SEMINARS ON CREATIVITY AND ETHICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000700100007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 6, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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JUN 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR' Deputy ]irector of Central Intelligence 001p R,is~Y
FROM. "John F ,.E Blake File
Deputy'Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Seminars on Creativity and Ethics
REFERENCE: Memorandum for Multiple Addressees from Acting DCI,
dated 25 February 1977, Subject: Recommendations of
Seminars on Creativity and Ethics
In answerlto your request that we discuss the findings of the
seminars which were convened at your direction to consider the subjects
of creativity and ethics in the Agency, we have held a series of meet-
ings with each of our Offices to determine:
a. If the recommendations emanating from the seminars applied
to this Directorate,
b. If this Directorate's personnel agreed with the findings,
and, lastly,
c. If any added insight could be given to the findings.
The comments of the Offices are summarized below insofar as they apply
to the six general conclusions listed in your memorandum.
1. Innovative Approaches to Decisionmaking
While the participants in the seminar concluded that more
decisionmaking authority should be delegated downward, there were mixed
reactions among this Directorate's personnel on this point. Some felt
they would like to have more of a say in the hiring, firing, promotion,
and assignment of personnel for whom they had some supervisory authority;
but, on the other hand, most felt they had all the other authority they
needed to carry out their functions. There were some who felt they had
the required authorities but were reluctant to exercise them until the
boss approved because they involved matters which had keen executive
interest. There was, however, almost a unanimous feeling in all the
Offices that it was all the constraints on the ability to reprogram funds
that had been placed upon them by the Comptroller's office, the Office
of Management and Budget and the various Congressional committees that
stifled and thwarted new ideas the most. The attitude being, "It's not
worth all the time and effort it takes to get the necessary approval
and resources, :so why even try!" Also, "Even if I'receive the initial
approval, someone else comes along later and either takes away the monies
that were originally allocated or cuts them in half, and I have to go
back to the drawing board."
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2. Receptiveness of Management to Innovation
Here the Offices were in general agreement with the findings
and recommendations of the seminar. All agreed that financial rewards
attained through promotions and achievement awards were nice but not
necessarily the real answer. Except for the Office of Personnel, the
others felt that the Agency's Suggestion Awards Program is also not the
answer. There were some who were of the opinion that the program has
been abused by individuals and that the program was administered in an
inconsistent manner. No examples were offered, however, to substantiate
these beliefs.
Many of the Directorate's employees felt that there should be
more face-to-face meetings between senior managers in the Offices and
the employees, accompanied by some greater expressions of interest in
what the employees, particularly at the lower levels, were doing. They
encourage a greater and more widespread use of notes or letters to
employees who deserved a special commendation or acknowledgement for a
job well done. They felt also that supervisors were quick to criticize
for an occasional goof and less inclined to give a pat on the back when
the reverse were true. There was some inconsistency here among the
persons who were questioned because many felt that the employees were
too often not advised of a poor performance until they received their
annual fitness reports. Quite a few urged. that the fitness report
should be used to recognize creativity.
When we turned to the subject of counseling, most persons
believed that there should be more of it, especially for the newer and
younger employees. Quite frequently, this class of employee is left
to fend for himself or herself and tends to become disillusioned and
discouraged.
Apropos of this, however, everyone seemed to feel that the
grievance procedures in the Directorate were good and well publicized.
3. Improved Personnel Management
One individual echoed the sentiments of several others when
he expressed concerns about whether or not his ideas, suggestions and
accomplishments were reaching the attention of senior management. Fur-
ther, he asked, "Is the boss too busy to see what's going on down at
my level?" Also, "With all the layers of management that the paperwork
has to go through, how can I be assured that you and the DDA are receiv-
ing the original version of my ideapor are you receiving a watered-down
version signed by either my supervisor or the head of the Office?"
Recognition again is a key factor.- This feeling or apprehension naturally
spills over and could have an impact on creativity'and motivation.
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Better communications, more meetings with personnel at all levels
should be held. There were a number of persons who attended the
recent Division Chiefs Conference and thought that this was a very
good means of communicating not only horizontally but also laterally
with their counterparts in the other offices. They urged that more
of the same take place, perhaps on an annual basis.
More than a few made comments about the "deterioration" of
the fitness reports and the fact that there was a great deal of
inconsistency in the standards from office to office and even branch
to branch. When they learned of the study that is now underway in
the Agency, they were pleased. (As an aside, it might be worthwhile
to give more widespread publicity to some of the studies that are now
underway in the Directorate and the Agency and thereby eliminate the
idea that management is just sitting still and doing nothing.)
Several discussions were held about the Directorate's senior
rotational program and, generally, the program was received favorably.
The Office of Finance had some reservations about it and felt that it
could only succeed if it were confined to individuals who had a
particular affinity for the skills of the office to which they were
assigned. They were assured that this aspect had been carefully con-
sidered.
4. Fostering Creativity
When the question of MBO's was discussed, the reaction was mixed
and varied depending on how closely the individuals were tied in to the
actual process. Those that were tied in closely to the MBO process viewed
the opportunity to meet with their senior managers as another way of com-
municating, and those that were not tied in viewed it as an over-bureaucra-
tized tool that simply created unnecessary work for the middle- and lower-
level managers.
As for think tanks, most people felt they were nice if you
could afford the time and the manpower to indulge, but, unfortunately,
such was not available. They all were too busily engaged in responding
to short-deadline requests from the Comptroller's office and other parts
of the "seventh floor" which, in many instances, they did not see the need
for or were duplicative of information which had been submitted earlier.
Once again, the offices pointed to cuts and positions and felt constrained.
When asked if there were ample opportunity for creativity in the
Directorate, the answer in almost all cases (except for the reason stated
in the preceding paragraph) was yes. The Offices of Communications and
Data Processing were two offices where this was especially true. Inter-
estingly enough, one or two persons expressed the opinion that there was
more challenge for the genuinely creative person today because of all
these constraints than there was back in the good old days.
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5. Liaison Relationships
Not much conversation was spent on this subject inasmuch as
it didn't particularly pertain to the Directorate.
6. Ethical Issues
If there were one subject that received a most resounding and
emphatic "no" from every one of the eight Offices, it was heard, when
the possibility of a Canon of Ethics was brought up. Most persons
thought that such a happening would be an insult to them and would
be courting disaster. The doctors in the Office of Medical Services
were especially emphatic on this issue. Furthermore, opined some,
they doubted if such a canon could be written and still be meaningful.
There were quite a few who felt that creativity and ethics were incom-
patible as they applied to intelligence. Moreover, it is difficult to
perceive how any fixed canons would be enforceable. In sun, everyone,
be he or she a doctor, lawyer, computer specialist or communicator,
felt that the ethics of one's profession and moral, religious and
individual standards were adequate safeguards against wrongdoing and
that to go further would inhibit individual creativity and discourage
people to a degree where many valuable employees would leave and good
prospective employees would pass up the chance to work for us. Good
leadership which sets an example for employees at all levels is far
more effective than any written canon.
d,'' John. F. E3Qk
John F. Blake
ADDA/MJMalanick:lm (31. May 1977)
Distribution:
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DDA Subj
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1 - JFB Chrono
Background: DDA 77-0995, Memo for DDA, DDI, DDO & DDST,T from DDCI, dated
25 February 1977, Subject: Recommendations of Seminars on Creativity and
f
Ethics."
