COMMUNISTS VIEWS ON NEXT WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500830157-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 157
• Publication Date: January 5, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY Poland
SUBJECT' Conniunist, s Views en Ne.ct d
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Po:.sibility oP_c:ar
1. Leaders of. the ~11CP/b (All ltvosian Coiunuxd.st RR MY of Bolshevvi cs) state that:
(11-.)
'I,ar is not i.mmL ont and is unlikely to break out before completion of
the.USSR's uecond Five Year Plana
(b) The is lo- ona, despite their use of the atom bomb and propaganda as
r,blacknnail," will not start a rrar.,
(c)
(d)
Il war doer como it will be at a tima chosen by the USSR.
Time is workin, for the USSR. The US ":ri11 achieve the r6conat2 action of
Germany and Japer and :.ill settle her Internal problems, but in t e mean-
tine, Siberia will be developed as the richest arsenal in Eurasia and
Communist influence in central and eastern Europe u:111 be &O.LrmIL-r eata-
bli.shed
2. Ccaaunistn in Poland claim that the USSR does not want war but is preparing for
it bee u ee the Soviets believe the fol?.arring troricn indicate a possibility of
eventual Nor .
(a) US expenditures for aria nen'ie during 1947 h ve, according to Noise Drogi
Glow koads), reached. a total of USw18 bilUou.
(b) US capitalists are pointing bovard ear because it opens markets and pro-
vides an easy road to prosperity? Those capitalists are aware of the.
groaing unemployment and difficult social conditions which have brought
the US to the verge of an economic cr5.o3.s. Family living coats in the
US have risen over I.,C,GOii since 1913
(c) US expansionist policies are demonstrated by her stLlengthening of anti.
dcmocrstic elements in central Europe; her toloratio.= of Fascist regimes
in Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Trance (tta Gaulle); Ond by the
Marshall Plana
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(e) l?Iro U has instituted a Teat anti?-A:orwnist drive to p+u?Le bui-va,:erican
Ole:-;emsCroc her yrny and a ovornnent.
in?a3 ects for Cppoei.r Forces in 'icxt Jiar
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(d) Tirfl 96 iS build in.- and expanding; hsr :Aloes in Greenli'.nd.
3. i.ccordin ; to the Coaxrunist regime in Noland, the USStt i ;akea the fol.:r orr - g
objective eatii?:atc of inn-'lo-:.axon War potential:
(a) r.o ete:
(1) The atonic bomb.
(2) :tcserves of raw material
(3) Efficient indufArial organization and highly developed industrial
technique.
(4) Gold reserves.
(5) Inhorent lve of freedom.
(b) c.caknesses:
(1) Cirowin,, economic friction bet.veerr the U:: and treat r1tain?
(2) The utru Cles for incoporu2onee occurring iu :an. colonial
possessions. '
(3) The Negro problen: with its threat of internal auv-er to the U>
and of revolution in uirica.
(u)
(7)
(?t) The forrcati.on of a Slav bloc in i:''ur )p.^: and the Soviet attenpts
to establish Slavonic solidarity vrith'l tc the US.
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(y) 'Plie activitico of the (xrr:erful Corrnunist oranizat:ions throughout
the world.
The general desire fcr peace in the r:orld and the specific anti-
pathy for war arson' the people of the iJJ.
The US' lack of a lar;;e stardin^ array. The atomic boat.) alone
cannot determine the course of .Far.. Large crmics are necessary
to occupy and consolidate corun:ere' +r_rritory. In the event of
;Far the U -5a could liquidate all US footholds in Europe and ocauioy
Asia before the arrival of hnglo-?Snxon troops.
It. The USS,t's estimate of its own war potential inclu6es the following factors;
(a) hsseta :
(1) A po,rerful industry.
(2) i'ret.onious reserves of raw materials and rnarrpov or,
(3)
(1)
The largevt army in the vrorld in an excellent itato of training
and oqui,l::rerit.
Cor,-.muriist purties throughout the world :rhieh are presently ,raging
a purer. ideological 'Far ao agent:; of the Comintern will bacorre,
on the outbreak of :gar, active instruments of sabotage, espionage,
and propa:;anda;
(5) All iuurlc-aoxon .realmesues can ',e credited as Soviet assets.
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14l _V..ita'tiort ::e'.l.Vercd dtrrin' ..orld . .ar? XI.
