OPINIONS OF CERTAIN US EXPERTS ON: (A) PURGE OF BARIA AND LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION; (B) SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY; (C) EFFECT OF SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS ON ASIAN COMMUNISM; (D) SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE AND DOMESTIC ECONOMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180165-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 165
• Publication Date: September 3, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
II
SUBJECT Opinions of Certain US Experts on: (a) Purge of Baria
and Leadership Succession; (b) Soviet Foreign Policy;
c Effect of Soviet Internal Developments on Asian
I Soviet Foreign Trade and
Domestic Economy
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1.
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THIS
Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Soviet post-
2 5X 1 will continue into the future. the reasons for this retreat
IX
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DATE DISTR. $ Sep 1953
NO. OF PAGES 7
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
K
This report is for the use within the USA of the Intelligence components of the Departments or
Agencies indicated) above. It is not to be transmitted overseas without the concurrence of the
originating office through the Assistant Di: ctor of the O111ce ui Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
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are as clee.r as the reality of the retreat itself and are simply the natural
Soviet response to (a) Ithe growth of an unexpected (in Soviet eyes) spirit of
resistance and capability for resistance in the free world and (b) rebelliousness
in the Satellites similar to that which developed in Russia in 1920 and 1921.
2. It is an interesting question whether, and to what extent, Beria's removal from
a war except under the m^'--t dcoperatc circumatances. a
mass uprising within the USSR itself might impel the Soviet leaders to resort
25X1 to war, but there seems little likelihood that such an uprising could occur in the
foreseeable future.
aggression as a strong possibility. But the Soviet leaders
25X1 are sufficiently impressed by the nature of a world war in 1953 to avoid such
in Soviet affairs.
3. General Omar Bradley bas given clear and well-publicized expression to the
view that the convulsions', now taking place in the USSR and its Satellites
are fraught with peril as' well as opportunity for the West. This view is
based on a sound regard for historical precedent and it in ueeful'in 'ca1111ig
attention to the inclination of weakening dictatorships to resort to'.military
adventures.=do not think there is more than a very slight chance that
25X1 the men in the Kremlin would deliberately invite another world war as a way
25X1 out of their difficulties. If this were the world of 1925 and the USSR were
in substantially the same 'position as today,[=would regard Soviet military
do suspect that he was less inclined than the other. Soviet leaders to soften
25X1 the rigors of Communistldictatorship in the Satellites. This could have
reinforced an existing opposition to Beria on the part of both the Army and the
2 5X 1 Pa-qty bureaucracy and given them a degree of ideological common cause on ibich
to combine against him. But while this is conjecture, it is obvious that
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Beria's arrest reprreents a stunning victory over the Soviet police organization
25X1 by the Party bureaucracy, and the Army and it is only a little less obvious,
Othe Soviet Army has acquired in the process important new influence
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4.
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Beria's downfall.. We tend to un:erestimate he degree of friction
on broad issues which always exists at the highest level of Soviet leadership.
Malenkov and others et theltop undoubtedly had their own reasons for wanting
to remove Beria but Beria'e isolation on the nationality question could have
been - and in niy opinion probably an - a critical factor. Already there are
signs of tig,`:ened administration in the republics and of the suppression of
cultural nationalism. Thi'! trend will continue until it reaches, in the minds
of the present Soviet leaders, the point of diminishing returns.
II
2 5X 15'=isagree with the theory ow being advanced by some people that unrest in the
Satellites led to Beria's fall.=doubt the existence of any causal connection
2 5X 1 between these events. 0 also doubt the likelihood that Beria's removal will
build up into a purge on the 1937-38 scale. =suspect that the purge will go
25X 1 no further than the uppermoist levels in the various republics. The acquisition
of unprecedented political power by the Soviet Army is a belief which seems to have
gained fairly wide acceptance since Beria's ar*est, but =think the chancec nra
25X1 against it. .11 iudications; point to Malenkcv as the top man and while the Army
25X1 was certainly on his side against Beria,0doubt that the Army'has emerged
because of that with any significant accession of power.