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Executive Registry
z
25 February 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
FROM E. H. Knoche
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Recommendations of Seminars on Creativity
and Ethics
1, As you are aware, two seminars dealing with the
subject of creativity and ethics in CIA have been conducted
in recent months under the auspices of the Center for the
Study of Intelligence. The first seminar was composed of
senior Agency officers while the second seminar group was
made up of younger personnel and included a broader repre-
sentation of the Agency population. With a few exceptions,
the conclusions of the two groups tended to coincide as
regards, basic issues. I believe the findings that have
resulted are thoughtful and deserving of serious study
regarding implementation.
2. As a result of a recent discussion I had on this
matter, it was concluded that all the recommendations do
not necessarily lend themselves to across-the-board Agency
implementation, at least in terms of applicability or
emphasis. Another question presents itself and that is
whether or not a more broad-based constituency would agree
with the findings. In order to pursue both these points,
I would appreciate your doing the following. In the
course of the next two months would you or your Deputy
hold a special staff meeting with each of your operating
components to discuss these findings. I believe some are
more applicable to specific Directorates than to the Agency
as a whole. Your meetings would be helpful in validating
this opinion. Such meetings also would either enhance theJ_J
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credibility of the findings or give us some different insights.
The Center for the Study of Intelligence will shortly
designate an officer to devote himself for some period of time
to this matter. The results of your meetings will be made
available to that individual for correlation.
3. Attached for your convenience is a combined listing
of the most significant recommendations of the two groups.
This combined listing may serve as a useful summary of the
recommendations I am asking you to consider. Since it is a
summary and a combination, it should not be considered a
substitute for the more detailed and separate recommendations
contained in the two reports distributed by the Center.
4. The recommendations of the two seminars are of
personal interest to me, and I look forward to continuing
progress reports from both the addressees and the Center as
regards their implementation.
25X1A
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 CONFIDENTiAl.
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1. Innovative Approaches to Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking authority should be delegated down-
ward to a greater extent. In addition, interdisciplinary
approaches to decisionmaking should be used to include all
office-level components involved, even across directorate
lines, where appropriate. Pre-decisionmaking periods should
be designated to allow open discussion and dissent prior to
a final decision.
2. Receptiveness of Management to Innovation
Increase the use of apw- t methods of recognition
to demonstrate management's continuing interest in'fostering
individual initiative.
3. Improved Personnel Management
Develop programs to improve career opportunities
thru better counseling, accurate evaluations, and increased
rotational assignments. Periodic zero-base review of such
programs will ensure effectiveness.
4. Fostering Creativity
Review the application of MBO to determine whether
it stifles creativity and, if not, that it is implemented
uniformly with the degree of participation necessary for
success. In addition, encourage development of informal
"think tanks" to allow officers to express their original
idea without fear of supervisory reprisal.
5. Liaison Relationships
Take a cost/benefit approach to liaison relation-
ships and prepare defense papers for justification to critics.
In this regard, request officers volunteer ideas for alterna-
tive collection techniques to compensate for future liaison
losses.
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6. Ethical Issues
Develop a canon of ethics for CIA and establish
an open forum for discussion of ethical issues relating to
operations. In this regard, disseminate a statement of
Agency policies
F-- I
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MEMORANDUM FOR:' Director of Medical Services
Director of Training
FROM . John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT . Levinson Leadership Seminar and
Center for Creative Leadership
1. Attached is the Routing and Record Sheet (Form
610), dt:d 17 July 1976, with notes from the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, which forwarded to him
our position paper on proceeding with both the Levinson
Leadership Seminar and the Center for Creative-Leadership.
2. the DDCI`s paragraphtl spea.kes)for itself. His
paragraph 2 presents a new tasking==ant an interesting one.
It appears to me that a paper jointly prepared by the
Office of Training and the Office of Medical Services is
in order. In deed, other components such as the Office
of General Counsel perhaps also should participate. I ask
that Mr. Fitzwater take the initiative, in concert with
the Office of Medical Services and other of his choosing,
to develop a prospectus. I would like to receive the
prospectus by Tuesday, 31 August.
Attachment
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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SEMINAR
REPORT
TWO SEMINARS ON
CREATIVITY AND ETHICS IN THE CIA
u
i CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
15 FEBRUARY 1977 TR/SR 77-02
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THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE IN OTR OPERATES
A RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION PROGRAM KEYED TO THE PROCESSES
AND FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CENTER
IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROFESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND
TO THE RECORD OF THE ART OF INTELLIGENCE. RESEARCH PROJECTS
ARE UNDERTAKEN BY INTELLIGENCE "FELLOWS"--VOLUNTEER
OFFICERS FROM ACROSS THE AGENCY ON FULL-TIME DETAIL TO
THE CENTER. INQUIRIES ABOUT THE CENTER PROGRA R COMMENTS
ON THIS REPORT ARE INVITED BY THE DIRECTOR/CS1,
Classified by 031484
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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15 February 1977
In late 1976 and early 1977 two groups of CIA officers
gathered under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence in the Office of Training to discuss the impact
of new controls and ethical considerations upon the climate
of creativity and initiative in the Agency. The first group
was composed of senior officers (in rank and years of expe-
rience) and was charged by the DDCI to consider also aspects
of dissent, awards, and foreign liaison as they pertained to
the basic issue.
The first group concluded that the new controls and
ethical considerations were not encumbering creativity and
initiative, but singled out other elements viewed as essential
in maintaining and improving a climate for creativity in CIA.
These were: clarifying the aims and goals of CIA; a reversal
of the tendency to "suck up" authority for decision making
to higher and higher levels; preservation of concern with
the long-term impact of proposed programs; conveying a
"style" of leadership which encourages creative initiative
and innovation; improving the climate for responsible dissent;
raising ethical consciousness; and finally, marshalling the
arguments to defend foreign liaison relationships while
examining alternatives.
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The second group, representing a wider cross section of
employee occupations, was composed of somewhat lower ranking
officers, some of whom were considerably more junior in years
of experience. Asked to review the findings and recommenda-
tions of the first group, it identified different issues of
prime importance to a proper climate of creativity in the
Agency, although it basically agreed. with the findings of
the first group. The issues the second group viewed as impor-
tant were: improving vertical and cross Directorate communica-
tion; eliminating the bureaucratic isolation of the offices
and Directorates from one another; clearer and continuing
statements of goals and purposes of the Agency and the
reasons for them; more feedback to individuals on the value
of their professional efforts; and finally, wide discussion
of aspects of ethical issues, both the ethics of Agency
activities and the ethics of Agency management of people.
Both groups viewed ethical issues as being Agency-wide con-
cerns not limited to a single Directorate.
Both groups made formal recommendations to assist in
carrying out these views.
