STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 23 No. 2 Summer 1979]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1979
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
"c'TUDI'ZT~~S
IN
INT', GENCIETT-~,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOL.. 23 No. 2 SUMMER 1979
TR-SINT .79-002
SECRET
NOFORN
0311
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
Materials in the Studies are in genera] to be reserved to U.S.
personnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal
is to be treated as information privy to the U.S. official community.
All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered
serially to facilitate control, accountability and recall. Copies which
are no longer needed by recipients should be returned to the Editor's
office, 1036 C of C Bldg., or may be destroyed if a notice showing
Volume number, Issue number, and Copy number is sent to the
Editor.
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors.
They do not necessarily represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other component of the
intelligence community.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
SECRET
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be
written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or
historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting
an article rests with the Editorial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or not, in
the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribu-
tion to the literature of intelligence.
GEORGE ALIEN
HELENE L. BOATNER
MAURICE C. ERNST
h ABBY E. FITZWATER
DONALD P. GREGG
RICHARD LEHMAN
JAMES TAYLOR
E. J. ZELLMER
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
SECRET
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from
any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside.
Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room
1036 Chamber of Commerce Building and need not be coordinated
through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on
bond paper. Articles may be classified through Secret. Supplements, separately
distributed, can accommodate articles of higher classification.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemination
center or the Center for the Study of Intelligence,
For back issues and on
25X1
other questions, call the Office of the Editor
erox-quality copies of back
25X1
articles can be obtained from Document Services Branch, Office of Central Reference,
where a complete file of Studies is available on microfiche.
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AND
SHERMAN KENT AWARDS
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the
literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the Studies. The prize may be
divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it
may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional $500 is
available for other prizes.
N:xcept as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject
within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be
considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality
and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial
hoard and staff are of course excluded from the competition.
The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves to
itself exclusive competence in the decision.
SECRET
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
CONTENTS
Summer 1979
Page
Studies in Intelligence Awards, 1977 and 1978 ...................................................... v
Personality Profiles in Support of
the Camp David Summit ................................................ Jerrold R. Post, M.D. 1
Intelligence analysis for Presidential diplomacy (SECRET NOFOIN)
The Mayaguez Rescue Operation Revisited .................................... David Mark 29
Intelligence in search of a consumer (SECRET NoFORN)
The Million-Dollar Photograph _ .............................................. Dino A. Brugioni 33
Allen Dulles prices a picture (SECRET)
Soviet Comint and the Civil War, 1918-1921 .............. Thomas R. Hammant 35
Translation from a Soviet history (UNCLASSIFIED)
On Optimism .................................................................... Dr. John L. Stephenson 41
An essay (UNCLASSIFIED)
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................................................ 45
SECRET
NOFORN
27
42
54
58
59
MORI/HRP THIS PAGE
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
The art of remote personality assessment
pays off at the highest level
PERSONALITY PROFILES IN SUPPORT OF
THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
Jerrold Post, M.D.
Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his
historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978
were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third
profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic
triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency
for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for
special praise: "After spending 13 days with the two principals," he said, "I wouldn't
change a word."
The history of studies relating personality and political behavior predates the
founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, but controversy over the validity of such
studies is as strong today as when Walter Langer and his associates probed the psyche
of Adolf Hitler for the OSS. Much of the current controversy is over causality: was a
particular political occurrence caused by a leader's psyche, or did it result from the
action of political, historical and cultural forces? This, I submit, is an unnecessary
focus of contention, for we believe, along with most historians, that most leadership
decisions are multiply determined, and it is when a leader's psychological and political
needs are congruent that there is a particularly strong drive toward action. Even the
most diehard critic would probably agree that if there is any occasion on which
personality features weigh heavily in political proceedings, it is during unstructured
negotiations among world leaders from different cultures with different perceptions,
values, attitudes and styles. Such was the case at Camp David.
On a visit to the Agency in August 1978, President Carter interrupted a briefing
to ask the assembled analysts and intelligence production managers how they could
help him before the forthcoming summit meeting, which had only recently been
announced. He particularly indicated that he wanted to be "steeped in the
personalities of Begin and Sadat."
The presidential request sent a spasm through the National Foreign Assessment
Center. The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) was tasked with
preparing political profiles which emphasized the political perspectives of the two
main actors; the Office of Central Reference (OCR) was tasked with preparing
updated biographic profiles which emphasized personality features; and the Center
for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) in the Office of
Scientific Intelligence was tasked with updating the studies of the personality and
political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin which had been
produced in 1977.
SECRET
MORI/HRP PAGES 1-5
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
SECRET Personality Profiles
In short order, the several components produced the required material. CAPPB's
contribution consisted of three pieces: an updated personality profile of Begin, which
called attention to the increasing trend of oppositionism and rigidity in his personality;
an updated profile of Sadat entitled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex," which stressed his
increasing preoccupation with his role in history and the leverage this could provide in
negotiations; and a paper which discussed the implications for negotiations of the
contrasting intellectual styles of Begin and Sadat. To eliminate redundancy, the OCR
and CAPPB profiles were integrated, emphasizing personality features of the leaders
apt to become of particular significance during the negotiations. The two integrated
personality profiles and the discussion of Begin's and Sadat's contrasting intellectual
styles were the personality materials forwarded to support the Camp David
negotiations.
It is important to emphasize that the ability of all components to respond
effectively in the brief time available rested upon a foundation of significant
background research as well as continuing monitoring of the target leaders. In the
balance of this discussion, some of the research efforts employed to clarify the
personality and political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin will be
described.
A recurring difficulty in analyzing the personality of world leaders is that the
necessary data, although ultimately obtainable, has not been systematically recorded.
Requests for "instant magic" are not uncommon when a coup, assassination-or in
more civilized countries, election-leads to a change of leadership. In order to
anticipate the needs of the intelligence community, over the years CAPPB has
regularly surveyed key intelligence consumers to identify leaders of special interest,
including emerging leaders, and establish research priorities. In developing this
priority list, State/INR, Defense/ISA, the National Security Council, and the National
Intelligence Officers are surveyed. Parenthetically, these survey results have always
impressed the authors with the vigorous diversity of interests among the key
consumers. Indeed, prior to the survey of the summer of [976 no single highest
priority candidate had ever been unanimously identified by all components. But that
survey revealed across-the-board highest priority interest in one world leader,
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.
In developing personality studies several kinds of data are reviewed. In addition
to drawing on all classified reporting, a thorough review of the open literature is
conducted. Official and unofficial biographies have often provided key background
material and insights, as have television, newspaper and magazine profiles. When
there are significant holes in the data, requirements are sent to the field to attempt to
develop the missing information. But the data which is particularly rich and especially
helpful in developing a solid feeling for the complexities of the personality of a leader
is derived from debriefings of senior government and military officials and individuals
from the private sector who have had significant personal contact with the object of
the study. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political
concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and
negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and
observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another,
especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive
negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Personality Profiles SECRET
The strategic importance of the Middle East, the relative imperviousness of the
Near Eastern mind to Western perceptions, and the highly personalized leadership
styles of its rulers have had the effect of focusing a disproportionate share of CAPPB's
efforts on the personalities of Near Eastern leaders. In the process of developing
studies of such leaders as King Hussein of Jordan, Yitzak Rabin of Israel, and Hafiz al-
Asad of Syria, we had regularly debriefed key officials whose concern was the Middle
East, including participants in the shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. So when we
began research for our study of Sadat in the winter of 1977, we had some material
already on hand and were able to reinterview those who had had significant contact
with Sadat.
Several themes emerged as we collated interview impressions. Sadat's concern
with his role in history and his preoccupation with "the big picture," coupled with his
abhorrence of details, were regularly mentioned. By appealing to Sadat's long-range
goals, Secretary Kissinger was often able to overcome negotiating impasses over
technical details.
Ambassador Eilts related one amusing and charming anecdote which epitomized
this quality. The occasion was a luncheon hosted by President Sadat just after a
breakthrough in negotiations. Present were President Sadat, Madame Sadat, Secretary
of State Kissinger, and Ambassador Eilts. "Your Excellency," said Secretary Kissinger,
raising his glass, "without your broad vision of history and your refusal to be bogged
down by petty detail, we never could have come to this day," "No, Henry," replied
President Sadat, "it was your negotiating skill which brought us to this day." "Oh no,
Your Excellency," replied Kissinger, "it was your ability to think in strategic terms
that ...." At this point, Madame Sadat interrupted with a loud sigh to Ambassador
Eilts, "Oh no, here we go again."
A major conclusion of this study addressed the manner in which Sadat's special
view of himself and this "big picture mentality" interacted. "Sadat's self-confidence
and special view of himself has been instrumental in development of his innovative
foreign policy, as have his flexibility and his capacity for moving out of the cultural
insularity of the Arab world. He sees himself as a grand strategist and will make
tactical concessions if he is persuaded that his over-all goals will be achieved.... His
self-confidence has permitted him to make bold initiatives, often overriding his
advisors' objections."
A finished study was disseminated in April 1977, on the eve of Sadat's state visit,
to the United States. Israeli politics were in acute disarray at the time. Yitzak Rabin
was forced to step aside as Labor Party leader in part because of revelations of his
wife's financial activities, and the controversial Shimon Peres became leader with the
elections of the Knesset only a month away. On reading the study of Sadat on a
Friday, President Carter requested for his reading the next Monday a similar study of
Shimon Peres, who, it was widely assumed-despite the Labor Party's difficulties-
would be the next prime minister of Israel. (There has been an assumption that we
maintain such studies as "shelf items" on all leaders of significance.) Modestly
disavowing superhuman abilities, we indicated we would immediately begin research
on a personality study on Peres, and returned to debrief again the shuttle diplomatists.
We were in the midst of the first draft when the stunning election upset occurred
which brought Menachem Begin to power. With retrospective wisdom, most analysts
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET Personality Profiles
have attributed Peres' loss to Labor Party complacency and widespread voter disgust
with allegations of corruption by the Labor government.*
With the election of Menachem Begin, the material on Peres was put aside for
another day, and research was immediately commenced on the new prime minister.
In contrast to Peres, who was well known to a number of U.S. Government officials,
there had been little official contact with Begin. But there was a rich source of
information in the open literature, for in two autobiographic works, the "White
Nights" and "The Revolt," Begin had revealed a great deal of the experience which
had honed his attitude. His preoccupation with legal precision and his inability to
restrain himself from clarifying imprecision was well illustrated by his arguing with
his Russian jailers about details of the Soviet legal code. Furthermore, in analyzing the
forth as well as the content of his writing, it was possible to understand some of the
complexities of his cognitive style. Later, Ambassador Lewis provided particularly
illuminating personal observations of the new prime minister's personality. The
CAPPI3 study was disseminated in July 1977, in time for Begin's first visit with
President Carter.
Once a personality study is completed, with a thorough analysis of the basic
personality structure, it forms a basis for continued monitoring of the subject. This is
particularly important for an individual like Begin, who had not coped with national
leadership before. A major question raised but unanswered by the initial study was
whether this leader, who had spent his lifetime in opposition, could function as a
leader for all the people, utilizing skills of compromise and developing consensus.
