ANNUAL DEFENSE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000600100011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 436
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 8, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 March 1977
OSD has no objection to declassification and release.
OSD review(s) completed.
NOTE FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT :
C/METAS
Annual Defense Report
1. You asked me to look through the attached DoD Budget
document to see if anything in it might impact on the DDA or
the Agency.
2. Section I (what I call the "Doom and Gloom" section)
spells out the perceived threat and the necessary U. S. Defense
strategy to meet that threat. There are many comparisons
between U. S. and U.S.S.R. expenditures for defense, various
weapons systems, manpower commitments, etc., which may or may
not be valid, but they serve to justify and increase in U. S.
defense spending.
3. Section II addresses individual defense programs
(i.e., nuclear forces, conventional forces, security assistance,
etc.), the basis for the programs and individual justifica-
tions which relate to the picture drawn in Section I.
4. It is written in very broad, general terms, addresses
overall programs rather than specific elements, and deals
very heavily in military strategy. I did not find anything
that would be of specific interest to the DDA. To the extent
that CIA's intelligence collection and production on Soviet
military (force strengths, capabilities and intentions) support
DoD policy decisions, that impact has probably already been
made.
5. One interesting point, however, that I was not aware
of before is the fact that DoD incorporates U. S. inflation
into their budget estimates.
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OPJ'AL.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Deputy to DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7D59
McLean, Virginia 20505
18 JAN
I am forwarding with this letter 15 copies of the classified
FY 1978 Annual Defense Report."
Enclosures: (a/s)
DISTRIBUTION BY IC RE(IISTRY
1 DDI
2 COMPT
2 DDS&T
2 DDA 91( 7,? ?II-1i
M. S4-e-- Hm
-
Rear Admiral, USN
Military Assistant
2 4 JAN 11:47
1 DDO
IC Staff
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SECRET 948
REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
TO THE CONGRESS
ON THE
FY 1978 BUDGET, FY 1979 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST
AND FY 1978-1982 DEFENSE PROGRAMS
JANUARY 14, 1977
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
CLASSIFIED BY The Secretary of Defense
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE, E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3,
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DECEMBER 1993
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FY 1978 DEFENSE REPORT
The task of the U.S. Department of Defense -- indeed the first
responsibility of the United States government -- is to protect the lives
and liberties of the American people in a world that is difficult, tense,
and even dangerous for those who seek to live in freedom and dignity.
The FY 1978 Defense Report sets forth the conditions we face, together
.with U.S. national security goals and needs. This summary describes the
main trends in the international environment and the path we are taking to
meet the dangers and opportunities of the period ahead.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1978 $)
$ BILLIONS
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
...,
A
%
%
t?e__
e
e
%
I
r
%
e
. %
A.,
i
i
%
i
TOA
/
????
...**?.
OUTL4YS
.
-
1964
1966
1968
1970 1972
FISCAL YEARS
I. Past Years and Future Requirements
1974 1976
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
1978
In the past two and a half years, the administration of President
Gerald R. Ford has recorded a number of accomplishments in the realm of
national defense:
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the morale of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces has
continued to improve and the American people increasingly recognize the
contributions the armed forces make to our security and to peace and
stability in the world;
-- the President and the national security leadership have been
necessarily forthright with the country as to the magnitude and momentum
of Soviet defense outlays and the resulting expansion of their military
capabilities over more than a decade;
the downward trend in U.S. defense spending (measured in constant
dollars) has been reversed; and
-- serious efforts have been undertaken to achieve equitable arms
control agreements which are in the national interest.
Real growth in the U.S. defense efforts in FY 1976 and FY 1977 has
enabled us to improve defense and deterrence by:
needed modernization of U.S. strategic forces;
-- expansion of the Army's conventional force to 16 active divisions
and their modernization;
-- steps toward restoration of the Navy's capability for two-ocean
sea control and the projection of power;
expansion of the Air Force to 26 tactical fighter wings;
improved combat readiness on the part of the forces;
added research and development to strengthen U.S. technology.
The accomplishments have been accompanied by some disappointments,
several of which require consideration by the new Congress.
-- Reductions in the defense budgets proposed by successive Presi-
dents have retarded the rate of modernization and expansion of U.S.
forces; it has been less than that demanded by the continued growth in
Soviet military capabilities;
-- Reluctance to accept technological advance endangers U.S.
security. We must strive to maintain the U.S. technological superiority
which has contributed so much to our security over past decades.
-- Support to improvements in strategic mobility is necessary to
avoid an inefficient use of scarce resources and a shortage of capability
to reinforce and resupply forward deployed forces.
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-- Support by the Congress of a number of restraints is necessary
to reduce waste, inefficiencies, and misplaced priorities. Realignment
of bases to fit the numbers and needs of present day forces is essential
to avoid serious consequences to overall efficiency and effectiveness.
The Defense Report for FY 1978 is presented against this background.
Last year, the FY 1977 Report stressed the growth in Soviet military
power relative to that of the United States because of decisions made
over the previous decade. To reverse that unacceptable course, President
Ford proposed a real increase in last year's defense budget. Although
$3.8 billion of the FY 1977 request was not approved, the budget, as
passed, did provide a real increase of 5.8 percent between FY 1976 and
FY 1977. Since the problem of security demands a long-term commitment
of steady growth and modernization, even more effort will be required of
us in the coming fiscal years.
BILLION
FY 1978 DOLLARS
171_
100
150
U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAM TRENDS
(U.S. Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs)
(Constant FY 1978 Doors)
U.S.
U.S.S.R. (JAN 77 ESTIMATE), , ?
,,,,,, 0?1`
140
........
130
120
...... 4.:2''''''' 4*.l...."' ma .. ea.
........ WO SEA ").*4....11.10,...
110........ ??? ov-
.....o ....0
.....
................
V00,00010
100
SOURCE: BASED ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THE coLLAn.corr OF SOVIET
90 MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND OF U.S. EXPENDITURES ON A COMPARABLE
BASIS. CONVERTED BY DOD FROM CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS TO CONSTANT
FY 1978 DOLLARS. JANUARY 77
0
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
FISCAL YEAR
76 TRANSITION QUARTER IS EXCLUDED F'.:fl
COMPARABILITY US AND USSR
73
74
75
.1- PROJECTIONS
76
77
76
The Soviet Union, whatever its purposes, is without question engaged
In a serious, steady, and sustained effort which, in the absence of a
U.S. response, could make it the dominant military power in the world.
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Neither the high quality of U.S. technology and weapons nor the considerable
talents and skills of the men and women of the armed forces will continue
to make up for the quantitative advantages of such an adversary. As in
the past, forces and weapons systems adequate to meet U.S. national
security requirements do not come cheaply.
It is with such considerations in mind that the President presents
his defense budget for FY 1978 and the projected Five-Year Detense
Program. Total obligational authority of $123.1 billion and outlays of
$110.1 billion are requested for FY 1978. Totals for FY 1977 and those
now projected for the Five-Year Defense Program are shown in the following
table:
?ive-Year Defense Program (Billions of Dollars)
(Fiscal Years)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total Obligational Authority
Current Dollars
110.2
123.1
135.4
145.8
156.7
166.8
+FY 1978 Dollars
116.7
123.1
126.8
132.3
135.7
138.6
Outlays
Current Dollars
98.3
110.1
121.2
133.7
145.5
156.3
FY 1978 Dollars
104.5
110.1
115.2
120.9
125.6
129.0
Proposed real growth in total obligational authority from FY 1977 to
FY 1978 will be about 6.8 percent, practically all of which will go to
the investment accounts -- primarily procurement and research and develop-
ment. Based on current assumptions about expected pay and price increases
during the period of the Five-Year Defense Program, real growth from FY
1978 to 1982 should continue to be substantial and, most of it, again,
will be concentrated in investment accounts.
The ability of the United States to afford such expenditures is not
in question. Indeed, we cannot afford to withhold the resources required
for strength, stability, and peace. Although security must surely rank
first among the nation's priorities, its price is small. In FY 1977,
even after the Congress had provided for a real increase, the Defense
share of GNP, of federal and total public spending, and of the total
labor force was the lowest since before the Korean war.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
4 FINAAICIAL SUMMARY
DOD/MAP as Percentage:
FY 1964
FY 1968
FY 1976
FY 1977
FY 1978
Federal Budget (Outlays)
42.9%
43.6%
24.1%
23.9%
25.0%
Gross National Product
8.2%
9.4%
5.5%
5.4%
5.4%
Labor Force
8.3%
9.9%
5.0%
5.0%
5.1%
Net Public Spending
28.6%
29.7%
15.9%
16.0%
16.5%
II. Basis of the Projected Efforts
Our nation simply cannot allow Soviet capabilities to continue expanding
and U.S. capabilities to retrench -- as they have over the past decade --
without inviting an imbalance and, ultimately, a major crisis. The solution
does not lie in adopting any specific or fixed annual increases in the
defense budget; there is no magic percentage by which Defense resources
must expand each year. Nor should we design the U.S. defense posture as
the mirror-image of an opponent's capabilities, simple as this might
appear; that would miss the essence of systematic planning and could rapidly
lead to major and expensive absurdities in force posture.
U.S. planning must include changes brought about by military technology.
A number of major consequences have already followed from such technological
advances:
-- to a degree unprecedented in its history, the United States has
become directly vulnerable to attack;
-- the nation must now maintain three basic types of military
force -- strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional -- with
defense budgets which must be higher than during the seemingly quieter
years before World War II; and
-- the potential destructiveness of new weapons leads reasonable
people to recognize that nuclear forces are instruments of last resort,
and that the more traditional conventional capabilities remain of fundamental
importance in today's world. In essence, we are seeing a revival in the
importance of non-nuclear military capabilities.
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The U.S. defense posture does not and cannot be made to relate
directly to the short-term objectives and tactics of U.S. foreign policy,
although it can and does contribute in a fundamental way to the environment
in which foreign policy is formulated and conducted. In the geopolitics
of an increasingly interdependent world, the U.S. defense establishment
constitutes one set of instruments -- along with diplomatic, economic and
other means -- at the disposal of the nation, and a diverse array of capa-
bilities is needed to achieve national objectives. Since long lead times
are required to develop modern military capabilities, decisions made today
determine the capabilities, not of today, but of the decades ahead.
The world of today is no longer one of many great military powers.
There are only two major powers -- the United States, which is the primary
champion of freedom, self-determination, and international pluralism, and
the Soviet Union, which has an imperial domain already sprawled over two
continents and is the primary advocate of a command economy, centralized
control, and the subjugation of the individual to the state.
Unfortunately, U.S. views on international issues and on the importance
of freedom are not expanding in the world. On 26 key issues before the
United Nations in 1974 and 1975 -- including the resolution equating
Zionism with racism and one eliminating the UN Command for Korea -- few
nations shared the U.S. perspective. In fact, less than one-tenth of the
member states voted as we did on a majority of these issues; over half
voted against our position nearly every time. Those who voted consistently
as we did total 13 nations out of over 140.
Nor is personal freedom flourishing. Freedom House, a private
research organization, reports that less than one-fifth of mankind enjoys
a degree of freedom even approximating our own, while nearly half the
world's population lives under a dictatorial regime of one stripe or
another. The United States and its friends believe in self-determination
for ourselves and others; the Soviet Union and its allies do not.
Some might say that sounds like "cold war" rhetoric. I consider it
simply the truth, and we best serve our ideals by talking the truth. To
do otherwise would be to grant "moral parity" to authoritarian systems.
Despite these fundamental differences, today's world is one of growing
interdependence. Nations and peoples increasingly rely upon each other
for supplies, industrial and agricultural goods, markets, investments, and
technical know-how.
From a defense perspective, we find that modern conventional weapons
are no longer the exclusive property of the larger industrial states.
Nuclear technology threatens to spread to many areas. A geopolitical
map of the world shows the United States politically, economically, or
culturally more dependent and more involved with other states and peoples
than ever before in its history. These conditions, combined with the
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weakening of the traditional international order, the collapse of old
empires, and the rise of the Soviet Union as an active world power, make
bold action across the oceans both more necessary and more dangerous.
Events in a distant corner of this increasingly interdependent world
cannot be ignored by the United States.
Recognizing these facts, the United States has engaged in a search
for the peaceful and equitable settlement of international differences. In
particular:
-- it was the United States which first sought seriously to control
strategic nuclear arms and achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in
Europe; and
-- it was the United States which struggled to end the fighting in
the Middle East and successfully concluded three agreements among former
belligerents.
While extensively involved in these efforts, we have kept the main
and continuing interests of the United States firmly before us. Our
fundamental interest lies in preserving the independence and territorial
integrity of the United States and its possessions. Close behind are
political and economic interests we share with various nations and alliances.
These interests are worldwide in nature; they impel our determination to
preserve freedom of the seas and of space.
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
ec
70
60
50
ao
30
20
10
1955 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
? FOREIGN TRADE
(IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
EXPORT =
IMPORT = 7.-????
umnpsuns
/
???
UR. 1915
MN EXPORT
IMPon7
a.
75 1976
USSR/US DEPENDENCE
ON IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL
300
Percent of Imports
75 50 25
25. SO 75 100
V
MANGANESE
COBALT
TITANIUM
CHROMIUM
ALUMINUM
TANTALUM
PLATINUM GROUP
TIN
RuonmR
mcm
umum
GERMANIUM. INDIUM
ummum
momum
BAR liE
IRON
Um)
MNER
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Iii. Conditions of Peace and Security
To create and maintain the conditions of peace and security in the
world is in large part to avoid actions and conditions which are provocative
belligerence on the one hand, weakness (which can be equally provocative)
on the other. Either can encourage others into adventurism they might
oLherwise avoid. The obligation of government is to preserve the strength,
determination, and flexibility needed to achieve U.S. goals and contribute
to stability around the world.
Helping to establish the conditions of peace means avoiding a military
imbalance in the world. Not only is a global nuclear balance necessary;
so are a number of balances in regions vital to our interests. Precisely
because traditional power depends upon large quantities of military equipment
and supplies, long lines of communication, freedom of airspace, and control
of essential seas, the U.S. must maintain strategic positions and forward
deployed forces. These, in conjunction with the system of alliances we
have maintained during the past three decades, provide leverage on prospective
enemies and help to keep potential conflict from American shores.
DEFENSE ALLIANCES Et TREATIES WITH U.S.
Th
CDT:,
Is
U.S. ? REP. OF KOREA
REP. OF KOREA
USA
U.S. ? JAPAN TREATY WI?,!
JAPAN
USA
MO TREATY NOM
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA NATO '
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BELGIUM
ECUADOR CANADA
EL SALVADOR DENMARK
EXJATAMALA FRANCE U.S. ? PHILIPPINE TREATY
HAITI FED REP. OF GERMANY REP. OF PHILIPPINES
HONDURAS GREECE USA
LIEXICO ITALY MANILA T.
NICARAGUA I NXEMBOURD
PANAMA NETHERLANDS AUSTRALIA
PARAGUAY NORWAY FRANCE
PERU P,RTUGAL NEW ZEALAND
TRINIDAD(TOBAGO TuRKEY PHILIPPINES
USA stNITED KINGDOM THAILAND
URUGUAY WELAND UK
VENEZUELA 11RA US U.S.. NEP. OF CHINA MEATY
REP. OF CHINA
USA
IV. Foreign Military Capabilities
MUUSWSK'
AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
USA
It is a fact that the greatest potential threat to the United States
comes from the Soviet Union. Absolute proof eludes us about the intentions
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of Soviet leaders, but no doubt exists about the capabilities of Soviet
armed forces to threaten U.S. vital interests.
As the Defense Report pointed out last year, there are 4.4 million
men in the Soviet military establishment -- compared with 2.1 million
men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces. All elements of modern power
are heavily represented in the Soviet military establishment, including
intercontinental strategic nuclear forces, large and growing theater
nuclear forces, and a wide range of modern conventional capabilities.
MANPOWER
IN
MILLIONS
4
3
2
1
0
1964 1970
FISCAL YEAR
? EXCLUDES MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES
U.S./U.S.S.R. MIILITARY MANPOWER
1975
1977
A significant portion of Soviet theater nuclear and conventional
forces is oriented toward Western Europe, with 27 divisions and 1,400
aircraft in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and 4 divisions and
265 aircraft in Hungary.. The USSR has an ICBM force that numerically is
50 percent larger than our own, and some 75 ballistic missile submarines
capable of attacking the United States. The Backfire bomber is coming
into service. Soviet antibomber defenses remain substantial, and it is
increasingly evident that they provide key elements of their population,
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NUMBER OF
DIVISIONS
50
40
30 -
20
10
800 1600 ? 2400
SOVIET DIVISIONS-DEPLOYMENT BY TYPE
AT 800 KM INCREMENTS
FROM EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER
'TrrrT
f
71717
800 km = 496 MI
LEGEND
M AIRBORNE DIVISION
El TANK DIVISION
E MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
3200 4000 4800 5600 6400 7200
KILOMETERS FROM BORDER
8000
8800
9600
10400
industry, and food supplies with some degree of protection against nuclear
attacks. The Soviets have also increased their capability to project
power far from their shores and from areas of their historical involvement.
What we are witnessing, at a minimum, is a sustained effort on the
part of the leaders in the Kremlin to expand their capabilities sufficiently
to became major participants in world geopolitics. In certain respects,
they have already broken through or leapfrogged the barriers erected by
the containment policies of earlier decades. They can be expected to
continue this process in the future. Certainly they will have a growing
capability to do so.
There is continuing momentum behind Soviet defense programs. While
the U.S. defense budget was, until recently, in a long, slow decline in
teal terms, the Soviet defense budget increased in real terms by more
than a third over the past decade.
Because of the steadily growing resources allocated to defense, the
Soviets now outproduce the United States in tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery. Their output of tactical aircraft and even
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helicopters is now greater than ours. So is their production of new
ships, in terms of numbers delivered. However, since we have built
larger individual units, new U.S. tonnage exceeds that of the Soviets by
30 percent.
While the United States has developed one new ICBM since 1965, the
Soviets have developed seven. Of their newest generation of ICBMs, three
have greater throw-weight, more and higher-yield multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and accuracies increasingly close
to that of our newest ICBM. In light of an ever-growing base for the
production of military materiel and an expanding corps of scientists and
engineers devoted to military R&D, reasonable people must conclude that
these programs will continue to accelerate.
We know that Soviet leaders talk of being engaged in long-term
competition with the West and of seeking to 'tilt the international
"correlation of forces," including the military, in their favor; that they
continue to sponsor and support "wars of national liberation;" and that
their writings suggest an ultimate victory of Marxism over the evils of
"capitalist-imperialism." Indeed, to describe the Soviet Union as a
status quo power is to ignore much of what has been taking place over
the past twenty years.
The Kremlin is behaving as though it is determined to increase Soviet
military power whether we show restraint or not; Sbviet.military programs
which we observe and measure exceed those necessary for deterrence; and the
magnitude of the Soviet military effort, impressive by any standard,
continues the momentum that it has displayed for more than a decade.
In short, we must base U.S. force planning on a recognition of the
size and scope of the Soviet military capabilities as they are, not as we
would wish them to be. This, indeed, is the most critical assumption
underlying the defense budget for FY 1978 and the Five-Year Defense Program.
I do not believe there is any other assumption that fits the facts about
the Soviet Union and our world in the late 1970s.
The future course of the People's Republic of China remains somewhat
uncertain, as does our relationship with Peking. While we continue to
seek more normal relations with the PRC, Peking is gradually developing an
intercontinental and sea-based ballistic missile capability. Accordingly,
we must take this into account in the design and deployment of U.S.
strategic nuclear forces, even though the United States may not be a
primary target. In addition, we must be aware of Peking's conventional
capabilities. Allies in Asia are necessarily sensitive to the regional
power of the PRC, and cannot ignore the possibility of local conflicts which
could affect their interests, and ours.
Other and lesser powers may also choose to challenge U.S. interests
and friends. North Korea, Libya, and Cuba are only the most obviously
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ESTIMATED U.S./USSR RELATIVE
PRODUCT-ON RATES
(1972- 1976)
43,Amiris
USSR U.S. USSR/U.S.
1912-76 1972-76 RATIO
AVG 1972-76
2,770 469 5.9:1
4,990 1,556 3.2:1
1,310 162 8:1
1,090 573 1.9:1
666 733 0.8:1
27,000 27,351
1/ Ground launched antitank missiles
US/USSR COMBATANT SHIP DELIVERIES
1966-1976
U.S.S.R.
NUMBER OF SHIPS
POS5,520 TONS
OISPLACEMENT
11 SUPPORT SHIPS OTHER THAN THOSE CAPABLE OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT ARE NOT INCLUDED.
11,11i!
1:1
UNDERWAY REPLEN-
ISHMENT
In MAJOR COMBATANTS
I I 10,000 TONS OR MORE
.49
:?Xe
MAJOR COMBATANTS
1000-10,000 TONS
p72 MINOR COMBATANTS
V/A 100-1,000 TONS
EiSUBMARINES
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US AND SOVIET ICBM DEVELOPMENTS
(1)
(1)
U.S.
4111M1IMIMM114.1151.111:1111?11,05
(3)
(1)
(1)
(6)
LR iJ
(1;8)
(1) (4) CI)
(1)
?
o) v
th.-
.? 1 r.) en co
to co V)". "7 I
?
co v)
= . .-
uoj
d) ch
Si)
1 cn
ii
1 'L
65 66 67 69 70 74 75 7
YEAR OF INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
11The numbers in parentheses represent the number of independently
targetable re-entry vehicles associated with each missile
COMPARATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET
. TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT
62 63
?
Billion
FY 1978
Dollars
70
U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT
(Procurement, FociPties, ROTE)
(Constant 77 1778 Dollersr
(Preliminary)
To
50
40
30
U.S.S.R. os OP '1.
?160
U.S.
43
20? ?20
10 r ?110
01 I !III .1 .1 I 1 I1 0
1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 713
Billion
FY 1076
Do1lara
20
U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY RDT&E
(Constant FY 1979 Dollars)
IPtellalinary)
..
10 we sal? ?110
saa
U.S.S.R. gr$1
sor.
esol
120
mes..d
... U.S.
0
1 I 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I 0
1964 65 66 67 08 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
U.S./U.S.S.R. ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS ENGAGED IN R&D
300,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
ENGINEERS IN THOUSANDS
U.S.S.R. TOTAL,
.0 U.S. TOTAL
re.
U.S. DOD FUNDED
1965 1970 1975 76
GRADUATING U.S./U.S.S.R. ENDINEERS
15I1I1 BACHELOR DEGREES
320
260
240
U.S.S.R. ?10
0111111111.?.1111
200
160
1-0
120
80
U.S.
417 mommrae..."ft1./
0
1965. 1970
1975 70
1/ Based on 1974 data. Data for 1976 is not yet available.
