DESTRUCTIVE DEFORESTATION IN EAST GERMANY, 1945-1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 231
• Publication Date: February 3, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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DESTRUCTIVE DEFORESTATION IN EAST GERMANY 1945-1954
This report gives information on the effects of land reform and
collectivization in forestry in the Soviet Zone of Germany, standing
timber and lumbering according to Soviet plan targets, the organiza-
tion of transport and distribution, reparations deliveries and forced
exports of forestry products, neglect of timber reserves and of n g-
estat ion, the SED personnel policy in the forestry service, organiza-
tion of the East German forestry administration, and exploitation of
the forest workers,]
More than 136 million cubic meters of timber has been cut in the Soviet
Zone of Germany from the beginning of the Soviet occupation to late 1953. The
plan figures for the annual timber cutting were set by the Soviet occupation
Power, and the SED guaranteed fulfillment of the plan by the use of terror
against the forestry service technicians and lumbermen. e
re of portsTto the grea Soviet ablocc ctheountcrieutstaimbndealsor or as . for Aed n
siderabl. share was used by the occupation forces. Partners. A con-
The following statistics give some indications as to the extent of repa-
rations shipments of timber from East German forests. During 1949, the number
of railroad cars which rolled each month to the East, loaded with timber and
lumber, averaged 7,500 to 8,000. Between 1947 and 1952, [prefabricated] wooden
houses of first-quality wood with a floor area of over 3 million square meters
were delivered for reparations account. During June 1b54, more than 1,000
railroad cars passed through Frankfurt/Oder an route to the USSR with [pre-
fabricated] wooden houses and furniture.
These arbitrarily selected examples show the contradictory manner in which
East Germany, which, in comparison with its domestic demand, is poor in food
resources and formerly imported lumber from other countries including the USSR,
was forced to export wood.
The last example cited above indicates that, after the official termina-
tion of reparations, the shipments of wood and wood products for the occupation
power did not diminish. In addition to [prefabricated] wooden houses, furni=
tore, cellulose, paper, railroad ties, and pit wood, timber is also exported
now as in previous years to Soviet bloc countries, particularly to the USSR,
which itself abounds in forests.
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During the last 9 years, the population of the Soviet Zone has suffered
directly from this destructive deforestation, and it is still subjected to
many sacrifices. Too little wood is made available for the demands of the
public. Furniture is available in limited quantity and poor quality, and it
is very expensive. Wood supplies for paper production are also extremely
short. Even the ROs and the consumer cooperative stores do not have enough
paper bags and wrapping material. Cardboard is a bottleneck in the entire
consumer goods industry.
East German plan figure for 1954 and 1955, as well as the long-range
plan up to 1960, leave no douot that wood and wood products will continue to
be diverted from the population to the Sovie? occupation power and its puppet,
the SED government.
The
reckless exploitationdofoalltforestry workers. The wages of lumbermen are yde-a
plorably low and, like all wages in the Soviet Zone, have little purchasing
power. A system of work norms which is tied to the low level of wages forces
the wor;ers to overexertions. In addition, they have little suitable work
clothing, pcrticuiarly shoes. Modern timber cutting tools are also in very
short supply. Motor saws in operating condition are seen very infrequently.
E"'=r suv ?;i~uie r.:or.ua_ tools as axes and saws are of
ir,:reased work efrorts. poor quality and demand
f The East German economic plan systematically neglects the needs of the
orestry service in regard to technical supplies in favor of other plan goals.
This is also the case with consumer goods production generally.
Of the total of about 2 million hectares of state-exploited woodlands,
the Soviet Zone ),,as already completely deforested a total of 600,000 hectares,
and a further area of 750,000 hectares has only half of its previous stand of
timber. Reforestation measures taken up to the present time are so limited in
scope that it will take about 100 years to repair the damages inflicted on the
.crests.
The measures taken ty the Soviet occupation power to change ownership
conditions in the forestry field served merely to tic forestry exploitation
into the organizational system of the monopolistic dictatorial economy. Dur-
ing the so-called land reform, about 826,n00 hectares of privately owned forest
lands were expropriated from landowners. holding 100 hectares or more. Of this
total, about 457,000 hectares were di utrituted to small agricultural enter-
prises. Under conditions in the Soviet Zone and with operating capital in
short supply, these enterprises were too small to he economically viable, and
ere forced to exploit their forest lands :eyond reason. After this reform of
forest lands, the small agricultural enterprises with less than 100 hectares
per 'arm controlled a total of 973,050 hectares of forest lands, but of these,
nearly two thirds, or about 5 P,000 hectares, were split up into little patches
of up to 5 hectares. However, the right of exploitation of forest lands was
soon. taken array even from those agricultural enterprises which were not ex-
propriated in the land reform, tot which to some extent profited from it. This
was done through an exploitation control instituted by the SED government.
Further, in mid-1952, the collectivization drive was launched, under
terms of which all agricultural and forest lands still formally under private
ownership are scheduled to expropriated and reorganized into agricultural pro-
ducer cooperatives (LPG.) and state-owned farms (VE-Gueter).
STAT
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revolt in June 1 -"y"b1Y1ss on rrom mid-1952 to the workers'
953, a large proportion of the agricultural and forestry lands
were expropriated. Forest lands held by enterprises not yet expropriated or
collectivized have already been organized into "forestry cooperatives" (Wald-
gemeinechaften) under the administrative control of the Kreis councils, which
exploit the lands in accordance with the targets of the SED economic plan.
Thus the entire forest land of the Soviet Zone is being incorporated into
the monopolistic economy of the SED dictatorship, and the sovietization of the
forest lands is being expanded. This does not proceed without opposition.
The forestry experts have resisted the destructive deforestation with all ap-
propriate means and have done their best to modify the more extreme measures.
For this reason the SED has purged the forestry force in its usual manner, has
eliminated most of the skilled, experienced men, and has replaced them with
unskilled, inexperienced, but faithful party-liners. The criterion applied in
the selection of these SED cadres was a willingness to fulfill the Soviet pro-
duction quota and to exploit the forestry workers to the limits of their
.trength in their pursuit of the destructive deforestation program.
However, not all of the men selected by the SED have reacted as expected.
Many of them, together with the held-over older experts, still place the long-
term interests of the German people ahead of other considerations and do all
they can by way of personal initiative and sacrifice to protect the forest re-
serves from the policy of destructive deforestation.
It is typical of the cynicism of the SED dictatorship that Rau, member of
the Central Committee of the SED, has announced that it will only be a question
of time before the regime also administers the forest resources of West Germany.
He made this statement in his capacity as chairman of the State Planning Com-
mission, at a time when the forestry experts told his that standing timber in
East Germany was less than the plan goal set for 1954 and 1955, and that cut-
ting at this rate could only he done at the expense of future timber resources.
Furthermore, the Central Committee of' the SED, explaining to the forestry school
of the Soviet Zone its request for an extremely large number of forestry stu-
dents, said that these experts would be needed to administer West German for-
ests!
i. EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM AND COLLECTIVIZATION IN FORESTRY
in 1945, before the !and reform the forest area of the Soviet Zone of
Germany was as follows (in 1,000 hectares):
Laender
k
M
State
Forests
Comrunal
Forests
Over
100 ha
Up to
100 ha
Total
ec
lenburg
252
35
!45
19
451
Brandenburg
403
69
300
122
894
Sachsen-Anhalt
S
122
19
168
249
559
achsen
188
49
133
103
473
Thueringen
198
75
80
142
495
Total
1,162
248
826
636
2,871
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during the course Of which the following forest areas were expropriatedoas2.of
I January 1946 (later changes were negligible) and incorporated into the land
funds of the individual Laender (in 1,000 hectares):
Laender
Mecklenburg
Brandenburg
Sachsen-Anhalt
Sachsen
Thueringen
Total
State Communal Private Forests
Forests Forests Over 100 ha Total
37 1 145 183
19 7 300 327
5 -- 169 ? 173
13 3 133 149
1, -- 8o 85
7F 11 826 915
According to figures as of 1 January 1947, it is reported that a total of
)66,700 hectares of forest lands had teen expropriated and incorporated into
the land funds.
