that the width of the water surface would
be about 100.00 meters. No passing channels would be necessary
since the canal would be only about one sea mile long.
24. A modern fuel depot was to be installed on the inboard side
of the east mole. The planned depths of the individual berths
would permit the bunking of any eligible ships. The refueling
of the fuel depot was to be done by large tankers-so the har-
bor would have to be properly equipped.
hue). Depot
25. A subterranean fuel depot was to be built parallel to the coast
at the root of the east moles The tanks could be placed in
groups of three, one behind the other. The very rigid chalk
rock rises to 50.00 meters above low tide at this point.
Thus all installations may be constructed in an effective bomb-
proof manner and properly camouflaged. The necessary housing
and administration buildings would be erected in the vicinity.
26. A modern repair and construction yard was to be built on the
east aide of the Dodden in a basin with a water depth of up
to 3.00 motors. The very firm marl is also high here, thus
affording the beat foundation for building.
27. The entire installation was to be organized as a a,'opair and
construction yard for very large naval vessels. The repair
yard would have to be installed on the west side due to the
geographical, situation. The' entire installation was to,', ~e 'ho=ded., oa
the west by the berths for battleohi.ps and aircraft carriers*.
Therefore, the repair basin was to have a depth of 12.00 meters
below low tide. The west side of the basin.,with the mole
extending northwards, was to be developed as berthing places.
Special shore installations would not be necessary because the
personnel of these units would live aboard during the berthing
time. The equipping with foodp anuiiunition, eta. p would take
place here. '11 theme supplies would be brought hereby rail-'
road.
28.. The installation of two repair dock groups was planned to 'the
south of this harbor basin. Two enormous dry docks should be
able to take care of the largest ships,, two medium docks should
take care of the other ships. The entire layout would result
in the following advantages
a. The construction of the four docks could be accomplished
in e, single large excavation at a construction site, laved
out on-a large scale.
b. The combining of two, docks would result in great struc-
tural savings. Two combined docks would need only one
middle wall which would result also in considerable savings
in floor strength.,uinoe then it would be possible to create
more favorable static assumptions. Further, One crane
installation and one flood and drainage installation
each could be eliminated'o
e. A common repair yard installation (shipfitting shop, wood
workshop, mechanical and motor shops, eto.) could serve.
all docks.
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.112-
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29. The east side of the repair basin was to, serve as the repair
quay and would have to be equipped accordingly, as for instance,
halls and workshops. The floating docks were planned in front
of the spit of land between the repair port and the outfitting
port to the east. Because a floating dock has many advantages
compared to,a massive dry dock (mobility, lower cost and short
construction time) it should definitely be included. The
necessary depths could be dredged. The singular advantage of
this entire repair dock installation~is that'inooming and
docking ships may take the shortest way without change o,.
course into the prepared dock because the dock installations
would be facing north. The outfitting port should have a
lesser depth (.8.00 meters-below low tide was planned). Lhrge
ships were to receive their final equipment in the so-called
repair port. The western quays of the outfitting port were,
to be reserved,as an ordnance department of the shipyard, as,
for 'instance, torpedo, mine, and artillery workshope, The
other operations, such as navigation, radio, woodworking
shops,,etc., wire planned J.ogioally on the east side.
,30. The adjoining construction port to the west was to have a
depth of only 6.00 meters to 7.00 meters below low tide.
Here the large construction docks and buildingways were planned,
Behind these installations, to the south, all halls and other
facilities necessary to initiate operations, were to be built.
31. The coast to the north would remain as an extension territory
f
th
or
e yard. complex - about two sea miles oe water front.
. w,w v wv, vM,V
workmen and employees. The necessary.housjn ;with social
and cultural facilities for a new shipyard town was to be
erected near Sagard.
DestroX er Berths
32. Two destroyer flotillas were to be accommodated on the southern
part of the built-up yard-peninsula. A mole-like seawall was
planned to protect the destroyer berths agaixnet west winds.