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the USSR 13 politically cverextended and that this overextension
7.
is the outstanding fact about the USSR at the present time. Itvill take years
for the USER to digest its satellite empire, if it can be digested st'alk'
It is one thing for a military and political power. to colonize in Asia and
Africa. It is another thing for a country such as the USSR to organize and
control a national civilization which is eaaallor superior to its own. The
leadership of the USSR has changed none of the long-range goals !to which it is
25X1 committed by doctrine, but the USSR is now clearly embarked on a tactical shift
of policy seeking to reduce internetlonaltensions and free its energies for the
primary task of consolidation.
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8. The Beria affair seems tr be thr. 1_~~~ginning of a struggle for power whose
eventual outcome no one can foresees Berla'e public statements at Stalin's
funeral show than he was very nt.rnng u.., that time and that he probably already
1. sr n~i*aa. of 4wv1~ I-a .Y~.~w~
held =-=h of the ,,n,ar uhich h0 ha.a -u
25X1 do not think that Satellite discontent played. any part in Beria's fall.
inclined to believe that Malenkcv and the Army ljoined together to rid themae vas
of whet each regarded as the mce't dangerous opponent. The Army may well have
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played. the key role in engineering Berta' arrest and may now possess unprecedented
political power in thF, USSR. evidence for or against a new role
for the Army must soon belrorthcominu. the Army has von political power
through the elimination of Rerial, --he.r, will. he47e to be changes lin?the top
command reflecting the positions', of in'iividual officers in the new scheme'cf
things. For there. cannctlhave --leer. --leer. unantmt*: v among the Soviet military leaders
on the question of leadership and three whc were out of step with events will
suffer for it. Only Voroshilov,if he were on the wrong side, v^uld be immune.
The absence of early changes in the up military level would indicate to me the
probability that the Army, although siding with'. Malenkcv against' Beria, has not
in fact acquired significant polls-ical power.
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9. the Soviet tacticliof softening its foreign policy;-and encouraging
a reduction in international ill-feeling will last as long as the internal
struggle for power is unsettled.'', All contestants for-power have a stake in
a more moderate policy since each will fear that sharp international difficulties
might throw the balance to the ether fellow. All candidates will prefer to take
their chances on succeeding through internal alliances and intrigue and will be
distrustful of the political advantage of provocations with unforeaeeable'risks.
My intuition, based on living moat of my life with Eastern European politics,
tells me that Molotov will be the next to go. ~t seems to me - and again my
view is based more on intuition that on evidence - that Molotov is the natural
Bukharin in the present picture and .16 more likely than anyone also to follow
Beria into oblivion, as Bukha-in!followed Trotsky.
10. One fact concerning Berialis worth netidg in connection with his fall from
power, although lit was specifically involved
25X1 in the recent events. Of~the Soviet lea ers who might logically, aspire to Stalin's
personal power, Beria van by a considerable margin the most feared and detested
by the Soviet masses. From 1937i~until the present, some 10 million persons have
passed through the puniebimg hands of Atria an the senior Soviet policemen.
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Another currently fashionable point of view with which in
disagreement is that further spectacular arrests are likely in the near
future. would not dare to predict this will not happen and[:Ido not belittTh
the theory of the inevitable concentration of power in a stets such as the
USSR. But Il we ought to take seriously the attention which the Soviet
press is now giving to the Leninist doctrine of "collective leadership"..',The..
memory of Stalin is being dc-emphasized and Malencov, wr.o is at-leas t rp untie inter
pares, is not being peddled as a demigod. We ought at least to The prepared
for the possibility that he USSR will be governed for some time to come by
something which, if not actually collective leadership, will be 'made to appear
as such and will be really closer to collective leadership than at any time
since Stalin's rise to power.
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This means that perhaps 40 million people in the USSR have been directly or
indirectly affected by him. The. hypothesia suggests iti If that if, as
indications show, a major attempt to reduce internal discontent as well as
external tension is underway, the removal of Beria might well have been
regarded by his enemies as an effective appeal for popular favor.
