WHEN CONSCIENCE AND CAREER COLLIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000800010005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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power project; Charles ilcastey, below,
believes he was denied :1 tenured pro.
fcsssorahip over a str ip-ruining issue,
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For these two men, ecological contro-
versies touched ofTcareer crises, Econ-
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Deck` .ng what to clo i~ fo
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x ;
~cst hen
t'ou'r nOt cliaectly irivolved in a qu stion lble
practice but you know it's going on.
by Avery Camaroty
young management consultant,
his Harvard M.B.A. still warm
,
had completed a series of high-priced
studies for an important client. Ile
knew he could offer nothing more of
value to his client, but his superiors
weren't satisfied. They wanted the cli-
ent pressured into still more contracts.
Though it disturbed the young con-
sultant to do superfluous work, he went
along.
Another man, in his late 30s, was
the $50,000-a-year chief financial of-
ficer of a large manufacturing con-
cern. Late last year he learned that
company representatives were routine-
ly bribing distributors to push the
firm's products. Unless the payoffs
ceased, he told the company's chief ex-
ecutive officer, he would quit. The ex-
ecutive replied sharply that he lu
all about the payoffs and saw no r
son to stop them. The financial on'
promptly quit. Ile is still withou
job, says a close friend, but rema
convinced that he did the right th.i
The ethical thicket
Making decisions of consciei
isn't something you do every day
the office. but most people, whet;
they're in government, industry
some other field, probably strug
with questions of right and wrong
least a few times in their careers. "':
Most everybody I've interviewed s:
lie's run into these ethical problem
reports a Chicago executive recruit
Reassuringly, however, the mess:.
from dozens of business and acaden
to Money sE"RSFQ For Release 2001/11/20 CIA-RDP80-00473A000800010005-2
 saurees, is that a blend of common delaying can magnify the matter into clear power. Lamson is supporting his
Sense and c;nrtioii caAp.PWygdoFidr Releas 00,1iL11V26YztiCl9kuF@DPBt&r(0047f3AOD0`8d0d`F 6Se2cls of small Ion-
a path out of the ethical thicket with- and long explanations: justifying your suiting contracts-the first of which
out snagging either your career or your position probably will embarrass the came from Boeing-but his future is
conscience. other person-and may give him some- uncertain.
In a 1973 report by the American thing tangible to pick apart. The case of mining specialist
Management Associations, about 70% A former personnel director of a Charles Beasley has taken a happier
of nearly 3,000 businessmen surveyed large midwestern drug company who turn. In 1973, Beasley, then associate
said they at least occasionally were ex- complied with an order lie considered professor of mining engineering at Vir-
pected to compromise their principles unethical now wishes he hadn't. Itis in- ginia Polytechnic Institute, wrote to
to conform to their company's or their structions were to find a replacement U.S. Interior Secretary Rogers C.B.
boss' standards. Moreover, they ranked for a friend of his who was to be de- Morton, urging the Interior Depart-
"reputation for firm moral and/or eth- noted-undeservedly, in the personnel ment to study better ways to reclairil
ical convictions" at the bottom of a director's opinion. lie was also for- strip-mined land in states where steep
list of factors considered in awarding bidden to tell his friend, who rev- slopes make reclamation difficult. That
promotions, behind "family and eth- ertheless increasingly sensed some- same year VPI denied Beasley's ap-
nic background" and far to the rear thing amiss as the search went on, plication for tenure. "Chuck Beasley's
of "personal contacts ('who you and begged to know what it was. Up- stand on strip mining had nothing to
know')." set by the tug of war between his job do with the tenure issue," says Paul
Some unethical behavior may sirn- and his friend, he quit after finishing E. Torgersen, VPI's dean of engineer-
ply offend your scruples-putting prof- the search. His friend, meanwhile, had ing. "I made my decision on strict eco-
its above environmental consider- read the signs correctly and severed nomic grounds. There simply wasn't
ations or pushing a customer to buy a the friendship. "I lost the friendship enough room for another tenured fac-
product that he doesn't need. Michael of a guy I'd grown tip with," says the ulty member."
