STATUS OF THE PRPZ / THE CHURCH / LIBERATED TERRITORIES OF POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500250168-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 168
• Publication Date: November 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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DISTR. UAIL Nov 1953
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT re)
1. If anyone states that large resistance movements or organizations now 'ctober 19517
25X1 exist in Poland he is dealing in wishful thinking.
2. The Polish Government in London via such means of communications an BBC (British
Broadcasting Commission), the radio in Madrid, Spain, and Radio Free Europe con-
stantly advise the people in Poland to refrain from attempting to form and Organize
25X1 large resistance movements because of the likelihood of failure and ultimate
reprisals by the USSR. They also warn against the acknowledgement and acceptance
of W so-called leader and organizer of such movements for fear that he may be a
25X1 provocator.
3.
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You have reed various press releases which point up resistance by the Polish I keys.
no doubt Qindividual acts take place from time to time butiI
the press has made much of these isolated cases. However; in speaking with displaced
persons and correspondence with others, would aescribe the political
situation in the following way. Poland by and large is in a state of ready quie-
scence in which a spark properly directed, with visible reliable means of ex-
ternal support, would do the trick. This wouldn't happen however until the Poles
were assured tl t allied forces would move in.
Status of the PRPZ/The Church/Liberated Tcrri.tories
of Poland
STATE LI
scarce raw maturia].s_ Polish economic activity is expressive of the plans andMJ
the needs of the L!ST . If the Soviet Government is Tenable to procure needed
25X1 materials or if, on the other hand, the Soviet Government R--11- nn o-itlet for its
r
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This report i!~ for the use withh, the USA nt the Intelligence components of the Departments or
Agencies indicated above. It is not to he transmitted over-scat vathout th
e concurrence of ,Ile
originating oince through the Aslstant Director of the Ofrice of Col.ection and Dissemination, CIA.
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finished products; it will use the Satellites as a front which serves the USSR
in either case.
5. 0 collection_ have been made for the children of North Korea, for the
25X1 blood bank of North Korea, and that workers in Poland have voted a day's wages for
North Korean relief (not willingly Korean orphans in large
numbers have been settled in Poland, Korean students are now enrolled in Polish
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schools, and Korean delegates have made many speeches in Poland. Rumors I
assist in reconstructio_.. These calls haven't met with notable success, however,
some technicians have peen dispatched to Korea to assist in reconstructing de-
molished factories. Some machinery has been sent to Korea in recent months from
Poland. Lathes and mac'1:ine tocl.s are two items which 1 -1 have been
exported. Whether or not such shipments to North Korea find their way into China
With reference to paramilitary training in Poland I the government is
taking advantage of such existing functions as univereitiee, csmps, ruid
vt:leti. groups. the government has instituted both pre
and paramilitary training as a se=en of the ctiriculz~ :nd ageuda for these
groups in particular.
The ouestiormaires which applioents must complete for the issuance of new pass-
ports in Poland are from sever: to eight pages long. These questionnaires contain
innumerable questions. The completion of these questionnaires is obligatory for
two reasons:
a. The ;Tavernue;:t is inr.srestcd in determining the background of the individual..
that is, to Li-earn s,hether ca, not the individual is a former bourgeois, a mem-
ber of the priviloga: class 01 wo.rk,~.ers, or the less privileged class of farmers.
This measu.rc stc:m.= ? e e a decasivo condition for any important apyointment
to the privll?etcd l.a sc of workers. It is further designed to get all the in-
formation possible on an i.rdividuai with the possibility of using this infor-
mation as ,.~ lever to is:dice t)ieind.ivitaal tc perform acts for-the state which
he is most -.apabie .f perfarisi.ng. For instance, if it is learned from the
questlcnnaire that a prcr_or, has rolativas abroad, particularly in the US,
who could cs_pply i:.f._o:laticn to tIe- leli.sh Government, this individual could
be forced "orr r,c.r..d. w?th cnr:'t; :::] ves in view of possible info3^'!Fktion
be. __ wcr~. _., five _ b correspond_nr
b. With -.he iE :6, ? ::c?: cce passports the security forces will be able to identify
readii.; any L--d further it will :hake more facile the task of determining
f.rk.-:zy cv __.it s or tronger: in the community. It is also planned
to cunr?r l the moiomanta of people ir_side Poland because of the obligation of
every citizen canto arriving in ar. locality to register with the police.
The r,oli::e, th;r_ siarnp the passport. 'thus the security forces will be able
to determine from the new passport and the stamps previous movements of the
individual. In ray occn, estimation -rill make urganization and operation
of any pot:.n it J. r_ ietas :.e g;:aups exceptionally difficult.
