THE STRUGGLE FOR COMPLETE LIQUIDATION OF BANDITS IN THE NEWLY LIBERATED AREAS OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700010255-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 255
• Publication Date: September 18, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT Military - Guerrilla suppression
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORi
?`-. INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
HOW
I
eriodica
PUBLISHED Semimonthly p
WHERE
DATE
PUBLISHED I Aug 1950
_...IANGUAGE Chinese
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O/ 1IIC COITS) 5111101 RITIIC lilt ==a.' IOCA5I KT
IO TIC H/t4TIM
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01CO M CW. 1 NPU015CIIW M TOU 00 1O' O 0105. 11 OOP
SOURCE
DATE DIST. /$ Sep 1951
NO. OF PAGES 7
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Hsin Kuan-ch'a (New Observer), Vol I, No 3, 1950.
THE STRUGGLE FOR COMPLETE LIQUIDATION
OF BANDITS IN THE NEWLY LIBERATID AREAS OF CHINA
I
In the first half of 1950, with the enthusiastic assistance of the local
people in the respective areas, the People's Liberation Army launched its`bandia
liquidating campaign in the newly liberated areas of Southwest, Central and South,
Northwest, and East China any concluded it with a successful victory. According
'to the first draft of statistics, some 40,000 bandits were liquidated in those
6 months. At present, with the exception of certain areas in Fukien, Kwangtung,
Kwangsi, and Western Hunan, bandit groups in East, Central South, and Northwest
China have been basically destroyed. The bandits' strength in Southwest China
has received a crushing blow. Bandits who had caused considerable trouble or
had created rather serious tensions in other areas have als. been practically
-.eliminated.
In the immediate future, one of the most important tasks of the People's
Liberation Army and the People's Militia in the respective areas is to continue
destroying the remnants of bandit.groups still scattered in the Southwest, Kwang-
tung, Kwangsi, Western Hunan, and Fukien who are still causing much trouble to
the local people in out-of-the-way places. Remnants of the Kuomintang Army have
turned into bandits and have conspired with the local feudal elements and profes-
sional bandits to cause trouble,) IM making conditions extremely complex and our
task of liquidating them very difficult. However, our undaunted Liberation Army,
wih its oglorious
the resppeectiveiareas,will continueitoco-
thet People's elentlessly
Ple
follow faithfully the pronouncement of Chairman Mao that "We are a fighting team,
also a working team." They will penetrate deeply into the farm villages in rally-
ing; the masses to implement land reform, to carry out the program of rent reduc-
tion, and to wage war against bandits and local blackguards under the guidance of
hne'eeht Pebp1b1rew,o i, rhmeut.
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d?temired supra
At the same time, a policy of _anla:I:y on
pression on the other has been adopted by the go=:ernwsnt; for the
ringleaders, leniency to the fol p ~~~ r. aofd- kusr ackao 1aled ~-?nt o .-nt of those By such se ,;.l, who have
u'_dat
e
shown merit by aiding in :'.ae liq
we shall be able to cut off the bandits from their oUza`p oofydeaundence thetely
feudal elements of the old soc.lety; and f ina`ly l!3ui~
and restore peace and order to society,
Southwest China
b the
y the
The Southwest is the last region on the ~ ~n defeat o beLaberetednd
People's Liberation Army.. Before their comVlet
Kuomintang bandits had laid the groundwork fo ge-s calinintelligencewwoorksin
was
this region. In May 9a9s the fifth g School"
a sets
tablished by the bandits in Ch?eng?=tu. Rere, a -Ls ge rvcbsr of 8
were trained to conspire with the ^smi=nt5 of coL?te re'o'L''t??"ary alementa to
a:heming to
tl it?ies behind the enemy 'e
_weat was liberated;
carry on so-called "guerrilla ac- t? nemy's
sabotage and destroy. revolutionary order?m AfterotheESo th of the defeated
the bandit special agents were largely local
loon
Kuomintang bandit army who, by conspiring with professional _aandd bandits to and carry
blackguards, and especially by utilizing feudal elements, p
their obstructive sr_tivities in the Southwest..