Lovdal, who teaches a course in busi- personnel director, now a successful Unlike Lamson, Beasley found be-
ness.policy .at the Harvard Business executive recruiter. "I felt used. The ing out of a job "an opportunity to
School, says: "Milking clients bothers ? whole shabby thing violated my per- grow." He currently works in Charles-
a lot of my former students who are sonal ethic;, but I didn't know how to ton, W.Va. as regional manager for
management consultants, but most go say no. Today, given the same order, one of the country's largest mining
along because it's the kind of deci- I wouldn't do it. I'm sure I would consultants. Many of the controls on
sion that can be rationalized without have kept my job, and I know I would strip mining that Beasley urged in
too much trouble. You can tell your- have kept my integrity." 1973 now are law, and he calls him-
self that there's always something ~~1Q60
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Imported by United States Tobacco Company.
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f7
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Colonel Barrie P..Masters (USA) is an Operations Research and Systems Analysis
Officer who has done considerable work in the field of tactical and strategic
intelligence. Ile was educated at the University of Oklahoma, BS; and the University
of Southern California, MS. Colonel Masters was a member of the Class of 1976 at
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
How can we further America's
interest in .a world where poieer
remains. the ultimate arbiter, and at
the same time' remain committed to
the strong moral values that gave birth
to our Nation? How do we reconcile
and advance both aspects of our
national purpose? In short, how do
we resolve the relationship between
principle and the needs of power?
The above quotation from a speech by
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on July 15,
1975, appears to capture the essence of the
current national debate over the role of ethics in
the conduct of our national intelligence
activities. Unfortunately the answers to these
questions are not easily derived. The subject of
ethics is difficult enough to come to grips with
when one is talking about such relatively
mundane activities as the practice of medicine
or law or the pursuit of business profits. An
examination of ethics as applied to our national
intelligence activities, especially in peacetime, is
made enormously more difficult by a score of
unique factors. Included among these is the lack
of general agreement over the legitimacy of the
intelligence function itself, the difficulty of
separating ends from gleans in specific function-
al areas and the belief in many quarters that the
requirement for secrecy is such a vitally inherent
component of a successful "intelligence activi-
ty" that the subject cannot even be properly
debated. Because of these difficulties, it'seems
? that it is essential to begin by making some
effort to define the terms "intelligence activi-
ties" and "ethics" before discussing them and to
do this in a way that permits ends to be
separated from means. After all, there is little,
point in debating the extent to which the public
should have access to intelligence information, if
the public has decided that intelligence collec-
tion is a repugnant operation which must be
terminated.
Intelligence Activities
From the outset, it is important to
establish that the term intelligence activities
covers a variety of functions which, while often
employing similar or even common means, are
cl.:arly aimed at different ends. If there is any
common thread to define intelligence activities
in a modern context, it is only that they involve
the secret or erstwhile secret actions of one
nation against others. The British. divide the
activities that we generally call "intelligence"
activities into five main functional areas:
1. Offensive Intelligence---the business of
divining the secrets of other nations.
2. Counter Intelligence and Security-
operations designed to deny friendly secrets to
the opposition.
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3. Special Operations-the business of
carrying out or supporting clandestine warfare
against another state.
4. Political Warfare--the clandestine
effort to influence the minds of the people or
officials of another state.
5. Deception--the effort to disguise the
true intentions of one's own policies and
actions.
The advantage of recalling the British
terminology for these various activities is to take
note of the fact that the British assign each of
these functions to distinct organizational enti-
ties. In the US this is not the case and the
functional distinctions seem to have become
badly blurred. One functional area (e.g., the
responsibility for collecting information and
producing intelligence about other nations) can
be (and is) the responsibility of many agencies.
At the same time a given intelligence agency
(e.g., the CIA) can be (and is) involved in several
or all of the functional activities simultaneously.
These facts result in enormous semantic
difficulties when the debate over the ethics (or,
if you will, the morality) of an issue is joined.
Take, for example, the following extract from a
Time essay on the CIA (Time, 29 Sept 1975):
It was a year ago this month that
the first revelation of Central Intelli-
gence Agency dabbling in Chilean
politics came out. Since then, more
than a quarter-century's worth of
skeletons. . . have tumbled from the
agency's closet. Today the CIA is the
least secret espionage service in the
world, and its director, William Colby,
the most visible and interrogated
master spy in recent history. The
agency has been in hot water before.
of course. But unlike the uproar that
followed the Bay of Pigs Jiacco in
1961, the current controversy threat-
ens the very existence of the CIA,
it was allowed by many Americans
and their elected representatives for
the first 27 years of its existence. Few
people today accept unquestioningly
the notion that clandestine foreign
operatives are a necessary evil. Even
fewer would unblinkingly bit), the
assurance voiced by former CIA
Director Richard Ilebns: "The nation
must to a degree take it on faith that
we, too, are honorable men devoted
to her service.- Almost daily, news-
paper editorials, legislators and some
presidential hopefuls characterize the
CIA as a wasteful anachronism at best,
an international menace and national
disgrace at worst.