8. The iseuu.n::r, of a c::~sepc?r-ts hasn't been discontinued, however, the entire pro-
cedure, particul.n ly the questionnaires, is complicated; consequently it has been
a slow process.
9. In look1tt i,%rg*? - . . : , i c : r . t i ? J , , ? ;. :-f hi-n,] in Polandl prior to
'lorld '..'ar II let.: than 7-4 .:,1' the land was possessed by so-caller] large
25X1 landowner . 'lrie nn :e.pt Cl J.arae landowners can be easily misconstrued by those
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not familiar with the agrarian pattern in Poland. in Poland 640 acres possessed
by one owner was unusi;al. The large holdings were usually half tbat amount. The
remaining E6% of the land was in the hands of the peasants and the Polish
State.
10. The Soviets used two methods for establi%_:ing collectivization. In central Poland
they tried persuasion by pointing out to the farmers the advantages of collective
farming and that it would be a big step forward in scientific agriculture. Here
collectivization was originally met with determined resistance. In the realiza-
tion that such resistance would b.eve to be worn down, the Communists (for some
reason tncrrn only to themselves) insisted that the democratic solution to the
problem would be expressed in the form of balloting for or against collectivization.
This gave the Communists sufficient time to employ pressure and persuasion against
the opposing farmers. ~or good statistical information concerning the year to year
development of collective farming in Central Europe see the publications by the
Free Europe Coamiittee j
11. The second phaa. or app::-ccch vi.4eccivlzation in the so-called liberated areas
LEast Prussia, the Oder-Keieae sectio7 was quite different from the mppr r.cu in
central Poland_ T;nsn a a were largely resettled by Poles who had succeeded
in escaping the eastern parts of Poland which had been annexed by the USSa The
resettlement of this population was handled under rules and regulations' Laid down
by the Communist government of Poland. It wasn't t.,:.ch of a. problem for the govern-
ment wasn't faced with the problem of transition from private ownership to col-
lectivistic ownership. They simply brought farmers to already existing collective
farms. For this reason collectivization was much faster than in remaining parts
of Poland.
12. The whole idea of collective ownership is repulsive to the majority of the popula-
tion and has proved itself defective in operation. Much of the deficit in pro-
duction is being ascribed to the reluctance of the population to resign themselves
tr1 that form of farming.
13. I don't believe that opposition to collective farming varies with the seasons but
that it is most noticeable daring the peak of harvest because the Poles ease up
whenever bumper crops ar~? evident. If there are signs of less intensity in farming,
it is due primarily to faulty organizational planning because the opposition is
constant.
The Government and tic Catholic Church
14. As you know goner:iment: ,ppooitic,ri to thu .?r a ch began with the persecution of the
lower clergy. It began reaching into tho higher ranks finally materializing in
the diocese, the bishoprics, and the ar=?hdiocese. It climaxed in the direct
attack on Bishop Kaczmarek and by the re.:ent internment of Cardinal Wyszynski
(Vishinsky). Allinformatlon is rather indicative of the fact that they have
decided to go all out against., if not the church as such, the hierarchy itself.
The government is still steps behind in the fight against religion per se with its
godless propaganda which emanated from the USSR proper. The official slog= in
Poland regarding he :car':h is "Obtain its loyalty towards the SLate." The
Communists are sot atta?:.ki.ng religion per se because they are pretending to abide
by the new Cottmuni.st-voted constitution which guarantees the freedom of religion.
Of course, this situation should be considered only as transitory to the desire of
complete subjugation of the chuu?ch. The role of the Church of Poland under its
present hierarchy is not planned to constitute a network of underground resistance
but to stand as a guardian. of spiritual and moral values of the population. This
naturally means opposition to the Communist doctrine.
15. Three years ag, /19507 an understanding, or rather a pact, was signed between the
hierarchy Ott the j o-verruu:nt in order to draw a line separating the interests of
the church from the :Interests of the state and to guarantee the satisfac+ory
functioning of both bodies side by side. That pact was met with suspicion by the
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G L TO I DEP1I:1.1L,~
West and corapletel.; nisur_ler toot as a surrender-of the church to the state.
This pact provided for the restriction of church and clergy activities to the
church. It made the hierarchy res?onsiblc for restraining the clergy from enterir.,
politics or influencing the faithful in political matters. On toe other hand it
guaranteed the church full autonomy in spiritual and religious matters.