The taking over of state and communal forests was carried out without
being called for in the law. This was done at the initiative of the local So-
viet Kreis commanders and the local SED so as to be able to distribute land
even where there were no private forests of more than 100 hectares. In general,
the land reform was carried out largely on the basis of local political whim.
The purpose of the Kreis commandants was undoubtedly to try to win the new
settlers over to Communism.
Forest land was distributed from the land funds as follows (in 1,000 hec-
tares):
To New To Former To State To Communal
Laender Farmers Farmers Forests Forests Total
Mecklenburg 95 19 67 2 183
Brandenburg 156 29 88 60 327
Sachsen-An-
halt 64 -- 83 25 173
Sachsen 63 2 65 19 149
Thueringen 35 1 29 19 84
Total 412 51+ 333 125 915
Although forest lands are probably the most unsuitable land for small in-
dividual exploitation, the forestry authorities failed in their efforts to
prevent the division of the forests among the new settlers and to add the ex-
propriated forest lands to the state forests.
Just how much political considerations influenced the distribution of
forest lands in the land reform can be seen from the fact that the target of
345,000 hectares to be distributed to farmers was exceeded by 113,000 hectares,
whereas the target for distribution to communities feel 40,000 hectares below
the plan goal of 165,000 hectares.
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s' about
457,000 hectares, was distributed among new settlersetc., in a
l d
3-5 hectares, and later 8-10 hectares, although these norms were dilutedfcon-
siderably in practice.
The division of forest reserves was carried out locally with little or
no attention paid to the requirements of good forestry practice. The crite-
rion was apparently to distribute the older, exploitable forest lands among
the farmers, while the younger stands were given over to the state or com-
munal forests. The resulting patchwork patterns of ownership could seldom be
corrected because of the heavy pressure exerted by the SED, especially since
the forestry experts were prohibited from taking any part whatever in the
land reform program. The forestry laboratory lands (Lehrreviere) of the Ebers-
walde forestry school were thus distributed and could only be reclaimed after
long and arduous efforts.
Just how ridiculous the distribution was can be seen from the fact that
valuable hardwood stands were divided among farmers living 30 and 50 kilo-
meters away. Only in Sachsen-Anhalt was it possible for an energetic, polit-
ically powerful man to correct these excesses.
The remaining 458,000 hectares of forest lands affected by the land re-
form became state and communal forests.
The distribution of the forest lands under the land reform in the Soviet
Zone was as follows on 1 January 1946 (in 1,000 hectares):
Laender
Total
- including -
State
Forests
Private Forests
Under 100 ha
Mecklenburg
451
36
133
Brandenburg
894
121
301
Snr_hsen-Anhalt
559
45
314
Sachsen
473
66
167
Thueringen
495
94
178
Total
2,871
361
1,100
The forestry inventory carried out in the Soviet Zone in 1949 divided
the private forests into those over 5 hectares and those of up to 5 hectares.
Forest lands were then distributed as follows (in 1,000 hectares):
State
Communal
Private Forests
Laender
Forests
For
t
es
s
Over 5 he
U2 to 5 ha
H
T
t
l
o
a
Mecklenburg
272
42
13
119
445
Brandenburg
397
107
169
r
198
871
Sachsen-Anhalt
300
92
85
105
582
Sachsen
256
43
56
96
450
Thueringen
231
124
51
81
48
7
Total
1,455
407
374
599
2,834
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If the foregoing figures should reveal a number of inconsistencies, it
should be borne in mind that many statistics coming out of the Soviet Zone
are undependable. All of the governmental offices there are understaffed, so
that accuracy often suffers.
It is interesting to note that the above statistics, issued by the sta-
tistical office on the 1949 forestry inventory, differ from those of the for-
est administration. The latter reports a total of 2,749,000 hectares,
including 1,385,000 hectares of state forests, 374,000 hectares of communal
forests, 368,000 hectares of private forest lands over 5 hectares, and
623,000 hectares of private forest lands up to 5 hectares (total: 2,750,000).
In early 1952, the communal forests were turned over to the state for-
ests, when the state forestry enterprises (STFBs) were organized. The so-
called church forest was not affected by this measure and has not been touched
up to now.
Forest land owned by farmers was briefly freed of any kind of state for-
estry supervision by the land reform, although the Regulation of Forestry in
the Soviet Zone of 29 October 1945, issued with the consent of the SMA (So-
viet Military Administration), clearly stated: All forestry in the Soviet
Zone will be _entrally administered and carried out." The temporary freedom
was granted in order to make the farmers believe that the SED intended to
promote the interests of the farmers. At that time, forestry experts were
prohibited from intercession of any kind in the exploitation of the forest
lands held by farmers.
It could not be expected that the farmers would follow good forestry
practice. The reasons for this lay in the poverty of the refugees, new
farmers, and small farmers, who tried to raise the money required for getting
their farms going by exploiting their forest holdings. The farmers, stripped
by the Soviet occupation of all resources required for operating their farms,
were free to make what use they chose of their forest holdings, and this they
did with an urgency corresponding to their poverty.
In one rural h eis in Sachsen having a total of 256 hectares of land-re-
form forest lands held by farmers, 25,000 cubic meters of timber was cut in
the period 146-1950, which comes to 98 cubic meters per hectare, or, depend-
ing on the stand, 11 to 25 cubic meters per hectare per year. Of this area,
29 percent was stripped without regard to proper forestry practice, but only
2.3 percent was replanted. The Mate of the area which was not stripped was
described as follows: "Destruction of the backbone of the stand by cutting
out the strongest trunks, exposing the rest to the danger of wind damage,
decreasing crown density (Kronenschluss) from 0.9 to 0.3 area coverage (Rae-
umde). Only 25 percent of this lumber ever reached normal trade channels.
The rest disappeared into the black market and barter trade.
In spite of this destructive deforestation, which was by no means the
exception, no steps were taken against the land-reform farmers, since they
were in great difficulties and there was a reluctance to embitter them polit-
ically.
Things were changed, however, when it was discovered that the repara-
tions deliveries could no longer be covered by cuttings from the state forests.
To withdraw the freedom of exploitation from the farm-operated forest lands
by decree was a step no one wanted to take. As early as 1948: there was a
certain amount of pressure from the SMA and SED to merge the farmers' forest
holdings into cooperatives and thus to get their output under control. These
efforts were at first entirely without success, since the farmers were opposed
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o any kind of Official restriction. In view of the fact that their farms
were already under the control of the state economy, they wanted to preserve
their freedom to exploit their woodlands at all costs, and, with this freedom,
their one means of acquiring ready cash.
With the creation of the Association for Mu;ual farmers' Aid (VdgB),
which was designed to control more or less forcibly the agricultural sector
of the economy, a similar control of the farm-owned woodlands was established
during the same year.
In early 1951, the Forest Exploitation Directives for Forest Cooperatives
and Peasant Foresters were n-m?ieated by decree. Financial pressures were
applied to make the farmers joir the cooperatives. Farmers who were not members
of the cooperatives had to pay to the state forestry administration fees per
hectare of land and cubic meter of timber cut; which were five to seven times
as high as those paid by members of cooperatives.