While William Colby is characterized as a
master spy, the thrust of the criticism in Time's
article (like many others) has nothing to do with
spying-it has,to do with the conduct of special
operations or political warfare. It turns out that
it is not unusual for the arguments about the
ethics of intelligence activities to be like
this-with the antagonists and protagonists
talking about completely different subjects (one
view is that the CIA is essential because national
survival depends on intelligence while. another
argues that the CIA is a national disgrace
because it has been known to dabble in Chilean
politics).
The term "intelligence activities" has
become so. corrupted and misunderstood that it
holds little useful meaning, particularly for the
general public. Actually there are three distinct-
ly different activities carried out under this
sobriquet, each of which must be examined
separately.
A. The Intelligence 1-unction
The intelligence function is only the
production of knowledge, usually about other
states. It is a function that has been carried out
by states throughout recorded history.
The CIA has lost, perhaps
forever, the special dispcnsatic,n that
What enables the wise sovereign
to achieve things beyond the reach of
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ordinary men is foreknowledge. Such
knowle (d-c is not available from the
gods, front the study of history or
from calculations. It must be obtained
by the use of secret agents. SUN TZU,
Chinese military theorist, 600 BC.
effort. Each of these aspects of the intelligence
function poses very different ethical problems.
For example, given the fact that information
exists, there do not seem to be any ethical
questions associated with the production of
finished intelligence. The analyst is indeed an
honorable man in the service of his country. The
ethical -questions really all arise in the conduct
of foreign and domestic information collection.
In fact, it is the latter-domestic collection-that
seems to raise the most dogmatic, unreasoned
outcries from its critics, and the least degree of
outspoken defense from its defenders.
And the Lord spoke unto Moses
saying, Send thou men that they may
search the land of Canaan. And Moses
sent them to spy out the land to see
what it is and the people, whether
they be strong or weak, few or many.
Old Testament, Numbers 13:16.
Adequate knowledge of the policies,
aspirations, and capabilities of foreign states,
linked with adequate information about one's
own domestic intentions and capabilities, pro-
vides the foundation on which each state -can
build its national policies. The requirement for
states to interact with other states, whether they
be friendly or belligerent, carries with it a
requirement for states to develop knowledge as
a basis for their foreign policy decisions. This
requirement in turn places an inescapable
responsibility on the national leadership of each
state to provide for the collection of informa-
tion from and about other states. The fact that
Americans have historically been somewhat
uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities
of power does not diminish in any way the
obligation of our national government to
provide for the collection and evaluation of
information (i.e., the production of intelli-
gence). The fact that the USA is in the position
it is, as a world power, means that this effort has
assurned global proportions.
The discharge of the intelligence function
requires the accomplishment of three separate
but related actions: 1) the acquisition of
information from or about other nations, which
is the foreign collection effort, 2) the
acquisition of relevant information about one's
own state-its citizens, economy, capabilities,
limitations, requirements, etc., which is the
domestic collection effort and, 3) the analysis
and interpretation of the two sets of informa-
tion, is termed the intelligence production
B. Special Operations
A second distinct function that intelligence
agencies carry out is the conduct of operations
or activities that are directed at influencing
events rather than at producing knowledge.
The service [British Secret Ser-
vice] is not only an instrument for
gathering other people's secrets but
also for making mischief among the
King's enemies. Any act is permissible,
even assassination. The only cringe is
to be caught. If an agent is caught, he
will be disowned.
Smith-Dummings, Chief
British Secret Service, 191 1-1939
There are many kinds of maneu-
vers in war some only of which take
place upon the battlefield. There are
maneuvers far to the flank or rear.
There are maneuvers in time, in
diplomacy, in psychology, all of
which are removed from the battle-
field, but react often decisively on it.
-Winston Churchill
1925
This function is known under a variety of
euphemisms, such as special operations, special
warfare, strategic services, etc., and may be
considered to involve such things as propaganda,
bribery, murder, deception, sabotage, war and a
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host of lesser actions against foreign individuals
or states. It is in this category that we find such
actions as the Bay of . Pigs operation, the
influencing of Chilean politics, assassination
plots, and so on. These operations are called
intelligence activities for reasons that are very
unclear, except that they may involve common
sources and similar means, and frequently the
responsibility for their conduct rests with
agencies called intelligence agencies. The British
categories of special operations, political warfare
and, to some extent, deception all fit into this
single functional area.
