OBSERVATIONS ON US PROPAGANDA AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL OF SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010217-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 217
• Publication Date: February 19, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICAT1ONSz, rufr
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC~~?EP9kf NO1 17
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR "Eerrrany (Covict Zone)
SUBJECT Observations 7n i::a Vropa{rancla Among Military
E'.3r5Ai,nel of Scviet Occupation Forces
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DATE DISTR, If Feb 52
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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Introduction
1. The question of propaganda during peacetime plays a very important role, if
not the chief role, thus, a well-formulated political propaganda in time will
bring more profit (advantage or usefulness) than the atom bomb. During World
rear II and in subsequent years, the Soviet Government considerably strengthened
its propaganda and agitation among its people, especially in the army. This
is evident merely from the fact that in all educational institutions, factories,
and even in apartment house administrations, obligatory study of "Short Course
in History of Conssarty" and other such political literature has been introduced.
In the army the political apparatus has been increased in size.
2. Before t1.e Central Committee of Ccmparty stands the very important task aimed
at involvement of the people, not only as a workir? force, but also in their
conscience. For this are used all possible means: schools, movies, theater,
press, radio, and even the church. Ptethods and forms of Soviet propaganda are
generally known; and in this article I don't have the purpose of describing them
in detail.. Before me there is, another task: to describe the general traits
of American propaganda directed toward the USSR and especially toward Soviet
occupation Cerces, stowing in this connection to what extent it (American pro-
pafanda) is able to counteract Soviet propar~;nda under existing conditions of the
mighty iron. curtain.
2non (overt) Methods of Propaganda
The fact of:t'e ex;.hence of tf-:e so-called iron curtain between USA and USSR.
does not parmit affective utilization of ,-rene and radio as means of propaganda.
Among overt metho,ts of propaganda bebng: radio (Voice of America), and the
illustrated magazine, America. Neither of them is accessible to the broad
masses of the ..oveet people. Lintenin- to Voice of America bror,dcasts is
forbidden and, therefore, the btoadcasts are Jammed by special equiement.
The magazine nm,rica is disseminated in the USSR in very- restricted quantity,
"
and among a certain circle of people. The content of the mvgazine,in. essence,
amounts only to description of life in America, with most: of its space devoted
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to arti_cle- tt".- c,ta science and technolcr.v and not, at all to pol'tical _,uestions.
.:c U,- ce of ..rncrica Broadcasts .re not ut^tanci .n; `'or
t` ':Lr _ i.iference in
content. from 1^>;?r:LC7 r^,1^azine0 Ti'.Lre .La a ('Fll.tl,* G.t' e ?ocracy. The majority
of 1;1:e rail Lo i.)ro::dc :.s'ts are devoted to all norts of production figures and
processe^ noi; onr? :rord abc;ut n - thuds for ntru-gle by the people against the
Cc?,.i.::1', :,c?.ernment., itut the Scvl. t .oc,ople a!,c-ut the "rood life" in America
r cl t,i ny old 1 ;_Ice to hear s else, r:ely, about, paths of strt,rgle
fcr :'reodorn, al,r.ut destrurLiolt cf It!e oc?]-itic;a arbitrary regime in the count y.
ahould tic the has is cf 11 nrc'pagarl:la for the USSR? Can it
b: ci`n3i. ir iii the ],/nice of :i.merican ;ir::1 the t.;.;azine, 11]::c.r ica. rhich pene-
t,rate the iron curtain to a certain exte:.t, ;;usl,.-fy their p rpo$e (or mission)
in '.he. toter of prcpagand:izin-? ravclut.ionary ideas in the struggle of the
people a -air17,1 the Sovi.n't authorities? Of course, it is not possible to say
i t.i L^ s very _pparent, not :.nly to tl-:c: people of Russia but also
bed; and 1.ts uorders.