Under this kind of pressure the distribution of forest land ownership
was as follows by the end of 1951 (in hectares):
Laender
Total Farm
Forest L
d
Forest lands in
an
s
Forest c-..e?...__
114,410
Brandenburg
126,000
-
147,851
Sachsen
155,000
43,627
7,079
Total
974
608
,
378,586
The essential purpose of the exploitation directives was to merge the
farm-owned forest lands into forestry districts (Reviere) administered by so-
called peasant foresters under the Kress forestry offices. As of 1952, ex-
ploiitatttionedof the farm-forest ::ands of less than 5 hectares was no longer
erm without restriction and was planned by the state. In 19521952,
pplans :called for about one million cubic meters from this source, but, only
22 percent of this plan was fulfilled.
This timber has to be turned over to the state timber supply organiza-
tion for the "normal price," which is still the ,44 ceiling price plus an
additional payment. The additional payments average up to 50 percent of the
normal price for logs, up to 100 percent for pit props, and up to 75 percent
for fiber wood. In establishing the prises of veneers and plywoods, the ad-
ditional payment is set by agreement with the buyer of the wood, so that no
losses will result in production, In this manner, state exploitation of
farmers' wood lots even of 5 hectares or less was accomplished. The farmers
can cut wood from their lots for their own use only with the consent of the
Kress forestry office.
With this, the right of the farmers to make use of their woodlands, in-
cluding those allocated to them by the land reform, was completely rescinded.
The actual expropriation of the farm wood lots was begun with the collectivi-
zation of agriculture in mid-1952. The forest lands of farms of over 20 hec-
tares expropriated during the first wave of collectivization were turned over
to the agricultural producer cooperatives (I.PGs), or to the local state
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agricultural enterprises for later distribution to the LPGs. Furthermore,
the woodlands of the smaller farmers whose lands were being collectivized
were turned over to the LPGs, and thus into the hands of the SED dictator-
ship.
The capital of forestry is the standing timber in the woodlands, which
continues to grow and increase. Thus the exploitation level depends on the
standing timber and its rate of growth.
In 1945, excessive cutting for armament and war needs had left the for-
est resources at a subnormal level, without placing continued long-term ex-
ploitation in jeopardy however. Although the Third Reich overexploited the
Brest resources of the country, the forestry experts did manage to reduce
the bad effects to a minimum. This situation was radically changed after the
Soviet occupation.
To gain an over-all view of the available forest resources, the SMA (So-
viet Military Administration) ordered a survey of forest land in the summer
of 1946. However, this survey was carried out in such an unscientific fash-
ion and the personnel used were so few and so poorly qualified that no reliable
result could be achieved. On the other hand, expectations of the SMA that
the data would be unreasonably high so as to justify o.erexploitation, were
not fulfilled.
The forestry resources survey was repeated as of 1 April 1949. This was
prepared in such a way as to permit the highest possible level of exploitation,
but was, in the final analysis, completely worthless.
'dire the survey was carried out by reasonably competent personnel the
results were perhaps acceptable. but in general they were no more reliable
than these of 1946, largely because of too little time and too few people.
The target was set at 100 hectares surveyed per day. Even a highly qualified
forestry expert could only render a superficial judgement on this basis, and
many were in no sense qualified. Same had no experience or training whatever
and thus were forced to make rule-of-thumb estimates.
The 1946 inventory set the available timber at 254,677,000 cubic meters
for a forest area of 2,693,000 hectares. This breaks down to 95 cubic meters
per hectare. Timber with a diameter of more than 25 centimeters at chest
height, i.e., timber nearly ready for cutting, was estimated at 88 million
cubic meters. Of this latter total, 17.7 million cubic meters was in Mecklen-
burg, 24.6 million in Brandenburg, 16.3 million in Sachsen-Anhalt, 7.7 million
in Sachsen, and 21.5 million in Thueringen.
The 1 April 1949 surrey, carried out only for state and corporate wood-
lands, estimated 1c1,500,000 cubic meters of standing timber on an area of
1,804.000 hectares, or about 1~)1 cubic meters per hectare.
However, between 1946 and 1949 about 55 million cubic meters of timber
was cut. This comeu to 20 to 22 cubic meters per hectare.
In spite of this, the 1949 estimate was higher than that of 1946: Of
course any survey on such a scale will contain a number of unavoidable errors.
However, the foregoing figures clearly demonstrate that the surveys are vir-
tually worthless. This is especially true since the normal age ratio of the
timber, a factor which has a great bearing on long-term exploitation, has been
thoroughly disrupted. Timler in the large and medium-size groups has been
virtually all cut. The present make-up of the forests makes any estimate as
to future growth completely impossible.
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with
timber reserves of 149,687,000 cubic meters, or90cubic ~meters Per hectare.
However, between 1949 and 1953, 953, 26 cubic meters per hectare were cut: Thus
the inventory of 1953 can be no more relied upon than those of 1946 and 1949,
the less so since it was designed to support the state forestry enterprises'
plan as of 1 January 1953 and also to justify the highest possible exploita-
tion level.
It is demonstrated again and again that the SED dictatorship is trying
to obtain its needs through exploitation of the remaining standing timber
with no thought whatever for the need for future growth. The supplementary
lumbering goals for 1953 and 1954, over and above those previousiy set, were
the result of the fact that the Soviet Zone had been forced to go without the
timber imports called for in its trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and
Hungary in favor of urgent imports of foodstuffs.
During the first years of the Soviet occupation, not only the volume but
also the type of timber cut by the forestry administration and its allocation
among the five Laender of the Soviet Zone, were decided by the head of the SMA.
The volume and type of lumbering were determined by the Soviet repara-
tions end military needs, the German forestry experts having not the slightest
,Sy in the m tier. No attention whatever was paid to the needs of the German
economy, insofar as it was not tied up with reparations contracts.
The term reparations must be taken here in a very wide sense. In this
sense the Soviets made use of all forestry products which could in any way be
turned into foreign currency or other assets. By way of example, a complaint
about a large quantity of veneer oak, which was supposedly delivered to Po-
land as reparations, came to the Soviet Zone from Copenhagen!
The forestry section of the SMA, which gave the orders for forestry ex-
ploitations, always added a wide margin to the requirements of the reparations
department so that there would be no stoppage of deliveries. The Soviet
estry experts were most ea r to s, for-
that they would not to seent~back toe thetUSany SR, rwhich Lwasothefusual vwayeof deal-
ing with such situations. This fear had th.e natural result in that the
stocks of cut timber were far in excess of a tolerable level. For example,
on 31 December 1046 there were about 6 million cubic meters of cut timber
awaiting pickup in the forests. By 31 May 1,J47, in a period of 5 months,
this volume rose to 8 million cubic meters, and by the end of 1947, it stood
at 11 million cubic meters, half of it in logs. Since 1951, a regulation
exists that all timber cut in a given calendar year has to be shipped by
31 December. Compliance with this order, however, is always hampered by lack
of transport equipment.
When the "German Democratic Republic" was founded in October 1949, the
right to order cuttings was transferred to SED officials. However, the
Pankow government is just as much suiject to the reparations and foreign-
exchange requirements of the USSR as the forestry officials of the SMA previ-
ously were.
If the SMA forestry department at first seemed primarily interested in
getting German lumbering under way again, it soon became clear that their
main objective was to subjugate Soviet Zone forestry to Soviet; interests to
the greatest degree possible. They introduced the Soviet forestry year,
based on the calendar year, in the Soviet Zone, replacing the German forestry
year, which runs from 1 October to 30 September of the following year and
which is thus more in harmony with the biological rhythm of nature. ,
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Shortly thereafter, it became quite clear that the rhythm of nature was
of no importance any more to the lumbering industry in the Soviet Zone.
