STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [ VOL. 23 NO. 4, WINTER 1979]

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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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• Publication Date: January 1, 1979
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
Vol. 23 No. 4
Studies
in Intelligence
Winter 1979
1450 Secret
TR-SINT 79-004
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be
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IIELENE L. 130ATNEII
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CONTENTS
Winter 1979
Page
Measuring the Military Balance in Central Europe ................ Paul F. Gorman 1
A high-level look at our No. 2 intelligence problem
A Plea for Continuity in Intelligence Production
Reflections of a retired analyst
Notes by two CIA Career Trainees
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................................................ 63
61
64
Intelligence Vignettes ................................................................................................ 67
70
73
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Major--General Paul F. Gorman ("Measuring the Military Balance in Central Europe")
is the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. The most recent of
his many field command assignments was as Commanding General, 8th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), in Central Europe.
swan song a ter a quarter of a century as an analyst in CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence.
`Before The Farm") are pen names of
recent participants in CIA's Career Trainee Program.
David Atlee Phillips (reviewer of Wyden's "Bay of Pigs") was chief of CIA's Latin
America operations until he retired to defend his profession as an author and
lecturer.
Robert Crowley (reviewer of "The Storm Petrels") specialized in defector handling
during his long career in CIA.
(reviewer of "A Station in the Delta") has served in numerous Asian
countries, including Vietnam.
("A Plea for Continuity in Intelligence Production") wrote this
("Briefly Noted") is The Staff of the Historical Intelligence
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The subject of this article is the Number Two intelligence problem
engaging the United States. Specialists in the calculation of the
threat posed by the field forces of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact
allies will be quick to recognize its importance and will set aside the
time necessary to read it; the general reader may need some
encouragement.
First of all, not every reader will need to understand nor even to
read all of the technical charts and formulae with which the author
has paved the course of his argument; most of these are elaborate
footbridges essential to the firm footing of the specialist. If some
readers find their eyes glazing over as they approach these bridges,
the prose at the other side will help them resume the journey with
little loss in equilibrium.
Second, non-military analysts will be rewarded for their persistence
in reading on by the discovery of a problem within a problem.
Those civilians who delight in quoting Clemenceau on the
management of war may be moved to engage themselves more
deeply in the issue. If so, they can find no better guide than the
author, himself a living refutation of the mordant aphorism that
"war is too important to be left to generals." His writing is clear,
his grasp is firm, his step sure, and his mission worthy and
purposeful.
Finally, the reader who perseveres in following this well-lighted
labyrinth will arrive at its conclusion a better informed public
servant. The truly concerned public servant will be inspired, as the
author urges, to master the techniques of force balance assessment
essential to dealing with what may become the Number One
national intelligence problem of the 1980s.
MEASURING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Paul F. Gorman
Major General, USA
The National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces is a mistermed
anomaly-not an intelligence officer, but a professional soldier, little experienced in
intelligence production, presiding over estimates which include such non-conventional
forces as Soviet and Chinese units armed with intermediate-range ballistic missiles or
other nuclear or chemical weaponry. I have received mail for NIO/Continental
Forces, which title is evocative but elides the naval dimensions of the job. Perhaps the
label might be more precisely "NIO for General Purpose Forces." But I concede that
much can be said for the colleague who proposed: "NIO for Conventional Notions." *
* Perhaps at the author's instigation, the Director of Central Intelligence redesignated his office "NIO
for General Purpose Forces" effective 1 October 1979-Editor.
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The Military Balance
It is at least true that NIO/CF's principal product, National Intelligence Estimate
11-14-XX, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, is one of the intelligence
community's lapidary displays, each gem of data well smoothed and polished by
interagency tumbling, in a Benvenuto Cellini setting of prose. Yet most Directors have
found exploration of NIE 11-14 onerous, even tedious. "What does all that divisions
stuff mean? What does it all add up to?," more than one has asked in exasperation.
The answer to that question remains most unsatisfying. Here follows one of those
chutzpah exercises now chic in Washington-the apprentice presumes to instruct.
In the first place, none of the NIEs in the 11-14 series address directly the
military balance, that is, assess the equilibrium or disequilibrium of forces. They have
not judged "who is ahead?," as have NIEs of the 11-3/8 series, treating the strategic
balance. Hence, NIE 11-14 offers no direct answer to questions usually out to the
Director by members of Congress who seek comparative rankings-superiority, parity,
inferiority-of the sort to which the SALT debates have accustomed them. Rather,
over the past decade the NIEs 11-14 have concentrated on describing those land, sea,
and air forces which might figure in Soviet combat operations, and estimating their
capabilities. NIE 11-14-71 (9 September 1971), Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in
Eurasia, dealt, inter alia, with the Soviet Union's allocation of forces among its
commitments to the Warsaw Pact and its military requirements along its border with
China. The next major revision, NIE 11-14-75 (4 September 1975), entitled Warsaw
Pact Forces Opposite NATO, focused more specifically on Soviet capabilities for
military operations within Central Europe.
'Che latest document in the series, NIE 11-14-79 (31 January 1979), bears the
same title as its predecessor, and preserves its narrower focus. I would judge the 1979
version better presented than its predecessors-it is assuredly more graphic; there
seems to have been a great deal of effort expended on summarizing and portraying
data in forms meaningful to the uninitiate; and there is an excellent section describing
how the Soviets might launch a conventional attack in Europe. But despite the
attempts of some of the intelligence community to have NIE 11-14-79 essay an explicit
comparison between Warsaw Pact and NATO's military capabilities, DIA and the
military services blocked any inclusion of what they term "net assessment," and
the NIE is therefore mute on the question basic to most policy issues: How does
the Warsaw Pact stack up militarily against NATO?
CIA has tried its hand at an answer. In August 1977 the Directorate of
Intelligence published a paper by James O. Carson of OSR on The Balance of Forces
in Central Europe.' Carson reassured that:
The balance of military power in Central Europe-especially as it
contributes to deterrence there-is not fragile. NATO's military deterrence
is multifaceted, being based on conventional forces as well as tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons. A shift in the military balance great enough to
significantly reduce deterrence in Europe would require achievement of a
major technological breakthrough by one side or a major shift in numerical
force ratios.
He went on to warn, however, of a gradually shifting balance as the Soviets overcame
their technological inferiority and modernized their numerically superior forces, with
potentially serious consequences:
The most serious results of the shift in the balance of forces in Central
Europe could arise from both sides' perception of that evolving balance.
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There is a growing but largely unsubstantiated impression in the West that
the vigorous, ongoing Soviet modernization effort constitutes a major
conventional arms buildup which has caused the balance to shift
radically ... should it become widely accepted that the balance has
dramatically shifted, this view could depress NATO confidence and in turn
increase Soviet assertiveness. Such It development could ultimately increase
the risk of war through Soviet miscalculation.