On the land side of this mole two berths for the flotilla
leaders were to be ereotedsand to the east ten wooden finger-.
piers, each for two destroyerej were to be built. The extensive
land installations required for two destroyer flotillas would
have been erected parallel to the berths.,8e,,eoo ~d av~at, an
33. This canal was declared necessary and included in the plans,
for reasons already stated. The required channel depth was
8.00 meters below low tide. he width at the bottom should
be 40.00 meters and the corresponding width of the surface
about 90 meters.
34. Two jetties were planned toward the Bodden, which should flank
the entry and each have a guiding light at the tip. This
excavation also would have to be closed off on the sea side by
moles, in this ;rasp, to the east in the Prorer Wiek? These'
moles would have to be especially massive, so they could resist
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position of the moles had not yet been determined by the model
tests. The necessary installations and a turn around basin
could be-built in the protection of the moles.
Laval Base
35. The construction of a naval base was planned on the south
side o4.,the Bodden. The berths for light and heavy cruisers
were planned in the eastern harbor. The most eastern harbor
was to be reserved for smaller special boats. Various schools
were to be installed on this base, such as artillery, torpedo
practice, and helmsmen schools. Furthermore, a cadet school
with all equipment was planned. The so-called "Black Hills"
were to be used'as a recreation center. Various schools and
casernes could be constructed in this very scenic area.,
Hospitals and administration buildings were also included.
Thus., the port area could be,kept free from all these build-
ings. The vessels of the naval base could take on supplies
and equipment in the western basin and the supplying of war-
ships with artillery, ammunition, torpedos, mines, depth
charges, etc. could be accomplished at a special pier in. the
western part of the entire installation. Large tunnels for the
various depots could be built in the Buch Hill (up to 51 meters
high) and in the western part of the "Black Hills" (up to 57
meters high). Natural possibilities for camouflage and bomb
protection were thus extensively utilized. All quays were
to be built with a depth of 8.00 meters below low tide.
Breakwe;ter
36. The' construction of a breakwater was planned in order to pro-
'toot the berths of the naval base against the surf during
strong north-west winds occurring on the Bodden. This con-
struetion was to be made with stones and/or concrete blocks,
piled on top of each other.
!'!-Boat and 8ubmarinp Bu tarp
37? when the project for submarine bunkers on Helgoland was started
i
n 1939, the possibilities of building similar installations
on Ruegen were examined. Assuming the construction of the
mole. installation and the canal, the following installations
were examined in a preliminary designs
a. , smaller installation for accommodating PT-boats and
small submarines was planned near Grossbanzelvitz. Only
berths were planned; no repair dock was to be installed
there.
b. The construction of a submarine bunker installation for
submarines, including the largest of the German Navy,
was planned north of Lietzow. The necessary installation
was planned to permit dooking of several boats at the
same time. All necessary workshops were planned. This
installation was also to be built into the hills. When
the construction of this excavation was postponed at
the end of 1939, the pxo ects were no longer mentioned.
c. In 1941-42 the possibility of constructing a submarine
bunker on Ruegen was again discussed in the project office
of the naval construction bureau. The territory around
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Lohme was considered but no satisfactory technical solution
was ever found. Entering and leaving a bunker in this
looation would have been very difficult during north-west
to north-east winds. Navigation of delicate submarines
would have Coen impossible during storms. The realization
of this px jeot was never seriously planned:
38.
39. In.oaae:the construction of a naval port is being considered
in connection with the establishment of national defense forces,
Ruegeu would be the
right place.
R1 G~ARI~IN'( ~.' r -UN 4TA2_0l'IQ ...gZ A a ` ,R '
11Q IAT r, S ON U GEN DURING 1252-55
.40.
oonstruotion of extensive ahipyards
and harbor installations was to be undertaken in the coming
years. Details of the antioipated.oonatruotion target are
still missing. the first construction
period, was to include two moles Paid a large fuel ae of as well
as the,completion of the exo'mation,
Mole Inst&llation and Aortai 4 av -iii, cam,
41 It may be, presumed that nothing will be changed in the basic
outline of the moles and the canal axis, as far as these ?
were stipulated on the' basis of years of planning and research
by the former German Navy in 1939. This is the best possible
connection between the fuel port and the fuel depot. It may
be recommended that the Hydraulic Research Institute in Berlin
prove the correctness of the mole locations in a large-scale
model test. The question can be reexamined whether a, second
entrance may be installed in the west mole - in approximately
a northwest direction. A considerable reduction in cost would
result, but the alluvion (sanding up) will probably prohibit
such a solution. The determination of the, channel depth is
very important, It should be remembered that since 1936,
12.00 meters below low tide was required by the former German
Navy for all new installations (Wilhelmshaven, Helgoland,
Rusgsn and the North-Baltic Oanal) in order to accommodate
large ships. In constructing a now mole installation, al-
lowanoes should be made for the next 30 years as far aM the
technical developments in shipbuilding will permit. In any
case it is recommended to build the moles so that it would be.