C.. Counterintelligence and Security
thought it was wlicn he equated domestic
opposition to a national security threat. Ap-
parently the British XX Committee thought it
was when they executed only German agents
who didn't cooperate, sparing those who did.
Apparently the CIA and the Postal Department
thought it was when they surveilled the mail of
private citizens in the name of national security,
and so on. Unlike the ethical questions raised by
foreign and domestic collection activities and
special operations, where the questions are
generally about morality in the absence of
standards, the ethical considerations of counter-
intelligence and security activities seem to
predominantly involve the morality of violating
accepted standards, usually legal ones.
A third distinct function that is carried
out by intelligence agencies are those activities
aimed at stopping other states from gaining
knowledge or carrying out operations that are
considered inimical to one's own interests. This
area is fairly well understood, commonly
defined and has seldom been the subject of
ethical confusion. A nation certainly has a right
to protect its secrets and prevent subversive or
other inimical actions against its people. Also,
since for all practical purposes we can say this is
largely a domestic operation, the ethics of
counterintelligence and security activities tend
to be proscribed by domestic laws. It is precisely
here, however, that ethical questions now arise.
The questions involve means rather than ends. Is
it ethical to ignore or even break domestic laws
in the pursuit of counterintelligence and
security goals? Apparently Richard Nixon
One other dimension needs to be consid-
ered before one can apply an ethical yardstick
to any of these activities. That is the question of
war or peace. 'A soldier has no difficulty in
rationalizing his role as a killer in wartime with
the fact that it is a crime for 111111 to kill in
peacetime. How about the intelligence opera-
tive? Does he have one yardstick for war and
one for peace? If lie does, how does he judge
whether we are at war or.peace in the modern
context? Does the same rationalization apply to
justify the collection of information about one's
potential enemies, as about one's actual
enemies? How about the collection of informa-.
tion about one's friends?
Between the extremes of peace and war lies
a spectrum of international relationships which,
FUNCTION
Foreign Domestic
Collection Collection
War
BLACK ZONE
Varying
International
GREY ZONE
Tensions
Peace
WHITE, ZONE
Special Counterintelligence
Operation and Security
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particularly in the past thirty years, has
rendered many historical standards inappropri-
ate. How does the intelligence operative, or for
that matter the government, determine an
appropriate morality for this vast range of
circumstances? Perhaps only one thing should
be clear. It is unlikely that the question can be
answered in the simple context of a single
ethical standard, or even of fixed ethical
standards. The solution is more likely to involve
the development of ethical standards for each of
the situations depicted in the figure on page 4 in
a manner which also recognizes a third dimen-
sion of complexity-time and situation.
Most people who think of ethics in terms
of good or bad behavior usually proceed to
apply their own standards of good or bad to
judge the behavior in question. This may have
sonic value from the individual's perspective,
but it is of billy small relevance to the
formulation of an ethical practice. It is the
existence of an ethical standard that provides us
with a capability to make collective judgments
about what is good or bad in society, just as it is
the existence of a code of ethics that allows an
individual to judge the morality of his own
conduct and actions in the light of contempo-
rary circumstances. Such a code does not seem
consciously to exist in' the US intelligence
community, or if it does, people in responsible
positions have been very slow to defend it.
It is not useful to approach the problem as
if the question is about the ethics of an agency
(Is the CIA a national disgrace?). Nor is it
particularly useful to castigate the perpetrators
of historical events in the intelligence arena for
whom no standards existed except their own
judgment of what was required to ensure
national security and-sni-ival. Nor is it particu-
lady useful to try to apply the precedents of
domestic law to the conduct of anything like
foreign collection--the Constitution does not
impart rights on foreign nations, etc. What
is important, at this point in time, is to
establish some understanding of what ethics are
and of how a code of ethics should be applied to
each of the areas described in the first part of
this paper.
What do we mean by ethics? Despite the
almost overwhelming national debate, it' is
remarkable that there has been so little effort to
define the terra ethics in any of the current
literature on the intelligence community. That is
not to say it hasn't been done, but it certainly
must not have been done often. Nor is that to
say that the terra ethics is not used. It is used
often by both the antagonists rnd the
protagonists of the behavior of the intelligence
community, but always without explanation.