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bellicose of the candidates. Such challenges may become more dangerous in
the period ahead. The incidence of terrorism, occasionally fostered by
irresponsible foreign leaders, could also increase in number and intensity,
and terrorists could become more heavily armed with more sophisticated
weapons.
V. Challenges to Security
Certain of these many challenges call for particular attention and
concern.
First among the dangers remains a nuclear attack on the United
States itself. However remote and improbable such an attack may seem, the
consequences of its occurrence would be so catastrophic that this possibility
must take priority in U.S. planning.
Second is the threat of a conventional conflict. Despite thirty
years of peace and relative stability, Western Europe -- a region of the
most vital political, economic, cultural, and strategic interest to the
United States -- continues to face the armed might of the Soviet Union and
its satellites. Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and conventional, are
being steadily strengthened; their doctrine and posture continue to be
offensive in character.
A direct attack on NATO is not the only basis for continuing concern
about Europe. The possibility of a succession crisis in Yugoslavia
remains. Around the Mediterranean, large communist parties of Western
Europe are exploiting the democratic process in order to seize power or
gain a major share of it. This is being done under the banner of "Euro-
communism," as though it were not real communism and is therefore somehow
more acceptable.
The dangers in the Middle East and Persian Gulf are well known. We
seek continuing progress toward a Middle East peace settlement. We also
have a fundamental interest in uninterrupted access to Middle East oil
and gas resources by the United States, and especially by Western Europe
and Japan, at acceptable prices. Both objectives remain in doubt.
Asia is still an area of high potential for conflict. The elements
that compose the Asian balance are multiple and fluid, reflecting the
complex relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and
Japan. Should conflict occur, it could have a significant long-term
cffect on the regional and global balance.
The dangers to current stability are diverse. They range from the
possibility of armed attack across an established frontier in Korea to
4.'dventurism in Southeast Asia, supported in varying degrees by some of
,the communist nations of Asia. The present situation is not unfavorable,
but it could deteriorate.
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U.S. interests in South Asia and Africa are primarily political and
economic, with strategic interests limited to lines of communication.
The social and economic problems of these areas may well create conditions
of local disorder and tension, which will be both disruptive in themselves
and may offer opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union or
other countries potentially hostile to the United States.
U.S. interests in Latin America are both political and economic,
although there are important strategic interests with respect to lines of
communication, particularly for oil, and access to mineral resources.
There are few contingencies, however, that might impose a substantial
requirement for U.S. forces. This is not to say that threats to U.S.
security might not arise in Latin America. The future status and security
of the Panama Canal, Cuba's potential for subversion and intervention, and
the persistence of possibly troublesome regional rivalries are serious
problems.
Two other dangers are global in scope. First, the Soviets have built
and deployed major air and naval capabilities with which they could attempt
to deny us freedom of the seas. Dependent as the United States is on free
use of the seas -- as avenues of commerce and as a medium for projecting
power and influence abroad -- such a threat would be unacceptable. Similarly,
the Soviets are working on capabilities to interfere with U.S. capabilities
in space. Any effort to use these capabilities would require a response,
which could only come from the United States.
2000
1500
1000
500
CHARACTERISTICS AND CHANGES IN
GENERAL PURPOSE*NAVAL FORCES - U.S./U.S.S.R.
NUMBER OF SHIPS
MILLIONS OF TONS
TONNAGE
U.S. SOVIET U.S. SOVIET
1976
10 2000
8
6
4
2
1500
1000
500
NUMBER OF SHIPS
1966
1971
FISCAL YEAR
DOES NOT INCLUDE BALLISTIC MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES
1976
TONNAGE
(IN MILLIONS OF TONS)
.......................................
U.S.S.R.
1966
1971
FISCAL YEAR
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in summary, we must recognize the difference between the world we
seek and the world we live in today. Democratic institutions are not
spreading in the world, international stability is not increasing, conflicts
are not decreasing in number or intensity, and the rule of law is not
flourishing. Yet in the complex world of the 1970s, we have a great
stake in standing fast on the frontiers of freedom and deterring the
serious threats that exist.
VI. The Role of America and Our Allies In The World
Because we are one of the two maior powers in the world, we must
continue to play a large role in international affairs. Were we to
relinquish this role, there would be no other power substantial enough to
counterbalance the USSR. Is there anyone who seriously believes that in
the absence of U.S. military power as a counterweight to the Soviets, they
would long be restrained from expanding their influence by whatever means
were available?
The mantle of leadership for those who believe in freedom has passed
to America. Our friends in Europe, while contributing to our collective
security, are no longer comparable powers. Further, with technological
advances in weaponry, the United States has lost the luxury of time in
which to mobilize forces, adapt industry to war production, learn from the
mistakes of others, and step into the conflict when prepared. Today,
no one can hold an enemy at the gates long enough to permit a leisurely
U.S. mobilization. With modern technology, that day has passed. There is
no alternative but to be prepared and thereby to deter.
US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
STRENGTH IN
THOUSANDS
1,400,000-
t200,000
1,000,000
800,000
SEA AFLOAT
S. VIETNAM
400.000
MAN
1984
I i I
56 58 /0
END OF FISCAL YEAR
GERMANY
?THAILAND
."-MISC FOREIGN
----OTHER PACI.IC
& RYUKYU:
1:0REA
OTHER EUROPE
-Et130PE AFLOAT
72
74 76
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While we do not count on the contribution of our allies in the
design of U.S. nuclear forces, we do rely on them in structuring our
general purpose forces. For certain major contingencies, such as an
attack by the Warsaw Pact, we assume that all NATO commitments will be met
and that, at a minimum, the forces pledged to the Alliance will become
available as scheduled. This assumption materially reduces the need for
U.S. general purpose forces in such contingencies. Nevertheless, experience
has shown that we cannot rely on our major regional allies at all times
and in all circumstances.
VII. Arms Control and Deterrence
Arms control negotiations naturally play a role in the design of
defense posture. The primary U.S. objective in these negotiations is
security through increased stability. We would prefer a world in which neither
major power had incentive either to attack the other or to strive for a
long-term military advantage. We also seek to reduce uncertainty about
the future and limit the costs of defense.
While hopeful, we must also be realistic in this complex, sensitive
and even risky area. So far, arms control successes have been modest. The
ABM Treaty of 1972 has forestalled extensive deployment of ABM systems,
and the Interim Offensive Agreement of SALT, due to expire in October
1977, placed a ceiling on the number of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs.
Such measures have clearly not dulled the Soviet appetite for new and
more capable strategic offensive systems, nor have they assured stability.
The Vladivostok Understanding of 1974 would come closer to realizing our
goals, but a new treaty has not yet emerged. The reason is clear. Despite
repeated U.S. proposals, movement thus far by the Soviet Union has not
been sufficient to permit the signature of an agreement that would be
in the U.S. national security interest.
The ,complex multinational negotiations for mutual and balanced force
reductions in Central Europe have not as yet produced anything concrete.
While arms control measures could conceivably impose restraints and reduce
the incentives for war, these goals remain before us. The facts of the
present must form more of a basis for U.S. defense planning than hopes
for the future.
VIII. Strategic Nuclear Concepts and Forces
In designing U.S. strategic forces, three main contingencies are
considered:
-- a surprise attack by the Soviet strategic forces against the
U.S. retaliatory capabilities postured in their regular day-to-day status;
-- a sudden Soviet attack against an alerted U.S. posture, a
posture which has many more bombers on alert and SLBMs at sea because of
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a deteriorating international situation; and
-- a sequential PRC-Soviet attack against an alerted U.S. posture.
U.S. force planning centers on the first contingency -- a Soviet surprise
attack on our day-to-day force posture -- since the other contingencies
prove to be less demanding.
It should be emphasized in this context that nuclear forces make up a
continuum of capabilities. They must therefore be assessed together
because:
-- Soviet nuclear forces cannot be fitted neatly into either
strategic or theater categories. Variable-range ICBMs have been based in
their medium-range sites, and both the SS-X-20 missile and the Backfire
bomber are indefinite as to range capabilities and missions.
-- The outcome of some nuclear conflicts may depend as much on an
ability to hold or occupy territory as on the destruction of specific
targets. For this reason, aircraft and missiles designed to perform deep
missions and attack "strategic" targets, may not always have the decisive
role in nuclear warfare.
-- Important "gray area" systems -- such as the SS-X-20, Backfire,
and cruise missiles -- do not fall into the current arms control categories
of central and non-central systems, yet they cannot be ignored.
The primary function of the continuum of nuclear forces is to deter
attack and prevent nuclear blackmail. Even though they absorb no more
than 20 percent of the total defense budget, nuclear forces provide the
foundation of deterrence. That foundation must be solid at all times, to
underpin the entire defense structure and our system of collective security.
Soviet nuclear capabilities can be expected to improve in the future
as they have done so dramatically In the past. Between 1965 and 1976,
their ICBM force increased from 224 to more than 1,500 launchers and their
SLBM force from 29 to 800 launchers. They began the modernization of
their long-range bomber force and made a considerable increase in their
deliverable nuclear weapons.
If the Soviet strategic posture is already impressive today -- in
numbers, throw-weight, and survivability -- it is becoming even more so in
terms of qualitative improvements which are part of the current wave of
modernization.
Three rather definite statements about developments in Soviet nuclear
programs can be made:
-- Whatever their motives, the Soviets have greatly expanded and
improved their strategic posture.
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-- Soviet programs do not reflect an interest in deterrence by
massive retaliation alone; their strategic nuclear posture is developing
a war-fighting capability.
-- While the Soviets are not likely to succeed in the admittedly
complex, costly, and difficult task of achieving meaningful nuclear superiority,
it is clear that their capabilities are taking them in that direction.
CHANGES IN U.S./U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
ICBMs
1800
USSR
00
V) 1200?
U.S.
A?
E 600
f
900 ?
600 IF NM
U.S
1W
I
? .
iii
1966 1971 1976 1966 1971 1976
re
SLI3Ms BOMBERS
.900
U.S.
USSR 4,
300
NO FISCAL YEAR
USSR'
1966 1971 1976
To preserve deterrence, U.S. forces must be designed so that, if
necessary, they are able to absorb an attack -- rather than depend on
warning for their survival -- and strike back after enemy weapons have
actually detonated. The most efficient basis for such a second-strike
capability is a mixed force of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers -- known as the
strategic Triad -- which interact strongly to increase the survivability
of each part.
The United States must also be concerned with the stability and
flexibility of the strategic deterrent. The posture represented by the
second-strike Triad should not be mistaken for overkill, as is so often
the tendency.
Continued modernization of U.S. nuclear ystems is imperative in
light of increased Soviet capabilities. Before the mid-1980s, the Soviets
could possibly have the capability, with a small fraction of their ICBMs,
to destroy the bulk of the Minuteman/Titan force. While this would in no
way give the Soviets a disarming first-strike, it could create a dangerous
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SURVIVING SILO
800
[
600
400
700
SECRET
SILO SURVIVAB!LITY
4SITIVITY TO SOVIET ACCURACY
HIGHLY CONFIDENT ACCURACY
AT LEAST THIS GOOD
HIGHLY CONFIDENT ACCURACY
L NOT EXCEED
/6 80 82 84 86
I NO FISCAL YEAR
isymmetry. Since much of the U.S. capability for Controlled, selective
resnonses resides in the Minuteman force, it may be desirable to make
the U.S. ICBM force increasingly mobile. Naturally, the United States
would prefer to avoid this costly turn of events and prolong the life of
fixed ICBM forces on both sides a good deal longer.
In any event, we must make sure that the U.S. nuclear posture inspires
the correct perception of strength. If allied and neutral nations see the
military balance as favoring the Soviet Union rather than the United
States, their independence and firmness may give way to adjustment, accom-
modation, and subordination. If potential enemies have a similar perception,
they may misjudge the situation and make demands which could lead to
confrontation, crisis, and unnecessary dangers. At present, the United
States and the Soviet Union are seen as having roughly equivalent nuclear
capabilities. Congress has underscored the importance of maintaining this
posture by requiring that we not be inferior to the Soviet Union.
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US/USSR STRATEGIC FORCES ADVANTAGE
101
21
6:1 ?
7?1 L.--
1964 1965 1970 1975 1980 1982
E.MT ? YIELD24
TW ? THROW WEIGHT
SSW ? STRATEGIC DUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE
WARHEADS ? SALLISTIt ISISSILE REENTRY
VERICLESAND AIRCRAFT CE.
LIVERED WARHEADS.
Even as we work toward effective deterrence, we hope for sound arms
control agreements. As a nation, we must approach such agreements cautiously.
So far our monitoring of existing agreements has been adequate and we have
been able to detect and investigate a number of questionable Soviet practices
since 1972. The necessary high confidence in our national -means of
verification is likely to decline somewhat, however, to the extent that the
Soviets attempt to conceal or disguise their programs.
The overall U.S. nuclear posture and related arms control agreements
must take Soviet efforts at damage-limitation into account. Most damage-
limiting strategies represent an effort by one belligerent to cause maximum
damage to his enemy and minimum damage to himself. The assumption behind
such strategies is that, if major asymmetries in damage can be achieved,
one side will survive as a functioning nation while the other will not.
The United States has never taken decisive action in this area. Basic
U.S. policy has been directed at deterrence through flexibility and the
control of nuclear escalation.
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The result of this policy has been a strategic nuclear posture with
the following characteristics:
a high-confidence Triad of second-strike retaliatory forces
within the Vladivostok Understanding of 2,400 launchers;
-- some 8,500 warheads on delivery vehicles for adequate coverage
of all relevant targets, even after the attrition suffered from an enemy
lirst-strike and from the penetration of his defenses;
U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
2500 ^400 TOTAL LIMIT FB III DI
6-1
2000
FR Hit/
1320 MIRV SUBLIMIT
500r
POSE 100
C-3
MM III
6-52
POLARIS
MMR
IVIIRV TOTAL
CURRENT FORCE
(END FY 1976)
TITAN
TITAN
TRIDENT
POSEIDON
C-4
POSEIDON
C-3
MM III
MX
6-52
MM II
MIRV TOTAL
PLANNED FORCE
(END FY 1936)
1413.111 IS CURRENTLY NOT ACCOUNTABLE FOR SAL PURPOSES
-- a single ABM site on inactive status except for its Perimeter
Acquisition Radar (PAR) and a light air defense dedicated to surveillance
and peacetime control of U.S. airspace;
-- a mobile fighter-defense system coupled with AWACS which would
be used for continental air defense in an emergency;
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-- a modest civil defense program to shelter the U.S. population
in existing structures and develop the capability to evacuate citizens
from selected areas during a period of grave crisis;
-- a system of multiple, complementary surveillance and early
warning capabilities and a survivable command-control-communications
network designed to permit the President to direct the strategic nuclear
forces in a deliberate and controlled manner.
With essential modernization of aging systems, this carefully
tailored posture is preferable to an unrestrained arms race in the
future.
IX. Other Nuclear Forces
Nuclear weapons provide a possible response to contingencies other
than a direct strategic attack on the United States or its allies. Our
allies have been and are today reassured by local U.S. nuclear forces
which serve as part of the continuum between conventional forces and
strategic capabilities. Theater-based systems constitute a key backup
to strong conventional defenses and a major hedge against a failure of
those defenses. Because other nations have developed local nuclear
capabilities, a U.S. deployment of such forces is required to deter and,
if necessary, counter them on a regional level.
'NON-CENTRAL' NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
NATO WARSAW PACT
MEDIUM & INTERMEDIATE
RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
BATTLEFIELD MISSILES
(SURFACE-TO-SURFACE)
ARTILLERY PIECES
MEDIUM BOMBERS
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
NAVAL AIRCRAFT
SUB/SURFACE LAUNCHED
CRUISE MISSILES- (AGAINST
LAND TARGETS)
E
ERTIFIED;]: PROBABLE
A
5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
2 3-
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As early as 1956, the Soviets began deploying MRBMs and nuclear-
,;loable light and medium bombers as part of increasingly powerful nuclear
tJtcces. At present, they have in their peripheral attack forces a greater
variety of long-range delivery systems and more missile launchers than
NATO. The current Soviet capability goes from the variable-range ICBMs
the new SS-X-20 to short-range tactical missiles.
The Soviets continue to maintain and modernize this force and to
J.rticulate a military doctrine which assumes an early use of nuclear
weapons by the Warsaw Pact in a European war. While the Soviets might well
timit such an attack to conventional means, they are not at any disadvantage
where theater nuclear forces are concerned.
Me People's Republic of China has now deployed a medium-bomber force
or 77 Tu-16s which are nuclear-capable, and a small complement of MRBMs
And IRBMs. India already may have a small nuclear arsenal and Great
Ilritain and France have long-standing nuclear capabilities to attack
Largets in Central Europe and in the USSR. In such circumstances, neither
we nor the Soviets are necessarily the sole iudges of where, when, and how
uch weapons might be used.
structuring U.S. nuclear forces, attacks in Central Europe or in
Korea are considered the most likely to call for backup, and nuclear
weapons are currently maintained in each theater. A decision to use these
weapons would depend upon (1) an enemy conventional breakthrough which
could not be countered, or (2) his first use of nuclear weapons. U.S.
capabilities must be sufficiently large and survivable to absorb such an
;itrack and still perform assigned missions. This means not only a mix of
)rices, but also an emphasis on mobility and concealment for survivability.
Sophisticated and survivable command-control-communications networks must
;accompany these forces.
To minimize collateral damage, U.S. systems are presently tailored to
estroy their targets with the minimum yields possible. As nuclear and
guidance technologies advance, theater nuclear forces must be modernized,
Out without blurring the important and time-honored distinction between
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
In light of the current Soviet nuclear threat, there are graver risks
tn not maintaining theater nuclear forces than in deploying them. Friend
;tnd foe, supporter and skeptic, all need to recognize that U.S. nuclear
i7orces must constitute an integral part of U.S. capabilities if the deterrent
to be effective.
Conventional Forces
A!though this is a nuclear age, conventional capabilities are increasingly
important to the security of the nation and to peace and stability in the
world. Conventional military power remains a principal instrument for
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pursuing international objectives where military power is to be used at
all. Nuclear forces credibly deter some limited -- although potentially
devastating -- hostile acts, but the primary burden of deterrence now
falls increasingly on conventional forces, although their effectiveness is
enhanced by the nuclear capabilities that underlie them.
There are other reasons for a non-nuclear emphasis in the U.S. defense
arsenal. Conventional wars appear relatively controllable, since their
tempo tends to be slower, allowing policy makers to act without excessive
pressure. Limitations on a conventional conflict in terms of territory,
weapons, or aims can more readily be defined and accepted.
The Soviet capabilities show an appreciation of the importance of
conventional strength, and reflect a determined, sustained, and increasing
effort to develop two powerful conventional forces -- one facing Europe
and the other opposite China. These modern offensive forces, combined
with their increasing capability to project power thousands of miles from
Soviet shores, have not appeared overnight. They are the result of a
steady effort made with great momentum over considerable time. What is
new is Western recognition of their magnitude and extent.
60000
50000
40000 USSR
CHANGES IN QUANTITIES OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENTS - U.S./U.S.S.R.
(1966-1976)
TANKS
30000
20900
US
10000
0 I I I I t
66
68
70
72
74
76
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
10000
8000
6000
US
4000
USSR
2000
-
0
IIII1
66
68
70
72
74
76
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
ARTILLERY
USSR
US
0 -1--J I
66 68 70 72 74 76
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
66 68 70 72 74 76
HELICOPTERS
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The number of active Soviet divisions, estimated last year at 168.
now appears to be more than 170. Soviet strategic airlift has also
continued to expand steadily in tonnage potential. Naval and amphibious
forces, designed principally for use on the perimeters of the USSR in
the past, are increasingly capable of extended and open-ocean operations.
The Soviets have increased the combat effectiveness of their ground
and tactical air forces, particularly those in Europe. Their divisions
have been expanded in size and modernized. New fighter-attack aircraft
have been deployed. For the first time, these capabilities may coincide
with the long-standing Soviet doctrine of rapid offensive thrusts,
reminiscent of German "blitzkrieg" tactics in World War II.
Thus, the conventional posture in Europe must be based on the
assumption that: (a) an attack with little or no warning by in-place
Warsaw Pact forces is possible; (b) an attacking force could amount to
500,000 or more men; (c) a forward allied defense is essential; and (d)
the ratio of the Pact attack to the NATO defense should be kept well
below two-to-one. We also prepare for an attack by Pact forces reinforced,
primarily from the USSR, after perhaps 30 days of mobilization and
deployment.
Despite U.S. dependence on freedom of the seas, essential U.S. sea
Lines of communication are less secure today than they were a decade
ago. With their improved naval, airborne, and airlift forces, the Soviets
can intervene by sea and air at considerable distances from the USSR,
and can sustain such an intervention for a substantial and growing
period of time.
CHANGES IN NAVAL FORCH / U.S.S.R.
(1966- 1376)
400
ATTACK SUBMARINES
???
300 an. ? U.S.S.R.
...
NUMBER
OF 200
SUBMARINES
U.S.
100
4'6 67 68
..
J t ....
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
YEAR
STANDOFF WEAPON SHIP DELIVERY PLATFORMS
250
200
150
NUMBER
OF
PLATFORMS
100
0
66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73
YEAR
74
75
76
400
300
NUMBER
OF
SHIPS
200
100
MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS
..........
0 !Jill 1.
66 67
150
NUMBER
OF
SHIPS
100
26
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
YEAR
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
67 68 89 70 71 72
YEAR
73
74
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Developments of Soviet military power are impressive, but the challenge
remains manageable. Today, NATO, as a whole, probably spends as much on
its defense as the Warsaw Pact. NATO armed forces total about 4.8 million
men and women, compared to the Pact's 5.6 million. However, since the
Soviets seem engaged in a steady, long-term effort, the feasibility of a
NATO conventional defense of Europe cannot be assured once and for all.
We must continue to meet these expanding capabilities if our goals are to
remain peace and stability, freedom and independence.
That peace and stability still exist in Europe and Korea must be
largely credited to the deterrent effect of conventional forces, ours and
those of our allies. Strength today, as in the past, contributes to
peace. Weakness -- as history testifies -- can invite war as much in this
day and age as before. In fact; the present circumstances make weakness a
greater provocation than strength.
Because of worldwide U.S. responsibilities, the conventional forces
are structured to deal simultaneously with one major and one minor contingency.
This is premised on the belief that a smaller engagement could escalate or,
in some manner, lead to a larger conflict elsewhere. While such contingencies.
are necessary for planning purposes, we do not predict any particular
course of events or even reserve U.S. forces for .any definite, special
use. At this point in history, nonetheless, we must at least have a
posture sufficiently large, modern, ready, and well-positioned to face the
most demanding challenge in Europe and still maintain a deterrent force in
Northeast Asia.
