CONGRESSIONAL QUERIES REGARDING CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000700040006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 11, 1977
• Content Type: MF

.1 DD/A RQ It,
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel
11 JUL 1977
STATINTL FROM
tanor Information, DDA
SUBJECT . Congressional Queries Regarding Classification
Management
REFERENCE . Letter from Congressman Preyer dtd June 10, 1977
(OLC #77-2432)
In response to Congressman Richard Preyer's letter in reference,
we have gathered the information below.
Question 1
The CIA is authorized to classify national security information or
material by Executive Order 11652, section 2(A). Only the terms author-
ized in the Executive order, i.e., Confidential, Secret and Top Secret
are used to identify classified information; and, the Agency does not
authorize the use of any additional terms or gradations to extend the
meaning of these classifications.
Question 2
The Agency does use certain markings, in conjunction with classifi-
cation, to control dissemination. These are authorized for use in the
Intelligence Community by DCID 1/7, 5 October 1975 (see Attachment A),
and include WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS,
CAUTION--PRIDPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED, and NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS. Internal markings used on classified documents include CIA
INTERNAL USE, ONLY and EYES ONLY. The marking CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY is
used on classified information which should n t be disseminated outside
of CIA, Agency Headquarters Regulation authorizes this marking STATINTL
(see Attachment B). The marking EYES ONLY is used when information,
classified or unclassified, is intended for the addressee alone and is
not to be disseminated further. Agency regulations recognize this marking
for medical information, financial interests and operational cable traffic.
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Another category of markings used in conjunction with classification are
sensitive compartmented information (SCI) controls. These markings are
applied to documents which contain information of a sensitive nature and
which must be handled on a more restricted basis than might be indicated
by the classification alone.
At one time SECRET-SENSITIVE was a legitimate classification and
control marking used to identify material which required greater discre-
tionary handling than that marked with classification alone (see Attach-
ment Q. In 1976 at the urging of the Interagency Classification Review
STATINTL Committee, Headquarters Regulation was amended and the SENSITIVE
marking eliminated. Although no longer authorized by Agency regulations,
SECRET-SENSITIVE is occasionally still found on some documents in the
Agency.
We can identify only three markings meeting reference paragraph 2
criteria of being used for "records which are not classifiable. .but
which are not to be made available outside the department." They are
EYES ONLY, ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY and FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(see Attachment B). In no case though does the marking eliminate the
requirement for review under the Freedom of Information or Privacy Acts.
As mentioned above, EYES ONLY is used to indicate that dissemination of
a document is limited to the addressee(s) alone. This marking has be-
come part of 44common law" in the Agency but has not been codified into
the regulatory system. ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY is used for
unclassified, non-sensitive administrative information of a proprietary
interest to CIA. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY is used for intelligence informa-
tion which does not warrant a security classification but does require
some degree of limitation on dissemination. This control marking might
be required on information for protection under copyright, libel and
slander laws.
None of the three markings above preclude release under the Freedom
of Information. Act and material with these markings are subject to routine
review upon request. At that point the marking is removed if the control
no longer applies. The limitations on access implied by the markings do
not expire; they are removed only upon the decision of the originator or
recipient of the material. Since the marking is never used as a basis
for denial of information to requesters, it is difficult to envision the
circumstances under which the use of these markings would become subject
to court challenge. We are aware of no such challenges to date. Document
origators determine whether their materials warrant any control markings;
but no official delegation of authority exists for individuals to apply
the markings. With the exception of EYES ONLY, the markings are not used
in conjunction with classification as the materials do not meet the
Executive Order 11652 criteria for potential damage to the national
security. Material with these designations would be freely available to
the public when transferred to the National Archives.
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Question 3
Within the past three years the Agency stopped using the marking
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION NOT TO BE RELEASED--EXEMPT FROM FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT. Originally, the marking was used for information which
is protected from release because it fell within one of the nine specific
exemption categories of the FOIA. Since the nine exemption categories
are permissive though, and not mandatory, the Agency no longer uses the
marking. In practice, our policy has been that nothing is automaticall
excluded from the FOIA. Those older documents which still carry the mar -
ing are handled in the same manner as others when requested under FOIA.
The other marking which we have discontinued within the time frame
under consideration is SENSITIVE. As indicated previously and in Attach-
ment C, the marking was used to show that a document contained informa-
tion of a higher sensitivity than might be indicated by the classification
alone. It was discontinued at the urging of the ICRC because of its
ambiguity and lack of inter-agency agreement as to meaning, handling
procedures, storing, etc.