ha?:e
Since late January 1950, they have int.=cif=e'- '`her}a:to destroy they
highways,
ter
organized into groups to rob the Ps-Ple and the r*Wc
d+" to
bridges, telephone and telegraph wires, to attack xa and co ea convoys, of and
usly
assassinate local cadres., continuing these as the
the ye.s_s`a _iJea sad. prop-
endangering the revolutionary order and .bzsatsninf~ r..nd tons to
erty. After having fought brsrely under axt:em d:ffi -1t launched its
liberate the Southwest, the People1e Liters+aoniArmy i~kic.teLy un i the
'bandit-liquidating campaign. Revising itp t. to mee 'c o_.t'.me in the r's ad
various liberated areas, it carried on meri ta abo and nd the rand;ts' ~?is:utegaadion
rallied the masses' support in order. bane lr h. bsea annihilated,
audiefeat. By the end of March 19?C`~Jra;.p7-0,000 ba *_eEn lM. blen a
and bandit groups in Western and Eastern bad p '.i ati.on .A=my shook. off its rrev.ous pas
In April and May, the sops?'~ - ;,.~+,;:.cs of enenc'_:^ciement
sine attitude and took the initiative by exployg^?' ee i0n 0c ofnc?s Clem anni
and annihilation, Progress was made :aefdul and.
Bandits in Szechwan Provirce, with the e:eceptlon of certain small areas,
have been liquidated, and land and ?aate ? communisation lines have abbeeenereesto ed.
In Kweichow and Sikang provinces, after the bandits were dealt a conditions were restored to norms. Although the major bandit groups have been r defeated in Western Yunnan,, remna,.te are at li oaun n? the ggov oveb mentsconsidera le
concern. On the whole, from Janu%Ty to May ..?5 s
west China were liquidated, while those ?!n many other areas hivetbeen entirelyd
annihilated. The vicious schemes of the Kuomintang
"guerrilla activities on the maIfLla?.ad" have reccelve4 at fetalAblo?eunder hevat.
tack of our People's Liberation Army and People s
of past accomplishments, _it`Is estimated that all bandit grouse. can be largely
. at vvr--The various provinces in Central and. South Chins were programs not lI eintthose the
same time, hence, fesbaits in!on3n_Province have already been entirely
itL'ee?'was not uniform. The and those in
liquidated, those in Kiangsi Province liquidated to a large d~e
are sti'--? small atu ?1r6~ a`~a bo-dering Sserhuan
bands for
small bandit except
&~ $ pan wbere eliminated
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C ONP S~UTLkL
i3 ? V ?t?`'+'' q jnr,~? tfi,F coa9t
In Kwangtung and. Kwmogsi pro*~in::' E6PCC - ,. Fce_fal a ?nts to pene?=
where the. Kuomintang bandits had sent a group of armrd g-
trate the mainland, the number of handit?e increased in .'an'tary and February,
and incidents such as the assassination of itiz4ns a d rsvoiutaonary cadres
re-
and attacks on local garrisons once red repeatedly. A f ley ,i9"ing e. a m i n dthe the true conditions prevailing March mldTYY of moblliaation
sponsible authorities issued in February and
against bandits. These orders clearly outlia dtthe poll ct andtmisstons re
the liquidating campaign by summoning t to tt
in
ng the vicious schemesaoflsabotageyandyde.strv,.tton plannedKbyathen
destroying areas
in d -remen
Kuomintang bandits. After 2-3 months of sttug in .the numerous~.farm illagest
and a rent-reduction movement were inaugurated e~nuc? sou .farm vn lae
throughout Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangei. provinces. and.
farm villages were gradually restored, had- Kvangtung }t,_a eWesternbaunan,
and Western Hupeh, where the band'--,: had- r..s'.:se_ 6eri_.uh
strength has been greatly reduced The major. bandit g. in he .antral
part of Western Hunan and In northeastern ;wane': ha-e rz res Y liquidated
and the remnants of bandit bends are now bMilitary n frce' ck ir ofiartion,, The
bandit-surPression force of the Kwangtung or` A_? is stren gth from
its political position and ral:yang the massee' y
p_ t in the Central and
January - - May 1950, over 170,000 bsnllt,e were l, _qui.da e
South China area.