It La not. uo:,sible to ask a Treat deal 'rom the mo azine, Imcrica, because its
COI; i-.oot Lae l.ded in advance aid is a-?reed .with the Jovi,.t liovei nnlent. but the
raldi.oIi, Ls n i, nu b- ect to v kin.d ?. olio cu:i. censorship by the USSR,
}lo:,e/r.r, 1 ere also in not felt real propa -anda lan hinge,
the desire(] rc?^11lG:; Gn ti'e ]. leolo"'i oa], front and con the
J;.]_Lt:LCCAI. ^'!;rl.'.'!'].c?, ;t; .., ;Iccc;cnx:;r;:r to ccurrteract L');v.Let prolul.ara:.da all
croc-rd ' , L1. c m (
a 1 people and put in its
cr r 1 ;;11'11 ...:ic!: :r la ] .lh tl?(, people ::trc r Ll',c n t,l:eir .. ]..Lef in a
;c,.? ? .c:r 1' ; or tion ., t;rl: 1r i.l: "i ;.c: USSR
i?1,. C(' Pal lrlc-..:_11'1 oi' :)rosargal..i,;l of tie
rrta. i a.Lti:ot: P LI e,r ol?c_,llnt,i-:l 1, 1. ,li_fficult.i.es
u:i ; our . n< i I' r:; . o llroadc,st rr.rt,ri.ct r n cr, ll.'. s ; nnt:Lcn of tie ?l.;ti*azi.ne,
cc r . i ma:L 1`
n~... t.r .~cin^c rshi,
i.' c a ,r the r;:ime it
L ~< tc, i nc1, crc. r tl ct c: i "' l,a , loci cot se.lnecltly
f). ,gill ].L'L r, t,ll'al :1.?.r cl oral cm eec- c t C: Vert 1;rcpa ;'.IiC11
or -'-?' c USSR
Cc.-r-rt; 1)rooa2' ;1da.
SovLet; occupation :orces,
a ;: c c';11 1 , in r.?.an , ..r r. ',},e c1:"ic,f role to be played by the covert.
ertl';r ...a]., ..cc-t-.'0:1 .;nl-. In. raL]CO. ;, large :art in p
1 ropy?-1,,da
~o L. c L be as., one . to t11,.. :it:.?n }.an r,m:i.r;raLion. It icon available all
for L,1 - uruo,e: o ? r': .n1oat.l on c::ce
.:1. i. lle1-1 ,
. 1. t cadres (staff).
r1.i.c t,ion. ;c. .eve;r, opr.:,:la pc?netrate3 to the other
lc r .r 1 , c:: cr1 1'ra: r.o 1, c: the :erc .. }
':o :culd get :LL. i lured
in 0,Ct,- :.T?n r:anv c:ne of:I a 1-'Lai' years Irl CuIcco.C'tion .i:Lth lll,ir official dl:'Lies,
v:rlt fl'e":L'.entl'.'- of :..akkl11r' t;r:Lcs on ofticLal travel.
On t, In .rn c sal .i_nt,et c str.diod
at, I :1-,l e ].i_e of t.' . o _jc I 1r. pc.cple. In
cl7 cu-'es I _l;cold .,'re been al-lc, even 1i cl;i/ frc,m tie Crtr,tf, to learn or
recei.ve name ''C:71 of il-:i-rlnation about tie .'est. but such as not the. case., I
did not, meet nc,r? d I i:e,ar ouch nc:,rs, ..,:1 not only I. All Soviet mill.tary
rlodl In L';rn i._'c unable to heart, t';:ct _.t any Lime saw a
ne.rs.;a:,er or rlhlr.t; distributed among t.lle Si.?v ,:l forces or the local
pooul.::t:i.on, f;oi;'oe in ..esters _.: r, ;ar, r 1,: con, n; acnl,:ainted :i Li. the emigre
)r e' an I;' c. , olune c f it. c I. r?culal;iorl, 1A occurred to the Pee-c L i t;i.: i. t, :could be
If all t?h r,7. ot: l.eiarc,a;cer?.
~, 1Tla 12 i_nc , etc of tie e;nl. political l.:iterat~:r_
did not, re:aa:n on V !!_:a ride biit c, 1-i h 1>>triL,uie l 7),:': Lnel tie iron curtain.
9. idle, :a,teln;t.a in 1"?1 :Lon are aairig ;r. :ie. B, it, Lln.l'ortunatc:ly, as of now,
ti'. i s 1, obIOrl: 1`G., t r, en ac.Lireci COllii;] 't:ely. '1'1:C Lo'.r:I.o b r rrcy in '~icrln.irly an of
ru;a Ices, net 1.ve rc per' contact ecu cotnmurl:i.cati.on Pith t1cc est, Tl:i.s is to
be ro-:;retted.
