PRODUCTION OF NEW USSR TRACTOR MONTHS BEHIND SCHEDULE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700150125-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 125
• Publication Date: November 23, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700150125-5
MAR 1957,,-"
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
SECURI.1'7C INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
COUNTRY ussR
SUBJECT Economic; Technological - Tractor industry
HOW
PUBLISHED Daily nevspapers
WHERE
PUBLISHED Moscow
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DATE
PUBLISHED 27 Jul, 26 Sep 1953
LANGUAGE Russian
REPORT
CD N0.
DATE OF
DATE DIST. ~ Nov 1y53
N0. OF PAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
PRODUCTION OF NEW USSR TRACTOR MONTHS BEHIND SCHIDULE
MINSK PLANT TO PRODUCE BELARUS' TRACTOR -- Moscow, Vechernysya Moskva, 27 Jul 53
The Minsk Tractor Plant has completed preparations for the production of the
Belarus' tractor and will turn out the first of the aew machines nt the begin-
ning of August.
More than 20 enterprises of the Belorussian SSR produce spare puris for motor
vehicles and tractors.
PLANT, MINISTRY BERATID FOR FAILURE TO TURN OUT TRACTORS -- Moscow, Pravda,
26 Sep 53
The Dfinsk Tractor Plant was supposed to have begun production of the Belarus'
tractor in July 1953, and should have turned out 700 tractors by nou. However, not
a single tractor has come off the assembly line, and if decisive measures are not
taken at once, production of the Belarus' will be delayed further.
The plant has not yet organized the production oP 200 type desiE;nations of
important parts. Hundreds of other type designations oP parts have been pro-
duced in negligible quantities, far insufficient for constant flow production.
For example, only two of the 700 rear axle hubs planned for this period have been
produced.
Most of the shops at the plant are taking part in the production of the Bela-
rus', tut tractor shop No 2 must supply the basic parts for assembly. However,
many sections of this shop hs.ve not produced even one half of the tractor parts
called for by the plan. In August, the plan ~n tractor shop No 2/ was fulfilled,
only 30.9 percent and in the first e0 days of September, the plan was fulfilled
only 6.8 percent.
STATE
ARMY
NAW
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The diesel shop is lagging in the output of engines. The pressing shop has
not organized the output of many important parts. The tool division of the plant
in psrticular is holding up production. Demidenko, chief of the tool division,
is not supplying the basic shops with iools and accessories and is thus holding
up the production of parts. Some production sections, lacking tools and dies,
resort to roundabout methods, which in some cases means making parts by hand.
The reject rate is high. A group of milling attachments were ruined and
had to be scent back to be remade because of a mista,ie by the Division of the
Chief Technologist. There is no real creative teamwork by designers, technolo-
gists, and production workers.
These mayor shortcomings are attributable to the plant management's poor
leadership in organizing production. Starting only after a long delay, the manage-
ment did not succeed in coordinating and guiding the work of all production sec-
tions and services. The plant directorate and the party committee are unper-
turbed by failures of shops to fulfill their assignments, are not sufficiently
demanding with respect to plant workers, and do not punish the people respon6i-
ble for failures. Tarasov, director of the plant, and Nikanorov, secretary of
the party committee, have repeatedly promised to remedy the situation and nave
named several deadlines for production of the Belarus'. Remedial measures have
been outlined by the party committee, but as yet no effective action has been
taken.
The Ministry of Machine Building USSR is largely responsible for the failure
to produce the new wheel tractor because it did not supply the necessary equip-
ment and materials in time, and did not organize effective cooperation among its
enterprises. A number of plants of the ministry have failed to supply the Minsk
Tractor Plant with important parts and materials. The Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle
Plant imeni Molotov has yet to prepare six dies for stamping radiator and engine
guards. The Ithar'kov and Lipetsk tractor plants are behind schedule in deliver-
ing parts. Because of mistakes made by ministry workers in distributing orders,
the Minsk Tractor Plant has been unable to obtain many types of parts for the
past 7 months.
A group of Leningrad enterprises of the Ministry of Chemical Industry USSR
have not fulfilled their contractual obligations to the Minsk plant. The Lenin-
grad Tire Plant was supposed to have shipped 2,300 tires to the Minsk plant in
the second and third quarters of 1953, but it has yet to ship a single set of
tires.
A month ago, Akopov, Minister of Machine Building USSR, issued an order
outlining measures to remedy the delays at the Minsk Tractor Plant, but there
has been virtually no change since the order was issued.
The September Plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU, called for the pro-
duction of no less than 250,000 plowing tractors in the next few years. The
Ministry of Machine Duilding USSR and party organizations of the Belorussian
SSR should give concrete assistance to the Minsk Tractor Plant so that it can
contribute its share to the above-mentioned goal, and start shipping Belarus'
tractors to kolkhozes as soon as possible.
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