TRANSPORTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 738
• Publication Date: August 9, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE CY
INFORMA.ION FROM
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Transportation
HOW
PUBLISHED Pamphlet
WHERE
PUBLISHED Duesseldorf, Germany
DATE
PUBLISHED 31 Dec 1941
LANUAGE German
Tilt DOCI02RT CONTAINS INFORMATION strl:Taa US NATIONAL tins,.
ON US Ru=t STATSS iintS US MISSING OF SAMOSA SS ACT IS
I. R. C.. 11 Fes x1, Ar AMtt,.Y. I7t TRANxM?1D1 tlt 1Nl RtrxLF/lo1
01 Ita CO1TRNit It AMT RAtnu TO AN SNASTNOS1t1S 111101 it nn-
nONIt1T1o.
'J M,.a RT Yn. 111,11O8l0"On or "is roan is
SOURCE
CD NO
DATE OF
INFORMATION 1941
DATE DIST. 7 Aug 1949
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
SowletruesischaVerkohrexirtschaft, 'Tore nigte Staha.werke
Aktieagesellachaft, Volkewirtechaftllohe Abte lung. United
Steel Works Corporation, Politico-Econtmio Department, 1941.
(FDB Doc 519238
1. PAIIECIAD8
A. Present USSR Railroad Network,
1. General Traffic Density
Although the present operating length of USSR railroads is almost
two-thirds lsrg.:r than that of 1913, the number of railroads is still very
limited, considering the size of the country and its population. In 1937
the total railroad operating length in the USSR amounted to 86,500 kilometers,
compared with 50,500 kilometere (without Poland) in 1913. In 1939 Germany,
including Austria, Sudetenland, and the Incorporated Eastern regions, had
approxLdately 74,000 kilometers, not counting private railroads. The ratio
of the population density per square kilomiter in Germany to that of Russia
is 1,000 to 53, the dencit7 of the railroad network in kilometers per 100
square kilometers in Germany to that of Russia is 1,000 to 38; and the
density of the railroad network in kilometera_per 10,000 inhabitants in
Germany to that of Russia Is 1,000 tc 610.
These figures reveal that in Germany there are 19 times as many inhabitants
per square kilometer as in the Soviet Union, 132 as compared with 7 inhabitants
per square kilometer; that the German railroad network is 27 times as dense as
the Soviet, 10.9 ab compared with 0.4 kilometers per square kilometer, end
that to every two German there is slightly more railroad length than to every
three Russians, 8.2 as compared with 5 kilometers per 10,000 Inhabitants. In
comparing the LdSR with other countries, It ohould, however, be borne in mind
that it is composed, of vast lands of which the steppes and tundras and partly
desert land are of no Importance whatsoever with respect co railroad freight
traffic sinrto they ere without Inhabitants or are only sparsely populated.
These areas, however, are not clearly definable and therefore cannot be omitted
for purposes of ocmparison. But even in the Ukx%ine, where the railroad length
eaounted to 14,400 kilometers in 1937, in the Moscow Region, and the Central
Black Earth Region (area between Tula and Kharkov), which rank among the most
STATE
Anwr
o~u~rr'~- 1 ,
pp
411MMML
Neae DISTRIBUTION
El
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eg i
der loredareea from the Atandroint of rmmun.icatione, vbe density cf the rail-
road network reaches only o'? fourth that rz rie a -'re. ' in the Rai [?t.. IL.
ration of the density of the rai.ircad r, t In r umetera ter 100 square kilo,
meters of area in Germany to that
in the Ukraine is approximately
:.,000
305
in the Moscow Region is approximat'ly
1,000
272
in the Central Black Earth Region
1,000
226
2. Principal Features of Railroad Network In Eltropean USSR
At the beginning of the Second Fire-Year P'a.u,the railroad network
in European USSR was still 5 to 1.0 times as dense as in Aatatic USSR. Whereao
in Siberia the railroad density varies between 0.9 and 11 kilometers per 1,000
square kilometers, in the western part of the Soviet Union It reaches approxi-
mately 24 kilometers, and in the Ukraine 32 kilometers per 1,000 square kilo`
meter. In 1933, the figure was 29.6 kilometers in the Moscow region and only
14.5 kilometers in the Leningrad region. As a result of the creation of new
industrial centers east and southeast of the Ural Mountains, the Western
Siberian regions gained increased prominence. No significant shift in the
regional distribution of the railroad network, however, in noticeable even
today'in spite of the fact that the expansion, by approximately 60 percent,
which the Soviet railroad network experienced between 191.3 and the present was
confined largely to the formerly unopened areas of Central Agin and Siberia.
The areal hub ~f the railrnnn network of European USSR is Moscow, .
the starting point of most important railroad lines. For through freight
traffic from the socth to the north, and to relieve the Moscowbeltt lline, to tin
recent years construction was begun on a semicircular ty pass a
east about 100 kilometers from the capital. Leningrad and Kharkov are next
in importance as railroad junctions. In the Ukraine, the main lines emanate
from Kiev. The r-dial system of the Czarist period is still recognizable even
today.
Lines :lead from the main junction to the border, setting up the
connection with the western and southwestern countries. Formerly tr ffiicci..
abroad was impeded due to the fact that the USSR railroad gauge Is app and
mately 9 centimebsim wider than the standard gauge customary if, Western Europe. It is 1.524 centimeters compared with the 1.435 centimeters
of the standard gauge. This necessitated reloading at the border Pointe. In
the_1920e, however, a voeparatively simple method was invented by which the
majority of the ordinary freight oars were transferred without reloading to
the wheel asse%blies of the standard gauge, which provided 'relief for the
froight `raffio.
3. The Main Lines
In view of the great width of the country the long through lines
j6giatral?, hereinafter referred to as main line are of particularly great
importance in the Soviet Union. Primarily they link the economi: areas east
and west of the Urals. In the European tart the three main liner, connecting
the TAni:,gi'ad-Moscow industrial region with the Donbass and which handle the
mass transport of the raw materials from the Donets Basin tc the north, should
be stressed. In Rostov the lines connect with the Transcauoastar railroad
leading to Baku. The last section to Rostov cf the onn6ral one, the so-called
Donbass Main Line, has not yet been completed. It has assumed a large part of
the tasks of the Enrek-Eharkov Main Line. The Bryanek-Vyazma->7hev line is to
relieve the Moscow railroad net, routing the Donets coal direotly to Lenin
grad. In addition ther3 is a through connection via Vitebsk-Gomal? between
Leningrad and Odessa, likevise between M.-?acov and Sevastopol?
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CQN IBEK IAL
CONFLDENTIAI
The burden of the "lateral ecnnecti;?,e between the Dnepr and the Donets
Regions, which accomplish the exchange of the iron ore of Kri.voy Rog and the
coal from the Donets,is extremely heavy. The Krivoy Rog-Nikopol, Zaporozh'ye
and Pyatikhatki-Dnepropetruosk lines have been electrified.
