COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER AND SOVIET PENETRATION IN SINKIANG
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-00809A000700040611-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 31, 2011
Sequence Number:
611
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 4, 1952
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
COUNTRY China; USSR
REPORT
CO NO.
SUBJECT Military; Political - Administrative e INFORMATION 1951
HOW orgar.I:at:o::, C/S
PUBLISHED Weekly periodical DATE DIST. A/ 177&& 952
WHERE
FUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED 25 Aug, 1 Sep 1951
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croachment in Sinkian/, ate `v-r and Soviet en-
as
in the ant King period:ca: Riit.
in cast: changes
Sinkiang since Apr:! 1?51- , --- and men*:.:rs me .abLehment Cf a re-
l sistance movement I. :. _
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=aitl t M-a- TIrLkestar, League The
eague is headed by tsa u,ul A.?c*c
the Sinkiang prcv:n a
:l a,.,verr.r r,:, ho r-troy-general of
reviews Chinese G>mmun-_nod j._ ^ u 1 -r Tung Fang-t,o (: II , )
' , the Sinkiang since
194 7 Revoi' the re:..r ,ri;a?. ot:Lof the frrme
Army Into the Fecple r Nationalist
osit-on c st tlonhtat: e; and dis-
P i tr C7p:, end J'L j., r?! _' '113 st,tloning ;;I ire,:ps
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books and arttc1c.s on the '-_, and hie rab,'_she3
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''here the :oirc.,~ rer..3?...- -
able, ?= a persona? an name was not ava:i-
Yrrox:mutiOn from the Chines, ^Oz cecr, given.
CENTRAL INT LIGE CE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENT, IL VUIIN(JGIi i
Hsln-wen Tien-tl
NO. OF PAGES 1
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
:tR%Jl _i1P hyEp
STATE
ARMY
NAVY NSRB
AIR FBI
CONFIDE d ~; 0
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C0NFIDENt? a ! i?c`.
KULDJA REVOLT
From the interior of Sinkiang comes news of many drastic changes of
a military and political nature which are reported to have taken glace
since April 1951.
First, the Chinese Communists, outer orders from the Soviet Union,
sentenced many prominent Sinkiang Communists to capital punishment in con-
nection with the Kuldja Revolt
Second, the Fifth Army, reorganized from the former Kuldja People's
Army, including a complement If two Cava;r; divisions and 11 cavalry regi-
ments from the Liei-shn Ho region, was assigned .uty in Korea The sub-
sequent decimation of this army left the nationalistic Sinkiang Communists
militarily at the mercy of the USSR
Third, the ranking Nationalist field officers who surrendered to T'ao's
Twenty-Second Army Group, were e-tri-r imprisoned or executed.
soldiers were sent to Sha-war. to Nationalist
reorganized, retrained, or liquidated.
Fourth, a detachment of Wan ? C^
tioned along the Karakora:r. and Kunlun unlun - Shan n 'trade routes wt chcstr Army sta-
southern Sinki?^g, .rode routes which straddle
the Pakistan, and India, entered Tibet and set up air bases
for USSR, Soviet Army unit,- subsequerrt:t penetrated northern Sinkiang
through the Dzungarian doorways c,f Kuidja and Chuguchak and liquidated the
Nationalist. Chinese Communist officials did not escape through investi-
gation by these troops The Soviet gasp on the tungsten, petroleum, and
gold-producing regions of Pc-lo, Wv-su, Kuc,ra? and Altai was tightened.
Fifth, at Srinagar, Kashm::, ;ca, termer sec
Sinkiang government, preclairnrd a M;s_-rc TurkestaneLeagaeewhich is anti-
Soviet in orientation.
These events point to an important -?eange in the Soviet Union s Cen-
tral Asian policy, At the end of World War !I. the Soviet Union,, faced
with what it considered. an unfavorable statue quo, found it expedient to
stir up toe nationalist Moslem repnb_,,:s c,f Central Asia and use their com-
bined economic an(i military might to boater the precarious Soviet military
positi,n? To this end, agent,, were Bent t
off
Moslem nationalists in Irkutsk Oalast, an'i a shkh tUzbe, ad ikzh, nd the
Turlvuen SSR? Uni. Uzbek, Tto, and
At the same time, the Soviet Union oraantzed the he so-called
Eastern Turkestan Peoples Retuhii-- with centers at Kuldjn, Chuguchak, and
A-k'o-su, indoctrinated the native t:pu;ace with ant;.-Kuomintang propa-
ganda, and completed the f,,rmaticr?, :.f a tuifer zorie by thus exploiting Tar-
kle nationalism.