One European who perceives such an alarming shift in the balance is the Belgian
general, Robert Close, who in his 1977 book, L'Europe Sans Defense? wrote:
For years, Europe was content to rely on American protection guaranteed by
monopoly of the supreme weapon and the nuclear shield.
This reassuring situation is a thing of the past now that thermonuclear parity
has become a reality and mutuality immobilizes and paralyzes the nuclear
arsenals of the two superpowers.
As a result, conventional forces have reassumed their full importance. The
overwhelming Soviet superiority gained by constant qualitative and
quantitative improvement confirms a definite shift in the balance of forces,
the guarantor of an uneasy peace at a time when competition between the
two opposing systems continues without respite, in spite of "detente" to
which we hear daily reference.2
Similar views have been expressed by General Sir John Hackett (who has NATO forces
fight a successful conventional defense in his World War III, but his "future-history"
is predicated on NATO's moving vigorously in the early 1980s to redress a shifting
balance), and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton (in No Soft Options Hill-
Norton sees public misconceptions of even "purely factual" NATO issues like the
balance of conventional forces as cause for lack of political will to translate NATO's
demographic and economic advantages into resources for deterrence, forward defense,
and detente).,
The point is not whether lots of new Russian tanks make West Europeans
nervous, or whether speculations about how the Soviets might use their growing
conventional advantage are well-founded, but simply whether, with such huge
American stakes at play in a game of perceptions, the U.S. intelligence community
ought seriously to consider addressing squarely the potential source of
misperception, and to produce a national intelligence estimate of the military
balance.
Congress is looking for such an estimate. No Senator or Representative preparing
to vote on U.S. appropriations for the defense of NATO is likely to be content with a
one-sided description of Warsaw Pact capabilities. All are aware that in gross resources
2 Close, General Robert, L'Europe Sans Defense?, Editions Arts & Voyages, Paris, 1976 (issued 1977).
Available in English from U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS L/7120, 12 May 1977. Quote is
from latter, D. 243.
' Hackett, General Sir John Winthrop, et.al., The Third World War: A Future History, London, 1978.
Ilill-Norton, Adm. Sir Peter, No Soft Options: The Political-Military Realities of NATO, Montreal, 1978,
who quotes Clauscwitz:
The possession of military or economic power is only of value if supported by
political will and the readiness of the people to provide the means to defend their
way of life and conception of democracy.
Cf., Howard, M., "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs, July 1.979, pp. 975-986.
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NATO is far stronger than the Pact: 200 million more people, 3 times the GNP, 70%
higher GNP per capita. Is there a genuine need for American manpower and money
to buttress NATO? Of course intelligence community witnesses before Congressional
committees inquiring into such questions can duck being responsible for "net
assessment," deferring to the Department of Defense or the JCS for treatment of the
military balance in Central Europe. But to demur is not to escape criticism. In fact,
any intelligence officer who forays into a discussion of Warsaw Pact forces, on the Hill
or elsewhere among policy makers, should anticipate taking knocks for our
intelligence estimates, and being identified as probable cause for future insufficiency
in U.S. policy.
Much has been published by the gemmating staffs of the U.S. Congress on these
issues. For example, the Congressional Budget Office has published an information
booklet "Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance,"' an inquiry into
methodology, based on a comprehensive review of unclassified sources. This
monograph argues that past estimates of the balance have been tilted toward
"optimism" or "pessimism." Without singling out any intelligence agency, the authors
perceive a "new pessimism" in vogue, part of a long-standing cycle of optimism-to-
pessimism, refecting current events and U.S. responses.
One of the authors cited in the CBO study, and one of the leading American
commentators on the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance, is also a Congressional
staffer: John M. Collins, a retired military officer, now strategic analyst for the
Research Staff of the Library of Congress, who has published comprehensive studies of
the NATO Pact balance (for example, his American and Soviet Military Trends ,5 and
his imbalance of Power)' Generally speaking, Collins' technique seems to be to
inform himself from finished intelligence, but then to use relevant unclassified data to
generate comparative data on selected measures of current military forces, and to
depict trends pertaining thereto. At Figure 1 are some graphs from his Military
Trends. 7 In the same publication, Collins develops a sort of balance sheet between the
United States and the Soviet Union, leading to a "standing" for 1970 and 1977
respectively.' (Table I.)
Anthony Cordesman, former Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of the Defense Intelligence Board, wrote the preface and summary-termed
a "net assessment appraisal"-for Collins' recent book, Imbalance of Power, in which
he points out that Collins labored under grave difficulties from the lack of objective
intelligence. As far as Cordesman is concerned, Collins' bete noir is the Defense
Intelligence Agency which, in his view, "has been the key link in shaping all free
world estimates of Soviet forces ... DIA tends to credit the Soviet Union with
capability when it does not know, and has a long tradition of providing answers
' 0130, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance, (Budget Issue Paper for FY-79), CPO,
Washington, December 1977. N.13: The CBO authors, James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, who worked for
John E. Koehler, point out that (p. xvii) "the brighter assessments are optimistic only in comparison with the
more pessimistic ones. Few if any of the numbers or ratios used in them demonstrate a clear NATO
advantage. They
do, however, suggest a closer balance...."
Collins, John M. American and Soviet Military Trends, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, D. C., 1978. Cf., Collins and Chivat, J.S., The United States/Soviet Military Balance,
Library of Congress, Jan. 27, 1976.
Collins, J. M., and Cordesman, Anthony, Imbalance of Power, Presidio Press, San Rafael. California,
1978.
Collins, Trends, 1). 118
Ibid., pp. :359-361.
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The Military Balance
Selected Ground Force Strengths Compared
Statistical Summary (Note Different Scales)
Deployable Manpower
Thousands
3,000
7777777777
777-7-7777
77777~
2,500
2,000
-4
4 4-
Soviet
1,500
4
-
1,000
500
Field Artillery
Thousands
30
25
20
OR,
oV e
15
10
5
u.5.
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76
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Medium Tanks
Thousands
Adapted from Collins, J.M.
American and Soviet Military Trends
Washington, 1978
60
=
50
40
r Gvlet
30
20
=
10
US.
Ready Divisions
Number
120
----- - --
----
-777
Soviet
-
100
80
777
77
60
40
u.S.
20
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76
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1970 "
1977'
NATO
Warsaw
Pact
NATO
Standing
NATO
Warsaw
Pact
NATO
Standing
Personnel
Divisions
Committed'
1,52.4,300
1,190,000
+333,000
1,409,000
1,600,000
-191,000
Armor
8
24
- 16
8
24
- 16
Other
22
28
- 6
28
26
+ 2
Total
Ready Reinforcements
30
52
- 22
36
50
- 14
Armor
2
14
- 12
2
10
- 8
Other
10
7
+ 3
10
6
+ 4
Total
12
21
- 9
12
16
-__4
Sub-total
First-line Reserves
42
73
- 31
48
66
- 18
Armor
2
2
par
2
6
-
4
Other
1.1
13
- 2
Il
18
- 7
Total
13
15
- 2
13
24
- 11.