Question 4
During the period 1 July 1971 to 20 June 1976, the Office of Security
conducted approximately 3,911 investigations into possible violations of
Agency regulations concerning the physical protection of information
classified udder Executive Order 11652 and Executive Order 10501. None
of the investigations concerned administratively restricted data, Only
2,120 resulted in formal charges, that is, a written report was prepared
on the incident. Although none of the investigations concerned the
assignment of'security designations directly, as a result of the investi-
gations documents which were determined to have been overclassified or
mis-classified were remarked appropriately by the originator.
Question 5
In none of the 3,911 cases were criminal charges filed or recommended
to be filed based on failure to protect information. Formal administra-
tive hearings are not part of the Agency's security investigative program
so there were no "hearings" held on the basis of the failure to protect
information. But, of the approximate 2,120 security violations charged,
the following administrative pe e adjudicated under the provi-
STATINTL sions of Headquarters Regulatio First Violation Oral reprimand
by the component division chief%=Mm~ authority and warning of possible
consequences of further violations; Second Violation -- Written reprimand
and warning by the responsible authority concerned and security check duty
for one week; Third Violation - Suspension without pay for a period not
less than one clay or more than thirty days and written warning from the
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Director of Personnel as-to the consequences of a fourth violation; Fourth
Violation - Suspension without pay for a period of not less than two weeks
or more than 30 days and consideration of termination of employment. Dur-
ing the time period in question, in no case was the dismissal penalty
effected. We do not compile statistics as to how many infractions involved
first, second, third or fourth violations.
question 6
The Agency does not file charges, administer hearings or assess
penalties on the basis of overclassification of information. Administra-
tive action of this nature would be taken in the event that there was
evidence of any deliberate attempt to use the classification procedures
primarily to cover error, fraud, mismanagement and the like. In. the
intelligence area it is difficult to predict the degree of damage to
national security which would result from a disclosure of a piece of
intelligence information, so that the classification process and the
decision as to the appropriate level of protection is very subjective.
But, in those cases where repeated,obvious overclassification occurs,
the Agency prefers to emphasize the positive through re-education of the
employee in the meaning and proper application of classification.
Question 7
The Agency does not conduct investigations for other agencies of the
Federal government.
STATINTL
Attachments. a/s
STATINTL
O/AI/DDA do (11 July 1977)
Distribu on?
Original -.?Addressee
STATINTL 1 - 4GC /atts
1 -DD wa s
1 - ISAS/RAB w/atts
1 - DDA Subject w/atts
1 DDA Chrono
1 - :EML Chrono
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/71-
CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
(Effective 5 October 1975)'
Pursuant to provisions of Subsection 102(d) of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, and other authorities vested in the Director of Central In-
telligence by the National Security Council, certain controls on dissemination of
foreign intelligence and related material 2 (hereafter referred to as foreign in-
telligence) are hereby established and promulgated.
1. Purpose
This directive establishes certain common controls and procedures for the
use and dissemination of foreign intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating
the interchange of information for intelligence purposes, there will be adequate
protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. This directive restates
applicable portions of National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 im-
plementing Executive Order 11652, and prescribes additional controls applicable
to the U. S. foreign intelligence mission.
2. Applicability
The controls and procedures set forth in this Directive shall be uniformly
applied by all member departments and agencies of the intelligence community
in the handling of all materials containing foreign intelligence originated by
the Central Intelligence Agency or by the intelligence components of other
USIB departments or agencies.
3. National Security Council Directive
a. National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 implementing Execu-
tive Order 11652 stipulates that, except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, classified information or material origi-
nating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other depart-
ment to which, it has been made available without the consent of the originat-
ing depa' tment.: This restriction on dissemination is commonly described as
the 'third' agency rule."
b. The NSC Directive stipulates that the dissemination of classified infor-
mation, including intelligence and intelligence information, orally, in writing
or by any other means, shall be limited to those persons whose official duties
or contractual obligations require knowledge or possession thereof. This is
commonly referred to as the "need-to-know" principle.
1 Supersedes DCID 1/7, effective 5 October 1970.
2 For purposes of this directive, "related material" includes: information describing U. S.
foreign intelligence sources and methods, equipment and methodology unique to the acquisi-
tion or exploitation of foreign intelligence, foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation,.
and photography or recordings resulting from U. S. foreign intelligence collection efforts.
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c. The NSC Directive also states that documents or portions of documents
containing TOP SECRET information shall not be reproduced without the
consent of the originating office. All other classified material shall be repro-
duced sparingly and "any stated prohibition against reproduction shall be
strictly adhered to.
d. The NSC Directive further requires that the marking, "WARNING
NOTICE-SENSITIVE. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED," be prominently displayed on all information and materials re-
lating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods; and, that materials so
marked will not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels
without the permission of the originating department and an assessment by
the senior intelligence official in the disseminating department as to the po-
tential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods
involved 3 For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation, communica-
tions, ox automatic data processing, this marking may be abbreviated
'WNINTEL.