The best known of the main lines nowadays is the coo" letely double--
tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad which connects Moe ow Frith the Far last via
& ybyshev (Samara)-Chelyabinsk, or Yaroslavl'-Perm, and Omsk-Irkutek - Khabarovsk.
From Zeningrad,this main tine can be rea'ohed dirartly in Omsk, via Perm-
Sverdlovsk. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is the main traffic artery of Asiatic.
USSR. The former through line has developed into an entire system of railroads.
It is, the starting point for those railroad lines that opened up the Siberian
raw material resources and industrial centera in Karaganda, Bertys (Kounrad),
Kuznetsk andMinusinek. Only since the outset of the Third FircYour Plan ha^e
efforts been made to avoid the detour via;tbe Trans-Siberian in transport to the
west,'and to'--set up direct links between the individual industrial centers.
This refers principally to sections of the South Siberian Main line mentioned
later.
The new industrial: center of Komsoaol'ek, in the Far East, is connected
to the Trans-Siberian in Khabarovsk. Since the Amur railroad, so close to the
border, to subject 'to ser?,us threats in emergencies, the Soviets revived an
old plan from Czarist times, namely, that of a Baykal-Amur Main Lin, ('RAM).
The BAM starts In Teyshet, by-passes lake Baykal in the north and is to end,
for the time being, in Somsomml?ek. It to not known to what extent t;i) con-
struotion of this railroad was completed by the beginning of the war. It is
planned to have its terminal at the Tatarskiy Proliv near Nikolayevek.
The Turkelb (Novosibirsk-Alma Ata-Taehken+-) was opener In 1931. It
links Siberia with Central Asia and supplies the Turkestan population with
grain, which made possible the development of cotton cultivation in this
region. The first large branch line, linked to it in 1939, was from Rubtsov
via Seminogorek into the zing:, lead, and copper region of Kidder.
The following large lines are under construction or planned:
Direct Tbilisi-Moscow connection,
Stalingrad-Orsk, with Connection to the South Siberian Main I'ne
South Siberian Main Line, Satan??-Ufa-Magnitogorsk-Orsk-Akmolinek-
Kaznetsk-Minusinsk-Tayshet.
Together with the BAM the latter Is to form a second Trans-Siberian
line designed to rel=evo the present one. At the end of January 1940 the
first test run took place on the Karaganda-Akmolinek-Kartaly-Magnitogorsk line,
effecting for the first time a direct connection between the coal region of
Karaganda and the ore deposits of Magnitogorsk.
It vrntld lead too far to enumerate all pica for the conntruotion of
nee railroad aoaneetions. Basically, their purpces is to knit together more
closely the Donets Basin with Krivoy Rog; the Murmansk and Ural regions vit4
Central European USSR; and Western Siberia with Central Asia, and to ehurten
the existing transport roates.
4. Proportion of Double to Single Track Lines
Apart from the comparatively limited track length, the USSR railroad
network suffers from a very unfavorable proportion of the double-tfa2k t: the
single-track lines. Of a total length of 86,500 kilometers in the Soviet
Union 1n 1937, only 26,500 kilometers (1913' 18,000 'k.Llometere) were double
track lines. According to the Third Five?Yea- Plan, a total of 34,000 kilo-
meters of double-track linos were to be completed by 1942. with a total. track
length of 97,000 kilometers. Even if this could be accomplished, the pro-
COHF OENT11L
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CONFIDENTIAL
portion would still be unfavorable, considering the fact that in Germany the
reverse is true. The double-track finer, ar of particular strategic importance
for which reason they are located mostly In the western part of the USSR.
Eaunomio interests received little consideration in the development of traffic
routes.
One of the greatest achievements in railroad construction was the
doubling of the Trans-Siberian, carried out within 3 years and completed
shortly before the war. This was not merely'a matter of laying a sedond track
on an, existing roadbed; for due to terrain difficulties, routes far off,the
main line had to be chosen for considerable distances The line now leads
to the vest doable-tracked via Kuybyshev-Penza-Valuyki into the Donets Basta.
In addition, the double tracking on the connection of the Trans-Siberian to -
the'capital, via the detour Sverdlovsk-Perm-Yaroslavl', was completed.
(at the Manchurian border) junctions of the Trans-Siberian are equipped with
to have been close to oompletior by the outbreak of the war. The Baku-Batumi
railroad was likewise in the process of being , converted, to a double-track
line. Also the three main lines from Moscow to the Donbass and the Mcecow.
Yaroslavl'-Kenosha;line hare double tracks. The Leningrad-Moscow lino is even
The portion of electrified lines within the USSR railroad network
lu very small, oonstr,'otion h-ving been started energetically only since the
Second Five-Sear Plan. Nevertheless, electrified lines increased from 0.2 per-
cent in 1932 to 1.4 percent in 1937. Essentially electrification is limited
') the surban traffic of the four traffic centers of Moscow, leningrad, Kiev,
and lmarkov. In addition to the mentioned connections in the Krivoy :tog region,
among others the Tranacaucasus rat]rrd has been partially electrified, also
the last section of the Murmansk railroad from Kandalakeha on.
B. Yffioiency of U39B Railroads
1. Freight Traffic
a. Transport Performance and Rolling Stock
A comparison with Germany shows how great the transport loads are
that the Russian railroads must handle. Not only did the absolute quantity of
the goods shipped increase, but also the average shipping distance. Fo, example,
daring the Second Five-Year Plan, the latter increased from 632 to 666 kilometem. Con-
sequently, as compared with 1913, the ton-kilometer performance Increased acre
than fourfold while the quantity of the freight shipped barely tripled.
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COL
TUSz~'R Freight Traffic Cooinared V: th That of Germany
Frei it Shipped AveraQe Shipping Distance
in Mullion tone) in
1928
481
156.2
1932
280
267.9
1942 (plan)
750
including Austria and Sudetenland
Year
152
158.
496
67
65.7
598
73
93,4
632
4,4
169.3
669
71
323.4
696
8o*
355,0
718
93*
370.5
1928
1932
1937
1942 (plan)
F5?si An cars
15,100
472,000
17,900
51; 5,8oo
23,700
750,000 (approximate)
31,700
1,200,000
For oomparativi purposes it should be stated that in 1938 Germany
(including Austria and Sudet:,nlan3) possessed a stock of 25,200 locomotives
and 650,200 freight oars.