Total Divisions
55
88
- 33
61
90
- 29
Medium Tanks "
Tactical Aircraft
6,535
14,500
-7,965
7,400
22,000
-14,600
Bombers
15
100
- 85
185
100
+ 85
Ground Attack
1,640
800
+ 840
1,500
800
+ 700
Interceptors
470
1,600
- 1,130
400
1,700
- 1,300
Total
2,125
2,500
- 375
2,085
2,600
- 515
MRBM/IRBM
0
650
- 650
0
550
- 550
Personnel strengths are active forces only for U.S./NATO, but include Soviet Category III divisions.
U.S., West German, and Soviet divisions have increased in size since 1970. Three German divisions,
for example, had only two brigades each at that time. All 12 now have three brigades. The British Army has
the same total number of brigades as in 1970, but has added a division headquarters.
These charts do not reflect NATO's increased strength in separate brigades and regiments, which are
included in some computations as "division equivalents." The IISS Military Balance, 1977-1978, for
example, shows 27 NATO divisions (excluding France), including 10 armored divisions, by counting division
equivalents (3 brigades-1 division).
U.S./NATO committed divisions include all active divisions in NATO's center sector. SOVIET/
Warsaw Pact counterparts are limited to divisions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. All are
Category 1.
" U.S./NATO ready reinforcements include all other active U.S. Army divisions, less one in Korea; two
U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Force (MAF) division/wing teams; six French divisions; and one British
division in the U.K. Soviet lists are restricted to Category I and II divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and
Carpathian Military Districts. There are no satellite state divisions in this class.
U.S./NATO first-line reserves include one active U.S. Army division; two U.S. Marine MAFs; all eight
U.S. National Guard divisions; and one Dutch reserve division. Warsaw Pact forces are Category Ill
divisions, including those in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts of European Russia.
Every U.S. division, active and reserve component, is shown. The Soviet Union has 112 others, some
Categories I and II. Many of those would be available for service in Central Europe if a crisis arose.
" U.S./NATO medium tank statistics include U.S. prepositioned stocks in unit sets (POMCUS), war
reserve stocks (PWRMS), plus 130 in divisions that serve as maintenance float. The number of Warsaw Pact
reserve stock tanks is not ascertainable.
Aircraft statistics exclude U.S. dual-based forces in CONUS.
NATO and Warsaw Pact comparisons include the United States and Soviet Union. French Army and
Air Force totals are included in all categories, even though those forces are not under NATO control and
only two divisions are deployed in Germany.
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whether it has sufficient data or not. It also has a tendency to mirror-image Soviet
capabilities against those of U.S. forces or technology when it lacks actual intelligence,
without indicating that such mirror-imaging is the actual source of its estimates. And
these tendencies are compounded by other problems which affect the validity of
intelligence estimates:
1. Both military and civilian bureaucracies need high estimates of the threat
to justify force levels, new weapons, and defense research. With some
exceptions, most users of intelligence want high estimates of the threat.
2. Intelligence officers are compartmented specialists. They often lack
practical experience with the real world problems in the threat forces
they describe. They lack the background and training to judge what
might go wrong with threat forces and plans.
3. Few intelligence officers have extensive training in measuring military
effectiveness. They are not familiar with test and evaluation techniques,
historical research on weapons or force effectiveness, or operations
research. They usually are prevented from comparing U.S. and foreign
systems by informal pressures from the Joint Chiefs, the service staffs, or
civilian decision makers.
4. Intelligence officers are rarely required to compare U.S., Allied, and
threat forces directly. In general, they generate data using different
standards, measurement methods, assumptions, and definitions from
United States forces data. These differences often lead to estimates which
disguise biases in favor of threat forces. Such biases include exaggerated
estimates of threat sortie rates, kill probabilities, rates of fire, readiness,
circular errors of probability, system reliability, mobilization and build-
up rates, and munitions stocks.
5. DIA evolved from service intelligence branches with a tradition that
intelligence counted the strength of the threat and estimated its location,
but did not judge its comparative tactical and military effectiveness. This
was partly the result of pressures by the more prestigious plans and
operations branches of the military services and the Joint Staff to cause
the intelligence branches to stay away from estimates reflecting on U.S.
capabilities. Accordingly, in spite of recent major efforts at reform,
intelligence still tends to concentrate too much on enemy order-of-battle
and technical performance of threat equipment, and to pay too little
attention to threat training, build-up capability, tactics, operations and
maintenance and similar "soft" factors.
6. In contrast, many intelligence officers have personal experience with our
allies. They see them (warts and all) and often with more than a touch of
American parochialism. Many intelligence users also have no incentive to
seek high estimates of Allied capability. The justification for U.S.
programs is as much the lack of Allied capabilities as the presence of
threat capabilities. This leads to an inverse tendency of U.S. intelligence
to underestimate Allied capabilities.
7. Estimates of threat capabilities are increasingly dependent on estimates of
technology and weapons systems performance. Many aspects of weapons
performance are, however, not even theoretically visible or detectable
through intelligence sources. For example, it is extremely difficult to
estimate factors like reliability, mean time between failures (MTBF), and
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equipment availability rates even for U.S. systems until they are proven
in war. Few weapons have ever approached their estimated or theoretical
technical performance capability in actual combat, yet experts continue
to act as if the "next" system would behave without problems.
8. Users have demanded and received intrinsically impossible estimates of
threat capabilites which go far into the future, or into unknowable areas
of speculation. The Office of Defense Research and Engineering, for
example, has forced DIA to make predictions of Soviet capability that go
so far into the future where it is unlikely the Soviets have such plans.
Since the only data available are U.S. plans or capabilities, DIA is forced
to "mirror image." It is not surprising that the intelligence officers forced
to do such work have tended to make guesses which maximize threat
capabilities.
9. These tendencies are compounded when intelligence estimates threat
capabilities for future years. These involve the greatest areas of
uncertainty and are most subject to the tendency to assume high
capability in the absence of concrete knowledge. This is why estimates of
trends in Soviet forces tend to be so bleak. The enemy we know is
invariably preferable to the enemy we will know.'
Some of Cordesman's critique appears to be cogent, and I suppose most DIA
analysts would plead guilty to at least one or two of his charges. But to be fair to DIA,
we should be clear that, if it lurks Cyclops-like in a narrow estimative cave, it does so
because of the DoD and JCS Olympians who set bounds on its nature, and direct its
destiny. More to the point, if DIA's monocular vision has distorted the prowess of
Soviet conventional forces, it has done so not by magnification, but by diminution.
Over the years, DIA has probably understated capabilities of Soviet conventional
forces.