In today's world the risks are those of irresolution and weakness.
The current non-nuclear posture and deployments help provide for the strength,
security, and stability necessary in a world of complexity, untidiness,
and declining freedom.
XI. Other Capabilities Needed for Our Security
Most of the defense program deals with the manpower and equipment
essential to national security, but other capabilities multiply the
utility of U.S. weapons systems. Without accurate intelligence, there
would be even greater uncertainty about the size and composition of an
adversary's forces and about his intentions. Either the risk to the nation
or the costs of the U.S. defense budget would have to increase substantially.
Today, it is possible to make relatively modest deployments to Europe
because of our knowledge about current Warsaw Pact capabilities and deployments.
Without such knowledge, U.S. requirements, our dependence on a nuclear
strategy, or the risks to the United States and its allies, would have to
increase.
Without adequate research and development efforts, we could not
improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces, maintain the overall military
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balance, or even understand our opponent's forces. The Soviets have
clearly made prpgress toward technological excellence in their military
establishment. The United States must be alert for new technological
opportunities with defense applications -- such as long-range cruise
missiles and guidance, improved sensors, miniaturization, and computer
technology -- and must be willing to move them along into production when
ready.
Finally, U.S. foreign military sales and assistance programs augment
the non-nuclear capabilities of those nations important to us in the
world. Support to other countries through programs of grants, loans, and
sales enables them to assure their security at less cost to the United
States. Without such arrangments, many of our friends could not be
expected to share the burdens of collective defense. Nor could we count
on their forces to complement ours with any degree of efficiency.
Overseas base rights and other facilities frequently depend on a U.S.
willingness to make weapons available to host countries. Regional balances
of power, as in the Middle East, may depend on support to friendly nations,
especially when others receive substantial support from the Soviet Union.
While balance-of-payments considerations do not determine U.S. decisions,
they cannot be ignored. An increasing amount of arms is becoming available
from Soviet and European sources. When independent states believe they
need arms to provide for their security, their requests should be taken
seriously, realizing that they value their sovereignty and security as
much as we value ours.
XII. Conclusions
The U.S. assessment of the international military situation and of
the U.S. contribution to deterrence makes it clear that the United States
faces a number of difficult but manageable security problems in the years
and decades ahead. Portions of today's problem result from decisions and
events of the past decade; still other portions have developed and will
continue to develop from the efforts of the Soviet Union.
We seek peaceful relations with all states, including the Soviet
Union. However, from the evidence, it is clear that the Soviets are pur-
poseful about their military programs. Weakness on the part of the West
is not an example the Soviets have emulated. If reasonable international
peace and stability are to be preserved, we must learn to live with the
fact of Soviet strength.
In FY 1977, we set in motion a program for the security of the
United States. It was intended to deal with the real world we face and
arrest the decline in U.S. capabilities relative to those of the USSR.
The task now is to stay on this path and assure an acceptable overall
military balance by developing an adequate defense posture. To do so, we
must raise the level of the Five-Year Defense Program, beginning in FY
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1978. This will entail a real increase in resources of about 6.8 percent
from FY 1977 to FY 1978, and substantial continuing growth (in real
terms) in the Five-Year Defense Program. To do less would be to take
unnecessary risks with our country's future.
More than 30 years have passed since the end of World War II,
longer than the interval between the First and Second World Wars.
During the past three decades, the steadfastness and strength of the
United States have contributed to the avoidance of another large-scale
conflict. Now is the time not to relax but to maintain a steadiness of
purpose and resolve. We must not abandon our objectives of freedom and
security.
I believe the United States will do its duty. Friend and foe alike
will understand the message of this budget. We will not be outmaneuvered;
we will not be outlasted; we will not be intimidated. With the support
of the American people, through their representatives in the Congress,
and with support for the programs set forth, we can demonstrate our
commitment to peace and stability, even in a world fraught with dangers
and populated with many who do not subscribe to freedom -- a world we
must preserve for freedom and for the dignity of mankind.
When I took the oath of office as Secretary of Defense, I made four
points:
"First, the safety of the American people and the hopes for freedom
throughout the world demand a defense capability for the United States
of America second to none. I am totally dedicated to that mission.
"Second, we are rightly proud of the armed forces, older than our
nation itself, and I will seek to strengthen that sense of pride among
us all. We were born as a nation out of military struggle. We owe our
national life to men and women who had the will to fight for independence.
The competence and dedication of their successors in today's armed
forces will be drawn upon fully.
"Third, that special kind of American military professionalism that
is devoted to the constitutional principle of civilian control, so
fundamental to political freedom in this country -- is a model for the
world. One who has served in the Congress knows how indispensable it is
that the defense of our country be a bi-partisan and shared responsibility.
"Finally, let there be no doubt among us, or in the world at large,
that the continuity of American policy can be relied upon by friend and
foe alike. Our defense policies are geared to the interests of this
nation."
My watch is ending. More remains to be done. Nonetheless, I
believe now as I did 14 months ago that "America must pursue its goal,
as it has throughout...200 years, as a guardian of liberty and a symbol
by example and deed in the service of freedom." In strength there is
freedom.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION I
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. The FY 1977 Budget 7
B. The FY 1978 Budget and Five-Year Defense Program 8
C. Basis for the Proposed Increase 8
THE BASIS FOR PLANNING 11
A. Approaches to Planning 11
B. Types of Planning 12
C. The Importance of Analysis 12
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 13
IV. FOREIGN POLICY AND FORCE PLANNING 14
A. Defense and Foreign Policy
B. U.S. Interests
14
16
1. Economic Interests 17
2. Political Interests 18
3. Ideological Interests 18
4. The Global Nature of U.S. Interests 18
5. Strategic Interests 20
6. The Conditions of U.S. Defense 22
V. FOREIGN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 24
A. The Soviet Union 24
B. The People's Republic of China 30
C. Other Foreign Military Capabilities 30
VT. THE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY 32
A. Nuclear Challenges 32
B. U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union 32
C. U.S. Regional and Functional Security Interests
and Objectives 36
1. Europe
2. East Asia
36
39
a. China 39
b. Japan 39
c. Korea 41
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3. Scutheast Asia and Oceania
42
Middle East - North Africa
43
L:in America
44
6_ South Asia - Africa
4D
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
46
A. The Problem of Vulnerability
46
The Problem of Power
46
C. The Problem of Interdependence
46
O. The Problem of Superpower Status
46
F. The Weakening of the Old Order
4/
Leadership
47
G. The Risks of Retrenchment
46
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 0
i. The Role of Allies
IL Arms control
SALT
Other Negotiations
DO
DO
Dl
C. The Requirements of Deterrence D2
D. Contingency Analyses D3
Strategic Concepts 54
1- The Nuclear Contingencies 54
2. The Conventional Contingencies D4
3. The Planning Concepts 5D
4. Future Planning Di
IX. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 60
A. Their Functions
The Threat
60
61.
I. Current Deployments 62
L. Force Improvements 63
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) 4
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs) 65
Long-Range Bombers 66
d_ Active Defenses 66
Passive Defenses di
C-nclusions 68
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C. Second-Strike Forces 68
D. The Triad 69
E. Assured Retaliation 71
F. Options 72
1. Soviet Capabilities 72
2. The Problem of Deterrence 73
3. Options and Escalation 73
4. Options and Hard Targets 73
5. Options and First-Strike 75
6. Options and Stability 76
7. Options and Collateral Damage 77
G. Equivalence 77
H. Arms Control 79
I. Damage-Limiting 80
J. Requirements 82
X. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES 84
A. Functions 84
B. Foreign Capabilities 85
C. Contingencies 86
D. Missions and Forces 87
E. Modernization 87
XI. CONVENTIONAL FORCES 90
A. The Utility of Conventional Forces 90
B. Foreign Capabilities 91
C. Conventional Deterrence 97
D. Contingencies, Missions, and Forces 100
1. Europe 100
a. Short-Warning Attack in Central Europe 100
b. Mobilization and Deployment in Central
Europe 102
c. The Flanks 107
2. The Minor Contingency 107
3. Force Implications 108
4. Northeast Asia 108
E. Conclusions 109
XII. OTHER CAPABILITIES 111
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A. Intelligence 11]
3. Research and Development 111
C. Military Cooperation with Other Nations 113
D. C3, Readiness and Production 113
C. Assumptions and Planning 114
XIII. NET ASSESSMENTS 115
A. Methods
8. The Strategic Nuclear Balance
1. The Present Situation
2. The Future
C. The Conventional Balance in Europe
1- The Current Situation
2. Future Prospects
115
116
116
116
119
119
120
D. The Conventional Balance in Northeast Asia 121
E. The Maritime Balance 121
F. The Production Balance 124
G. The Basic Choice 127
XIV. CONCLUSIONS 128
A. The Problem 128
B. Arresting Adverse Trends 128
C. The Conditions of Security 129
I. The Strategic Nuclear Posture 129
9. The Theater Nuclear Posture 130
3. The Conventional Posture 130
4. Other Capabilities 130
D. Major Objectives 131
E. The Costs 132
F. The Task 132
SECTION II
1. THE NUCLEAR FORCES 133
A. Strategic Forces 133
1. Strategic Offensive Forces and Programs 133
a. The Basis for the Programs 133
b. Description of the Programs 139
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2. Strategic Defensive Forces and Programs 149
a. The Basis for the Programs
b. Force and Program Status
3. Strategic Command, Control and Communica-
tions
a. The Basis for the Programs
149
152
159
159
B. The Theater Nuclear Forces 161
1. The Basis for the Programs
2. Program Status
161
162
a. Battlefield Nuclear Systems 162
b. Theater-wide Strike Nuclear Forces 162
c. Theater Defensive Nuclear Forces 163
d. Maritime Theater Nuclear Forces 163
e. Intelligence, C3, and Planning 164
f. Peacetime Security and Storage 165
THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES 167
A. Land Forces 167
1. Program Basis
2. Force and Program Status
167
172
a. Force Structure 172
b. Force Modernization and Readiness 175
B. Naval Forces 194
1. Program Basis
2. Force and Program Status
194
206
a. Aircraft Carriers 211
b. Surface Combatants 212
c. Antiship Systems 214
d. Fleet Antiair Systems 215
e. ASW Aircraft 216
f. Undersea Surveillance Systems 217
g. Attack Submarines 218
h. Amphibious Lift 218
i. Mines and Mine Countermeasures 218
j. Mobile Logistics Support Force 219
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C. Tactical Air Forces 221
1. Program Basis 221
2. Force and Program Status 224
d. Air Force Tactical Air Structure 225
6. Air Force Modernization 230
c. Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air
Vorce Structure 238
d. Navy Tactical Air Modernization
Programs 243
D. Mobility Forces 250
Program Basis
Force and Program Status
250
253
Early NATO Reinforcement 253
5. Tactical Airlift 257
c. Aerial Refueling 258
d. Sealift Enhancement 259
III. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 261
A. introduction 261
Ai. Areas of Concern 261
C. Benefits from Security Assistance 265
D. The Programs 266
1. The Middle East/Persian Gulf/North Africa 268
7. Europe 269
1. East Asia and Pacific 269
/, Africa 269
5. Latin America 269
IV. INTELLIGENCE 270
A. Realignments in Defense Intelligence 270
Oversight 270
2. Intelligence Product Improvement 2/0
3. Adjustments to the Operating and Management
Structure 271
Program Direction
Specific Programs and Initiatives
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1. The Consolidated Cryptological Program 275
2. General Defense Intelligence Program 277
3. Special Activities/National and Selected
Activities 278
4. Intelligence-Related Activities 278
a. Tactical Warning 278
b. Tactical Support (Battlefield) 279
c. Tactical Support (Ocean) 279
d. Intelligence Staff Support 279
e. Training 279
f. Intelligence Support Systems 279
?g. Reserves and National Guard 279
D. Program Effectiveness and Efficiency Measures 281
V. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 283
A. Introduction 283
B. Program Basis 283
C. C3 Programs 284
1. Day-to-Day Posture 284
2. Crisis Management 286
3. Theater Conventional War 287
4. Theater Nuclear Conflict 289
5. Strategic Nuclear War 290
VI. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 293
A. RDT&E Goals 293
B. Program Basis 293
1. The Technology Balance 293
2. Mission Requirements for U.S. Military
Forces 294
3. Resource Allocation 295
4. Lead Time Requirements 295
5. R&D Cooperation with Our NATO Allies 296
6. U.S. R&D in the Private Sector 297
7. Technology Transfer 297
C. FY 1978 RDT&E Program Emphasis 297
1. Strategic Programs 298
2. Non-Nuclear Forces Programs 299
3. C3 Capabilities 299
4. The Technology Base 299
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VII. LOGISTICS 301
A. Objectives 301
B. Overview of Defense Logistics 301
C. Logistics Funding 302
D. Improvements in Logistics Efficiency 303
E. Readiness 304
F. Proposed Improvements in Materiel Readiness 305
I. Logistics and Readiness 305
2. Ship Materiel Readiness 305
3. Aircraft Materiel Readiness 307
4. Land Forces Equipment Shortages 309
3. War Reserve Stocks of Munitions and Combat
Consumables 310
a. Secondary Items
b. Munitions
G. Installations and Facilities
310
310
311
t. Defense Construction Program 311
2. Real Property Maintenance Activities 311
1. Defense Family Housing 312
4. Environmental Quality Program 312
Accident Prevention and Occupational
Health Programs 313
VIII. MANPOWER 314
A. Introduction 314
B. Program Basis 314
C. Manpower Costs Trends 316
D. Military Personnel Issues 318
I. Personnel Management 318
a. Enlisted Personnel 318
b. Officer Personnel 318
e. Personnel Turbulence 320
2. Military Compensation
3. Other Issues
a. Commissary Stores
0. Health Care
4. Military Retirement System
5. Recruiting Activities
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321
321
322
322
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E. Military Compensation Reform 324
F. Unionization 327
G. Civilian Personnel Issues 328
H. Equal Opportunity Program 329
I. Reserve Components 330
IX. MANAGEMENT 332
A. Introduction 332
B. Planning 332
1. MBO and Presidential Initiatives 332
2. Planning Process 332
C. Organization 333
1. DoD Reorganization 333
2. Education 334
3. Standardization of Management 335
4. Personnel Policies and Standards of Conduct 335
D. Execution 336
1. AAG Report Implementation 336
2. Commercial Off-the-Shelf Products 337
3. Contract Administration 337
4. Energy 337
5. FMS Procurements 338
6. Implementing Profit '76 338
7. Investment Policy Study Group 338
8. Manufacturing Technology 339
9. Outyear O&S Costs Reduction 339
10. Production Management 340
11. Productivity 340
12. Shipbuilding Claims 340
13. Weapons Standardization 341
14. Specifications and Standards 342
E. Coordination and Control 342
X. THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE ECONOMY 343
A. Summary 343
B. Comparison with Past Years 346
C. Assumptions and Projections 346
D. Outyear Projections 347
E. Analysis by Mission Area 348
1. Strategic Forces 349
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2.. General Purpose Forces and Other Program
Missions 349
F The Budget by Appropriation Category 349
G. Defense and the Economy 351
U. FMS Transactions and Projections 352
I. Obligation Shortfall Below Estimates 352
J. Mission Oriented Budget Presentation 353
DoD Financial and Force Tables A-1
Manpower Tables B-1
Don Force, Program and Budget Data C-1
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SECTION I
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
This is my second Report to the Congress of the United States as
Secretary of Defense, and the last Defense Report of President Ford's
administration. It affords an opportunity to summarize what has been
done and what needs to be done for the continuing security of the United
States.
In the two and a half years since President Ford took office, he
has recorded a number of accomplishments in the realm of national defense.
Of these, several deserve particular emphasis.
-- Throughout the country there is a renewed recognition that the
nation's security cannot be taken for granted. I have left no doubt
about the magnitude and persistence of the effort by the Soviets to
expand and improve their military establishment. The American public,
for its part, has become aware that there is no necessary incompatibility
between the search for equitable agreements with the Soviet Union and an
insistence on a strong defense and adequate deterrence.
-- Security and stability have been increased in two ways: by
some progress on arms control and by the President's determination to
halt the erosion of U.S. military and deterrent strength caused by the
steady real increase in Soviet military spending and capabilities, and
the equally steady decline in our own over the ten years preceding 1975.
-- With the reversal of the downward trend in real U.S. outlays
for defense, it has become possible to support and accelerate investments
in a number of programs essential to the future security of the United
States. As a consequence:
The modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent
is now under way, with decisions on production of the Trident submarine
and the B-1 intercontinental bomber, and the acceleration in the development
of a more survivable land-mobile ballistic missile.
The increasing importance of U.S. conventional capabilities
and deterrence has been recognized, and proposals set forth for major
resources to be allocated to its expansion, so that in the years ahead:
o the Army will field 16 rather than 13 active divisions,
and these divisions will be given increased firepower,
mobility, and protection from air attacks;
o the Navy is moving to improve its capability for
two-ocean sea control, its air and amphibious capability
for the projection of U.S. power, and its ability to
maintain a presence as required;
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the Air Force, with 26 fully-equipped tactical air
wings, will be able to provide an expanded and more
modern capability for worldwide offensive and defensive
air operations;
worldwide mobility will be improved through expanded
and more modern airlift, and through greater inflight
refueling support;
0 current research and development plans and programs
should provide new weapons technologies for the
fulfillment of our commitments.
-- President Ford has strengthened our arrangements for collective
security abroad, with particular attention to:
- ihe improvement of U.S. combat capability and the realignment
of U.S. support forces;
an increase in U.S. combat units -- both ground and
air -- stationed in the sensitive central region of Europe;
- greater standardization of equipment with our allies,
culminating in agreements within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to adopt the F-16 air combat fighter, the Roland army air defense
missile, and standard common components for the next generation of main
battle tanks.
-- The all-volunteer force has been brought into being and is
solidly in place. Racial and drug problems have declined. The men and
women of the services are dedicated to their profession. The American
people recognize and applaud their devotion. Their competence is unequalled
in the world today. It must be maintained.
-- At the same time, the U.S. military presence overseas has been
reduced wherever circumstances permitted. We have followed a consistent
policy of bringing forces back to the United States whenever U.S. interests
and commitments could be sustained with smaller foreign deployments. In FY
1976, the total of U.S. military manpower outside the United States
decreased by more than 10 percent, from 517,000 to 464,000. As the
accompanying illustration shows, this is only the latest installment of a
steady decline over the years.
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STRENGTH IN
THOUSANDS
1,400.000
1.200.000
moomo
mom
mom
moo
200=
CHART I-I
US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEA AFLOAT
S. VIETNAM
GERMANY
?THAILAND
ISC FOREIGN
-.---OTHER PACIFIC
^.--JAPAN & RYUKYUS
KOREA
-.---OTHER EUROPE
-,*??? EUROPE AFLOAT
1564 66 68 70 72 .74
END OF FISCAL YEAR
76
A remarkable degree of consensus has developed over these needs,
reflected in progress across a broad front of national security matters.
As the war in Vietnam drew to a close, a reaction against things military
tended to obscure even the most vital interests. During a period of detente,
or relaxation of tensions on the heels of the war, there was a tendency to
rationalize away or ignore national security issues. Instances of disagreement
within the intelligence community as to what the Soviets were doing, and
why, made a common view of the problem facing the country difficult.
More recently, the air has cleared. There is ample evidence of
momentum in Soviet military activity, and increasing agreement within the
intelligence world as to what that activity means. Does anyone today
really believe that, without U.S. strength to counterbalance them, the
Soviets will not seek to expand their influence -- to the detriment of
freedom?
Arbitrary incremental reductions can always be made in the defense
budget -- indeed in any budget. In real terms, that is exactly what has
been happening to baseline outlays for defense during the last decade.
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President's budgets were successively reduced each year. In no particular
year did the cutback appear severe or damaging. The sky did not fall because
of any one of these reductions. Indeed, still greater reductions could have
been made without any immediate or apparent penalty to U.S. security.
However, the underlying damage is there; the rot sets in.
It must be remembered that a President works with defense capabilities
inherited from his predecessors. Lead-times on modern defense capabilities
are as many as 5, 10, or 15 years. Ship overhauls can be delayed, aircraft
repairs postponed, investments in modernization stretched out or denied.
Those who make the reductions in a given year are not likely to pay the
penalty during their duty. It will come later, on someone else's watch,
as it has in this instance.
There is no free lunch. If we are to have adequate defense capabilities,
if we are to preserve U.S. freedom and security, a price must be paid. Peace
and stability cannot be achieved with mirrors, magic wands or good intentions,
promises or tricks. In a dangerous world, peace and stability require
an underpinning of strength. Strength costs money.
Some disappointments have accompanied the accomplishments. Several
of these disappointments -- and their implications -- require serious
consideration by the Congress.
-- Congressional reductions in the defense budgets requested by
successive Presidents make it difficult to engage in the sustained and
orderly programs of modernization and expansion that are necessitated by
the continued growth in Soviet military capabilities over the past decade.
On that score, the Congress should avoid mistaking transient increases in
unobligated balances of budget authority (based on outdated estimates) for
reductions in the costs of counterbalancing the expanding nuclear and
conventional power of the Soviet Union. As the FY 1978 defense budget
and the projected Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) make clear, those
costs have not decreased. They have increased. Congressional support
for sustained real increases in defense budgets is, if anything, even
more essential today than before.
-- Technological progress and freedom go together in a modern
society. Opposition to technological advance is bound to have a negative
effect on a nation which must meet the Soviet challenge to freedom in an
open society with a relatively small force and with relatively lesser quantities
of high-quality equipment. Only technological superiority will enable
the United States to keep its forces relatively small. Attempts to
suppress new technology are based to some degree on views of American
responsibility for the arms competition which have no foundation in
fact. Technological restraint on our part would unquestionably be
welcomed by the Soviets. There is no evidence that it would be reciprocated.
-- Failure to support the essential strategic mobility program will
result in a continued inefficient use of scarce resources and a loss of
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defense and deterrent capabilities necessary to the worldwide responsibilities
of the United States. The period ahead will be an era when getting
there first, even with the least, may be what counts the most. It should
not be necessary to deploy more forces in a particular theater than are
absolutely essential for purposes of collective defense. However, that is
true only if, beyond those minimum essential deployments of men and
materiel, the United States has at its call a powerful central reserve
and the improving strategic mobility permitted by modern technology.
Central reserves without mobility have little value. Worldwide influence
without worldwide mobility is a contradiction in terms.
-- Finally, to provide incentives for efficient management, Con-
gressional support is needed to effect economies in the operations of
the Defense Department. Management, for example, must be given flexibility
to adjust the base structure as forces change, and obsolete methods of
compensating and budgeting personnel must be brought up to date.