The creative diplomacy of November and December of 1977, highlighted by
Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, placed even greater emphasis on the personalities of
the two key actors. A particularly interesting aspect of this visit, and something
probably insufficiently attended to, was the impact of the media upon political
behavior and the conduct of negotiations. Sadat's already special view of himself was
given a new boost. We initially characterized this personality reaction "the Barbara
Walter syndrome," but by summer of 1978, as it grew exponentially, designated it as
Sadat's Nobel Prize complex. As we followed his political behavior particularly closely
over the next several months, one of the most interesting changes had to do with the
sharp increase in the first person singular. The frequency of the word "I" increased
dramatically in Sadat's statements. There were accounts suggesting that Sadat would
not accept reports indicating that his goals for Egypt and himself were in trouble.
*This is not the first occasion when the request for a personality study appeared to precipitate the
downfall of a leader. The publication of a study of King Idris preceded the takeover of Libya by Qadhafi in
a coup by two weeks. A principal conclusion of the study of Rene Barrientos of Bolivia was that "because of
a strong need to prove himself as a man, Barrientos would likely burn himself out before his time."
Barrientos died shortly after publication, having piloted his helicopter into a high-tension wire. Just in the
past year, the program was having a remarkable record. Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa resigned
because of poor health shortly after the publication of the personality study on the very day a major analysis
of the decision-making structure in the Vorster government was disseminated. The succession problem in
the Soviet Union was thrown into disarray by the death of Kulakov, one of the prime contenders to succeed
Brezhnev. His unexpected death by a heart attack followed by two weeks initiation of research on his study.
Our study of Boumediene of Algeria was being drafted when Boumediene suffered an incapacitating and
ultimately fatal cerebellar hemorrhage. An attempt to assassinate Prime Minister-elect Ohira of Japan was
made on the very day our draft study was submitted for editing. Most recently, the initiation of a major
research study on Ugandan leader Idi Amin Dada was followed almost immediately by a Tanzanian
counterattack on Uganda, and on the day the study was disseminated Tanzanian troops were reported in the
streets of Kampala. Although this pattern appears to transcend coincidence, it is not true that initiation of a
CAPPB bersonality study is being used as an alternative to covert action.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Personality Profiles SECRET
There was a consequent shrinkage of the leadership circle around Sadat to those who
would support his optimism.
In parallel, Prime Minister Begin demonstrated a continuing facility for
statements of a provocative nature, often precipitated by reporter's questions. A
member of our center traveled to Israel to update the earlier study of Begin and
focused extensively on some of the growing oppositional properties in Begin's
personality.
The prominence of these personality features led to a proposal that one of the
dinner seminars hosted periodically by the Director of Central Intelligence be devoted
to the topic of "The role of personality in the Middle East conflict." The dinner was
held in the spring of 1978, attended by a number of those who had been intimately
involved in Middle East negotiations, including Ambassador-at-large Alfred Atherton,
Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Harold
Saunders, and Dr. William Quandt, the NSC's senior Near Eastern specialist.
In pulling together materials for this meeting we focused particularly on matters
of form, entirely apart from political substance, and addressed such issues as Sadat's
abhorrence of detail contrasted with Begin's predilection for precision and legalism.
This precipitated a lively discussion among the participants on just how different
Begin and Sadat were as personalities, and the problems these differences made when
they were being dealt with in concert. One senior official advanced the notion that the
personality differences were so profound that the two leaders should never be brought
together in the same room. The task of preparing for the dinner discussions and
distilling and analyzing the proceedings led us to sharpen the focus of our analysis on
the stylistic differences between Begin and Sadat, and helped pave the way for the
focused personality materials produced in support of the Camp David summit.
In focusing on the differences, there was an explicit analysis of the problems in
simultaneous negotiation which these differences would produce, with some
recommendations for dealing with these diverse personalities. The special circum-
stances of Camp David temporarily narrowed the differences between these two
extraordinary individuals and made possible the Camp David accords. Needless to say,
the gap persists. Above and beyond the massive political problems which must be
overcome to reach a settlement, the fundamentally differing personalities of the two
key actors remain a major source of tension in this historic drama, and will require
continued observation and evaluation by the intelligence community.
(This entire article is classified SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.)
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Next 19 Page(s) In Do
cument Denied
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
HAYM SALOMON,
THE SPY WHO BECAME AMERICA'S BANKER
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)
Haym Salomon, sometimes referred to as the "financier of the American
Revolution" because of his large financial commitment to the American cause (for
which he never was repaid), deserves recognition in another quarter as well-as
an American spy.
Salomon had a personal commitment to liberty. He was born about 1740 at
Lissa, Poland, where his parents had settled after being driven first from Spain,
then from Portugal. As a young man, Salomon had the opportunity to travel
throughout Europe and to acquire skills in several European languages, and in his
native land became an advocate of Polish independence. In 1772, when another
pogrom threatened, his parents fled to safety in Holland, and Salomon set out first
for England, then for America, arriving in New York in 1773. He established
himself as a commission merchant and broker, and is said to have involved
himself in the activities of the Sons of Liberty.
When the British occupied New York, Salomon remained in the city,
continuing his patriot activities. On September 22, 1776-the same day that
Nathan Hale was hanged as a spy in New York-British authorities there arrested
Ilaym Salomon as a spy. He was fortunate not to meet Hale's fate, at first being
confined to Sugar House Prison, but later was released and turned over to General
Heister, to serve as an interpreter in the Hessian commissary department. While
detailed to the Germans, Salomon is credited with inducing a number of them to
resign or to desert. After another short period of imprisonment, Salomon was
released on parole and returned to his business. He continued to serve as an
undercover agent, targeting the Hessians for desertion and using his personal
finances to assist American prisoners.
In August 1778, Salomon was again arrested, charged with being an
accomplice in a plot to burn the British fleet and to destroy His Majesty's
warehouses in New York. He was condemned to death for sabotage and sent to the
Provost to await execution. On August 11, 1778, Salomon bribed his jailer with a
belt of gold guineas which he had smuggled into the prison, and made his escape
to Philadelphia. He subsequently served as paymaster for the French forces in
America, handled most of the wartime financial subsidies from France and
Holland, conducted government sales of privateer contraband, was a purchasing
agent for the Continental Army, and was the sole broker for the sale of Congress'
bills of exchange. Far from profiting by these assignments of trust, he returned all
his commissions and by the end of the war had advanced close to $700,000 of his
own funds to the new government and had made many loans to colonial leaders.
After the war he suffered heavy financial reverses and died in bankruptcy.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
Intelligence in search of a consumer
On 12 May 1975, the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez was fired upon and seized by
Cambodian forces near Poulo Wai in the Gulf of Siam. The ship, a 480-foot, 10,000-
ton container craft, was bound from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand, with a cargo of
commercial goods and supplies.
After its seizure by Cambodia, the U.S. crew was taken to Koh Tang, a 3-mile by
2-mile jungle island approximately 34 miles from Kompong Som. Attempts to
negotiate the release of the ship and crew were unsuccessful and, by 13 May, the
White House viewed the use of force as the only way to prevent the crew members
from eventually being taken to the Cambodian mainland and possibly imprisoned. On
14 May the United States launched a military strike against the Cambodian island of
Koh Tang. A major part of the basic intelligence on which the action rested was
provided by CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD).
This article relates the role of one element of the intelligence community in
support of policy makers involved in planning for the Mayaguez rescue operation. In
passing, it shows how standard tasking mechanisms tend to be overlooked or bypassed
in a crisis, and shows the importance of improvisation and flexibility at such times.
The story of the DCD role in the Mayaguez rescue operation is not well known within
the intelligence community, and makes an interesting narrative, presented here in
chronological order.
At 1100 on 13 May 1975, a telephone call was received by a junior DCD
headquarters officer from an officer of the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC) who wanted to know whether DCD could obtain photographs or charts
of Poulo Wai. Ile explained that the Navy had levied a priority request on NPIC for
the information but NPIC files had no material on the island. Someone believed that
oil exploration had been conducted around Poulo Wai; if so, perhaps a U.S. oil
company might have charts, photographs or other data on the island. Could DCD
help?
DCD's New York and Houston offices maintain extensive contacts with U.S. oil
companies, and they were immediately asked to respond, by 1700 if possible, with
anything that might meet the Navy's priority request. By 1630 both New York and
Houston had reported that charts and photographs of Poulo Wai had been located and
would be relayed to headquarters as soon as possible. Both offices volunteered detailed
textual information on the island terrain and on the location of Cambodian
installations and personnel.
The response was gratifying, but when the DCD officer tried to reach his NPIC
contact by phone at 1635, he drew a blank. Without the NPIC intermediary, he had
no way of knowing who wanted the information, how valuable it was, or how urgently
MORI/HRP PAGES 29-31
SECRET 29
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
SECRET The Mayaguez
it might be needed. He had a pretty good idea from the Washington Post and other
media coverage that Poulo Wai must be related to the growing crisis surrounding the
capture of the Mayaguez, but officially he was working in the dark. So at 1645 he
called the CIA Operations Center tb confirm his assumptions and enlist some help in
finding his anonymous consumer. The watch officer on duty, although unware of any
request for intelligence on Poulo Wai, suggested that DCD contact the National
Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Southeast Asia. By 1700 the NIO was on the phone, and
it did not take him long to recognize that the information DCD was trying to relay was
a partial response to a set of requirements originally laid on through his own office. He
asked DCD to begin immediate action to develop similar topographical information
on nearby Koh Tang island.
The DCD officer explained that action might not be possible until the next
morning, since DCD's operations were geared to the normal hours of its sources in the
business community. There was only the briefest pause at the NIO's end of the
conversation before he replied: The information needed on Koh Tang is central to the
situation involving the Mayaguez. No matter what it takes, or how slim the chances
are for getting the information, you have got to go after it now with the highest
possible priority. From now on, he concluded, you can assume that your consumer is
the President and that he will get any information you can develop.
New York and Houston were advised of these new requirements and priorities,
and New York was able to respond with some additional data on Poulo Wai and some
initial information on Koh Tang immediately. At 1800 Houston called with more
material on Poulo Wai, but nothing on Koh Tang. Pressed to pursue the search, the
Houston field officer replied that he was reviewing a list of sources who had not been
contacted in some time in the nebulous hope that something in their background
might provide a lead to a source for the information.
In 15 minutes Houston was back on the line to say that a source had been located.
He was an independent consultant to a U.S. oil company who had done some survey
work on the island a few years earlier. He had the maps and charts, but it would take a
few hours for him to pull the material together and get it to DCD. With the NIO's
injunctions ringing in his ears, the headquarters officer asked Houston to get their
source to a telephone and put him in direct touch with the NIO.
At 1830 this was done and the source briefed the NIO directly on Koh Tang's
terrain as he remembered it. When he had taken all the data down, the NIO told the
Houston field officer that his information couldn't have been more relevant or more
timely, and that he would be passing it on immediately to the DCI for his appearance
at an emergency National Security Council meeting at 2200. With the DCI briefed
and on his way, the NIO told Houston to cease operations for the night at 2130.
Promptly at 0800 the next day, 14 May, the NIO was on the phone to DCD
headquarters with a request form the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the source located the
previous evening be flown to Washington for a military debriefing at 1600 the same
(lay. Houston's response, at 0830, was that it was impossible to obtain a seat on a flight
that would meet the. debriefing deadline. When this word was relayed to the NIO, he
told DCD to sit tight while he tried to get some help from the Pentagon.