The reader may recall earlier articles in this journal which drew attention to the
intelligence community's persistent underestimation of Soviet strategic forces.10 There
is a growing body of evidence that a similar lacuna exists vis-a-vis Soviet general
purpose forces. For example, the U.S. Navy's latest Net Assessment of the United
States and Soviet Navies 11 shows that the principal DIA document setting forth
estimates of future Soviet naval forces, the Defense Intelligence Projections for
Planning (DIPP), underestimated in its projections the assessed Soviet order-of-battle
for any given year over the past eight. On page 9 are three of the charts used in NA
78.
It is doubtful that a comparable analysis of DIPP land force projections would
disclose a similar gap with assessed Soviet land force order of battle over the last ten
years, simply because the DIPP has been counting mainly manpower and divisions. In
1975 OSR published an analysis pointing to qualitative changes in Soviet Theater
Forces which were affecting the balance.12 Philip A. Karber of the BDM Corporation,
Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, xv-xvii.
C:f. CIA, Studies in Intelligence: Taylor, Jack H., "Wohlstetter, Soviet Strategic Forces, and NIEs,"
F
" U.S. Navy, Net Assessment of the United States and Soviet Navies (I?) (NA-78), Vol. 1, Chapter 5,
"Uncertainties in Projections," pp. 50-51.
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Number
350
2 73
%
DIPP 71
-~ DIPP 72
DIPP 73
??DIPP 75_
- DIPP 77 _
ACTUAV-do
8
1968 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
This figure shows the number of general
purpose submarines projected in DIPP-
71, DIPP-72, DIPP-73, DIPP-75, DIPP-77.
In each successive projection there has
tended to be a sizable increase in the num-
ber projected for any given year, although
the actual totals do indicate the down-
ward trend in numbers noted previously
in this report.
Secret
NOFORN
Number
380
.,._ DIPP 71
DIPP 72
v DIPP 73
? ? ? DIPP 75
DIPP 77
ACTUAL 008
This figure shows the number of ASM
bombers projected for the Soviet naval
air arm in DIPP-71, DIPP-72, DIPP-73,
DIPP-75, and DIPP-77. Once again, suc-
cessive projections have tended to in-
crease the number projected for any given
year. However, in this case, the actual
totals indicate a strongly increasing trend.
Figure 2
Soviet Principal Surface Combatants
Number
-~ DIPP 71
- DIPP 72
.. DIPP 73
.. DIPP+ 75
DIPP 77
- ACTUAL 008
1968 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
This figure shows the number of Soviet
principal surface combatants projected
in DIPP-71, DIPP-72, DIPP-73, DIPP-75
and DIPP-77. In DIPP-72, there was a
major change in the estimate, to a rapidly
decreasing force size. DIPP-73, DIPP-75
and DIPP-77 continue to project a rapid
decline, but delay the start. It is interest-
ing to observe that the actual totals have
been in fairly good agreement with the
original DIPP-71 projections.
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SECRET The Military Balance
in contract studies for DoD, subsequently pointed out that division/ manpower counts
failed, inter alia, to identify modernizing Soviet combat service support systems.
Moreover, Karber and his colleagues, in a study published in February 1978 entitled
Trends in the Central European Military Balance," noted that over the dozen years
from 1965 to 1977 intelligence estimates had perceived relatively little change in the
commonly used measures of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance.
But significant change there had been. To inquire into both qualitative and
quantitative differences among weapon systems and units on both sides, Karber
assigned to each numerical indices of effectiveness-weighted effectiveness indices, or
WEI, and weighted unit values, or WUV (which shall be explained in detail in the
following pages)-which are widely used to assess land force balances in DoD
analyses, particularly those of the U.S. Army. Thus measured, important new Warsaw
Treaty Organization (WTO) capabilities, the product of burgeoning Soviet military
technology, became evident:
In the last 12 years both alliances have greatly increased their theater
equipment inventories and significantly upgraded the quality of their
deployed weapon technologies without altering the personnel and division
balances to any great extent ... Although there is evidence of substantial
growth for both alliances, the Warsaw Pact quantitative increases exceed
those of NATO in every category except light tanks and armored personnel
carriers. The Pact has particularly widened its quantitative advantage in
tanks, anti-tank guns, artillery, and multiple rocket launchers and has
decisively overcome a NATO advantage in anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGMs) held in 1965. If quantitative and qualitative trends are combined
(using WEI/WUV), the growth of Warsaw Pact forces relative to NATO is
more dramatically apparent. The weapons systems ratio for 1977 reflects a
Warsaw Pact lead in all weapon categories.... While NATO technology was
generally superior to that of the Warsaw Pact in 1965, today the Soviets have
generally achieved qualitative parity in deployed system technologies and in
some cases have technology superior to that currently deployed by
NATO...."
Reproduced on page 11 is the summary table from the Karber study (Classified
SECRET).
This past spring, a study conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation used a similar WEI/WUV methodology
to compare future programs of NATO force modernization with projected
Soviet/Warsaw Pact modernization, and reached conclusions that in the mid-80s the
capability gap between conventional forces of the two coalitions facing each other in
Central Europe will narrow, but that at least some NATO allies will lose ground vis-a-
vis threat forces.',' In Table III on page 11, the Warsaw Treaty Organization's
improvement in firepower is measured in "armored division equivalents" (ADE), a
WUV score of weighting which uses the U.S. Armored Division as standard. (The
WTO forces include Soviet divisions stationed in East Europe or available in West
Russia, and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact-NSWP-divisions of Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany.)
11 Karber, P. A., Whitley, G. A., and Komer, D. R., Trends in the Central European Military Balance:
Quantitative and Qualitative Change in the Ground Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliance, The
BDM Corporation, McLean, Virginia, February 1978. Classified SECRET. Also, Karber, et at., Net
Assessment of the Maturing Soviet Threat in Ground Forces (U), 12 October 1976 (Net Assessment Project
186-Phase III), (BDM Corporation), SECRET.
Ibid.
DASD/PA&E, NATO Center Region Military Balance Study, 1978-1984, July I3, 1979, Classified
SECRET, pp. 6-7.
10 SECRET
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The Military Balance SECRET
Change in Major Theater Weapon Inventories
(Active Units 1965-1977)
WTO Percentage Change
NATO Percentage Change _
WTO/NATO Ratio
WEI
WEI
(Quantity + Quality)
Type of System
Quantity
Quantity /Quality
Quantity
Quantity /Quality
1965
1977
Tanks
30
45
12
26
2.2 to 1
2.5 to 1
Light Tanks
-
-2
44
73
0.9 to 1
0.5 to 1
Armored Personnel Carriers
42
90
44
63
1.1 to 1
1.3 to I
Antitank Guided Missiles
625
908
300
587
1.1 to 1
1.6 to 1
Antitank Guns
70
39
- 33
32
1.5 to 1
1.6 to 1
Light Antitank Weapons
28
131
26
2
0.6 to 1
1.3 to 1
Artillery
58
78
32
49
1.4 to 1
1.7 to 1
Multiple Rocket Launchers
50
145
*
**
-
7.2 to 1
Mortars
8
50
4
5
0.5 to 1
0.8 to 1
* Quantity increased from 0-to-176 between 1970-1977.