Whereas German forestry practice calls for cutting from fall to spring, tim-
ber was now cut from 1 January to 31 Dece'aber, even though timber cut in the
summer, during the growth year, is easily subject to deterioration.
The timber felling plan target was divided into quarters, so that the
fulfillment of the annual plan could be better supervised. The fact that
10,000 cubic meters of veneer oak, because of transportation failures, deteri-
orated to such an extent that 9,000 cubic meters of it could only be used for
firewood, seems not to have been a matter of interest to the SMA. Plans to
cut another 10,000 cubic meters in the same place could only be blocked by
going outside regular channels.
Pine which had discolored as the result of having been cut in summer was
refused as reparations delivery, but nonetheless the suggestion that summer
cutting be stopped was turned down.
Because of the lack of qualified personnel in the land forestry offices,
a logical allocation of the plan targets for timber felling among the various
forestry districts was very difficult anyhow. This allocation of quotas was
often carried out in an even more illogical way by ...tervention of the Soviet
forestry officers, who had little knowledge of local conditions but who med-
dled in everything.
By way of example, several thousand cubic meters of pine were cut each
year on a peninsula of an inland lake for 3 years in a row without one cubic
meter of wood ever being taken out of the woods; this on orders from the So-
viet officials. That the Soviets were interested only in plundering the for-
est resources of the Soviet Zone is indicated by the fact that the only basis
used in establishing cutting norms was the total amount of standing timber
available and not the amount maturing annually. For example, a quota of an
additional million cubic meters of timber was transferred from Sachsen to
Mecklenburg when it was learned from the survey carried out in the summer of
1946 that Mecklenburg had greater resources of pine and hardwood timber. In
the same way, those industries working on reparations orders (paper, cellu-
lose, textiles, etc. were g?.ven ariority in lumber supply.
The official timber cutting quotas of the SMA, in round numbers, ran as
follows: last quarter of 1945, 5 million cubic meters; 1946, 19 million;
1947, 21 million 1946, 17 million: 1.4y, 13 million; 1950, 14 million; 1951,
14 million; and 1952, 12 million. No final figures are yet known for 1953,
but these can be estimated on the basis of available data at about 12 million
cubic meters. This comes to a total of 127 million cubic meters of official
timber felling.
In the years up to 1949, the total annual cut was considerably exceeded
on orders of the local Kreis commanders and other Soviet officials. After
1950, cutting in excess of plan was officially prohibited, but a new trick
was used to reach the same end: the annual plan total had to be fulfilled
ahead of schedule, i.e., by October. The timber felled during the rest of
the year was then called "a start on the next year," without this total ever
being taken into account in the total cut the following year. Overfulfill-
ment of the plan was thus achieved by way of the back door.
In addition to the centrally ordered cutting, there was a not inconsider-
able local, unofficial cutting. In part, this was carried out as a special
firewood action for the population, in part by the occupation forces for
their own use, and in part it was covered up by entries as timber damaged by
insects, an item which could not be checked. These additional cuttings could
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be conservatively estimated as 1.5 million to 2 million The cubic total would
ters per year,
or a total of 9 million cubic meters to the end of 1950?
thus be 127 million plus 9 million, or 136 million cubic meters, or 68 cubic
meters per hectare on the state-administered or state-exploited forest lands
of about 2 million hectares. This is many times the total which should have
been cut on the Is of tie stand and its maturation.
The Five-Year Plan again calls for 10 million cubic meters per year in
1954 and 1955, which means, on the basis of previous experience, that the
quotas will be o!erfulfilled to about 12 million cubic meters annually. In
addition to this, there will again be an uncontrollable cutting for military
needs and on military training grounds. If one bears in mind that, of the
2 million hectares of state forests, at least three quarters have less than
40 or 50 percent of their normal stand of timber and that about 600,000 hec-
tares have been completely stripped, it becomes clear that such large-scale
cuttings can no longer be covered by
t
ma
uring tibd
mer an will have to come
out c.^ existing reserves; which again will reduce the rate of natural increase.
Th? Soviet Zone practice of expressing the excess exploitation in per-
centa.ge terms of tl:?= n.aturirl,; tinier is deliberately false and misleading,
since they mate use of normal maturation rate figures which have long since
lost their va lidit A mor.
orest area wit yr , e revealing e1`t.'re is gice;, by con.ariab ; r
h rate of cabin P oral
i.', cubic meters per hectare. Sincewa~iargeoProportionaof texi helforestoarea isto
no longer adequately stocked with standing timber, as has been shown above,
the cutting rate per hectare of remaining timber is considerably higher.
The continued overexploitation represents not only a present, but also a
future damage to our forest resources.'
esources. The wood that is being cut today does
not by rights belong to this generation, but to our t;randcia ldren and great
grandchildren. The damage dCr;e now cannot he made good for at least a century.
The exploitation excess varies from wood type to wood type, depending on
the degree to which the various species are required for reparations or for-
eign exchange needs. The hardest hit are the srands of pine and oak, while
spruce and leech fare somewhat f ett.er, :.i.nce they are exportable only as
fiber wood and offer little tv way fore L'n exchange earnings.
.
The 6(u,. .^;i;n_odd hectare: of privately owned forest lands are not covered
ry statistics u t.o 1952. The per-hectare cut is probably no lower than that
of the state-administered forest land.
The high wind and insect damage losses are essentially included in the
foregoing figures. The great wind damage in the spruce of the Thueringen
forests in June 1946 amounted to 1.3 million cubic meters of timber, while in
the Harz it amounted to 300,000 cubic c:eters. Since Lhese quantities of tim-
ter could not be worked away proritly because of the shortage of forestry per-
sonnel, the fallen timber added greatly to damage by spruce bark-borer beetles
(Fichtenborker:kaefer), which had vott-on a foothold durin the last years of
the war and after the capitulation.
Even though 1.4 million cubic meters of timber damaged by beetles had
been cleaned up and decontaminated by the fall of 1914;, there were still about
1.7 million cubic meters left from the leetle damage of the summer of 1947
which remained to be decontaminated. To take the proper measures against the
extensive beetle damage anticipated for the summer of 1y46, the forestry of-
fices were relieved of all but the technical aspects of decontamination,
while the recruiting, housing, feeding, and equipping of the necessary workers
was made the responsibility of the minister-presidents or ministers of the
Laender Thuerin,gen (Thuerin.ger Wald), Sachsen-Anhalt (Harz), and Sachsen
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decontaminate about - `-- ----:-nary measures it was possible to
to the fall of 1948.3 Themillion meters of from May
cubic meters and left deforested areas totaling about 25,000 hectares.llion
The area affected by dendrolimus pini (Kieferspinner) and by lymontria
monacha (Nonne) totaled 1.5 million hectares, while a total of 13,000 hectares
were completely denuded. The dendrolimus pins affected the the Brandenburg
and Sachsen-Anhalt forests most heavily. Damage was lighter in Mecklenburg
and Sachsen. The lymantria monacha damage occurred primarily in Sachsen, and
to a lesser extent in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and Sachsen-Anhalt. All at-
tempts to combat the dendrolimus pini with insect lime failed, because neither
suitable insect lime nor the necessary raw materials were available in the So-
viet Zone. Not until 1948 did the SMA supply a number of planes, which made
it possible to dust about 63,^00 hectares with insecticide during 1948 and
1949.
The few experienced foresters in the Soviet Zone calculated that the re-
maining standing timber will hardly cover the targets for 1954 and 1955. When
informed of this, Rau stated that West German forests would be available for
exploitation by that time:
The reckless exploitation of East German forests not only affects present-
day resources but will also affect the growth pattern of future timber.