The USSR stock of freight cars, therefore. increased from 1932 to
1937 by approximately k0 percent and that of locomotives, approximately, by
only 32 percent whereas the ton-kilometer volume expanded by approximately 1.15
percent. Zt is natural that, with this rolling stock, such outputs as those
shown above could be attained o:.ly through continuous, extraordinary straining
of the traffic apparatus. Already in 1932 the traveling performance of the
rolling stock vastly axceodeb. the German scale:
Germany USSR
7.oeomotive-kilometera per locomotive 36,653 34,947
Car axle-kilometers per freight car 20,074 61,239
During the Second Five-Year Plar. an even more extensive utili-
zation of the r-lling stick is expeotod to have been attained. By cutting
tkt hauling time of freight oars from 9 to 7 days (Germany in 1938, epproxi-
wately 3.5) and increasing the average traveling speed from 14.3 to 19.6
kilometers per hour, the average day's run of the freight oars was increased
from 99 kilometers In 1933 to 140 kilometers in 1937. The number of care
made available each day rose from 51,400 to 89,700 and was to reach 110,000
in 1942. In Germany, including Austria and Sudetenland, in 1938 the number
of oars was 154,500.
The rollit.g stock is insufficient not only in view of the
extraordinarily great shipping distances but also with regard to the operating
length of the railroad netvork, The stock of locomotives and freight cars,
per 1,000 kilometers of operating length, lagged far behind the density of
German rolling stock.
COSFIDENTIAL .
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDNNTlAL
Equipment of Line Network With Rolling Stock
1913
1928
193P
1937
037 was below 1.5 million ton-kilometers per kilometer of operating length.
mately 5.3 million ton-kilometers in 1942 as compared with 4.2 millinu tea-
kilometers in 1937. In Germany, in comparison, the average traffic density in
length. In spite of this improvement the load of the Russian railroads would
still be a huge one since the network, even with a length of 97,000 kilo-
meters,; would still not match thedimensions of the area to be supplied. The
number of ton-kilometers per kilometer of operating length is to reach approxi
52.0
286
11,422
459
196
12.550
407
2:19
11,976
4oe
274
10,910
6,784
6,139
6;691
8,834
After completion of the Third Five-Year Plan there was to be 31.6
locomotives and 12,371 freight cars to each 1,000 kilometere of operating
the demands upon the railroads increased en steadily, by 400 percent over the
figure of 1913 according to the Soviet press of 1940, that the o'itl:ut per
vehiole had to be increased at the expense of safety. This is responsible for
the high repair requirements of the rolling stock: 6 percent for freight cars,
and 20 percent for locomotives.
b. Operating Instability
As is known, the frequency of accidents on the USSP railroads is
unproportionately high. It can be attributed to insufficient training of
personnel and to the poor condition of installations end rolling stock.
Already structural defects have become apparent in the foundation.
The construction pattern followed is chiefly that of field rai?.roads, as they
are used in wartime. Perfect roadbeds and auxiliary installations hardly exist.
The great distances, the unfavoreole terrain eonLitions, and the complete
wilderness of scale"of the regions through which tracks must be laid, make the
prooureoieut of the construction material ec difficult that the track dust ccn-
etructed is used to lay the subsequent track. The top of the roadbed is in
even worse oonditio:, than the .oandation. As a rule, sand is used as ballast.
Gravel is found rarely, broken stones hardly ever. Generally, untreated wood
is need as ties. The number of ties, (1,440 per kilometer), is very low-in
comparison with Germany, 1,600; and the United States, 2,000. Furthermore, the
track material is too light. Whereas in Germany a track weighting approxi-
mately 45 kilograms per meter was used before World War I, more than 80 per-
cent of the Russian main tracks have a weight of less than 38 kilogrr:.ms per
meter.
The intrrduction of new heav, steam locomotives necessitated the
strengthening of the trackvork, which has been effected already on some lines
in the Ural region and on the railroads in the interior of the Donets region.
I ?CONFIDCMTIAL
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trains, receive special premiums for each freight train routed through on
schedule. Such premiums are not paid for pacsenger traffic. Cdnsequently,
the passenger trains and the for fast trains each day experience delays of
many houz'b.
personnel, locomotives, and repair shops, intentionally, passenger traffic
was curtailed heavily. In 1937, the Soviet freight traffic load was 355
billion ton-kilometers; passenger traffic, however, only 91 billion passenger-
kilometers, i.e., hardly twice the amount of German passenger traffic, whereas
the freight traffic, load was 41 times that of the German. Many passenger
connections were dispensed with and the lines made available to freight traffic.
Special supervisory ,officials, whose task is the prompt routing of the freight
Passenger traffic in the USSR lags far behind freight traffic.
Because of the .limited extent of the railroad network, the lark of trained
b. Passenger Train Performance
In contrast to the prewar period, suburban traffic is gaining
increasing importance, over long-distance traffic, due to the rapid growth
of cities in. the process of industrialization. Of the 1.2 billion persons
transported in 1938,0.9 billion fell to suburban traffic. The main share
is handled by Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and Kiev. The following table
war period:
Year
Posen ms Transported
Average Traveling Distame
in millions
in km
.~
1913
185
136
1928
291
84
1932
967
87
1937
1,143
80
shows the development of the USSR passenger traffic as compared with the pre-
The rolling stock for passenger traffic is extraordinarily small.
Whereas the loads, expreeeed in passenger-kilometers, increased by 261 percent
between 1913 and 1937, the etoc of passenger cars expanded only by 13 percent.
for the same period. A passenger-kilometer load almost twice as great as than
of Onrmany was attained in 1937 with a rolling stock estimated to be 60 per.-
cent smaller. In 1937, Germany posseeued 60,000 passenger care, the USSR, ho-
.4-ever, only An estimated 25,000.
The average traveling dpaed of passenger trains is likewise low.
In 1937 it amoanted to 2h.6 kilometers per hour. The fastest train, the
"Red Arrow," rune between leningred end Moscow. On this comparatively faror-
able straight line it attains a speed of barely 71 kilometers pcr hour. In
general, hoverer, the traveling speed of the fast trains is between 40 and 60
kilometers per hour. The speed of the "Siberian Express" operating between
Moscow and Vladivostok is 40 kilometers per hour.
CONNIBE T!AL
Passenger Traffic
a. Neglect of Passenger Traffic
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Basis of USSR Inland Naviiration
1. Favorable Geographical Conditions
radiate in all directions, and empty into the seas surrounding the country,
Essentially, there are two head-water regions; the Valday Mountains north
west of Moscow, and the northern part of the Urals;. As in the case of the
railroad network, a radial orientation of the waterways is evldont. It Is
worth noticing that Mosco- is located in the traffic focal point also with
respect to the waterways network. .In 1937 it was linked through the Volga
Moskva Canal to the waterways basin of the Central-European USSR, the Volga-
Oka Ring.
and the Bug-Dnepr Canals form the connection between the Dnepr and the rivers
flowing into the Baltic Sea, and an eastern depression with the Neva-Volga
System which includes the Mariinsk Canal System between Moscow and Leningrad.
Both traffic channels, which connect the Baltic Sea with the Blank Sea and
Caspian Sea, respectively, have to overcome only very slight differences in
elevation, thus allowing both downstream and upstream navigation. Natural
lateral connections, as acll as canals which could facilitate an exchange of
commodities between the various river basins, are lacking. As rule, the
canals coaseructad so far, serve to complete the continuous north-south con-
nection (Mariinek Canal, Stalin Canal).