4. Advance authorization
a. To facilitate the dissemination and different uses made of classified
foreign intelligence within and among USIB, departments and agencies, to,
assure the timely provision of intelligence to consumers and to handle the
volume of such materials in a practical way, it is necessary to provide con-
trolled relief to the "third agency rule within the intelligence community in
addition to that provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.
Accordingly, USIB departments and agencies have been given advance au-
thorization to use each other's classified foreign intelligence in their respective
intelligence documents, publications or other information media, and to dis,
seminate their products to third agencies or foreign governments,' subject
to limitations and procedures prescribed in this Directive.
b. Classified foreign intelligence documents, even though they bear no con-
trol markings, will not be released in their original form to third agencies or
foreign governments without permission of the originator. Information con-
tained in classified foreign intelligence documents of another department or
agency may be extracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB
Agency in classified foreign intelligence reports and released to third agencies,
except as .specifically restricted by control markings prescribed in this direc-
tive. For purposes of this authorization, "WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be
considered a restrictive marking.
a Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with USIB
or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized channels include the
intelligence components of USIB departments and agencies and within each department
and agency (including their contractors and consultants) as determined by the recipient senior
intelligence official.
4 Excepting FESTRICTED DATA and formerly RESTRICTED DATA, which is prohibited
from foreign dissemination under Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended.
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c. Information contained in 'classified foreign intelligence documents of
another department or agency not bearing any control markings may.be ex-
tracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB Agency in reports
disseminated to foreign governments provided .4
(1) No reference is made to the source documents upon which the re-
leased product is based.
(2) The source and manner of acquisition of the information are not
revealed.
(3) Foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure chan-
nels and procedures.
d. Any department or agency disseminating foreign intelligence beyond
the departments and agencies of the USIB shall be responsible for ensuring
that recipient departments and agencies understand and agree to observe
the restrictions prescribed by this directive and maintain adequate safeguards.
e. No release of a classified foreign intelligence document, whether or not
bearing a control marking, shall be made to foreign nationals and immigrant
aliens, including U. S. Government employed, utilized or integrated foreign
nationals and immigrant aliens, without the permission of the originating
agency. _
5. Additional authorized control markings
a. In addition to the WARNING NOTICE prescribed by NSC Directive
any of the following additional markings may be used on foreign intelligence
whenever, in the opinion of the originating department or agency, extraordi-
nary circumstances related to the intelligence source or methods require more
specific dissemination restrictions. Use of these markings shall be limited to
foreign intelligence, the disclosure of which, could: compromise the status of
collaborating foreign governments or officials or otherwise seriously damage
U. S. relations with foreign governments; subject U. S. citizens or others to
the possibility of personal danger or incarceration; seriously impair the con-.
tinuing cooperation of private individuals providing foreign intelligence; se-
riously affect the continuing viability of vital technical collection programs;
or, result in the possible compromise or loss of some unique foreign intelli-
gence source or method. These control markings will be individually assigned
at the time of preparation of the completed document and used in conjunc-
lion with classification and other markings required by Executive Order 11652
and the implementing NSC directive and, unless otherwise indicated in 6a
below, carried forward to any new format in which that information is in-
corporated, including oral and visual presentations.
(1) "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CON-
TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR"
This marking shall be used when unique source sensitivity factors, known
to the originator, require strict compliance with third agency rule procedures,
in addition to a continuing knowledge and supervision on the part of the
originator as to the extent to which the original document and information
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contained therein is disseminated. Documents and information bearing this.
marking will not be disseminated beyond the Headquarters elements of the
recipient organizations and the information contained therein shall not be
extracted and incorporated into other reports without the permission of and
under conditions prescribed by the originator. (For special purposes, primarily
bibliographic notation, communications and automatic data processing, this
marking may be abbreviated ORCON.)
(2) "USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY"
- Foreign intelligence so marked will not be disseminated to departments
and agencies not represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board without the
permission of the originating agency. Within each USIB department and
agency dissemination shall be as determined by the recipient senior intel-
ligence official, and may include department or agency contractors and
consultants unless specifically prohibited by addition of the "NOT RELEAS-
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS" mark-
ing described below, -(For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications and automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre-
viated. USIBONLY.)
(3) `NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/
CONSULTANTS"
Foreign intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated to contractors
or contractor consultants without the permission of the originating agency.