Brandenburg spruce has been the hardest hit. Experts estimate that by
the end of the Five-year Plan in 1';!55, all spruce timber of class 2a (more
than 20 centimeters in diameter) and upwards will be completely exhausted.
This will also remove the parent trees for future growth of Brandenburg
spruce. For this reason it is all the more welcome that the West Berlin For-
est administration has taken steps to preserve the Brandenburg spruce parent
stock in its forests and also has estaldished nurseries for spruce stock. A
number of conscientious foresters in the Soviet Zone have also taken steps in
this direction.
III? TIE ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION
As has already teen noted, the volume of cut timber left in the forests
increased from 6 million cubic meters to 11 million cubic meters during 19117.
It is obvious that a great proportion of this wood deteriorated badly before
it was distributed to the consusPrs. This was not only the situation in 1947,
but has been more or less the rule ever since. The reasons for this situa-
ti.or. [have been explained above].
Transport facilities were completely inadequate. It was absolutely im-
possible to bring out the timber with teams of horses, even though the Kreis
commanders recklessly tried to enforce this type of transportation. Tractors
and trucks were an insufficient solution, since they were not available in
sufficient number, to say u-thing of the shortages of motor fuel, tires, and
spare parts.
In typically Soviet fashion, an attempt was made to improve transport of
timber, not through a better supply of equipment, since this could not be
done, but by means of a reorganization of the transport system.
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The
originally for brinizing the
the rcomout of the wo ds had
brigades toftimber
munities which had the
right to use the farmers' teams. Since the matter was not going well, it was
turned over to the forestry officials in 1;49, although this step did not
make a single additional horse, tractor, truck, tire, or liter of gasoline
available. The heads of the forestry service, who knew nothing about fores-
try, agreed to take over the responsibility, even though they had scarcely
enough personnel to take care of their forestry responsibilities. Naturally,
there was no improvement in the situation. Then the DHZ for Wood was estab-
lished, the responsibility for hauling the cut timber was turned over to this
organization.
Similarly, the distribution of timber to the consumer was repeatedly re-
organized until it finally was again given to the forestry service. After
1945, the delivery of timber to the consumer was carried out as it had been
before the capitulation, i.e., through the forestry service directly to the
consummer. This system rot only prevented centralized control, but also had
political developments. The political objective was to
crush the privately owned wood-using enterprises. This end was not served by
the non-Communist forestry officials giving these enterprises - sawmills, etc.
-- (sometimes preferential) delivery of timber.
A general ben on this sort Cf activity was unenforceable, and a close
control in the widespread forest regions was not practical. The act was gen-
erally not detected until after the fact, when the wood had already been de-
livered and could no longer be returned.
The first step was to take the delivery of cut timber out of the hands
of the forestry service and make it the province of the so-called Industrial
Offices (Industrie Kontc.re) of the mender and Kreise, since these offices
could be more effectively controlled politically. This exleriment could not
be successful in view of the lack of specialized knowledge on the part of the
functionaries, so the DHZ for flood was created which then took over the dis-
tribution of cut timber from the forestry service to the various consumers.
The DHZ for Wood at first alto controlled all wood users, especially
furniture makers. These enterprises were soon taken away from it, so that it
then became the DHZ for Tinter and Lumber (DI'Z Roh- and Schnittholz). In
1952, this DHZ had five branches in each of the five Lnender, each one of the
branches covering three to five Landkrei:.e, in addition to which it had a so-
called branch office (Aussenet,ellenbuerc) in each Kreis seat.
The average branch had a turnover of stout 3C' million DM (East), col-
lecting a commission of about 15 percent on lumber and 10 percent on cut tim-
ber. Office personnel numbered 6o-t:t; persons.
Traneloading stations were established at the ra aroad terminals, where
the wood was delivered for shipment to the consumers. Each of these loading
stations was in the charge of a manacr (Diepocent), who took over the wood
deliveries from the forestry service and then consigned it to the various
consumers. In the course of a year he handled about 2C.0 o units (10,000
cubic meters of cut timber and 10,000 cubic meters of lumber).
A system of norms applied to the loading stations just as for the for-
estry service. The basic wage, catalogued according to five location classes,
ranged from 0.83 to 1.07 DM, or 0.93 to 1.12 DM. Additional compensations
and premiums ranged from S to 15 percent of the 7asic wage.
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Wood receipts were controlled by the forestry servi ce cutting plan. De-
livery schedules were regulated by the goods distribution plan. Since these
two plans did net agree in practice, there were countless breakdowns in the
distribution system, especially since no lumber could be delivered without a
written directive from the DHZ branches.
Since cut-timber distribution on the Soviet pattern turned out to be too
costly for the smaller area of the GDR
, Jurisdiction over cut timber, bark,
and resin was taken away from the DRZ for /lood. These products were then sub-
ject to the control of the forestry service under the principle of "direct
delivery from producer to consutser." he forestry service not only shipped
these products directly from the forestTs, but. also handled such details as
transloading and shipment directly to the plant.
As o:' 1 January T-53, the
forestry service (the state forestry enterprises) too, over the ins'
tallations
of the DRZ for 'Wood engaged in handling cut timber, bark, and resin, includ-
ing stocks held as of tie end of 1952. The forestry service also took over
personnel formerly employed by the DFZ for .docd at these installations.
Distril:ution o:' cut timer is carried out in accordance with a material
distribution plan prepared by the marketing divisions of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry or of the Bezirke for the state forestry enterprises
(for state forests) and for the
))gels forestry 'co,ir (:'_. private .atC woodlands).
TV. REPARATIONS DELIVERIES AND FORCED EXPORTS OF FORESTRY PRODUCTS
Since 1955, the lion's share o: the recklessly excessive cuttings of
timber in the Soviet Zone has been taken over by the USSR to cover the needs
of its occupation troops, for "reparations." and for forced exports. The
scope of' the Soviet take from Soviet Zone forests is a "state and party
secret." But extensile deforested
areas mare it clear to even the layman
that the dama,_e to c;erman forest resources will not be made good tar genera-
tions.
The amounts of the cut tinier user 'n the Ccviet Zone econoryy, by occupa-
tion troops, or for Forced exports are hard to establish. The volume of lum-
ber taken by the Soviets for reparations can not he estirated with accuracy,
since all pertinent data had to be turned over to them or destroyed. Private
statistics were prohibited and keeping such was dangercas, besides being in-
adequate. The Soviets organized these r?:pjration ieliveries by numerous
routes, so that any over-all picture was Made impossible. The cutting and
stockpiling plans do not give an accurate picture either, since they were
often deliberately misleading, to cover up the actual take. Some estimate of
the scope of the take can Ic gained from the 194- monthly average of 7,500 to
8,oo0 railroad carloads of cut timber (lnfs, pi' props, etc.) and lumber
(boards, planks, beams, etc. )going -vast, or to the sound-currency countries
of the West, and thus alto rentered to Soviet !tdvar,tage.
These carload figures do not, include industrial'; or~c e,i wood in the
form of prefabricated houses, cellulose, paper, textiles, etc. Since deliv-
ery of carloads is not accepted until they reach the border stations, rejected
quantities are not paid for but are nonetheless shipped on to the East. The
deliveries are credited at 1)44 prices.
The prefabricated-house program required large gtantities of first-class
spruce timber. The prefabricated houses were made In about five different
types by the Soviet Zone for reparations or forced exports. The various types
have a floor space of about 40 to 90 square meters. The price paid to the
producer enterprises ranged from 12,000 to 30,000 DM. The USSR paid only about
60 percent of this price, the remainder being borne by the Soviet Zone. The
export price collected by the USSR is not kro'.>n exactly, but is considerably
higher.