NOTE: The Center has been requested by senior managers of the
Agency to pursue these topics further. As the Center develops
plans responsive to this request it will be helpful to know of
those particularly interested in aspects of the subjects raised
in these papers, so that the Center can tap the widest possible
representation of Agency employees in the further exploration of
these matters. Please indicate your continuing interest in the
subject and any comments you may have on these papers to the
Center offices. Room 1036 Chamber of Commerce Building,
extensions
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CONFIDENTIAL
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4+'N Iii EN I .At
Report of an Initial Seminar on Ethics
and Creativity in the CIA
Has the long trial of the Agency in the past three years
put a damper on the creativity and initiative of its employees?
Is healthy dissent constrained? Is our ethical consciousness
dulled? Do we, in fact, need a canon of ethics in the CIA?
These were some of the issues discussed by eleven senior officers
from across the Agency meeting on 11 and 12 November under the
auspices of OTR's Center for the Study of Intelligence.*
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr.-E. H.
Knoche, opened the session, asking the group to suggest ways
of advancing innovation and creativity in the CIA under the
constraining impact of inspection and controls. Is the
Agency open enough he asked; does it allow enough opportunity
for dissent; and how might a climate be maintained that does
not discourage responsible dissent? Mr. Knoche said that the
American people now accept intelligence as within our consti-
tutional system, but that the need remains to define the
bounds of propriety for intelligence within this system.
Should the ethics of intelligence be viewed only against the
nature of the perceived external threat at any given time, or
are there some "ethical eternals" for intelligence that can
be reflected in a canon? Should we try to develop one?
*List of participants at Annex B..
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CONriDEar, ,A :,_
Mr. Knoche noted the increasing external criticism of the
Agency's liaison relati-onship with certain repressive
foreign governments (and of activities of these services
in the United States) as an example of a problem involving
the propriety of CIA activities. He asked the group to
consider whether we are creative enough to find other ways
to secure the positive intelligence benefits now accruing
from these liaison relationships should we have to modify
or terminate some of them.
A recapitulation of the group's discussion following
W. Knoche's remarks is set out below, along with the group's
general conclusions and recommendations.
Creativity in the CIA
If creativity within the Agency is defined as the ability
to stimulate new and fresh ideas on what to do and how to do
it, then creativity is alive and well in the CIA today; it is
less healthy if measured in terms of individual initiative,
and willingness to take risks. This was the near-unanimous
view of the participants in the discussion. In terms of
innovation and imagination, we are as strong today as ever.
If the need is there, sequels to the
are well within our creative grasp, although
the pressure of budgetary constraints may be causing our more
imaginative thinkers to be somewhat less assertive in putting
forward the grander schemes. On the other hand, some
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participants noted that the budgetary problems have actually
stimulated the expression of good, alternative and cheaper ways
of doing things than in the salad days of the past.
Our experience with real creativity is that it is irrepressible
and cannot be held down. With a really good idea, there is still
room in the CIA to try it. The DDI has just reorganized some of
its structure, seeking a fresher, more effective product and a
better climate for creativity. There are imaginative new
collection activities underway in the DDO. The DDA, it was
said, is a sharper and more perceptive outfit than in the past.
From this perspective, the challenge with creativity is probably
that mainly of protecting the climate we have now and of en-
couraging it more.
But creativity in terms of imagination alone is not the
whole of it. If creativity is assessed in terms of certain
important ingredients closely related to it, such as the
willingness in routine situations to take new initiatives
or to take risks, then the present CIA prognosis is not
nearly so favorable in the view of the participants. They
expressed the view that individual initiative down the line
in the Agency has been dampened in the past several years
to the point where a lack of it is having serious negative
consequences on our overall performance. The reasons for
this are numerous, and many are plain to be seen. The
solutions, however, are not nearly so obvious, or confident,
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or easy. Among the reasons and the solutions advanced by the
group for the decline in initiative were:.
--that the motivation routinely needed for it stems
in large part from knowing clearly as an indi-
vidual and as an organization where you are going
and what you are doing. Our notion of this as an
Agency is foggier today than in the past. Not
only have we more people from new outside quarters
telling us what we should be doing, but our own
internal leadership has changed repeatedly in
recent years causing rapid changes and some
contradiction in marching orders. It takes time
for this to clear; while the effect persists,
the unfortunately typical reaction is to keep
one's head down and mark time.
--that the outside scrutiny of the Agency has
inevitably accelerated a trend toward centraliza-
tion and a "sucking upward" of the authority for
decision-making in the CIA, undercutting at lower
levels at least, the climate needed for creative
initiative to flourish. The diminished role of
the branch chief in the DO was cited. With less
authority for decision than in the past, he is
not looked to as much for leadership and thus
loses the motivation to take innovative initia-
tives. In contrast, our overseas chiefs of
station, in whom we still entrust considerable
individual authority, were cited repeatedly for
responding well in that climate so propitious
and stimulating for creativity.
--that the spotlight on the Agency is not altogether
unhealthy by any means. It has resulted in a
greater concern than in the past with the poten-
tial impact of a given initiative and with a
more realistic concern for its potential value.
Employee attitude surveys tend to confirm this,
although some in the group were not sure it is
a view fully shared by the younger officers.
The trick, then, is to retain the constructive
caution, but not stifle the initiative.
--that the responsibility for accomplishing this
trick must in part rest with the individual
officer. He can put his head down, be over-
careful in checking with his supervisor, with
the Inspector General, or the General Counsel's
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office, or he can keep before him the vital need
to exercise his responsibility and authority to
the fullest with prudence, but not with over-
caution. (Some in the group believed that the
present trend to overcheck the propriety, indeed
even the substantive wisdom, of many proposed
Agency initiatives would lessen as we become
more familiar with the new regulations and
controls on us. Others believed that more
checks will inevitably descend on us in time
to come, thus perpetuating the present situation.
Some believed there was a tendency to seek more
from the Inspector General and General Counsel's
offices than what either should provide, that
is, legal opinions rather than policy decisions.)
--that apart from the individual officer's duty to
fully exercise his authority, tie solution also
lies in part in a style of lea ership" in the
Agency that must demonstrate a real trust an
interest in initiative, that In fact demands it,
is receptive to it, and sincerely tries to
utilize it. In the view o the group, the way
an organization is operated is the primary
influence on the way its employees respond.
People repeat rewarded behavior and try to
stay away from what gets them in trouble. An
overly-cautious leadership that fears to use
the opportunities for a delegation of authority
promotes an overly-cautious response in its
employees. If the Agency leadership does not
repeatedly demonstrate its trust and confidence
in the rank and file, the Agency as a whole will
not be able to show it is worthy of such trust.
(Some in the group sensed an isolation problem
developed in the Agency leadership in recent
years. In the smaller, more closely knit CIA
of old there was not the private elevator, the
executive dining room, the vast building itself
that made it possible for a top manager to come
or go or to spend his whole day, if he wished,
with no real exchange down the line that might
feed him new suggestions, new initiatives from
below).