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The present so-called "struggle for power" in the USSR does not constitute a
serious crisis. The regime is as stable now, in spite of the purge nA Aeria,
as it was before the death of Stalin.
12. The problem of succession had been under discussion in the highest levels
of the Government and party in the USSR since 1941. The idea of a continually
operating collective leadership of the country has been pretty well'accepted
within the USSR. Stalin had suggested a five-man presidium of the Politburo which
would act as a Directory of both the Government and the Party. His proposition
fell through because of internal jealousies. Mi.lenkov, incidentally, was not
included among the original five. The present situation is essentis.ily a
revival of this same idea.
13. Another proposition was to broaden the base of the Central Committee structure.
There had been pressure from certain Party centers to enlarge the Politburo to
permit larger participation by the Party centers. The recent reorganization of
the Politburo from 14 to 25 was to show the country that new blood was being
brought into the leadership in preparation for Stalin's death. This was all a
part of a deliberate program to prepare the populace for the idea of a eoll,ctive
leadership to replace Stalin. Eventually one man would be built up into a
symbol of leadership, but this might be a matter of years as it was in the
case of Stalin. Meanwhile it was bast tc prepare the populace for the idea that
is t^^? *a'" of the Central Committer eel
w
Cue reel seat of 'y
Stalin's death probably came eexewhat earlier than expected and the populace
;tee not yet quite ready for the idea. Malenkov was the logical man to emerge
in a position of leadership for Reveral :seasons: (a) there was a long history
of close personal association between Mcllenkov and Stalin; (b) every other
major candidate had something wrens with him that disqualified him either by
age, race, or intelligence; (c) Maier.kcv:s designation was anticipated by
his selection to make the pcliti::al r~.por at the Peaty Congress, following in
the footsteps of Lenin and Stalin.
15. The Red Army is the obedient t___ whoever leads the Party, no there should
be no trouble from that quarter. There '_s no military man in sight with
sufficient strength of character'-:'assume a dir.tatorship. But in is not a
military man; he is a Political Marshall, ojoshi who has never shown any
military talent, cannot be considered a military man, either.
16. A military threat of all-out war does not exist at present, and has not in fact
existed since the development of the atomic bomb. Before such a threat can
exist, the USSR must: (a) build. up a stockpile of atomic weapons; (b) make
itself as strong as possible, eccncmically as weal as militarily; (c) make
as many allies as possible; (d) neutralize as many other countries as
possible and (e) perfect plans tc make prompt seizure of German industry in
the Ruhr Valley and the oil of the Middle East. Although all-out war is
unlikely in the near future, there. has been no abandonment of the Stalin
concept of "active defense" whit?'r, includes minor aggressions of a scattered
and temporary nature.
17. In view of the above I would vent?ir- the following predictions: (a) there will
be no violent struggle for power within the USSR; (b) there will be no serious
repercussions among the populace; (.) --here may be a relatively quiet period
of perhaps as long as 10 years during which the USSR will consolidate its gains
in Europe and China, and build up the Soviet e_onomy to withstand the showdown
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18. the death of Stalin and. the contest for power which that event
has set in motion are bound to have important effects on the Moscow-Peiping
The death of Stalin alone
and on Mac Tee-tuna's influence in Asia
relationshi
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world's foremost Communist. The present situation in the Kremlin seems to
assure that no new Soviet personality will soon emerge to such a degree as to
eclipse Mao. The significance of this is crucial in India, in my judgment. There
is perhaps no 'more important fart in India's present political life than the
profound attrdction which Mac Tae-tung has for Indian intellectuals, even
those who distrust Moscow and the MQgcew-directed international Communist
25X1 campaign. Otalked with mar.y of these intellectuals and have seen their
attempts to resolve their dilemma by insisting that the Peiping-Moscow accord
is strictly voluntary on the part of Piping and that it will last only as
25X1 long as it suits Mao's purposes. Yet
the Indians who argue thus are uncomfortably aware of their rationalization and
of the fact that they wish for, rather than believe in, Peiping's independence.