** Quantity/Quality increased form 0-to-12,403 between 1970-1977.
'Table III
Trends in Warsaw Pact Force Modernization
Soviet .._.. .._ ....... ...... ............... 50.5 60.1 19%
NSWP ..,.... _..... ......_ .............. 20.4 23.8 17%
"The Pact's modernization effort is expected to include all major types of
weapons in Soviet and East European ground forces. As a result, the Pact forces in the
mid-1980s will have increased capability for combined. arms operations against
NATO." " The study then goes on to point out that projected modernization of NATO
forces in the same time frame will be asymmetric, with wide differences in
effectiveness developing among the allies:
NATO Force Modernization (ADEs)"
(1978-1984)
U.S. .. 6.5 8.6 2.1 33%
FRG . ...._. 10.7 12.8 2.1 20%
UK 3.4 4.1 .7 18%
France 3.0 3.5 .5 17%
Netherlands .. _ .. ....... ...._., .......,,... 2.7 3.1 .4 15%
Belgium.... ........... ..__.,,....... ... .... 1.94 1.96 .2 1%
Canada ..... _,..._....._ ........... ... _., .209 .276 .067 32%
Denmark .... ., ....... 2.03 .199 -.04 -2%
These differences are the more striking when WEI for specific weapon systems are
compared: (Table V, next page).
Ibid., p? 1-7, Classified SECRET.
Ibid., p. 1-13, Classified SECRET. Negative values in this and the following table mean that
modernization has cost so much that less firepower is afield, a better quality of arms notwithstanding.
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The Military Balance
Modernization of Major Firepower 1"
(In-Place Forces)
Armor
1978
2.56
4.37
.96
.98
.94
.48
.45
1984
3.14
5.45
.93
1.29
1.1
.43
.43
% Increase
23%
25%
-3%
31%
17%
-11%
-4%
Artillery
1978
.53
1.93
.44
.52
.62
.26
.54
1984
.93
2.3
.49
.59
.62
.26
.52
% Increase
75%
10%
11%
13%
0
0
-2%
Anti-Armor
1978
1.60
1.59
.41
.27
.28
.37
.09
1984
2.73
1.69
.76
.68
.41
.43
.17
% Increase
70%
7%
85%
152%
46%
16%
89%
Total Increase
2.1
1.8
.4
.8
.3
.07
.03
% Increase
45%
17%
23%
46%
15%
6%
3 %
The purpose of the OASD/PA&E study was to inquire into the need for revised
NATO programs, particularly those calling for earlier arrival of more U.S.
reinforcements. Based on the WEI/WUV comparisons, the study concluded that
NATO requires both substantial force modernization by all members and full funding
of the U.S. program to preposition stocks of unit equipment in Europe and otherwise
provide for swift deployment of reinforcements (Figure 3, opposite).19
Note that the difference between Curve B and Curve C is another portrayal of a
potential "gap" in capabilities-still another measure of a shifting balance-which
might develop if either (1) the U.S. Congress failed to appropriate funds for DoD
NATO programs, or (2) our NATO allies failed to live up to their modernization
commitments implicit in the newly adopted Long-Range Defense Plan, or (3) both
shortfalls materialize.
So "balance of forces" is a most serious intelligence problem, one for which
our traditional analytical frame of reference and usual technique has been largely
irrelevant. There seem to be three principal questions or issues involved:
1. Whether the intelligence community should assess the military
balance in Central Europe.
2. If so, how to weigh the military forces involved.
:3. Most important, how to present the assessment to the policy maker.
ISSUE I: Assess the Military Balance?
It is important to understand the depth of resistance in DIA and the military
services to launching on any course which might lead U.S. intelligence to render
judgments on U.S. forces, which is plainly the prerogative of the commanders
concerned. While military intelligence feels free to participate in National Intelligence
Estimates which assess wholly foreign military balances-even when, as in the
Arab/Israeli balance, substantial amounts of U.S. arms figure-they have steadfastly
Ibid., p. I-15 Classified SECRET.
'y ibid., p. 1-20, Classified SECRET.
12 SECRET
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The Military Balance SECRET
Pact-to-NATO Force Ratios
(Based on ADEs) 1984
Force Ratio-
Pact: NATO
Curve A
Mid-1980s if PACT modernizes
and NATO does not.
20 25 30
Time (Days After PACT Mobilization)
1 Curve B for 1984 is nearly equivilent to the curve for 1978. The difference between Curve B
and Curve C thus represents NATO's net gain in 1978-84.
Secret
NOFORN
refused to join in any comparable assessment in which U.S. forces are significant. But
surely military intelligence carries its aversion to "net assessment" too far, I recently
asked a DIA office to update a chart plotting, over time, thickness of frontal armor on
Soviet tanks against penetrating power of U.S. antitank weapons, but was told that the
office had no access to "blue data" and that such "net assessment" was beyond its
charter. I find it difficult to believe that anyone trying to analyze Soviet tank design
can do so competently without data on the U.S. weapons which the Soviet tanks are
built to confront-preferably Soviet data, but in its absence, our own. I find it
similarly hard to credit estimates of Soviet theater capabilities from analysts
uninformed of those of NATO. Having helped write over the years numerous policy
papers for which intelligence provided "input," usually "red" data of stipulated kinds
and amounts, I suggest that commanders, operators, and planners can as readily input
"blue" data for purposes of National Intelligence Estimates. Noting that they have
already been doing so for NIE 11-3/8, the strategic estimate, I urge that it is now time
to extend the practice to NIE 11-14, given these policy issues, each of which requires
assessing the balance:
? Nuclear parity, and concomitant renewed importance for "conven-
tional" strategies.
? U.S. commitment to the NATO Long Term Defense Plan.
? Needs for modernizing NATO conventional forces, despite foreseen
economic and demographic strains.
Curve 1131
Mid-1980s with projected
programmed NATO modernization.
Curve C
Mid-1980s with NATO modernization
and programmed U.S. reinforcement.
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SECRET The Military Balance
? Requirements for modernizing NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear
Force.
? Extension of U.S.-Soviet bilateral arms limitation talks to Theater
Nuclear Forces.
? Multilateral arms limitation negotiations, notably MBFR (Mutual
Balanced Force Reductions)
? U.S. objective of limiting arms transfers to the Third World.
ISSUE II: How to Weigh?