10. I ! . must; be La c:rl a_:.t,c, accoll:;t. that, (1:1.,Lribution c , ; ' literature ar?:ong
a: ala1. ocnuo''.!..co a raonrlel in a.:COlnn?i1::1.t.d by rrc'.at '.lifficulLies. Courcter?-
me naves taleen h)V the 3:..'aeat is Vrr'rill'.,. (,n t :u"1 1.1:1.; c.:.i:.Lcl 2lrl v :ry sr rious, 7trictrom
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of the occ potion (life), I t hl de?re'
;I . ~p ae;~.:nt ;,c twc,rk of t,i:o 1/,:,B.
party and Krirr.somol ce;-nization;, etc i.rvdeed are cnnsiicrr.i unconquerable
barriers between t.,ir, countries, R1.:vsia ar;d ,.rn? rica, But, this most not
force us to turn asi'e from coo intr-ntio,c:. G:.nme;uer,tly, that which cannot
be Hone directly or ,verily must bu clone illeg.].ly, i do not know all the
methods heir, used a{, the present tire to throw words of truth across the iron
curtain. But I have certain ideas on ti-is sus-,, ect wl.ich I .;ou.ld like to share.
There is oil:irr; special in these i,leas, taut they may be something unexpected
on that side of tho world.
(1) it is necessary to conduct propaganda activity very carefully, keeping
in rind the re-,ime which has bean established for Scvlet military
personnel in Eastern Germany. ley are not pcrmitteci any contact
with the local population. Military unfits ;;re located at a great
distance from interzonal borders. Exhibition of tie least sy;r;pathy
or fricndlines, fcr the .ect results in political terror, etc.,
(2) fork arson-, Co?rict Army p-rsonncl shoull have two directions:
(a) Act'vo arr:tation, and
(b) i'arti_al 'discri.mination a ai.nst individual officials.,
(3) Activity of individual emigrait rcups should he considered useful at
the time glen the majority of their propaganda and literature gets
to the ether side of tie iron curtain. 'iheir wiork can be evaluated
en the basis of tle number cf defectors.
(tr) Orr;anization of proper reception of defectors and wide-scale l,ro-
parandizint of such facts will give positive results. For the Army,
a defection the worst thing possible. Among the army leadership it
is always subjected to r_orious political analysis,.
(5) In r,roprioanda should be used truthful information on he current issues
of the clay -- issues shier t,- uch Soviet citizens in tI.eir daily life,
of, prop a7andr about great structures of Communism, etc, There are
many themes wl,L.;h can exert much influence on Goviat military personnel.
They _re all dictated by the Soviet Government itself. In essence, in
cry opinion, it :would be desirable to give a special place in propa-
ganda to the following questions: Party dictatorship in USSR,, Stalin
is t'e bloody executioner of tic people, do :ollective form "heaven,"
socialism in reality, etc. _ver`,rthi.nn which an he brought to the
pr.opie cannot be c'runer:xted, but most certainly the result will have
ouch an a^peril .,rl'ieI? wl] crush Stalin and 1! is barbarous Communist
party. in this no rrr^ard shr,,,ld be hides for personalities. and the
lan^uare of the people itself ohmild be used.
(6) It-is most inportent and most di.ffi-:uit to establish communication
w'_th the ot.i:cr ..'de. On time oasis of (my) experience and of reality
I ;an propose l,'r iollowing possibilities:
(a) Creation in East Qern,any of widespread agent networ''t with
special 1-ink of nropaaanda. For this purpose, it is best to
utilize tia local population, Tt.c role of such representatives on
l e r.~,ct trer:cndcus,. hero im, an era ple of the results of the
practical activit,'es and a characterization of it:
(1) Tlilita'y personnel, despite all rr,.;;ulations, seek acquain_
tacnce with German rue n. . 7'ter r,evr.ral meetings, a situation
of m?:tug]. trust is achieeved. In so -h a case, spoken tropa-
:randa and written eaturLril such :_ ; 1 c.sfiet., become possible.
As result of much an ac ,,.aintance, military personnel:
a. Nay be aesesod cf 1. Ruin:; with German women, and hence,
suffer all the cunseeucnces,
b. Nay make tl e lecizion t;o cross over to .western Germany
with the German sweetheart on oeeourt of politi' .l
csnvicti.ons, and also on adcaunt of u.ar of account-
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c. loss cC documents, especially Party Bard, as result of
contacts ?J'ith German .?roman. is reason for ;;oink; over to
;Vest.,
The German population is capable o' ['ur?nishinLr those riho
desire to e,o to the ..est pith vel': _cie tra:is:,ortation,
civilian clothing, guides, and even a.ith falsified documents.
It is nccesrary to observe here ti at this question plays a
basic role, and th.it, such means must be taken into account
in organizing ['lirht (defections of Soviet military per-,
sonnel. Practice has sh::rn that the overwhelming majority
of defections to the Jest were accomplished successfully
only pith Ji_rect help frem tl :e Gccr^ -.xr: ; and that it is almost
impossible to accomplish alone :?? itl:out aid. This fact is
eloquently confirmed by the orders from the Soviet command on
the occasI ins of attempted escapes to aeste''n Germany.
