MILITARY AVIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600200205-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 205
• Publication Date: July 30, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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J
DATE OF
U FOREiATION February 1947
30 July 1948
NO. OF PAGES 13
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
STAT
STAT
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PHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
Russian peariodical, Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, Vol XXIX, No 2,"
February 1947. (FDB Per Abs 11T3 .- Translation specifically
requested.)
FIGHTER D:FENSE AGAINST 11d,SS AIR ATTACKS
During the recent war the air arm rspeatodlt delivered poworiul
attacks upon various objectives. Hundreds, and sometimes evun thousands,
of bombers participated in these attacks. They usually operated under
cover of a large number of fighters. Diverse targets, both in rear
areas and in the combat sore, Mere attacked. In the latter instants,
the air am attacked with the direct cooperation of the ground forces.,
In daytime operations tha attacker endeavored to complete his
rdaaion within the shortest possible time and with minimum losses to
himself. This was accomplished by the concentration of r large masa
of bombers against one or more targets during a relatively short period
of time.
It was natural that in carrying out these air attacks the air
aim enocuntered strong opposition from the'eneo'ts antiaircraft defenses.
The attacker resorted to various measures to reduce his losses. The
most important are listed here:
1. Flying the bombers in compact combat formation with strong
f ghuer cover (from 0.5 to l.f fighters to each bomber).
2. Flights at great altitudes, often reaching heights of 7,000
to 8,000 meters and more, which hampered the interception of the bo bers
and lowered the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire.
3. The adoption of various means of operational and tactical
concealment to rLiait*e the c'.efendars anti preeerre the er,pmsmt rt
surprise.
1 -.
CiASSiF1CATiON
NAVY x NSRB~._ I
RSSYiUCT
RESTRIGIEr
(SIFICATION ,tisstutur: l
CENTRAL I~'~
NFORtii. W
SUBJECT Military Aviation
PLACE
ACQUIRED JSSR
d
GENCY REPORT
PORT
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These, then;, were the most important factors in an a
situation where defending interceptors or fighters were active.
*1e can conclude that the following conditions are necessary to
repel mass air attauke successfully`
1. An efficient organization for the observation of enemy
air activity.
2. Early alerting of one's own fighter groups.
3. Carefully planned grouping of fighter planes on the
ground and the correct choice, of the order of their going into
action.
4. A high degree of combat readiness and precise organization
of take-offs.
5. Skillful operation of fighters in combat, which demands
appropriate pilot traln4ng, choice of suitable combat foxwations,
proper distribution of forces, and developnent of cooperation.
6. Continuous direction of fighters from the ground and in
thr' air.
Abseawirue and Rngarinr Lnemv Aviation
The fundamental purpose of the sysiem of observation of the
combat activity of enemy aviation is to secure information on the
location and strength of enemy aviation and the natui'b of its activity.
Enemy activity may be observed in a number of ways, In actual
combat there were many cases where an enemy air attack was detected
only vhrriugh radio interception: when the airerafts' radios were
being checked while the ships wore grounded, during the completion
of a take-off, aasombly in the air, and during the initial stages
of a mission.
However, during the war, long-range "radio locating stations"
acquired a decisive imrortance because of their ability to warn
interceptors well in advance of the appearance of enemy aircraft.
These stations made possible the constant observation of the enemy's
aerial forces. If an enmW aircraft went beyond the wave band of
one of these radio locating stations, he was kept undor constant
observation by neighboring atatioras1which followed his flight course
and transmitted all pertinent data to the command points in charge
of the fighters.
It is apparent that in carrying out an air attack the attacking
force always attempted t9 delude the defending fighters (3.g., by
causing varLous types of interference with the operation of the radio
locatore). Consequently, the :ightar command ado;=tee measur.s to
secure uninterrupted observation of the errsiy'a activities. These
measures ?rwre succossfstl.y met by the followtn~: operations carried
out by fighters.
Detection of the anoap was considered successful whenever the
fighters were ably tc; take off, attain the required altitude, at.d
enor.unter the enemy far ircm the objective or threatened area.
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1.LL ucyou w - ... -.?-v --
range,
upon many factors, chiefly upon the radio cati dstectiions'
enemy
t1je range of
As a general rule
it
i
,
y.
v
of sensit
was alvays being increased, as this permitted the fighters to prepare
to repel an attack, concentrate their forces over off threatened before he rareehed
and, once having encountered the enemy,
his target.