Examples of when this marking may be used include National Intelligence
Estimates and similar national intelligence reports, and other foreign intel-
ligence, which, if disseminated to consultants or contractors, might seriously
impair the continuing cooperation of contributing private individuals. This
restriction shall not apply to those consultants hired under Civil Service
Commission procedures, or comparable procedures derived from authorities
vested in heads of departments and agencies by law, and who are normally
considered an extension of the office by which they are employed. In apply-
ing this control marking, originators will give consideration to the need of
USIB member Departments and Agencies to use contractor consultants and.
contractors to perform services which cannot be adequately performed by
U. S. Government personnel. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
notation, communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may
be abbreviated NOCONTRACT. )
(4) "CAUTION PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" '
This marking will be used in conjunction with foreign intelligence obtained
from various sources in the U.S. private business sector, and as the informa-
lion may bear upon proprietary interests of the source, or may otherwise
be used to the source's detriment. Recipients of reports bearing this marking
shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure that the information is not
used to the detriment of the source. This marking maybe used in conjunction
with the "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS"
marking described above. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
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notation, communication and automatic data processing, this marking may
be abbreviated PROPIN.)
(5) "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS"
Foreign Intelligence so marked involves special considerations requiring
that it not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals
or non-U.S. citizens without the permission of the originating agency.
Examples of when this control marking may be. used include: the possible.
compromise of the status of relations with collaborating foreign governments,
or officials; or jeopardizing the continuing viability of vital technical col-
lection programs. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre-
viated NOFORN.) When the originating agency predetermines that infor-
mation can be released to a specified foreign government(s) the following
marking may be used: "THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
FOR RELEASE TO (specified country(s) )." (For special purposes, pri-
marily bibliographic notation, communications, or automatic data process-
ing, this marking may be abbreviated "REL (specified countries).")
6. Procedures governing use of control markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use foreign intelligence in a manner contrary
to the restrictions established by the control markings set forth above shall
obtain the permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only
to the specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically
apply to all recipients of the information as originally disseminated unless the
originating agency removes the control markings for the benefit of the re-
c::Lpients. In those cases where dissemination outside the recipient agency is
desired utilizing lesser or no control markings, the recipient agency should
prepare a sanitized version which may be released with the originator's
permission.
b. Control markings authorized in paragraphs 3d and 5 above, shall be
displayed prominently on documents, incorporated in the text of communica-
tion messages, and associated with data stored or processed in automatic data
processing systems. Unless the entire document justifies the protection of the
control marking(s), each portion requiring the marking(s) shall, to the extent
feasible, be marked with the appropriate marking abbreviation authorized by
this directive.
c. The standardized restrictions and control markings set forth in this
directive are to be employed uniformly by all departments and agencies in the
intelligence community, thereby assuring like control and restrictions on the
use of foreign intelligence disseminated within the departments and agencies
represented on the USIB.
d. The substance of this directive shall be published in appropriate regula-
tory or notice media of each agency or department, together with appropriate
procedures permitting rapid interagency consultation concerning utilization
of intelligence and information. For this purpose, each USIB agency will
designate a primary referent.
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7. Report of unauthorized disclosure
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in
unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the foreign intelligence of another
shall be reported to the Director of Central. Intelligence through the USIB
Security Committee.
8. Prior restrictions and markings
Questions with respect to the current application of control markings author-
ized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and
utilized on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be
referred to the originating agency. These markings are: WARNING NOTICE--
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED
DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS
ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD,
BACKGROUND USE ONLY and NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
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ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
~-' or automatic data processing, this marking may be abbreviated REL (specified
country(s)).
f. OTHER MARKINGS. The following are several additional control statements,
not prescribed by DCID 1/7.
(1) CiA INTERNAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be used for classified
information which if disclosed would violate existing Agency policy regarding protec-
tion of sources and methods. Intelligence or information with this marking may not
be released or shown to anyone outside the Agency without permission of the origi-
nating office. Within the Agency, intelligence or information with this marking may
be released only to full-time Agency employees and is not to be disseminated to
consultants, external projects, or reserve personnel on short-term active duty unless
permission of the originating office is obtained.
(2) ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be used for
unclassified, nonsensitive administrative information that should not be disseminated
outside of CIA.
(3) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be used whenever intelli-
gence or intelligence information does not warrant a defense classification, but does
require some dissemination limitation. Intelligence or information bearing this mark-
ing may be used for official purposes by foreign governments that have been autho-
rized to receive it by the originating agency. It may be disclosed to non-Government
persons and organizations only with permission of the originating agency. This control
marking is used alone and never in conjunction with a defense classification. Some
reasons for requiring such dissemination control are protection under copyright, libel,
slander, and communications laws, and protection for moral, ethical, or legal reasons.
g. METHOD OF MARKING
(1) DOCUMENTS. If possible, control markings on documents will be in full capitals
immedi
t
l
b
l
h
d
a
e
y
e
ow t
e
efense classification. If the control marking is used without a
defense classification (see subparagraphs f(2) and (3) above), the marking will be
mad
i
th
e
n
e same manner required for a defense classification (see HR
Control stamps are available from Building Supply Officers.