Selection of measurements for assessment of the military balance in Europe is not
easy. Gross measures like ratios of manpower, Gross National Product, or even
numbers of divisions on each side conceal as much as they reveal, given contrasts in
the social systems and military structures. For example, expressing force ratios in
terms of raw numbers of divisions is hazardous, so elusive is the term "division." James
Carson of OSR, recognizing that "beancounting" involves accounting for "beans"' of
different shapes and sizes, used this table (Table VI, page 15).20
To illustrate the analysts' risk in the absence of reliable "blue" data I point out
that I took command of one of the two U.S. mechanized divisions in Germany in July
1977, one month before Carson's paper appeared. The numbers for the division should
have included:
8th Infantry Division (Mech)
Medium Tanks
392
Cobra-Tow
42
Major AT Weapons
574
The significance of the corrected numbers is that they might have affected one of
Carson's key measures of the balance, ADE (armored division equivalent), which is
computed "by combining the unit's total number of ground combat weapons and the
quality of each weapon in terms of firepower, mobility, and survivability." As Carson
notes, thus counted, the overall NATO position looks better, more "optimistic:"
The resulting application of ADE scores to major NATO and Pact combat
units ... yields the Pact a 1.7 to 1 numerical advantage in ADEs over NATO
as opposed to a 2.3/1 advantage in numbers of divisions.21
There is no reason worth considering why an OSR analyst struggling with such a
calculus should not have access to the latest and best count of "blue beans."
On the face of it, ADE, or other WEI/WUV scoring, seems to promise a
straightforward way of counting those "beans," and thus assessing the balance. But
there are major limitations to this method.
WEI (weapon effectiveness indices) are lineal descendants of the firepower scores
the U.S. Army has used for tactical force comparison since at least the 1941 Louisiana
maneuvers. Each WEI is essentially a weighted sum of the dominant characteristics
SR 77-10100, p. 7.
" Ibid., p. 7-8. Generally speaking, application of weighting techniques has the effect of presenting a
lower force ratio-but not necessarily so.
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Soviet, West German, and US Divisions '
West German US
Soviet Tank West German US Armored Soviet Motorized Mechanized Mechanized
Division Armored Division Division Rifle Division Division Division
Personnel ........... ....... _.......... .. 9,500 24,000 15,400 12,200 24,600 15,600
Medium 'ranks 325 315 324 266 278 270
Other Armored Vehicles z ..... 249 715 968 460 777 1,029
Artillery' ........ .. ... ... ............ 78 88 66 90 88 66
AAA Weapons" ....... ....... ..... 173 121 120 206 121 120
Major Antitank Weapons' ... 15 50 225 63 61 270
I Personnel and equipment strengths are estimated model wartime strengths; actual wartime strengths vary from division to division.
2 All tracked, armored vehicles, including light tanks and excluding engineer vehicles.
? Includes guns and multiple rocket launchers.
Guns and missiles, including Redeye and SA-7 Grail.
Guns and missiles with a range of 1,000 meters or more, excluding missiles mounted on personnel carriers.
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SECRET The Military Balance
for a particular weapon.~'z WEI express relative value or prowess within nine
categories, or families, of weapons." For any particular category, e.g., tanks:
WEI=ctF+cn M+,S
F is firepower, M mobility, and S survivability and CI, C, and C, are
judgmentally assigned coefficients (constants) expressing relative weighting.
For example, one formulation of WEI,ank, arrived at by Delphi techniques polling
military professionals (U.S. soldiers tend to emphasize firepower over other
capabilities) produced these values for C6 Cn, and C,:
WEI,,,nk=.60F+.15M+.25S.
In turn, Frank, is calculated by arbitrarily designating a value of a standard tank (e.g.,
M60AI or T-55) and then judgmentally quantifying on a scale of 0-1 seven factors
comparing the standard with any other tank; for example its:
lethality (Pk)
ammunition type available (A)
basic load (13L)
auxiliary weapons (W)
time to fire (FM)
night capability (NF)
stabilization (P)
Then Ftankn, any given tank, is a function of the sum of the ratios of the
characteristics of that tank and the standard tank, Tanks, computed for example, per
this formula:
F=.59PPk+.13FMn+.1081 +.07Wn+.06An+.03NFn+.02Pn
Pk. FM, 131, W, As, NF5 P,
Similarly complicated formulae are used to compute M and S, the mobility and
survivability indices.
here are some actual WEI for various tanks, normalized to the U.S. M60A1:
U.S.
M60A1
1.00
USSR
T62
1.17
U.S.
M60A3
1.14
USSR
T72
1.37
FRG
Leopard
11
1.34
USSR
T80
1.46
UK
Chieftain
1.28
The WUV (weighted unit value) aggregates WEI for the arms within given units,
weighting the contribution of each weapon to the unit's overall combat worth. Again,
judgmentally derived weighting figures heavily. Here are some typical weightings
assigned to category or weapon family; note that these differ by mission, and by
theater (reflecting differing utility of armament in the several environments):
Middle Fast
Category Offense Defense Average
1. Small Arms 1 1.2 1.1
I[1. Tanks 64 55 60
Average
1.3
46
1
24
This discussion draws on an unpublished paper of 1973, "Review of Index Measures of Combat
Effectiveness," by D. M. Lester, Office of Secretary of the Army, and R. F. Robinson, of the Air Staff, and
on material provided by the U.S. Army Concept Analysis Agency, Bethesda. Maryland.
" U.S. Army WE.I compare these families (1) small arms; (2) armored personnel carriers; (3) tanks; (4)
armored reconnaissance vehicles; (5) anti-tank weapons: (6) cannon/rockets; (7) mortars; and (8) armed
helicopters; (9) air defense artillery.
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The WUV is computed for a given unit thus:
WEI X Category Weight: (W) X Quantity (Q)=WUV
WUV=WEIsmall arms X CWsmall arms X Qsmall arms
+ WEltanks X CWtanks X Qtanks
+ WEIother)s) X CWother(s) X Qother(')
Sample WUV computed in 1978 showed these differences among divisions:
Offense
Defense
US Armored Division
50,816
53,651
USSR Tank Division
37,889
38,127
US Mechanized Division
45,025
48,877
USSR Motorized Rifle Division
40,664
40,714
In practice, these are compared to a defending U.S. Armored Division and expressed
as a ratio, an Armored Division Equivalent (ADE):
Offense
Defense
US Armored Division
0.95
1.00
USSR Tank Division
0.71
0.71
US Mechanized Division
0.84
0.91
USSR Motorized Rifle Division
0.76
0.76
Generally, the more one aggregates using this technique, the more the input
judgments-however carefully drawn from knowledgeable professionals-dominate
results, and therefore the less reliable are the quantifications.
WEI suffer from:
-Linearity (20 bullets are not necessarily 20 times effective as 1 bullet).
-Lack of comparability (if WEItank =100 and WEIrj0c=1, 100 rifles =t-1
tank).
-Dependence on judgmental inputs vice reliable combat or test data.
-Ignoring synergistic effects of weaponry (tank plus scout-afoot is some
multiple of WEItank plus WEIrinc)?
-Category limitations (no radar, C3I).*
WUV suffer from:
-Sensitivity to judgments on category weights.
-Cascading uncertainty, stemming from summed WEI.
-Slighting terrain, weather, morale, doctrine, training, and relative finesse
or efficiency. Military history is replete with examples which support
Napoleon's view that in war "mind and opinion make up more than half
of reality," and which confound Voltaire: "Dieu est toujours pour les Bros
batallions."