The range at which the enemy was detected (T) in units cf time
consists of the following minimum factors: the tirre consumed in warning
the fighters and the cow-and for executing the take-off (to); the tins.
spent in taking off and assembling in the air (to); the time consumed
in flying to the area under attack with the required rate of climb,
taking into account aircraft coming from the most distant airfields
(tp), and the time extended in combat until the enemy is destroyed
(t,). These factors are depicted schematically in Figure 1..oaNat the
y,
fighter
ene
th
,
my
e
the greater the speed possessed by,
range at which he moat be detected. The chances for the success of
the fighter planes are improved when they have a small time reserve.
The operation of directing interceptors to the enemy had a very
important bearing on defense against enemy bombing attacks. This task
became more complex when the hostile aircraft flew at a great height
or with extreme speed, since under these conditions it vas almost im-
possible for the fighters to intereept them without prior direction.
l combat of fighters barely arriving at
t
i
ua
n ac
There were instances
the area of attack, or missing it entirely because of inadequate direc-
tion.
This direction was carried out by severa`^r.oans. ,Among o hersfmay
enemy aircraft me determined by tntewts,-1VU ----
(many hundreds of kilcmeters), radio sets in the aircraft themselves
` -- th
s"". craft at short distances.
en
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~~ ;erceeT,~
Figure 1. hl ample of Calculating Minim= Depth of Detection
The ground radio locating stations and the radio eats In aircraft
target in any kind of weather, In mast cases they were oleo used for
intercepting eamy aircraft.
Direction in the sums of depth is divided into remote and products
direction. A system of remote direction involved a rough orientation by
the fighters of the eneq 'e location; a system of proximate direction, on the
other hand, meant an ieaediate enconoter between the fiahtere rM the onus..
The must powerful ground radio locating stations were utilized for
remote direction. Mien the eneigq was detected ho was kept under constant
obewcvation and all dtta pertaining to his flight was trerxmn,tted by
radio to the fighter command posts. This data (location, altitude,
course and number of aircraft) was relayed by the command
tt
s
o
pos fighter group oomaaMers already in the air.
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locating stations and radio sets and remained in effect until the
encounter began. If circumstances permitted, radio stations at
observation posts were also used in prmdmrte direction.
in the organization of interceptor direction, the establishment
of reliable communications between stations controlling remote and
proximate direction was always to be desired. The remote direction
stations went into operation first. After informing the proximate
direction stations of the enemy's position, they continued their
observation of distant targets. :then the enemy emeried from the
field of observation controlled by proximate direction stations,
In order to guarantee the reliable and uninterrupted direction
of interceptors, the radio locating stations covered the area in
their own zones where aerial engagements might occur as well as the
approaches to this area.
he was once again picked up by she remote stations..
Figure 2. Example of Coordinated Attack Against Beers
by Front-Line Interceptors With Supporting
and hear?Line Fighters
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ing interceptors to hostile targets from the grotiuie were .ne louorang;
(1) direction transmitted to the fighters from data concerning the
location of the enemy's aircraft tin relation to the ground); (2)
essential data on the enemy's course and altitude given fighter group
commanders.
The first method did not require preliminary calculations on the
ground (these calculations for intercepting the enemy were worked out
- this
d P
-'---
- air)
o
h
an
reason it-was considered the sitaplest method. It was justified when
process the enormous amount of data transmitted by the observation
In
drawback
i
.
ous.
stations. This method, however, had one very ser
order to reach their target successfully, the interceptor crews had
to be able to observe the terrain below them since the directions
transmitted by.the radio referred to check points on the ground.
amupit~t of Fiaht^ Craft and Their Gemmitment to Action
rust be borne in mind that only the second method guaranteed
the absolutely successful interception of the enemy by figh+ers.
Obviously, its application demanded fine organizational work on the
part of the command points of the air arm. The first method was
utiUzed usually only for orienting the fighter group at the time of
the take-off and afterwards during the initial stages of the flight
distribution- on the airfields) was usually determined b;' the necessity
of speedily concentrating in the air sufficient interceptors to
t hostile aircraft and destroy them 'aei.'orethey re:.inhad the
t
i
ercep
n
approaches to the combat zone-or the obieotive (area) under the attack.
by distributing a basic quantity of fighters in a B+veo fr nt-line area IM
near as possible to the chief opcrationel directions used by the entry+s
aircraft -o'.ld take off as quickly as possible. Thu righters were
ed in such a way that it Was possible to draw upon fighters
o
di
sp
s
from supporting fronts or from the roar lines to repel enemy air attacks.