Authors and speakers alike use the term as if it
carries a crystal clear meaning to their
audiences, but inevitably the real basis for their
argument is a key, usually all implicit but often
debatable assumption.
Take, for example, the following extract
from Lyman Kirkpatrick's recent book, The
U.S. Intelligence Community, in which he poses
a number of rhetorical questions as a basis for
his discussion of ethics:
Are the intelligence activities of
the US government consistent with .
American ideology? Has the US
succumbed to the philosophy that the
ends justify the means? Is American
democracy in danger of being destroy-
ed by the means purportedly being
used to preserve it? If the legitimacy
of the intelligence community is
established, what are the ethical and
moral bases for such activities? Have
the ethical aspects of intelligence
work served in any way to damage or
destroy the morality of the nation?
Kirkpatrick accepts the currently fashionable
assumptions that the ethics of intelligence
activities should be approached from the
perspective of American "ideology," honorable
means, democracy, the morality of the nation
and so on, without ever discussing the relevance
of these concepts.
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The uselessness of Kirkpatrick's answer to
his own questions perhaps illustrates as well as
anything the potential difficulties of accepting
this approach (although his conclusions (10 not
differ greatly from other similar attempts by
supposedly knowledgeable people).
While intelligence work may not
be among man's most honorable
activities, neither is it the least
worthy. If the People of the US
believe in their way of life and want it
to survive, then they mist take the
steps necessary for survival.
His answer, which infers that since there may be
at least one less honorable profession sonic-
where, things must not be all bad, and that
anything that contributes to the maintenance of
our way of life should be acceptable, cannot
give much comfort to those who believe that a
question of ethics requires searching appraisal.
How should ethics be defined? There are
many definitions in the literature. For example,
Webster's defines ethics as (1) "the study of
standards of conduct and moral judgment or (2)
the system or code of morals of a particular
philosopher, group or profession." However, in
the specialized literature ethics is defined in
terms of several more difficult concepts. Some
authors use the term "the doctrine of moral
principles" to define ethics, others use the term
"the science of human conduct," ~ till others see
ethics in terms of a "moral. philosophy." One
can see the difficulties'with all these attempts at
definition as soon as they are applied to real
situations. There is no generally accepted
doctrine of moral principles. 'there is no
scientific way to explain all Human conduct.
There are numerous moral philosophies to call
upon.
The words moral, ethical, virtuous and
righteous are commonly used interchangeably.
But these words also provide for a great deal of
flexibility in constructing an argument about
what is ethical. It can be (and is) argued that
ethics has nothing to do with common morals or
uncommon virtue; that what is ethical can
depend on a higher order of rationalization such
as that used to justify the theft and disclosure of
national secrets on the basis that there is a
higher order appeal to reason than merely
obeying the law or a government regulation.
Morality relates to good or bad behavior.
But the determination of what is good or bad
behavior is highly subjective, depending on what
society is used to and the underlying philosophi-
cal basis for the judgment of behavior. Morals
change over time; they are readily shaped as
society changes. What is important to under-
stand is that moral implies conformity with a
generally accepted standard of goodness or
rightness of conduct or character at a given
time. That is, morality must be judged against a
prevailing code of ethics, not the other way
around.
The question of ethical behavior in the
intelligence conimunity only becomes relevant if
one in fact has a code of ethics. Much of the
current furor over the past behavior of tic US
i it_Iligence community seems to be based on a
false promise that there is soniethin.- called a
code of Ariieisan behavior for people in the
intelligence business. There is of course.no.such
thin,;. "American ideology" does not provide
mudi guidance for "honorable men dedicated to
the service of their country" when the
alternatives may involve the destruction of the
state itself or even the destruction of all
mankind. A code of ethics must provide an
objective set of standards to help an individual
decide the moral questions which he faces from
time to time and the basis by which a wider
society judges the morality of individual acts.
The important question for America to answer
is not what the code should contain in specific
t rnis__btit_who' should establish..it.VThere are
three of many possible answers to this question.
A. Society As A 11'hole
The American people are enti-
tled to know what their government
has done, the good and the bad, the
right and the wrong.