.The favorable geographical orientation cL the waterways is adversely
affeoted.by a cempa.~etireiy shot navigation period. In winter, shipping
13 interrupted for me.,the by a heavy cover of ice, and in summer the water
level frequently sinks so low as a result of the drought that wandering sand
banks impede navigation. Regulated water channels, which are really indis-
pensable for the wide, mostly shallow, USSR rivers, do not anat. The riv?,e
in the south of European USSR are frozon approximately 100 days per year; in
the north, approximately 200 days; In the south of Asiatic 'TSSR, approximately
235 days; and in the Asiati3 North, approximately 275 days. The navigation
period varies at the upper and lower courses of the Volga between 6 and 9
months. Conditions are more favorable in the cases of the Dnepr and Don Rivers.
The period open to traffic is generally limited from 2 to 4 months on the re?-
raining rivers.
The poor maintenance of the waterways during World War I, and their
deterioration In the postwar period, rendered many of the waterways completely
unusable. When the Soviet regime finally came to recognize the importance of
inland shipping for the mass transports so characteristic of USSR communications,
it first had to center its attention on the improvement and increase in
efficieuoy of the waterways. However, it could devote only limited effort to
new construction projects. Except for the brief navigation period, the poor
structural condition of the waterways does not permit any extensive utilization
of inland shipping for freight traffic. The numerous USSR waterrays, there-
fore, constitute traffic routes of only subordinate importance in the
country's communication system.
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Only -jr, USSR rivers are described as navigable.
At the beginning of 1940, 94,800 kitouieterr, .1 weterw8 y5 were actuax.y ra
gated, of which 3,000 kilometers were se.uals. Tne length C the inland water
ways network thus is longer than the USSR railroad network whereas !n Germany
the inland waterways account for approximately only one bixth of the length cf
the railroad network.
B. The Artificial Waterwase .
Of the canals built under the Czar the old Mariinek Canal. System (1,050
meters long) LProbably 1,050 kilometer is the most important one. It linaa
the Baltic Sea via the Neva, Svir, Vytegra, and Shekena Rivere with the Volga,
and through the latter, with the Caspian Sea. The canal installations are out-
moded. Traffic to nut very extensive. Until now only ships with a maximum
loan capacity of 800 tons could navigate this canal system. According to
the most recent plane it was to be dredged to a depth of 5 meters and pro-
vided with modern lock's for ships with a maximum load capacity of 20,000 tons.:
A connection between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, Via the Dvina
and Dnepr wad established through the Berezina Canal upon completion of the
Dneprostroy;Looks. The efficiency of the canal, however, does not come up to
present dnydemands and therefore is of little importance to traffic. Besides,
the estuaries of these rivers, at the Baltic Sea, are located in foreign
countries. For this reason several plans were considered acct-ding to which
the Dnepr wab'to be employed as a useful connection. The ohorteet route would
be via the Lovat and a protected Lovat-Dnepr Canal. Furthermore, c canal bo-
tween the. Desna and Oka is planned which would establish the connection with
the Volga-Oka Ring and the Mariinek System. This waterwep would fulfill an
old desire for a link between the Upper Volga and the Blank Sea, which would
gi*e the Usraine, so rich in natural resources, a link with all USSR economic
areas, over the navigation ring of Central-u:opean USSR.
The construction of canals under the Soviet regime was carried out
principally from a viewpoint of defense. Two large new works should be men-
tioned here: the Stalin Canal, as connection between the Baltic and the
Mate Sena, and the. Vc'_ga-Moskva Canal.The Salin Cartl was to
oprelieve the
Murmansk railroad; among other things, to assist
foreign war materials, and to facilitate the exchange of light naval forces,
In 1933 it was opened to traffic. Contrary to some allegations, it is defi-
nitely not altogether free of ice. its depth is 3.6 meters. Of great economic
importance it the already mentioned Volga-Moskva Canal which was opened to
traffic in 1937. It can be navigate?. by sea-going vessels and a small naval
force will oe able to cast anchor at the naval port planned for the vicinity
of-Moscow. it is 128 kilometers long, approximately 60 ma.,ero wide and 4.5
meters deep.
Finally in European USSR, the frontier canals in Belorussia should
be mentioned which, after ::sing take: over by the Soviets, probably were to directed agvinsteGebrmmaany.inAbovepall, thetBug-DnprrCanalc(builtnina1780, 100 kilo-
ma
meters long) may gain importance for transport of Ukrainian raw materials to
Germany via the Viola River and the Baltic Sea. Until 1939 it was in com-
uythe
paratively poor repair. The the Dnepr had ben madeanavigeblecthrough
depth of the canal. Only after
construction of the reservoir (Dneprostroy) near Zaporozh?ye, did the canal
gain importance. Fovever, navigation conditions on the Dnepr must be im-
prnved still further if the canals connected with it are to be used to a
large extent for the traffic between Germany and the Ukreine. Its depth
versos between 0.9 meters at the upper course and 1.7 meters at the lover
course. The Soviets Intend to ensure a continuous depth of 5 meters by means
of ten reservoirs. Freight traffic of the Ukraine with Northern Europe
could at a future time, if necessary, develop aia Daniig a Koenigsberg.
A navigation period of 7 to 8 months may be expected.
German Institute for Economic Research (Deutechea lnstitut fuei
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The Oginekly Canal, built in 1770, for the present is of importance
only in local traffic. It is 12 meters wide and its mean navigation depth is
__ n I,n ...e+o..s
shipping period.
shipping space of approximately 14,000 tone, up to 600,000 tons 01 irelght
g
o
In op.,* o go
of H?rope at present serves only internal USSR eooaomy, due to the unfavorable
location of its mouth. Sea-going vessels cannot reach it. Although the land
at the mouth is very fei`~.Lio, the climate is much too dry. In spite of the
huge volume of water which the Volga carries to the Cawptan 3et, t'_ latter's
eater level continues to sink and is already 26 meters oelow th^t of the Black
Sea. Prerequisite to the eo'Ivinq of the Volga Project, in the fram9vork of
which 4 to 14 million hectares of steppe land are to to irrigated vtth the
waters of the Volga, is the tapping of the water-rich rivers of northern USSR.
A large reservoir of approximately 18,000 square kilometers, roughly the area
of lake Iadega, at the upper course if the Kama near Solikaask where Soma,
Vyohegla and Pechora Rivers approach snob other, is to collect the waters of
the rivers mentioned and feed them. into the 7nlga. Along the Volga, Kama, and
Ota Rivers a total of 16 reservoirs are to be built, eight of which are
allocated to the Volga. They will cake possible the production of 12 million
kilowatts of electric energy and an annual supply of 60 billion kilowatt hours.
The past Soviet production varied from )0 to 145 billion kilowatt hours. The
largest reservoir is under construction at Kuybyshev. Upon completion it will
occupy an area of 740,000 hectares and will be up to 20 kilometers in width.