WEI/WUV analysis is better for small-scale military balance comparisons which
attempt no more than to describe potential, or resources on both sides, e.g.:
-Weapon system trend comparisons.
-Tactical force balances in local situations.
* Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence.
SECRET 17
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SECRET The Military Balance
WF.I/WUV analysis is weak for large-scale net assessments, such as portrayal of
the theater force balance, and weakest when it purports to predict a campaign
outcome, precisely since it perforce deals with static comparisons, and cannot take into
account such dynamics as force concentration, and superior tactics.
To illustrate these points, let me cite two examles from the work of Karber, et. al.,
of the BDM Corporation. In their Trends in the Central European Military Balance,
they used a series of charts which plotted the cumulative WEI of the Warsaw Pact
weapon systems vis-a-vis those of NATO. For example, this series on tanks, which
showed first inventories, then types, and finally WEI trends (Figures 4,5,6).sa
1 regard this application of WEI as meaningful, better than saying only that the
Pact has a 3:1 superiority in numbers of tanks, because the WEI take armor protection
into account, and portray the differing firepower of older and newer types in the
inventories on both sides. The graphs portray a large and growing gap in capabilities,
both in quality and quantity, which might inform policy makers contemplating
amelioration via better NATO tank or antitank systems.
Portraying trends is helpful. Carson of OSR, cited supra, noted that in 1977
overall the Pact enjoyed a land forces advantage of 1.7:1 over NATO, as measured by
WUV (ADE); he did not say what this means (although his is clearly a more helpful
statement than simply a ratio of numbers of divisions on either side). Karber, writing
about the same time, computed the WUV ratio at 1.85:1, and noted usefully that
NATO had improved its WUV only 42% since 1965, as contrasted to a 69% plus-up for
the Warsaw Pact.
But Karber, et. al. have also provided an excellent example of the perils of using
and interpreting gross WEI/WUV ratios.25 Applying WEI/WUV analysis to the
German and Allied opposing forces in 1940 (before the German offensive), they found
overall a fairly even balance. An intelligence analyst then might have used
WEI/WUV to show that the Allies were offensively postured, with a clear edge in
tanks, and some advantage in artillery. The Germans seemed better postured for
defense, with superiority in antitank systems, anti-aircraft systems, and aircraft. WEI
ratios are shown in figure 7.
Obviously, such analysis, limited to theater gross comparisons, could not have led
to a warning of the German cover and deception which led to a concentration of
forces in the center. The Germans threw 29 divisions through Holland in a swift,
shocking campaign which drew 57 Allied divisions into Flanders. Meanwhile, 19
German divisions pinned 44 Allied divisions behind the Maginot Line, while 45
divisions massed for a crushing assault through the Ardennes against the 15 Allied
divisions defending there. In short, the Germans accepted the risk of inferior force
ratios on two fronts (albeit assuring themselves of offsetting advantages of surprise and
initiative) in order to generate a clear superiority of force for breakthrough in the
center (Map, Figure 8).26
While the division-to-division ratio was 3:1 at the Ardennes schwerpunkt, the
WEI/WUV ratio was 4:1, reflecting, among other measures, German non-divisional
firepower massed there (Figure 9).27
Karber, et. al., op. cit., pp. 21, 23, and 25, Classified SECRET.
Karber, P. A., Whitley, G., Herman, M. and Komer, D., "Assessing the Balance of Forces: France
1940," BDM, McLean, Virginia, June 1979.
Ibid., p. 3-3.
Ibid., p. 4-4.
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The Military Balance
Center Region Comparisions
Medium and Heavy Tanks
Inventory
20,000
Western
Eastern
Secret
NOFORN 580645 10-79 CIA
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Deployment of New Generation Technology
Tanks
The Military Balance
U.S.
M-60 (1.03)
M-60A1 (1.03)
M-60 A-2 (1.10)
XM-I (1.35)
FRG
M-48 ( .90)
LEOPARD 1 (1.02)
LEOPARD 11 (1.17)
UK
CENTURION (1.04)
CHIEFTAIN (1.14)
FR
M-47 ( .74)
AMX-30 (.93)
USSR
T-54/55 (.95)
T 62 (1.03)
T-64 (1.22)
T-72 (1.22)
PACT
T-34 (.66)
T 54/55(.95)
Secret
NOFORN
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Medium and Heavy Tanks
(Active Units)
Secret
NOFORN
NATO
PACT
L Cent.
M-47
A-2
M
-60
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a
X
a
a
fp
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SECRET
Force Ratio Comparisons
Ratio
j Allies
3 Germans
The Military Balance
Aggregate Armor Systems Fire Support Anti-Armor Aircraft Anti-Aircraft
Theater Balance Systems Systems
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The Military Balance
Germany vs. the Allies, 1940: Balance of Forces in Sectors of Attack
German
Army Group B
29 Divisions
Allied Forces
57 Divisions
FLANDERS
(Deployed in battalions and
W used primarily as infantry
g support)
42
4 31
Armored division
Infantry division
Mechanized infantry
division
Cavalry
of German advance
16 May
21 May
4 June
Germany
boundary
group
errata U rg++
Allied Forces
44 Divisions
Germany
Army Group A
-11
'w4G'NO7 LIN
E
1 13 (Fortress Divisions)
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SECRET The Military Balance
Comparison Ratio by Sector
=Allied
MGerman
k M v..
3.75
w e,
w,41?
3.25
--
dw "F ".M rv'"". 4
2.75
r
2.25
-
1.75
1.25
.75
777777
.25
?.,
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The Military Balance SECRET
To illustrate a contemporary application of this sort of force balance assessment,
here is an example (see Table VIII) from the OASD/PA&E paper cited above. The
analysts used WEI/WUV to portray how the Warsaw Pact, taking advantage of its
growing ground force capabilities and its advantages of initiative, could, in 1984,
create Ardennes-like force ratios opposite the German I Corps and British I Corps in
NATO's Northern Army Group. Postulated is a Pact attack on M plus 5, (NATO M
plus 10) with five Fronts and 89 divisions (consistent with NIEs 4-1-78 and 11-14-79).
The "base case" is a Soviet strategy of superiority everywhere, in which event force
ratios of 6:1 at the schwerpunkt become possible. The "option" accepts parity
everywhere except there, in which case ratios of 8.3:1 at the breakthrough sector
become possible.
Pact Force Advantages in Alternative Force Allocation Tactics 2"
Pact/NATO Ratios
by Corps
NEI
GEI
UKI
BEI
GEIII
USV
USVII
GEII
Base
1.5
6.1
6.1
1.5
1.5
3.0
1.5
1.5
Option
1.0
8.3
8.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
These data point up the danger that SACEUR, General Rogers, may have the
modern Russian equivalents of Halder, Guderian and Rommel facing him, and they
illustrate for intelligence the criticality of our warning and indications estimates. I
agree with Karber that WEI/WUV analysis has its place "as a reasonably short hand
method for establishing military force relationships which require further analysis to
have any real significance. . . " 11 And I reiterate that its best applications are found at
Army Group (Front) or lower echelon.