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eparations _- _- "'? ucuual production cost and the 1944-level
rase of forestry product reparations, irrespective of whether the commodity
be cut timber, semifinished or finished wood products, resin, bark, etc.
During the period from 1947 to 1952, prefabricated houses with a total
floor area of 3.1 million square meters were turned over. Each square meter
required 0.7 cubic meter of wood, all of the best class. Grade 2 lumber was
rejected. The Soviets set exaggerated quality requirements for all wood de-
liveries. They required first-class pine for use in railroad ties, packing
cases, and the like. No counter arguments were tolerated.
The Hitler war had to be paid for in both East and West Germany with a
great loss of timber resources. The following is a comparison of cuttings
in the Soviet and Uestern zones after the war (in cubic meters per hectare):
1945-1949 Soviet Zone Western Zone
1950-1,53
26
16
Total 1945-1,53
6e -
This represents a depletion which by far exceeds the new growth.
It has been ascertained that the greatest share of the 136 million cubic
asters of timber cut between 1545 and 1953 in East Germany was consumed by
the Soviet occupation forces or went for so-called reparations shipments.
Since the beginning of 1954, the so-called reparations deliveries have
been formally stopped. Actually, the shipments to the Soviets have not di-
minished. Lumber, prefabricated houses, furniture, and other wood products
continue to be shipped as "exports" to the Soviet bloc countries and their
trade partners. The prices for these forced exports are barely higher than
the prices used for r
the Soviet occupation forces ~also continue oundiminished. Df TDring 1954 a to
long trains loaded with lumber and wood products run daily from the S vs before,
to the East. During June 1954, 37 trains passed through the Frankfurt/Ode /Zone
railroad station with over 1,000 freight cars loaded with dr
furniture, and ether wood products. prefabricated houses,
M mom
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V. NEGLECT OF TIM?IDM RESERVES AiiD OF RZ%FOR:,3TATIOI7
In the Soviet Zone of Germany, the fulfillment of the cutting plans and
the supplementary cutting plans has been the center of activity in the forestry
field from 191+5 until today. Only the efforts to camouflage this activity have
been intensified through these years.
area ThetStatistical0Offic hin Zone the size of the deforested
124,000 hectares; Sachsen-Anhalt, 76,000 hectares;6Sachsen, 64r000 hectares;
~g~
and Thuers n been n, 75,000sh e ctr es) 0, this amount, 35 percent, or 13';,000 hec_
tares (Mecklenburg, 22,000 hectares; A_andenbur;;, 42,000
hectares; Sachsen-Inhalt, 27,000 hectares; Sachsen, 22,000 hectares; and
73,000 hectares),
The Central Forestry Office differed in its figures somewhat in that it
listed the size of the deforeste3 area as 350,000 hectares and the size of the
reforested area as 199,000 hectares. :C;ich of the two _firsures is closer to
reality is difficult to say. The deforested area given is undoubtedly too
small and the reforested area too large, insofar as reforestation is understood
to mean the full stocicia~ of ;en ,.,,lture i : the appropriate locslit?r.
In this last sense, the reforested area is estimated by specialists to be
about one third to one half the size of the deforested area. The insufficient
tree plantings may be traced to the unskilled or insufficient personnel or to ncial
the re the means treoafulfillsons.
areo not yamionavailableprominent
at n the appropriatee tmenu
On 1 April 1251, the Statistical Office listed the size of the area not
yet reforested as 172,000 hectares. The same Statistical Office listed the
deforested area around the end of 1) 0 as being; 400,000 hectares; the reforested
area was given as l3`5,000 at that time. This leaves a deforested area
of 262,000ahectares,iw.ict choTvevcr, was reported by 1 April to be only 172,000
heirs question that the difference between these
i.e., 90,000 hectares, was ref'orestel durin
e
end of 1950 and 1 April ln'jl. Accordln- to t,,,, .) ' period plan, tile
reforestation figure amounts to 320,000 hectares. >iinze the deforested area
as of 1 April 1951 was given as 172,000 iectares and since a prohibition exists
against complete deforestation, It follows that 143,000 hectares of deforested
area must exist somew'.:ere or must be created in orier to fulfill the quota of
the Five-Year Plan.
It was inevitable that this rIestru_tiv:e deforestatio^ as well as the high
cost of reforestation should noon i~eccr,c ,apparent to all. This was of course
uncomfortable for the S21) regime since it operated with tae appearance of a
socially minded economy. A way out was found. Sin-,e it was not desired to give
up further forest exploitation, it was camouflaged with considerable propagan-
distic efforts, such as prohibiting "rea,:t
order to follow "new methods, based on. thek' ovledrre o liroic deforestation" in
biology" and to convert to "eroLP?essi': pr
e rtiot
timber reserves." e forest :rana emen*, wit h+it'.aconsideration for
As an example, they used a timber-reserve-winded management method which
had been developed in the Erzgebirge by meritorious German Forestry Service
workers. The method and its originators were than misinterpreted in an incredi-
bly unscrupulous manner. The method of systematic afforestation was similarly
mistreated. In order to emphasize the introduction of the timber-reserve-minded
management method, the Forestry Office Menz (in Bezirk Potsdam) which was always
rich in timber reserves, was picked as the exemplary forestry operat_-on.]
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Smaller cutting plans, not based on tree types, were set up for this forestry
office and appropriate instruction courses were given. It is understandable
that the young forestry service workers, who were being trained under the SED
regime, turned with fervor to this new method, which was reportedly much better,
because they too recognized the destructiveness of the deforest.,ci.on methods
which had been employed. While they lacked all practical experience, they did
expect it to become a forest conservation method.
Less understandable was the position of some experienced forestry personnel,
who were willing to offer these camouflage expediencies to the political regime
and to propagandize in their behalf. Despite all the camouflage, however, the
destructive deforestation continued. The high cutting plans and their timber
species selection do not facilitate a timber-reserve forestry operation. Offi-
cially the forests are not immediately denuded; instead, in an effort to fulfill
the cutting plan by number and species and contrary to conservation methods, the
best trees are cut and the poorest and most unusable trees are left standing.
The resulting gaps in the forest are camouflaged in connection with Krutzsch's
"Rejuvenation priorities" with the cover words "reju:eaation centers." Simultane-
ously with the introduction of the conservational forestry method, complete de-
forestation was prohibited. Exceptions to this prohibition could be made by the
Government Forestry Office or the i` eis Forestry Office in cases where more than
one hectare was concerned. 4nen ::ere than 3 '.:ectares were to be stripped, the
Central Forestry Office had to rant permission. ,since the plan, including the
highly demanding species plan., !.ad to be fulfilled, it became necessary to make
10 one-hectare cuttings instead of one 10-hectare cutting. Lumbermen sarcas-
tically refer to these woodlands an "parks with playgrounds." Little can be seen
of a reforestation of these re,:uvenation centers; in genernl,the reforestation
has also been seriously impeded by a lack of funds and manpower.
The same applies to the care of young timber. The clearing of older stands
and dense forests requires considerable funds and labor without bringing any in-
come and is therefore not desired. The one of forests as (razing lands for cattle,
which was introduced again witi: the land reform program, is not easily curtailed.
The present picture of :;not German forests nay be presented as follows: one
third of the state-managed forests are thinned-out and mutilated middle-aged for-
ests without any chance for forestation, anot'':._r third consists of young timber
which as yet is not worth very much, and the rerrainiag third consists of poorly
reforested or unreforested bare areas.
