CURRENT SITUATION IN FINLAND

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00809A000500840034-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 7, 2003
Sequence Number: 
34
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 8, 1947
Content Type: 
IR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00809A000500840034-9.pdf240.09 KB
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,Approved For Release 2003/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500840034-9 corn t1 9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GRJ P( 25X1 INTEWGENCE REPORT L' 25X1 25X1 0 25X1 DATE: INFO. 25X1 D1ST. 8 August 3.947 PAGES 3 SUPPLEMENT 1. In comparison with other eountrjed in the Soviet cp`:cre of influence, 1Q1and le a tree country. Thin is a "model" $talinprotectorato. The country is not occupied. There are neither secret nor open Soviet controllers in thr adwiai tration. The parliament nee freely chosen: the Communists have only air-fourth of the seats. There are no disappearances of the citizens. only the :;oliti- eiano nho were responsible fcr the war have been arrested, and the oftti.eera who were mixed up in the hidden-weapons affair. The condemned politicians are in prison, but..that does not mean that they cannot continue their aotivitxee and partake in Finnish political life. Tanner the ex-13mder of the SooisF.eto is still the president of the cooperative 11anto on leave, and has been, un until lately, ruesiving his salary. He is allowed to see his lnxyer, and h.. family. There is a ruoor that he is pulling some big po1itical deals out of prtaon, and he is supposed to be one of the initiators of the last governmental crisis. The case aFainet the officers to being conducted publicly, with all lo;al para- phernalia. 2. No socialisation has been established. The nationalisation of industrr neces- sitate a change in the con titution. The Corrnuniai.e and Sooialiste 4-:me the majority in the government but they have not got a majority sufficicar. for a change of the con.1titution, which is two-thirds of the votes. This in the reason *W all oocialiratir: plans will long lie in the i'srllamentary Comnia.:;ona. A lot was writton the. Russia was against socialization because she vas .u'raid that the Finnish iadustrf would then be unable to live up to its reparation com- situ atte. It is a fact that there was no intervention frog Uoecow, a.w.i there was no pressure c.ithcr for socialization. In general Russia doze not 'paddle in internal Finnish ; ?)blerne. 3. During the last year the Finnish economic situation improved. Agricut'ural production will becoua better, and should attain this year (1947) 00,E of the prewar standards; (in 19)46 it was 60%) Industrial production is alreacly nearly on a ploy-war statue. Its main work goes toward reparattorw for Russia. i 1952 Finland will have to deliver goods north 300 mUliou gold dollar;:. Prices for this have bcenn calculated at 19.80 levels. brriy one-third of this is kqy- 9'inniah production, which is timber, the rant to t,u products of the metal industries. This will necessitate enlarging o that. industry to a very groat extent. For dolaya in deliveries Finland pairs 5% penalty. Up until am Finland has paid 110 million dollar,. It is forceeen that in 3eptembsr of COUNTRY FL:laud SUWECT Current situation in Finland 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/21 AUG12% "2` 25X1 1$676 ApprtivecFFgr Release 2003/11/21: CIA-RDP80-00 A000'008t4 034-9 thi' year the eottnbry Will be in arrears 3 million do . Th e is most important because it allows Russia to m3ddlo in internal Finnish prob- leme, and opens the door to new economic demands. The thriftiness of the Finns, outside help, ospecial],y Swedish, have helped Finland to accocplish this. 4. At the same time, ecports to the Host are growing. Economists say that this year this export Trill grow to 300 million dollars, cecgpa roe. with 240 million achieved in 1946. li%ia Trill enable them to import up to 230 million dollars worth of goods, compared with 180 million in 1946, of which only 12 million need go to Runsia. 5a The food situation has nlso improved greatly. Thera is no rationing of meats fish or vegotableb, none for eggs. In restaurants, food is about like it was before the war. 6. One problem for anxiety is the low wages. The prides of'food have risen 15 times pre-war levels, wrnges, on the other hand, only 6 times. 