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possible to deepen them to 12.00 meters below low tide at a
later time. In this connection it should be pointed out that
.modern tankers of about 22,000 tons have the following measure-
ments.
Length: 160.00 meters
Width: 21.00 meters
Height: 11.00 meters
Draft: 9.20 meters
The development in this specialized field of ship construction
is also progressing rapidly?as new tankers are constantly
increasing in' dimensions.'
42. The entrance between the mole heads could be chosen correctly
at 200.00 meters., The diameter of the turning basin could to
in the magnitude of.400.00 meters. The out-through may probably
be accomplished by d'1r excavating, in which cans it would be
advisable to leave the bottom of the,canalat 12.00 meters
below low tide in view of the Comparative short diotano?
of the out-through (about one sea mile). A later dredging
could,only be accomplished by wet dredging and would be very'
difficult because of the heavy marl bottom.
43, The changing water level must be taken into consideration is
measuring the channel depth. Regarding the water lire!, the'
-
, 1944, on page 320, states that the water
usually .r see in winda from NW to E8E, mostly in NNE and NE
storms, when it may increase to 2.00 meters over normal: It
drops usually in winds from SE'to WNW, mostly in 55W-SW and
WSW storms, when it may drop to 1.3 meters below normal. Water
levels"of 0.5 meters above and 0.5 meters below normal occur
several times during the ye" especially in the autumn and
winter months. The average daily variation in water level is
20 centimeters. The normal level is two centimeters below
sea' level.
44. For the most practical installation of, a fuel depot, it is
important to clarify the question as to whether crude oil
shall be delivered which would first have to be prepared in a
pefiner .
It may be assumed
that ready fuel shoo d be s off- rite i~e - is. at Ruegen. The
measurements of' this fuel depot with all the extra installations
such as laboratories, a dministration,buil4ings and housing,
social accommodations, etc., should be determined early enough
so as to facilitate easy planning.
Yar Insta llations on the East Side of the.Orosi! a mrunder Aodd en
45. It'may be expected that the very advantageous. conditions,
constructionally, strategically, and navigationally, near
Martins Harbor ' will lead'-.to the oonstruotion of a new yard
or'repair,yard in the near future. Since all groups interested
in the coastal area of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik '. -
have busied themselves for over a year with the final location
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47.
48.
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of the large dry dock, it will be attempted in the following
exposition to give a brief on the previous development and the
present stage of the project, in order to stimulate a decision
soon. When the development goals of the two ship yards in'
Warnemuende and Wismar became known in the summer of 19509 the
measurements for the dry dock in Warnemuende were:
Length 160.00 meters
.Width : 24.00 meters
Depth over sill: 6.80 meters under low tide
and one floating dock with about the same measurements was
planned for Wismar.
In the course of time the measurements for the dry dock increased,
so the following measurements were -required in summer 1951:
Length : 230.00 meters
Width 35.00 meters
Depth over sill;: 10.10 meters under low tide
The VEB Industrial Planning Office, Rostock, which was com-
missioned to make the plane for the yard construction, pointed
out on several oooasions that it was their opinion that it
would be technically and industrially wrong to build such a
dry dock in the shipyard area in Warnemuende. Since the mole
installation in Warnemuende only permits a dep?ta of 8.UU meters
under low tide, the construction would Aot be justifiable.