Of course, WEI/WUV numbers are not the only numerical methods available for
assessing force balances. Two other techniques of static analysis should be described,
both purporting to account for intangibles omitted from WEI/WUV. One might be
termed a macro-analysis, in that it deals with the larger aspects of the power
relationship, assigning weights to each. Ray S. Cline, former Deputy Director for
Intelligence, CIA, and former Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State, proposes an overall formula as follows: 30
Pp=(C+E+M) X (S+W)
where P, is perceived power
(_; = critical mass= populat ion+ territory
E = economic capabilities
M =military capabilities
S = strategic purpose
W = will to pursue national strategy
Within this paradigm, Cline calculates M, military capabilities, by judgmentally
awarding weights for (1) quality of manpower, (2) weapon effectiveness, (3)
infrastructure and logistics, and (4) organizational quality, averaging, and multiplying
by manpower. He produces a number for every nation, which enables tabular displays
of force balances as shown in Table IX.
~` OASD/PA&E, op. cit., Table 1-20, p. 1-34. N.B.: This paper cautions (p. 1-28) that the WEI/WUV-
derived tables do not purport to predict outcome, "apply only to corps-level engagements and should not be
used to evaluate adequacy of NATO's theater posture."
Karber, "Assessing the Balance of Forces," op. cit., p. 5-1.
"Cline, Ray S., World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, Boulder, Colorado, 1977.
SECRET 25
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SECRET The Military Balance
Table IX
Non-Nuclear Military Forces: Estimates of Equivalent Combat Capabilities
Total
Weapon
Infrastruc-
Organiza-
Equivalent
Units of
United States
Manpower
Manpower Effective-
ture &
tional
Combat
and NATO
(thousands)
Quality ness
Logistics
Quality
Average
Capability
United States
2,086
1
1
0.9
0.8
0.9
1,877
West Germany
(FRG)
515
1
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.9
464
Prance
513
0.8
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.7
359
Turkey
490
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.5
0.5
245
Italy
362
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.5
181
United Kingdom
344
1
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.8
275
Greece
200
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.5
0.5
100
Netherlands
112
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.8
90
Belgium
88
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.8
70
Canada
78
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.7
55
Portugal
60
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.4
24
Norway
39
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.7
27
Denmark
35
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.6
21
Total, gross manpower: 4,922,000
Total, equivalent units of combat capability: 3,788
USSR
4,400
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.7
3,080
]',)land
300
0,6
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.6
180
East Germany
(GDR)
204
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.8
163
Rumania
191
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.5
96
Czechoslovakia
190
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.7
133
Bulgaria
177
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.6
106
Hungary
120
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.7
84
(;line modifies these totals further by factors which take into account "strategic
reach" (the distance from homeland) and "scale of effort" (Israel and the USSR get a
bonus for perceived seriousness about matters military). He is then able to draw up a
"final assessment." The following table is an extract to illustrate the outcome:
Concrete
Idements
Perceived
National
Total
Country
Power
Strategy
Will
Coefficient
Total
United States
468
0.4
0.5
Q9
421
FRG
112
0.7
0.8
1.5
168
UK
99
0.6
0.4
1.0
99
USSR
402
0.8
0.5
1.3
523
(;DR
22
0.8
0.2
1.0
22
Poland
48
0.5
0.2
0.7
:34
a Ibid., pp. 114-130
'2lbid., p. 173
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The Military Balance SECRET
In contrast with Cline's "macro" technique, which weights only the grossest
characteristics of national military potential, are such methods of microanalysis
exemplified by Trevor N. Dupuy's "Quantified Judgment Model," a method of
comparing the relative combat effectiveness of two opposing forces in historical
combat by determining the influence of environmental and operational variables upon
the force strength of the two opponents." 33 Dupuy assigns numbers to fifty or more
variables in a series of complex equations describing a real (or hypothetical) battle,
and undertakes comparison following this construct, as shown in Figure 10.
Illustrative is his computation of Force Strength (S), a concept resembling
WEI/WUV:
S=(Ws+Wmg+ Whw) X r?+ Wgj X r,, + (Wg+ Wgy)(rwg X hwg X zwg X wwg) +
(W1Xrw1Xhw1)+(WYXrwyXhwyXzwyXwyy)
The symbols represent the following:
S --Force Strength (overall weapons inventory value of a combat force, as
modified by environmental variables)
W --Weapons Effectiveness or firepower inventories of a force, a summation
of the OLI values of all small arms (W5), machine guns (Wmg),' heavy
zwg --Season factor, related to artillery
wyg--Air superiority factor, related to artillery
rwi -Terrain factor, related to armor
hw; --Weather factor, related to armor
rwy --Terrain factor, related to air support
hwy--Weather factor, related to air support
zwy --Season factor, related to air support
wyy-Air superiority factor, related to air support
But he goes on to compute Combat Power Potential-which sweeps in much more
than the' U.S. Army's Weighted Unit Value:
P=SXmXIeXtXoXbXu5Xr,,Xh,,Xz5Xv
The symbols represent the following:
I' -Combat Potential (Force Strength as modified by operational variables)
m -Mobility factor (as calculated in Equations (6) and (7); m for a defender is
always unity)
le -Leadership factor (when data permits an assessment)*
t -Training and/or Experience factor (when data permits an assessment)*
o -Morale factor (when data permits an assessment)*
b -Logistics factor (when data permits calculation or assessment)*
us -Posture factor, related to Force Strength
r? -Terrain factor, related to Posture
ha-Weather factor, related to Posture
z1, -Season factor, related to Posture
v -Vulnerability value
Dupuy, T. N., Numbers, Predictions, and War, MacDonald's and Jane's, London, 1479, pp. 50ff.
* This is incorporated in a relative combat effectiveness value (CEV) or factor, when it has been
calculated.
SECRET 27
weapons
(W1,w),
weapons
(Wgy),
r?
-Terrain
factor,
rwg --Terrain
factor,
hwg-Weather
factor,
antitank weapons (Wg;), artillery (W.), air defense
armor (W1), or close air support (Wy)
related to infantry weapons
related to artillery
related to artillery
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Quantified Judgment Model
(After T.N. Dupuy)
a. Quantitative
General
(a) Weapons characteristics
(b) TO&Es, both sides
b. Qualitative
2. CALCULATE PROVING GROUND
WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS (OLI)
VALUES
Enter characteristics of
each into OLI calculation
formulae to obtain a value
for each individually and
by categories.
4. CALCULATE FORCE STRENGTH
Apply all relevant environ-
mental variables to the OLI
values of weapons inventories
in each category. Add results
to derive Force Strength (S).
6. CALCULATE RELATIVE COMBAT
POWER
If Pf/Pe > 1, friendly side
should theoretically have
been successful; if Pf/Pe