From 1943 to 1948, the USSR head tni; line in Central Asia, smash-
ing the China-India policy of tl:e Ut and Britain, with th?. hammer of the reli-
gious and racial antiforeignism of Sir,i,;sng Moslems. With the advent of Tito-
ism in 1948, however, there was a marked shift in Soviet Far Eastern strategy.
In the first place, the Chinese Communist conquest of North China wrecked the
eastern defense barriers being built by the Soviet Union, and the three buffers
of Kuldja, Chuguchak, and A-k'o-su were renlered useless. In the second place,
the newly won independence of Pakistan (15 August 1947) and the spread to Cen-
tral Asia of Pan-Islamism presented the danger of serious defection among the
republics in that area. The Kremlin line was therefore altered: the Chinese
Communist advance into Northwest China was supported and many Central Asian
Moslem nationalists were liquidated.
CONFIDENTIAL
~~!itYU it1THEdENTf
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were the fi:-t victims of+thisu major who instigated the Kuld a
began the
1949 -- coinciding or Policy shift. This international Revolt
beg was a1m4st complete by with 951ges among the East European Satellitesge
hasimi, almos c y June 1951. Kuldia insurgents, men miAkhbasfu , Ishaichjan, Kanidatulu, and others Rover 1,000
all, were executed. Masud Sabri, ' numbering over lead
of the nself-government ZBeg, and Mh
after. nationalist t the Masud incident movement, t Mohammed Emin, leaders
after.
alone, over 3,800 re rut persons were a resttd there-
1951. The masterminds of this were Primarily wove t-ld, mere
Nazis: prisoners of war, Purge were primarily Soviet-held former
scientists, and Journalists.
Among Central Asian and Sinkiang nationalists, a brotherhood of anti-
Soviet feeling has developed. Recent reports from ndi-
cated increased guerrilla activity the Kazakh SSR have i
The Kuldja Revolt may be described as having gone through three defin-
ite stages, namely:
1. Collapse of Sino-Soviet relations during World War II;
ward expansion of the Soviet Urion; and US
Yalta Agreement. This period lasted from Maressl 44on China to the Ftsthe
p? USSR initiation of the cold war; 9 to August 1945
toward Mao Tse-tung until the Kuomintang conciliatory
ti the -C the Communist y Policy
of
from a he the us
Truman Doctrine; and the than a Party schism; the e-
e
negative to a positive othe tiong of the US anti-Communist a attituttitude
1945 to the end of 1947. This period lasted from September
and Pa. stanThe;adhvent ofoTitooism the independence of the
Chinese Communists; Dthe purg of India
lists in the Soviet Satellites This and the
(June 1951). period runs from 1948 to he of naiona-
present
Stage 1, March 1944
- August 1945
After the Tehran Conference in
USSR were degeneratin October 1943, when relations
USSR Ceres deg
way of g the Us was prepared to send aid directly the
up the 3 The Soviets frustrated this plan by up hed Moslems othe movement in western te Sinkiang- and, by perpetrating theKulda Rltblocked t he o. 500 US Army vehicles en route from the Revolt,
vGf
J The insurgents seized Chu Chao-liang and Wu hunrshan Gulf
Nationalist Chinese who opposed the revolt
affair appear as ? Soviet intentions were Also , two
Mar~ 1944, they p_ tigatehetrisingoltly Oar in the Moslem world make the
Bator, an arte nasoatest A-k o-su led by the Also' in
Russian Abdugani Bator in his crater, in September, Ka, man
they supported the Os White
cup at Kucha
The Kuld,ja Revolt of November 1944, was led by the Uighur All Khan
He organized a military government and, under the Pan-Islamic b
the slaughter of thousands of Turn.
the lug "infidel' s, directed
g influence in Sinkiang began an t0 wane. troops. With this s incident
C
of power by the new g g Following the stabilization
Sinkiang Communist government at Kuld,;a, the Soviets next planted native
Sent ngdo b agents -- Akhmedjan, among others--in the military h ment he desbycAli Khan Turn By spreading Pan-Turkic o h y were
ere-
Moslem united front from the authorities.