Northwest China
St yer,
The region of Northwest China was completely _ibea'*?, ale there; At hat
time, remnants of the Kuomintang bandits had caused much ub and e; th eyr
conspired with local blackguard'1 to rob, kidnap, andjint,;oate,st China is r
h-
ub the work of the Central e the2 task of Gover=-et, Se
bandits there was rather
abi ted by y people o of many races, , 9uidatin8 ~ F= the
difficult. However, under the guidance of the sound pri._c1.leacof +he eghalityn
of the races, the People'', Liberation Army adopted. a policy
between military and political branches of the goirernmsnt, A policy of suppresd
siun and consolidation, with the promotion of political dieintegr.ation used as
the chief weapon to eliminate the bandits, achieved great succees.In the last
few months bandit groups in Kansu Province Lave been essent_:a.:.1Y eliminated, as
have bandit groups a stand ill T anlarge p in 6 the e mountelna of
bands in southern Shensi der.
In Sinkiang Province, the rebels headed by Osman; yaaolopus, and Ku-ni=?mu-
ban, underlings of US imperialists and the Kuomintang bandiia, after
beingthe
by the determined attack of the Peoples liberation Army cooperation t with tat=
local people, had been essentially wiped out rear .;
l inis f yy ti s.ndton t'of n
tt hie inndits
leaders, Ku-ni'.mu-han, was raptiu ed by our army . end of *bis year,
in Northwest China can be largely liquidated before the
East China
In East China, with the exception of bandit groups operating in kukien Prom and s within thismall groups
can be said ito large in tq-aidate.Wnces major bands
General
Thus, after a half year of struggle, bandits in the vat liberated areas
have either lost their leadership or been largely e l.I.m:!nate.d. '~e'r th? bandit
groups along the communication lines in the Southwest had been eitminated, goods
between the city and the country were able to flow freely and hence food prices
have been gradually stabilized. :9.t the same time. rest: oration of production and
collection as been rallying thefmasses' ssuuppoorthavInball par'talofVHunannPrcvince, the progrpasvsemaded
3?
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in liquidating bandits has been good, and attention has been paid to establish-
ing the people's armed forces in strategic locations to strengthen the people's
political power in the farm villages and to prepare the groundwork
form in that province this fall. In the Northwest, the bandit groups in the
various areas have been eliminated, and thus tr..ansportationb-
lines in that area have been made safe,
lished. At the same time, the people, who had been much troubled by the bandits,
are now returning to their homes to pursue their normal productive activities.
The guiding principles of the People"s Liberation Army in eliminating bandits
are military suppression, political reindoctrination, and rallying and uniting
the masses. By examining its experiences in various regions, tt has developed the
following three procedures to accomplish its tasko
The first procedure is based mainly on military suppression in conjunction
with political offensive, aimed at eliminating bandit groups anddeefeattingg heirgth
main forces. When launching a -bandit-liquidating campaign, superior is concentrated to ccnfront the bandit groups with a determined attack. After the
block-
bandit are defeated employed a to liquidate remnants of by such
ade and not giving
them a minute's respite.
The second procedure is based mainly on political offensive in conjunction
with military isolation. The masses are rallied to assist in rounding up the
ringleaders and eliminating scattered bandits. When the a numberrmed arecalrin-
ing toward areas in which bandits are operating, a large habitants may fear coming in contact with the People's Liberation Army, and others
may even leave due to the bandits' threats. Undeuchon itions, the PeOple'sm-
Liberation Army will try to propagate the army principles
portance and objectives of liquidating the bandits, and the determination of the
Central People's Government to eradicate bandits, asking the people not to assist
bandits but to aid the government's campaign by giving information. Because the
people have been much annoyed by the bandits, they have a deep hatred for them,
and only with patient treatment will they eventually conquer their fear and aid
bandit-suppression units. For example, once a citizen of Ni*''~=tong in An-shun
.seen, Kweichow Province, raced 40 li fone li equals 1/3 mill '.-to the headquarters
of the bandit-suppression unit to give information. The people's warmicl vePfor-
their army is very moving. During the battle at Yang
iWe ? when the People's Liberation Army had gone without food or water for 2
days, the local populace, upon their own initiative, sent food and water to their
positions.
In fostering political disintegration of bandit groups, the policy of leni-
ene y and determined suppression is employed, pointing out to the bandits that if
they do not surrender, the only road left open to them is teat d policy , whle towardnthose
who truly repent the People's Liberation Army will adopt of en.