The Department itself undertook several management initiatives during
1976 in a concerted effort to check spiralling manpower costs and commit
a greater share of Defense resources to essential weapons procurement
and research requirements. All but a few of these initiatives required
affirmative action on the part of Congress.
Over $2.3 billion in FY 1977 savings were generated by refining
various legal processes which had dictated excessive and often wasteful
Defense pay costs:
-- Presidential refinement of the Pay Comparability Process ($2.1
Military Pay Raise Reallocation Authority ($70 million);
Elimination of the one percent retirement "kicker" ($70 million);
Limitations upon Payments for Unused Military Leave ($90 million);
An opportunity to save an additional $350 million in FY 1977 and
several billion dollars by the close of FY 1981 was lost when Congress
failed to approve Defense initiatives calling for:
Reform of the Federal (blue-collar) Wage System;
Consolidation of DoD Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training;
Elimination of Dual Compensation for General Schedule Civilian/
Reservists.
These actions will be proposed again in FY 1978. Additional savings
beyond the current fiscal year, as well as management improvements, will
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result from internal DoD reorganization initiatives involving the consoli-
dation of numerous related functions within both the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS) and realignment of the existing military base structure to
conform to current mission requirements and reduced manning levels.
The Department has made every effort during the past year to inform
the Congress about its activities. The accompanying table gives some
indication of how the volume of this communication has increased during
the past 12 years.
TABLE I-1
DoD Responses to Congress
Calendar Years
1964/76
Measurement
1964
1976
Increase (%)
Number of witnesses
630
1,721
173
Hours of Testimony
650
1,425
119
Number of Committees
hearing DoD Testimony
24
75
213
Supplemental Questions on
Budget Submitted to
Secretary of Defense
293
585
100
Pages in Congressional
Justification Books
7,189
11,927
66
Written Inquiries
(Estimates)
98,000
127,000
30
Telephone Inquiries
(Estimates)
568,000
650,000
14
It is against this background that the Defense Report for FY 1978
is presented. We have made significant progress in a short time in both
specifics and direction. We are today set on the proper path to assure
national security in the decades ahead. The people of our country seek
safety, stability, and efficiency. To reach these goals, as this statement
will emphasize, we still have a considerable distance to travel.
Last year, I emphasized and illustrated the clearly adverse trends
in Soviet and U.S. defense spending and capabilities. I stressed the
substantial growth in Soviet military power relative to that of the
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United States because of decisions made over the previous decade. At
that time I warned that if the comparative decline in American effort
and strength were not reversed, the United States would find itself
second to the Soviet Union in the essentials of military power, would be
seen as weakening in its ability to contribute to peace and stability in
the world, and that the effect would be to inject a fundamental instability
into the world situation. Adequate military capabilities are the underpinning
necessary to the peaceful resolution of international issues; however
resourceful the diplomats, and however sophisticated the diplomacy,
second place militarily is unacceptable.
A. The FY 1977 Budget
The defense budget presented to the Congress by President Ford in
January, 1976, was designed to arrest the relative decline in American
military power and lay the foundation for a defense posture adequate to
U.S. security needs in the decade ahead. Although the Congress did not
appropriate $3.8 billion of the original FY 1977 request, it did provide
a real increase in total obligational authority of 5.8 percent from FY
1976 to FY 1977. The decision was a sound one, and the United States
and the world will be safer for it. However, national security cannot
be provided on a one-shot basis. As the President has emphasized, our
security and our ability to contribute to peace will require a sustained
effort over a period of years.
CHART 1-2
U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAM TRENDS
(U.S. Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs)
(Constant FY 1978 Dollars)
BILLION
FY 1978 DOLLARS
170
150
110 ? .....
150 U.s.s.R.( JAN 77 ESTIMATE)
000.0. otosooss0000000ss............00004.???.**.s"
..
140
125
130
100
....................................
SOURCE: BASED ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THE DOLLAR.COST OF SOVIET
90 MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND OF U.S. EXPENDITURES ON A COMPARABLE
BASIS. CONVERTED BY DOD FROM CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS TO CONSTANT
FY 1978 DOLLARS. JANUARY '77
I I I
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 76
FISCAL YEAR
-*PROJECTIONS
76 TRANSITION QUARTER IS EXCLUDED FOR
COMPARABILITv US AND USSR
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B. The FY 1978 Budget and Five-Year Defense Program
The effort proposed by the President is without question within our
means. Total obligational authority of $123.1 billion and outlays of
$110.1 billion are requested for FY 1978. The amounts already appropriated
for FY 1977, and those now projected in the Five-Year Defense Program,
are shown in the following table.
TABLE 1-2
Five-Year Defense Program (Billions of Dollars)
(Fiscal Years)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total Obligational Authority
Current Dollars
110.2
123.1
135.4
145.8
156.7
166.8
FY 1978 Dollars
116.7
123.1
128.8
132.3
135.7
138.6
Outlays
Current Dollars
98.3
110.1
121.2
133.7
145.5
156.3
FY 1978 Dollars
104.5
110.1
115.2
120.9
125.6
129.0
Proposed real growth in total obligational authority from FY 1977 to
FY 1978 will be 6.8 percent, practically all of which will go to our
investment accounts -- primarily procurement and RDT&E (Research, Develop-
ment, Test, and Evaluation). Based on current assumptions about pay and
price increases during the Five-Year Defense Program, real growth from
FY 1978 to FY 1982 will continue to be substantial, and, most of it,
again, will be concentrated in capital investments. Since the program
assumes military personnel of about two million men and women, the
projected increase and its allocation represent an efficient way to add
needed capabilities.
C. Basis for the Proposed Increases
The main reason sustained increases are required is the military
policy of the Soviet Union. We now know more about the Soviet defense
effort than we did a year ago. The pace of Soviet military programs is
about as we estimated it in early 1976, but the resources allocated to
the effort are larger. The facts are clear, and so is the challenge.
It will require a sustained response.
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? CHART 1-3
ESTIMATED SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
AND ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH
(IN CONSTANT RUBLES)
Estimated Soviet
Expenditures for Defense, 1970-1975
IldlionflutUes
SO
(constant 1970 vices(
20
10
Announced Defense Budget (mutant prices(
Annual Rates of Growth?
PomM
ID-
1970
1070
'Saks!fated in 9970 Rubtes.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1971
MIN Estimate defined as the Uses might sew the. defense ellet
Estimile defined for comparison with US acccunts
1975
1977
1971
5973
1972
1974
1973
1971
The Soviets are continuing to expand and modernize major elements
of their defense posture. They are continuing to add to their large war
production base. Some of their equipment is beginning to equal ours in
technological sophistication. The Soviet Union is a power which is
engaged in a serious, steady, and sustained military effort. Whatever
its purposes, its options are growing as the West's have diminished.
The United States effort must be as serious, as steady and as
sustained as that of the Soviet Union. Starts and stops will not do.
We cannot continue to believe that U.S. technology, the sophistication
of U.S. weapons, and the considerable talents and skills of the men and
women of the Armed Forces -- substantial as they are -- will suffice by
themselves to make up for substantial quantitative advantages of our
rival. As the Soviets add quality to quantity, we must add quantity to
our technology and skills.
Given present estimates, the B-1 and Trident programs, combined
with an FY 1984 initial operating capability for Missile X (MX) and continued
research and development on elements of our strategic defenses, should
prevent the Soviets from obtaining any useful advantage in strategic
nuclear capabilities during the period ahead.
Reconstitution and expansion of U.S. Army stocks of equipment in
Europe will increase the rate at which the United States can reinforce
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its deployed capabilities in NATO and should contribute to deterring
attacks on Western Europe. Modernization of the Army's forces based in
the United States will strengthen our ability to reinforce NATO and
increase our capability to deter or respond to a variety of other
contingencies. Our strategic mobility, worldwide, will be increased by
an expanded procurement of Advanced Tanker/Cargo aircraft. Acquisition
of modern sealift units will further improve our ability to transport
heavily-equipped combat forces to distant areas.
The shipbuilding program, as proposed, will significantly expand
the size of the Navy, and our capability to assure the freedom of the
seas to the end of this century. A growing number of ships will allow both
increased worldwide presence in peacetime and greater overall effective-
ness in wartime. The funding of service life extensions for the Navy's multi-
purpose carriers and modernization of the Marine Corps and amphibious
forces will provide necessary U.S. sea-based tactical air and seaborne
assault power for the continued projection of deterrence where U.S.
interests dictate.
Modernization of the Air Force tactical air units will continue.
investment in AWACS, the F-15, F-16, and A-10 will improve the U.S.
ability to defend more effectively against the Warsaw Pact tactical air
and ground forces in Europe, or respond rapidly to other contingencies,
worldwide.
The achievement of these improvements requires larger U.S. defense
budgets over a period of years. Nothing is more essential than that the
American people and their representatives understand the necessity of
this increased effort. At stake is nothing less than the safety of the
United States and the survival of freedom. To be safe, free, and
independent, we must be vigilant, steady, and strong.
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II. THE BASIS FOR PLANNING
The dangers ahead dictate explicitness about the assumptions and
logic that lead to the defense posture of the United States and shape
the budgets now before the Congress. Only if the premises and chain of
reasoning are provided to the Congress and the American people, and
understood by them, can we expect to receive the necessary hearing on a
subject so vital to the nation. Accordingly, this annual Defense Report
is designed, in its first section, to specify the principal factors and
assumptions which have impact on the current posture, and the principal
objectives of proposed defense programs.
The second section of the Report analyzes the issues faced in
reaching the objectives set forth and describes the programs best suited
to meet them.
A. Approaches to Planning
Defense decision-making is occasionally pictured as reflecting
essentially the influence of parochial interests. However, no one who
has actually observed the planning process in the Department of Defense
and the interaction with the Office of Management and Budget, the National
Security Council, the President and the Congress can be the slave of
such half-truths. Perhaps more than in any other department of government,
Defense has a long tradition of systematic, analytical, and cost-conscious
approaches to its needs. Too much is at stake for the planning process
to take any other form.
Major historical trends in U.S. and Soviet defense spending and
military capabilities offer one way to grasp the broad security problems
that face the country. We cannot allow Soviet capabilities to rise and
U.S. capabilities to decline for an extended period of time without
inviting a major crisis for ourselves and for the world.
But trends by themselves -- however adverse -- cannot tell us what
forces should be acquired in order to reach our security objectives.
Simplistic recommendations for an arbitrary but specific annual increase
or decrease in the defense budget serve the nation no better. There is
no fixed percentage by which our resources should expand or contract
each year. Rather, there are capabilities that must be provided.
The approach to planning which specifies a defense posture as the
mirror-image of an opponent's capabilities has the virtue primarily of
simplicity; but it misses so much else essential to serious and systematic
planning that it can rapidly lead to major and expensive absurdities in
force and weapons acquisition. As a result, it has no standing among
planners.
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To take account of the many and diverse factors that should shape
the defense posture of the United States, the planner must turn to
specific contingencies -- illustrative conflicts that could occur now
and in the future -- and analyze what would be needed to maintain U.S.
interests under these conditions. Only an understanding of hypothetical
but not necessarily improbable attacks permits a serious insight into
the types and quantities of military resources that must go into a
defense posture sufficient to achieve the nation's obiectives with high
confidence.
B. Types of Planning
Defense or force planning is not the same as the more detailed
contingency and operational planning done by military staffs. Rather, its
main purpose is to ensure that resources, in the form of force structure,
personnel, weapons, materiel, supplies and other factors necessary to
military effectiveness over a wide range of contingencies, are available
to the President and his subordinates. As such, force planning does
not, and should not, dictate where or how these capabilities should be
used. In the face of many uncertainties, force planning strives --
within the budgets provided -- to furnish the President with sufficient
power and flexibility to conduct national security policy in a manner
consistent with the nation's interests.
C. The Importance of Analysis
Because so many real uncertainties are involved, and so many interests
are at risk, conservatism in the design of the U.S. defense posture is
in order. Superiority over, or insistence on numerical equivalence with
potential adversaries, may be justified. But underlying such considerations
must be a bedrock of analysis based on the world as it actually exists.
Modern force planning has the virtue of providing such a foundation. It
demands specificity about a number of factors:
the theaters in which contingencies could arise;
the nature of the contingencies;
potential enemies and allies;
the roles U.S. forces could be expected to play; and
the types of forces that could be used.
To identify these factors, modern force planning requires a context
within which the detailed analysis of hypothetical campaigns, the clash
of forces, and selection of preferred defense postures can proceed.
Even manpower planning and research and development must and do take
current and expected contexts into account.
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III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY
Part of the planning context is provided and shaped by the revolution
in military technology launched during World War II and continuing to
this day. The most profound effect of this seemingly permanent revolution
has come from the invention of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them at intercontinental ranges with increasing accuracy.
A number of major consequences have followed from the introduction
of nuclear weapons, increased long-range accuracy, and the growth of
related technologies.
-- First, to a degree unprecedented in its history, the United
States has become directly vulnerable to devastating attack.
-- Second, a nuclear standoff -- however dynamic and precarious --
has developed in which it seems widely recognized that the strategic and
tactical nuclear thresholds must be kept as high as possible and, as a
result, and somewhat less widely recognized, that the more traditional
conventional capabilities remain of fundamental importance.
-- Third, the United States must maintain three basic types of
military force -- strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional
and peacetime defense budgets that must be higher than during the seeming-
ly quieter years before World War II.
-- Finally, the technological revolution has caused the paradoxical
effect of reviving, albeit in a modified form, the geopolitical character
of the world of pre-nuclear years.
The possibility of nuclear warfare is certainly still with us.
Nonetheless, we find the world resuming a more conventional shape and
harboring many more traditional concerns than many assumed only a
decade ago. Geography, and the politics and strategies imposed by it,
never actually lost their importance during those years called the
nuclear age. But today we recognize far more than in the 1950s and
1960s not only the basic importance but also the limited utility of
nuclear weapons and, therefore, the vital role of conventional weapons
in maintaining defense and deterrence. Geopolitics and an appreciation
of its implications for national security have become essential to
modern force planning and the design of the U.S. defense posture.
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IV. FOREIGN POLICY AND FORCE PLANNING
The Congress recognized the relationship between foreign policy and
Eorce planning in passing Section 812 of the FY 1976 Department of
Defense Authorization Act. This amendment requires that "the Secretary
of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prepare
and submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives a written annual report on the foreign policy and
military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year,
how such policy and force structure relate to each other, and the justi-
fAcation for each."
A. Defense and Foreign Policy
As this Report set forth last year, the U.S. defense posture does
not and cannot be made to relate directly to the short-term objectives
and strategies of foreign policy decision-makers, although it can and
does contribute in a fundamental way to the environment in which such
decisions are made. The military establishment constitutes an instrument
at the disposal of the nation, just as diplomatic, economic, and other
means are available and may be applied to achieve national objectives.
And, just as we should hesitate to change the size and composition of
firefighting forces or insurance coverage because the need for them may
temporarily seem to lessen, so we must be cautious of suggestions that
we can safely reduce U.S. defense capabilities simply because, during a
period of peace, they are successfully demonstrating their value. The
defense establishment is an institution as easy to tear down or cripple
as it is difficult to reconstruct and indeed impossible to reassemble
rapidly, owing to the long lead times required for modern military
capabilities.
To say that, however, is not to argue that the size and composition
of U.S. Armed Forces should be insulated from what happens in the world.
The nature of force planning is such that elements of our defense posture
tend to be sensitive in a number of respects to considerations of geo-
politics. To the extent that our assumptions about those considerations
evolve, the U.S. defense posture may -- but only may -- evolve as well.
What is the current map of international politics? It no longer
shows a world of many great powers. The United States, separated from a
number of its friends by two oceans, has become the primary champion of
freedom, self-determination, and international pluralism. The Soviet
Union, its imperial domain already sprawled over two continents, continues
to extol in action if not always in words the virtues of authoritarianism,
a command economy, and the subjugation of the individual to the state.
The constituents of Soviet ideology are probably more numerous than
ours. Political and economic freedoms are expanding in a few nations --
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Greece, Portugal, and Spain -- but at present in many other places they
are contracting. If the great issues of international politics were to
be decided by vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
side of freedom would win rarely. The United States and its friends are
in a minority. They are under pressure in a divided and dangerous world.
Instability has been increased by the spread of technology across
this splintered and shrinking world. As modern societies have become
more dependent on foreign sources of supply, on interconnected systems
of communication and transportation, on international systems of production,
commerce, and banking, they have grown more vulnerable to a variety of
attacks -- ranging from political intimidation, economic pressures and
terrorist acts to full-scale military assaults.
Modern conventional weapons no longer are the exclusive property of
the larger industrial states. Nuclear technology now threatens to
spread to many areas suffering from a shortage of energy, a sense of
insecurity, or both. To these conditions, must be added the weakening of
traditional international order, the collapse of old empires, and the
rise of the Soviet Union as an expansive world power. The effect of these
changes is that what happens elsewhere has an impact on us. Events in
distant corners of our increasingly interdependent world cannot be
ignored by the United States. Nor can they be met without some risk.
Caution and reluctance are understandable. But events of the past
two decades have not made the United States more independent politically,
economically, or culturally. On the contrary, the realities of interdependence
-- more so than ever before in our history -- oblige us to face the world
as it is, not as we might wish it to be.
No nation is "an Island, entire of itself;" "every nation is a
piece of the Continent, a part of the main." The United States is no
exception. But this much must be added. No nation has done more to
accompany its involvement with a continuing search for the peaceful and
equitable settlement of international differences.
-- It was the United States, not the Soviet Union, which first
sought constructively to control strategic nuclear arms and achieve
mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.
-- It was the United States, not the Soviet Union, which has worked
to end the fighting in the Middle East.
Our good faith in contributing to peace cannot be in doubt. Yet
this remains an era in which the statesman and the soldier must keep
close company. Constructive diplomatic initiatives are necessary. They
must be supported by strength.
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B. U.S. Interests
The force planner, faced with a dangerous world, must ask where we
may be called upon to deploy and operate the nation's forces. Perhaps
his best initial guide to an answer lies in identifying the main and
continuing interests of the United States. Our most fundamental interest
lies, of course, in preserving the independence and territorial integrity
of the United States and its possessions. The common defense is a
Constitutional requirement and duty.
However onerous that charge in a world shrunken by technology, it
by no means ends the responsibilities of the force planner. U.S. interests
inevitably exceed these boundaries. It is understandable that the
determination of interests beyond the territory of the United States is
less precise, subject to evolution, and a topic of debate. Nonetheless,
the determination must be attempted.
CHART IV-1
CEO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
? mum INTERESTS
? POLITICAL COMPETITION
? SUPPORT OF FREEDOM
- ALL REQUIRE GLOBAL MILITARY
ASSETS AND ACCESS
-ALL REQUIRE A GLOBAL STRATEGY
GLOBAL STRATEGY
ACCESS
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1. Economic Interests
The United States is not an economic island. We depend for our
standard of living and economic security increasingly on raw materials
imported from abroad, and some of these imports have strategic value as well.
We find it profitable to trade and invest abroad; imports and exports
now total more than $200 billion a year, and U.S. international investments
are currently valued at more than $100 billion. The United States, to
be sure, is singularly blessed in having inherited a rich and spacious re-
source base; we would suffer less than most if we were to lose access to
foreign trade, investment and raw materials. With belt-tightening and a
substantial decline in standards of living, we could still manage. As
the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated, we would suffer dislocations,
but our allies in Europe and Northeast Asia might be mortally wounded by
any prolonged interruption in the established patterns of international
trade.
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
BO
70
60
so
40
30
20
10
FOREIGN TRADE
(IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
EXPORT =
IMPORT =
?
IU.S. 1971 I
$114 EXPORT
1130 IMPORT
IS
UNITED STATES
Gl
44
70
71
72
73
74
75
CHART IV-2
1976
17
USSR/US DEPENDENCE
ON IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL
100
Percent of Imports
75 50 25 11 25 50
1 I-
75 100
MANGANESE
COBALT
TITANIUM
CHROMIUM
ALUMINUM
TANTALUM
PLATINUM GROUP
TIN
RuompAR
NICKEL
TUNGSTEN
GERMANIUM-MMM
BERYLLIUM
ZIRCONIUM
BARITE
IRON
LEAD
COPPER
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Political Interests
The vulnerability of our allies, particularly in Europe and Northeast
Asia, underlines the complexity of contemporary U.S. interests and the
degree to which they are interrelated. In a world where strategic
nuclear parity has caused conventional power to rank in importance with
nuclear power, we cannot go it alone. We seek both to deny accessions
of power to rivals and to ensure sufficient friendly power -- political
nnd economic as well as military -- to counterbalance that of our competi-
tors. Because of these interests, we must care about the economic
welfare of our allies even when our own is not directly in ieopardy.
fiecause ot these same interests, we find ourselves associated regionally
with what, ideologically, may strike some of us as strange bedfellows.
However, for those knowledgeable in the ways of domestic politics, in
the United States as elsewhere, coalitions of this character should come
as no surprise. Politics, whether domestic or international, rarely
permit the luxury of ideological purity. Even if we make democratic
rreedoms the test of our association with other nations, we must not
Lorget that all authoritarian institutions are neither identical in
their repression of freedom nor irreversible in their tyranny, as we
have seen successively in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Nor are they
similar in their actions with respect to self-determination for other
nations.
i. Ideological Interests
To cite the fact of political balances -- balances that exist in
any political process, however peaceful, orderly and democratic -- is
not to minimize our dedication to democratic values at home and support
of those beliefs abroad. Freedom of choice, whether economic, political
or personal, is a rare privilege in this turbulent world. As a people,
we have not sought to impose on others a system of government which
guarantees such rights. But we have a duty both to advocate democratic
principles and to encourage those societies where freedom grows or
continues to flourish. So, too, it is logical that we treat differently
nations within the large group that do not practice freedom, distinguishing
between those which are aggressive and do not respect the rights of
others, and those which respect the self-determination of values.
4. The Global Nature of U.S. Interests
Our interests -- political, and economic -- are necessarily worldwide
In nature. The bulk of U.S. trade and overseas investment focuses on
the highly industrialized nations of the Western Hemisphere, Europe and
Northeast Asia. But we draw on critical raw materials from the Middle
East and Persian Gulf, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Our dependence
on foreign energy supplies has risen dramatically in the past 15 years,
and it continues to grow. Already over 40 percent of our petroleum
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comes from external sources, and more than 33 percent of that total is
imported from the Persian Gulf. We draw on tin from Malaysia, Thailand
and Bolivia; on manganese from Brazil, Gabon, South Africa and Zaire; on
titanium from Australia and India.