The seemingly fluid leadership situation ih Moscow, as a result of Beria's
fall, will have the effect of weakening the suppressed doubts of these Indians
an to Mao's personal strength ana independence in the Communist world. I am
afraid the stage is set for the development of an Indian policy more favorable
than ever toward the Peiping regime.
19. As regards the actual relations hetveen Peiping and Moscow, the factor of
Mao's personal attitudes toward Soviet leaders should be taken into account.
There is evidence that Mao respected and admired Stalin. Cog Kuo-tao has
told me that Mao used to refer Stalin as a "smart operator . It seems
almost certain that Mao was inclined to defer to Stalin. I believe it
...^likcly that he i - l l be .-"mac: to m c he pr_- -V ?. .:ict lc=d-re.
There can be little doubtyaboutya continuing close relationship between
China and the USSR but recent ~veiit5 have ?-ert.ainly increaaed'Mao'e
bargaining position within that relationship. Mao~s relative prestige has
grown considerably and. the pcv.-r which has controlled, or at least directed,
him is beset with interna' diffi^u";tics.
20. I lexpect Mao Tae..tung to press to a more favorable trade balance with
the USSR. Assuming USSR dictation in ('h.ina?s affairs-.also expect
25X1 him to seek a freer hand to play ty e,c' Ir. many areas of domestic policy.
25X1 Mao has always been cautious and canny the political exploitation of
agrarian problems, and he has pn~-hed muchtarder in this sphere during the
past 18 months thanQ+ould hev expected him to. It seems that the
Korean War and pressures from. Mr)sccw probably forced him to ti en up
25X1 internally mcre than he felt was really desirable.
Mao will now ease up in var?ous sectors on the home front and, at the same
time, begin to promote himself more and more as the leader of a "New Asia".
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Indiaie vulnerability is
25X1 gravest. Burmese leaders seem ; earer-he c on Communist China and lees
susceptible to Mao as a man and as a symbol.. The Thai political structure is
25X1 weak, opportunistic, and unre-__able, and the effect on Thailand of such new
25X1 power and prestige as Mao may acquiro. Is unpredictable. 0 not followed
25X1 the internal situation in the other Asian. '.ountriee closely enough in recent
months to hazard a comment where they are concerned.
21. In an effort to reach a better understanding of recent events in the USSR
25X1 and their si ificance in respect to economic relations with the rest of the
world, I Irecently reviewed all :_' Malenkov's speeches and public
25X1 statements to try to detect his personal views. As a result, 0 come
to the conclusion that although there may be temporary tactical changes from
25X1 time to time, there will be no fundamental. change in the basic policies of the
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22. Foreign trade is a very small factor in the economy of the USSR, less than
1.3% of the national income, but the Soviets make very effective use of ?
it as an instrument of foreign policy.
is as complex as their foreign policy,
to place as expediency dictates.
strong potentials for peace and 1s n. to be considered only a means of
developing war potential. Ccnsequen '_}i, feeling in France end Britain is
a neutral thing and that a reasonable amount -of trade can be carried on without
endangering political relationships. These countries already feel that the
US r.ttitude toward trade with the USSR. is :too strong and unnecessarily
'e-rictive. Soviet propaganda etre&jee the. point that foreign trade has
The pattern of Soviet foreign trade
varying from time to time and place
23. In the Scandinavian countries the USSR makes effective use of foreign trade
for propaganda purposes. Soviet economic missions in these countries play.
t,p US tariffs, import quotas., and disc.Timitiation on shipping, and at the
same time offer attractive terms in order to establish trade relations that
can later be used for political advantage. In practice, however, the more
erperienoe the Scandinavians have with ,rvi?iet trade, the less they like it. For
instance, when Denmark exported butter Ito the USSR in 1952, the Soviet ships
were never ready to take cargo at the late and hour agreed upon and the Soviets
complained about everything imaginable, saying the casks were not brand new, the
foil was of inferior quality, etc, when actually everything was completely. up
to international standards according to agreed specifications. There were so
many unfair complaints that eventually the Danish Butter Cooperative became
thoroughly disgusted with the entire transaction. This sort of thing has
come to be the general rule in trade between the Scandinavian countries and
the USSR. If there were adequate alternatives available, the Scandinavians
would not trade with the USSR. They consider this trade a last resort.