While the tendency of the group was to place the onus for
lagging initiative on attitudinal factors in the CIA, and not
on the growing strictness of actual regulations, or on the
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seemingly ever-more structured and formal mechanisms for
operation, management and decision in the Agency, there was
a considerable unease evident about how these mechanisms are
influencing our creativeness and initiative. The MBO system,
in the view of some participants, tends artificially to drive
our activities, resulting in the setting of objectives that
may not represent a true consensus on what is really needed
in any given unit. False goals, thus set, can camouflage real
needs, meanwhile orienting the unit much more than is needed
to an information-feeding process of progress reports and
similar activity. In the view of these officers, creativity
and initiative usually suffer when activity is overly focused
behind a few formal goals.
But others took the position that MBO and similar manage-
ment techniques often provide not only the linkage for dialogue
on objectives and activities that has not existed in many units
before, but an orderly and time-bounded procedure for the
solution of problems and completion of goals. Accordingly,
it has thus enhanced the opportunities for lower-level
initiative and participation. The group perceived a current
lack of a sense of participation as an inhibitor of initiative.
Another factor impinging upon the climate for initiative
and innovation is the amount of frenetic distraction from our
proper intelligence role which many view to be the main result
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of the manhours spent on such things as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, the Privacy Act, and endless responding to investiga-
tions, and the simple but possibly more pernicious threat that
attention to form and artificial deadlines will outweigh
attention to substance in our work.
Agency personnel practices were also cited as barriers
to creativity and initiative in some instances. Much of the
individual's stimulus for initiative springs from the degree
of job satisfaction he feels. If he is constructively busy
and believes that he is contributing, his initiative and his
creativity are usually good. The trick-is to construct the
division and management of work responsibilities so that the
individual feels needed and purposeful in his endeavors. This
is, of course, easier said than done in a bureaucratic organiza-
tion, especially one, according to some participants, with
serious personnel surpluses in some units at Headquarters.
The group endorsed more serious Agency efforts to develop a
"selection-out" process early in employment as one means of
coping with the personnel surplus and maintaining job satis-
faction. Continued effort at broadening rotational assign-
ments between components and Directorates was also suggested
as an important means of infusing fresh perspectives and,
thus, more creativity throughout the CIA*
*In encouraging broadened creativity and initiative among CIA
officers, it is of course important to continue striving for
the improvement of the caliber of our people. In the view (contd.)
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The Suggestion. Award System
In considering how to enhance creativity in the CIA,
attention turns naturally to the already established system
for suggestion awards in the CIA. The group discussed this
system, and the question of whether it could be further used
to encourage creativity--possibly by rewarding good ideas
that for one reason or another could not actually be implemented.
It was noted that the suggestion award system is already
one of the more successful in the government. However, its
image (somewhat inaccurately) connotes a monetary reward for
suggestions that are mainly intended to cut financial costs
in procedures or save time for the Agency. Altering this
image to encourage substantive initiatives on operations or
other matters might be worthwhile and is probably worth some
careful study. However, this could result in explicit rewards
to people for simply doing their job, thus creating a psycho-
logical aura not favored by the group. Informal mechanisms,
such as "'developmental" or "think" units within individual
components did .find favor as mechanisms for stimulating an
attitude or climate favoring creativity, as long as they were
sufficiently flexible, informal, and closely tied to the every-
day lifeblood activities of the units.
of the group, to do this it is necessary for management to get
a better multi-dimensional view of its personnel for rating and
promotional purposes. One step in this direction would be the
inclusion of a peer-rating system along with supervisor-written
fitness reports. The key to such a system's success would be
to keep Lt focused on the positive qualities of the employee and
avoid allowing it to become a stereotyped and routine procedure.
Other steps suggested included additional emphasis on leadership
training. 8
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they can cause beneficial change in a foreign liaison service's
methods of operation by standing up for principles.
Opportunity for Dissent
Closely related to the encouragement of creativity and
initiative in the Agency is the creation of a climate that
does not discourage responsible dissent. The participants
in the discussion generally agreed that some of the Agency's
past dif:Eiculties and transgressions might have been avoided
had adequate channels for dissent existed. In the past,
dissent was essentially an individual initiative, with no
guaranteed institutional reaction. The opinion was offered
that some of our ex-employee critics may have been spurred
to publicly turn on the Agency by the inadequacy of effective
internal dissent channels in their day. Most participants
believed that today more officers are aware of the existence
of explicit institutional channels; for example, the strength-
ened Inspector General's office, although a minority questioned
if this channel was effective for all categories of dissent.
Nevertheless, the participants agreed. that many officers in
the Agency still appear to believe that the way to get ahead
is not to dissent from the views of authority. One attitude
survey was cited in which some 60 percent of the respondents
said they feared opening up and expressing their views. How
does the Agency overcome this frame of mind?
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The group noted that two basic types of dissent are
important to consider. Each has different consequences.
There is on one hand dissent over the wisdom of a specific
operation or policy. On the other, there is the question
of dissent over the propriety in terms of ethics or law of
an operation or policy. In the latter case, channels for
registering dissent and for management to react to it are
probably adequate. This was held by the group to be true,
for example, with covert action planning. While there are
still difficulties in this field (see section on ethics in
the Agency), opportunities for dissent either in terms of
the wisdom or propriety of the planning are not among them.
But the climate for dissent in terms of challenging the
wisdom of a policy is another matter. Here, there is no easy
institutional answer. An employee seriously dissatisfied with
policy in his unit can approach the Inspector General's office.
But this constitutes a major step, traditionally used only for
issues'of wide and serious significance. What about the day-
to-day process in any individual unit of truly exposing the
pros and cons of proposed activities? Does the climate exist
to encourage this in a healthy way? Efforts to formalize or
institutionalize the process at this level would be counter-
productive, according to the participants, who feared it
might spur the "Sam Adams mentality." Some present, in
fact, contended that the growing formality and organizational
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discipline in our overall managerial and control structure
is probably undercutting expressions of dissent by forcing
it to be registered with such formality and finiteness that
employees find the process seriously intimidating.
But the problems should not be thought of as simply one
of expressions of view from the lower level upward. The issue
is really the degree of openness existing above the level of
the individual officer's sphere of responsibility. The way
to achieve this openness.- said the discussants unanimously,
is to make sure that the decision-making process up and down
the line is open and encourages participants at all levels,
that it is a process that truly reflects the ros and cons
a given situation. This is accomplished by a managerial
attitude that encourages alternate views, is willing to
tolerate them, and to give. them a fair and responsive
hearing. If this attitude exists, it is quickly communicated
throughout the organization. The need for formal channels or
official mechanisms is diminished, if not eliminated.
Where institutional mechanisms are needed, some in the
group suggested the value of recent experiments with so-called
"A and B team" approaches in which a policy option, recommenda-
tion, or proposed operation is formally examined by groups
with opposing points of view, each seeking to muster the best
arguments for its view, but with each required to address the
issue from comparable perspectives. Obviously, such an approach
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is most useful on issues of real significance and considerable
breadth where time is not of particular essence. One group
member also suggested that the Agency study the utility of
an ombudsman system similar to that existing today in a number
of public and private organizations.