U.S. political interests are extensive: witness our commitment to
eight formal treaties of mutual security -- with Latin America, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia and New Zealand
(ANZUS), Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China (Taiwan),
the Philippines, and Thailand through the Manila Pact. The United
States is a full participant in CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), but
not a signatory. We have longstanding commitments to the security of
Israel, and important links to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Spain. While
most of these commitments date back a quarter of a century or more and
reflect the containment strategy adopted at that time, they still reflect
our basic political interests.
.13
CHART IV-3
DEFENSE ALLIANCES Et TREATIES WITH U.S.
b
RIO TREATY MI
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
..Z
COSTA RICA fita(r.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BELGIUM
ECUADOR CANADA
EL SALVADOR DENMARK
HONDURAS FED. REP. OF GERMANY REP. OF PHILIPPINES
GREECE
USA
FRANCE U.S. - PHILIPPINE TREATY
GUATAMALA
HAITI
NICARAGUA ILTAvmsou.RG MANILA PACT*
U.S.. REP. OF KOREA
REP. OF KOREA
USA
U.S. - JAPAN TREATY W.V.
JAPAN
USA
MEXICO
PANAMA NETHERLANDS AUSTRALIA
PARAGUAYNORWAY FRANCE
PERU
PORTUGAL NEW ZEALAND
TRINIDAD/TOBAGO TURKEY PHILIPPINES
USA URUGUAY UICNEILTAENDDKINGDOM THAILAND
UK
VENEZUELA USA US US. ? REP. OF CHINA TREATY
REP. OF CHINA
USA
19
ANUS S629
AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
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It surely is the case that if the United States so wishes, it
can -- with a Gross National Product of nearly $2 trillion -- tailor its
capabilities to its needs.
TL is by no means clear, however, that a reduction in present U.S.
commitments abroad would result in a reduced defense posture. Much
depends on the threat. An isolated America, without any external obligations
but with most of the world organized against it -- with previously
allied or friendly nations shorn of our present support and drawn into
the Soviet orbit -- would require a much more substantial defense effort
ami budget than is the case today.
J. Strategic Interests
The worldwide nature of U.S. political, economic, and ideological
interests inevitably brings other interests in their train. Despite
technology, we still depend on the seas for the bulk of our external
commerce. And because we are a large trading nation -- as we have been
throughout our history -- we must be vitally interested in the freedom
of the seas and the narrow waters that connect them. The new domain of
space, with its opportunities for communication, geodesy, meteorology,
and a host of vital military activities, is rapidly growing in importance.
CHART IV-4
WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND
TRADE ROUTES - SELECTED AREAS, 1975
c-17)
T
t 171n,
WESTERN EUROPE.
13.0 2.1 77?
TO US .5 pt COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
12.3
( 20.3
MIDDLE EAST
1.7
3.5
5.3
KELM,
JAPAN
3.2
--.
TOTAL: US? W. EUROPE ? JAPAN
,AFRICA CONSUMPTION: 34.3
M.A")? PRODUCTION: 10.5
clII! 0 COMMUNIST NATIONS CONSUMPTION 1 SOUTH AMERICA
OIL SUPPLY ROUTES 9
kwoz4sii 0
: 0.2
11.7
1575 IN MILLION BARRELS PER DAY PRODUCTION
INT. PETROLEUM
TN CYCLOPE 0 IA
1976
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IN mmunN BARRELS PER DAY
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Our interest in freedom of access to space has already become
great. Most important, because this is a geopolitical world in which
conventional as well as nuclear power plays such a role, we continue to
have worldwide strategic interests.
Nuclear forces, for the most part, concentrate unprecedented amounts
of firepower into relatively small units. As a consequence, very powerful
blows can be struck with nuclear delivery systems at intercontinental
ranges. And because these systems are so powerful at such great distances,
there is a tendency to assume that the outcome of a nuclear conflict
would be decided in a matter of hours or at most days.
Conventional forces, by contrast, require large concentrations of
men and materiel to be effective. Their radius of effectiveness is
limited, and the outcomes of major conventional wars have usually been
decided only after extended campaigns of attrition. Personnel, equipment
and supplies must be transported over great distances; stockpiles of
combat consumables must be established; multiple campaigns may be fought;
and victory must usually come from incremental and cumulative progress
by air, sea, and land. The length and cost of this process will depend
to an important extent on the geographical positions of the belligerents.
Even in an era of wide-bodied aircraft and improving strategic
mobility, enormous advantages accrue from forward deployments of forces.
CHART IV-5
MARITIME BASES AND FACILITIES
CD 0
40,
*
KEY:
111 SOVIET BASES AND FACILITIES
? SOVIET ANCHORAGES
* UNITED STATES BASES AND FACILITIES
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Strategically located bases are necessary to protect lines of communication
especially when our interests overseas are great and distant. It is one
thing to think about the defense of Western Europe with U.S. divisions
and air wings based in Germany, with the control of such narrow waters
as the Bosphorus and the Strait of Gibraltar in friendly hands, with a
fleet deployed in the Mediterranean, and with bases in the United Kingdom,
Tceland, Greenland and the Azores. It would be quite another matter to
contemplate a defense without those assets and with the entire U.S.
military effort having to be sent directly from the United States to the
:ront. Despite the advances in technology, we have not freed ourselves
either from the need to project our awn power in an efficient manner, or
from the requirement to deny strategic areas to those who might be our
adversaries.
6 The Conditions of U.S. Defense
To set forth the international interests of the United States is to
define the objectives which guide U.S. foreign policy and force planning.
The central objective of U.S. foreign policy is to maintain an
international order that assures the physical security of the United
States, its economic well being, and the preservation of its institutions
and values.
Vor over three decades the United States has worked toward this
objective, primarily by policies to enlist the active collaboration of
the industrial democracies in defense, in economics, and in other areas
of international life where there was a sufficient commonality of interest
and objectives to permit a collective response. These policies have
heen remarkably successful. A collective defense has helped to deter
general war and has provided security to the system's participants while
reducing the financial burden on each. Behind this defensive shield, the
economies of the industrial democracies have prospered, political stability
has been encouraged, and social justice broadened. Although there have
been important departures from this general pattern, the overall results
validate a continuation of the basic policy of collective defense.
The conditions under which this policy and force planning will be
pursued during the next few years are likely to be characterized by:
-- the continuing growth of Soviet military power and of a capability
to project it into areas and to ends damaging to U.S. interests;
-- maintenance of current alliance relationships and acceptance
of Spain's importance to NATO;
warfare;
continued dangers of nuclear proliferation and of nuclear
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rapid technological change;
-- the increasing economic dependence of the United States and
its major collaborators on each other and on the so-called Third World
for raw materials and energy, and their vulnerability to any significant
disruption in the flow of these goods;
-- tension and disorder in much of the underdeveloped and parts
of the deveEl_oped world, which -- with the increasing availability of
sophisticated arms, the growth of major regional powers, and uneven
economic, political, and social development -- will create opportunities
for external manipulation and polarization of political attitudes against
the West, and make international relations more difficult and dangerous
for the West; and
-- the continuing importance of the PRC as a factor in the security
balance between the industrialized democracies and the Soviet Union.
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V. FOREIGN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
The greatest threat to the United States comes from the Soviet
Union. While controversy continues to ebb and flow about the intentions
of Soviet leaders, there can be no doubt about the capability of Soviet
armed forces to threaten U.S. vital interests, including the United
States itself.
A. The Soviet Union
There are 4.4 million men in the Soviet military establishment
(compared with 2.1 million men and women in the active elements of the
U.S. Armed Forces), and that total does not include well-armed border
guards of the KGB and the security units of the MVD. All the elements of
modern power are heavily represented in the Soviet military establishment,
MANPOWER
IN
MILLIONS
CHART V-1
U.S./U.S.S.R. MIILITARY MANPOWER?
PROJECTION
1 I J t I j _I _I
1964 1970
FISCAL YEAR
EXCLUDES MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES
including intercontinental strategic nuclear forces, large and growing
theater nuclear forces, and a wide range of non-nuclear capabilities,
including chemical weapons. Each of these forces, while expanding in
size, has been given weapons and communications equipment of increasing
sophistication. The Soviets have not seen quantity as a substitute for
1975
1977
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quality; for the most part, they have kept the one and worked to improve
the other. Technologically, their military establishment is now approaching
the quality of our own in many respects.
We should not be misled, in this connection, by news stories about
the Soviet MIG-25 (Foxbat), a high-altitude interceptor which its pilot
landed in Japan last September. Design of this particular model of the
Foxbat began in 1960, probably as a defense against the 3-70 and SR-71,
which were then being developed by the United States. FOxbat first flew
in 1964, and became operational in 1970. It is, for its time, a good
combination of technical sophistication and cost-consciousness. Titanium
has been used only where necessary; the same is true of aluminum honeycomb
and solid state devices. The designers have compensated for the weight
of the aircraft by powering it with two turbojet engines, each with
about 25,000 pounds of thrust, and by giving it a greater internal fuel
capacity than had been estimated. Most of the components are "off-the-
shelf." Care has been given to ensure ease of maintenance.
The result is an aircraft with an excellent climb capability, high
speed at altitude, a system to control its flight from the ground, and
the ability to deny high-altitude overflights of the Soviet Union. Not
only is Foxbat a capable aircraft for its time; it provides a significant
technological benchmark from which the Soviets have advanced in the
succeeding 16 years.
A major portion of Soviet theater nuclear and conventional forces
is oriented toward Western Europe. There are 27 divisions and 1,400
aircraft poised in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; another 4
divisions and 265 aircraft continue their occupation of Hungary. Substantial
Soviet forces are also deployed to the borders of the People's Republic
of China (PRC).
In the heartland of the USSR is an ICBM force -- some of it now
deployed under the cover of the Moscow anti-ballistic-missile (ABM)
defense system -- which numerically is 50 percent larger than the U.S. ICBM
force. At sea and under construction are 75 ballistic missile submarines
capable of attacking the United States. The Backfire bomber continues to
come into service with both the Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation
forces of the USSR. Anti-bomber defenses remain substantial, and it is
now evident that the Soviets seek to provide key elements of their population,
industry, and food supplies with some degree of protection against nuclear
attacks.
These nuclear strike capabilities and strategic defense forces seem
excessive for second-strike purposes. Their locations and the nature of
Soviet military planning are bound to cause some ambiguity about the
roles and missions assigned to them.
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NUMBER OF
OIVISIONS
60
40
30j
20 -
10
1
I
800 1600
SECRET
CHART V-2
SOVIET DIVISIONS - DEPLOYMENT CY TYPE
AT DO KM INCREMENTS
FROM EAST-WEST GE 1A BCRDER
1111.11.
f
In km , 496 MI
EGEND
AIRBORNE DIVISION
[11] TANK DIVISION
n MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
r---t
2400 3200
4000 4800 5600 6400 7200 8000 8800 5600 10400
KILOMETERS FROM BORDER
There is far less ambiguity about other forces available to the
Soviets. The Soviets now have 7 ready airborne divisions which, as they
demonstrated during the Middle East war of 1973, they would consider
deploying overseas in special contingencies. They have also developed a
substantial capability for long-range airlift with which they transported a
great deal of war materiel to Angola and assisted in the transfer of a
sizeable Cuban expeditionary force to Guinea in 1975. The Soviet navy
continues to evolve into a force with worldwide capabilities, supported
by a merchant marine designed to support military operations in peace
and war.
What we are witnessing, at the minimum, is a growing capability sut-
ftcient to enable the Soviet Union to become a major participant in
world geopolitics. In certain respects, they have already broken
through or leapfrogged some of the barriers erected by the containment
policies of earlier decades. Given the momentum of their programs, it
must be assumed that this process will continue in the future.
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Of particular significance is the continuing momentum behind Soviet
defense programs. As far as can be judged, while U.S. defense outlays,
until recently, have been in a long, slow slide and were more than 13
percent lower in 1976 than in 1964 (in constant dollars), the Soviet
defense effort (estimated in U.S. prices) increased in real terms by
more than 40 percent in the same period. Estimates show that in 1964,
U.S. defense spending exceeded comparable Soviet efforts; by 1976,
however, the situation had been reversed, with the Soviet level of
effort exceeding that of the United States by over 30 percent in dollar
terms and by nearly 40 percent when retirement costs are excluded.
Perhaps even more important over the longer term are the economic
resources invested in future, not current, military capability. Estimates
indicate that Soviet programs in RDT&E, military construction, and
procurement have exceeded those of the United States in every year since
1966. In 1976, the Soviet military investment program was more than 90
percent larger than that of the United States.
The bulk of both total Soviet military spending and the increases
in it (measured in rubles) have gone to forces which constitute a direct
threat to the United States and its European allies. On the average,
the costs of the Soviet forces oriented toward China took about 11
percent of the total Russian military budget between 1964 and 1976.
During those 12 years, roughly 15 percent of the growth in the Soviet
level of effort, on the average, can be attributed to the buildup in the
Far East. The remaining 85 percent has been allocated to strategic
nuclear forces and the forces deployed opposite NATO Europe.
Because of the resources allocated to the Soviet defense effort
during the past decade, the Soviets have consistently outproduced the
United States in tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, submarines,
and minor naval combatants. Their present output of tactical aircraft
and even helicopters is now greater than ours. While the United States
has developed one new ICBM since 1965, the MINUTEMAN III, the Soviets
have developed seven. Of their newest generation of ICBM's, three --
the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 -- have (compared with the MINUTEMAN III)
greater throwweight, more and higher-yield multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles (AIRVs), and nearly comparable accuracies. With a
large and growing war production base, and an expanding corps of scientists
and engineers devoted to military research and development, reasonable
observers must conclude that, if anything, these many programs will
continue to accelerate.
We cannot state with certainty exactly why all of these scarce
resources (from a Gross National Product probably no more than two-
thirds as large as ours) are being devoted to military power. But as I
have pointed out: It would be unreasonable to assume that a nation
would develop that kind of capability, that number of square feet under
roof of shipyards, laboratories, test facilities, that number of scientists,
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CHART V-3
US AND SOVIET 10E.WI DEVELOPMENTS 1
2
2
5,000
U.S.
(1)
..1.1695.1.61?11?111111=40161f
(3)
U.S.S.R.
1(18)
r;
(1) Ii (6) t
(1)A : (4) f1 /
i (1)
;J ti
- R en 1.3 r) 1 cr3r r.
,
i
u1 V3'.' ?c,f) ;E,,A ,,, ; V) -..4, '-. , i ,Cl) C;)
V)
ri (i) c* L 4 : V) tn l s'
Li v.o
62 63 65 66 67 69 70 74 75 7
YEAR OF INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
1/The numbers in parentheses represent the number of independently
targetable re-entry vehicles associated with each missile
TRENDS IN US/USSR PRODUCTION
OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT
1966-1976
TANKS
4,000 -
USER ????
3,000
2,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
1,000 2,000
U.S.
-.A
1966 68
5.0ao
4.000
3,400
2.000
000
0
ARTILLERY
70 72 74 1976
? "" ? ? ? U.S.S.R.???
.---
U.S.
1966 613
70
72
74
1976
1,000
Ant & SCOUT CARS
ANTITANK
MISSILES
1966
5,000
4,000 -
3,000
2.0430
1,000
68
70
72
74 1976
TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT
U.S.
a
1966 68
U.S.S.R.
---
5,000
4,000
3,000
1,008
70
,000
2.003
1
70 72 74 1976 966 68 70 72
HELICOPTERS
U . S.
74 1976
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engineers, and construction workers, suddenly to turn them off. It is a
pattern; it is clear; it is unambiguous; it is providing increasing
military capabilities which, in turn, offer the Soviets increasing
military options; it cannot be ignored.
To be sure, the argument can be and has been made that this large and
dynamic effort results simply from a traditional fear and distrust of
the outside world. However, the Soviet people are ruled by a totalitarian
regime with a passion for secrecy and a capacity for abrupt reversals of
policy. Stalin demonstrated this capacity in 1939 when he suddenly
allied himself with Nazi Germany. Times have changed, we are told,
since the paranoid years of the old dictator. But it was not Stalin,
who ordered the invasion of Hungary in 1956, nor was it Stalin who sent the
Soviet armored and airborne divisions into Czechoslovakia in 1968. We know
by their words, moreover, that Soviet leaders say that they see themselves
engaged in a long-term competition with the West, that they seek to tilt
the international "correlation of forces" in their favor, and that they
continue to support and sponsor, "wars of national liberation." To
describe the Soviet Union as a status quo power is to ignore their words
and much of what has been taking place over the past 20 years.
No evidence is available that the Soviet leadership intend to launch
a direct military attack on the West in the immediate future. Recent
experience may underline the prudence and caution of that leadership --
despite an older and more flamboyant history of threats to Berlin and the
deployment of missiles to Cuba. U.S. self-interest may demand that we try
to resolve conflicts of interest with the USSR by peaceful means, to seek
understandings and mutual cooperation where the opportunity arises, and seek
to improve the prospects for international stability through sound arms
control agreements. But at the same time, prudence requires that we
take into account the other and darker face presented by the Soviet
Union.
-- We must recognize that the Kremlin is not demonstrating restraint
in the development of military capabilities.
-- We must recognize that Soviet capabilities indicate a tendency
toward warfighting and damage-limiting rather than for the more modish
Western models of deterrence through mutual vulnerability.
-- We must recognize the magnitude of the Soviet military effort
and the momentum it has today as a result of their purposefulness over
more than a decade.
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-- And, logically, U.S. force planning must be based on a recog-
nition of the size and scope of the Soviet military effort as it is, not as
we would wish it to be, for it is those capabilities today and in the tuture
which provide the Soviet Union with the options that we must face.
These, indeed, are the critical assumptions underlying the detense
budget for FY 1978 and the Five-Year Detense Program. These assumptions
fit the facts about the Soviet Union as we now know chem.
R. The People's Republic of China
"e future course ot the PRG remains somewhat uncertain. The United
States continues to seek more normal relations with that country. Despite
hopeful prospects, we cannot wholly ignore the PRC tor purposes ot force
planning. Sino-Soviet relations could improve. Peking is gradually
developing an intercontinental and sea-based ballistic missile capability.
We must take it into account in the design and deployment of our strategic
nuclear posture, even though we may believe that its targets will not be
n the United States.
Because our allies in Asia are necessarily sensitive to the regional
power of the PRC, we cannot ignore the possibility that local conflicts
of interest might bring about the danger of armed clashes and pressures on
the United States to support our allies.
But the deepest concern must be reserved for the outcome ot the
LIvalry between the PRC and the Soviet Union -- a rivalry with a continuing
potential for violence, including even the possibility ot nuclear exchanges.
The United States has not encouraged or taken sides in this antagonism. But
we cannot ignore the existence of the substantial military buildup that has
occurred on the frontiers of the PRC, or the history of border clashes
Oetween the USSR and the PRC since 1969. The extent to which this
Atuation should affect the defense posture of the united States, broadly
defined, requires continuing review.
C. Other Foreign Military Capabilities
Other and lesser powers may choose to challenge the interests and
allies of the United States. North Korea, Libya, and Cuba are only the most
obviously bellicose of the candidates. Such challenges may become more
dangerous in the period ahead.
We are already witnessing the proliferation ot modern conventional
weapons beyond the main industrialized nations. Regrettably, one cannot
rule out a further diffusion of nuclear weapons. It both trends continue,
what we have characterized in the past as minor contingencies may become
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more substantial in scale, as recent conficts in the Middle East, including
the war in Lebanon, have foreshadowed. The incidence of terrorism,
possibly fostered by less responsible leaders of some nations, could also
increase and terrorists could become more heavily armed with sophisticated
weapons.
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Vi. THE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY
For purposes of force planning, it is necessary, although not
sufficient, to know that there are threats to the security of the
United States. Such threats must be understood and evaluated within a
geographic context. The scope of the security problem facing us should
not be underestimated, just as it should not be overestimated. We
cannot expect to match all the capabilities of every conceivable adversary
who might threaten U.S. interests in various parts of the world. In
addition to identifying both U.S. interests and the potential threats
to them, the force planner must indicate the kinds of challenges that
might realistically be expected to arise. There is no shortage of such
challenges.
A. Nuclear Challenges
First among these challenges -- and one that is accepted by almost
all as requiring countermeasures for the indefinite future -- is a
nuclear attack on the United States. Whatever the state of U.S. relations
with the Soviet Union, and however much we may strive for progress
toward strategic stability through arms control agreements, force
planning must treat this challenge with the utmost seriousness.
The threat of a direct nuclear attack on the United States must
have the first call on our attention and resources. But we must not
forget that our closest allies face the same possibility. Since none
of them have nuclear capabilities on the scale of the United States and
the Soviet Union, U.S. force planning must take their situation into
account. Nor can we ignore two other harsh facts:
-- the Soviet Union is modernizing and expanding its nuclear
capability to a point where it could threaten and coerce its neighbors
as well as the United States;
-- the PRC continues gradually to develop a medium-range nuclear
capability which will bring all of Asia within its range.
Historically, these challenges have been taken into account in
U.S. force planning. We must continue to do so.
B. U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the
major threat to the United States and the international system on which
we depend. While Soviet intentions and objectives are obviously not
fully knowable outside of the Kremlin, Soviet military trends can be
identified with some certainty:
I. Across the spectrum of capabilities from strategic nuclear to
general purpose, the Soviets give evidence of moving toward a fundamental
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shift in the "correlation of forces" that would give them peacetime and
crisis leverage over the United States and its allies.
2. The emphasis in Soviet nuclear programs on quantitative superiority
indicates concern for major warfighting potential, in contrast to the
U.S. emphasis on deterrence and stability.
3. Increases in the overall size of Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe -- together with increases in armor, armored fighting vehicles,
and artillery 7- and continued stress on force modernization indicate
the continued priority of Europe in Soviet military planning. They
may also reflect a change in operational concept toward capabilities
for attack without major prior reinforcement.
4. The Soviets have built up forces capable of meeting Chinese
threats and providing assurance of success at all levels of Chinese
attack or provocation.
5. Military capabilities for power projection at long distances
from the Soviet Union are being developed with the resulting ability to
extend influence in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, and to employ
higher levels of aggressiveness in so doing.
(a) Increased Soviet naval capability can provide forward
presence and a basis for contesting U.S. influence.
(b) Improvements in both airlift and merchant sealift now
provide Soviet leaders with a long-range intervention capability.
(c) Availability of a willing proxy -- Cuba today, possibly
others (such as North Korea and Vietnam) tomorrow -- offer the opportunity
to avoid direct Soviet military involvement, thereby lowering the
political cost of exercising influence. Concern for adverse Chinese
reaction may limit Soviet use of Asian proxies.
The scope and vigor of the Soviet programs occurring at a time
when the USSR has achieved a powerful deterrent as well as rough equivalence
with the United States in strategic forces, raises the question of
whether these programs can or will carry them to some form of strategic
superiority over the United States. They trends lead to one judgment
about the Soviet Union, and that is, in the main, their large and
growing military capabilities with a growing offensive and warfighting
orientation offer options to them which clearly are adverse to those
who believe in freedom and self-determination, and particularly the
United States.