These facts were recognized by the government officials in
Berlin and an engineering board was oom-
missioned to examine the dry dock affair and to work out the
technical data on which a decision could ossibl ,be made b
the ministry.
three harbors on the coast of the DDR, 8tralsund9 Rostock and
Wismar - were examined for the possibility of constructing
a large dry dock installation,
49. Stralsund was immediately excluded from being seriously considered
because of the extremely poor channel conditions. It was then
decided to examine Wismar$ Warnemuendeo and Rostock and to
compare the gross expenditures for construction of the same
dry dock installation in both harbors. At the'same time rough
estimates ' for completion dates were aeoertained.
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50. The necessay, channel depth was calculated at 10.20 motors be-
low low tide plus a water cushion under the keel for main-
taining buoyangy-o l 0.80 meters; thus a total depth of 11.00
meters. below low tide is.nooessaryv Additions for water' level
variations and greater drafts of damaged ships were not con-
sidered. A depth of 12.00 meters below low tide would be bebter??
However, the comparison is based on a depth of 11.00 meters
below low t4de.
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a.
Warnemuende
Expenditure Estimates (Oat Marks)
Dock building
55,000,000
Supplementary costs
3,400, 000 om3 marl and
sand. to be dredged
42,000,000
5.km new moles
175,000,000
new construction,
mole base
east
17,000,000
demolition (wrecking)work
12,000,000
Total.Costd
301,000,000
(additional costs)
(246,000,000)
Construction of the equip-
ment harbor
11,000,000
Restoration of the east
mole,
80O0,000
Extension of both moles
20,000,000
Total '.
44,000,000
51.
Even if the.dock in V`arnemu'enda- is not built, the construction of
the . yard requires considerable additional'costs for dredging,
which were calculated for 8.00 meters and/or 7.30 meters depth
as follows,s
Prom the turning basin
seaward
65,000,000.
sea mil passage 35,000,000
Total 100,000,.000
V, Wismar
Dook building
8uplrmentary costs,
Dredging to `11.00 meters
below low tide` in the
Wismar Bay 'for 13 1/2
STen if one takes into consideration that Oout, 44,000,000
Oat Marks must be expended Without building - the dookW.iu Warns-
muinds, the following expenditures would results.
4,500,000
relocating of the large dry.
look. to Wismar. would result in considerable reduotion in costs.-
Expenditures (Ost''Marks)
301, 000,.000
?. 44 , 000,000
+. 001-.000
below low `tide would cost about 15,000,,000 0st Marks.. It
Ost Marks..' Further dredging of-the, channel to 12.00 meters
Pace of., 1
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Wismar
144
The relocating to Wismar would mean.a saving of 15.7r000,000
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a18w~ .
would take years to accomplish the dredging in Warnemuende
because. of the heavy marl at the bottom and it would be im-
possible,,without.oonstruoting various suitable wet-dredging
equipment., The middle-type ground in Wismar.could be dredged
with the existing machines. The entire dredging could be
performed in :three to four years, and by increasing the amount
.of equipment, the construction time could be shortened.
53? In Deoember 1951 the order was given to begin the, test bores in
Wismar immediately. This: was to obtain necessary information
regarding the ground and no special difficulties of a geo-
logical nature were expected in completing this large oon-
struotio , The intensified boring which began in February 1952
showed surprising results by April 1952. Alma t in all boring
pits; a, 3.00 - 440 motor water-bearing layer was struck at a
depth of about 15.meters below low tide. It consisted of
very-voarsegravel mixed with a large quantity of large atones.
lm isolated places another ground water layer was discovered
,(about 22.00 meters below low tide ground
This, was ar'tssiaa
water, which rises to about +5.00 to 6.00 metiers above low tide.
concerned with ascertaining the
direction of the ground water. ,It may be expected that the
upper ground water stream flows parallel to the surface of the
earth from the northtre0t higher territory to the ata. It must
also be determined '4bother a lowering of.the ground water to
aboutr204o meters below low bide ispossible' during construction
without. drawing,the ground water from the surrounding territory.
This is a delicate - question,, since the building timo'is ex-
peoted to be about. three years., A constant lowering of the
ro
d
t
r
g
un
wa
e
may? hardly be expected for the. above mentioned
reasons. The consequences that muot be drawn from this dis-
agreeable information are manifold. Individually they are:
&.,_The projected work can only be begun at s much later date
because there is no clarity yet on the ground water - situa,-
tion (delay in completion).'