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Finally, the Eastern Turkestan People's Republic was set up in January 1945
at Kuldja, and the Akhmedjan faction, which quickly deposed Ali Khan Ture, an-
nounced its aim to liberate ail of Sinkiang by force of arms. By 21 February
1945, at the time of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union had already established
"by pr.,xy" a land base in Chinese Sinkiang and an all-Communist government which
guarded the gangway to v-rthwest China. Akhmedjan Kasimi became head of the Mili-
tary Government, Rakhimjan Klujaev, Minister of Internal Affairs, an,. Abulkhair
Ture, Minister of Education. The White Russian Balinov was mats field commander
of the People's Army of the Eastern Turkestan People's Republic and secretly re-
ceived aid from the USSR.
In July 1945, when the Chinese Nationalist government was forced to sign the
Yalta Agreement and when the Sino-Soviet Treaty was concluded, the Red Army marched
on Sinkiang and attacked Urumchi from the Kuld,ja and Chuguchak corridors. Red
motorized units and the Red Air Force sped aid to the People's. Army of the Eastern
Turkestan Republic. The battle in the Wu-su--Ching-ho area cost the Sinkiang Se-
cond Army of the Chinese Rationalist government the valuable Wu-su oil-fields;
the 25th Division was routed and its commander, General Kuo 'h'i, was taken pris-
oner. The Turkestan People's Army then drove toward Urumchi along the Ma-nn-ssu Ho
and won the trade center in August 1945.
Stage 2, September 1945 - December 1947
The period from September 1945 to August 1947 was important for the diploma-
tic victory won by Foreign Minister Molotov over the US State Department. In Sin-
kiang, Chang Chih-chung was looked upon by the Soviets as a Chinese Kerenaky; conse-
quently, they made preparations for a Sinkiang October Revolution in keeping with
the pattern used in the Balkan "changes in government."
After General Marshall's visit to China, in 1946, `.he atmosphere was charged with
talk of vast military aid to the Kuomintang government. Chang Chih-chung, with paci-
fism za his watchword, promptly asked Soviet Consul General Savilov to act as mediator
between the Sinkiang insurgents and the Chinese Nationalist authorities An agree-
ment was reached and signed by both sides in January 1946.
Chang showed alarming indifference to the reckless pacifism of George C. Marshall
and Jaw..cs F. Dyrnes. His behavior enabled the Soviets to restrain the onslaught
of the Soviet. Army and the Turkestan People's Army, and to concentrate on the poli-
tical arena, Akhmedjan Kasimi was directed to set up a coalition government together
with Chang Chih-chung. Communist sympathizers were planted in this government and
awaited the word to carry out a "chang& in government." the Northweet China pattern
of democratic "freedou" and the Soviet pattern of democratic "organization," the
Chinese legal system and the illegal Communists movements, clashed and rent law and
order in Sinkiang to pieces.
At this phase of the political struggle, Chang had a choice of three courses tofol-
low in fencing with Soviet Consul General Savilov:
1. Mobilize Nationalist economic and military might (there were only 50,000
Kuomintang troops in Sinkiang at that time); quickly stabilize internal political condi-
tions in the province; and open a "cold war "
2 Use such true nationalists and advocates of self-government as Masud Sabri,
Isa, and EmIn in organizing the people and embarrassing the opposition.
3. Take advantage of international political conditions -- the Sino-Soviet
Treaty and the desire for peace -- to bring the opposition to terms.
Unfortunately, Chang decided upon the third course and was subsequently de-
feated by Savilov at the same time that Secrrltary of State Byrnes was defeated by
Foreign Minister Molotov,
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In the spring of 1947, the Chinese Nationalists severed relations with the
Chinese Communists, an act which intensified the cold war '!tween the US and the
Soviet Union, Marshall's attitude became more intransigent, the Truman Docfriae
and thr- Marshall plan 'fastened the production of arms, and a new opportunity
arose -,or Sinkiang. The Chinese Nationalist government sent Masud Sabri, advo-
cate of self-government, to be chairman of Sinkiang Province (May 1947). They
were thus taking the second course outlined above.