At 0900 the NIO advised DCD that a military aircraft was being diverted to
Houston at the direct orders of the Joint Chiefs. The Houston field officer and the
source would be flown direct to Andrews Air Force Base where a helicopter would be
waiting to terry them to the Pentagon. Houston was advised, and the field officer and
his source departed post haste to meet their flight.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
The Mayaguez SECRET
At 1530 DCD headquarters got the word that their field officer and his source
had landed at Andrews and were on their way to the Pentagon; the headquarters
project officer and his boss promptly left to meet them.
At 1600 the debriefing session began in a crowded National Military Command
Center. In attendance were representatives of the Joint Chiefs and other ranking
officers involved in planning the Mayaguez rescue operation. The DCD source gave a
thorough description of Koh Tang's terrain, population centers and fortifications;
pressed, he gave his assessment of potential problem areas. Asked directly by a Joint
Staff officer for his view of the best area on the island to land a strike force, he gave
his opinion. The essential details of his briefing were cabled directly to the assembling
strike force.
The debriefing ended at 1800 and the source was escorted to the NIO's office at
CIA headquarters by the three DCD men. He was still there-in case more
information was needed-at 1930 when word came that the strike against Koh Tang
had been given Presidential approval. A short time later the DCI, enroute from the
White House, called to ask if he could meet the source, and at 2130 the group met in
his office to receive from the Director the President's personal appreciation for their
efforts. The next day the source was flown back to Houston on the same Air Force jet
that had brought him to Washington.
DCD's role in the Mayaguez operation was notable in several respects. It is an
office more accustomed than most to receiving its requirements by way of formal and
often elaborate tasking channels many times removed from the ultimate consumer. As
noted, it is geared to the businessman's working day, and much of its collection work
proceeds at the pace of its commercial sources. It obviously is not as well known to
tasking officers as NPIC or its own parent organization, the Directorate of Operations.
In this case DCD got its tasking requirement almost by accident well after the initial
requirement had been laid on other intelligence collection components, and for awhile
DCD was working without any official sense of the importance and urgency of its
task. Having found one needle in a haystack half a continent away within one working
day, we were promptly sent back to find a smaller one the same night. With a little bit
of luck, a lot of determination and professionalism by a few skilled officers and,
eventually, some well placed assistance, we put the requester and the source face to
face in just over 24 hours through a process that operated almost entirely outside
normal tasking channels and on a wholly informal basis.
Whatever one may think of the purpose and the result of the Mayaguez rescue
operation, it was DCD that provided the essential, ground-level intelligence needed by
the strike force to bring it off. In the process, DCD gained some valuable insights into
the operation of the higher levels of the crisis management mechanism. One can hope
that the crisis managers and the tasking channels in between learned something about
DCD's potential and capabilities as well.
(All of the foregoing article is classified SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.)
SECRET 31
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
MORI/HRP PAGES 32-33
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
SECRET
Allen Dulles prices a picture
Although a technological intelligence revolution occurred under his administra-
tion as Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles remained a case officer at heart
and often had difficulty comprehending the technical intricacies of the collection and
analysis systems over which he presided. Kelly Johnson, the aircraft designer, would
wax eloquent in his presence on the splendid aerodynamic qualities of the U-2.
Richard Bissell had patiently explained the technological breakthroughs of thin-based
film and panoramic cameras, and Arthur Lundahl had explained many times how
modern photo interpretation was performed. Dulles' grasp of the technological
processes underlying these systems remained remote, but he had no difficulty
appreciating the results.
One of the burning questions of the day was whether the United States was
suffering a "bomber gap" in comparison with the Soviet Union, and a principal task of
the intelligence community was to ascertain the number of Bison bombers in the
Soviet inventory.
When the U-2 photographed the bomber arsenal at Saratov Engels airfield, the
Bisons were lined up wingtip-to-wingtip, clearly showing that there were fewer than
had been estimated. The bomber gap controversy had for all practical purposes been
settled.
When Lundahl and Bissell spread the photo before Mr. Dulles, the Director lit his
pipe, took several deep puffs, turned to Frank Wisner, his covert intelligence chief,
and asked, "How much would you have paid for the information in this
photography?" Wisner thought for a moment and answered, "About a million
dollars."
In subsequent testimony before Congressional committees, at White House
intelligence briefings, budget hearings, and on other occasions, Mr. Dulles frequently
displayed the photograph. But he never referred to it as the Saratov Engels or the
Bison photo. NPIC always knew what briefing board he wanted when he or his aides
would call to ask that the "million-dollar photo" be included in his briefing packet.
(This entire article and the accompanying photograph are classified SECRET.)
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Revolutionary origins of Soviet
communications intelligence
SOVIET COMINT AND THE CIVIL WAR, 1918-1921*
Translator's note: The following is a translation of the article "The
Organization and Combat Use of Radio Intelligence During the Civil
War," by Col. Yu. Ural'skij in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Journal of
Military History), Moscow, No. 11, 1972. The article gives a rare glimpse
into the early operations of Soviet Comint and the importance that the
top leadership gave to it from the very beginning of the Soviet regime.
Footnotes citing Soviet archival records have been eliminated, and a few
explanatory footnotes, enclosed in brackets, have been added.
When setting up control agencies, units, and subdivisions of the communications
troops of the Red Army that was being created to defend the Soviet authority, the
Revvoensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Republic (RSVR)' attached
great importance to the use of radio as a means of communication among the troops
and to its application in the interests of intelligence.'
During the period of the civil war, the radio situation that had developed on all
fronts favored the organization of radio intelligence by the Red Army, since the
combat actions encompassed a large territory of Soviet Russia and were of a mobile
nature. The interventionists and White Guardists made rather broad communications
use of fixed and mobile (field) radio sets, which were supplied to the headquarters of
their armies, corps, and divisions, as well as to naval vessels and merchant ships that
were carrying troops, arms, ammunition, and other military supplies to the White
Armies of the Entente.' Attached to the headquarters of Kolchak, Denikin, and
Wrangel were military-diplomatic missions from the Entente countries with a staff of
military advisors who had radio sets at their disposal. They maintained contact with
London, Paris, Warsaw, Athens, Constantinople, and other cities.
The interventionists and the internal counter-revolutionaries carried out radio
communications in the range of 250-3500 meters, with wave lengths from 290 to 740
meters being used for field communications. The White Guardists had at their disposal
the radio sets of the former Russian Army, as well as American, British, and French
equipment that had been supplied by the Entente. For example, Kolchak's
*For previous articles on the origins of Russian communications intelligence, see works by the same
author in Studies Summer 1977 XXI/2, p. 21, and Summer 1978 XXII/2, p. 29. This article is adapted from
the September 1978 issue of CRYPTOLOG.
' [The RSVR was set up on 2 September 1918 to unify all military control at the fronts and in the rear
during the civil war period.]
2 Radio intelligence had sprung up and had received its organizational formulation during World
\Var I.
,[It appears that the Soviet use of the term "Entente" includes all the non-Russian interventionist
forces, rather than just the World War I Allies.] MORI/HRP PAGES 35-40
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Soviet Comint
headquarters in Omsk had a radio set with a power of 30 kilowatts, which was used to
set up communications along the lines: Omsk-Arkhangel'sk-London and Omsk-
Nikolaev-Constantinople-Paris. The fixed radio sets had a power of 3-30 kilowatts, and
the field and shipboard radio sets, respectively, 0.5 and 3 kilowatts; this made it
possible, on medium and long waves, to cover rather considerable distances either
directly or by way of intermediate radio sets. At the same time this allowed radio
intelligence to monitor the enemy's radio transmissions from a considerable distance.
There was almost no observance of communications security or discipline among
the White forces." Operational summaries concerning combat operations at the fronts,
and sometimes even combat orders, were transmitted by radio in the clear. Sometimes
the addresses in the radio messages were not encrypted, for example: "Urgent.
Operational [summary] No. 3. Via Krinichnaya by radio to General Shkuro..." The
radio data [callsigns, frequencies, etc.] of field radio sets were not changed for long
periods of time. It was possible to determine who the radio sets belonged to by their
call-signs, for example: PGW-poezd generala Wrangelya (General Wrangel's train);
ALM-cruiser Almaz; ZhA-destroyer Zharkij; ShI-submarine Shipka; GRV-
Cur'ev; etc. The grouping of enemy troops and the department and movements of
headquarters could be learned from radio messages; from radio direction-finding
information, from conversations in the clear between officials, or, indirectly, when the
field radio set ceased operating and then started broadcasting again, but with reduced
audibility.
Thus, the White and interventionist radio communications were a priceless source
of information for the Red Army radio intelligence service concerning the enemy.
When, in the course of the civil war, Soviet Russia proved to be surrounded by a
fiery ring of fronts, telegraphic communication with the Western European countries
was cut off, and the delivery of foreign newspapers and magazines stopped, there was
a sharp limitation in the amount of incoming information concerning international
life. However, as during the years of World War I, the international radio stations
(Paris, Lyon, Nauen, Carnarvon, Corsi, Rome) continued to transmit regularly (within
the wave-length band of 600 to 1500 meters) newspaper reports concerning the
international and military situation. The reports submitted by the foreign
correspondents accredited to the headquarters of the White armies traveled along
these channels. All this was of interest and enabled the RSVR, and the Red Army
headquarters and troops, to intercept that information and to be informed concerning
the international and military events, and to obtain valuable information about the
enemy.
For the Petrograd Telegraph Agency (PTA) and subsequently the Russian
Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), the interception of foreign reports was carried out at the
Moscow, Tver', and Tsarskoe Selo radio stations, which had been constructed in 1914
for the purpose of linking the Russian Army's General Staff with the frontline staffs
and with the Allies. In April 1918 these and other radio stations in the War
Department were transferred, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, to the
People's Commissariat for Mail and Telegraph. In order to increase the amount of
information, in the facilities occupied by ROSTA, its own radio station was set up in
'[it also appears that the Soviets had a problem in maintaining communications security as well,
especially curing the Red Army's offensive against Poland in the Civil War. According to a former Colonel
of the Polish Army General Staff, Polish Comint units kept the General Staff constantly informed on the
movements and intentions of the Red Army. See M. Stezhinskii, Radiotelegraf Kak Sredstvo Razvedki
(Radiotelegraph as a Source of Intelligence) (Translated from the Polish), Moscow, Voenizdat., 1932,
pp. 20-21, cited in Marshal IT. Peresypkin, Voennaya Radiosvyaz' (Military Radio Communications),
Moscow, Voenizdat., 1962.1
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Soviet Comint
1919; that radio station received reports from the correspondents at the civil war
fronts, and also intercepted foreign telegrams. They were used in Pravda and
Izvestiya, which regularly printed surveys of military operations at the front, and, in
addition, provided special "pages for the Red Army man." A similar station was
located at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
The organization of a radio intelligence service in the Army dates from the
beginning of 1919. However, attempts to carry out radio intelligence and to intercept
enemy radio messages had been undertaken earlier by Red Army units. For example,
during the second half of 1918, the interception of foreign reports was organized at
radio stations 504, 600, 601, and 602 of the Western Sector of the screen detachments
which had been intended for operational communications. This was carried out by
radiotelegraph operators who were familiar with radio intelligence from having served
in the old Russian army. During the period from July to October 1918, they
intercepted 1576 radio messages. In July 1918, radio station 504 carried out
surveillance and interception of the radio messages from the field radio stations of the
Kransnov troops which were operating in the Don area. The necessity of organizing
not only radio intelligence, but also radio counterintelligence, was recognized by the
front headquarters, For example, the Board for the Administration of the Military
Telegraph Communications of the Northern Front, in a report to the military
commissar of the Northern Front in November 1918, noted, "... in order to detect
and to provide warnings concerning the possible operation of enemy radio stations in
the rear of our armies, and also in order to obtain information concerning the location
and operation of radio stations attached to enemy military units, it is necessary to set
up radio direction-finding stations and to organize radio monitoring on the front...."