The problem as to, whether' work may be done with a lowering
of the ground water must be examined. ..If;this possibility
'does not exist, then.'a shaft must?be built in an open
.excavation to'a depth of about. 2.50 meters above ground
'w,ater and then book off the water layer by means' of
W
heat-piliaig. ('onsiderable delay inOOm1etion and high
additional 'building costa.:)
It must also, be datermined', whether it would beat all
possible to.. ram ' through the,grave; layer that contains so
many large stones with rein~orobd concrete' sheet pilings.,
Since it is very -dif 'i oul.t . to : oour.a " onox'eta sheet
ili
p
ngs, ;new difficulties
calcul tad :from the b:eg nrii''n . ,wince the ; eotui gaol ogical
condition's condition's Y}ave,be.come owrr,:,,it is to sae"e petted that
considerable additional oonst.Ouotiona]. measures toast be
included because af' the inter
aeed buoyancy (tension piles
?
or more. concrete), resulting An high ad4i:tional vests.
In recognitian. of.. these newt arisen d f'fioulties, the
V1B,Zndustry-Design-Rootook is..seeking a more favorable
looatton, within the VVi?amar ay for th, day dock, the dif-
ou
fi
lt ee having been clearly recognized., In .oanaeation
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AM=
Although the newest difficulties were not
yet known,.it.was strongly advised to build the large
dock on Ruegen. In' view of the fact that the mole in-
stallation and the excavation could be installed as.an
isolated project. the. investigation of, the construction
of a dry dock ould, be only advantageous. The following
serious reasons against t he building of a dr dock in
Wismar ,!ere
Wismar is not. strategically well located, only 60 km.
from'Luebeok.. The large dock. should doubtlessly
be at the disposal of the fleets of the Soviet Union
and Poland,
(2) Should. warships call at the dock, espionage could
.not be prevented, einae the dock can be completely.
observed with field glasses from surrounding heights.
'Constrotion of ei'feative antiaircraft artillery
oaxznot' bs as easily carried out as,,on Buegen.
(3) ; The dock-was to be built on the north end of the
yard, about two and,one-half kilometers from the
repair ,section of the, yard. The' .ship repair halls
are locate. on the western side of the 9o+Qalled
west harbor. Building several.new work balls in the
immediate vicinity of iha dock cannot be avoided. ,
(4) Wismar is located on the southern tip of the Wismar
Bay. The Bay is very,flat in,the southern part as
.well as all along the shore, so the early formation
of ice is promoted. Flat bays and narrow channels
fresse relatively, easily. The Ba];tio Sla j n al,
1944P page 274, states the following bout Wismara,.
In the, flat channel to Wismar which have very little
current, ice appears far more frequently than in
neighboring ports on the open sea, of the last-.30
winters (1911-1,2 to 1940-41.) only five wintereswere
completely free of ice. On the,other hand, during
the ,..game period shipping was' only completely. closed
.th ie times because of ice, the longest period wag.
39 days in the viinter of 1939.40?
In medium and severe winters usually.only temporary
traces of ice may appear about the first of Deoemberi
normally, lasting ice appears only between Christmas
and New Year. In moderately severe.winters one can
oovzt on the ice disappearing in February, in severe
winters this process can be delay6d until the middle
or even the end of March. ,4u iAddition, the outer
..channel to Wismar is urproteo ted from storms from
all wind directions. During strong winds damaged
ships would have to await a lull on the, open sea.
The conditions may not be termed favorable .n any
respect.
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54!-
55*
The approach to Wismar - also to the yard ? is about
13 1/2 sea miles.long. Of this distance the last
Six sea miles proceed through a channel 50 meters
wide at the base and with a depth of 8.00 meters
below low tide. The entire channel has several
curves, with sharp 'angles on the outer side. If a
damaged ship would have to be brought into the dock
with the help of tug boats, it could only be acoom-
plished with utmost difficulties. Maneuvering the
tug boats in the' narrow channel would entail countless
dangers to the damaged ship. Incase a hawser should
break, or for any other reason (sabotage) the ship
should go aground in the channel; it would block
the entire harbor traffic of Wismar for a long time.