16. It appears obvious that both contracting parties had no confidence in the execu-
tion of the _:,r:,visions of the pact. mince that time a pastoral letter signed by
all of the Polish bishop= has t.;.~r. is_ued to all of the clergy who in turn read
it during church services. This letter attempted to explain the basic agreements
reached in the three year-old pact. It also emphasized to the clergy and the church
faithful the necessity for the strictest observance of the commitments agreed to
by the hierarchy. Obviously, the government did not issue any such instructions
to its arrencies. Cnnsaquently complaints by the hierarchy were made to the Communist
government. These complaints pointed out the infractions of various provisions
oy the government and-the fight was on. (The church was accused of interfering
witl Party meetings because the worshippers attended church services during hours
when Party meetings were held; free movement by the clergy was curtailed, etc.).
The League of Loyal Priests. whirr; is c.Wpriaaa o# clergymen with doubtful repu-
twbions,and the Godless League were in fe efront in accusing the church of
violating its agreemrnt.n-
17. Regardless of all eff:rte by the hierarchy and the clergy, the people still consider
that the only place whe,.r:, at lens:; temporarily, they can have the feeling of
being free citizens. is within the church. They look upon the church as their
leader in the m-r.,1. r,ffort to hcvc the freedom of Poland restored. Therefore, the
whole atmosphere in the church must be considered as definitely hostile to the
Communist regimr. and the regime knows it.
Conmmunizatior. Deviationssm
16. The old Polish Committee of Liberation headed by Wanda ilasilewska formed the nucleus
for the Lubli'a Goverrrr,ont. Its' wiuther.,hipjcomprised essentially of Communists
included a number of C-.mmunists who wore ideologically motivated, but even ?ehough
Coumtunists, trained in tb-' USSR- they were still Poles at heart. In their plans
for eeanunictn :ol.a:,l ,:::.y loo'.t=:d the USSR for friendly support, just as
99 percent of the :'al.ea x, ?_ led the ':1estern powers to help restore a free Poland.
It appeared to me that l ii,. ideological. Polish Communists had unlimited faith in
Stalin and hi= r.t :mi.:o . They they r.,,_.rred to Poland and helped Mikola czyk
form the .._.. ra strong desire- to see Polar ecome a
Communist St,,. r.t: _..t _-,r.peration with the USSR. During the first
few :reeks of 'eminent it appeared that their dreams
would be real i_ria T c'o n .1 interference from the USSR. The Polish
Communists made pi : trda4 gavr:3a i n i -:land by stressing Polish patriotism, the
brotherly help reserve1: .;UWc:0n Sip 11o.1- -h Gomumnists and the USSR was on an economical
ground and not err. 'd4nlr..E,i:ai- difference. The first treaty with the USSR (basis
for the Cla:1i) ocnm:rein]. one. Prawn un by the USSR it stipulated that the
Poles had to she?i.cr iP oilii.on tons of cool per year to the Soviet Union at a
cost which wa:> fur :u sec , cst oir r r;>1.r.tion. The Nationalist Communists of
Poland real.iz d in no timO? at all the mining industry of Poland would be
cperatir t' on t1v: : iSo of t!:e ! ,,gen.
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20. The second clash devclored when a plan for the industrial expansion of Polish
industry was delivered under executfve order from the Kremlin. This plan totally
ignoring one which had bs worked out by the Polish Government, actually made of
Boland an economic and industrial cell devised to fit into the pattern of Soviet
economy.. It would result in an unsound and economically unjustifiable.plan of
super growth of Polish heavy industries far beyond the needs of the country or
beyond the possibilities of a reasonable marketing abroad. The Polish Communists
immediately discerned that the plan was devised to serve Soviet economy. These
discrepancies between interests of Polish planned economy and the Soviet plan
made it clear to some of the top Communists that the actual plan of the Kremlin
was, namely, the in::iusion of Puland as an integral part of the Soviet Union.
21. Immediately therea_'ter a difference of opinions was aroused in top groups of
Polish Communists. One segment believed that through persuasion or by reaffirming
their loyalty to the USSR they could succeed in convincing the Kremlin to'plan the
economy in correlation with the interests and needs of F. '.and. Assuring them-
selves that they were right in their faith in the Soviet Union and that there was
purity in the intentions of the USSR, this group risked some public statements.con-
rtwrning their i e 1 i of u T believe ?' hat they intended to pacify the minds of others,
particularly public opinion which was aware of the situation. In fact public
n nio.. if -dvaz se,
?-pi??~?~?? v ~?ld have tiL'ebaLezied the poealble success of a drive for new
Party members which was being undertaken. They didn't realize (maybe a few did)
that they were actually signing their own political death warrants by those public
utterances.