By means of a 2 kilometer break through the divide of ?erevoloksk, the Volga
loop at Kuybyshev is to be cut off. This will shorten the Volga route by
173 kilometers. The Uglich and Rybinsk locks were opened to traffic in part
this summer and were ',o be completed by 1942. The reservoir below Kalinin
was put into operation in 1937. 1
is to be,closed by, means of a canal. in , e m.n
also be tied to the Great Volga System and obtain a water route to the Black
Sea. Beyond this, the plane provide for a continuation of this waterway from
the Ob= via the Ket through a canal to the Yenisey and farther via the Upper
Tunguska and i,he Angara to lake Baykal.
0. The Great Volga Pro act
The most revolutionary of the projects for USSR inland navigation is
concerned with the improvement of the Volga and its junction with the water-
rich rivers of the north. Its completion will be of great importance not
only to USSR economic life but also for 0,9 ewehange of commodities between
USSRt and Central and Western Shrope.
ability and abundance of water the largest stream
d navi
f
region o e r
the Ch'isovayaare to be improved and the gap between the, Iset and the Chusovaya
hi z nor Western Siberia would
It is intended to transport Kuznetsk coal by water to the industrial
f L_ IT I. Navigation on3itions or, the Tom, Ob', Tobol, Inset, and
an increasing measure.
The Siberian rivers serve as approach roads to both the Trans-Siberian
railroad and to the Arctic Ocean Route which the Soviet Union intends to use in
s
gable 19;500 kilometers; and the Yenisey for , om
In Siberia, navigation has gained relatively greater importance than
in European USSR since hardly any other means of communication exist there and
the rivers are navigable far into their upper courses. The Ob-Irtyeh is nevi-
tars
8 4C0 kil
The Augustovo Canal is used only to float lumber.
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and the industrial region of Moscow. Such a .route would be only 2,?50 ki1-
ateters long whereas the one leading over the Volga-Don Cana will be 3,420
kilometers long. This proposed route, however, would first have to be regu-
lated along its entire length.
By 1960 the entire Volga was to have a cant,iiiauua u--kth )i 'mats .. Tne
plan to attain a depth of the Volga, chanr91 cf 2.6 meters by 1942, was, how-
ever, only partially accomplished.
The task of the Great Volga Project, from a standpoint of communications,
is to provide the shortest possible connection between Moscow and the Black
Sea. To this end a Volga-Don Canal is being built near Stalingrad which for
traffic purposes shifts the mouth of the Volga to the Sea of Azov or the Black
Sea. Iteoons~ruction is said to have begun this, year. Am0 nimum depth of 6.4
meters is planned. It will also be utilized as a traffic route between the
Caspian and Black Seas, particularly for the transport of petroleum. Tc be
sure, a shorter connection between these two seas via the Manych and Kuma
Rivers has been planned and completed impart.
In addition to the project of the, Volga-Don Canal another very old plan
is under consideration, according to whicn the Oka would be linked with the
Upper Don, and thus a'direct waterway connection set up between the Donbass
N
Freight Transport
Freight Traffic on Inland
ed
Frei t Trn ort
Ouhput
in million tone
(in billion ton-km)
1913
48.2
37.2
1928
18.3
15.9
1938
66.6
32.9
1939
72.6
35.0
36.0
1942 (plan)
58.0
The ton-kilometer output did not increase in the same meusurp as the
freight tonnage transported. Thus the average transport dtetanoe, in contrast
to thb railroad, has decreased. In 1913 it wee 772 kilometers; in 1928, 86';
kilometers; ip 1938, 481 kilometers; and in 1939, 526 kilometers.
This decrease of the transport distbnoa may be attributed in part
to the increased shipment of goods which requires relatively short shipping
distances, such as building materials. On the whrle, the average shipping
distance decreased for almost all types of goods. This is particularly true
of petrjleurr, which has to travel the longest distance. 1,650 kilcnetnre in
19,28, 1,140 kilometers 4a 1937. For short hauls, inland shipping was used;
long-distance hauls were left to the railroads.
Distribution of
nand-Shipping Traffic Over Vemioue
waterways in 1937
Quantity of Goods
in Million Tons
Percentage of
Total Quantity
Volga; Be-, Oka
31.4
46.9
Northwestern waterways
io.5
15.7
Rivers of Northern USSR
11.0
16.7
Dnepr, Don, Kura
6.8
10.1
Others
JR
103
9
100.0
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USSR 85.5
Germany (without
Austria) 7.7
in view of the waterways network at its d1 al ,~si, are shown by the following
comparison of the shipping loads of Germany and Russia in 1937;
Waterways Traveled Goode Transported amtPut
inland shipping more extensively for freight traffic. The combined transport
Is being effectively subsidized by reduced feeder tariffs. By 1942 the traffic
load of inland. shipping was to be increased by 76 percent as compared with 1937,
whereas the load carried by the railroads was to be raised by only 44 percent for
the same period. Decades of neglect of the waterways, however, could not be
overcome so rapidly. Moreover, the amount of availrble tonnage is Insufficient.
Thus is brought about the fact that th'e economy, even in the case of typical
bulk goods,'is making increasing use of the railroads which are more reliable
in. spite of their inherent defio! ncies.
Transport Diatributiou of Most Important Bulk Goods Over
Inland Waterways and Railroads (in rt:11:1ion tons) .
Building
Materials
Grain
Petroleum
Lumber
Coal
1913
--
5.9
5.4.
11.7
0.8
1928
1.2
1.2
4.8
8.3
0.1
1932
5.4
2.6
7.4
26.3
0.6
1937
9.8
4.3
7.9
35.5
2.1
1938
--
4.8
8.3
34.8
2.1
Building
Mat.eriala
Grain
Petroleum
Lumber
Coal
1913
7.3
18.3
5.8
20.8
26.3
1928
13.7
15.5
8.7
20.1
30.4
1932
43.4
23.8
17.0
46.3
56.7
1937
102.4
?38.9
24.7
66.2
116.6
1938
--
40.4
28.2
63.5
120.9
I
Figures on the transport of ore, iron, and steel in inland shipping
were not available. According to the above figures thv total amount of
building materials, grain, petroleum, lumber and coal, transported over the
inland shipping system in 1937 was approximately 60 million tone. In
addition, over one million tore of salt were transported over inland water-
vayg. This leaves about 6 million tone for miscellaneous goods shipped.
An approximate amount is shown for miscellaneous gods in 1938. Even if the
remaining quantities were to be ascribed in fell to the transport of ore,
iron, and steel, the share of inland shipping in the transport of bulk
goods would still be unproportionately email. In contrast, the railroads
transported In 1937 a total of app.oxisatel,^ 57 million tona of ore, irc,n,
and steel.