The formation of radio intelligence subdivisions began in January 1919. Every
front and army headquarters was supposed to have one intercept station (priemo-
informatsionnaya stantsiya) and a radio direction-finding station. The former was
intended for the reception of ROSTA summaries beginning with the words "to all
Soviet deputies, to all editorial offices, to all propaganda points," and for the
interception of foreign newspaper reports and radio messages transmitted by the
enemy's field radio sets. It was manned by eight persons and had one or two radio
receivers with a vacuum-tube amplifier. The latter was supposed to detect enemy
radio stations and get bearings on them. The staff at the radio direction-finding station
consisted of 19 persons. In January 1919, for the purpose of supporting the Field Staff
of the RVSR with intelligence information, a radio intercept station manned by 22
persons was set up at Serpukhovo.
Radio intelligence tasks were frequently assigned also to the field radio stations of
troop staffs. But that was caused by an acute shortage of radio facilities and
radiotelegraph operators working in the intelligence field.
The radio apparatus used for radio intelligence consisted of old models and was
produced both by foreign companies and in the shops of the Navy Department. For
the most part, they were detection receivers with a wave length range of 240 to 5100
meters. With the aid of changeable circuits, the limit of the range was extended to
15,000 meters. In order to increase the sensitivity at the radio receivers, three-cascade
amplifiers operating on radio tubes were used.
Because of the shortage of radio direction-finding stations, an engineer at the
Communications Directorate of the Red Army, V. I. Bazhenov, invented a special
antenna. This antenna made it possible to adapt for purposes of direction-finding the
ordinary field radio sets.,
See Instruktsiya po prisposobleniyu polevykh radiostantsij k radiopelengovaniyu po sposobu
inzhenera Bazhenova (Instruction Manual for Adapting Field Radio Sets to Radio Direction-Finding by
Engineer Bazhenov's Method), Moscow, 1922.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Soviet Comint
Organizationally speaking, the radio intercept and radio direction-finding stations
were part of the radiotelegraph battalions of fronts and armies.
The over-all management of the radio intelligence service was carried out by the
radio department of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, and, at the
front, by radio-communications and radio-intelligence sections of the communications
directorates of the fronts and armies. The sections summarized the radio-intercept
data, and drew up informational documents-daily radio-intelligence summaries and
diagrams showing enemy radio communications as they had reconstructed it. These
materials were intended for the Field Headquarters of the RSVR and for the
intelligence sections of the appropriate staffs. The most important information was
immediately transmitted by telegraph to the Field Headquarters of the RSVR and to
other interested headquarters.
It should, however, be noted that the possibility of organizing and making combat
use of Red Army radio intelligence at the fronts was limited because of the shortage of
radio equipment and specialists. As a result of this circumstance, on all fronts except
the Caucasian Front it was impossible to carry out completely the radio direction-
finding of enemy radio sets.
During the civil war years, the radio-intercept stations intercepted a large
quantity of radio reports issued by foreign telegraph agencies. During 1919-1921,
approximately 1000 intelligence summaries were issued solely on the basis of materials
intercepted by just one radio station, attached to the RSVR (translated from English,
French, German, and Italian). Summaries of radio-intercept materials from the
foreign press were reported to V. I. Lenin. They were also regularly provided to
members of the RSVR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin, the
Moscow Oblast' Committee of the RKP(b), the Cheka,l ROSTA, and the directorates
anti departments of the RSVR Field Headquarters on matters pertaining to their areas
of responsibility.
The communiques transmitted by foreign radio stations contained important
political, economic, and military information. For example, a radio message
intercepted early in 1919 revealed Kolchak's over-all strategic plan for the 1919 spring
offensive. In a statement made by Kolchak in Omsk, it was started, "We will attempt
to establish contact with Arkhangel'sk, and as soon as we succeed in occupying a line
on the Volga, we shall establish contact with the south and General Denikin, after
which we will change over to the offensive and advance on Moscow. Seizing Moscow
is our primary goal. . . ...
In his article "How the Bourgeoisie Uses Renegades," V. I. Lenin emphasized the
value of foreign radio communiques. "Our radio stations," he wrote, "intercept radio
messages from Carnarvon (England), Paris, and other European centers. Paris is now
the center of the worldwide alliance of imperialists and, therefore, its radio messages
are frequently of particular interest.
The radio waves were the first to carry across the front line the information that
the Entente was preparing a new campaign against Soviet Russia (the chief reliance
being placed on bourgeois Poland and Wrangel).
During the period of Red Army combat operations against Kolchak in 1918-1919,
the radio intelligence service on the Eastern Front successfully monitored the radio
communications of Kolchak's Siberian, Western, and Urals White Cossack armies, as
well as White Guard radio stations in the Astrakhan, Gur'ev, Krasnovodsk, and Baku
[Secret police; predecessor of KGB.]
V. t. Lenin, Poln. sobr. loch. (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 39, p. 182.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Soviet Comint
areas. Kolchak's radio contact with the Entente was also established. Radio messages
and radio conversations in the clear made it possible to establish the location of the
headquarters of Kolchak, Denikin, the Caspian Front, the Caucasian and Don Armies,
the Astrakhan Detachment, and the group of forces in the Northern Caucasus.
In the summer of 1919, in combat engagements against the White Cossack Urals
Army, the enemy's radio communications were monitored not only by the radio-
intercept stations at the headquarters of the Turkestan Front and the I and IV Armies,
but also by radio station 529 at the headquarters of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 596 at
the 24th Rifle Division, and 530 at the 25th Rifle Division.
On the Southern and Southeastern Fronts in 1919, radio stations 504, 522, 518,
and others monitored the field radio stations of Denikin's army and the fixed stations
situated on the coast of the Black Sea (Nikolaev, Odessa, Sevastopol). On the basis of
radio messages and radio conversations in the clear, the radio intelligence service on
the Southern Front in May 1919 succeeded in revealing rather precisely a grouping of
Denikin troops in the south and in noting a concentration of the Volunteer Army in
the Azov-Donetsk sector, the III Don Army in the Lugansk sector, the II Don Army on
the Northern Donets, the I Don Army to the south of the Don, in the Tsaritsyn sector,
and General Wrangel's Caucasian Army in the Northern Caucasus, and also succeeded
in establishing the deployment of many of the White Guard troop headquarters.
On 5 October 1919 a radio intercept station at the IX Army headquarters
intercepted and decrypted radiogram 04118, which contained a combat order issued
by the Commander of the Voronezh Group, General-Lieutenant Shkuro. The order
assigned tasks to the units of Shkuro's cavalry corps after its seizure of Voronezh. The
information received was immediately transmitted to the headquarters of the
Southeastern Front.
The radio intelligence service of the Red Army operated more successfully
against Wrangel in the concluding phase of the civil war. Factors that contributed to
this were the experience that had been accumulated in the combat use of radio
facilities for purposes of intelligence, and the improvement in the supplying of
technical equipment to radio battalions.
During the Red Army's combat actions against the Wrangel forces, many of the
intercepted radio messages dealt with enemy groupings, the redeployment of
headquarters, and the headlong flight of the White Guardists from the Crimea. For
example, in one radio intelligence summary issued by the headquarters of the
Southern Front it was indicated, "From radio messages intercepted by the chief front
[station] from radio stations 6ZhT, 7ZY, and 5PY, one can make the following
conclusion: radio station 5PY, attached to the 2nd Don Cavalry Division,
approximately between 29 September and 1 October, was transferred, together with
the division, to the area to the north of Volkovakha; previously that radio station had
been in the Aleksandrovka area." The data obtained was subsequently confirmed by
tactical reconnaissance.
Beginning on 8 August 1920 the radio stations on the Caucasian Front noted an
exceptionally large amount of radio traffic in the Sea of Azov area. The possibility of a
landing operation was raised. And, indeed, on 14 August, under the command of
General Ulagay, a landing was made in the Akhtarsk area. Front-line radio
intelligence continuously monitored the enemy's radio communications, intercepting
radio messages and official conversations. The information thus received contributed
to the defeat of this landing.
On 16 October a radio intercept station of the Caucasian Front headquarters
intercepted an order from the Commander of the II Army, General Abramov, which
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
had been sent in the clear. That order concerned the changeover on 17 October to the
offensive against the Red Army units on the Kakhovka bridgehead. Knowledge of the
enemy's plan of operations helped the headquarters of the Southern Front-to whom
the intercepted White order was forwarded-to destroy the Wrangel forces at
Kakhovka.
In the final stage of the Red Army's combat actions in the fight for the Crimea,
the White Guardists did not have enough time to encrypt their combat documents,
and the radio traffic was sent in the clear. The radio messages contained information
concerning the withdrawal of units, their evacuation from the Crimea. For example,
changes in the enemy's groupings were mentioned in the 25 October 1920 radio-
intelligence summary issued by the Southern Front: "... radio station OCh, attached to
I Army headquarters, was removed, for transfer to a new location. Apparently the
enemy has begun evacuating Melitopol. Radio station 81T, which serves the
headquarters of the troops operating in the Nikolaev area, also has been removed for
transfer to a new location. During the past few days we have observed almost no
activity by the enemy's field radio stations. One can assume that the headquarters of
the divisions and corps to which the field stations are attached are being redeployed."
Radio communications also provided information about the course of the
evacuation of Wrangel's troops from the Crimea. For example, General Kutepov
reported to the fleet commander that he had 6500 officers and men on board a
steamship, and there was absolutely no water or bread. He also reported that "the
LAZAR, which was being towed by it," had sunk as a result of a leak. The
KRONSHTADT reported to Constantinople that it had absolutely no coal or food
supplies, it had 5000 passengers on board, and was towing the ZVONKIJ.
On the basis of the radio intercept information, the Commander of the Southern
Front, M. V. Frunze, in order dated 15 November 1920, demanded the "development
of the most energetic efforts on the part of submarines and the liquidation of the
enemy's attempts to use the sea to escape the blows being dealt by our armies."'
Thus, it follows from what has been stated that during the years of the civil war
the Red Army's radio facilities were used successfully for intelligence purposes against
the enemy.
At a conference of front-level chiefs of communications troops that was held in
1921, the activities of radio intelligence were rated highly. The radio intelligence
service that had been created in our Armed Forces "completely justified its purpose
and provided the Red Army with valuable material concerning the enemy, thus
helping the Red Army to achieve victory." The role and importance of
communications troops, including the role and importance of the radio facilities, were
also given their proper credit by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic,
which, in recognition of the valorous and extremely valuable work for the benefit of
Soviet Russia, expressed its appreciation to the entire complement of commissars,
commanders, and Red Army men in the Red Army communications troops.