(2) MULTIPLE CONTROL MARKINGS
(a) If more than one control marking is justified for a document, the markings will be
placed, if possible, beneath the defense classification and separated by a horizontal
line, preferably two hyphens; for example:
SECRET
USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY - - NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS
OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS
(b) If a document is composed of two or more separate items, the appropriate control
marking or markings for each item will be shown:
SECRET
USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY
and
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS
Moreover, the overall publication must be marked with a classification and control
to protect every item, for example:
SECRET
USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY - - NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS
OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS
-+Revised: 21 April 1976 (938)
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY 15
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STATINTL
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r f. OTHER MARKINGS
(1) CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be used for classi-
fied Information which if disclosed would violate existing Agency policy
regarding protection of sources and methods. Intelligence or Information
with this marking may not be released or shown to anyone outside the
Agency without permission of the originating office. Within the Agency,
Intelligence or information with this marking may be released only to
full-time Agency employees and is not to be disseminated to consultants,
external projects, or reserve personnel on short-term active duty unless
permission of the originating office Is obtained.
(2) ADMINISTRATIVEINTFRNAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be
used for unclassified, nonsesitive ad istratyp il3fprlnatit~ra that sbogld
not be disseminated outside of CIA.
(a) FOR OPT"IQIAL USE ONLY. This control marking may be used whenever
intelligence or intelligence information does not Warrant a defense classi-
fication, but does require some dlsseminatlaa llmitaton. Intelligence or
Information bearing this marking may be med. for official purposes by
foreign governments that have been author]*d to' ,receive it by the origi-
nating agency. It may be disclose4 to non-governr4ent persons and or-
ganizations only with permission of the originating agency. This control
marking is used alone and never In conjunction With a defense classi-
fication. Borne reasons for requiring such dissemination control are
protection under copyright, libel, slander, and communications laws, and
protection for moral, ethical, or legal reasons.
(4) SENSITIVE. This control marking may be used In conjunction with a
defense classification to Indicate that the document requires greater dis-
cretionary handling than might be suggested by the defense classifica-
tion only. The distribution made or agreed to by the originator should
not be expanded without consulting the originator, The marking may
not be used In lieu of the control marking WA TINA NOTICE--SENSITIVE
SOURCES METHODS INVOLVED.
(5) See 13~or application of
4$j.Ahe Freedom of information
Law, to rkings described etibparagrapl (a). and (3) above.
g. METHOD OF MARKING
(1) DOCUMENTS. If 'possible, control markings on documents will be In
full capitals immediately below the defense classification. If the control
marking Is used without a defense classification (seepuho. rnnrQlobe
and j above). the marking WIll the same manner required for
a de ense classification (see Doptz'Qi stamps -are available
from Building
(g) MULTIPLE CONTROL MARKINOI3
(&~ It a document warrants the application, of more than one control
marking, they will be placed, U ' ppossible, beneath the defense classi-
ficatlau on a single no and aspar, ats4 b' a 4ia9onal lone; for example:
8EORE'.C
NQ FOREIGN DI/?QNTS.QLLED DISSEM
(b) If a publication is composed of two or .more separate items, the ap-
propriate control marking or markings for each item Will be shown;
for example, tWo Items might be marks4 rgspectively:
SECRET
NQ SON DJSi t$
and
tai;;sU~'
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4
CONTRQLI DI8SEM
is Revised'. 2 December 1971 (652)
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 LEO J. R`OAf ? CAUL. ?'
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GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAY9uRH HOUSE OFFICE BUILnnu ROOM I3.349-B-C
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2031!5
June 10, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
.Washington, D.C. 20505
T.Xf;L11 `~LYS ReT ryyW)
OLC
Dear Admiral Turner:
In connection with its oversight responsibilities for the freedom
of Information Act, the Privacy Act and government records policies, this
subcommittee is concerned with security classification r.nanagement practices,
and with the use of administrative markings and other identification codes
which restrict access to documents.
To assist us in evaluating such practices and restrictions, would
you please furnish the subcommittee the following information. Even if
some questions do not apply to your agency, please respond to all those
which do.
1. Is your agency authorized to classify documents under terms of
Executive Order 11652? If so, what terms are used within your agency,
either formally or informally, officially or unofficially, to indicate
gradations or extensions of the tern "top. secret", "secret", or "confi-
dential"? (For example, "top secret--grade l", "secret-sensitive", "top
secret--eyes only", "noforn", "official use only", or "non public", etc.)
Please list such terms.only if used in combination with the standard E.O.
11652 designations.
2. What legend or legends are used by your agency to identify
records which are not classifiable under Executive Order 11652_ but which are
not to be made available outside the department and/or outside the govern-
ment? For each such term, please list:
(a) Its specific name.