General Sung Hsi-lien, commander of the Sinkiang Guard General Headquarters,
expanded hie force to 80,000 troops, many of whom were American-equipped. ?!e
conferred with the Kazakhs and the Ulghurs, rallied the Chinese, Manchu, Mongol,
Moslem, and Kazakh peoples around Masud Sabri, and op=ned a legal war on th : Com_
monists of Sinkiang. But Chang Chin-chung, still adamant in his demands for com-
promise, refused to support the plane of Sung and Maeud. Hopes for an anti-Soviet
united front in Sinkiang were dashed
It was not long before the Kremlin went over on the offensive. The Soviet
Union sent recruits from Pei-t'a Shan and unite f the Mongolian
the border areas of eastern Sinkiang (5 June 1947, Arran n eredst
P'u-?t'ao-kou Revolt while in southern Sinkiang AkhmedJan then engineered the
w
ction fared which
as aimed directly at Sung and Masud. Syncnonizednwithet
was
hese militarypthrusts
i
"ao._theaSovietSperpetration of a vast anti-US movement within China proper and a
s for t
had b.laid by
hese Chang, a Politician who showed Ilia true colors cbysfinallyedefecting toe
the Chinese Communists.
However, the adamant support of a cold-war policy by both Masud and Sung and
their work to unite the Uighurs and the Kazakhs with advocates of self-government
was continued. When the P'u-t'ao-kou Revolt collapsed, the prestige of Akhmed an
went with it for his military maneuver was bridled. At this impasse, the Krem-i+n
decided to ser.d Akhmedjan and more than ten funous Communists to Kuldja to ring
and isolate the advocates of self-government led by Masud
At the same time that this was talking place, the Chinese Nationalist govern-
ment decided to discontinue its policy of directing the flames of the nationalism
of minority peoples toward the cold-war powder keg. In this, the second stage of
the Kuldja Revolt, Sung Hsi-lien won the fret victory for the democratic forces
of the free world.
Sta a Janna 1948 one
1951
During this phase of the international struggle, one that began in 1948 and
runs to the present (June 1951), although the Chinese Communists took the main-
land, the USSR suffered a series of crucial setbacks and was forced again to change
its policy toward nationalists in Eastern Europe, Greece, and Central Asia.
In the spring of 1948, when Titoism began to evolve and when serious defections
appeased among Communists in Southern Europe, the situation in the Balkans under-
went a drastic transformation. Then, too, on 15 August !947, Pakistan was declared
an independent dominion. As the slogans of Mohanmea.:Ali Jinnah stirred many former
pro-Soviet Moslems in the Central Asian frontier regions, the USSR launched a
purge of C^:aaunists in the area who showed inclinations toward independence and
deviationie~. The Eastern Turkestan People's Republic (1944 - 1948), therefore,
was overthrown and quickly replaced by the Sinkiang People's League for the De-
fense of Peace and Democracy Chere.4n after referred to as Sinkiang People's Lea-
gu 7. During the 1950 Stalin-Mao conference, the Foreign Minister of the Sin-
kiang People's League was sent to Peiling.
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e Kuldjs insurgents,Akhmed,jan and Ishka, as well as others, had committed
the he,tcr of "adventurism" in their futile attack on P'u-t'ao-kou and were li-
gaidaied after the Soviet Communists took Kuldja. The internationalist, Saffudin,
arrirtn'- f.rcm the USSR to head the Sinkiang People's League, established diploma-
tic it with Peiping. In November 1949, when the Wang Chen units of the Chinese
CcmTunist Army entered Sinkiang and took over the Kuldja People's Army, the lead-
cri of the :.^w Sinkiang People's League announced that Akhmedjan and his compa-
triots, vhll~ on their way to Peiping earl; in September, had been ambushed and
killed by brigands loyal to Outer Mongolia. Saffudin lost no time in appealing
dir.'rtly to Mao for aid. At the Stalin-Mao conference in February 1950, there-
fore, th= Sinkiang People's League was placed under Chinese Communist direction
and guarantees "self-government" status.
The vans,n left after .he r?irge of the Kuldja insurgents we.s promptly filled
by troop: of the Soviet Army. The Kremlin sent MVD details to mop up remnants
of th:= -urki Akhmedjan;action, despite the fact that they had been comrades in
arms 3t.alir.istc caring the bitter anti -Gei_.an campaigns. This is the great
trogedv of the Sinkiang Communists. It is the ultimate example of the aphorism,
"Who:. the fox has been caught, the hounds are killed and boiled."