The combat experience of using radio equipment for intelligence purposes during
the years of the civil war was used for the further development of the radio
intelligence service in the Red Army.
" M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoj vojny (M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts). Collection of
articles, Moscow, 1941, p. 448. Unfortunately, the submarine forces could not execute this order. The two
submarines in the Black Sea-the AG-23 and the AG-24-were not ready for operations in the open sea.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Dr. John L. Stephenson
A few years back a statement so frequently heard that it almost became an
aphorism was, "An optimist learns Russian, a pessimist learns Chinese." Today in
intelligence circles a similar expression containing another dour thought might well be,
"An optimist learns to live with oversight, a pessimist learns to live with public
disclosure." But the path along which intelligence officials are now traveling has no
simple sign-posts that give absolute directions. Should the language of choice be
Chinese or Russian? How much should the Congress and the public know? The mind
set needed by anyone who would thread his way through these thickets is that of the
optimist, not the pessimist.
Each of us has a definition of what optimism means. Generally we think of an
optimist as one who sees more good than evil in the world and, when there is conflict,
finds good triumphing over evil. There is no intention here to advocate that the
intelligence community should have a Panglossian view of the world. We do not
necessarily live in the best of all possible worlds and, in fact, may not inhabit the only
world. As intelligence officers, we should see the path to the future as an opportunity
to optimize our creative abilities. The future does not have to be a shock, nor should it
be seen as a hopeless thicket. It should be seen as a tomorrow of opportunity in which
intelligence history will be made by those who have the foresight to recognize that the
next tomorrow will be even more challenging. That is the optimism which we should
seek to cultivate.
Nowadays pessimism is running rampant in the country. Its descendant, greed, is
popularized in the media as the "me society." Grab it today; there may not be an
opportunity tomorrow. We cannot question that the world is in turmoil. Who knows
what will happen tomorrow? The task of intelligence is to help clarify the situation for
the U.S. Government. With an attitude of pessimism, however, the result is paralysis.
When the concept of optimism is forsaken, "no" is an easy answer to give requests for
new intelligence initiatives. To allow new initiatives to be stymied by pessimism is
tantamount to losing the battle without even fielding the forces.
Optimism, on the other hand, spawns benefits over and above accomplishing an
organization's mission. To get and keep good people an organization must maintain an
environment of achievement. Optimists are achievers. They are the ones who will
attract and hold others to their cause. Good morale should never have to become an
organizational goal in and of iteself. It will come from doing good work, from
achieving, from seeing the opportunity of the future. The stimulating atmosphere of
optimism, not the paralysis and decay of pessimism, is what intelligence needs not only
to measure the future, but also to create its own vitality. MORI/HRP PAGES
41-42
41
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
On Optimism
Estimates, which by definition concern the future, are the ultimate refinement of
an intelligence organization's purpose, and the estimative process is the breath and
blood of the intelligence organization's existence. Optimism, in the sense of a desire to
contemplate the future as an opportunity for creativity, needs to be infused into the
entire chain of events that takes place in arriving at an estimate. If this optimism, this
active desire to address the future and master it, has been dulled, then we need to
rekindle it.
Perhaps in our maturation as an Agency we have tended to squeeze out of our
people the attitudes and thought processes that give rise to innovation. Innovation is
needed in devising new methods of collection. Innovation is needed, perhaps even
more importantly, in finding the hidden requirements (or questions) which, if.
answered, will produce that flash of understanding which is so critical in the
estimative process.
As an aid in coming to grips with the problem of a lack of innovation, pose to
yourself the question, "Why do we place so much emphasis on the study of history
when all our lives will be spent in the future?" A discussion of that question, especially
by people whose profession is estimating the future, would do well to conclude that
educational time should be allotted to a course of study called "future." This is not to
denigrate the lessons of history. Rather it is to force us to look ahead, to be
imaginative, to contemplate the future with an air of optimism, for history is not
created in its own image.
If we can begin to see the future as an outlet for our creativity, then maybe the
optimism that blossomed in our youth will be extended in time. From these blossoms
will come not the decayed fruit of middle-age self-doubt and pessimism, but rather
the seed of new opportunity and optimism.
JOHN JAY ON SECRET INTELLIGENCE
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)
... There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the
persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those
apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by
mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions
who would rely on the secrecy of the President who would not confide in that of
the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have
done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties that although
the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate,
yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as
prudence may suggest.
John Jay
The "Federalist"
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
For 23 years Studies in Intelligence has provided a medium for the publication
of articles on theoretical, doctrinal, operational and historical aspects of intelligence
work. More and more frequently in recent years readers have urged on the Editors the
adoption of a more contemporary and forward-looking viewpoint in the selection and
commissioning of articles. A criticism often heard is that articles and book reviews
tend to focus on the "good old days" of World War II and the early years of the Cold
War. Why, it is asked, do we read about contemporary operations only in
commercially published works derived from unauthorized disclosures, from files
released under the Freedom of Information Act, and from the pens of former
employees? Why do the debates over the role of intelligence in an open democracy fill
pages of the Congressional Record and the Washington Post but leave the pages of
Studies untouched? Where are the articles by the current generation of intelligence
practitioners that challenge the precepts of an earlier age and explore the problems of
global intelligence in a multi-polar world?
The answers to these and other critical questions lie less with the Board of Editors
than with our readers, who are both the object and the source of the articles published
in Studies. As the last veterans of the OSS and the men who broke PURPLE and
produced MAGIC pass into retirement, there is still a need to distill their wisdom and
experience into tonics for the present and the future. But there is a much greater need
for contemporary practitioners of our craft to come forward with the lessons they have
learned and the perceptions they have of the future of intelligence.
The Board of Editors is persuaded that a modern and successful approach to
intelligence work has indeed been developed during the past decades and that useful
thinking is being devoted to the intelligence challenges of the future. It remains only
for members of the present generation of intelligence practitioners to contribute to the
continuing literature of our craft as the passing generation has contributed in its time.
We wish to make explicit, therefore, that the intended focus of Studies in
Intelligence is on the contemporary and future practice of intelligence, as well as
lessons from the past. As an essayist has written elsewhere in this issue, we see the
future as a creative opportunity, and we earnestly solicit contributions from those who
share our vision.
MORI/HRP THIS PAGE
43
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
THE WIZARD WAR: BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, 1939-1945. By
R. V. Jones. (Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, New York, 1978.) 556 pages.
The Wizard War is an important book for some of us but should be a joy for all
who read it. It is an autobiographical account of R. V. Jones' experience as the
"Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science)" on the British Air Staff during World
War II. In that role, he is credited with the development of scientific intelligence, a
credit I believe he deserves. In the course of the account, Jones and a handful of
associates deal-in high boffin* style-with German attempts to overwhelm the
British in the air war through increasingly sophisticated technological ploys including
the use of navigational beams, radar defenses, airborne radar, electronic warfare, and,
finally, the V-weapons.
With one notable exception, afficionados of R. V. Jones will find little new insofar
as his war experiences are concerned; the book is largely a repackaging of previously
published stories, often with the original prose intact. Added now, however, is the
Enigma dimension, which proves to be large indeed and adds a credibility that some
of the old stories seemed to lack. The attempt to uncover the meanings of project or
operational codewords discovered through communications intercepts is particularly
intriguing. But most importantly, for those who have come to admire Jones as an
individual and to appreciate the effect of his personality, the tales run back to his
childhood and family, his years in school and at the Clarendon Laboratory at Oxford
under the direction of "the Prof," F. A. Lindemann, later to become Lord Cherwell
and one of Britain's more controversial figures. Here, too, is a postscript, bittersweet,
as memories of triumphs and glories are mixed with the sense that if only a Britain
drifting downstream since 1945 could be reminded of past accomplishments it might
abandon a "mood of self-seeking easement" in favor of a sense of purpose and service
that would restore its stamina and capacity to act. It is no surprise to learn that Jones'
father was a sergeant in the Grenadier Guards who demanded of his son discipline,
precision, service and endurance.
Jones, if nothing else, is a dynamite storyteller, and it is this quality of the book
that should delight even its Luddite readers. If you can't find excitement in glimpses
of such scientific movers and shakers as Lindemann, Tizard, Watson-Watt, de Bye,
Schroedinger, E. A. Milne and James Tuck as real people, you are still left with
anecdotes that deserve retelling even if the names are forgotten. It is to the author's
credit that he never fails to interrupt the war or slow the development of a vital
countermeasure if he can throw in a good story about the people involved. It makes
one admire the British system as well as to learn that good old Freddy Wintle (an
Army major posted to Air Intelligence to coordinate information about German anti-
aircraft gun defenses), after having been incarcerated in the Tower for threatening the
Director of Air Intelligence with his revolver, flummoxed an Army court-martial by
insisting that he had not meant to intimidate the Air Commodore since he well knew
* "boffin, n (origin unknown) Brit. slang, a scientific expert." (Webster's Unabridged. But see p. 46
below-Editor.) MORI/HRP PAGES 45-50
45
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
that "he is the type of officer that if you rushed into his room and shouted at the top of
your voice 'the Air Ministry's on fire!' all he would do would be to take up his pen and
write a minute to someone about it!" Such stories are abundant and have been well
polished in the retelling.
But all of this aside, the intelligence story is magnificent. The unravelling of
Knickebein, the first of the German bomber navigation schemes, is a classic tale of
technical intelligence analysis. All the elements we use today are there: clandestine
reporting, prisoner interrogation, Elint, Comint, overhead photography, materiel
exploitation, that beautiful, clean, logical analysis that is founded on a few physical
principals, and good luck.
It was the breaking and countering of Knickebein that made Jones a major figure
in British intelligence during the war and set him on the course of fathering scientific
intelligence. It was the beginning of a love affair with Winston Churchill, who long
remembered and wrote of Jones as the man who "broke the Bloody Beams." There is
little purpose in recounting here the intelligence story itself; suffice it to say that the
problems and the technical intelligence analysis were worthy of one another. Told by
another participant, I am sure the stories would vary, with the pre-eminent role
assigned in different ways. Forget it. The participants and the disagreements and the
contributions are accounted for and the achievements of scientific intelligence in
dealing with the enigmas of the "Wizard War" are notable enough to reflect credit on
all who were involved.
It would be misleading to suggest that Jones' role was only that of a technical
intelligence analyst. He was analyst, collector, countermeasure inventor, operator, and
policy advocate across the whole range of the technical war. Indeed, he somehow
carried the responsibility in MI-6 for scientific intelligence as well as his comparable
role on the Air Staff, an arrangement that was the basis of his leadership of scientific
intelligence. His role was, in fact, so central to the intelligence effort against German
technology that the figure of Jones himself becomes very intriguing. He holds strong
views about the process of intelligence analysis and the way it should be organized. To
no small degree these derive from his own characteristics and predilections.