Lees el'ritrlent i.. ifustrial or,;a:tiaat1on thanl the L's, acrd lack of
tlu; atonic bomb.
The e;:istarwe ;tithin the tJ Sit of both overt and covert opposition
ol.eriente .
Nusitiort of Possible I'artici.[yartts in :er
5."
Yellowing is a surw-zry oi' statements by loading; Polish (o r t r it;tts rogardinr
the internal anti foreign position of possibly participants Ir. a future .jar:
(a) The W. All stater.:ents or:phasizo US ic:;,orialisr as d :onstrated by
1 or uc ivitiors in Iraq, !ran, ;audi ftrabia, and The UJ,, by
inciting u wrpt against i'ritain and inereasing her oivn influence over
Can? cta and :.ustralia, is hclpina to noal:on the iritish Zupiro. Chiang
Eai.ahok's opposition to t;5 effortu to strcri than Japan's zil3.tary
potential can cause the Uk cor iderablo trouble.
(b) Croat Eritain. The USSit doe:: not conaic:or Great > ritain a perrimont
L'a actor -o-V"' s rcrtgth In the structure of the. world. The vanishing
i.+ritiuh tw*apirc, in a i4?aritic effort to preserve its position of power,
is tryin;; to act as ned'i ator botraeen the US and the US&t. In the roan-
tire, the U:i is oyutei,:ati.cal'_y trcanin;; array Canada, itus?tra1ia, and sev-
cral ,lritisir ponceusions in hfri ca., Y;hilt the WSa is prepared to take
over the rest.
~(c)
(d)
(e)
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. The U 4 h is endeavoring to absorb all of c,orr.:any into. bar
sphere of influence. absorption will be facilitated by the sinilurity
:xrta,ccn Corn unisr and t.atienal .socialism raps' ch once i.oforc paved the
.1ay or Core.:unisn in C cri; any.
--ranee. The main o e j ctivo of the : Wrench Cotinunists is to cha:*:a prance
into a "people Is democracy" and 'tie her foreign policy to the QU510 a
throw ;h their nutual fear of a militarily ;iovrerful Germany. The USSIi
realizes that the i?rench people are opposed to both Communism and ?as..
cisr,: and must therefore .be accorded special treatment if they arc to
accept the "new system.'- Capitalists, for eranple, rust be given con-
cessions not ordinarily permitted in Communistic courttrie . If do 7aullo'
attempts a coup d' etut with nglo-,:axon aid, the Cor::unists ir.: rar,ce
will start an `u:~ceciiate offensive and hope for Sotiot assistance.
Greece. Greece is the current proving ground for UL and t;~'5it weapons
0 orce and influence. Communists believe that the U:, is losir ; :orld
prestige t_vrough her involvement in Gruelc internal problems- and her
inability to solve them in accordance :pith her on plans. The UbSit
foresees the following solution to the breek question
(1) 1. "cls:r:ocratic" ; overruaent will. be bet up in the terra tory presently
occupied by the Cor:a:.unict:j.
(2) The iJSSic will then propose to the U:; a compromise calling for a
Government of l utional Unity in Crocco.
(3) The taw .till accept the proposal.
(!t) hen foreiCn ar:icu are ::itlydra;n and Conmr.unist elements in the
national Unity Government uro sufficiently strong, ".reactionary"
elos:ents .till be pur ;cd fro:.: the 7over;"::errt cure's the Coununists
will assume full po:;er.
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(f) Poland. Poland occupies a pr!r.ary position in boviot plane for
"democratizing" Europe but muot co-.operate with the 1*: ;U in these
plans in order to secure Soviet assistance. All underground organi-
zations must be eradicated and the popular tendency toward ,.nglo -
Saxon orieutation must be corrected. In it:; state ?ents, the PPii
streseeu the WSW c i7illin ness t', help i~oland and eit6n the anti-
polish action of the i nglo-Saxons in questionin;; Poland' s .,teutern
borders and rebuilding Germany.
(~) the u;M Soviet politicians believe their diplomacy has teen suc-
cessful. They have achieved the forr.ation of a ,lav bloc as a i ,rrier
to Ge2'r, ar. rrosoion and have created "People's den:oeraeios" in central
and southeastern r;urope which will serve as transitl3nal iredla for
future L;orrrcunist statee. They have also deatrnyed --uropo's balance
of power which has been a tiraditional basis of i.ritish foreign policy.
ii~b'IUI;i:TIkL
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