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1528
1932
1;18
2.' Passenger Transport
Compared with the slight consideration which passenger transport
receives in railroad traffic, inland, navigation is being used increasingly
for tourist traffic. The rise of passenger traffic between 1932 and 1938
amounted to;:24 percent on the railroad and to 55 percent on the water routes,
or approximately 18 and 52 percent, respectively, figured in passenger-kilo-
meters. These figures show further that in inland navigation, tec, the
average traveling distance has decreased, although not in the sane manner as
on the railroads.
Passenger Traffic on Inland Waterways
Passers Transported
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now ships under the Soviet regime was so slight that in 1937 the total tonnage
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17.8
43.6
68.1
117
1.03
47
Inventory of Inland Merchant Vessels
Self-Propelled Ships
Ships Without Self-Propulsion
Number
Pr!vi.:; Pcve??
Number
a a city
'p
tin 1,000 hp
(in 11,000 tons)
1913
5,556
1,700
24,153.
13,400
1928
1,898
463
7,000
4,960
1933
2,082
549
7,224
5,514
1937
2,514
687
7,477
5,786
In the figurce for 1937 the number of scrapped ahlps vac not cone'.dered,
theraforo the actual number of available ships sho:l1 be somewhat lower. In
1938, the German fleet (without Austria) possessed 5,440 self-propelled sLIps
with a total of 849 `aorso-power fsh7 and 12,441 ships without saif-propulsion,
tusving is load capacity of 5.8 million tons.
The majority of the USSR ships are very old, and repair work and the
prod notion of spare parts claim the largest part of the total production.
Since the repair shops are unable to meet the demands made on them at the
heginbing of the nevi gition period, usually, a considerable paroentage of the
ships (in 1937 approximately 30 percent) are not ready for use.
Part of the newly built ships are large, efficient craft, the dimensions
of which are considered in the blueprints for new canal construction, such as
the cargo chip of 8,000 tons capacity and the naphtha tanker approximately
200 meters long, 20 meters wide, with 4.5 meters draught, and a water dis-
placement of 18,000 to 20,000 tone. Some of them are small tug", so-called
eriver au.to'eobiles" which can also navigate small rivers. The corresponding
barges are 8 meters long, 3 meters wide, and have a capacity of 3 to 10 tons
and a draught of approximately 30 o,ntimetere. The standard TIS R ship, in
accordance with the dimensions of present artificial waterwayi, has a
capacity of 700 to 800 tons, is 77 meters long, and 8.5 meters wide. its
maximum draught is 1.8 meters.
Colliaiuns are quite frequent even in inland navigation. They may be
attributed largely to the incompetence and unreliability of the perecanel.
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1 , GG 4I .' TI ,TIC
Tasks of USSR Ocean Navi tion
?y Sea B9 Land
1913 78.3 21.7 60..8
1929 84.4 15.6 62,6
1932 94.0 6.o 82.3
1937 93.4 6.6 84.6
39.2.
37.4
17.7
15.4
make use of foreign tonnage. From the structure of USSR elgport trade it is
easily explained why 'USU. ocean shipping is concentrating primarily or. import
trade. The Soviet Union imports high-grade industrial products. Their trans-
port is a source of relatively high revenaefor the Soviet fleet. Cheap bulk
goods are exported, the transport of which must be left largely to other
countries due to lover profits and lack of tonnage.
A special circumstance is the fact that a considerable portion of the
traffic load of USSR ocean sh.tppine sarves domestic traffic. The merchant
fleet also assumes the task of eonaeoting with each uthei the widely
separated water areas of the Baltic Sea, White Sea,Arotic Ocean, Black Sea,
and Pa;?.fic Ocean. In 1936, a year of little foreign trade, domestic ocean
traffic witu 23.2 million tons oven exceeded foreign ocean traffic amounting
to 14.8 million tons. Thus it amounted, in 1936, to approximately one third
of the inlard shipping traffic.
larly in the avant of strong, traffic fluctuations which accompany the
irregular development of its export trade, the Soviet Union is forced to
itself mare strongly in the field of exports. For this reason and particu-
eatoly 82 percent of the imports, bat only 30 percent of the exports, are
B. Regional Distribution of Merchant Fleet
he important industrial areas at the Dnepr, Doa, and Donate Rivers were
91
decisive in the development of USSR ocean navigation. The bulk of the :wean
navigation is neutered in the Black and Azov Seas. In 1939 approximately
two fifths of the merchant fleet, 150 merchantmen with 420,000 gross register
tonnage and the tanker fleet with 28 units of 133,100 gross register tonnage,
was located in the Black See through whose ports was channeled, primarily, the
export of bulk goods produced in the adjoining industrial areas, of the grain
from the Ukraine and of oil from the Caucasus. The Pacific Ocean was eecond
until 1939. Over one fourth of the merchant fleet, 380,000 gross register
tons, (sinoe 1939, 270,000 gross register tons) was at home there. The Baltic
Sea occupied only third place. Barely one fourth of the USSR merchant fleet
was anchored in 1939. Primarily the Baltic Sea ports transship import goods.
A total of 80,000 gross register tonnage was accounted for by the White Bea
and the Arctic Ocean.
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The Most Important Seaports
Odasea 572 128 1,375 356
Baku 31 2 148 1,528
1217
191-3 L911
Leningrad 4,008 336 2,648 2,720
Arkhangel'ek 123 1 1,060 1,908
Murmansk -- 107 - 756
Vladivostok 280 404 43 ii
Batumi 31 2 1.,1.48 1,528
Mariupol' 117 36' 740
Nikolayev 24 2 1,796 5'41
grad and Odessa were almost.equal. Under the Soviet C.overciment, however, grain
shipments were stopped but shipments of petroleum and manganese are were in-
creased. Today Batumi is the most important Black Sea port, even ahead of
Odessa. The transshipment volume of Batumi is said to exceed 5 million tons
while that of Odessa is said to have diminished +o barely 4 million tons. A
transshipment rolume of apj.rnximate ly 3 million tone each is given for !4nriupol'
and Taganrog, and of over one million tole each for Astrakhan and Baku. Sevastc-
pol' is reported to be handling a traffic volume of more than 4 million tons, and
so is Ma;.mansk.
Ae present Loningrad is handling the largest volume of transshipments, which
is, stated to be above 5 million tons. Formerly the volumes handled by Lenin
For years the Soviet Government has been turning its attention to the
Arctic sea route with a view to setting up e connection between the Far Eastern
regions and European T1 Sn which would be shorter than the .oote through the)
1sdian Ocean. According to Soviet sources a few ehipa eucoes~;fu:lc urilei ins
Arctic Boats in 1937. Some ships got as far as the estuaries of the Indiglrka
and golyma Rivers. The problem of coal supply causes great difficulties.
Formerly the requirements were filled at Spitsbergen or Sakhalin. However,
since these distances are too great, the coal deposits on the Chukotskiy
i'eninsula are to be opened. it is not known to what extent these plans have
been realized. The Soviets were anticipating that this year (1941) the
Arctic fleet could be supplied by these coal mines. In addition, other coal
deposits in Northern Siberia, the miring of which has not yet beers otarted, are
to be utilized.