Organizationally, he seems to have been remarkably successful in winning
acceptance by the leading figures with whom he worked and gaining access to the full
range of information and activities related to his intelligence efforts. On a more formal
level, the bureaucracy defeated him at every turn. Indeed, his initial appointment to
the Air Staff was blocked by the Treasury, which would not authorize his salary of 575
pounds a year. Even Jones' account makes it clear that he must have been a four-star
pain-in-the-ass to those who expected reasonable behavior of civil servants. A proper
27-year-old, on being assured of the adequacy of bomber navigation, does not confront
leaders of the Bomber Command with a query as to why, if this were true, so many
bombers on practice flights flew into hills. Jones was a classic British boffin, a term
used to denote scientists working with the Services during the war for which many
amusing etymological derivations have been suggested. Perhaps most appropriate here
is Watson Watt's description of the boff in as having a bill with two separate functions:
"One is to poke into other peoples' business and the other is to puncture the more
highly coloured and ornate eggs of the Lesser Back Room Bird which are quite
inappropriate to the military scene." Jones was adept at performing both functions.
His apparent concern for personal recognition and intolerance towards those who
resisted giving it generates the major flaw in The Wizard War. The book is flavored
by a preoccupation with "setting the record straight" about personal contributions and
the priority of ideas; it comes off as unseemly. It is not that Jones fails to share credit,
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
for this he does most magnanimously, and the final section almost washes away the
bad taste. He tends to be magnanimous, however, toward those with whom he was not
really competing. He seems a prickly fellow with little tolerance for the failing of
others. Much of the book has the flavor of the bitter academic rivalries and
machinations of C. P. Snow's The Masters.
Jones' principal organizational cause is for the central direction of all scientific
intelligence (including both analysis and collection) by a person who is genuinely a
scientific intelligence officer rather than just a scientist. His bitterest bureaucratic
defeat came at the end of the war when, at the recommendation of P. M. S. Blackett,
separate scientific and technical intelligence organizations were created in all the
services and in MI-6. Jones saw his wartime leadership of all scientific intelligence
deteriorate into membership on a committee of 13, with rotating chairmanship, which
was to direct the activities of all the organizations involved. Rather than accept such
an arrangement he took the Chair of Natural Philosophy at Aberdeen University,
where he remains today.
Some of Jones' precepts about intelligence are important. He strongly urges that
the final judgments of intelligence be made by technical intelligence officers rather
than by scientists serving as consultants. The latter, he argues, are so susceptible to
ascribing specific scientific failures to physical impossibility (false principles of
impotence) that they are unacceptably vulnerable to situations in which they have
failed or not tried to achieve an important development but in which the enemy
succeeds. In such cases, the intelligence officer must consider the information from all
his sources, including the scientific expert, and question them all until he can
somehow resolve the incompatabilities that exist. Only he can do that. It is, of course,
required that he have the technical competence to take issue with the experts on the
scientific substance of the matter.
On the face of it, this is an unassailable argument. In fact, however, the large
number of defense scientists with widely differing views available in the United
States-a group principally characterized by an ability to overcome technical obstacles
intimidating to the normal man-ensure that the "principle of impotence" will not be
too easily invoked by any segment of the community. Moreover, technical intelligence
analysis rests upon a structure of constraints on the doable that enables the analyst to
bound the possibilities of what is occurring with high credibility. In recent times he
has suffered from an overabundance of hypothetical attacks on reasonable constraints
that has reduced attempts at analysis to shambles. In consequence, it is often the
intelligence analyst rather than the scientist who becomes enamored of his constraints
and is unwilling to see them fall to more imaginative thinking. The consulting scientist
has been particularly valuable in challenging constraints too deeply embedded in our
thinking. Nonetheless, this situation does not weaken the argument that it is the
technical intelligence analyst who, in the end, must make the final judgment on the
basis of all the information at hand.
Jones argues for small organizations and the close participation of the director of
scientific intelligence in the analysis. In such circumstances, the individual can make
the organizational integration we so painfully pursue among large numbers of analysts.
Splendid! But for the United States, at least, the staggering workload generated by the
range of problems with a significant technical ingredient, the lack of sharp focus
provided by the exigencies of war, and the need to deal with problems that run from
tomorrow to 20 years hence all limit the efficacy of such advice. No doubt the quality
of finished intelligence would be higher if it were produced by a small group of men
of the caliber of Jones and his associates. No doubt either that the satisfactions in being
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
part of such a group would be higher than to be a part of our present intelligence
factory, but it simply is not to be.
The point is well made that intelligence is not an end in itself but has value only
to the extent that it succeeds in generating proper responsive action. Much of The
Wizard War is taken up with Jones' efforts to this end. All in all, he was remarkably
successful. Success only comes, of course, with a reputation for credibility based on
accurate and timely reporting. He achieved credibility through his work on
Knickebein and his remarkable success in combining his knowledge of the later
navigational beam systems with Enigma decryptions to anticipate the targets of
German night bombing raids. He apparently had some trouble with timeliness,
however. His consumers repeatedly objected that he was loathe to provide any
information until he knew all the facts involved. We all know the frustrations of
having to report on the basis of inadequate information, and some readers will know as
well the frustrations of needing intelligence but not getting it because of the
unwillingness of intelligence analysts to go beyond the limits of the hard information.
at hand. Jones' guidance on this matter is straightforward: "It is not good enough to
bark at the slightest approach of danger; you must first learn enough about that danger
to he able to tell your operational staff what it is so that they can take definite action."
Ile attributes intelligence errors in dealing with the German rocket program to
premature reporting. Moreover, such demands for regularized reporting only
constitute distractions that slow the process of analysis. "With every bleat, the sheep
loses a bite." How responsive a chord that strikes! But, alas, alerting the policy makers
.to upsetting possibilities, even if vaguely defined, is a chore we cannot evade.
It is also interesting to ask how Jones and his handful of co-workers were able to
accomplish so much. Are there lessons to be learned from their experience? The
answer, I think, is yes. Jones himself was a remarkably able man and a first-rank
scientist. His credentials in the latter regard were never in question; he took his
doctorate at Oxford at the tender age of 22 when he was awarded a Senior Studentship
in Astronomy at Balliol with the promise of subsequent fellowships especially tailored
to match his interests and talents. Before entering full-time government service at the
age of 25, he had done seminal work in the development of infrared systems for
detecting aircraft, which for a short period competed with the development of radar.
This experience and stature were important to the leadership he provided.
More important, however, was his interest in and consciousness of the processes of
analysis and scientific research. His commentary on the ingredients of analysis and
their relative contributions is the most satisfying of Jones' writing for me, and I
recommend it to all intelligence analysts. He deals explicitly with the ways in which
data must be used, hypotheses developed and tested, and with the ways in which
biases of all sorts are apt to affect results. Most intriguing are his discussions of the
need for Occam's Razor, accuracy and significant precision in the use of data, the
effects of "principles of impotence" on intelligence analysis, and the significance of
irony in analytical and scientific results. There is little doubt that this "sense" of
analysis importantly affected his work and its credibility.
Jones is an accomplished practical joker. The essence of this art is the ability to
anticipate the response of others as they are to be manipulated into some ludicrous
situation. The Wizard War is full of his triumphs in this questionable sport. There
were occasions, however, when his skills were of tremendous value in anticipating
German reactions to new challenges, particularly as countermeasures to each new
technological ploy were introduced. It played a role, too, in the formulation of
deception schemes. At one point Jones directly participated, and obviously with great
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
relish, in the interjection of misleading information into the communications between
German night-fighter pilots and their ground controllers-a practical joker's dream.
The technical intelligence establishment would benefit from paying attention to
Jones' use of clandestine reporting, the respect he gives it, and the very high regard he
shows the sources who produce it. At a time when the newspapers are full of lunatic
reporting about the replacement of clandestine intelligence operations with technical
collectors, it is appropriate to note that this definitive work on the origins of scientific
intelligence is opened with a Foreword not by a scientist, an Air Marshal, or even by a
computer, but by "Amniatrix," the code name for a French agent (now Vicomtesse de
Clarens) who gave 10 months warning of the V-bombardment of London. Such fitting
and proper tributes to the many sources who contribute to technical intelligence
analysis abound in this book, and we all would do well to emulate them in whatever
way we can.
Despite its extraordinary demands, intelligence in wartime has some advantages.
Priorities are fairly clear. One is not apt to have the vapors because he or she is not told
precisely what to do. And the measures of success are unambiguous and harsh.
Misestimates very quickly come to light and errors cannot be supported for long. Read
Jones on the Coventry raid, for example. Think how satisfying it would be to be able
to state with assurance to Congress or OMB or even RMS that, as a result of the work
accomplished during the past year, on 1 day in 3 we are able to inform the fighter
command of the exact place of that night's German bomber attack, the time of the
first bomb within 10 minutes or so, the expected ground speed of the bomber, their
line of approach to within 100 yards, and their height to within 2 to 3 hundred meters.
Comparable achievements in the post-war period may never be so heralded because
real confirmation is never possible before a new system replaces the old.
Having finished the book, one must wonder how R. V. Jones has really fared since
his wartime experiences. When, in response to a sense of duty inculcated in his
childhood and youth, he abandoned his fellowship in astronomy in favor of working
on the IR detection of aircraft, he burned some important academic bridges. He was
quick, therefore, to grasp an appointment to ,a chair at Aberdeen when it was offered
after the war. Other than a brief return to the intelligence establishment at Churchill's
request in 1952, he remained at this second-rank (though I am assured a good second-
rank) university. He has worked primarily in the field of instrumentation, for which
he has been honored and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1965. His
scientific career has been respectable but not outstanding-less so than might have
been expected from his early promise. The bureaucrats seem to have triumphed;
unlike nearly all the other boffins of note, he has not been knighted for his wartime
contributions.
The problem is, of course, that he got hooked on intelligence and has never quite
escaped the exhilaration, the crucial personal involvement in matters of highest
importance, and the sense of contribution that. marked his wartime experiences. He
has characterized the Knickebein investigation as the high point in his professional life,
a fact reflected in all his writings. He just can't shake off his exposure to intelligence.
As one who joined the CIA with the thought that it should be an intriguing experience
for a couple of years and left more than 21 years later in a state of trauma, I can
understand.
It is perhaps a final tragedy that his writings, his claims, his unseemly readiness to
talk about intelligence, have burned his bridges to the British intelligence community
as well. That establishment seems to view him now, as others had in the past, as
something of a pain-in-the-ass.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
As for me, I say, Up With Reggie Jones! He is the closest thing the technical
intelligence analyst has to a patron saint and we need one now. He has set us a
splendid example and been a literate and moving spokesman for our craft. Clutch The
Wizard War to your bosom and pay tribute to the men and women in British
Scientific Intelligence and to its founder, R. V. Jones.
CODES AND CIPHERS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)
The use of codes and ciphers was not a new experience for the managers of
American intelligence during the Revolutionary War, since frequent interception
of the mails by both sides had made it a common practice even in personal
correspondence. John Jay, the future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who
served as chief of counterintelligence, devised a code which used a dictionary as a
code book, and a simple substitution chart for names and words not in the
dictionary. Robert Morris, who was a member of both the Committee of Secret
Correspondence (foreign intelligence) and the Secret Committee (covert procure-
ment) of the Continental Congress, devised a cipher for communication with
George Washington. An example of the combining of codes and ciphers is found in
a message from "722" (Abraham Woodhull or "Culper, Sr.") to "711" (George
Washington): Dqpeu Beyocpu (Jonas Hawkins) agreeable to 28 (recruitment).. ."