(b) Its-application.
(c) The manner in which it was put into use (e.g.,
agency circular, formal regulation) and by whom (e.g.,
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J?M . N. MC CLOSK[Y. in.. CA. jp_
J. OAMIOMIM 0"Y". IND.
JOHN N. ERL.LNVORN. ILL.
-00
413
AQ0070j(Y4Qb06-#fiz_, 3~;t
`~C. iaTi7 +t.
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department head, general counsel). Please enclose a copy
of the document putting the term into use.
(d) The authority under which the term was put into
use (e.g., statute, executive order). Please include a
copy of the statute, executive order, or other document
furnishing the authorization.
(e) The date it was put into use.
(f) The last occasion on which the need for such a
particular designation was reviewed.
(g) The procedure used to remove the marking after
some period of time. (I.e., does the restriction auto-
matically expire? Undergo review?) Simply note if this
information is included in the material furnished under
(c).
(h) The procedure used to evaluate materials with this
marking when they are requested under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (e.g., is marked material automatically withheld
from being furnished under FOIA? Can anyone other than the-
person who initially marked the material remove the marking?)
(i) Whether this marking has ever either generally or'in
a specific case been challenged in court? If so, what was
the result and what is the case citation?
(j) The! number of agency officials who are authorized
to determine that a document or record should be marked
with this term.
(k) The criteria by which officials are given authority
to determine that a document or record should be marked with
this term.
(1) Whether this marking has ever been used on documents
which also qualify for security'classification under Execu-
tive Order `J 1652. If so, why?
(m) Compared to E.O. 11652 security classifications and
from-a standpoint of document sensitivity, would you say
materials carrying this mark are about as sensitive as materi-
als marked confidential, marked secret, or marked top secret?
(I.e., how restrictive is this marking supposed to be?)
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(n) Whether you consider material marked with this
designation to be freely available when it is sent to
the National Archives?
3. Have you stopped using any such legends during the past three
years? If so, please list the same details as requested in (a) through
(e) of item 2 above, and also state why the legend is no longer used. If
.,5ome documents still carry this mark from when it was used, please also
`answer for it'questions (g) through (i) and (1) through (n) of item 2 above.
"Ad
our agency
ations were conducted b
esti
l in
f
! 4
H
y y
g
ow many
orma
v
.
at the seat of government between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1976 into
possible violations of your agency's regulations concerning the protection
of information which was
(A) Classified under E.O. 11652 or its predecessor,
E.O. 10501?
(B) Administratively restricted by use of some term
described in your response to question 2 above?
aA (Do not include routine "desk checks" or similar routine
supervision or information protection procedures in tabulating
(5U responses to this question.)
Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) above,
(a) How many of those investigations concerned improper
physical protection of information?
(b) How many of those investigations concerned failure,
to assign a high enough security designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned the assign-
ment of too high'a security designation to information?
5. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question 4,
in how many instances from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1976, were
(a) Criminal charges filed, or recommended to be filed,
based on failure to protect information?
(b) Administrative hearings held on the same basis?
(c) Administrative penalties, ranging from reprimands,
to loss of pay for specified periods, to dismissal,
assessed. on the same basis?
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6. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question
4, in how many instances during the same five year eri d were charges
filed or recommended, administrative heart i or penalties of any
sort assessed on the basis of over-classification or other excessive re-
striction on access to information?
7. If your agency conducts investigations for other agencies of
the Federal government, state how many formal investigations into possible
violations of E.O. 10501 or E.O. 11652 were conducted for those agencies
at the seat of government during the five year period.
(a) How many of those investigations concerned
improper physical protection of information?
(b).How many of those investigations concerned
the failure to assign a high enough security-
designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned
the assignment of too high a security designation
to information?
We appreciate your efforts of compiling this material. Would you
please have responses in the hands of the subcommittee by July 15, 1977.`
If you have questions in the meantime, please contact Ricff r- L -B-aFi7es r
of the subcommittee staff at 225-3741.
Sincerely,
R. 6 W-14 J,; 0~
Richardson Preyer
Chairman
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 DDA 77-3499
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16 JUN 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
STATINTL FROM
ssis an or Information, DDA
SUBJECT Congressional Queries Regarding
Classification Management
1. Attached is a letter to the Director from
Congressman Preyer who is Chairman of the Government Infor-
mation and Individual Rights Subcommi.tee of the Committee
on Government Operations. Please not:e that the Congressman
has established a deadline of 15 July for response to his
Subcommittee. Therefore, a very prompt response to OLC from
the responsible components is called for. We have reviewed
his letter and feel that paragraphs 1 through 3 can be most
appropriately answered by the DDA staff. Paragraphs 4 through
7 would appear to be appropriate for response by the Office
of Security.