This coordination with supporting fighters and with fighters protect-
.. nr-- a -
d
an
proved to be very effective.
following manner.- taking off from a sup-orting front or from a rear
at airfields located in the rear.lines or on a supporting from burs
2, variant 3), It is evident that all the details of this coordinated
eavm. .. ....,. .? -6"'- -, ------- - - -.
(ding
at the given front, intercepting and enraging the enemy, then landing
operation conformed with prennred plans.
The order of the fighter craft's entry into action usually de-
pended upon the aerial situation, chiefly upon the number of anew
aircraft taking part in the attack, their combat formation, and
b -
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In all cases the defender strove to create a favorable con
of flight personnel, etc., all normally play an important role in
caking up air strength.
Determining the exact moment for the take-oft of our fighters
p lw an especially Important role L n repelling massed e---W air
attacks. Usually, the take-off schedule was determined beforehand.
our interceptors accordingly, the probable duration of the flight to
the designated areas, the time needed to reach the most effective
altitude, assembly of the fighters in the air, and approach to the
area of engagement, as well as studying the location of airfields
where the fighters could land after the engagement (see Figure 3).,
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Base and to the llienp'e Course of Action
centration of forces in the air; this advantage may have consisted
of superiority over only a part of the enemy's formation. Vie can
tentatively say that an aerial situation is considered favorable to
the defense when two or three fighters are opposing one enemy bomber
and when one enemy interceptor craft is matched by one of ours. Of
coursa,.these numbers are not to be.considered invariable; the changing
combat properties of aircraft, differences in training and instruction
encountering the ens at a great range after an extended flight,
the fighters attempted to take to the air earlier than the time
set for their tale-off. It must be observed that the most destruc-
tive factor encountered by the defense was late take-offe, sines
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this enabled the enemy aircraft to reach the target and carry out
the attack before being intercepted. During actual cat there
were cases of such tardy take-rffa not only. preventing the inter-
ception and destruction of enemy aircraft, but even preventing
their pursuit as they emerged from the target area. ,
Cr~4 t Read3n.._. eae - 9-4-find-AMMbling
The experience gained from the recent war showed that the
greater ranges.
delay became increasing1 vital and important.
These airfields were q Lte familiar tc all flight personnel
and were included in the general liaison system (see Figure 5).
Their presence enabled interceptors to operate more freely and at
groups of fighters could lank., refuel., and rejoin- the battle without
participation In combat (see,i+igure 4).
quantity of their fuel,the iten which determined the extent of their
Determining the proper m=nt for taking off was of vital
consequence to fighter planes pith a small flying range (l} to
2 hours). In their case, not cnly a tardy take-off but also a
take-off followed by an extrem ly quick or rapid climb was detri-
mental, since during the course of an extended flight in pursuit
of the eneav the fig era would have already expended a considerable
by the speedy adoption of decisions by fighter commanders and their
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Figure 4. Example of Too Rapid Climb by Fightors
(in Relation to Fuel Reserves)
efficient organization and execution of .take-otfe and assemblies
in the air by the fighters was just as important as the factors
just mentioned.
The orgauitiation of take-offs by interceptors was guided by
gze 4undament^1 requitement: the gu+'.rartee that they would be in
the air within the shortest possible time. To this end, the inter
cept+ats, by previous arrangement, were disnooed on the field in such
a manner that they took off in sections on order and formed their
the interceptors (rounding other aircraft, resdying the antiaircraft
directions from the senior commander at the command post. In addition
squadron formations without unnecessary tasting. The interval between
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at ihE grerafi~s ? ?,~
Am s mrf'e/d
4
The senior commander determined the order of assembly at the,
from the air base.
tie
VOW
oirauuller sweeps to gaiin altitude in the area of their own base,
when the enemy was very close at hand, or while turning to in
If the interceptors were obliged to engage the enemy in larger
th -11-, effected their assembly either while engaged in
150 or 180 degrees, or during their rugnL e,cvuuu
perimeter.
l
e t
pVI ng -4
furthest., point of their co;erse, the assembly of fighters into groups
Figure 5. Advantages of Utilizing Reserve or Refueling 4-.rfisl
di n the number of aircraft taking off and the
y
-
e
o
d ermined theeaaerial situation. However, the general priciplas
... . e- 4- ---U.+ -a the sA@a4
Combat formations of interceptors, destined to destroy large
en +s aerial arm were of manq kinds. They were
f th
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As a general rule, a fighter combat formation consisted of
g
in b.:arxng , -g, ,
various units attacking the enemy either in sequence or simultaneously.