Ethics in the Agency
The issue before the discussion group in this sphere was
whether the CIA as an organization should give explicit atten-
tion to the nature and adequacy of its ethical values and, if
so, how this should be approached. Before focusing on this
general issue, the group attempted to identify the major Agency
activities that often appear to raise questions of moral
standards or values. It was asserted by some present that
Agency employees as well as outsiders tend to view the ethical
issue as focused primarily on the DO. While there is reason
for this, it is clear that issues of ethical standards also
arise with significant consequences in the other Directorates.
Some of those mentioned for the DDI were:
--how to deal with requests for intelligence
analysis that partially involved assessments
of U.S. domestic developments. (The student
attitude memorandums of the 1960's.)
--dealing with requests for intelligence analysis,
especially from Congress, where the end use may
be to prove a partisan political case, or even
to support a re-election campaign.
--dealing with requests for intelligence analysis
where it appears that a judgment supporting a
policy position is desired by the requestor.
This is complicated by institutional coordina-
tion problems.
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Some ethical issues in the DDS&T involve:
--the proper control of contract activity to avoid
opportunities for graft or other fiscal abuses.
--the extent to which the analysis of foreign civil
technological developments can be conducted.
Issues of industrial espionage arise here, as
do questions of the release of the analysis
without unfair benefit to U.S. firms.
--the extent to which the Agency should engage in
sso-called psycho-biographic studies that are
not dependent on first-hand medical examination
or contact, but on interpretation from inferred
evidence--an ethical issue with psychiatrists
and other like professionals.
In the DDA some of the main issues involve contract
control and the maintenance of the proper relationship between
Agency security activities and U.S. domestic police forces.
For the most part, however, the group concentrated its
discussion on the agent-case officer relationship in the DO
and on covert action operations. With regard to agent
recruitment, some participants said that ethically the agent
is considered a "consenting adult," usually more aware of the
personal. perils of his espionage activity than his case officer.
Strategies which obtain his services under duress are not to
be ruled out, although it is clear that most successful agent
recruitments, certainly the more productive ones, usually are
based on more positive factors. Two areas of agent relation-
ships that were mentioned as warranting strong ethical concern
by case officers involve recognition of the duty to protect
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the agent from danger and identification if at all possible
and to arrange a fair and-equitable termination settlement
when that point arises. In both relationships, according to
one participant, the Agency has at best been inconsistent.
There was unease expressed over the Agency's future ability
to protect the identity of its agents and in turn the moral
conviction with which the officer can promise protection to
the agent. Most of the participants expressed themselves as
against instructions to an agent that his handlers know would
place hin in extreme danger of identification or personal
harm. It was also generally agreed that the Agency does not
really take a needed long-term view of its agents, and that
ethical -Issues arise for the most part from the short-term,
pragmatic decisions made with regard to agents. MBO pressures
which are akin to "scalp hunting" exacerbate the problem.
With respect to covert action operations, the group
agreed that a serious attitudinal problem exists throughout
the Agency.that not only questions the ethical propriety of
the cove:ct action concept, but also involves the willingness
of many officers to take proposed operations seriously enough
to do adequate planning and evaluation in connection with them.
With regard to the ethical propriety of the covert action
concept, it was agreed that there is little use within the
Agency in debating it in the abstract. An official statement
aimed at our employees explaining the Agency's policy on
covert action was deemed worthy of consideration by the
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Agency's :Leadership. This, it was believed, would help
generate a climate of openness about CA activity within
the Agency that would aid in reassuring those employees
who question the Agency's ethical stance on this issue.
It would be difficult to avoid phraseology in such a
statement that might negatively restrict the Agency's hand,
if times and circumstances of external threat to the U.S.
change. An effort to develop such a statement was neverthe-
less seen as worthwhile.
With regard to the adequacy of planning within the
Agency for covert action, there was a consensus that an
explicit educational effort is needed to increase under-
standing and acceptance of how the CA planning and decision
process now operates. Such an effort would seek to make
clear the opportunities in.the process for evaluation of the
pros and cons and the desire of the Agency to consider proposed
CA operations not only in terms of the efficiency of the plan,
but also in terms of its chances of achieving its intended
result and the likely consequences of that result.
The issue of whether the Agency needs to develop and
promulgate a general ethical canon or code for its activities
drew a mixed reaction from the participants. It was asserted
that younger officers in the Agency have a strong concern over
ethical issues, and feel the weight of past "transgressions"
by the Agency together with the responsibility for preventing
them in the future. Unless we develop a canon, according to
17
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one participant, we really have no coherent way to pass on
the traditional ethical standards of the Agency to younger
officers. Another participant said that any organization
with a mission as structured as that of the Agency has a
de facto code of ethics whether it is written down or not.
U.S. military organizations, it was noted, have recognized
this and have attempted with some success to develop ethical
canons responsive to the military mission. Agency critics,
of course, are heavily concerned with the ethical question
and, in the view of some participants, the Agency has failed
to answer them effectively because it has not consciously
developed a full and explicit ethical stance. We need to
set some clear norms for ourselves, one participant said,
because we are at our worst when we feel we can act dif-
ferently from others. Our ethical responsibility to each
other as intelligence officers and as at least one officer
believed, to the people of the United States, is of vital
importance in maintaining the esprifi de corps and effective-
ness of the Agency. Although no code can guarantee to stop
ethical abuses, it could help. One thing no code can be
expected to do, in the view of the majority of the partici-
pants, is to equip the Agency to say no to an outside admin-
istration or to Congressional pressure. If a code were
developed, it was the unanimous view of the group that the
Agency leadership, to make it effective, would have to stand
consistently and clearly behind it.
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There was a clear awareness that an attempt to develop a
formal code would be a formidable task, and might have some
adverse effects. Such an effort could be viewed on the out-
side as hypocritical. Does an espionage organization really
want to set professional standards for itself that put it on a
par in a sense wjth established professions like medicine
and law which operate with canons of their own? How specific
should such a code be? How general? There would be so many
twists and turns and subtleties of meaning to consider that
the chances for misinterpretation and indeed the lack of
clear understanding would be very large. One participant
feared that such a code would only confuse the case officer,
making him tend to shy away from the tougher agent decisions
and initiatives--often the vital lifeblood of espionage.
The opportunities for various perceptions of such a canon
were illustrated in a discussion of one such code that has been
developed in draft and circulated for comment. Some Agency
managers to whom it was shown objected on grounds that it added
unnecessarily to their responsibilities; middle-level officers
liked it, seeing it in part as a wedge with superiors to fight
objectionable orders; the young officers in the DO liked it
because it offered them an ethical rationale for engaging in
espionage.
COr,wi s~ B IAA.,
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One participant who was not enthusiastic about developing
a code or, canon of ethics suggested that if such an effort
were made it should be cast in the form of a sort of charter
in which the purpose of the organization is set forth in
positive terms rather than in terms of ideals such as objec-
tivity. Such a charter would permit the,desired ideals to
flow from the positive statement of purpose. There is a danger
in setting up a list of negative "do-rot's" in that we would
appear to be stating that we would only execute those orders
which fit within some stated set of ethics.