By the and of 1942, in accordance ;ith the Third Five-rear Plan, a
scheduled connection with the Far East via the Arctic sea route was to be
ensured and a transport load of 158,000 tons attained, According to a pee-
phlat issued by the USSR Commercial Attache in Berlin in 1930, a load of
10,300 tons was shipped from Siberia to Arkhangelsk via the Arctic Ocean in
1920. The total turnover had become 12 times greater (i.e., 120,000 tons)
by 1930 as compared with 1920. All transshipping operations of the Ob' region
it was stated, were effected at P.oviy Port in the Oh' Bay, and those of the
Yenisey region in the port of Igarka. According to the pamphlet, the port
of Igarks is a calm, deep-water port protected from f1bating ice and winds
and accessible to ocean steamers having a maximum draught of 7 meters. It is
called the "future Siberian Arkhangel'sk." In the situation created by the
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ver, con ids ptirni,! telnr C1 er to the r-5~-rb171ty ,f I er,,an drllre_ri.c
of war materials by this route via Arkhangoi2sk. Judging from the present
state of affairs it remains, however, very questionablo whether any scheduled
traffic of sizeable extent can ever be accomplished by means of the Arctic
route.
E. Performance of USSR Ocean Shipping
Ocean Shipping of USSR (coastal
Goods Transported
Passengers Trans orted
in million tone
in millions
1913
36.9
1929
8.8
1.5
1933
16.3
3.3
1938
30.4
3.1
1942 (plan)
44.5
Under the Soviet regime the traffic volume has again closely approached
the prewar level. In Spite of this, the quotas provided in the five-year pl ns
have not been attained. In 1937, for example, the plan was only 69 percent
fulfilled and in 1938 the traffic vuluate decreased from 37 billion to approxi-
mately 34 billion ton-ki1cmeters.
F. USSR Merchant Fleet
The merchant fleet is operated by eight State Shipping Companies of which
the Baltic Line ir. Leningrad, the Black Sea Line in Odessa, the Northern Line
in .Arkhangel'ek, and the Far Pastern Line in Vladivostok should be emphasized.
The largest part of the merchant fleet consists of Steamers having an average
tonnage of 1,7v0 gross register tons. Approximately one fourth of the fleet is
made up of motor vessels of an average ;,onnage of 2,470 gross register tons.
In 1939 the merchant fleet possessed
560 steamers with 960,000 gross register tone
139 motor vessels with 346,000 gross register tone
17 sailing ships with 10,000 gross register tone
i.e., a total of 716 ships with 1.3 million gross register tons. The steeper
tonnage consists mainly of used units purchased abroad. The motor vessel
tonnage, however, is comprised of new ocnetructione. Ten shipyards are at
present available fur the building of now ships. It is estimated that their
maitmum annual production was around 60,000 gross register tons. The main
center of ship construction is Leningrad with five shipyards Nikolayev has
two shipyards, Sevastopol', Vladivostok and Astrakhan, one each. In order to
be able gradually to operate without foreign tonnage even in the field of
export, the attention o.' the Commissariat for Ocean Shipping is centered at
present on the construction of merchant vessels suitable for the transport
of bulk goods.
Number of Ships
Gross Register
Tonnage Available
in 1,000)
1913
7k7
852
1928
222
336
1933
352
867
1937
--
1,258
1938
--
1,281
1939
716
1,316
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There 1s a lack oi" special ships,tuga, oll and grain ilgncera. _'h F'
number of svailable.pilot boats and is;e-brcakersis likewise insufficient.
T7 MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC
A. Hi e
There are two types of USSR highways, namely, chauseeee, i,e , improved
and surfaced roads; and roads, i.e.., somewhat graded but nonsurfaced field
and wood roads. Great cross-country connections are called highroads. They
consist in part of chaussees but most of them are merely ordinary roads. In
spite of the expanse of the country there are no continuous road systems. .
The majority of the roads connect individual localities or ropreec-t approach
roads to railroads or waterways. There are only few bridges. Most of them
are made of wood and are very narrow. As a rule, fords are found satisfactory
for croseing small rivers, and punts for larger ones. During the rainy season
in the fall and the melting of the snow in the spring the roads are completely
impassable. In summer they, are passable, although rough and dusty.. In winter
they can be used only with sleds. Generous plans strive to match the Western
European road net. For the time being, however, the most sensitive gape in the
road nets must be closed and existing roads improved.. A real road network,
executed according to a uniform plan covering the whole country is nonexistent.
TLe total length, of USSR roads ii-approximately 3 million kilometers...
Approximately one half thereof are passable and only 4 percent of this half
had paved surfaces in 19)4. The following estimated figures show the develop-
ment of the continually passable roads, i.e,, those provided with stone or
?ephalt surfaces, or the paved runways now preferred by German motorized units.
1928 25,000 kilometers
1932 37,000
1934 56,000
1937 63,000
It may be assumed that .he total length of the ohauesees today approxi-
mates 80,000 kilometers, i.e., approximately 3 kilometers per 1,000 square
kilometers. Germany without Austria, in 1938 had 392,000, i.e., approximately
63.2 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometors. The above figures are rough
estimates. Somewhat more exact information was given regarding the new con?-
struotion of paved highways in the First and Secona Five-Year Plans. During
the First Five-Year Plan, approximately 12,000 kilometers.of roads were paved,
and during the Second Five-Year Plan, 26,500 kilometers. At any rate, the net-
work of ohaussees is still smaller today than the railroad network. Only within
a radius of 60 kilometers around Moscow are all roads paved with concrete or
asphalt. Long and well-constructed road systems connect Moscow with Leningrad
via Kalinin-Novogorod; with Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov via Tula-Orel; Voronezh via
Tula; and with Gor'iiy. Shorter roads extend from Moscow to Yaroslavl', Rahev
,"I Ryatan', A continuous road links Leningrad with Kiev via Pskov-Vitebsk-
Gomel' and it is to be exoonded as far as Odessa. A road was planned to lead
from Kharkov to the Crimea. N ring the Third rive-Year Plan a total of
210,000 kilometers of roads were to be newly ccnetruoted or improved.
B. Performance of US3t Motor-Vehicle Traffic
Like all other means of transportation, in the Soviet Union the motor
vehicle is used primarily for freight traffic. Quantitatively, 56 percent of
the freight traffic load is said to he carried by motor vehicles. From what
wan said it is understood, however, that the average transport distance for
motor-vehicle traffic is eoasiderably shorter than that on railroads and
orate-ways; therefore, In ton-kilometer volume the share of trucks in the
total freight traffic in 1937 amounted to only 2 porc'r,-, The main achieve-
ments lie in the field of local traffic. Detailed information regarding
rl o$FI'DEATL+L
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quantities transported ie 1,.t %r 116.LLe.' i.,~ tc l' a Ii. c i Ci i
Plan, the volume of motor-vehicle traffic is to be raised from 8,.7 b1? ion
ton-k":laneters in 1937 to 4'0 billion ton-kilometers in 1942.
