POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPRESSION IN BULGARIA UNDER COMMUNIST RULE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600360352-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 352
• Publication Date: November 27, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPRESSION IN IJULGARIA UNDER COMMUNIST RULE
(Quoted from Basel National Zeitung)
The present members of the Bulgarian government have all been trained in
the USSR, where they occupied various political and military positions. Cher-
venkov taught at the Communist Party School in Moscow; Foreign Minister Vladi-
mir Poptomov was employed at AGITPROP (the agitation and propaganda section of
the Comintern), held a responsible position in the NKVD, and was a close col-
laborator of .Lozovakiy in Soviet trade-union organizations. Deputy Prime Min-
ister Rayko Damyanov also lived for many years in the USSR, and Karlo Lukanov,
chairman of the State Planning Commission, was a long-time delegate to the Mos-
cow Soviet. Finance Minister Kiril Lazai,ov taught in Soviet colleges, and Dimo
Dichev, chairman of the State Control Commission was cadre chief of the Comin-
tern. Foreign Trade Minister Dimitur Ganev was a member of the Comintern sec-
retariat; Minister of Construction Blagoy Ivanov was a high Soviet functionary;
Minister of Health Petur Kolarov was a lieutenant colonel in the Red Army; Sava
Ganovski, chairman of the Commission for Science, Art, and Culture, also held
a high post in the Soviet bureaucracy; and Chief of Staff General Asen Grekov
was a colonel in the Red Army.
With Chervenkov in power, the "old guard" of'Communists is being consis-
tently eliminated. Members of the latter comprise those Communists who stayed
in the country during the war and the German occupation and who did not hold
any posts in the Soviet government. Most of them were in prison during the
occupation or were active in the underground; after 9 September 1944, they set
up the Fatherland Front government. The antagonism between this group and the
emigres who returned frrm the USSR was only latent as long as there was still
a necessity to repulse jointly any opposition from the agrarian and socialist
elements which still'existed at that time. "
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL CQ~~~~E~"~1~41~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
COUNTRY Bulgaria
SUBJECT Political; Economic; Sociological
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED" Paris
DATE
PUBLISHED Jun - Jul 1950
LANGUAGE
THIS OOCUNINT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
Of TNI UNITED STATES WITHIN TNT NIANINO Of ISPIONANI ACT SO
U. S. C.. NI AND SS. AS ANINDID. ITS TNANSNISSION OR THI NIY ELATION
Of ITS CONTINTf IN ANT MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZIO PERSON IS PRO.
HIOITIO OT LAW. NIPR000CTION Of THIS FORM IN PROHIBITED.
DATE OF
INFORMATION 1950
DATE DIST. ?'7 Nov 1950
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
SOURCE Osvobozhdenie anti-Communist? Vol I, No 8-9, 1950.
The break with Tito precipitated the tension with she party; all "national"
Communists were accused of being Tito sympathizers and were eliminated, leaving
the Moscow Communists in sole power. Since the execution of Kostov and the
death of Dimitrov and Kolarov, Chervenkov now faces only two major rivals: Anton
Yugov and Dobri Terpeshev. Both were transferred to insignificant ministerial
posts, Industry and Labor respectively; then they were openly accused by Cherven-
kov'of collaborating with Kostov.. 'As a result, Terpeshev was expelled from the
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Politburo and the same fate may await Yugov. Terpeshev, next to Kostov, had
been the most popular among Bulgarian Communists and was highly praised for
his heroic part in the inderground movement; he was a favorite of Dimitrov,
just as Yugov had been the most influential figurc under Dimitrov's regime
and Glen now commando a considerable following among the militia forces. In
the recent purges, many prominent Communists were expelled from the Central
Committee, such as Lt Gen Boris Kopchev, political commissar of the Army; Ivan
Buchvarov, chairman of the Cooperative Union; former Finance Minister Vulko
Kochev; Krustyu Stoychev, Communist Party secretary for Pirin Macedonia, and
others. In all, 12 members of the Communist Party were expelled.
Thus Chervenkov succeeded in crushing all opposition to his policiee .nd
is now putting into practice the principles he represents, which may be ex-
pressed in brief as follows: only that is right which serves the USSR. Indeed,
the welfare of the USSR is now the only standard of Bulgarian patriotism. Fur-
thermore, Chervenkov proclaimed that the previous economic policy of the coun-
try had been wrong. At the Central Committee meetings of ]5 and 17 January 1950,
he announced that the main economic objective should not be electrif.:cation and
industrialization, but the adaptation of-Bulgarian economy to the needs of the
USSR. This would md'a.n that the country has to stop converting its resources into
electric power and factories, and must direct all its efforts to agriculture and
producing the raw materials to be furnished to the USSR. This seems to be con-
firmed by the fact that work on several electric power projects that were started
in 1947 and 1948 has been stopped.