Present conditions (end o: June 1951) find the former secretary-general of
Sinkiang, lea, at Srinagar, Kashmir. The Chinese Communists, continuing in their
role or High Executioner, have arrested the famous Kuldja insurrectionist, Kani-
patult, s giant both in physical strength and nationalistic fervor. After aving
es:aped from former Governor Sheng Shih-ts'a1. he organized the Kuldja rebels
and later was commander in chief of the Kuldja People's Army and concurrently re-
gional tcipervi3or of that city during the period of martial law. Later, he was
p-cr6"d by the Communist Party cadres ai ng with Kulbahnbatlu, Moslem leader in
southern Sinkiang, and several hundred others Furthermore, about 3,000 followers
of N_3tud Sabri and over 800 disciples of the Kazakh historian Niwad were either
kill'I or cent to the Soviet Union for adm:nist.rative trials.
D c'Ing the public trial of Osman Bator and 59 other Kazakh nationalist lead-
ers at. Urumc.;!, net onalists throughout Sinkiang were suddenly confronted by the
de.as'ac!!:- 'act r.hst regardless of leftist or rightist proclivities and despite
pro- Or an:!-Ccmmur.ttt activities, they were being indiscriminately branded with
the sane iron. "unning dogs of American imperialism," and were soon to become the
object of a noddy Soviet purge. The revolutionary "cleansing" of the Kuldja in-
surgent.,, :,a_ r,miniacent of the cruel fate suffered by Rajk of Hungary, Markos of
Greecc, Gomulka of Poland, and Clementis of Czechoslovakia.
Kuldja People Z Army Becomes Korean. Cannon Fodder
In Sinkiang, during recent months, he Kuldja People's Army has been reor-
ganized and sent to the Korean front. Formerly the Nationalist Revolutionary Army
of the Eastern Tuu?keatan People's iepublic, it was renamed the People's Army of
the Sinkiang People's League for the Defense of Peace and, after subsequent reor-
ganization by the Chinese Communists, became the Fifth Army of the First Army Group
in General P'eng Teh hum 's First Field Army. It is made up of the 13th, 14th, and
15th Div s!ers and has an over-all strength cf 14 regiments, most of which are ca-
valry: It. t, the former army of the Kuldja insurrectionists. M.v y Taranchi and
Kazakh recruits from the administrative districts of Kuldja, Chugurhak, and A-k'o-su,
who are ardent nationalists, still fly the colors of this army bearing the Turkic
crescent and star.
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?roops of the Kuldja People's Army received their baptism of fire during
i-sm in -each its waeermpr,c. rervcombatolutionexperieary
h wever, cameg duringdactiveiduty
under ;.wviet field commanders. In the winter of 1944, during the siege of Kind a
there :troops trapped and completely encircled a regiment of the Chinese Nation -
list 7th Division under Li Yti-hsiang, and the Kuomintang troops '
their way out only after a bitter struggle. It was a cavalry unit of the Kuldja
People's Army, moreover, which struck the rear guard of the Chinese Nationalist
45th Division in the Tien Shan.
In Tanuary 1945, the Kuldja People's Army split into three attacking col-
umns, Abasufu, leading one column through the bitter marched on Kuldja from A-k'o-su; I.'Lhshihjan led a bitter cold
Kazakh c c vavaallryrysthr thrust st Turfan and
from
the Drungarian gateway into Chuguchak; and Kanipatulu, skirting the precipitous
T'ien S'an passes in the west, lunged directly at Urumchi itself, During these
marches and the ensuing battles, the Sinkiang nationalists fought alone and un-
supported.
In August 1945, during the Ching-ho--Wu-su campaign, this insurgent army
commanded by General Balinov, a White Russian, met the Chinese Nationalist Sin-
kian.q Se.ori Army under Hsieh I-feng in a battle of maneuver on the Ma-na-ssu
plain. The column under Ltehshihjan was joined by a mechanized brigade of the
Soviet Army which had secretly entered Sinkiang at Chuguchak; together they
pushed scuth'a-; on Wu-su under the protection of an air umbrella and cut the
escare. roue cf the Sinkiang Second Army. Commander Hsieh I-feng withdrew from
Wu-s:,, his forces under heavy Red Air Force bombardment (incendiaries were used
Jr. these bomber attacks) and the Tu-shah-tzu oil field, located 20 kilometers
6,:'1thea_t of Wu-su, fell to the Red Army. The 45th Division under Kuo Ch'i was
trrappp'v l''veen of Ching-ho and Wu-su by the composite force of Soviet armor ani
the Kuldja People's Army. The entire division was routed and
K0O was t.aren prisoner. ills was a Soviet breach of faith, coming as tt did
at t..- ,am- lime when the Silo-Soviet Treat; was signed and just after the Japa-
nese surrenjer, However, since the red Army operated under a protective Kuldja
People's Army shield and since the Chinese Nationalist forces were decisively de-
feated in the field, no Soviet personnel 'r military equipment were captured.