C. Production, and Stock of Motor Vehicles
1. USSR Automobile Industry
The emphasis of the USSR automobile-industry is placed on the prc?.
duction of trucks. In 1938, in contrast to a production of only 27,000
passenger automobiles, 184,000 trucks ire, a manufactured. The truck pro-
duction of the Soviet Union thus rani:ed directly behind that of the US and
topped that of Great Britain. In 1938 the USSR built almost as many truoke
as Germany, Fngland.end France combined; but, as a whole, i.e., including
passenger automobiles, it did not quite reach the total production of France.
Manufacture of Motor Vehicles in Largest Producing Countrieo in 1938
Country
Total
Trucks
Passenger Automobiles
(1 OW unite)
(1,000 unite)
(tn %)
1,000 unite
in
United States
2,190
498
19.6
2,001
8o.4
Great Britain
445
l04
23.3
341
76.7
Germany
346
65
18.8
281
81.2
Prance
227
27
11.9
200
88".1
USSR
211
184
87.4
27
12.6
Only under the Soviet regime did the country turn to the production
of its own trucks and, finally, its ova passenger automobiles. The Stalin
Plant in Moscow and the Molotov Plant in Gor'kiy should be stressed particularly.
The Stalin Plant has a daily capacity of 280 trucks, 30 passenger autorwbilea
and 7 omnibuses; the Molotov Pfau'., a total of 580 motor vehicles.
Year
Trucks
Passenger Automobiles
Total
1928
- 29
1,200
100
1,1'00
1932
23,800
30
23,900
1935
77,700
19,000
96,700
1937
171;500
18,500
200,000
1938
184,400
27,000
211,400
1942
(plan)
300,000
100,000
400,000
Stook of Motor Vehicles of USSR
(in 1,000 unite)
1928
a-1
19 8
1942 len
Jiotor Vehicles
16.7
75.4
570
760
1,700
Trucks
7.5
54.6
475
635
--
Passenger
automobiles
a:d omnibuses
11.2
20.8
95
125
In 1939, Germany, Including Austria, possessel a stock of 471,000
trucks and 1.6 million passenger automobiles.
OOP !1IIENTIAL
50X1-HUM
- 18 -
CONFIDI7V'!;:._k
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Sh
iRpod
Received
~
(in 1,000 tons)
(in 1,000 tong)
White sea
19
187
Baltic Sea
48
269
Black Sea
0
2
operation. The number of vehic''es undergoing repair was larger than the new
production. Repair facilities remained inadequate even during the following
year. Fuel, lubricants, and rubber tires, in comparison to uther countries,
are of poor q' iilyand expensive. A rubber tire, which abroad lasts for
30,000 to 40,000 kilometers, can be driven only 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers in
the bad condition of the roads. The material wear is great even on vehicles
capable of crose-counie travel. Before the war the repair trade and the spare-
parts industry could no longer keep up with the heavy material wear. There was
exist either in the construction of roads or in the accessories manufacturing
industries.
Prior to World War I, freight traffic between Germary and the USSR was
largely over the sea route, i.e., the Baltic ports. Around t.a turn of the
from Paldiski and Tsllin to Leningrad, and a connection from Ventspils to
;elgava were established, which carried the goods imported by sea into the
interior of the USSR. The port of 7laypeda was not used as heavily as the
Baltic ports since from there the railroad had to pass two borders, When the
Baltic States were made independent, following World War I, part cf th.e Cerroan
Soviet sea traffic was shifted to the ports of Leningrad and Murmansk.
As a result of the creation of the little states between Germany and the
USSR, by virtue of tho Treaty of Versailles, the re-establishment of railroad
connectives between the two oouLtrlee was delayed for a long period. For
political raa,ons Poland wished to prevent a rapprochement of its two neighbors.
Thus a railroad connection could be established only via the Baltic countries.
When the traffic cn this route assumed large proportions, Poland did not want
to forego Its share of the transit revenues and shoved readiness to permit
transit traffic through Poland. German-Soviet traffic increased rapidly there-
after arl'reaohed its maximum In 1931 faith more titan one million tons, of which
680,000 tons were transported through Poland. Prior to World War I, railroad
shipments from Germany to tho area of present day Russia (i.e.. minus ship-
mentA to that Part of Poland which wac ceded to Russia at the Congress of
Vienna in 1815) amounted to approximately 750,000 tone, and shipment to
Germany from this area amounted to approximately 1 1/3 million tone.
Starting in 1932, the German-USSR railroad traffic again rbceded heavily.
Except for express transports, the exchange of goods was accomplished via the
Baltic Sea. German traffic statistics reveal the following quantities for ship-
ments from Germany and receipt of goods from the Soviet Union over the sea
route in 1937:
COL
in 1937 a total of 243,000 tons are said to ha-e been shipped by rail
thro*h Poland in both directions.
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The Railroad and Transit Agreemznt of December 19)9 created again the .
prerequisites for the revivai of mutual raixoad traiflc. Iot..owing'tne sub-
jugation of Poland, Germany had a common border with the USSR for almost
1,000, kilometers. Whereas prevlouely there has been only two railroad lined
between Germany and the USSR, now nine border crossings were set up of which
two were located at the border between East Prussia and USSR, namely, at
Szczepki-AUgustovo and Prostken-Grayevo. Of the remaining crossings, those
at Zurawica-Peremyschl and Terespol--Brest -IAtovek were the most important.
From the start, tariffs with special rates were established for the most im-
portant conmodities, i.e., grain, mineral oil, yarns, cotton., iron and man-
ganese ore, iron, steel, and iron and metal goods.
Az before, a considerable part of the goods went via the Baltic Sea,
In addition the route via the Black Sea and the-Danube was used or the goods
were shipped from Black Sea ports by rail to Germany via Rumania and Hungary
or Slovakia. Additioaxl possibilities for German-Soviet goods traffic would
hare opened up had the inland shipping route Dnepr-Bug-Pieta been improved
example, the Volga System which handles the transports to the Baltic Sea; and
the Dnepr -Viola route via time Dnepr-Bug Canal. Moreover, transport vta the
Black Sea will expand. ,The 'conditions regarding railroad transport between
Germany and the Ukraine are relatively favorable. The USSR railroad network
attains its greatest density in the Ukraine and also the largest number of
double-tracked lines are found there. The difficulties stemm.'_ag from the
wider gangs of the Soviet railroads have been eliminated in part. In the be-
ginning of October of this year already more than 15,000 kilometers had besn
converted to the German gauge. It is anticipated that gradually the entire
rail network of the Ukraine will be converted. It will be more difficult,
however, to solve the problem of space utilization on the return transports,
ei'oe the finished products shipped by Germany to the USSR will occupy less
space.
CONFLUEN'I'IAL
r~Ff E4EN i ~A1
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