Raising-work would be very tedious under s oh narrow
channel oonditions. the above
Mentioned explanations are so convincing, that all.
authoritative offices should be induced to review
the entire dock situation.
71
a medium,-sized dock is to be 1a d
for the Warnow Yard. ktepaiar installations would also then be
necessary in Warnemuends? The T'he expenditure: would not be under.
etandable, since in the neighboring
wteptuS Yard therel
are float' d k .
n
g oc s whicah could be used.
It is proposede To build the large dry 'doalr together with a
smaller dock on Ruw..' an and, to plan a slip i"gr ships up to
1, 000 tons in the Yard. heir dookings for larger
ships would' all come to, Ruegen, while 411 units awaiting
"repairs in all yards would be ,towed to ausgezi for underwater
repairs.. Thus far all dookings had to take place in Antwerp.
Naturally the necessary halls and' workshop ,would,'hays to be
built at this dome: group.. All diaa.dvautages lusted for Wieimar
would be eliminated for 1iu,egon` and oonziderabls' savings could
be expected. Rxpsrisnoe, shows that a repair .yard cannot be
operated profitably alone, so in time' it aru,.d be' necessary
to install a shipyard for new construction of comparable size.
The yard workers could be kept'bury-even ifthe dry dock is not
being completely utilized.' If larger ships than 100000 tons
should be built in,the. course of 'further soouosaioel development'
of, the DDR, Ruegen would offer the possibility' of constructing
building docks and slips-under than best building conditions,
Particularly ,the building of largor naval units was thought'
of in this connection.
O T I 1aiTTL I G ro~-n Ynnr~rn~
~6. ?ppropriate construction sites for building-pT-boats and sub".
marine bunkers could be found. In this case the sites chosen
in 1939-40 would again b.u considered. Tie. southern ,part of the
Sodden would be the appropriate site for th, .i.nstp,llation of a
naval basin with many berths and aooomnodating naval schools.
The buildings could be 'located to a Aare' extent in the nearby
woods. The mine and torpedo yards, ammunition depots for all
calibers would ,best be situated near the- village Ralewisk.
sere the various installations could be built bomb-proof in
the Such Hills and the western part of the "Black Hills",
8 RET
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57? At this point the overseas port for freighters over 12,000 tons
'well known, the three ports Wismar, Roetook and Stralsund can-
not become very important as long as the entrance conditions
are not improved and connection,to canal-net
cannot be guaranteed. imports and etports have to
be transported by rail,.espooially in the case of the first
two ports. The. overloading of the present railroads already
requires new. railways and stations. It is most uncertain and
problematical whether the German railway is in a position
to transport the constantly increasing cargo without too great
delay and breakdown. The only first class waterway is,the
Oder River. ?If it were. possible to deepen and level the water-
ways,to the harbor of Stralsund at not too great ax expense,
the problem would already be solved. It is therefore sug-
gested-that, the overseas port in the Groesen Jasmuinder Bodden,
be'built. The possibilities for enlargement in.this'bay are
so far-reaching that an agreement in plans by all interested
groups should be possible. Railway connection could be com-
paratively; easily! installed. The freight could also be trans-
ferred directly from large ships to modern motor freight barges
by means, of, lighters. If. the necessary quay sheds. were
built, a regular pick yip and delivery service could be developird.
About 60 - 70% of all winds come from the west, so the vessels
could go southward through. the Bodden.and southeast canal in the
lee of the island. The way would obnti.nue via the Greifewalder
Bodden, Pseue River, the, Kleine Rafe'; into the Oder River.
Then the middle-European waterways would be open to various
transports. It ehould'not be especially difficult to build
flat motor bargee in the.inland ship yards and equip them
properly for the tiansporte.
54. -The, 'core of the foregoing comments is the description of the
"large dry dock". An immediate ,and final, decision, on the lo-
oat on of the construction, iaa ab oolutely neo'ewsary in the in-
terest 'of 's timely and suocesefu.l start; of the project.
59.. If it should 'be decided to oonstruot this project on Ruegen,
the necessary construction measures could be coordinated with
.the preparational work for ',the oompleti.on oaf the mole project
equipping the ponstruotion site, boring, construction of,housing '
or.workere, etcA~.
60.
BEGET
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