The reforestation of these areas is sorely neglected because, in the Soviet
Zone, planning is done from the top echelon to the lower echelons in the forestry
service too. The reforestation plan is arbitrarily set up at the higher echelon
and just asar'sitrarily passel town the line. Whether or not the seed or seedlings
are available at the location or whether they are conditioned for the particular
area is only of winor consideration. IDsvertheless, regardless of how plans and
actuality may balance, no holder of a forestry position would dare report the
nonfulfillment of a plan.
Resin extraction from p_ne trees 'a, been. --ons derably in_rease(i. Normally
those trees which are marked for -:uttinrin the near future are so cut for resin
extraction that the "Lechten," herrir:,;bone-design cuts from which the resin seeps,
do not cover more than two thirds of the tree, so as to keep it sufficiently alive.
Timber which is to be cut in the coming winter in. the Soviet 'Zone--and that includes
timber in the intermediate stage between pole timber and timber with a larger di-
ameter (chest-high diameter of about 20 centimeters) -- is tapped for resin in
three levels, one above the other (by means of a ladder). 'dith this system, a
great part of the timber dies before cutting. The lumbermen call this system
"tapping to death." In contrast to thi, ir: the "live" tapping system used for
timber to be cut in future years, in which t::e tree is tapped at only one level
and sufficient bark (at least one third) is left unslashed.
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However, since pay is no longer based on the number of cuts, but on the area
covered by the various resin cuts, the workers are encouraged to leave not 33
percent, but only 10 to 20 percent of the tree's bark unslashed in order to earn
more money. Thus, "live" tapping is changed to "death" tapping. Despite the
timber-reserve-minded forestry service, resin tapping is not done on a tree-by-
tree basis but on bark-area basis.
VI. THE SED FSgSONTIEI, POLICY IN TIM, IDRESTRY SERVICE
From the very beginning the East German personnel policy in the forestry
service was aimed at weeding out all persons who would not willingly accept or
even resist the destructive deforestation. The regime wanted to have lumbermen
who would be loyal fu,-tionnries bent on fulfilling the Soviet cutting plan.
This remained the basic point of view of the personnel policy of the Communists
and the Soviet officials in the forestry service. This policy continues today.
An active Nazi past on the part, of forestry personnel is of little consequence
in this personnel policy. The only decisive factor for former Nazis is subordi-
nation to the orders of ..ice 3ED regime.
In October l;+45, te Ji?11 (Jeviet 'i1it:ry Alrar:istr_tioa) retained former
GIL':,P (National Jociaii:;t German corkers Tarty) forestry officials. However,
L, November 1945, General Zhukov, the Soviet commanding officer, ordered the dis-
mi:;:a1 of all officials and employees [of the forest-- cervicel. This was done
because the 3o:lets Were not satisfied witl. the slow reorganization of the ad-
ministration. (in the Soviet sense) and partially because the opposition of the
profs -;tonal forestry men to t'.e plan to cut 5 million cubic meters of timber
durir., the quarter October-December 1951 was being felt.
Even though the dismissed forestry personnel was retained at first on
location so as to prevent, t'.e severest damage, the measures soon aimed at the
complete exclusion of th.is personnel. The local JED party executives and the
unions increased the pressure on the professional forestry personnel which
eventually lead to their dismissal. SED followers tried to find a cozy little
nest in the local forestry positions. T::e positions looked desirable not only
because no difficulty was foreseen in cutting down the required timber, but
also because in addition to a high income, otherwise not attainable to these
individuals, the position offered a control of shortage .ommodities; namely,
wood and food, the latter from the public Lands (Dienstlaendereien), with which
all personal needs could be satisfied by [illegal) bartering.
By defamations, denunciations, intrigues, etc., professional people were
replaced ruthlessly by lumbermen who were able to ingratiate themselves with
local autnorities and people not familiar with the profession. The new per-
sonnel knew only one goal, that is t.e punctu,l overfulfillment of the timber
cutting plan, without any reg'ud for forestry principles. Ever. though it was
possible at first to remove the forestry service from the jurisdiction of local
political units (Kreise, Bezirk(i), the local political forces soon gained so
much support from political personnel offices of the Laender forestry offices
that, by 1947-1943, only a few forestry field stations were occupied by ex-
perienced personnel.
As early as 1946, training of forestry personnel was started at the for-
estry schools at Eberswalde and Tharandt and in five forestry schools of the
Laender to combat the damages which quite naturally resulted from the place-
ment of inexperienced personnel in forestry positions, which later also in-
cluded positions on the highest level of the forestry service. In addition,
training courses were offered on a continuous basis for the forestry service
examination. Unfortunately the training did not have the effect desired by
the training personnel, despite all their effort.
.. rw
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The selection of trainees by the political bodies was contrary to all
professional traditions and was based exclusively on Political considerations.
Only "workers' sons" were accepted, and all applicants from families of for-
estry officials were rejected. Forestry training is permeated with political
instructions, and often not the professional knowledge and ability of the
trainee, but his political outlook and activity, are the deciding factors at
the time of the examination.
It must be noted that the training personnel at the forestry faculties
and at the forestry schools are not without success in teaching on as broad
a basis as possible. Unfortunately, the guidance in the field and the trans-
fer of experience from the older forestry personnel to Vie new personnel re-
mains insufficient. This was the result of t'e GED regire's earlier prohi-
bition against placing the new personnel in the hands of e:cperienced forestry
personnel, and the situation is now being perpetuated because only a few ex-
perienced forestry people rer^nin active.
politA
ca cidc, an-1 number oferatithe
newly tra the fore,try people succumb to the system of
?
entry to the political arena flevetlelessoI it hmustabelnotedsthatst eon
'
percent-
age of such instances rennin:: relatively low. Most of the new forestry
is concerned wit., the professional training and gettin3 ; ahead person-
refuting Communist Hen. anal the ']ED dicl , whil le performance in the storsitip, ever, though professional
position is restricted by the general conditions.
The training of the new forestry personnel since 19':6 has enabled the
partial
sartialsreplacement'of untrained personnel, narti_ularly in forestry field
Y Pr cal forestry work is to be done.
In the higher forestry offices t',-.is is not the case as yet. Particularly
the leading forestry position, are preferably geld by j -'D functionaries, who
implicitly adhere to the political directives and denlads. Since the leading
personnel understands very li`tle Cr nothing of forestry, there is no super-
vision or control. Only a snail n tuber of thoroughly trained personnel with
Pre-1945 experience in forestry week and aleinistratioa hold offices to
the Percents,,(- of such personnel of the t.ot.la f dab;
under 10 percent. Thanks i^ due T:::em for i orestry perso eat to la turn future hear, ileac their best to sun over
generations forest's hies to ::o!, fear the scars o^ the present mis-
management.
The training of rmst(!r i'oreal ore Forsteirt) has undergone many changes
since 1946, often through arbitrary local improvisations. Since 1?50, all
applicants, whether they are applicants for the colleges, for forestry schools,
or for work in the forests, must unclergo a asi- of 2 yearc. The npprent.lces, nor.: live in work training period
of c of piton l live n apprentice homes, are organ-
iced apprentice brigades under to direction of a brigadier; they learn
all phases of forest fie11 wor;: and :rise attend the professional school (Berufs-
schule), which is supplemented to some eytr:nt by forestry ir.ctruct?ons.
The future progress of the apprentice depends err the outco:e of the final
examination and the forest worker test. Taecreti,,lly, forestry knowledge and
ability is decisive; however, in practice, the political development of the
apprentices, which is influer:cod considerably by the frequent studies of current
events, is decisive.
Applications of apprentices who hold a diploma from n secondary school,
who have passed the forest worker test satisfactorily, and who have the political
recommendation of the SED will be accepted by the forestry schools at aberswalde
and Thnrandt. The duration of the studies is roughly the same as at 41est German
forestry schools; however, some semester progress examinations have beed added.