As far back as 1946, the USSR promised to furnish the equipment for one of
the largest power p:ajects, first named Traycho Kostov and later renamed Stalin;
the first shipment, however, was received only in 1948 and consisted of old,
British-made machinery which was no longer needed in the USSR. When the Bulgar-
ians complained about this obsolete British machinery, they were told to erase
the English names and markings. The large orders placed during 1946, 1947, and
1948 in Czechoslovakia likewise were delivered only in a small part.
Not a single large project was put into operation during 1949 and the first
months of 1950; everybody in Sofia now knows that the high-sounding plans for
the Bulgarian steel, cement, textile, and cannirg industries have been buried.
Even the long-projected plant for agricultural machinery has not been completed.
It is true that even without producing machinery, Bulgaria could easily obtain
industrial products in exchange for its agricultural products; however, such ex-
port'.%operations are forbidden by its Soviet sponsors and their Bulgarian help-
ers,who .direct that export must be operated for the benefit of the USSR exclu.
sively. The USSR sells Bulgarian products on the international market, insofar
as it has no use for them. Bulgarian iron, tin, and zinc ores are shipped di-
rectly to the USSR, where they are processed. The uranium mines in Stara Plan-
ina, 40 kilometers from Sofia, are Soviet-owned; the ore is shipped in sealed
cars, under guard of NKVD agents, direct to Stalin and from there by sea to
Odessa, in regular weekly shipments. The same is true of the Dimitrovo coal
mines, which are shipping their output to the USSR; the textile'plants also are
working exclusively with Soviet wool and cotton, and shipping the finished fab-
ricb back to the USSR.
As to Bulgarian agriculture, two thirds of the tobacco crop'is placed at
the disposal of Soviet-foreign trade; the remaining one third can be sold only
with great difficulty, because Soviet agents underbid the prices on the inter-
national market. One of the most valuable export products, rose oil, is also
exported by the USSR at a very low price; when the Bulgarians offered a small
oil shipment to the US, after securing it at great effort from the Soviet agents,
they were told that the latter had offered the product at a much lower Rrice.
Thus, rose cultivation in the famed Bulgarian Rose Valley is steadily declining
as the prices paid by the governme:it are so low that producers have lost all in-
terest in raising the flowers.
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The USSR is the only country providing Bulgaria with industrial products
-n an exchange basis for raw materials; the USSR sells these raw materials for
currencies on the international market and pays for them with products which it
does not need, selling them to Bulgaria at very high prices.
The Bulgarian people have no interest in the struggle between the two Com-
munist factions, and equally detest the national and Moscow brands of their op-
pressors, deriving only small satisfaction from the fact that the Communists
fight and destroy each other. Generally speaking, the Bulgarian people are rap-
idly sinking into apathy and hopelessness. Fear and distress are th-, leading
factors in their daily life. There is a constant fear of being deported to one
of the numerous concentration camps throughout the country, the largest,of whi-_I.
are located near Dimitrovo in Bogadanov Dol, where the inmates are forced to
work as slaves in the Georgi Dimitrov coal mine. Another large camp has been es-
tablished on a Danube island.
Hunger is also an ever-present companion, as food rations are entirely in-
sufficient and unrationed goods are out of reach of the average citizen.
The working day of a woman worker in a textile plant usually lasts 10 hours.
Since operations are mostly conducted on two shifts, every worker has 2 weeks
of night shift and 2 weeks of day shift. FrPnuently work is extended to Sun-
days for the sake of "norm fulfillment." The women are paid 6,000 leva a month,
but part of their wages may be deducted if the norm has not been fulfilled. Fur-
thermore, 2,000 leva are withdrawn for the canteen service, where the workers
are served the same meal day after day. An additional 450 leva go for the com-
pulsory subscription to three Communist newspapers. After '.educting expenses
for rent, lighting, transportation, and a few other basic items, the amount
left is hardly sufficient to buy a few rationed foodstuffs, and purchases on the
"free market" cannot even be dreamed of. A kilogram of rationed bread costs 30
leva and lb0 on the free market; a liter of rationed milk, available only for
children and invalids, costs 100 leva; and a pair of children's shoes costs 6,000
leva.
The continuous struggle for subsistence leaves no time for political activ-
ity. That is one of the main reasons why there is no organized resistance to
Communism, although the vast majority of the people in cities and rural areas
heartily hate and despise their Communist masters and their Soviet overlords.
Another reason for the lack of resistance'may be seen in the complete annihila-
tion of anti-Communist parties and organizationE., and in the constant surveillance
of the people by the Bulgarian and Soviet police. The people are well aware that
the only relief they can expect must come from abroad, and all their hopes are
directed to ;card the West. In this connection, the breaking of diplomatic rela-
tions between Bulgaria and the US was considered the first step taken by the
West against Communist dictatorship, and aroused new hope in the Bulgarian peo-
ple.
CONFIDENT IA
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