Whether or not it would prove possible to develop a satis-
factory and defensible canon, there emerged a general consensus
among the group that the Agency should probably make a serious
attempt at it, while taking some other specific steps aimed at
focusing the ethical consciousness of CIA above the subliminal
level of concern at which it now exists. The very effort
itself, whether we ever get to a fixed canon, may be the most
worthwhile part of it. Discussion of ethical issues is needed
for new people coming into the Agency. It offers them the
opportunity to confront,. and to explore problems they may
face later in the course of their careers. Discussion of
ethical issues should be made a part of the training program
with specific time for the subject built into a variety of
training courses including those for operational officers,
analysts and support officers.
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Report of the Second Seminar on Creativity and Ethics in CIA
A second more representative and somewhat more junior
group of Agency officers discussed the issues of creativity
*
and ethics in a seminar on 17-18 January 1977. This group
raised some important additional approaches it believes would
stimulate a proper climate of creativity, provide channels
for dissent, and stimulate the high ethical consciousness
required of CIA employees.
New Emphases
Elements that the second group saw as of primary
significance to creativity and ethics were:
a. better vertical and cross-Directorate communication
in CIA;
b. elimination of the bureaucratic isolation of
office-level components across Directorates;
c. a clearer and continuing statement of the
aims, goals, and purposes of the Agency;
d. more feedback to individuals regarding the
value of their efforts; and
*List of participants attached
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 031484
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e. open forum discussions of ethical topics on a
wide scale throughout the Agency as the principal means
of maintaining a high degree of ethical consciousness.
The more junior group is very concerned with the state
of vertical and lateral communication in the Agency. In
fact, problems of communication within the Agency arose on
every topic discussed. It noted that employees who are
leaving for other employment frequently cite poor communication
as a major reason. Lack of, or distortion of, information
coming down from senior staff meetings was also cited as
unnecessarily depriving lower ranking officers of the kind
of stimulus they need for new approaches and creative ideas
to help meet the challenges faced by the senior staffs.
Staff meetings are not properly used as a positive activity
to enhance communication, the group charges. A related
concern of the second group was the bureaucratic isolation
of office-level components, both within each Directorate and
among Directorates. There was a strong endorsement of the
"one-Agency" concept as correct, but not yet a fact in
practice.
Among the tactics it believes would contribute to
better communication and thereby improve the climate for
creativity, the second group cited a profound need for
better, and perhaps more importantly, the continued articu-
lation by management of Agency aims and goals, especially
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the reasoning behind its choice of policies and objectives.
Lack of effective and consistent guidance, rapid changes of
senior leaders, the recurrent investigations, even a failure
often clearly to halt one program when another had been
picked to replace it, were cited as leading to confusion in
the ranks over the "what" and "why" of Agency policy on all
types of matters, and as contributing to the discouragement
of initiative and creative ideas.
There was, of course, a recognition that to a degree
our aims and goals are set from outside the Agency and that
its senior leadership cannot in all cases spell out defini-
tively what Agency policy in certain areas is to be. Still,
the group strongly believed management must be more alert to
giving what guidance it can.
More important than major alterations to the present
suggestion and special achievement awards system is a more
active and conscious effort at feedback of information and
praise where merited for efforts conceived and executed by
individual officers. By the time many programs have proved
worthwhile, especially in the DDO, the officers who broke
the ground and worked on the initial input have frequently
long since gone on to other assignments or lost track of the
value of their input. The group urged liberal use of
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statements for personnel folders recognizing the contributions
of employees.
To enhance ethical consciousness, the second group was
more anxious to engage in open forum discussions of various
aspects of ethics, both the ethics of our activities and the
ethics of our management of people, than to attempt a written
canon of ethics for the Agency.
The group had no important substantive disagreement
with the conclusions and recommendations of the first senior
officer seminar on creativity and ethics. It did, however,
develop a number of its own detailed recommendations going
beyond the work of the first seminar. These are included
below under the discussion of each topic.
Creat_Lvit
The second group fully endorsed the conclusion of the
first that we do have a rich repository of creativity and
initiative in our personnel today. It questioned, however,
whether the environment of the Agency today really reinforces
doing things creatively. It suspected, rather, that the
environment tends mainly to reinforce conventional wisdom as
the proper approach. Personal initiative was once the
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watchword, but today the cumulation of rules, paper work,
coordination, staffs, and the like often tends to institu-
tionalize the avenues of inertia rather than creativity.
Still, there was for the most part less concern with manage-
ment and organizational constraints to creativity in the
second group. Management by Objective (MBO) is viewed as
not having been given a proper chance to work; it is not
widely understood by Agency personnel nor uniformly applied,
according to the participants. MBO, as it is now practiced
in the Agency, was criticized for overstructuring and over-
concentrating on reporting mechanisms no one reads. Its
central weakness, according to the group, is that its current
structure in the Agency cannot be depended upon to provide
two things MBO was designed for: a sense of participation
and better vertical communication, especially regarding our
specific goals. There is also a sense in the Agency of a
frenetic pace of leadership which imposes unrealistic dead-
lines and thus inhibits the exercise of creativity, and
fails to reward its application. The Agency needs far
greater flexibility in responding to creative initiatives,
and needs to train its new managers to require creativity
from their subordinates.
Recommendations
1. In order to foster better communication and break
down the bars of isolation of office-level components:
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--Senior managers should occasionally attend the
staff meetings of the next lower level to see
that essential concerns are communicated and
placed in the correct context. Staff meetings
should be used for the positive communication
channel they might be.
--Decisionmaking should involve all office-level
components across Directorates that will be
affected, not just the action office that will
carry it out.
--Interdisciplinary and "Country Team" approaches
should be used on major undertakings of the
Agency to a much greater degree than at present.
--The dissemination of information within the Agency
on the degree and nature of response, awards, or
recognition given creative initiatives should be
broadened.
2. In order to foster greater flexibility in response
to creative initiative and bolster management requirements
for a climate of creativity:
--Tangible rewards for creative suggestions should
be provided by recognizing the achievement
officially. Cash awards, where clearly appli-
cable should be continued, but other avenues
such as more employee input into rotational
and future assignments as well as increases in
an individual's responsibilities, might be con-
sidered as rewards for outstanding creativity.
Here a distinction is drawn between excellence
in doing one's job and truly creative work that
goes beyond that.
--Letters of Instruction and Fitness Reports should
reflect the duty of a supervising officer to
maintain a hospitable climate for creativity
and record the degree of this attained by managers.
Our management training must include some instruc-
tion on how to foster a creative climate among
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subordinates. The DDO "precepts" for job/grade
categories should reflect the requirement for
openness to new and creative ideas as a pre-
requisite for management/grade promotion.
3. To further enhance the climate for creative initiative:
--Provide a better articulation of Agency aims
and goals, especially the reasoning behind our
choice of policies and objectives.
--Encourage greater efforts at program rationaliza-
tion and justification so that abandoned programs
are definitely identified as such and new programs
become the full focus of attention.