Therefore, in all areas, fostering of political disintegration has given outstand-
ing accomplishments; the inner circles of the bandit intelligence headquarters are
being shaken; and the numbers of those who surrender or repent have multiplied.
For example, in the Southwest Military Region, the number which surrendered in
March was 20 percent of the total number of bandits, in April it was 34 percent,
and in May it reached 54 percent, while in Eastern and Northern Szechuanu PProvince,
the number ranged from 60 percent to 80 percent. Also, in breaking up
groups, attention is paid. to families and relatives. They are invited to round-
table discussions, where the government's liberal and lenient policies are ex-
plained, as well as its determination to suppress the bandits, and they are told
-4-
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F I n, Pill
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not'to'miss the excellent opportunities offered them of persuading the bandits
to repent, returm.to their own homes, and engage in productive work. A mother
of a bandit at pi-ahan in Szechuan province, when she understood the policies
of the People's Liberation Army in liquidating bandits, by crying and begging,
persuaded her 'son to surrender.
The third procedure ib to rally the masses to support the government in
liquidating scattered bandits and local blackguards, with the 'aim of uprooting
the bandits' sources of supply and destroying the feudal exploitation of the
farm villages. After the bandit groups have beery-defeated, the consciousness
of the masses vi13: be promoted. Then, the bandit-suppressed units will pro-
ceed to study true. village conditions, to discover and foster r helpfu,l mint
in order to use them in the work of completely Ii uidating of l and lite rruly
ban-
attaining?a goal in which "everyone is engaged
dits, everyone is engaged in propaganda, every village has its soldiers, and
has its work to do." Experience in various areas proves that the
every lo after the blaekguarda have been
bandits dits lose* hheir means of subsistence only
ixtesminated, and, consequently, after this the troubles loused by them abrupjly
cease.
`A`s?$ua 'pokey and a centralized l(cadership are the keys to the success of
our bandit-liquidating campaign. The intelligence activities of the bandits are
dependent on. the puppet Pao-chic organizations, the armed strength of landlords,
and, secret groups who carry on a keen and complicated strug-
gleaa blackguard' or secretly, politically or militarily. Therefore,
to toe elliminat iminte bandits u eiianditts s of a a political f nature, all branches of the government and
a
the muses must join in united action against them. The main armed units, :a111-
tart' organizations, and the party must organize a centralized office or command ength
p headquarters charged with msrsbaling the total availablels every rofithe party,
the army, the political organizations, and the people.
tralized directing office of the party) the military, and the people must be
Separately established in each city and village in accordance with-the conditions
and nods of the area.
eop le' organiza-
In the scuthxest, local bandit-liquidating committees and people's
tials. =o,;Mt-de'Zane have been widely established, making it ibls bfor t
'military to work in close -cooperation with the masses in launching anti
operations. Through clod cooperation between political the military branches
nchest-
of the government, with wean assistance and supporrcgk
campaign has become a popular movement and has enabled the government
to check the expansion ofbandit activities.
A*,gorthern and Eastern Szechuan, a bandit-suppression command headquarters
for centralizing operations has been established. It since has delivered the
bandits a crushing defeat in the border region of those two areas.
In Hunan Province, the military authority has also taken as its chief func-
tion and mission the task of liquidating bandits. In $ovember 1949, employing
a destain unit of a field army as a nucleus, a command'headq asters for bandit
quar-
liquidation was established. After the es~cis amts ofgtehisao command ndc eadiuar-
ters, with the assistance of'the local pop
,in 20 days a missioi originally scheduled to take one month. It shattered the
schemes of the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's and Pai Chung-hsi's so-called
"'"resistance movement behind enemy lines."