As to the future, the USSR can be expected to continue certain
patterns, including:
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strengthening its already formidable nuclear and conventional
ntlitary forces;
seeking to expand its influence by manipuLating local tensions
and conflicts, particularly in the Third World;
-- offering political support and various forms of military
assistance to exploit opportunities to divide the Western alliance
system;
seeking to neutralize Western military advantages in areas in
which Soviet and Western policies are in contest;
-- pursuing arms control initiatives that will enhance their
security, support their military and political objectives, and stabilize
the military balance at levels favorable to the USSR.
Soviet policies toward the West, according to their own statements,
remain predicated on the doctrine that the forces of history will result
in the victory of Communism worldwide and that the appropriate Soviet
tole is to facilitate the process without endangering the Soviet state.
Soviet leaders profess to believe that the balance is shifting in their
Favor in the world. At the same time, structural economic weakness
represents a vulnerability for the USSR and has compelled the Soviets to
look more to the West for food and technology.
rhe Soviet leadership has engaged in policies which can reasonably
be described as relaxing tensions with the United States and Europe in
areas which it believes provide, at present, the best opportunity for
enhancing its own security, promoting its economic development, dealing
with the problem of an unfriendly China on its eastern front, dividing
the West and encouraging the spread of Soviet influence.
Soviet leaders seem to recognize that U.S.-Soviet relations are
particularly sensitive to developments in Europe, and Soviet policy
toward Western Europe has seemed to be designed to enhance Soviet influence
without arousing alarm in the United States or among our European allies.
In Asia and elsewhere, a reality has been the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Particularly difficult from the Soviet standpoint has been the improve-
ment in U.S.-PRC relations. The Soviets would logically view any overt
11.S.-PRC military collaboration as increasing the threat to them.
Conversely, the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere could be made considerably
more difficult by any significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Despite
Lhe past intensity of the dispute, the Soviets have substantial incentives
to seek such a rapprochement, as a method of enhancing their security in
The Far East and easing their problems in the Communist movement.
To the extent that the past is a guide to the future, the Soviets
Jre likely to regard the Third World as a primary arena tor competition
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both with the West and with China. The growth of their strategic and
conventional forces will give them more room for maneuver in support
of their clients and in attempting to intimidate neutrals and friends
of the United States. The question is how far the Soviet leadership is
prepared to go in exercising the options that its newly developed capa-
bilities provide. Clearly, there are dangers in challenging the United
States directly in such critical areas as Europe, the Middle East or
Asia. However, despite an apparent desire, thus far, to minimize the
risk of a direct military confrontation with the United States, they
have not been willing to exercise notable restraint in all areas of the
Third World. Their use of Cuban forces as surrogates in Angola introduced
a disturbing new dimension to their methods of operations.
There seems little prospect for significant change in Soviet policies
affecting U.S. security interests, even were there to be a change in
Soviet leadership. Soviet military budgets seem likely to remain high
and to increase in real terms. The options and opportunities that the
resulting military capabilities will provide the USSR over the next few
years will enhance its ability to counteract Western political-military
capabilities and to exploit opportunities almost anywhere in the world.
In such a situation, U.S. security objectives toward the USSR should
be to have sufficient military capabilities to:
-- deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on the United
States, its allies, and countries important to us, and to be capable
of protecting their territorial and political integrity should deterrence
fail;
-- deter and to offset the expansion of Soviet power and influence
in areas important to the United States;
-- reduce areas of tension that risk U.S.-Soviet conflict, while
improving mechanisms for maintaining stability and control should a
crisis develop;
limit, and if possible reduce, Soviet-U.S. arms competition;
and
-- encourage constructive Soviet collaboration on such international
problems as arms control, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and Law of
the Sea that affect our mutual security interests.
American policy toward the USSR in support of these objectives has
several distinct elements. They should include:
-- maintaining a strong national and collective allied defense
that can discourage Soviet adventurism or if need be respond to efforts
at coercion, either overt or tacit, on the part of the Soviets and their
allies;
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-- encouraging negotiation to settle outstanding differences and
to reduce tensions;
- pursuing arms control initiatives to enhance stability in the
military balance and improve crisis control;
-- seeking, where appropriate, bilateral and multilateral agreements
of mutual interest.
The emphasis given to any one of these elements of policy will vary
with circumstances and the degree to which it is seen to be contributing
to overall U.S. objectives.
C. U.S. Regional and Functional Security Interests and Objectives
While some U.S. security interests and objectives, particularly
those concerned with strategic nuclear arms control, will be pursued in
a bilateral U.S.-Soviet context, most will involve close interaction
with U.S. allies and friendly governments. In the sections that follow,
the nature of U.S. interests, objectives and policies are examined by
region. There are, in addition, functional elements of U.S. security
policy such as arms and technology transfer, arms control and non-
proliferation that have foreign policy implications of global rather
than specific regional nature. They are discussed throughout the chapter.
1. Europe
The fundamental U.S. security interest in Europe is to maintain
Western European strength and deny the Soviets any ability to control or
coerce Western Europe, either by military occupation, intimidation, or
manipulation of domestic political or economic forces in Western European
states.
Major U.S. security objectives in Europe include:
- to maintain the military capability, conventional and nuclear,
necessary for deterrence and the defense of Western Europe;
to promote the continued cohesion and development of NATO;
- to encourage a major contribution to the NATO collective defense
by the Western European states, and ensure that European and U.S. defense
efforts are complementary and effective;
-- to encourage the continued growth of strong, popularly supported
national states in Western Europe which, are collectively capable of
resisting Soviet pressures, and prevent growth of Soviet or local communist
influence;
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-- to encourage political, economic, and security cooperation
among Western European states and between them and the United States;
-- to seek to reduce tension in Europe that might lead to conflict,
and encourage various negotiations which could enhance stability in the
East-West military relationship with undimished security.
The overall U.S. security relationship to Europe will continue to
be governed largely by NATO treaty obligations. In our European security
policy, we must seek to balance the fundamental NATO relationship with
the emergence of new areas of European cooperation in the defense field.
A variety of proposals and efforts toward European defense cooperation
were put forth or attempted in the 1950's and early 1960's. More recently,
as our European allies have grown stronger, they have attempted some
improvement in and coordination of their defense efforts. However,
progress has been slow and the problems involved in developing effective
regional defense arrangements remain formidable. The United States has
adopted essentially an attitude of support toward such recent cooperative
efforts. However, overall U.S. support for European integration has
been predicated on the assumption that defense would and should continue
to be handled within the NATO framework.
A European defense entity seems not to be a near-term prospect.
But we have encouraged Western Europeans to explore possibilities of a
greater degree of defense cooperation among themselves. In the long
run it would be healthier for Europe and for the U.S. relationship with
Europe if Western Europeans developed a stronger defense capability.
Given the importance of Central Europe to the defense of NATO, the
Federal Republic of Germany is a principal geographic focus of NATO
strategy. For many years the United States has had a close relationship
with the Federal Republic in the military field, which reflects not only
its critical geographic location but also the economic and military
capabilities it can bring to bear on the task of defending Europe. The
Germans, of course, see the U.S.-FRG relationship as a crucial guarantee
of their security, bilaterally and in the alliance context.
France withdrew from the NATO military structure in 1966. However
sensible the subsequent low-key but useful pattern of ad hoc French
cooperation with NATO, it is highly desirable over the longer term that
members who benefit from the alliance so directly make a full contribution
to its strength.
Since the Defense Review of late 1974-early 1975, the British have
undertaken additional budgetary reductions. By 1979-80, British forces
will be virtually non-existent east of Suez (Hong Kong is an exception),
British capabilities to deploy and reinforce in the Mediterranean will
be vastly diminished, and Britain's overall quick reinforcement forces --
both manpower and transport capability -- will be dramatically cut back,
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severely limiting Britain's ability to show force on either of NATO's
Flanks, or in the Middle East or Persian Gulf. Britain's formal contribution
to the Central Front, for the present, continues undiminished.
Whether or not the Southern Flank continues to be politically
unstable, the United States will want to work closely with its allies to
ensure necessary cooperation in dealing with Middle East crises. It
should now be clear to all NATO allies that events can and do occur
outside of the NATO area which directly affect the nations of the Alliance.
It is imperative that the divisions apparent in the October war of 1973
do not recur in any future crises.
Portugal is effectively firming up its ties to NATO. If political
progress in Spain continues as it has over the past year, the prospects
of its future membership in NATO would seem good. The United States must
continue to support its eventual entry into the alliance. The question
of possible Communist participation in some allied governments remains a
serious problem. Only those seemingly willing to grant Communism moral
parity with freedom can ignore the speed with which communist campaign
promises can be and are reversed. Only those who ignore the impossible
problem of having nations with whom we are engaged in a most intimate
security relationship, involving the sharing of substantial national
security information, can be unconverned with the evolving election
pattern in some NATO nations. The fact is that in such an alliance, the
inclusion of communists in the government of a member nation, over time,
is incompatible with our security interests.
3oth the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus war and the recent "Cod War"
between Iceland and the UK have underlined the difficulties of NATO, as
an organization, assisting effectively in resolving conflicts among
NATO's members. NATO's role in seeking to bring Greece and Turkey
closer together may be limited largely to offering a forum for bilateral
reconciliation, and the exercise of moral suasion and good offices. At
the same time, NATO faces a number of problems and decisions that have
their roots, directly or indirectly, in the Greek-Turkish relationship.
The difficulties concerning Greece and Turkey, however, do not alter
their strategic importance. It is important for the defense of Europe,
for NATO, and for the long-term interests of the two nations that both
remain on the Western side and continue to participate in European
defense.
On the northern flank, Norway's strategic position remains important
both to the defense of Central Europe and to the balance of power in the
Atlantic. There have been conflicting Soviet and Norwegian claims to the
Arctic seabed, and a buildup of Soviet forces along this flank. Norway
cannot meet the threat on its own.
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2. East Asia
The fundamental U.S. security interest in East Asia is to ensure
that the area will not be dominated by any country or combination of
countries hostile to the United States. The elements which compose the
Asian balance are multiple and fluid, reflecting the complex relations
among the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. The threats
to the current stability are diverse -- ranging from the possibility of
armed attack across an established frontier in Korea to adventures in
Southeast Asia, supported in varying degrees by some of the Communist
nations of Asia. The present situation, however, is not unfavorable:
Sino-Soviet rivalry persists; Japan remains allied to the United States
and threatening to no country; the non-Communist nations of Southeast
Asia are developing a degree of national resilience and regional cohesion
to the point where they may not be readily susceptible to outside mani-
pulation. But the leadership adjustments in China, North-South tension
in Korea, and the uncertain policies of Vietnam constitute uncertainties
that could have a major -- yet unpredictable -- impact on East Asia.
U.S. policy, including a strong military position in the Western Pacific
and the maintenance of existing security commitments there, will be an
important factor in preserving peace and stability in the area, although
the future will also depend on a number of factors which are not directly
under U.S. control.
Aside from its formidable military capabilities against China, the
Soviet Union can pose a significant nuclear and a limited naval threat
throughout the Pacific; the USSR also possesses a limited capability
for combined conventional operations against Japan. The Soviet capacity
to utilize force to promote political objectives in the area is currently
severely limited by the continuing U.S. military presence in the area,
by the Sino-Soviet dispute, and by its lack of political resonance
among the non-Communist nations of East and Southeast Asia. The forward
presence of U.S. conventional forces thus plays an important role as
the source of psychological and political reassurance necessary to
avert intimidation. The maintenance of Pacific-based strategic nuclear
forces serves a similar function in providing evidence of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella.
a. China
The United States has a basic security interest in building
constructive political and economic ties with China, even as we continue
to seek to lessen tensions with the USSR.
Basic U.S. security objectives in pursuit of these interests are:
to counter attempts by any single nation to dominate the
Asian-Pacific area;
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-- to implement the declared U.S. intent to normalize relations
with the People's Republic of China, while protecting U.S. interests in
a peaceful settlement of the problem of Taiwan;
-- to encourage Chinese cooperation in promoting stability in
the area, including Korea and Southeast Asia; and
-- to maintain a military posture in the Pacific which will con-
tribute to stability in the area over the longer term.
China has now entered the post-Mao era, and the present leadership
in Peking has indicated that China's foreign policy will not change.
The fundamental characteristics of Chinese foreign policy seem likely
to persist, including a deep suspicion of the USSR that influences
China's view of the U.S. role in the world. While China will probably
continue to have a basic foreign policy objective of countering the
threat from the USSR, some readjustments in their relationship, for
example, a lessening of border tension, could take place. Such develop-
ments might or might not require adjustment in the U.S. posture.
Yet in planning we must also hedge against the possibility of a future
deterioration in U.S.-PRC relations, for differences persist between
the U.S. and PRC outlook in policy and ideology.
b. Japan
The United States seeks to preserve and strengthen its partner-
ship in all fields with Japan, our most important Asian ally. The
U.S.-Japanese alliance is not only a central pillar of Japanese
foreign policy, it is a crucial element in the stability achieved in
Northeast Asia, and contributes significantly to the maintenance of
peace and security in the region and worldwide. The alliance thus
serves fundamental U.S. interests.
Despite the modest size of its existing defense forces, Japan's
economic power and political influence make it a key factor in the
East Asian political and security situation. In dealing with Japan
in the security field, it is important that we display strength and
steadiness, and that we act only with appropriate sensitivity to
Japanese concerns.
In broad terms, United States security objectives vis-a-vis
Japan are:
-- to ensure Japan's security against nuclear threats and to
cooperate with Japan under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty in
defending against potential conventional threats. In fulfilling that
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objective, the United States should continue to encourage Japan to
improve the capabilities of its forces for the defense of its territory;
-- to encourage -- through close consultations -- compatibility
and complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and
doctrines;
-- to avoid policies and actions which would undermine Japanese
confidence in our bilateral relationship, and in general to demonstrate
to Japan -- through consultation, a sensitivity to its concerns, and
steadiness in our own policies -- U.S. strength and reliability, as an
ally and a stabilizing force in East Asia.
C. Korea
The U.S. interests in Korea derive from our historic commitment
to the independence and security of the Republic of Korea (ROK), its
geographic location, the concern of the other major Asian powers over
events there, and the fact that developments in Korea could significantly
affect our relations with these powers. U.S. security objectives
include the following:
-- to deter conflict in Korea, while seeking a political resolution
of the Korean problem; and
-- to help the ROK to strengthen its deterrent through assistance
to ROK development of its economic and military strength and self-reliance.
Our ability to pursue these objectives is constrained by a number
of factors. North Korean intransigence and Sino-Soviet rivalry make a
political settlement negotiated by the two Koreas unpromising.
In pursuit of these objectives we and the ROK have made clear to
North Korea and the PRC our readiness to dissolve the UN Command
provided North Korea gives reliable assurances that the existing
Armistice Agreement will remain valid, or to replace the existing
Armistice Agreement with mutually acceptable permanent arrangements
to keep the peace and ease tensions in the Peninsula. The United States
has also urged resumption of the South-North dialogue, expressed a readiness
to open relations with North Korea if the Communist powers are prepared
to take similar, reciprocal steps toward the ROK, and supported UN membership
for both the ROK and North Korea on a provisional basis, pending progress
toward unification.
The ROK, in pursuit of greater self sufficiency, has made notable
economic and military progress, with U.S. support. It has emerged as a
strong middle-level economic partner of the United States while assuming
the main burden of its defense. U.S. military assistance to the ROK is
now on a credit rather than grant basis, and the ROK has planned -- and
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:s financing with its own resources -- an extensive five-year military
Vorce Improvement Program. The continued modernization of ROK forces
Alould allow us the eventual option of a further reduction of U.S.
j:orces in Korea. However, the appropriate level of our forces will
continue to be a function of the nature and magnitude of the North
Korean threat, the ability of the ROK to meet that threat, and the
prevailing international situation.
Southeast Asia and Oceania
The United States continues to have formal defense relationships
with the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and with Thailand
through the 1954 Manila Pact. We have contributed to regional stability
following the fall of South Vietnam by assisting friends and allies.
specifically, U.S. objectives are to:
-- encourage regional stability which will preserve the independence
of countries friendly to the United States;
provide material support to allies and friends; and
-- maintain access for ourselves and our allies to vital lines of
communication through the area.
Mvents in Southeast Asia are less likely than in the past two
decades to have a major impact on the major power alignments. Except for
China, whose capability to project military force outside its own borders
remains limited, the area is remote from the major powers. The principal
potential threat to stability comes from Vietnam, whose military power
has grown and whose attitude toward its neighbors remains unclear. The
other countries of the area, to one degree or another, are seeking to
adjust their relations with one another, as well as with the major
powers, in an effort to preserve their independence and security.
Those countries friendly to the United States acknowledge the value
of a continuing presence of American forces on the periphery of Southeast
Asia (e.g., in the Philippines) to lend substance to our contribution to
the regional balance. The basic task is to relate U.S. political,
economic and limited security assistance programs to the efforts of
friendly regional states to build stable societies capable of withstanding
Internal security threats and to maintain essential base rights and
facilities that make possible fulfillment of a responsible regional role.
U.S. air and naval bases in the Philippines are important in this
respect. In addition to fulfilling a defensive mission for the Philippines,
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they provide the capability to monitor and if necessary defend the lines
of communication through the area. Moreover, facilities in the Philippines
are the southern anchor of the U.S. forward military position in the
western Pacific; as such they help reassure friends and remind adversaries
of the U.S. determination to play a role in Asian security.
We have fundamental interests in preserving the military balance in
the South Pacific, in supporting key relationships with Australia and
New Zealand and in ensuring that Micronesia does not come under the
domination or excessive influence of an outside power.
4. Middle East - North Africa
Fundamental U.S. interests in the Middle East include:
continuing progress toward a Middle East peace settlement;
-- uninterrupted access to Middle East oil and gas resources by
the United States, and especially by Western Europe and Japan, at acceptable
prices;
-- use of international waterways and airspace on a non-discriminatory
basis; and
establishment of internationally recognized borders.
Major security objectives in the Middle East and North Africa include:
-- preventing the spread of Soviet or Soviet-supported radical
influence in the area;
-- not permitting the military balance to become adverse to
Israel, while encouraging progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement;
-- continuing and expanding constructive relations with all
Middle East states, including the major oil producing countries;
-- reducing potential causes of major power confrontation in the
area; and
-- encouraging regional stability and promoting cooperation among
the states of the area.
Several factors constrain the U.S. ability to protect these interests:
- intra-regional tensions: the Arab-Israeli conflict and intra-
Arab rivalries jeopardize U.S. interests, and offer the USSR opportunities
for exploitation at U.S. expense;
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the growth or Soviet military power: its presence in the
region increases the possibility of confrontation between the super-
powers; and
-- different perceptions between the United States and its major
allies: occasional differences on how to protect common Middle East
interests constrain U.S. freedom of action.
Security assistance and development of cooperative military relations
between the United States and friendly states of the area, and among
each other, will continue to make a contribution to the:
-- maintenance of regional military balances between contending
states create a situation of mutual deterrence;
-- development of reliable friendly forces (for example, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Morocco) capable of contributing to regional order and
deterring or combating outside intervention.
Given the reality of the local arms competition and, given that the
United States is certainly not the only arms supplier, the intensity and
character of the competition is not subject to U.S. control as such.
The Soviets, other Western countries and even Third World countries are
sources of arms for the contending states. In addition, certain countries
have a greater indigenous military production capability than others.
These are obstacles to cooperation in controlling the overall flow of
arms to the area. It will continue to be important, therefore, to
encourage forms of regional cooperation in political, economic and
military affairs that will reduce local tensions and contain any ex-
pansionary ambitions.
5. Latin America
U.S. interests in Latin America are both political and economic
although there are important strategic interests with respect to lines
of communication, particularly for oil, and access to critical mineral
resources. There are few contingencies, however, that might impose a
substantial requirement for U.S. forces.
U.S. security objectives in these areas include:
-- monitoring, and
communication, such as in
-- deterring, and if
hostile to us in countries
intervention would be seen
if necessary defending, certain key lines of
the Caribbean and the Panama Canal;
necessary blocking, intervention by nations
important to our security or where such
as affecting the major power balance; and
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-- supporting allies and countries friendly to the United States
to encourage stability through regional balances.
The United States has important interests in these areas. We
can anticipate continuing Soviet attempts to expand its influence in
Latin America. However, these countries, because of their complexity,
diversity and nationalistic sentiment, have not been easily manipulated.
This is not to say that threats to U.S. security might not arise in
Latin America. The future status and security of the Panama Canal, Cuba's
potential for subversion and intervention, and the persistence of
possibly troublesome regional rivalries are serious problems.
The roles for U.S. forces in these areas could include monitoring
and, if necessary, defense of key lines of communication, reassurance to
U.S. friends, and deterrence of hostile intervention in areas we deem
important.
6. South Asia - Africa
As in the case of Latin America, U.S. interests in South Asia and Africa
are primarily political and economic, with strategic interests limited
to lines of communication (LOC).
U.S. security objectives in South Asia and Africa include:
monitoring and, if necessary, defending key LOC; and
-- supporting friendly countries by diplomatic and economic means
to encourage stability and to assist them in being less susceptible to
Soviet or other influences hostile to Western interests.
The immense social and economic problems of these areas will continue
to create conditions of local disorder and tension, which will be both
disruptive in themselves and may offer opportunities for exploitation by
the Soviet Union or other countries hostile to the United States.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The size and composition of the U.S. defense posture depends to an
important degree on the role the United States may wish to play in
contributing to international peace and stability.
A. The Problem of Vulnerability
That Americans have been forced to play an active and leading part
in international affairs does not come from a lust for profits or world
domination. Nor has it been an accident or an aberration. The role has
been inescapable in part because the United States itself has become
increasingly vulnerable to direct attack by intercontinental and sea-
based ballistic missiles. This new vulnerability has led to the con-
clusion that the United States must be concerned about the outside world,
if for no other reason than to minimize conflicts of interest with the
Soviet Union and discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which
could increase still further our potential vulnerability.
B. The Problem of Power
Another reason for the U.S. role is the power potential of the
United States -- so much the product of the energy, imagination, and
freedom of its citizens, the richness of its resources, its continental
size, and the dynamism of its market economy. Such power acts as a
magnet on those who wish us ill as well as on those who seek support and
protection. As the years immediately preceding our involvement in the
last two world wars demonstrated, this magnetic attraction, among other
factors, made it impossible for us to stay aloof from what had begun as
the quarrels of others.