James Lovell, a member of the Continental Congress who had been arrested and
imprisoned by the British as a spy following the Battle of Bunker Hill, served as
the cryptographer for communications between the Committee of Secret
Correspondence and its secret agents abroad. (Although many of these agent codes
were broken, the one by Charles Dumas at the Hague was pronounced
unbreakable by the British, who intercepted some of his despatches.) Perhaps the
difficulty of the unfamiliar in dealing with codes and ciphers is best expressed by
the Marquis de Lafayette in a postscript to a message to the Comte d'Estaing:
.. I beg you to excuse the awkwardness and the bad construction of my ciphers;
I am very new at this business, and I fear I have made them as unintelligible to
you as they would be to Mylord Howe..."
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Books
THE THIRD WORLD WAR: AUGUST 1985, by General Sir John Hackett and
others, Macmillan, New York and London, 1979. 326 pages with appendixes.
Editor's Note: Studies in Intelligence normally does not review works
of fiction. We are departing from the norm to consider a book written
about the future which differs only in style from the war game scenarios
and crisis models routinely produced by general staffs and politico-military
think tanks. For the intelligence analyst and collector it presents a
framework in which a variety of considerations and assumptions about the
Soviets, the NATO alliance, and the intelligence community's own
capabilities can be tested.
General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War was published in England in
June 1978 and was first commented on in this country by Drew Middleton in the New
York Times a month later. In a telephone interview with Middleton, Hackett
expressed the hope that the book would stimulate, in Britain and in the West
generally, a greater awareness of the grave implications of current military spending
trends. Hackett believes the European dependence on the American nuclear umbrella
has led to weaknesses in conventional defense capabilities which open the way for a
rapid escalation of any major conflict into a full nuclear exchange. Since its initial
publication the book has sold very well in the U.K. and was taken seriously enough
within Britain's top policy-making circles that Prime Minister Callaghan Presented
President Carter with a copy at the Guadeloupe summit.
Hackett is a retired Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine who
wrote TTWW with the collaboration of several other distinguished military officers,
both British and American. The book can be dismissed (as Time magazine chose to) as
an apologia for the military-industrial complex. Certainly, in the hands of advocates of
vastly increased defense spending, it can be a powerful and thought-provoking piece
of propaganda. For Kremlinologists the book also lays out a fascinating scenario
stressing both the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the internal contradictions
within the "Soviet empire" which eventually bring it down. For the technologically
minded the book places heavy stress upon our vital superiority over the Warsaw Pact
in terms of science and technology. For the geopolitician the book carries a sobering
forecast of what the next decade may look like in terms of patchy economic progress
and widespread political instability. Interestingly enough, Hackett and his colleagues
see economic competition developing increasingly along North/South rather than
East/West lines.
While there is little explicit reference to intelligence in the book, the entire
scenario is loaded with vital implications for all aspects of the intelligence process-
collection, collation, analysis, early warning, and long-range forecasting.
Basically, Hackett's scenario is as follows: President Carter is finishing his second
term and the subsequent Democratic candidate is Vice President Mondale. In the
1984 election Mondale is defeated by Governor Thompson, a fictitious southern
Republican governor.
The Soviets, feeling that various tides are running against them, particularly in
Eastern Europe, decide to test the incoming President in the period between the
election and the inauguration. Consequently, an Iranian oil tanker and a U.S.
MORI/HRP PAGES 51-54
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
intelligence ship are sunk by Soviet submarines in November 1984. A summit meeting
between U.S. and Soviet leaders is set up and is inconclusive. Looking at a series of
options prepared by a "Soviet Kissinger," the Soviets decide to encourage a concerted
attack on the Union of South Africa by a variety of black Africans, to move militarily
into a post-Tito Yugoslavia which is showing signs of dangerous instability, and to stir
up a certain amount of trouble in the Indian subcontinent. The United States
unexpectedly (in Soviet eyes) responds to the thrust in Yugoslavia by sending in the
Marines, whose heavy punishment of the Soviet forces is graphically displayed to all
the world by ubiquitous television cameras. The Soviets then decide to attack NATO
through Germany, planning a drive to the Rhine at which point a call for a cease-fire
and political negotiations would be issued.
NATO is aware of the growing possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack and when it
comes, in August 1985, most preparations have been made. The attack is non-nuclear,
but includes Soviet use of chemical warfare which provokes a NATO response in kind.
The Soviets stress the use of massed armor, and the descriptions of modern tank
warfare are vividly rendered. Although numerically outnumbered and forced to fall
back, the NATO forces are able to inflict heavy casualties on the Soviet forces, thanks
in large part to technical superiority and a greater flexibility in the NATO command
structure. France decides to fight as part of NATO, to the surprise of the Soviets.
The U.S. commander in Europe almost immediately receives requests from his
embattled tactical commanders for permission to use nuclear weapons. He resists these
entreaties, but eventually bucks them upward to the U.S. President, who rules against
the nuclear option. Crucial to NATO's ability to take the initiative is the progress of a
convoy across the Atlantic carrying vital reserve troops and additional armor.
Eventually three-fourths of the convoy make it to French ports, despite attacks by
Soviet torpedoes, missiles, and aircraft. With these reserves in hand, NATO launches a
counterattack.
The Soviets, their initial thrust halted near the Rhine and forced back by the
NATO attack, decide to launch a single nuclear strike designed to cow NATO forces.
The English city of Birmingham is selected and the destruction of that city by a single
nuclear blast is described in stark terms. NATO immediately responds in kind and a
British and an American submarine each launch missiles aimed at Minsk, which is
totally destroyed.
At this point internal strains within the Warsaw Pact are surfacing rapidly. Some
Polish units allow themselves to be overrun and captured by NATO forces. It quickly
becomes clear that the East European satellites do not wish to be incinerated in a
nuclear war fought for Soviet goals which they neither share nor support. A coup
within the Soviet Union then takes place, the Russian army begins to withdraw to its
traditional borders, and the fighting stops. The book ends with a fascinating but still
sobering look at the rest of the world-even in the wake of this holocaust peace is by
no means permanently assured.
The basic thesis of the book is that NATO and the West survive-barely-
because of measures undertaken in the early 1980s. Washington reinstitutes the draft
and has reserve troops at an acceptable level of training. The British upgrade their air
defense to the point that the island remains "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" from
which effective air support is given to the American ship convoys. Perhaps most
vitally, the West has maintained its technological superiority in newly designed
weapons which prove to be crucial in stopping the numerically superior Warsaw
forces.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
Hackett makes this statement about the current balance of forces in Europe:
"Invasion from a standing start in the late seventies, if it had ever been tried, would
most certainly have brought the Russians to the Rhine within a few days-unless
NATO employed nuclear weapons." It is the bleak implications of that belief which
caused Hackett to write what he calls "a cautionary tale."
While one may disagree in any number of ways with the particular scenario
which Hackett lays out, his book represents as sophisticated a look at upcoming peace
or war issues as we are likely to see outside of a formally constructed war games
scenario. Furthermore, the book is solidly rooted in fact-NATO's current state of
readiness, the U.S. position with regard to troop reserves, Warsaw Pact arms and
doctrine, and the deplorable status of Britain's air defense. Thus, while Hackett's
specific scenario is not likely to occur, it is plausible and sobering enough to stimulate a
variety of questions, many of which the intelligence community will be asked to deal
with over the next several years. A few of the questions which immediately come to
mind are:
? Is there a real prospect for an increase in political unrest in Eastern Europe? If
so, how will the Soviets react?
? How clearly are the Soviets able to grasp implications of social and economic
dislocations throughout the world and to consciously use such events to try to
embarrass the United States?*
? How will Western dependence on Middle East oil impact on our ability to fight
a non-nuclear war distinguished-inter alia-by the incredible rate at which
resources are consumed?
? How likely are the French to fight if NATO is attacked in Germany and the
Soviets make it clear to Paris that they do not intend to attack France in any
way?
? What would China do if the Soviets attacked NATO?
? Is the current pattern of Soviet defense spending, when compared to that of the
West, likely to bring a situation in the mid-eighties where the Soviets could feel
confident that they would win a non-nuclear war?
? Is the demise of Tito likely to cause such instability as to invite a Soviet military
intervention?
? Are the Soviets likely to be the first to use chemical and biological warfare in a
war with NATO?
? With what degree of enthusiasm would non-Soviet elements of the Warsaw Pact
take part in an attack on NATO?
? How much warning of a Warsaw Pact attack would NATO forces be likely to
receive?
The list of questions could be much longer than this; all are being dealt with to a
greater or lesser extent at the present time. They will be argued with more vigor and
? See in this connection the "Ryabukhin report" (p. 62) written by a fictional Soviet described by
Hackett as "a Harvard-educated muscovite sometimes known in the West as the best backroom Kissinger
the Russians had."
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
more point over the next 5 years, whether one chooses to accept General Hackett's
thesis or to dismiss him as a conservative alarmist. The book ought to be read, and read
seriously, because it brings such questions vividly to life as it spins out in plausible and
sobering fashion one version of what the next 6 years might bring.
For readers in the intelligence community, the book invites the immediate
question of how well qualified the community is today to deal with the deeply
disturbing questions flowing from Hackett's narrative.
NO "BAY OF PIGS" FOR PRESIDENT PIERCE
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)
Although at the time of his inaugural President Franklin Pierce hoped-like
many Americans-that the Cuban people would revolt and, like Texas, seek
admission to the Union as a state, political reality dictated otherwise. Acquisition
of Cuba from Spain, he decided, must be by peaceable means, if at all.
One problem facing Pierce was a filibustering expedition against Cuba by his
old wartime colleague, Brigadier General John Anthony Quitman. Quitman,
working with a Cuban junto, sought to "free Cuba." Pierce opted to disclose
intelligence to Quitman in an effort to discourage the move.
Roy Franklin Nichols, Pierce's biographer, describes what happened:
"Pierce knew that Quitman was again preparing to invade Cuba. Despite
popular clamor, this must not be. Quitman was called to Washington and showed
the plans of the Cuban fortifications. The general then realized that he could not
hope to succeed and quit."
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Books
PIERCING THE REICH, by Joseph A. Persico, Viking Press, New York, 1979. 376
pages.
It has been said that General Donovan's organizational design for OSS was to hire
as many people of diverse experience and competence as he could find, scatter them
generously around the world, and expect gratifying results. On the whole his
confidence was justified.
This is the story of the efforts of OSS to penetrate Germany for intelligence
purposes during the Second World War. Or rather it is three stories-or possibly four.
First it is the story of the successful enlistment by Allen Dulles' mission in Bern of a
number of anti-Nazis of German or Austrian nationality, who volunteered their
services to procure information of intelligence or political interest inside Germany.
Second it is the story of a small group of energetic, resourceful young Americans who
developed a dynamic and somewhat ruthless program to infiltrate an assortment of
German POWs, Poles, Belgians and a few uniformed members of the armed forces of
the United States into the Greater Reich for what were essentially tactical intelligence
purposes. Thirdly it describes the development of arrangements in OSS to utilize the
intelligence potential of various labor organizations. Finally it contains a vivid and
essentially accurate account of how support facilities were created to forge documents,
invent cover stories complete with plausible confirmatory "legends" and evidentiary
material, and also of relations between OSS and other branches of service, particularly
the Army Air Forces.