--Review the application of MBO to assure that it
is given a fair chance, implemented uniformly,
its concepts disseminated at all levels through
education, and that the real participation and
communication vital to MBO is exercised.
--The group endorsed the first seminar recommendation
if on encouraging the further development of
component-level "developmental" or "think" units.
It recommended "Creativity Committees" vertically
organized which would permit the movement of ideas
and solutions developed in such forums through to
action. These would not be "bitch," but rather
suggestion, forums providing an avenue above any
officer's immediate superior for a hearing of a
creative idea without: prejudice to one's career.
A far more active program to promote feedback on the value
of efforts that had been expended by personnel on specific
projects is essential, according to the group, and an effec-
tive program to provide such expressions will do more to
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spur initative than will monetary rewards. The present
suggestion and special achievement awards system is healthy
and was viewed by the group as a significant factor in the
Agency's efforts to promote a climate of creativity. As was
the case with the first group, the second was convinced of
the need for better publicity of the existing program for
special achievement and exceptional accomplishment awards
(in contrast to cost-saving suggestions).
Recommendations
--Develop ways to channel back statements of
appreciation for work well done once the value
of the effort is evident.
--Increase the use of non-cost methods of recognition
for work exceptionally well done, such as medals,
citations, certificates, letters of commendation,
etc.
--Continue and expand the present suggestion and
special achievement awards system.
Foreign Liaison
The group was appalled by the possibility that outside
elements--the public, the media, or Congress--could eventually
force the abandonment of foreign :Liaison programs, especially
if this were to be done in a manner dictating which foreign
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--After such a review--aspects of which may already
be under way--a firm defense should be made wherever
the Agency is challenged by external elements to
alter its liaison relationships, especially to
Congress and the National Security Council.
--More can and should be done in fostering creative
approaches to alternatives to liaison relation-
ships. We should look now at what we would lose
in a termination or severe curbing of a liaison
relationship and adjust operating directives,
planning, and activities accordingly to cover
that contingency. Our recruiting patterns should
be targeted with possible liaison loss in mind.
Dissent
The second group concluded that a great deal more openness
is needed in Agency decisionmaking up and down the line to allow
for legitimate dissent that is perceived as constructive and
does not penalize the dissenter. While such an open management
style now exists in some elements of the Agency, it is not uni-
formly present. There is general agreement on the need for
broadening the decision base, while recognizing that in some
sensitive programs, wide knowledge of the details would be diffi-
cult (but these are the most subject to being misapplied as
attested to in MHCHAOS and the drug experiments). The group
agreed with its predecessor that there is much fear of rocking
the boat and personal risk involved in raising dissent within
the Agency today. Integrity on all sides was seen as essential
for constructive dissent. The group viewed dissent as divided
into three categories: personal, policy, and organization.
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Recommendations
1. Personal Dissent: There are adequate mechanisms
available for the expression of personal dissent, such as the
"Godfather" (a trusted senior friend/advisor) channel, the
possibility of skipping a link in the formal chain of command,
EEO, guidance counseling, and, finally, the Inspector General's
office.
--Guidance counseling is the weakest link in this
chain, and it should be improved by better inte-
gration of the full range of Agency assistance
that can be brought to bear, including psychologi-
cal, medical, training, Career Management Group,
and normal office professional career guidance.
The task should not be placed in the hands of
the Office of Personnel because, despite helpful
intentions, OP does not have the kind of knowledge
about the various components that is necessary for
effective guidance counseling.
2. Policy Dissent: There is a possibility of disagreement
on either the wisdom or the ethics (propriety) of a policy,
and the latter should not be confused with the legality of a
policy. The Godfather channel can work on low-level, day-to-
day minor policy matters, but it is imperfect in its degree
of responsiveness and availability to all. On matters of major
policy which are not time-sensitive, the A and B team approach
was endorsed.
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--pre-decisionmaking periods should be delineated
with the factors involved in the decision spelled
out, providing a period of time for thought and
review of the matter by all elements involved
before a formal dissent must be taken.
--Additional formal mechanisms short of appeal to
the IG should be created. (NOTE: As with the
first group, the second was divided, and it was
about equally divided on this point.)
3. Organizational/Management Dissent: In order to
provide a forum for review of management practices in an
atmosphere that would be creative rather than prejudicial, a
minority suggested:
--Periodic zero-based management review of each
unit's work at unit conferences which would
involve all employees in a reexamination of all
significant facets of organizational methods and
management processes.
Ethics
According to the second group, discussion and examination
of ethical considerations is growing more important as we
move away from a world of black and white issues (cold war
approaches) to more complex new fields of intelligence
operations and analytical demands. It challenged the concept
that younger officers have a corner on the market of ethical
concerns, believing that they have, in fact, come more to
terms with the ethics of Agency operations before being
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hired than did their seniors. Some felt that it is mainly
the senior officers who are suffering anxieties over ethics
today. The group did not profess necessarily to share the
ethical considerations under which those more senior "cold
warriors" of the 1950s made decisions at that time and the
lingering mentality some still retain. Thus they were not
eager to find a means to pass along those ethics to younger
officers. The group was at pains to emphasize that what is
legally permissible is not necessarily ethical. It is this
latter distinction which needs considerable discussion and
understanding beyond the recognized usefulness of legal
guidelines.
The second group viewed ethical standards as so rapidly
changing as to suggest the existence of "situational ethics"
which make it impracticable and constraining to develop a set
code. The group was most concerned about instilling into
our officers a sense of integrity, and this underlaid its
approach not only to the ethics of operational activity, but
to the ethics of handling personnel and to supervisory rela-
tionships within the Agency. It agreed that we are operating
on a sort of unwritten code that has built up over the years
and that an effort at setting more clearly delineated standards
is laudable. The group believes that espionage is essentially
unethical by definition in a perfect world. However, we don't
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live in a perfect world; espionage activities are engaged in
by our enemies, and thus also are necessary for us. Given this
situation, the Agency, in order to keep vital and fulfill its
role, must continue to think the unthinkable in order to be
a step ahead of foreign adversaries.
The group as a whole did not believe the Agency should
attempt to write a code of ethics because it would become a
string of platitudes and a list of do's and don'ts that have
already been spelled out in legal guidelines. It would also
be very difficult to get a code that applied equally to all
components of the Agency. Furthermore, it could not be made
legally binding, because we do not have, nor should we have,
the power to act as judge and jury for ourselves. And, finally,
it would require constant revision. Still, the group did not
fundamentally object to an attempt to work toward such a code,
nor would it resist one, if written, so long as it was fre-
quently updated. A better approach, in the belief of the
participants, would be considerably more discussion and under-
standing by the Agency's personnel, particularly through
branch managers, of the significance and ramifications of legal
guidelines on CIA ethics and the integrity of its officers.