C. The Problem of Interdependence
Since those days, U.S. involvement with the rest of the world has
become even more intimate. By any measure, our external interests are
larger and growing. Interdependence has become something more than a
slogan, even though the United States continues to remain relatively
more self-sufficient than most other nations. This interdependence is
heightened by those who, with close ties to other countries, expect the
United States to interest itself in the circumstances of the homelands
they have left (as in the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus)
and to protect them individually in their many overseas enterprises.
D. The Problem of Superpower Status
There is the further fact that the United States, by reason of its
energy and accomplishments, belongs to an exclusive group. It is one of
only two military superpowers. The Soviet Union, with a GNP much smaller
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than that of the United States, a weaker technological base, and an
inefficient civil economy, has lifted itself to this status by dint of
large allocations of resources to its military and the imposition of
sacrifices on its citizens. As a consequence, it has become a formidable
power. If the United States were to retire from the world stage, or
decide to play only a minor role, there would be no counterbalance to
the USSR. Few would suggest that given the magnitude of Soviet power --
and the absence of the United States as a counterweight -- the Soviet
Union would long be restrained from expanding its influence. Western
Europe and the Far East would be susceptible to domination. The world-
wide effects of a U.S. retreat would be politically, economically,
militarily, and psychologically disastrous.
E. The Weakening of the Old Order
If such a forecast seems to place an undue burden on the United
States and exaggerate its responsibility for world order, we must
remember how much has changed since World War II. Our friends in
Europe, while vital to the United States and contributing in essential
ways to collective security, are no longer playing the parts on the
world scene to which they and we had become accustomed for so long.
Understandably, their old empires are gone, and with their breakup has
vanished what authority and order they imposed on large parts of the
world. The imperial policemen have left their beats and the increased
disorder, now so evident, is one legacy of their departure.
Only forty years ago, the idea that Great Britain, France, and
Germany combined could not contain the Soviet Union would have seemed
ludicrous. Now, no one believes that they can. Furthermore, in the
absence of a strong united Europe, the United States has lost the
luxury of time in which to mobilize its forces, adapt its industry to
war production, learn from the mistakes of others, and support others in
conflict as the great arsenal and reinforcement of freedom and self-
determination.
F. Leadership
History has now cast the United States in a role of world leader-
ship -- a role which requires military power to accompany justice -- a
role which requires large, ready forces and places the United States in
the frontline rather than in the rear of freedom's defense. The emblem
of the American eagle, with an olive branch in one talon and a sheaf of
arrows in the other, has become fully symbolic of our role.
To have history push us center stage does not mean we are left
without choices. For thirty years, however, we have assumed in our
planning, and we continue to assume, that the United States will not
shrink from world leadership. There are a number of reasons for this
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assumption. Historically, we have found that a relatively passive role
not only left the initiative in the hands of others, but also resulted
in losses which later had to be recovered at a tragic cost in lives and
treasure. In today's world, a passive role would imply that initiatives
taken by others could not be harmful. Yet there is no evidence to show
that if we fail to protect our interests, others could or would do it
for us.
It was argued before Pearl Harbor that if only the United States
stood on the sidelines. Hitler and Stalin would eventually destroy one
another, after which we could help our friends in Europe to pick up the
pieces. However, the nation did not believe we could take the risk of
leaving to others the settlement of a conflict so decisive to the future
of western civilization. Ultimately, the decision was made to play an
active role in both war and peace, to help shape events in directions
favorable to the United States, even though the costs of doing 4o would
prove great.
C. The Risks of Retrenchment
Despite this, we still hear echoes of the old plea for passivity in
the assertion that if only we would exercise restraint, the Soviets
would reciprocate and follow suit. Unfortunately. the evidence on
Soviet behavior points in the opposite direction. The reality is that
the interests of the United States stretch beyond our shores, and a
reduction of our commitments while maintaining equal security and well-
being would lead to significantly higher, not lower, defense costs.
In the present situation, there is no serious way to maintain U.S.
security at diminishing cost. To be sure, we could redefine major U.S.
security commitments, reduce the U.S. defense perimeter accordingly, and
turn our back on some of the larger contingencies that now concern us.
But the burden of proof for the safety of such a retrenchment must lie
with its proponents. Certain questions in particular would require
answers:
-- Do they believe (and if so, on what grounds) that a major
reduction in U.S. commitments would in any way lessen the U.S. need for
strategic nuclear forces?
-- Do they believe that the vacuum caused by a U.S. withdrawal
from its obligations in Europe, the Middle East, or the Western Pacific
would or could be filled adequately by our former allies in default of
superpower backing and support?
-- Do they believe that the prospects for nuclear proliferation
would be reduced by a lessening of our relationshin with South Korea,
the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Iran?
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-- Do they believe that the Soviet Union is so benign and modest in
its interests that it would not be tempted at some point to fill the vacuum
we would have created, with subsequent and adverse effects on international
stability?
-- Do they believe that a momentum would not be created, with the
effect of reducing the national security of the United States, unless
U.S. defense costs were raised considerably higher than they are now?
-- Do they really believe that the world is so divided into
watertight compartments, that the loss of one or two major compartments
would have no consequences for the others?
For those who fear that world commitments and the defense posture
necessary to our security could tempt U.S. leaders to play the world's
policeman, a moment with the realities of history should be somewhat re-
assuring. First, we have never aspired to that role. Second, history
suggests that our part in the dramas of the past has been limited,
despite the pleas of friends and the challenges of foes. Yes, in some
instances, we have tried to provide a measure of leadership; we have
tried to assist in replacing the old imperial order with a more democratic
system of international politics; we have tried in a number of instances
to create a measure of order and stability. Above all, we have tried to
contribute to the process of collective security in a volatile and
divided world. We have had a measure of success. I know of no choice
but to continue that effort.
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vii[. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Role of Allies
In the design of u.S. nuclear forces, we assume that any missions
assigned to these forces must be accomplished without external assistance
other than from overseas bases, communications, and intelligence facil-
ities. To say this, however, is not to suggest that we lack interest in
the closest possible coordination with the British and French nuclear
forces. We seek such cooperation at all times.
Our approach is different in the design of our non-nuclear general
purpose forces. For certain major contingencies, such as an attack on
Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact, we assume that our NATO partners will meet
their commitments and that, at a minimum, the forces pledged to the
alliance will become available as scheduled. This assumption materially
reduces the need for U.S. general purpose forces, although we have to
recognize that other non-NATO contingencies might arise in which we
could count only on U.S. forces for the necessary response. We need
only recollect the obstacles the United States encountered in its effort to
resupply Israel during the Middle East war of 1973 to realize that our
major interests and our major regional allies' view of their interests
sometimes diverge.
B. Arms Control
One of our primary objectives in arms control negotiations is
enhanced security through increased stability, preferably at reduced
force levels. We prefer a world in which neither superpower has any
incentive either to attack the other or to strive for a long-term
military advantage. At the same time, we seek to reduce uncertainty
about the future and ease where possible the pressure for growth in the costs
of defense. If security through stability can be achieved by means of
agreements for equitable force reductions, we, of course, support such
agreements.
1. SALT
We must, however, be realistic. So far, arms control successes
have been modest. The ABM Treaty of 1972, with its subsequent modifi-
cation, has somewhat forestalled greater expenditure on the deployment
of ABM systems, reduced uncertainty about the need to counter these
defenses, and perhaps constrained the competition in this area. Con-
ceivably, it has contributed to stability as well, although that is less
certain.
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The Interim Offensive Agreement, which expires in October 1977,
placed a ceiling on the number of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and
thereby reduced one element of uncertainty, during its life. But it has
not lessened the Soviet determination to acquire new strategic offensive
systems and has not appreciably increased stability. The Vladivostok
Understanding of 1974 would represent an improvement over the Interim
Offensive Agreement. But, as yet, it is not clear whether or when a new
treaty which is in the U.S. security interest, will emerge from the
negotiating process.
2. Other Negotiations
The complex multinational negotiations for Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR), with objectives as laudable
as those of SALT, have yet to realize specific results. In MBFR the
United States and the participating NATO allies are negotiating with the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to reduce as well as limit
forces in Central Europe. Although these negotiations have been in
progress for more than three years and NATO has demonstrated its serious-
ness with significant proposals, the Warsaw Pact nations continue to
oppose parity of outcome in the form of a common collective ceiling on
active-duty military manpower. As the MBFR negotiations continue, they
serve as a significant example of the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance
and its ability to coordinate policy on far reaching and complex issues.
Within the last year the United States has successfully negotiated
other agreements, including the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Environmental Modification Treaty,
which has just been opened for signature, and would prohibit "engaging
in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effect." Some
ongoing negotiations, such as on the International Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflict, are also in progress, and there have been preliminary
consultations or technical discussion with other states about possible
future arms control efforts, including chemical weapons, and radio-
logical weapons. Although recent arms control measures have to some
extent imposed restraints, and may help to slow the competitive inter-
action, it would be an exaggeration to claim that existing agreements
have succeeded in these directions.
The United States has conducted and will continue to conduct, its
defense planning strictly within the limits set by existing arms control
treaties and agreements. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will
do the same. But we cannot afford to pretend that current accomplishments
in controlling arms have materially lessened the problems and costs of
prudent force planning or the need to apply ourselves to that planning
with the utmost dedication.
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C. The Requirements of Deterrence
decisive factor in shaping the defense posture is the
concept or deterrence which underlies U.S. force planning. As has been
frequently noted, deterrence is based on the assumption that if a
potential aggressor is confronted with the threat of a sufficiently
severe response, he will be likely to refrain from making his attack.
The fundamental condition of deterrence, therefore, must be the actual
Jltal,:ary capability to implement the threat.
That much is obvious. But deterrence, as we have emphasized over
he years, requires even more than an inventory of forces. The cap-
-Ability itself must be at least as ready as the threat, able to absorb
even a surprise attack by the aggressor and still respond deliberately,
able to penetrate defenses and reach its designated targets, and suffi-
ciently powerful to do the required amount of damage to the target
system.
Furthermore, the threatened penalty must be credible; if challenged,
the United States, and, in certain cases, its allies, must have the evident
resolve to commit the capability to the declared course of action. If
these conditions are not met, there is a risk that an aggressor will
choose either to ignore the threat because he considers it implausible,
or to attack in the hope that he could eliminate our capability as a
preliminary to proceeding with his plans.
Clearly, the U.S. posture depends heavily on the degree to which we
meet these requirements of deterrence. If we were to decide that a
declaratory policy need not coincide with action policy, if we believed
that as a nation and a government we were superb at deception, or if we
would not be disturbed at being caught out in our bluffs, we could con-
ceivably move in one direction. We could try to create the facade of a
defense capability, a military house of cards, accompany it with threats
of mutual disaster, and hope against hope that the deterrent would never
be tested. This is the direction seemingly urged by those who believe
there is a distinction between deterrence and defense.
The other direction -- indeed the only sound direction -- requires
that we design and maintain a defense posture which is credible against
a wide range of challenges. This means that the posture must have a
serious fighting capability that we ourselves believe is responsive and
effective, and that the threats accompanying it do not frighten us more
than they do the potential enemy. We have chosen to go in this latter
direction with our defense posture, although in certain areas progress
has been less than complete.
To arrive at a credible deterrent, whether nuclear or conventional,
we must assume for purposes of planning that deterrence has somehow
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failed, allow a hypothetical attack to take place, and then assess the
effectiveness of various possible defense postures as they absorb and
respond to the attack. If we can design a posture which can credibly
perform its missions under these conditions, we believe we will have
confidence in it, potential enemies will be reluctant to challenge it
even in desperate circumstances -- and deterrence will thereby be
reasonably assured.
D. Contingency Analyses
The tests selected as the basis for designing and assessing the
adequacy of U.S. forces have a major impact on the size and character of
the defense burden we must bear. It is essential, accordingly, to be as
explicit as possible about methodology.
The many contingencies which could arise out of the troubled
international environment provide an ample basis for designing the U.S.
posture. But U.S. forces are not planned on the assumption that we
alone, or the United States even with its allies, must be able to meet
all possible and plausible contingencies simultaneously. Nor is it
assumed, because selected contingencies have been used for the purposes
of designing and testing the U.S. defense posture, that these are the
only contingencies to which U.S. forces can or will be committed.
Contingency analysis is useful because it permits a reasonably
realistic if aggregate method of determining U.S. force needs. It also
provides a way of imposing a measure of control over the total size of
the posture. It is not useful, and is not intended to be useful, as a
forecast of where, when, or how the United States would or should use
the resulting capabilities. Those decisions remain with the President
and the Congress; they are not within the exclusive province of the
Department of Defense. The functions of this Department are limited.
They include:
-- providing the Commander-in-Chief and the Congress with forces
adequate to the security of the United States;
-- advising how to achieve the nation's objectives most effi-
ciently with the military means at our disposal;
operating the forces at his direction.
Discussions of contingency analysis must not be confused with these
realities.
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,, Strategic Concepts
L;. contingency analysis is to serve as a technique for arriving at
and controlling force size and composition, not only must particular
contingencies be selected for analysis; strategic concepts must be
specified as well. Several considerations shape the choice of con-
'7i..ngencies and concepts for use in force planning. The designated
contingencies must entail serious but plausible threats in areas of
ulaior interest to the United States. They must involve a substantial
but realistic commitment -of capabilities by a prospective enemy. And
'They must be genuinely demanding in that the potential attacker has the
titiative, is malevolent (rather than cooperative), and uses the max-
imum of his available capabilities in the most efficient way open to
him. We could, of course, assume a more cooperative enemy who would
1Pad to our strengths. But that is not what war and its deterrence are
about. Persumably, a serious antagonist will do his best to prevail,
and we have to allow for that possibility.
The Nuclear Contingencies
We must obviously look at a number of contingencies in the course
of designing the U.S. defense posture because of variations in geography,
distances, climate, and possible opponents. But for the purpose of
translating military requirements into a specific force size and com-
position, we focus on a limited number of cases. In the design of U.S.
lrrategic nuclear forces, three main contingencies are considered:
-- a surprise attack by the Soviet strategic offensive forces
against U.S. retaliatory capabilities postured in their regular day-to-
day alert status;
a surprise Soviet attack against what is called a U.S. gene-
rated alert posture -- that is, a posture which has more bombers on
alert and SLBMs at sea because of a deteriorating international situation;
-- and what amounts to a sequential PRC-Soviet attack against a
U.S. generated alert posture.
A number of other contingencies are also analyzed, not so much to
derive the basic U.S. force structure as to determine whether the three
base cases have demanded sufficient size and flexibility in that structure
to deal with dangerous "off-design" possibilities.
2. The Conventional Contingencies
The contingencies to which the most attention is given in con-
sidering the design of the general purpose forces are also three in
number:
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-- an attack by the Warsaw Pact, starting at the conventional
level, on the three main fronts of NATO;
-- an attack on South Korea by North Korean forces, which could
be supported by the PRC or the USSR, or both;
-- and what in the past has been described as a lesser contingency
such as might arise in the Caribbean or the Middle East, and initially
involve U.S. but not Soviet forces. During the 1960s, a war at sea was
also examined as a separate contingency. Today, however, maritime
campaigns are treated as parts of the other contingencies.
Because the variety of non-nuclear contingencies is so great, it is
particularly important to test our posture in a number of "off-design"
cases. A conflict in the Persian Gulf is an example of a case, which
could make demands on the U.S. posture not brought out by any of the
base cases. Force planning must analyze the implications of this kind
of sequencing, and possible Soviet reactions in the immediate area and
elsewhere, so as to permit judgments about the insurance to maintain
against its possible occurrence and demands.
It has long been recognized that if the U.S. defense posture were
designed to deal simultaneously with all the contingencies that could
occur around the world, the defense budget would rapidly absorb a much
larger portion of the Gross National Product. If allied forces were not
included in the calculation of requirements for general purpose forces,
the demand would be greater still. Even when analysis is limited to a
small number of cases for force planning purposes, and allies are taken
into account where appropriate, the demands become substantial. In
order to place a ceiling on these demands, and at the same time to make
a rough statement of the risks run with the posture, a strategic concept
is developed. In essence, it dictates the number of base or realistic
contingencies for which the United States should be simultaneously
prepared.
3. The Planning Concepts
Strategic nuclear force planning deals only with the case of a
Soviet surprise attack on U.S. day-to-day alert forces. The assumption
is that a U.S. posture configured to deter this contingency should be
able to handle other nuclear contingencies (including a PRC attack),
provided that we had received strategic warning and gone to a generated
alert. Where general purpose forces are concerned, the U.S. posture
is planned on the assumption that, in conjunction with our allies, we
must be able to respond to one major contingency (with Europe and Korea
as the two test cases) preceded by a minor contingency (such as a con-
flict in the Middle East not involving Soviet forces).
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There are circumstances in which a strategic nuclear posture con-
servatively designed to absorb a massive surprise attack and strike back
could fall below the planned level of effectiveness. A successful
Soviet damage-limiting program could produce such a relative failure.
Even a conservatively designed general purpose force posture based on
the current strategic concept could be stretched to the breaking point
if two major contingencies were to arise more or less simultaneously, as
they did in World War II. In the past, the strategic concept required
the capability (which included the high-priority reserves) to deal
simultaneously with two major contingencies and one minor contingency.
Since 1969, however, planning for force sizing has assumed that the
Sino-Soviet split would preclude the need for the United States to be
prepared at all times to fight a conventional two-front war on the
ground.
Whether that assumption continues to be valid is an issue which
deserves continuing review. Some slight modification in the concept has
already, in practice, occurred. For the most part, active forces are
relied upon for planning an initial defense. And it has been concluded
that positions of deployed strength in both Europe and Northeast Asia
should be maintained. Thus, even in the event of a war in Europe, the
United States would attempt to hold a forward defense line in Asia
anchored by our Pacific base system in Japan and elsewhere in the area.
A case can be made for going still further in this direction, even
with a continuation of the Sino-Soviet split. The alternative of
moving toward a less ambitious strategic concept is not as persuasive at
this time. Modifications of the strategic concept, because of the force
planning approach, could have an impact on the U.S. defense posture, as
was demonstrated in 1969. But hardly anyone now denies that the United
States should have the capability to resist an attack on Europe in
conjunction with its allies. And the volatile state of the world,
combined with the nature of U.S. interests, still make it prudent to
have the capability to respond simultaneously to one other contingency
of a smaller scale. Even U.S. overseas deployments are becoming increas-
ingly difficult to modify in light of the need both for deterrent forces
in place and for rapid-reaction capabilities in an emergency. In fact,
one of the criticisms made of the U.S. reply to the Mayaguez seizure in
1975 was that we had not maintained sufficient quick-response forces
deployable in the vicinity of Cambodia.
While strategic concepts can be changed, with implications for the
U.S. posture and the risks we run in the world, the process should not
be arbitrary. Those who believe that the current U.S. defense posture
is excessively large or even counter-productive should demonstrate where
and why they would change the assumptions underlying it. I do not see
any basis for a reduction.
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The selection of planning contingencies and the determination of
strategic concepts permit the specific analysis of hypothetical campaigns
and the derivation of the forces needed by the United States to maintain
the conditions of national security. Two features of this approach
deserve reiteration and re-emphasis.
-- First, although the process of force planning requires a
simulation of military engagements, whether through field exercises or
war games of various kinds, the purpose of the approach is to ensure the
maintenance of peace through deterrence and stability.
-- Second, although quite specific contingencies are used as the
basis for generating the U.S. defense posture, the resulting forces are
not tied to these particular contingencies, except insofar as they are
deployed to a particular theater or committed annually to an alliance.
The fact that the European contingency dominates U.S. defense planning
and generates the bulk of the general purpose force requirements does
not mean that these forces can and should be used only in the defense of
NATO. Once generated, they are available for commitment as the President
and the Congress so direct. It is on this basis that the determination
of detailed force requirements proceeds.
4. Future Planning
The current planning approach still does not come to grips adequately
with an emerging nuclear problem. This year, as in the past, the
Defense Report uses the terms strategic and theater to describe U.S.
nuclear forces, and treats these forces as having separable roles in the
arsenal of deterrence. However, there are several reasons why, in the
future, we should be cautious of this nomenclature and consider all the
nuclear forces as constituting a continuum of capabilities.
The first reason is that there is no clear distinction between
strategic and theater (or tactical) nuclear forces. For some years, the
Soviets have based variable-range ICBMs in their medium-range sites.
Now, with the prospective deployment of the SS-X-20 missile and the
deployment of the Backfire bomber, they have introduced a further element
of ambiguity as to the range capabilities and missions of their various
nuclear forces. The United States, for its part, has forward-deployed
various systems capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union (carrier-
based aircraft, for example).
The second reason is that aircraft and missiles designed to perform
deep missions, and attack what used to be called strategic targets, may
not necessarily have the decisive role in nuclear warfare currently
attributed to them. The outcome of a nuclear conflict, as has been the
case in more traditional warfare, could depend on an ability as much to
hold or occupy territory as to destroy specific targets.
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The third reason is a function of the first two. Important systems
such as the SS-X-20 do not fall neatly into one or the other of the two
current arms control categories of central or non-central systems. Yet
they could play an important role in a nuclear conflict. If arms control
negotiations are to reduce the probability of nuclear war over time, it
seems likely that they must at some point, in some manner, take into
account these "gray area" systems, regardless of where they are based or
what targets they can attack.
Cruise missiles are particularly difficult to classify. They are
applicable to many missions. They can be launched from aircraft, land
launchers, ships and submarines -- with nuclear or conventional warheads
-- in strategic, theater and antiship operations. The development
program being pursued has focused on cruise missiles in the following
categories:
air launched strategic nuclear;
land launched theater nuclear;
ship launched theater nuclear, and non-nuclear antiship;
submarine launched strategic and theater nuclear, and non-
nuclear antiship.
Improved cruise missiles would be consistent with a mix of large-
deck and smaller carriers in the 1990s. A broad spectrum of shallow and
deep interdiction targets in a theater could be attacked by cruise
missiles with several different launch modes. In the longer term, as
terminal guidance systems are developed, many "strategic" targets could
be attacked with conventionally armed cruise missiles. In the nearer
future, a long-range air-launched cruise missile will constitute the
most efficient way to maintain the utility of the B-52 force.
Cruise missiles may be tempting candidates for arms control, but
because of their versatility and the verification issues they raise,
considerable caution needs to be exercised in how they are treated
within the framework of SALT.
Cruise missiles raise management issues as well. Precisely because
of their versatility and efficiency, they cut across traditional mission
boundaries and challenge familiar weapon systems. Central supervision
of their development may be necessary both to realize their promise and
to ensure the caution necessary in arms control discussions of the
future.
