ACTIVITY OF THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN RESPECT TO MARCH 1953 CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A000300510001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/03/05 : CIA-RDP80-00810A000300510001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY Chile
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean.
Ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and IN, of the U.S. Code, M
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person Is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
Activity of the Chilean Co i
mmuj t, ply DATE DISTR.
R
n
espect to march _19.53 Chilean
Congressional Elections
NO. OF PAGES
0
25X1A
2'8 February 1953
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
PLACE ACQUIRED
25X1
25X1
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE' APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. In reference to pre-electoral activity of. the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)!:
and, expectations for the March 1953-Chilean Congressional and Municipal.
elections ~ a , defeat for the Communists.._and..the Frente del Pueblo is predioted611.
The estimated Frente del Pueblo voting. strength, based on studies effeotsd:
recently by the PCCh electoral affairs.committee, is 100,000, Howover,
~ this
is a. maximum figure .and probably is very unreliable, inasmuch as it is`not
even broken down into area distribution,:nor was it calculated on that,badise
This in itself makes the estimate rather meaningless in view of the regional
bases -on which the elections are to be h
:4
e
2. PCCh leaders would reportedly
consider the: Party-as having won a moral vi0tory
should the nationwide Front., rqAl __
WJL%owwu. VW
ibanista total,fall"below 300,000 votes. Fri-
electoral's tivitys and/or F,theronts,
del Pueblo meanwhile has been at a virtual. standstill, and what litt esthere has
been hasp been considered: ineffective. ., .
This state of affairs is ittributsd
primarily.to,the reluctance of regional ,and local Communist leaders to collaborate
with:. their Socialist allies and the failure. of the Frente del'ueblo to formalise
regional,--.pacts with other politioal.groups.., Only in the Antofagasta - Tarapaca
prov.noes where the Frente del Puebla and; Radicals are banding together in
support.'. of Senatorial candidates Salvador ALLENDE Grossems (Sopol,list).and
Barcial MOW Miranda (Radical), is there any semblance of effective campaigning
by the Frente del Pueblo. It is... reF;ported that the pre-electoral activity of the
other non-Ibaniata forces has been equally as slow and ineffective as that of
the Communists and Frente del Pueblo to date.
The PCCh meanwhile has authorized Frente'del Pueblo negotiators to make regional
and local electoral pacts with any"-political
groups or parties whatsoever,
including the Rightist Parties and
v
e
en the Popular Socialists, so long as
these pacts strengthen the chances of Frente del Pueblo candidates in the area
involved. The PCCh is however reserving the right to reject Fronts del Pueblo
Support of certain Radical candidates whom it considers-"morally tinaooepts,blee
CONFIDENTIAL
NAVY AIR FBI ,r AEC
(NNse W