SHIPPING ACTIVITY IN KOREAN PORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500530069-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: June 9, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For4RAIe's4 i~ZIJUJPI0701y: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500530069-5
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY R4p"lFi of Korea.
SUBJECT Shipping Activity in. Korea.*. Port, .
25X1A
PLACE ACQUIRED
(BY SOURCE)
DATE ACQUIRED
(BY SOURCE)
..IS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFCCTINO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STA:[S. .ITHIN TMC MIANINO Of TITLE IS. SECTIONS 701
A10 704. OF THE U.S. COD[. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION ON .EVE.
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO 00 RECEIPT Of AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON 15
25X1A
i
CD NO.
DATE DISTR. q June 1954
NO. OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
SOURCE US ateaimehiI' operatcr .
he Office of Nay, al Int,,r.llige:are furniahad this following information to CIA
for IAC difasemi nation . 1.x.. accordance with paragraph 3c of NOCID #7j
Traffic
1. Port of Paean. The pcrt., of PuYax?. is in all respects a satisfactory port with
minimum berthing. capac:i.'.?,y of 20 deep draught cargo veseela alongside piers,
plus a minimum of five ancharagrs bertb.,LE for discharge to lighters. Heavy
lift craneLb up to 150 tors are ur+ually available through the Army Port and it
may ';~e :cr..iderInd that the i.:.ghterra of various types are availablee iR sufficient
ton-msg.: and variety to adequately bar~dl.e the anchorage berth capacity. Transit
aliede a e located. at Ruin bertha but Lorain lies a problem ae there is a serious
lack of iutermediat.e warahouaeB. and with the present system of attempting to
diapeare+e ai.i ?_argoee from Pusan al.moF,t entirely by rail, it appears difficult,
If not isgpce.nible', to maiutaiu the neceeeaary fluid Bate in the transit sheds.
The probable answer to th.a is tc utilize the available i iitabla vessels,.
C-?1e . etc,. in an of fici.eax t, c:o&e' v.teae eer. vice , thus taking a good share of the
load from the railroad and affordi:.lg a more flexible situation in the port.
In th:t.a regar3 i"; in noted that frcm six t.a eight veep els of C-1 or similar
ty m, awned by the Korea Sb.ipp.tag Company (governmc:n".:),, are almost constantly
Idle at Pluaen.
2. Port of ' nchca. The port of Incha must be considered as a t;rev..eily hazardous
finr_acia117 for I5 veaeele of Liberty size and larger. The only berthing.
available at dockside to inside a tidal basin, entry therein being considered
safe only fox, smaller ve.ssele. Larger vessels therefore must discharge at
anchorage a coueoiderable distance from landings due to the extreme tide A The
foregoisag, together with the hazards of, fog and relatively unprotected
anchorages, conspire to make a call risky unless the revenue is unusually
attractive. Further, the lighter supply in not considered adequate although
it is understood that mtepe are being taken to acquire additional service.
3. Outp+aesL'ec. There are several email ports in Korea that are capable of handling
fairly ieep draught vessels; 'but as their capacity is limited? and as conditions
U.S. Officials Only
CONFIIKTIAL
SEE LAST PA(sF? r'c.'.s =I-ABJECT & AREA CC'a'-17S
01STRIOUT1 1; STATC.~X ARMY _]CI I NAVY -X AIR_X Pel i_II 77-1
This report is for the Lae within the TISA of the Intelligence components of the Departments or
Agencies indicated above. It Is not to be transmitted overseas without the concurrence of the
originating office through the Assistant Director of the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500530069-5
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Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500530069-5
Cob-FIDTZNTIAL/U8 OFFICIALS ONLY
change, it is considered adv1ss le to go into each offering as a separate
situation. Here again it may be suggested that coastwise service could virtually
obviate the requirimenl for direct calls by large vessels at these ports.
4. Outbound Cargo. I see no immediate radical change in the movement of producze
outward, with. the expected exception that possibly tungsten may move d,-rectly
to the UB east coast, instead of through Japan, and there is the possibility
that graphite may -e in substar.>i5.l quantities. It might be worth mention-
ing the,: the 100 thousand tons of Korean' rice has not yet moved, and this
possibility still exists. Scrap is another matter, but so involved in the
politico of both the US and Korea that it is difficult: tc predict what may
develop. At the moment there is no apparent activity in commercial scrap, but
it seems probable that commercial vessels soon sh.oull be able to participate
in the military movement now carried entirely by MSTS time charter vessels.
Opts: a in Efficiency
5. Husbandry of Vessels Inadequate. Facilities for vessel b.i ebendry are virtually
nonexistent in Korea. At present there are no facilities or agencies worth
mentioning for survey, repair, parts, chandlery or provisions. Navigational
aids are infrequent and unreliable. Tugs, cranes, water and emergency minor
repairs are at the aufference of the US Army, and while there is no reason
believe they will subsequently be denied, the possibility exists.
6. Cargo Stowage. Stowage of mixed gerrr.al cargo is a" item ::L,Qortant because
-f some unusual customs and practices here. Extreme long hatches of mixed
cargo are to be avoided, despite the fact that the long hatch may be with two
nets of gear. The stevedores, under the present; Army contract', will not put
enough men in the hold to work both eats of gear efficiently. Block stowage
of package cargo is quite helpful. Itess of a nature not readily manhandled
are generally very Blow as the stevedores,, not being e;ble to make good tonnage,
lose Interest and etell for as many meals as possible.