-Senator Church
June:, 1975
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The leaking of official secrets is
desirable if the official secret is
information that the #;overnrnent is
improperly hiding from the public
and which the public has a right to
know. This is a very important part of
democracy:
-Senator Cranston
August, 1975
Both of these statements are based on a
supposition that all activities of the national
government are conducted solely in the interests
of individual members of society, that individ-
ual meint.'ers of society must be informed of
everything done on their behalf by their
.government, and that out of this exchange will
come some form of appropriate guidance. If one
argues that intelligence activities are only
conducted on behalf of the individual members
of society, one can argue that it is only right and
proper that society as a whole create the code of
ethics. It may seem that the ethics of every
government agency should be established by the
.people to whom it is responsible, but the facts
are that this has generally never been the case,
and, in any case, this would clearly present the
most difficult set of criteria to 'conic to grips
with. There are a number of problems inherent
in any claim that individual interests predomi-
nate in the formulation of a public policy. To
what extent can individuals be relied on to
know what their own interests are? To what
extent is it permissible for the society to give
special weight to the interests of some
individuals rather than others? How can the
.inevitably conflicting interests of millions of
people be justly served by policies that do not
serve them equally? Should certain interests
such as personal liberty and freedom from
search be accorded such extraordinary weight
that they transcend another interest such as
national security or are there gradations of
individual rights throughout the fabric of our
society? These problems generally make it
impractical to formulate anything as complex as
the subject on the basis of individual interests.
B. The Government
Another approach to the establishment of
a code of intelligence ethics is to place
responsibility on the group, within the society
as a whole, which logically can be judged to
hold rational and informed views toward the
Intelligence function itself and which, from the
viewpoint of both the community and the
society at large, has a legitimate responsibility
toward standards-setting. In general, in the
United States, it is the government grouping of
which the intelligence Community is a part, to
which it reports, and to which it holds itself
responsible that fills this requirement. In fact it
is this group that the intelligence services tend
to fall back on as the legitimate arbiter of
ethical standards wherever forced by circum-
stances away from the use of "guild" ethics
(which will be discussed next). Apart from the
fact that this approach eliminates some of the
complexities of the previous approach-it
potentially, at least, limits the need to
disseminate information which no one wants in
the hands of foreign nations. It implicitly
recognizes the argument that there is a national
interest, conceived as something more than the
interests of its individual members.
. C. The Intelligence Community
Using the narrowest definition of ethics
(the code of a particular profession) it can be
argued (and is) that the code of ethics of the
American intelligence community is set frgm
within by the code of the world-wide
intelligence community and that this is estab-
lished by historical custom and practice. Using
this concept, individuals regard themselves as
highly skilled members of a worldwide "guild,"
practicing an art little understood outside the
guild. Their activities are shrouded in secrecy,
thought they draw on a common history and
common experiences. Individuals tend to have a
common respect for each other as practitioners
of a vital and sometimes dangerous trade
.regardless of whether they are cooperating or in
opposition to each other.
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The obvious tendency of this grouping is to
judge intelligence ethics in the light of "what
the other guys do." By implication, common
practices are ethical, successful practices are
ethical, or "whatever has to be done" is ethical.
That the ethics of the American intelligence
community have been "guild ethics" in the past
should not be a surprise, nor a cause for
criticism. With a couple of exceptions (like
Stimson's policy "Gentlemen do not read each
other's mail" and Eisenhower`s acknowledge-
ment of his responsibility for U-2 flights) there
has never been any attempt by either the
government or the people to establish any other
basis for a code of ethics since the time the
nation was founded. Nor should one jump
necessarily to the conclusion that the guild
ethics of the past are not in fact in the best
interests of the nation after all. They have
certainly stood other nations in good stead for
more centuries than this country has existed.
SurnInary
can be judged. There is, therefore, no reasoned
response to the question, is this or that activity
consistent with an established morality, unless
the action is one that clearly broke a law. Even
then, if one argues that a nation's survival is its
first and ultimate responsibility, and that.
national goals are conceived as something
greater than individual goals, what is ethical
does not necessarily need to be lawful. To quote
two famous people from the annals of British
history again:
We are bred to feel it is a
disgrace ever to succeed by falsehood
... we keep hammering on the
conviction that honesty is the best
policy and that truth always wins in
the long run. These pretty little
sentiments do well for a child's copy
hook, but a man who acts.on them
had better sheathe his sword for ever.
-Sir Garnet Wolsely
Commander-in-Chief, British Army, 1869
It is virtually impossible today for an
individual to take a rational position for or
against any specific intelligence action on moral
grounds. It is ridiculous to pontificate, about
actions that occurred in the past unless a
domestic law violation was clearly involved.