Combat experience shoved that the screening group way more ef-
d actions flying at different altitudes in
...
n
force of fighters, which were divided .i.nto ec e a
aircraft each.
Each of the echelons making up the striking force ether at-
tacked the bombers in dense combat formations (the "wedge" forma-
tion, etc.), or dispersed themselves in depth and along the front
y " or "column" section formations, the
n nsn "wed
The distribution of interceptors in these groups depended upon
various factors, but above all upon the enemy's expected resistance
and his combat formation. ben the enemy bombers were inadequately
supported, two-thirds of the defending force consisted of a striking
ofldto20
hl
3. A reserve force designed to supplement the striking and
screening forces.
its objectives.
2. An umbrella force designed to pin down the effective re-
sistance of the enemy's fighters until the striking force achieved
to engage the sneay's bombers.
the following:
1. A striking force made up of one or more echelons designed
e
fective whew Campos
echelon formation, since this increased their r. Maneuverability. Several
of the units composing this group might be attached to echelons operating
with the striking force and convoy them directly during the attack and
during their return, etc. made up of ss :Cly at ferent
sim
ir
n
e reserve group
ost
unit
o d distributed among the a
altitudes in echelon format o
vulnerable to attack.,
In the usual combat formation tho v_.rious types of fighters were.
disposed so that the aircraft with the greatest firopmver made up the
I the screening and reserve groups wore found the
T.
peered in the interceptors' field of vision, e c
fighter group made his final disposition of forces and informed his
........44-4na11y et their missions. The screening group, as
as a 6o... o.a ...+v,
following manner. If circumstances permitted, they converged upon the
target with an altitude advantage over the ene;tiy. After the enemy ap--
th -mm--der of the
hold the initiative throughout the engagement..
striking .arcs.
best aircraft available to carry the fight to the enemy fighters and to
-
a rlu.e, wnuo aaaw ----- -
convoy and tried to engage them so a3 to draw thou as fro.-a the bombers.
the screening
d b
in
tt
y
e
a
The striking force, regardless of the success a
group, quickly attacked the bombers with the aid of those units least
Ie3reseft fire or enemy fighters. Usually its attacks
4
b
f
t.
'. an
oppose
.
Cane in rapid succession. They pressed home the attacks on the bombers
until they had left the target area and until other enemy fighters in
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and protected them from high-altitude attacks by enemy fighter
echelons.
The fundamental target of all defensive fighter craft was the
enemy bomber. Therefore, the success attained by the interceptors
in engagements which were intended to repel air attacks by hostile
forces was evaluated first by the number of bombers knocked out and
secondly by the degree to which the interceptors disrupted the
enemyrs attack.
of interceptors simultaneously. In this way much'success was realized
through the effective coordination of all the forces.
In replusing enemy air attacks carried out by large air groups
under an effective umbrella (either antiaircraft fire cr fighters),
it is expedient to commence defensive operations with large masses
Actual combat showed that the entry of interceptors into combat
by small groups was inefficient since in this instance they sometimes
were unable to overcome the resistance put up b1 the enemy's fighter
escort.
description of their objectives as they encountered the eneapr ended
with the entry of the interceptors into the combat zone where the
e.-AW was encountered. Here control was left entirely in the hands
of the subordinate commanders of the air units or segments, each of
whom acted independently without close coordination of the total
firepower,
changing situation, the sudden chanties of position of the combat
zone, and the great altitudes at which the combat took plhce.
The use of large masses of fighters showed that the control
of fighter groups from the ground, which usually began with a
formations of enemy aircraft was extremely complex, especially when
the battle raged intensively over a large area. The uninterrupted
control of such an engagement from the ground was often neglected
because of the great number of fighter groups engaged, the rapidly
which does not imply a complete divorce from ground support. Through
ground control points the interceptors can receive information and
orders fro the senior aviation coanoader. while the engagement is in
progress (concerning the cessation of hostilities and the r direction
of interceptors to another Hostile echelon, etc.):
In other words, control of the fighter arm of aviation during
eider themselves reserve forces, whether support is needed, etc,.
In this case the fundamental ;Means of controlling the inter-
It is uncertain whether such a situation is normal. We feel
that in combat all the actions of the interceptors should be co-
ordinated by the senior coward-r, who, present in the air with the
interceptors, -can direct the subordinate groups under his command.
He can indicate which group is to attack the bomber group, which
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