22. Other members of the top layer of Polish Communist leaders who either from caution,
or simply not to compromise their positions, remained silent on the subject. They
sensed the unfavorable reactions coming from Moscow concerning the outspoken group
of Polish Commies. In fact they took a negative stand accusing their outspoken
comrades of National Chauvinism and of the betrayal of the Communist cause. This
Is the group which still remains in power in Poland and forms the central corps
for the PZPR (Polish Communist Party).
23. The PZPR is compor-)fnow L' -tp er 195ai of a very thin layer of ideolo(:ical
Communists whir?h 'i s bel ng reduced in r_,nbers, of a more numerous egotistid-1y-
minded group of Communist.:, wnc.,in exchange for advantages offered to them by the
Kremlin are ready to accept any dirty assignment given thmm by Moscow. Finally,
the PZPR consist_ of an c:r.zwh_lming majority of people who have, been forced by
pressure to Join and c::_ry out assigned tasks. This group, morally not strong
enough to refuse, exca-,e th?_sesolve:, for belonging to the party in two days:
(1) pretending that by ro rnbsrshi_r, in t:h, Fart.;- they can use their influence in the
interests of the and (=_) er suading themselves that overt
resistance would be x'rt:?*_les= and the:_c:Cco not worth trying. The people in this
latter categoi i arc c_d into the i a: t f oostl.v by a promise of advancement
(advancement bci.ng rect.lct.d to n.inbers of the Party., by economic advantages,
by promises that t sir ci:iidren will h_)'e the advantage of higher education, and
in some cases members ere also reeorutted under promises of lenience to relatives
already arrested by ti:e politi_al police. It would be fallacy to disregard the
dangers which till:; ,r,r,up r r e=en*, (-r-Li.nally, joining of the Party is represented
to them as *::onalioy, H-O5 -ro: ti e r,-.,dual pressure applied causes them to
go all out in ing tin . ry,ti: Party. Very few actually succeed in
limiting -heir a 1 i.?ri: is t t _i,. i :roc registration which they underwent is joining
the Party Ti,.-- r_-i:uh:borr. cn-:L :h-:- ref. _e to go along are being exposed as enemies
of the State e;.-I a: i;all:, n-re ruthlessly treated than non-Communists.
21+. To speak of i> ii~rmnnfi:_ 0 Party is to make a mistake as to the
whole Soviet sya-c.er... i the man in the street. can no longer trust his personal
friends and re-cr.ive ct;r hirlie,r ups in the Party distrust of each other borders
on obsession.
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Communist Buiuuni lro ?
25. If, however, it i?:: ou_t :,i 1:.ho c ? eution Pc, expect the existence of political align-
ments ;rithir. the party the-c- is or... contra-distinction which can be applied as
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& denominator in g;'c.uping ranters of 4cmmlunist functionaries. As you know, in
the Communist bureaa~-ra,y it -' .on established rule that any advancement to a
higher position within th,. Pasty :nuet be sponsored. by personal references from
some higher functionary. 'roue the personnel files of both the sponsor as well as
the sponsored party are kept by the political police. Special annotations are
made referring to who sponsored v:lom,with the result that an imaginary line can
be drains down from each high official separating those whom he personally sponsored
from the rest of the Communist bureacracy. This actually constitutes a chain
reaching down from r?abinet members to the lowest members. In case of a purge of
the top man all of? those linked to him are endangered. In most cases, however,
the members below the top man succeed in saving their skins by openly attacking
their benefactor as soon as it becomes evident that he is doomed. However, quite
a number of his most intimate collaborators usually share his fate. That explains
the number of victim::: involved in each purge of a top official.
these purges have not occurred too frequently in Poland.
no extensive purges in conjunction with the purge of ewla. The Polish
Government are : a 11.ed 1
Idoscow tc , r?..
of the US;itt ~.. rr:.
1ixect consultations. actually they are in
l , t. . ~t:.!.ntdecL 20 date LOctober 19537 the policy
dc.w: Lo-ping the general idea throughout
1 rid.-pendently of the USSR; that no
Communists have denounced Beria perhaps to save their own skins. It may also mean
that the top Communist team in Iolan,i is loyal to Moscow or that its members
have }'eem I--, 411,'1 o betray their .Cal, poi: t of vv. . -Az
of the mcment they :germ to deveterll.y execute all the orders received and lend no
- e - 'a
a "?'" for fax an Soviet tb-c .._
v`pYr`???'-??u+~%?? ?- ?~ vvaai on is i; Vill:CltlOlL. Gtu.y time C6II
Justify either o?f the above explenatI:na.
It doesn't app.:aa:- that i:!.:c. P-TR ir, directly connected with or acting under orders
of the Soviet G:,ranru: ! at' l arty. The fl:nction of governing Poland by the Soviet is
being e>.eri,ls