Consequent;y, tht charge of military intervention could not be verified and
15,003 aold:srs of the Republic of China died without their countrymen knowing
of their sacrifi_e.
:he fight use of military fore by the USSR in aiding her satellite arm-
ies is rot pea. Despite attempts to conceal their identity with uniforms of the
KuldJaic' t:,e forces dispatched to Sinkiang were made up cf many recr,:its from
Central Aster nationality, groups, and. although Chinese Nationalist soldiers cap-
tured many of t'tem, these Asiatics could not readily be distinguished from the
real Fuidja ire'rrgents. Nevertheless, Kuomintang commanders were able to tell
the K,,13tsicis from regular Red Army troops by observing the firepower and battle
tactics of tnn forces Opposing them.
In 'he a?,t.'ymn of 1946, when this writer reached Kuldja, Chinese at the scene
of the uiege (November 1944 to Tanuary 1945) reported that the insurgents fight-
ing a regimen'. of Chinese Nationalist troops who held the vital Ai-lin Park were
so weak that they could scarcely maintain a sustained attack for one day. When
night fell, however, martial law was declared; Soviet artillery could be heard
rumbling through the city streets to take up firing positions within range of the
park, The barrages which usually followed set part of the park afire and Just
before dawn, the guns could again be heard rolling out of the city. This hap-
pened every night during the last week of the siege until the park was finally
taken.
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Also, tc::ording to information received by this reporter, when General Kuo
Ch'i, commander of the 45th Division, was captured and brought Lefore the smartly
drec_ed rebel ccmmander in chief, General Balinov, Kuo believed that the White
RussiF would be his prosecutor and judge. He soon discovered, however, that it
was rrs..ly Balinov's aide-de-camp, a man whose insolent behavior bespoke unlimited
authority, who was his inquisitor. General Balinov, unschooled and awkward in
speech, feared saying the wrong thing and took his cues from this aide. This
pattern of impromptu coaching is not a new Communist device.
The emal.l remnant of the Kuld,ja People's Army today is actually the same
Cody that fought under the banner of nationalism and is made up of recruits from
the adm,nsatrative districts of Kuldja, Chuguchak, and A-k'o-su. The Soviet union,
however, is depleting an excellent military reserve by sending the unit to fight
with the Ch,,nese Communists in Korea. According to considered opinion based on
dispa--:;e, from the front, the troops of the Communist Fifth Army, a force which
reacneu .i,e central front in Korea during the last week of April and which was
throvr. tsck in the May "Spring Offensive," may include most of the Kuldjaists. It
is iron:-al that the Eastern Turkestan people's revolt should have finally peri-
shed in a sea of US fire at the 38t1- F' ;-'.*cl.
F_::'_ i lnho ' for Troops of Tao Chih-? ue-
w;,c?n genera] T'ao Chih-yueh capitulated to the Chinese Communist armies in
Sept-ote: 1i1'?, the Nationalist government had approximately 80,000 troops in '. I
Cho.. ]cra?ions and unit designatiuno vere as follows:
]. 3inktang G.;ard General Headquarters, General Tlao Chih-yueh, commander
in. : tef and provincial garrison commander, replacing Sung Hsi-lien, and directly
:u::,.?l1rtted snits were stationed in and about Urumchi. The units included the
Inicp-nier', 4th Cavalry Brigade under Tang Ching-Jan, the 7th Cavalry Brigade,
fo?.r reginente of various nationalities under Osman Bator, one guard xegiment,
one ,n_'eprrien- border patrol regiment, one independent artillery regiment, the
25th M ott'1.:ci Regiment, one pack-horse regiment, one reconnaissance regiment,
et,:.
2. "lht recrgrinized 78th Division under General Yeh Ch'eng was garrisoned
at Vic a:ri`. was made up of the 179th Brigade under Mou Wo-,jo, the 179th
Brtaa:e :ender to Chu-?'