Governmentenciee
7. United Nations Koreas. Reconr+tr.uction Agency. /mKRAT Primarily concerned
in :Long--term de.velopme*at, heavy induritry, construction, light manufacturing,
etc. Considerable confusion) exists and they are faced with a shortage of
funds as the various ratio..*.ia have not all come through; their ova"head is
clearly out of proportion. There is reason to believe that this etigency will
zl t.mrs#,el v be more or le,se aor~fi.ar.d to advisory activity,, h.owever., there has
bears and there will, s-!',!'11 ? r. },.~,:r.?, o., _ g a^
8, ROK Goverxunen? The deciding Cantor in the procurement and movement of
material eeeured with their' own fund, thr:,ugh the Offiaeof P_ocua?aimejit of
other agencies. They are also a factor of considerable weight in material
or w.,vement handled under the various other pr. ogrIAms. The fact that there
19 a good deal of energy devoted to placating government leaders continually
givimg off righteous Indignation end defiance, indi.caten an influence not ?
otho wi_oo commensurate with their posa.tion.
CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY
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General Inf. ormatir,n
9. Communications . ?Tnhtlie-vably inefficient; considering that the physical
properties and equipment are regarded ai fairly good. Of considerable impor-
tance tr, any busine!ie opera i.ng in Korea ie to develop, by one meene or
ano,b.er? met:hot12 cf communicating lccally and abroad.
10,. Perstonnel. At the clerical level, c.cmparati.vely tire7.l educated English- ripe aking
ICoreene are available readily ar.d reanof.ablyr? All, however; are sorely lacking
in experience which res 1-to in a somewhat difficult situation in that their
normal temperament lead.e them c delusions of grandeti:r. Further, once in the
wiait;e-collar braache: tr many .are, inclined towtaxed a pouedo-executive attitude
that produces little, despite great flourishes. It hac been noted that beet
results can be obtained with a first ??cl.aee native manager, provided one keeps
a clone eye on him.
11.? The coclie laborer., 'tv tredcres may be considered y4 fairly good, if
prop rly eupervieed and decently pa:.d. Supervision at, this level is a great
problem, am there are relatively few competent persons available. Pilferage
ie also a cone .ax.'.: problem in the employment of t:b.ie type labor, and there is
no sure solution.
12? ROK Government. at,tittvie. Cc:rruptic;n i.e+ rampant at all level, of the government,
and 'e a'in not only cam: accepted p;:'actice, but practically mandatory.
This,; i': is '.inderetood, hate long be'ecn the method in he Orient. and therefore
in z:e't neceyn,aarily of great alarm. The general inefficiency, arrogance and
igrLcranc,s io d:1.scot.raging bu%, In a een.:ae;. understandable when. the facts are
coneidered. Sw-ely it will take a generation r:r more of experience before
",heee people can approncb. any dtgreer of governmental iaor.ality and efficiency.
13 Native Hueaineaaa Firms. Herr- ag:+:i.u t1L.W problem of experienr.:e is involved,
hcweva:r,, 'the traders bane the native: ac=en common to the tlrient, and 'there
16 developing; a group of buel.nr:eemen whca9 teLrouga. Ability,, government connec-
tione,, or boat., are factc,rs in tradei. "-'he 7`..ticy of the i r.'eaan government
and the FOA to encourage there f.irmei hhuul.d further their advancement. The
syaet m of reYbatee, etc, -;n well entttabl.i.nhed, and from a shipping standpoint
it may wmll come; thaat a :.r.,.mprador.^ rf aubagent eyntem Is neca!asary.
Recommendations
14. There aecmr .lit:vle. doubt .:Le,!;; har.)r.tng further w&r.Y *.hr-re, will, be a gu?aetanti
and fairly immediate inc:rc:arke in the volumes of civil cargo into Korea with,
excepting perieb.ableB, a rapid red'.u:ti.crL In the volume of military tonnage.
White. it i.e ncW br.l ie+red t,n.at the vrluu,_i of civil cargo wt11 rearoh that of
certain pn.,T; pcr.i.c:.dte of mili:,ary mr,u?eme.it, it in very probable lwlat the ret+eult
may be eq,ual or more Dar lout? part c:nnge ration, as It its doubtful that dimcharge
en1 will. tea ah rapid.
15 In view of the inc:rneoiug demand for r1n Livery to Inchon, particularly with
trenenh:.Irments 511 at. Ahoy It. ft recommended that effective arrangements
be t uder] a.ll.crii.r,g the tn iuancJ> of through bi.lla of lading with 5''/s at
Puetan. T : i.a entirely poeaihles this Japanese may rofunci to allow, or
cariuue:'.y c,bcntruc ..? traaaohipmen'r of Kct?ean cargo.. :,c .Tapaneee ports .
and -
L.1 ~' rn ;:aIJHJECT & AREA CODES
7"6 ~,t,d '53t./E.
>56 . ,.t,3 531-/F
i~b 9 53L/F.
13L/E
783.2 53L/F(XZ
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Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500530069-5