Dissemination of leaflets .,rithout communication (contact)
:uri.th Soviet military ;,erso,.nel should be done as follows.
a. In each mil i.tary unit a certain number of German em???
ployees are iorking. Alts ougb a a rule they are in..
formers to Special Secti ns, their loyalty to Soviet
organs is very doubtful.. Ti ey are completely capable
of bringing- lc: t;ters onto the unit. area and dropping; them
unobserved nt,. tie post box. A Car as leaflets., that
1LS more dangerous
b.. A Ger" an s.Lc ps a bc;oic rr,ilit,ar?; perrun on tl.c road or
street ,and him :.1 letter allegedly dropped by a
Guss:Lan ;:ekes Ccund by the German alonr the road. The
duty oC the Scviet mil.'.tary persons >r. ul d be t send ti'e
letter tc: the addresses by Iropping it into tic first
military ma.i.l box :rhich he passes.
Author says i,e Pa,l such an experience once in Last _ ermany
himself and didn't suspect tl-:e German or tie letter, that
he merely dropped it into tl:e nearest Soviet military
mail bor. .i1th(nt even o _eni.n;r it.. lie cc ,ticnc; t: L. such
a method could not, be used Cre_,uentiy in one area, that
it .r:uld have to be used over widely separated areas).
c. At n.i ?ltt It i_r not. so ia_C.Cicl:.lt, to drop leaflets on the
territory of a unit. At dawn they :iill. I),- tiered up
by sola:iers wi?i.lc officers are -till sleeping.
d. A S,.v-i.c't military person who has taken oif i:is coat or'
clothes at ,a restaurant, theater, or beach may find a
leaflet in h:s picket. Streetcars, autobusses, ta:_'.,
chance encoun tors with German aaomen arc conce:dent
possibilities for transmittal leaflets to int,cre:>ted
p,irscns.
e. Aerhii balloons wi.t)h leaflets can be e::fectlye ,n] _y at a
shol't distance, U... r, is, ::hen the ob,jcct'ive (target) is
visible, O herwl se, it, Is very difficult, to calculate
the point .tlier.?e they .rill fall.
Leaflets can be :scattered. (dropped) along the cost
prch;:hic routes for movc,? eats. of mil i.tary units, es -
peci_allr during i io.lcl rcises, all t1 c, close (j In view
of t' e fact that suck c:_eu'c i.'oes :trr coruhtcte 1., as a rule
nl rcy 1.11 11c .,..me locality.
Firing ran cm
:,1:.1
train u' :,seas:
at
night whatever
is des.'.~.re l
be
dropped on tem..
At
the beginning
of the class
day,
the ;:.ajc:,rity of
the
leaflets ;rill be
gathered up and will fall iito dependable hands.
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h. A truck driver retur:ing to his unit brings in the body
of h i. truck several. bun es o ' leaflets, so to speak,
direct to their address. It :i_s very easy to t'rro:r a
bundle o;' leaflets into a truck in traffic, and tYii s is a
completely cafe Tr.ethod.
i. A leaflet .rhich has a 'rived in the 1-,ands of a soldier and
which is ::ritten to his li.kinn will replace dozens of
other methods of disseininaticn. He will most certainly
pass it on to hin nearest friend and they fill go over its
contents in detail.
(1,) Radio is an important form of communication t: or the troops.
Suitable broadcasts on the proper mil_tary wave lengths can be
of interest tc Scviet signal corps personnel. In this case
the maximum effect can be achD.ved durin; the period of field
exercises hen c,.mparatively more radio stations are in use.,
especially in tank and mobile units.. It is necessary to
remember that a stand-:;y radio station is in action con
tinuoucly an l that listening to other radio stations takes
place in spite of the strictest restrictions?
Tl ere are very many methods of d. ssemi.n_rt,ing ;iropa;,anda among
Soviet occuuation forces.. I amn not in position to describe
all of them, t}:crofore have presented only Mhos:: r': ich
are possible and practical and care be used under conditions
existin- tl-:ere ;here our pork is iirected.
The conclusion to he dram on l;l::i.s ;uestion is be increase the
activity of organs involved in disseminating propaganda to
the other side of the ;orld, not taking into account the
nossibili.t,ie ansi mean In t- is I see very great,
cancc in The solution of the problems dealt :iith above
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