Although the book contains a number of minor inaccuracies* it obviously results
from a comprehensive review of documentary material made available from OSS
archives and also an impressive number of personal interviews. The author has a flair
for dramatic writing. The exploits, achievements, sufferings, interrogations and
ultimate fortunes of participants in one episode of espionage or another come through
in graphic and sometimes chilling detail. These operational descriptions all have a
genuine ring of authenticity. It all happened and pretty much happened the way the
author says it happened.
He also deals skillfully and on the whole successfully with the problem which
confronts anybody who tries to describe in sequence a number of activities which
occur simultaneously and continue over a protracted period of time. Inevitably several
threads are left hanging while new ones unravel. Lt. Commander John Hedrick Taylor
vanishes into the hands of Gestapo agents charged with executing captured Allied
officers on page 140. He reemerges in Mauthausen concentration camp on page 276,
presenting the reader with some initial difficulty in remembering what he had done to
get there. However, the author contrives to maintain the momentum of the over-all
story with a minimum of confusion.
The introductory chapter which sets the stage for the OSS effort against Germany
contains a necessarily oversimplified and in certain respects misleading account of
how OSS had functioned in Europe before the liberation of France. Obviously a few
*Russel Forgan took over command of OSS in the European Theater towards the end of 1944 from
David Bruce who was therefore not in charge of operations against Germany during the period covered by
the book as is alleged. Whitney Shephardson was in charge of Secret Intelligence (SI) in Washington, not
London. Paul Mellon served in Special Operations (SO) and not SI, and the reference to him on page 266 is
obviously a mistake. Bill Casey did not make a fortune before the war.
MORI/HRP PAGES 55-59
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Books
pages are not enough for anything like an historical analysis of the multifarious
activities of OSS in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) between Pearl Harbor
and the German evacuation of Paris. The book is exclusively concerned with the
positive intelligence mission of OSS/ETO. Quite properly it introduces this subject
with a brief outline of other functions performed by OSS in this area-support to
resistance activities, sabotage, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, black
propaganda, etc. On the whole the author does this reasonably well-albeit in a
somewhat breathless style. Some of his statements, however, provoke comment.
At one point (page 12) he says "By 1943, Bruce was commanding two thousand
spies, saboteurs, propagandists and supporting staff." If the author means, as I
understand he does, uniformed and civilian U.S. subordinates, the figure strikes me as
way too large for 1943. Succeeding paragraphs are perhaps susceptible to the
interpretation that in 1943 occupied France was swarming with OSS agents. There
were not really all that many OSS agents in France prior to D-Day; those who where
there were mostly part of a joint program of the London Group of the British Special
Operations Executive and the SO Branch of OSS.
If it is a mistake to exaggerate the performance of OSS/SO as an independent
entity, however, it is equally a mistake unduly to deprecate it. OSS in the resistance
and paramilitary field did more than "tag after" SOE in Europe, as Persico states
(page 15). The decision to merge available British and American resources with a view
to developing the potentialities of resistance in France and Scandinavia was a wise
one.* Competitive efforts by the American and British secret service unilaterally to
deal separately with various groups and networks, given the fractionated political
allegiance of the French underground, would have resulted in chaos and surely been
counterproductive. As it was, under joint OSS/SOE direction and, ultimately, the aegis
of DeGaulle, French guerrilla and sabotage operations contributed substantially to the
success of the Allied assault. And the American part in this success was significant, if
not crucial.
An accurate appraisal of the precise value of any of the activities of OSS in the
European Theater is difficult to make. The SO/SOE contribution to winning the war
can be judged by the extent of the damage to the German war economy from sabotage
or by the number of days German reinforcements were delayed in their movement to
join the battle in Normandy. The value of counterintelligence can be judged, in part at
least, by the diversion of German forces from Normandy due to the success of the
deception plan in which of course German double agents played a part.
* Friction, of course, existed between American and British officers. Persico refers to an OSS "liaison"
officer from whom Maurice Buckmaster, head of the SOE F Section, withheld files. Buckmaster was, by
nature, suspicious and most unreceptive to the idea that he was supposed to cooperate with Americans. On
the other hand there was no such thing as "liaison" with SOE in 1944. The American who wasn't getting
what he wanted from Buckmaster must have been a full-fledged member of the integrated SO/SOE staff, or
he had no business asking for papers. If so, he had a clear right of appeal to the joint British /American
supervisory staff, to which Buckmaster reported, and the British chief of which, Brigadier E. Mockler
Ferryman, was totally objective and completely sympathetic to American problems.
**For what interest it may have, during 1944, 524 Americans served in France behind the enemy lines.
Of these, 85 were agents and organizers and the balance Jedburghs and members of operational groups. For
what significance it may have, 26 DSCs, 38 Silver Stars, and two Navy Crosses were awarded to American
citizens serving in an operational capacity with OSS in the European Theater. American aircraft assigned to
OSS operations flew 2,717 sorties between 1 January and 1 October 1944. During the winter and spring of
1943-44 the burden of flights into the heavily defended areas of Northern France and the Pas de Calais was
carried primarily by American Liberators. In addition, U.S. air forces personnel at the disposal of OSS
carried out a substantial number of landing operations behind enemy lines. In the first 9 months of 1944
some 5,000 tons of American-packed equipment were dispatched to the field. During this period American
packing stations actually packed twice as many containers for air delivery as their British counterparts.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Books
Judging the over-all value of information attributable to espionage operations of
one kind or another is particularly difficult. It is not unfair to say that the value of the
intelligence attributable to some of the operations described in Piercing the Reich was
at best questionable. In some cases the importance of the targets for some of the teams
dropped into Germany and the coverage produced is substantially overblown.
This is not to say that these missions were not justified. Given the paucity of
information on conditions in Germany and the almost total surprise achieved by the
Germans in their attack in the Ardennes in December 1944 it is easy to understand the
avidity with which military consumers clamored for intelligence. It is also impossible
not to admire the courage with which these missions were carried out; the
determination and endurance of the agents involved in most of them, and the
imagination, skill and persistence of those who mounted them. But bombing targets on
the already saturated railroads, an interesting report on Hitler's headquarters,
information about German morale, or the non-existent national redoubt, or the
identity of Gestapo headquarters-this is not the kind of information which,
interesting though it may be, is essential to winning a war.
The value of intelligence from OSS Bern is universally acknowledged. At great
risk to themselves Allen Dulles' crown jewels-Kolbe, Hans (Tiny) Gisevius and
others--provided a stream of illuminating information on the military intentions and
deployments and political maneuverings of the German government as well as on
internal political and economic conditions and developments. But here again if the test
is whether the outcome of the war was vitally affected by this intelligence the answer,
problematically, is no.
Clearly the coverage was extremely useful as collateral to confirm the accuracy of
information obtained through Comint (ULTRA). But the greatest potential of Allen
Dulles' connections was probably political. They were a source of guidance and
channel of approach for possible negotiations looking to the cessation of hostilities-
first, prior to July 1944 with the anti-Hitler conspirators and, much later, with officials
prepared to surrender the German armies in Italy. Neither of these possibilities was as
successful as it might have been-the first for reasons of policy. A conceivably
substantial pay-off from the second depreciated as a result of Soviet intransigence,
hesitation and delay. None of this was Allen's fault.
The author attributes excessive significance to Bern reporting on German secret
weapons. For one thing the air strike against Peenemunde was not, as Persico suggests
(p. 56), exactly decisive. According to R. V. Jones, who claims, and deserves, a large
share of the credit for orchestrating the intelligence effort against the V-weapon
development, the bombing attack on Peenemunde set the German program back some
2 months, which was substantial but not definitive.
The point, however, is that the mosaic of information on German progress with
rocket and pilotless aircraft construction was pretty much complete without reporting
from Bern, which contributed to the picture but does not appear to have been an
essential ingredient. An anonymous report received in Oslo, reports from the Danish
underground and foreign workers in Germany, coverage of the communications of the
radar units- of two companies of the Luftwaffe (identified by a shrewd hunch as
tracking the test site), and photographic reconnaissance all were integrated under
skillful direction to bring the target into focus.
So the book can perhaps be faulted because it may tend somewhat to inflate the
value of intelligence coverage of Germany by OSS during the war. But what a
delightful and reassuring fault this is after the spate of dreary "revelations" which
feed the current appetite for cynicism. And those who argue that all that was needed
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
Books
to win the war was ULTRA and MI-6 would do well to ponder the implications of an
American government entirely dependent on a foreign service for its information. The
intelligence acquired by OSS Bern and, to some extent, from labor connections
provided American policy makers with an independent means of monitoring
developments, political and military, inside Germany. The essentially tactical
operations involving agents infiltrated by air or through the lines produced some
useful information. They also served as an invaluable school of experience in the needs
and methods of clandestine activity on which a post-war, hopefully permanent, U.S.
intelligence service could build.
Piercing the Reich is a good book which deserves a permanent place in the
literature of intelligence and should be read by anyone interested in the orgins of the
American intelligence service.
U.S. MAIL INTERCEPTS DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)
Throughout the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress regularly
received significant quantities of intercepted mail, which it caused to be exploited
for intelligence and propaganda purposes. With the end of the war, most
emergency measures were terminated, but not the postal intercepts. In a secret
resolution of September 7, 1785, the Congress authorized the Secretary of the
United States for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, to inspect "any letters in any of the
post offices" except those to and from members of Congress, when required for the
"safety or interest" of the government. The authorization, limited to a 12-month
period, was recorded in the Secret Journals of Congress, not to be made public
until 1820. Granting this authority to Jay, who had been the wartime
counterintelligence chief and would be the nation's first Chief justice, appears to
have followed the British practice, then and now, which vests in the Secretary of
State the right to authorize mail intercepts.
When the 12-month authorization expired, the Congress renewed it without a
time limitation. In the third year of peace, the following resolution was recorded
in the Secret Journals, not to be "declassified" until 34 years later:
"October 23, 1786:... Resolved, unanimously, That whenever it shall appear
to the Secretary of the United States of America for the department of foreign
affairs that their safety or interest require the inspection of any letters in any of
the postoffices, he be authorized and empowered to inspect the said letters,
excepting from the operation of the resolution all letters franked by, or addressed
to, members of Congress."
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0063OA000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
Reproduced below is a clipping from the Washington Post of November 9,
1978:
Correction
Because of a typographical
error in Tuesday's Washing-
ton Post. It was incorrectly
stated that the manuals con-
cerning the RIIll spy satellite
were printed In 1967. They
were printed In 1676.
The Editor is persuaded that this clipping at last explains a curious document
which has, alas, passed out of his possession but which he is confident he can
quote from memory. The document is said to have been found in a battered,
stained dispatch case of the Seventh U.S. Cavalry which. by roundabout means
entered the War Museum of Ludwig I of Bavaria, was bequeathed to Leopold,
Second Baron Munchausen, and thence came into the hands of one Private
Schweik of the Imperial Austrian Army, who gave it to my great-uncle Miroslav,
who gave it to me. The text was scrawled hastily (and nearly indecipherably) on a
standard U.S. Army message form and dated June 25, 1876: It read:
TO Wm. T. Sherman,
General, United States Army, Commanding
FROM George Armstrong Custer,
Colonel, Seventh U.S. Cavalry, Commanding
SUBJECT Intelligence Requirement. No. 7C-6/25b-76
MESSAGE BEGINS Where is the imagery of the Little Big Horn you promised
me? MESSAGE ENDS.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
SECRET
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00630A000100070001-2