2. Would you please draft a response to paragraphs 4
through 7 and submit to me by COB 8 July so that I may
consolidate it with our inputs
Attachment: a/s
CC: OLC
STATINTL OGC
STATINTL
AI/DD c (16 June 1977)
Distr
Original - Addressee
1 - OLC
1/- OGC
t',' DDA Subject (filed AI)
1 -DDA Chrono w/o att
l - ;HGB Chrono w/o att
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STATINTL
 AIQ AROSON PREYER, NAC, CHAIRMAN
'LSO J. P% N. CALIF.
JOHN E. MOSS. CAUF. ?
'MICHAEL HA.4NNG7GN. MASS.
LES ASPIN. WIS.. Approved For Release ff M. ( 80-00473
PETER N
KOSTMAY
R
.
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, PA.
T"emon; S. W[ISf. N.Y.
aAREiARA JORDAN. TEX.
(tCorngre of the Jnniteb 'tates
3ou..e of Aeprlelentatibe
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-349-B-C
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
June 10, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner:
PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY. JR.. CALIF.
J. DAHFGNTH QUAYLE. IND.
JDHN N. ERLEN.n.N ...
NISwI?? 0'54
Executive Registry
(7 L&
OLC #77 ,~
In connection with its oversight responsibilities for the Freedom
of Information Act, the Privacy Act and government records policies, this
subcommittee is concerned with security classification management practices,
and with the use of administrative markings and other identification codes
which restrict access to documents.
To assist us in evaluating such practices and restrictions, would
you please furnish the subcommittee the following information. Even if
some questions do not apply to your agency, please respond to all those
which do.
1. Is your agency authorized to classify documents under terms of
Executive Order 11652? If so, what terms are used within your agency,
either formally or informally, officially or unofficially, to indicate
gradations or extensions of the term "top secret", "secret", or "confi-
dential"? (For example, "top secret--grade 1", "secret-sensitive", "top
secret--eyes only",."noforn", "official use only", or "non public", etc.)
Please list such terms only if used in combination with the standard E.O.
11652 designations.
2. What legend or legends are used by your agency to identify
records which are not classifiable under Executive Order 11652 but which are
not to be made available outside the department and/or outside the govern-
ment? For each such term, please list:
(a) Its specific name.
(b) Its application.
(c) The manner in which it was put into use (e.g.,
agency circular, formal regulation) and by whom (e.g.,
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-2_
department head, general counsel). Please enclose a copy
of the document putting the term into use.
(d) The authority under which the term was put into
use (e.g., statute, executive order). Please include a
copy of the statute, executive order, or other document
furnishing the authorization.
(e) The date it was put into use.
(f) The last occasion on which the need for such a
particular designation was reviewed.
(g) The procedure used to remove the marking after
some period of time. (I.e., does the restriction auto-
matically expire? Undergo review?) Simply note if this
information is included in the material furnished under
(c).
(460g1p
11 1-1puP,' .. ES
(h) The procedure used to evaluate materials with this
marking when they are requested under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (e.g., is marked material automatically withheld
from being furnished under FOIA? Can anyone other than the
person who initially marked the material remove the marking?)
(i) Whether this marking has ever either generally or in 2
a specific case been challenged in court? If so, what was ) I1
the result and what is the case citation?
(j) The number of agency officials who are authorized
to determine that a document or record should be marked
with this term.
(k) The criteria by which officials are given authority
to determine that a document or record should be marked with
this term.
(1) Whether this marking has ever been used on documents
which also qualify for security classification under Execu-
tive Order 11652. If so, why?
(m) Compared to E.O. 11652 security classifications and
from a standpoint of document sensitivity, would you say
materials carrying this mark are about as sensitive as materi-
als marked confidential, marked secret, or marked top secret?
(I.e., how restrictive is this marking supposed to be?)
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(n) Whether you consider material marked with this
designation to be freely available when it is sent to
the National Archives?
3. Have you stopped using any such legends during the past three
years? If so, please list the same details as requested in (a) through ('
(e) of item 2 above, and also state why the legend is no longer used. If
some documents still carry this mark from when it was used, please also
answer for it'questions (g) through (i) and (1) through (n) of item 2 above.
4. How many formal investigations were conducted by your agency
at the seat of government between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1976 into
possible violations of your agency's regulations concerning the protection
of information which was
(A) Classified under E.O. 11652 or its predecessor,
E.O. 10501?
(B) Administratively restricted by use of some term
described in your response to question 2 above?
(Do not include routine "desk checks" or similar routine
supervision or information protection procedures in tabulating
responses to this question.)
Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) above,
(a) How many of those investigations concerned improper
physical protection of information?