7. The Government and the Parliament. e presen uoveacnmen -7 as of a coalition of three parties: Communist, Socialist, and Agrarian. The eremier is Pekkala, leader of A small Socialist group wwi].ocked" with the Communists (Social Unionists). He is known for his intemperance In the country, for his laziness and lack of ability. The Cown- munists have the Intarior CUinistry and police. Seats in government were divided iy-.c one-third eachf this has givon the Communists more influence than they would have if the P,:rliamontary setup were decisive (they have only one-fourth of the votes). The Agrarians are a class-peasant party, and are meetly concerned with prices for their products. They are slightly colored by reaction. The Socialists, until lately, formed two groups: the Lefb, pro-Communist, and the Right, rhich is nerd actively anti-Communist than the Agrarians. They are un- der the influence of Tanner. A stabilization within thet- party has been achieved and the youflg Rightist elements htvo gninod influence. AC those in the Govern- ment belong to both factions, the party is tryin6 to get rid of the Leftist ministers. Outaido of the Government there are the Conservatives in opposition. 8? The Cabinet Crisis. The constant emand for higher wages on the one Lund, and the demand for higher prices by the Agrarians on the other, have created difficulties between the parties. The clash was started when the transport workers asked for a 20% raise in gages. The Agrarians opposed this and pulled their ministers out of the Government. ,.t that sane time elections of delegates to unions were taking place. Up until then the Cannmunists wore strongest in these, and before the elections the chances of the Socialists and Comr.:unists ware regarded an even. against all exportations, the Socialists got a majority of 45 mandates. This fact caused a betterment of the economic situation and a certain disregard for ftussia','as the Socialists felt strong in the Unions. he younger leaders of the Socialist Right felt the situation to be wipe for a reconstruction of the Government to reduce Cocmunist influence and get rid of the Prime sinister mho was going to be replaced by an Economist. At the same time the Leftist minis- terra in the Cabinet were to be removed. Two possibilitioswe were opens (1) The creation of a Government without the Ar--Tarians, giving a Cabinet in which the Comcnwnists mould ue in the minority, and would be w.tinable to increase their influence by baiting the Agrarians with milk prices; (2) New elections. The Comrninists agreed to a reconstruction under the condition that the Premier would be one of their men; in fact they wanted to keep the ttatas quo. It looked as if this state of affairs could not be solved, (the crisis lasted 7 weeks) and that eleotions would have tc be held. These would have reduced the influence of the Communists oven more. 9. The Tomb. Mist thou, "unknown" individuals throw; a bomb into the Soviet Logation. This whole affair Is very dubious. The Legation is closely watched by the pclice. The bunt was. thrown through a closed window, and the glass Vas unbroken. There was no explosion, the policemen on duty did not notice anything. Some newspapers burned in the room next to the minister+s. The tannish police was notified only after some hours and was not allowed to make an investigation on tbo ApDt.--- Approved'For Release 2003/11/21: CIA-RDP 44V~' Ogo1wb' -OV76 Approved For Release 2003/11/2AP 8$-,010{,0"4-9 *mtever happened, it cculdl+t have maj a the F4nns, asking monists. The Soviet press started a savers campaign against for a purge. The local police, although in Chomamaisstt ha,~The was purge not take tect the culprits, in spite of anneuner~ place, but all demands for a reconstruction of the Covernnent were dropped; the election s~ Finland, but without clear them it is difficult to govern with also. It becw)e the Comcau~igt CONFIDEMAL This document conta,LDJ information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act 50~ U.S.C. 31 and 32 as amended. its transmission or the revelation of its contents,irL any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. 10. polish Di lunatic fl resentativea in Finland. ,a brother. 'he post is in reality e s er, as ewe , Wanda 1 as oars in the hands of Bryczkowaki, the secretary, who is Warsaw's man. They both like to contend that they are not Comnunists. They are smooth and sociable men, and the have been able to break the ice around them, both with Finnish society adt~. authorities. Besides these two.thero are at the Legations Saysk and Mrs. Eglund. The doorman is yyesolowski, a Communist who was there with the old staff. U. The Commercial Treat with Poland. This was gn on Ap . Po has assumed the obligation of delivering to Finland 1,0?5,000 tons of coal at 12 dollars per ton; of this total 405,000 tons are to be delivered in the next 15 months 100,000 tons during the ne=t year after that, the rest during the third year. Finland is obliged to ship to Poland dur- ing the 15 months pulp rood, iron ores, and small wooden houses for a total of 12 million dollars. In a separate deal, Poland premised to sell Finland during the next.five years 3 million tons of coal for cash. Because of the grwt.need for wedish Polish Finland and this a contract-was accepted with u satisfaction. the Approved For Release 2003/11/21: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500840034-9