Final examinations lend to the degree of graduate master forester; if the oc-
casion should arise, the degree of Doctor of Forestry may be granted.
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Forestry worker examinees who are not admitted to the forestry schools -
political and subject qualifications are the same as for university study -- may
be admitted to a forestry trade school on completion of a special entrance ex-
amination. The forestry trade schools were founded in 1946 in Rabensteinfeld,
Mecklenburg; Eberswalde, Brandenburg; 3tolberg, Sachsen-Anhalt; Tharandt, Sachsen;
and Schwarzburg, T?nueringen. he forestry trade school at Eberswalde was dis-
solved or combined with the itaben3teinfeld school as the result of "political un-
reliability," or in other wcrds, as the result of denunciation. (Six students
were arrested and given long sentences.) The Stolberg school was moved to Rossla,
and finally to Ballenstedt/liar z. Since 1946, the four forestry trade schools,
with their 2-year courses, have been developed into schools of forest technology
(Forsttechnikum) with six-semester courses. T'hc students are graduated for-
estry engineers after completion of the final examination.
No basic differentiation is made in the employment of 7-aduate master for-
esters and fareatry engineers in either forestry administration or in the field.
The positions are open to all, depcndin. only on political suitability and re-
liability in the SED sense. This is roughly similar to the Soviet system, or the Pe of thathet
thatlte's he attitudeitowardnthe SED dictatorship andspoliticalesuit-
ability is decisive and that even the person not at all familiar with the field
is given preference over the "politically retarded" graduate :.aster forester or
forestry engineer. This has 'mad the result that some of the trained forestry
personnel have gone into other occupations. Those forestry worker apprentices
who are not admitted to either a forestry school or a forestry trade school re-
main forestry workers and can work their way up to the postition of brigadier
(timber cutting boss, loading boss) in timber distribution, timber trr.nsportation,
etc. Those in political favor with the 33D or who have rendered outstanding
service may, in exceptional cases, be given training opportunities and a chance
to rise by way of the workers and peasants schools; through correspondence courses
for matter forester, which have been initiated by one of the forestry trade
schools; and, in the case of graduates of forestry trade schools, through ad-
mission to university study.
The number of master fore,+.:r trainees has, in the meantime, been sharply
increased. At the order of Minister of ''dueation, the entrance committees
of the forestry schools at E',~t_rswnlde. and The.rard? were directed to admit
forestry students each for the semester beginning on 1 ie tember 1953, 75
meihatng
the total number of forestry students and o
fewer at Tharandt. When the schoolss imotested wthat there about
were 0neithersufficient
facilities for such a large number of students nor positions for them on gradu-
ation, they were informed that the order would nonetheless stand. Reason given:
the students would be required to fill positions in hest German forestry offices:
This gives n clear indication as to how the Pankow regime visualizes a reunifi-
cation of Germany.
VII. ORGAi1I5ATIOt1 OF :fv.:itST GERI u: FO 3-~Tlly IDMETI3TRATI0I1
The organzzntion of the Fast Gcrran forestry administration has been subject
to constant changes since 1,45. The basic principle behind these changes was ob-
viously to eliminate all forestry administration tradition, which was equated
with "reaction," and not only basically to reorient the previous tradition, but
also to impose the Soviet economic organization with its totalitarian planning
principle. The present form of the "i'eople-Owned State Forestry Enterprises"
is approximately the same as that of the Soviet Satellite states.
STAT
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The goal of sovietization of Last German forestry was not
at all times. In part this was due to the special circumstances preys there, in part to conceal pursued directly
difficulties in the nee tile reparations deliveries, or in order toovercome
transportation or distribution of timber.
Parallel to the administrative organizations dominated by the Sr"'D
administration, Land governments, Kreis governments
ministration of the Soviet (central
forestr iilitary ?dminist )' there was a control ad-
try administration in the S6A Karls' ration [fore , Thus there was a
various Land administrations, and also ar..orst and aofficerry'a ifced with in the
control functions with each breia commander. onomic The fore offi
to the Land administrations forestry
y rt tiimee a buyers;
the hoLac Officers do
iasAel 'ereoIn :: part foresters and in a
Kreis co..:anders as arule had neither
threstr crrastrn no r lumber experience. This Soviet control apparatus
the Pankow regime, not only influenced and controlled Germane
istration at all leve admin-
ls, but also iirectly interfered with forestry operations.
This was particularly the case witi: she Kress co.:aanders.
A description Of the develcirent Of forestry in East Germany from 1945 the resedtncanreflect 3sent a frost section of the average circumstances to
'4 ne
is
local circumstances at all times.
are frequently deal ocal imrrovi;rtion, in E ven now there
ree a rl great deycontradictory, net in harmony wit t of all detailed
h sl or, In icy
'i , poorly conceive 3. 'i'cere beinf a lack Of' forestry nknowledgein the
e?re crecognized nied. nothing is done about this situation; indeed, it is often not
Forestry in East Germany was hit just a
the s hard as other parts of the econ-
omy by Soviet measures, although it was affected somewhat later. In any
exploitation has greater long term e
ffects, and is therefore ase,
imore serious .
The forestry offices -- Land ;?orest offices, forest boards and forest
districts -- were occupied only inadequately or not at all in 1945
nel had been "transferred" previously or had fled to the '.Jest ahead of the
entry of Soviet troops. h ' The person-
and Kreis Insofar as these people did not return soon the local
munists, Political aadministration s filled these positions with "reliable" Com-
up their w work ut d to
rn Shortly order y experience The Land fort
took
the d not entirely without trained forestry e war in similar fasoffices hion, though
personnel.
Not until August 1945 did the Soviets create the "Central Administration for
Agriculture and Forestry" with a "Central Forestry Office" within the framework
of the Central Administration of the Soviet 'Lone.
Shortly thereafter the S,'V, institt,;,,.; the "Forestry Order in the Soviet
Zone of Occupation." In essence this order pro ected the formation of a for-
estry office (which was to administer all forests, irrespective of t
ownership) on the former German pattern: a central fore-try office zone, five Land forest offices, type for as well as local boars of a for the
g
siere to and forest districts. The or a plan aite
adhrdat itheuprin
cipletthat the forests should not be stubnecttto any local
e, s
government. In metros cad be t`'e direct responsibility op the Land only to bring some semblance of order into forest loier was pot into effect
reparations deliveries possible. exploitation so as to make
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:.i'tcr e ;empornry and 2>rov'_sio
na'_ licati
r. of the_':>r: ter fm_ ^ ' r y o.' were re t' .:'.ant, r
(Oberfoerstereien or ni ?e?i ) s
171 t
?cu ied a es for ;s
subordinate to the Kr: is c 'tic
1
th
.
au
oritie T eao -; ?^ ,
of various sizes, dependin_; o:: the forest area of the :L-A3 11.,000 hectares). An instructor ''' a~pointcd to er"c?? of nrcnt
ricta to direct ands '
:'soil forest boar,.) `.. of t'n forest ?.lintri_i::. (? !:
Concurrent with the ._ _ution of
^eia forest
,lid not control the peasant rc,o._and;, ter ae?ra ta:.en tolr.:r-"
o. adciinistrative wo,.;-,,,.:,:,
of 1tt.:b ?_ Yr (.'.i r.?.. i(rt, ?.`-
r,: .,unsibility of large s , In - :c
tc, amnia~d b,. ^or?_.,t bon?lr. ?'1'
t
y
'
e inst
ll
t(;
liscrl:'ed and were rtor;?e,'. ' rest,`rs. ,. -t . m,0.
i P.'tne_^' -,__,;',nt~. ,
rC:; llli:e?i in .-, l