(b) How many of those investigations concerned failure
to assign a high enough security designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned the assign-
ment of too high a security designation to information?
5. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question 4,
in how many instances from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1976, were
(a) Criminal charges filed, or recommended to be filed,
based on failure to protect information?
(b) Administrative hearings held on the same basis?
(c) Administrative penalties, ranging from reprimands,
to loss of pay for specified periods, to dismissal,
assessed on the same basis?
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6. Answering separately for categories (A) and (B) of question
4, in how many instances during the same five year period were charges
filed or recommended, administrative hearings held, or penalties of any
sort assessed on the basis of over-classification or other excessive re-
striction on access to information?
7. If your agency conducts investigations for other agencies of
the Federal government, state how many formal investigations into possible
violations of E.O. 10501 or E.O. 11652 were conducted for those agencies
at the seat of government during the five year period.
(a) How many of those investigations concerned
improper physical protection of information?
(b).How many of those investigations concerned
the failure to assign a high enough security
designation to information?
(c) How many of those investigations concerned
the assignment of too high a security designation
to information?
We appreciate your efforts of compiling this material. Would you
please have responses in the hands of the subcommittee by Jul 15, 1977.',
If you have questions in the meantime, please contact Ric ar E. Barnes
of the subcommittee staff at 225-3741.
Sincerely,
R.6-ZA j'AO'X O
Richardson Preyer
Chairman
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OGC 77-3971
23 June 1977
STATINTL
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT : Congressional Inquiry Regarding Classification
Management
1. You have requested that OGC respond to Question 2(i) of a letter
of 10 June 1977, to the Director from Congressman Richardson Preyer,
Chairman of the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations. That question asks, as
to any "legend or legends," which you have identified as "Administrative-
Internal Use Only," "For Official Use Only," and "Eyes Only," used by the
Agency to identify non-classifiable documents subject to limited distribution,
Whether this marking has ever either generally or in a specific
case been challenged in court? If so, what was the result and
what is the case citation?
2. The use" and meaning of "For Offi Use Only" and "Administrativ
Internal Use Only" are prescribed in H 2) and (3) which indicate thesTATINTL
markings generally are intended for app ication to information which does not
warrant a defense classification, but requires some limitation of disseminatio
The "Eves Only" arking is not similarly defined, but its use is recognized STATINTL
STATINTL in HR as to certain medical information, H regard-STATINTL
ing st 'nancial interests, and H an _Icon- STATINTL
cerning official cables. These markings appear o have no o asis
beyond the regulations and do not serve, by themselves, as a basis for
denial of information to requestors. It is difficult to envision the circumstances
under Which the use of these markings would become subject to challenge and
no legal proceedings on any such basis are :known to this Office.
3. In short, the answer to Question 2(i) should be merely, "we are STATINTL
aware of no such challenge."
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6 JUL 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Information to the DDA
STATINTL FROM:
curity
Congressional Queries Regarding
Classification Management
REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated 16 June 1977,
DDA 77-3499
1. In accordance with your request the following is
submitted in answer to those Congressional queries relative
to the Office of Security.
Question 4
(A) During the period 1 July 1971 and 20 June
1976, the Office of Security conducted approximately
3,911 investigations into possible violations of
Agency regulations concerning the protection of
information classified under EO 11652 and EO 10501.
(B) None of the investigations concerned admin-
istratively restricted data.
(a) All of the 3,911 investigations
concerned improper physical protection of
information, although only 2,120 resulted
in formal charges.
(b) & (c) None of the investigations
concerned the assignment of security designa-
tions.
Question 5
(a) In no cases were criminal charges
filed or recommended to be filed based on
failure to protect information.
OS 7 2941/A
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(b) In no cases were administrative
hearings held on the same basis.
(c) Of the approximate 2,120 security
violations charged, the following administra-
tive penalties w ated under the
provisions of HR
(1) First Violation Oral reprimand
by the component division chief or higher
authority and warning of possible conse-
quences of further violations.
(2) Second Violation Written
reprimand and warning by the responsible
authority concerned, and security check
duty for one week.
(3) Third Violation - Suspension
without pay for a period not less than
one day or more than 30 days, and written
warning from the Director of Personnel
as to the consequences of a fourth viola-
tion.
(4) Fourth Violation - Suspension
without pay for a period of not less than
two weeks or more than 30 days, and con-
sideration of termination of employment
affiliation. (NOTE: In no cases was
the dismissal penalty effected.)
2. In reference question 5(c), the Office of Security
did not compile statistics as to how many of the 2,120
infractions were concerned with a first, second, third or
fourth violation.
3. In discussions with your staff it was resolved
that questions 6 and 7 did not have to be answered by the
Office of Security.
STATINTL
STATINTL
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