What is lacking is a code of ethics against which
the morality of actions can-be judged.
To conform with most Christian moral
philosophies, a code of ethics would have to be
a relative code and judgments would have to be
made in terms of what is 'called "contextual
.ethics." This means that right would tie
determined by the total context of the decision
and of reality--riot by the application of moral
laws from outside the context of the circum-
stances. This is a principle that Seems to have
escaped the notice of those who are currently
bent on a witch hunt in the intelligence
community.
There is no sued thing as an American
national ethic against which the morality of
intelligence activities past, present, and future
In war-time truth is so precious
that she should always be attended by
a bodyguard of lies.
-Winston Churchill
Prime Minister, 1943
Again, what would be judged immoral in one
context may have nothing to do with what is
judged to be ethical in other circumstances.
The first key requirement is to differenti-
ate between so-called. intelligence activities on
the basis of the ends they serve. Only then can,
questions of morality be applied to ends as well
as means. Four functions have been identified
which should be examined separately, each
under a variety of scenarios ranging from what is
traditionally known as war to what may pass for
peace. The objective of this examination should
be to avoid throwing the baby out with the
bathwater in a spasm of righteous and misplaced
morality. While it is nice for this nation to be at
peace and to dream of being at peace for ever,
history should teach the merits of using at least
a certain amount of caution in that regard.
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Once it has been determined which ends
must be served and under what circumstances,
the second key question is to determine who it
is that should establish a code of ethics for each
of the aetik ti:s in question. There is little
question that our society throughout -our allowed-most professional groups to
csfablish their ov'n objective standard s_ of
con duct to a iiiajor de' ree. However, in the case
of the ^Illteillgence com1 muIlity, three factors
have intruded.
1. The community appears to have done
some things of very questionable wisdom
regardless of standards of morality.
2. The community has done a very poor
job of standing its ground on the basis of its
own ethics when placed under attack.
3. A principal basis for all intelligence
activities is to support the formulation or
conduct of foreign and defense policies. As with
most things in our society, times change and
emphasis shifts. Foreign policy formulation,
which was formerly considered the almost,
exclusive prerogative of the executive, is
increasingly influenced by Congressional direc-
tion. This trend carries with it a natural
tendency for increased Congressional interest in
and regulation of national intelligence activities.
The Congress lias now assumed_.ancl.must
shoulder the responsibility for establishing the
-ethical standards' for the intelligence comn ufli-
ty-to clarify the .confiision fiat has_beencaiised
by :t71e destruction of confidence in former
standards. In discharging this responsibility the
Congress must also understand some new
facts-the importance of distinguishing ends
before means, the significance of contextual
ethics, the importance of maintaining historical
continuity as standards are changed, the
undesirability of publicity for its own sake, and
soon. -
CoIlgress does not have to set down a code
of ethics in every last detail. In fact, in my
judgment, that is to be avoided. What is
necessary is the establishment. of clear guidance'
to the exec tine in stifticlentilcfail to provide
for the detailed implementation of standards by
the executive branch. Common values link the
American people and their government. We
must have trust in these values while we forge
Irlstitutionlil safeguards against abuse. It is not
the society at large that can determine the
proper ethical standard on a case-by-case basis.
The society at large can, however, expect its
representatives in government to provide guid-
ance whereby its servants can judge the morality
of their actions in the context of an
ever-changing environment. The question is not
whether national values should affect implemen-
tation of national policies but how. The purpose
of our intelligence activities can be defined to
safeguard those values and to do it without
exposing honorable men to unnecessary public
attack for past events.
Perhaps the single most useful action that
could be taken in this whole field is to recognize
and correct the difficulties that are caused by
the poor definition and overlap of organiza-
tional functions. The clear separation of
intelligence, special operations and counter-
intelligence activities at the national level and
the improvement of coordination within each of
these areas would improve everyone's under-
standing of the processes involved. There are
apparently few who question the need for
nations to conduct covert intelligence activities
in either peace.or war and few who question the
need to conduct special operations in war.
Ilo.vevcr, there are many who question the
desirability of special operations in peace and
some, in influential positions, who are ready to
condemn special operations under any circum-
stances. Without organizational changes in the
intelligence community-including the removal
of special operations functions from the CIA,
new standards will be difficult to implement and
even harder to monitor satisfactorily.
This paper was written as part of the NWC
electlre course-''Intelligence and the National
Security Planning Process. "
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