24. I
In Germany, Soviet policy is tc enccuragelWestern Germany to expand her
exports to the USSR and benefi'. by imports from the Ukraine. This policy
has been quite successful with the result lthat Soviet political influence
in Western Germany is increasing, and the Soviet Union is confident of
gaining political control over the whole of Germany by means of pressures
developed througb,Lhis trade.
25. In France and the UK, the Soviet' are encouraging the attitude that trade is
strong that considerable ad hc: tra:!, !s pcesible without jeopardizing
their independent positions in '.tie Cre- world. In Japan the Soviet Union car, '~e :co
. e,:red
I to grant ostensibly attractive
trade concessions as seen as ratan d.iecovers that trade with Southeast Asia
cannot he expanded sufficiently o offset the loss of Korean War purchases.
The motive here, too, is increased pc?_itical influence.
a
27. In the Middle East and South Asia, in
ddition tc offering favorable trade
terms, the USSR can be expected r?. c,ffer assistance in the industrialization of
underdeveloped areas. Her techniques may !include the export of entire
factories. In Iran the USSR w;1: offer technicians, construction of
pipelines, and propaganda :tc convince the Iranians that the USSR is Iran's
best hope for protection and ccorcmic reha'bil.ltation. In this effort the
USSR may move very slowly and with great persever anee, taking plenty of
time to gain the con_fidence cf the pecple.i India should be closely watched
for efforts by the USSR to ti,, har into the orbit economically through the
purchase of industrial raw mate.r.iaie.
28. In Indochina, a truce may follow the truce' in Korea. This tactic would be
related to one of the maJcr problems of the USSR: the prevention of the
formation of the European Defense CommunityffLC A truce in Indochina would
strengthen France's case against the EDC, and possibly result in reduced
defense expenditure in both France and, the US. From then on, through trade,
the USSR might be able to gain a greater amount of control in Indochina than
through military action of the Viet Mirhh. The USSR would not be prepared for
sustained military effort on a major scale against the free world until both
Iran and Indochina are under effective lcontrel.
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29. Throughout the free world the Soviets can be expected to play up the idea
of'?co-existence more and more, endthat increased free trade will be to the
mutual gain of all couutries. If free trade and its promised benefits fail
to materialize, the Soviets will place all blame on the restrictive policies
of the US.
30. In the Satellites the USSR has not been able to gain complete economic control,
even under the Molotov plan. When Poland was allowed greater freedom in her
foreign tra..e, she immediately turned to the West. It is a' mistake to consider
the 'USSR and Satellites as one trading area. The expansion' of Western trade
with the Satellites might not necessarily result in strengthening the position
of the USSR. It is conceivable that ad hoc agreements for trade with Poland
and Czechoslovakia might eventually be exploited to the benefit of the US.
However, the use by the USSR of the Satellites and other third countries as
a means of increasing her capital strength through trade must be closely
watched.
31. The present high level of military expenditures in the US and USSR is bleeding
the USSR worse than it is the US. This is a primary reason:, for the Kremlin 'a
desire to reduce international tensions temporarily. For the immediate
future, perhaps for a period of several years, we can expect the USSR to use
economic penetration rather than military strength as a tool of foreign policy.
mania will give Malenkov a better opportunity to strengthen his position at
home, particularly via a via Bulgnninand the Army. Promises to increase the
per capita standard of living have been made to the people of the USSR so often
and for so long that it has become an urgent obligation on the Kremlin to
increase the output of consumer goods. Some of these promises must be kept
to keep the people from becoming too dissatisfied. This can be done only at
the expense of the war machine, and ie dependent upon a relaxation in
international tensions.
32. All this adds up to a definite tactical change toward peace, to reduce cold war
tensions and mislead the free world, but it does not indicr.te any fundamental
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