5-
C0lFIDEATIAE
C BDE%T1-1
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From this, it can be seen that close cooperation between political and
military branches of the government and people's assistance and support are
such chain of
the most important links in the gigantic
cooperation the
e bandits completely. It is only with don avoid t we we can apre-
vent loopholes through which the bandits might escape, then our unsatisfac-
will be trivial orof no avail.
ment results. otherwise, of rr
went will be great; In our activities, we must strictly and faithfully put into execution the
rth this, we must nbe we
policy of leniency and determined suppression. Inidoing
of any actions which would fail to separate the guilty or punishing we
inno-
oppose any action which would result in arresting, beating,
cent persons. In punishing bandits, we shall distinguish between those with
political backing and those without. We shall also find out whether they be-
came bandits of their own initiative or were forced to join. We shall investi-
gate the gravity of their crimes, so that separate convictions and punishment
can be given. Our past experiences prove that if we faithfully execute our
policy of leniency and determined suppression, the evil counterrevolutionary
elements will be isolated and sooner or later r brought tocJudgment. Asst the
bandit bands,'disintegrate many bandits,
will surrender. Those who refuse tovsurreGndderrarlrepent, we shall tde e
were r inedly
e ass, giving no leniency whatsoever.
forced to join bandit groups and who have committed no great crimes will
be set free after their surrender. The only requirements we will make ofuthem
is that they hand over their weapons and register. If they are willing
eriod of
home to pursue productive work, we shall set them free about aa he ort
education. Those who indicated repentance by bringing
of liquidation of their fellow bandits will be acknowledged in accordance with ly ass the degree of merit; but those who give information whilecclandestinely assist-
ing the bandits, spread rumors to undermine the peoples
e>
similar obstructive action, we shall strictly suppress,
Before March 1950, the above-mentioned policies were not faithfully carried
out in the Sou:uwest. The responsible authorities declared the lenient policies,
but executed these policies more or less too strictly. Asmanre6ult, thoseewhoo
deserved severe punishment were not the right dissatisfaction in the
deserved leniency were severely ly punished.
people and helped: the bandits. Many persons have said to us that our policy is
Beof tl leniency
"unlimited leniency," suspecting that ourpolicy
noyt is our just
stm"tosetthese
everyone free. Therefore, in rallying the the ig yes nee
results created ill effects which impeded our ,rork. But' fortunately, P
sible authorities in the areas quickly corrected thesmstakes andefaitrfull
executed our policy o". leniency and determined suppression. masses have gradually given up their fears as well as their misunderstanding.
Many of the ;_-ople have voluntarily organized propaganda teams to assist the
ban-
bandit-liquidating ugiAnn of and Goverment in
dits. Farmers Hsiang B, , Wei Bungchu
a
in Liang-span Helen in Szec4yran Province organized some 20 farmers and arrested
three bandits in that village. They first asked these bandits to write letters t of repentance and then turned them over to the locals government. When theybwere
arresting bandit h'yn Chi-pin, on s wife empty stomachs,
fast. . Although they had made a a long journey before dawn "We cannot throw away the People's
Hsiang An-dung and ethers declined, saying:
Government's confidence in us."
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To gain victory in our bandit-liquidating campaign, strict discipline and
a spirit of comradeship must be observed by the People's LibertheynmArmt yni-
the People's Militia in the various areas. At the same time,
fest a high decree of heroism and devotion in wiping out meevilss for the good sof
the people. In the transition from regular fighting pP g- P
against the bandits, certain groups of the bandit-liquidating units in the
Southwest are ignoring the difficulties ahead.
In the Northwest, the bandit-liquidating units still do not fully realize
the seriousness of the bandits in those areas, thinking that "several hundred
thousand soldiers of Hu Tsung-nan and Ma Pu-fang have been defeated, and the
erroneously attention."
has o suc-
remaining ti are not worthy of
ceeded our fighting
n dd, it is not worthwhile
and fearhdifficulties'.y hence,
battles killed
n small to
not e willing polit-
ical t on fight
cal education b by the party and government, together with their actual
sites in fighting the bandits, these unfortunate ttitudes areobeing the comt
They now all realize that our struggle-against the
important tasks confronting us on the road to reconstruction and prosperity.
In the regular discussions of the various units, after they understo detheeim-
portance and meaning of completely liquidating the ,
ized that this struggle against the bandits is a class strugglehoulderand
to s
possess higher political consciousness and be willing
sibilities. Therefore, all the comrades in the armed forces have raised their
enthusiasm and spirit of comradeship. In many areas, they have put up the slo-
gan: The bandits are still not liquidatedthe , we musbanditst
of them are fighting determinedly ag
' and to add more honors and awards to those they have already at-
into the party
tained.
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