Recommendations
To heighten and encourage ethical consciousness in the
Agency:
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CONIF . AL
ANNEX A - RECOMMENDATIONS
of the Seminar on Ethics and Creativity in CIA
held 11 and 12 November 1976
1. To Preserve and Enhance Employee Creativity and Initiative,
the Agency Should:
a. take every opportunity to stress that individual
officers should try to exercise their responsi-
bility and authority to the fullest, avoiding
unnecessary referrals of minor matters up the
line.
b. take every opportunity to stress the interest
in and receptiveness of management to individual
initiative.
c. continue to stress and develop personnel programs
designed to cut the size of the Agency's work
force, improve its evaluation systems for
employees and provide opportunities for rota-
tional assignments.
d. seek to stem the trend of decision-making
authority to rise to ever-higher levels by
a conscious effort to delegate authority
downward, and set a tone of trust towards
the levels to which that authority has been
delegated.
e. take a detached look at the extent to which MBO
and other formal management systems may be
inhibiting creativity.
f. encourage the further development at a component
level of informal "developmental" or "idea" units.
2. In Coping With Criticism of CIA Foreign Liaison Relation-
ships, the Agency Should:
a. explicitly develop for use with the critics the
best possible case for maintenance of responsible
liaison.
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b. explicitly request interested Agency officers
to come forward with ideas for new collection
techniques to compensate for any future losses
in liaison information.
c. encourage initiatives designed to modify
objectionable behavior of liaison services.
3. To Enhance a CIA Internal Climate that Does not Discourage
Responsible Dissent, Management Throughout the Agency Should:
a. take every opportunity to maintain an open
decision-making process up and down the line
that truly provides opportunities for pro and
con consideration of issues in a given situation.
b. avoid the creation of further formal mechanisms
for dissent, while seeking to apply, where cir-
cumstances seem appropriate, such techniques as
the A team, B team approach to problems and
issues.*
4. To Enhance Our Ethical Consciousness, the Agency Should:
a. authorize an explicit, broadly-based effort to
develop an ethical canon, recognizing that this
is a tricky, difficult task, but that the benefits
of the process itself will probably be well worth
the effort.
b. provide explicit opportunities?in the training
cycle of the Agency for the discussion and
exploration of ethical problems that arise
in all parts of the Agency.
c. consider the dissemination of an official
statement aimed at our employees delimiting
and explaining the Agency's policies and
processes on covert action.
*This recommendation was supported by a majority; a minority
believes there should be further formal mechanisms on major
issues.
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--The legal guidelines under which the Agency now
operates must be understood by all managers down
to branch level, especially the inter reta ion
and implementation ofd D.O. 11905
--An open forum should be established for Agency
employees to discuss ethical issues such as:
a. legality vs. ethics.
b. are there ethical standards that are valid
for all Directorates?
c. impact and implementation of new CIA
constraints and guidelines.
d. individual responsibility vs. blind following
of orders.
e. controversial Agency operations or practices
which have been Y?evealed to the public--
presented in a general, philosophic framework
that CIA employees can understand.
--A serious reexamination of the ethical considera-
tions involved in the handling of people within
the Agency should be undertaken.
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25 February 1977
MEMORAII~DUM FOR: Deputy Director far Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
.FROM E. H. Knoche
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Recommendations of Seminars an Creativity
and Ethics
1. As you are aware, two serninars dealing with the
subject of creativity and ethics in CTA have been conducted
in recE~nt months under the auspices of the Center for the
Study cif Intelligence. The first seminar was composed of
senior Agency .officers while the second' seminar yroup arras
made up of younger personnel and included a broader repre-
sentation of the Agency population. With a fe~o exceptions,
the conclusions of the two groups tended to coincide as
regards basic issues. I believe the findings that have
resulted are thoughtful and deserving of serious study
regarding implementation.
2. As a result of a recent discussion I ~aad on this
matter, i~was concluded that all the recommendations_do
'~ mot nec_essaril- y 'fen~~~~r me selrves-t~ across-ti~~ioard Agency
tom' imnlomantatinn_ at lpact in terms of anoYicab-Ility or
emVp~iasi s . ~ ~Cnather question presents: i tsel f and that i s
whether or not a more broad-ba.~ed__~anstituency would agree
- - --- ._
~~~~Fi_e fiild~,gs. In order to pursue both ti~ese points,
I wouT-d appreciate your doing the following. In the
course of the next two months would you or your Deputy
hold a special staff meeting with each of your operating
componE~nts to discuss these findings. I believe some are
o~rg_ a p p 1~_ca_b l e,_ t.Q s p e c i f i_~. _~i r~ t o r a t e.~~._ a n __ e y~ n c y
a~ a wio1e. Your meetings would be helpful in validating
this opinion. Such meetings also would either enhance the
Downgraded to Unclassified When
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHh1E.NTS
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 001777
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credibility of the findings or give us some different insights.
The Center for the Study of Intel ligence will shortly
designai:e an officer to devote himself for some period of time
to this matter, The results of your meetings will be made
available to that individual for correlation.
3. Attached for your convenience is a combined listing
of the most significant recommendations of the. two groups.
This combined listing may serve as a useful summary of the
recommendations I am asking you to consider. Since it is a
summary and a combination, it should not be considered a
substitute for -the more detailed and separate recommendations
contained in the two reports distributed by the Center.
4. The recommendations of the two seminars are of
personal interest to me, and I look forward to continuing
progress reports from both the addressees and the Center as
regards their implementation.
Distribution:
Orig - DDA w/att
1 - DDI w/att
1 - DDO w/att
1 - DDS&T w/att
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1. Innovative Approaches to Decisionmaking
~~.~'~Decisionmaking authority should be delegated down-
ward to ~~ greater extent. In addition, interdisciplinary
approachE:s to decisionmaking should be used to include all
office-lEavel components olved, even across directorate
lines, w~iere appropriate re-decisionmaking periods should
be designated to allow open discussian and. dissent prior to
a final decision.
2. Receptiveness of Management to Innovation
Increase the use of non-~ost.metl~l,af recognition
to demonstrate management's continuing interest in fostering
individual initiative.
3. Im roved Personnel Mana mint
Develop.. pr~grams_ to ~ improve .career opportunities. ,r'?~`
thr.~,~,betiR,~~, _couns~linc~, accurate evaluations, ,and' ncr~as.ed
rotationa:l~.assignments. Periodic zero-base review of such
programs will ensure effectiveness.
4. Fostering Creativity
Review the application of c4B0 to determine whether
it stifles creativity and, if not, that it is implemented
uniforml~~ with the degree of participation necessary for.
success.Y In addition, encourage development of informal
"think tt~.nks" to allow officers to express their original
idea without fear of_supervisory reprisal.
5. Liaison Relationships
Take a cost/benefit approach to ~,}~is~on re_lati~or-
sps and prepare defense papers for justification'to critics.
In #~is ~~egard, request officers volunteer ideas for alterna-
tive col:Lection techniques to compensate for future liaison
losses.
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4Dey~a,,a _car~o~,,~~~, e~~ acs fq~r~;~~ and establish
an open forum for discussion of ethical issues relating to
operatia:ns. In this regard, disseminate a statement of
Agency policies on covert action and other constraints
under which CIA operates.
6. Ethical Issues
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