The classifications of strategic, tactical, or antiship used in
Section II of this Report will probably require change as cruise missile
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technology evolves. Tomahawk is a case in point. It is being developed
for several different roles. Current efforts are directed toward develop-
ing an antiship version of the missile with a conventional warhead and a
land attack version with a nuclear warhead. Maritime platforms currently
being planned for conventional Tomahawk deployment are attack submarines
and some surface ships. The missile is also designed to be compatible
with aircraft. Combatants would carry a mix of Harpoon and Tomahawk
missiles, with Tomahawk providing greater lethality against major Soviet
combatants and a longer range strike capability.
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LX:. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
The first task in U.S. force planning is the design of the U.S.
strategic nuclear posture. At this time and for the foreseeable future,
only strategic nuclear forces, particularly those or the Soviet Union,
can directly threaten the safety and the survival of the United States
TABLE IX-1
U.S. AND USSR STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
OFFENSIVE
IEBM LAUNCHERS
ENO FY 1976
END FY 1977
U.S.
USSR
U.S.
USSR
OPERATIONAL
1054
1550
1054
1450
OTHERS
0
0
0
0
SLBM LAUNCHERS
OPERATIONAL 1.2.4f
656
800
656
800
OTHERS
ONG-RANGE BOMBERSil
OPERATIONAL V
419
187
418
212
OTHERSiV
184
166
1841/
153
'()RCE LOADINGS1/
WEAPONS
5330
3270
8402
4110
HEFENSIVE3./
;AA DEFENSE
SURVEILLANCE RADARS
59
6500
59
6970
INTERCEPTORS:LW
416
2590
341
2540
SAM LAUNCHERS!!!
9720
9650
DEFENSE
LAUNCHERS
64
64
V Includes ontine missile launchers as well as those in thrlinal stages of contraction. in
cvathaul. repair, conversion and modernization.
1/Does not include test and training launchers. hut, Inr the USSR, don include launchers
at test ranges which are probably part at the operational force.
1,/ Includes launchers on all nuclearipowered submarines and, for the Soviets, operational
1,unchers for modern SLOMs on GiClass diesel subrnarines.
yin following long-range bombers are placed in this allegory: for the U.S.: 8-52s, F8-111
and 8-1; faith. USSR: Be.,, Bison. Backfire. F11111 does not lit the SALT definition of
,tateac nuclear rim very vehicle
1/ Includes deployed. stake -configured, aircraft only.
.J111 ,For the U.S., includes bombers for ROTHE and in reserve, mothballs and storage. For the
USSR. includes all variants of Beer, Bison and Backfire (raners, ASW. trainers, reconnaissance.
eic.) wherever located.
2,1 Reptevants the maximum number of airuslt assuming no cannibalization.
yTotal force loadings reflect ooly those independently-atonable weapons associated with on-hoe
1t1.13Ms/SLBMs and 00 aircraft. Weapons reserved for mural end weapons on inactive status
we nor included.
/Excludes radars end launchers at test sites sir outside CONUS.
LINTIsese numbers renewal Teal Active Inventory (TA!).
11,/ These launchers accommodate about 12.000 SAM intaceptors. Some of the launchers haw
...Wavle rails.
Their Functions
The U.S. strategic nuclear posture deters such attacks. But that is
not its only function. Although both Great Britain and France maintain
modest nuclear forces, only the strategic capabilities of the United States
stand as a major bulwark against nuclear blackmail of and attacks on our
aLlies.
is fashionable, I realize, to assert that if only the two super-
powers, and especially the United States, would set a good example and
engage seriously in nuclear disarmament, other countries would be less
Lempted to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. But this assertion
almost surely without foundation in fact. The motives of states which
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aspire to nuclear status are invariably complex. It hardly seems plausible
to believe that any significant reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, and the
subsequent decrease in their nuclear protection for other countries, would
discourage nuclear proliferation. Strong U.S. nuclear forces may not
be a sufficient condition for nuclear restraint on the part of others,
but they appear to be a necessary condition. Indeed, they may have a
role to play in discouraging rash action by nations which acquire small
nuclear forces. In this connection, only six nations have tested
nuclear weapons at this tume, But there may already be as many as 20
nuclear aspirants, and the number could well rise to 40 by 1985.
An equally important function for the strategic nuclear forces is
to provide the foundation on which U.S. and allied general purpose
forces gain credibility. Consequently, even though they absorb no more
than 20 percent of the total U.S. defense budget (when a share of indirect
support costs is added), they require the most serious, continuing
attention.
If the U.S. strategic foundation is not solid at all times, the
rest of the defense structure we build -- and our entire system of
collective security -- may collapse. If we fail to maintain a modernized
strategic posture, the Soviets (who seize every occasion to modernize
and improve their own) will certainly see the opportunities presented to
them. They are already behaving in a manner which indicates their
interest in more than deterrence as some have defined it in the West.
We must expect them to continue in this vein. As the Central Intelligence
Agency has pointed out:
The Soviets are committed to the acquisition of "war-fighting
capabilities," a decision which reflects a consensus on the need
to assure the survival of the Soviet Union as a national entity
in case deterrence fails. It also accords with a long-standing
tenet of Soviet military doctrine that a nuclear war could be
fought and won, and that counterforce capabilities should be
emphasized in strategic forces. Mutual assured destruction
as a desirable and lasting basis for a stable strategic nuclear
relationship between superpowers has never been accepted in the
USSR. But Soviet political and military leaders probably regard
it as a reality which will be operative at least over the next
decade.*
B. The Threat
While this judgment may seem harsh, even unseemly in a period of
negotiations, and contrary to much conventional wisdom, it is supported
by a great many facts. To be sure, the Soviets started well behind the
* Hearings before the Subcommittee cn Priorities and Economy in Government,
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Part 2, May 24
and June 15, 1976, p. 68.
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United States in strategic capabilities, and with a much weaker technological
and industrial base. For many years, therefore, it was possible to
rationalize Soviet programs large:y as reactions to earlier U.S. initiatives
Now, however, the situation has quite a different appearance. Between
1965 and 1976 alone, the Soviets managed to increase their ICBM force
from 224. to over 1,500 launchers, and their SLBM force from 29 to around
800 launchers. They also began to modernize their long-range bomber
force.
CHART IX-1
CHANGES IN U.S./U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
ItAMs
1900r900
200,?
600
11.11i11111
1966 1371 1976
600
300
StRIVIs
ii 55
11 S
900 r
600 I--
ROMRFRS
(IS
ussri BACK1-114E
.......
300
fill .1111 _ 1
1966 1971
END FISCAL YEAR
1976 1966 1971 1976
As their offensive capability has increased, so has their inventory of
deliverable weapons. Their strategic loadings (weapons which can be
loaded on board strategic missiles and bombers) rose from 450 to about
3,300 warheads and bombs between 1965 and 1976, and there is every
indication that the growth in deliverable weapons will continue at a
rapid pace.
Current Deployments
In 1977, we already face a mature and sophisticated Soviet strategic
nuclear capability. At the present time, the Soviets deploy fewer than
1,500 ICBMs, over 800 SLBMs, and over 200 long-range bombers, including
those Backfire aircraft assigned to naval aviation and other aircraft
rapidly convertible from tankers to bombers. They appear to believe, as
we certainly do, that a diverse offensive force mix is important insurance
to have and that investing in only one basing mode for missiles would
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entail an unacceptable risk. However, to date, they have placed less
emphasis on long-range bombers than we do.
As far as we can tell, the Soviets are building to the limits on
missile launchers set by the Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, with a
deployment mix of about 1,400 ICBMs and 950 SLBMs. As their SLBM force
has expanded well over the threshold of 740 launchers, they have been
deactivating older SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM launchers. Of the 1,320 MIRVed
launchers which a SALT II agreement based on Vladivostok would allow,
the Soviets have deployed about 235 thus far.
It has been estimated that the Soviets could deploy as many as
3,300 launchers and bombers (excluding Backfire) by 1985 if they were
not constrained by existing and proposed SALT agreements. There is
evidence that they could, as an alternative, reload some silos after an
initial launch.
Soviet active strategic defenses remain about as they were reported
a year ago. The Moscow ABM system consists of 64 launchers. Anti-
bomber defenses are composed of about 9,700 surface-to-air (SAM) launshers
and 2,600 PVO interceptors. Soviet command-control-communications (C )
for both strategic offense and defense have been given increased sophistication
and redundancy during the past year, and they appear to have the capacity
to execute a flexible, war-fighting strategy. During the past year, we
have gained a better appreciation of the extent of the ongoing Soviet
civil defense effort. The program, which is under military direction,
provides varying degrees of protection for leaders, the general population,
and industry.
2. Force Improvements
The overall Soviet strategic posture is already impressive in terms
of numbers, throw-weight, and equivalent megatonnage. Even more impressive
is the generally successful effort to improve the quality of the posture
within the limits of various SALT agreements and understandings. In short,
we are witnessing a significant upgrading of Soviet war-fighting capability
in the current wave of modernization. A further wave, expected to
follow this one by the end of the decade, could increase that capability
still further.
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CHART IX-2
US/USSR STRATEGIC FORCES ADVANTAGE
1-
i
I
164 1965 1970
a. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
1980 1982
CEGEND
EMT YIELD 278
TW = THROYVWEIGHT
SNEIV = STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE
WARHEADS . BALLISTIC MISSILE REENTRY
VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT DE-
LIVERED WARHEADS.
The most striking evidence of the qualitative improvements arising out
ttf the current wave of modernization comes from the Soviet ICBM force.
The new SS-17. SS-18, and SS-19 missiles continue to be deployed in modified
and upgraded silos at a rate of about 100 a year. We estimate that there
are now about 40 SS-17s, 54 SS-18s, and around 140 SS-19s in the force. We
believe that some of the modified silos have been hardened to resist at least
2,500 pounds per square inch over-pressure. Units of the SS-11, SS-17, and
SS-19 ICBMs have been deployed underneath the umbrella of the Moscow ABM
system. In addition to a MIRV configuration, the Soviets have developed
high-yield, single warheads for the SS-17, the SS-18, and the SS-19. The
is currently being deployed in both single and MIRVed warhead modes.
When configured in its MIRVed mode, the SS-17 has 4 MIRVs, each with a
yield of about 700 kilotons. The SS-19 can carry 6 MIRVs with yields
-stimated at one megaton per MIRV. We now believe that the SS-18 can
deploy as many as 8-10 MIRVs with yields estimated at between a half and
bne megaton per MIRV. The SS-18, carrying two types of MIRV, can probably
use both types to attack a single target without causing fratricide. The
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second, and blunter, type of MIRV will arrive on target about 10 seconds
after the first and faster RV, but with a sacrifice in accuracy. It is
becoming increasingly evident, moreover, that the SS-19 now could have an
accuracy approaching that of the Minuteman III, and there are no intrinsic
reasons why the SS-17 and SS-18 cannot have nearly the same CEPs (Circular
Error, Probable). A major Soviet hard-target kill capability must therefore
be anticipated in the near future.
We believe that the Soviets could deploy the SS-X-16 ICBM in a land-
mobile mode as a successor or supplement to the SS-13. The payload of the
SS-X-16 will probably consist of a single warhead with a CEP of about .25
nautical miles. As reported, a shorter-range version of the SS-X-16 ICBM
system, the SS-X-20, is about to be deployed in southwest Russia and in the
vicinity of the PRC as a replacement for the older SS-4 and SS-5 MRBMs and
IRBMs. The SS-X-20 consists of the first two stages of the SS-X-16, has a
demonstrated range of at least 2,200 nautical miles, and carries three
MIRVs with a CEP of about .2 nautical miles. As far as we can now judge,
the planned deployment of MIRVed SS-X-20 missiles could give the Soviets
almost three times as many warheads as did the older MRBMs and IRBMs.
There is also the possibility that the missile could be given a range
equal to the SALT definition of ICBM range (5,500 kilometers or about 3,000
nautical miles) either by the addition of a third stage or by offloading
MIRVs.
Even as these deployments and developments go forward, still another
generation of at least two new ICBMs proceeds in research and development.
We do not yet know the specific characteristics of these new missiles. But
we anticipate that they will show still further improvements in accuracy
and thus in hard-target kill capability. Testing of one or more of these
missiles will probably begin later this year.
b. Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
The Soviets have continued to modernize their SLBM force and are
producing a significant improvement in the sea-based component of their
Triad. Submarines are becoming only slightly quieter, but missile ranges
are growing longer, and MIRVs are being developed for SLBMs. The Soviets
have ended production of the Yankee class submarines in part, no doubt,
because the boats would have to go on station within range of U.S. and
allied ASW forces in order to cover targets in the United States.
The Delta I submarine, of which at least 15 have been launched, carries
12 SS-N-8 missiles, each with a range of at least 4,200 nautical miles.
(A recent firing of the missile covered 4,900 n.m.) The Delta II submarine
has ceased production after four units. It is nearly as large as the
Trident submarine and carries 16 SS-N-8 missiles. Additional Delta production
is continuing; the latest variant has been designated the Delta III. It
will carry 16 of the new SS-NX-18 missile. The SS-N-6, Mod III, aboard the
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Yankee submarines has three multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs). The SS-N-8
missile currently has one warhead, with a yield of about one megaton. The
present generation of SLBMs does not have a significant hard-target kill
capability. But it is sufficiently accurate for use against bomber bases
and other soft targets of high value. The SS-N-8 has the further advantage
that it can cover major targets in the United States from launch-points as
distant as the Barents Sea and the North Pacific. Such deployments,
relatively close to home ports, allow more time on station (the equivalent
of having additional SSBNs) and provide a degree of sanctuary from anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) forces.
Ft should be emphasized that the SS-N-8 is about comparable in range
to the full-payload range Trident I missile we plan to deploy in 1979. By
chat time, the Soviets may have begun deploying a submarine even larger
than any of the Delta series. They have already tested two new SLBMs.
One, the SS-NX-17, is a solid fuel missile with a large post-boost vehicle
(PBV) and a single warhead. The other, designated the SS-NX-18 is a
iiquid fuel missile which, to date, has flown with two MIRVs. It is
estimated to have a capability of carrying three RVs. In November 1916,
the SS-NX-18 underwent a successful launch at sea. Its range is approximately
4,000 nautical miles. We now estimate that it will go into the new Delta
III boats. It could also be installed in modified versions of existing
submarines at some future time.
Long-range Bombers
The most significant change in the Soviet long-range bomber force has
been the addition of the Backfire to the older Bisons and Bears. The
Backfire has now been in service with Soviet Long-Range Aviation for about
30 months. Around 25 are deployed with the LRA, and total production
(including aircraft for Naval Aviation) is currently running at a rate of
about 2.5 a month. We continue to believe the Backfire has an inter-
oontinental capability given certain flight profiles. Use of its inflight
refueling capability would assure intercontinental ranges, and its performance
is likely to be improved with time. Evidence exists that the Soviets are
also working on a follow-on heavy bomber with greater range and payload to
roplace the aging Bears and Bisons.
d_ Active Defenses
The Soviets have not yet remedied their vulnerability to relatively
sLow bombers penetrating their air defenses at low altitudes. However,
they continue efforts to plug this gap, and they are expected to develop
an AWACS-type aircraft and a look-down, shoot-down capability greater than
that of the Flogger B in the 1980s.
More imminent is the renewed development of rapidly transportable,
high-performance surface-to-air missile defense systems. One new system
consists of a phased-array search and track radar and probably an
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interceptor missile with a velocity almost comparable to that of our
Sprint low-altitude ABM interceptor. This new system, which has been
tentatively designated as the ABM-X-3, has a well-defined capability
against both strategic and tactical aircraft and tactical missiles. The
full system has not been tested in an ABM mode. However, it also appears
to lend itself to the defense of both hard point and soft targets against
ballistic missile attacks. If its components were stockpiled, the system
could be deployed on relatively short notice. Deployment could begin as
early as 1980.
In theorizing about strategic nuclear stability, some analysts have
postulated that mutual vulnerability is a condition of stability -- in
other words, if each side offered its vulnerable population and industry
as hostages to the other, neither side would dare to attack. These same
analysts saw acceptance by the Soviets of this premise in their signature
of the ABM Treaty of 1972. It has become equally plausible to believe
that the Soviets have never really agreed to this assumption, and that
they entered the ABM Treaty either because of severe resource constraints
or because they feared that, without an agreement, U.S. technology over
the near term would give us a continuing and even growing advantage in
this form of defense.
e. Passive Defenses
This hypothesis gains in plausibility when the spectrum of Soviet
active and passive defense programs is considered. While U.S. R&D on ABM
systems has slowed down, theirs has not. In the realm of civil defense,
there were significant shifts in program emphasis in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. The current Soviet civil defense program is broad in scope
with preparations suggesting the following order of priority;
political
hardening
and other
Assuring continuity of government and control by protecting the
and military leadership;
Providing for the continuity of important economic operations by
facilities, protecting personnel, protecting some food supplies,
measures; and
Protecting nonessential personnel through sheltering or evacuation.
Available evidence suggests that all of these preparations are continuing
and that the Soviets are following the above priorities. While the evidence
is still coming in, and we cannot make firm judgments on either the magnitude
or potential effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, the available in-
formation suggests a strong Soviet interest in damage limiting.
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3. Conclusions
Two points should be made about these developments in Soviet offensive
and defensive programs.
-- First, whatever the motives for past Soviet strategic expenditures,
it should now be evident that the Soviets have taken the initiative in
a wide range of programs, that restraint on our part (whatever its reason)
has not been reciprocated -- and is not likely to be -- and that the
behavior of the Soviets indicates an interest -- not in the more abstract
and simplistic theories of deterrence -- but in developing their strategic
nuclear posture into a serious war-fighting capability.
-- Second, while the Soviets may not persevere or succeed in this
admittedly complex and difficult task, their growing capabilities must play
a major role in U.S. force planning.
To underline this last point may seem trivial. But some believe that
U.S. strategic nuclear forces are already insensitive to whatever the
Soviets do with their offense and defense. In my judgment, few ideas could
be more dangerous to the security of the United States or further from the
actuality of the strategic situation. As Albert Wohlstetter wrote nearly
twenty years ago, the balance is delicate, and the task of strategic nuclear
deterrence is continuing and demanding. Not only should the design of the
U.S. strategic posture be highly responsive to the threat; it must also
reflect a number of other factors including the specific and changing
conditions of modern deterrence.
C. Second-Strike Forces
It has been a longstanding policy of the United States to recognize,
first, the peculiar ability of strategic nuclear offensive forces to deliver
devastating and even decisive attacks with little or no warning, and
second, the advantage that an attacker would gain if he could destroy the
U.S. strategic forces. Accordingly, a major condition of nuclear deterrence
is the maintenance of second-strike retaliatory capabilities -- that is,
forces which can reliably wait until an enemy has attacked before striking
back.
The reasons for this caution are worth remembering. Nuclear strikes
have such unprecedented implications that they must never result from an
accident, an unauthorized act, a misunderstanding, or a hasty conclusion
that if they are not used, they will be lost. Under law, it is the
responsibility of the President to decide when and how to use the nuclear
forces of the United States. It is the responsibility of the Department of
Defense, not to force his hand, but to ensure as far as possible that he
can make this decision with deliberation and with the confidence that he
knows the circumstance of the nuclear attack.
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We take a number of measures to keep the probability of accidents and
unauthorized acts extremely low. We also strive wherever possible to
design U.S. forces so that, if necessary, they can actually absorb an
enemy attack, rather than depend on warning for their survival, and strike
back only after nuclear weapons have actually detonated. Until recently,
ICBMs and SLBMs have been ideally suited to meet this design requirement:
through a combination of mobility and concealment in the case of the SLBMs;
through hardening in the case of the ICBMs. Since bombers are extremely
soft and concentrated when on the ground, they cannot ride out an attack in
the same way as ICBMs and SLBMs. We must keep some percentage of them in a
high degree of alert, and depend on tactical warning to get the alert
aircraft off their bases before incoming weapons arrive. Positive control
measures then permit their recall after launch in the unlikely event that
warning systems have given a false alarm, as is at least within the realm
of possibility even with the advanced and complementary surveillance systems
now available. In addition, we maintain the capability to keep a portion
of the bomber force on continuous airborne alert if the need should arise.
The President can obviously commit any or all of these three forces to
their missions with or without warning of an attack. But his option to
avoid pre-emption or a "launch on warning" of ballistic missiles (which
cannot be recalled) should be preserved by ensuring that he does not have
to commit the forces until he is confident a nuclear attack is in fact
under way. To design otherwise would be to undermine deterrence by
creating unnecessary fears of a first-strike which, in turn, could lead to
instability in a crisis and increased risks of a nuclear war.
D. The Triad
The most efficient way to preserve a responsive, controllable, retaliatory
capability is by means of a mixed force of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers --
namely the Triad. Maintenance of a second-strike Triad continues to be
justifiable on a number of grounds. First, history shows that no system,
however ingeniously designed, is ever entirely invulnerable for an indefinite
period of time. For most measures, there tend to be countermeasures. And
the countermeasures may show up with little advance warning, especially
when one of the contestants operates in a closed society. Considering the
fundamental importance of the tasks assigned to the U.S. strategic retaliatory
forces, it is not unduly conservative to maintain three capabilities with
differing characteristics, differing challenges to an opponent bent on
countering them, and differing rates at which their vulnerability is likely
to become critical. To take a less conservative approach is to risk
precisely the instabilities which arise from claims of "bomber gaps"
and "missile gaps." The Triad minimizes those risks because when vulnerabilities
do begin to appear, they can be dealt with in an orderly fashion rather
than with costly crash programs.
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Another advantage ot the Triad is that the three torces interact to
promote the survivability ot them all. While the survivability ot the
SLBMs does not depend directly on the ICBMs and bombers, the Soviets could
concentrate much larger resources on countering ballistic missile submarines
if they did not have to worry about the other two components. The ICBMs
and bombers, on the other hand, interact strongly for their mutual benefit.
A simultaneous attack against ICBMs and bombers through U.S. warning screens
would enable the alert bombers to launch even if the ICBMs were withheld.
An effort to slip under the warning screens and attack the bombers would
give the ICBMs unambiguous evidence of the attack through the prior detonation
of weapons on airfields. And any attempt to pin down the ICBMs while
attacking the bombers would run into such delicate problems of communication
and timing that it would risk triggering both forces.
The Triad also provides major insurance against systems failures. The
bombers are a thoroughly tested part of the Triad because they have
experienced actual combat and fly daily. However. ICBMs and SLBMs are only
fired on non-operational trajectories. Although we seek operational realism
in test launches of our ICBMs, we have never launched them from operational
silos. On two occasions, the Department has been denied the funds and the
permission to tire the Minuteman ICBMs in this mode -- a practice the
Soviets follow with some regularity. As a consequence, confidence in the
three components of the Triad is uneven, and the possibility that some
portions of the force might not perform as expected cannot be overlooked.
As far as can be judged, however, there is virtually no probability that
all three components would fail catastrophically.
As long as the ABM Treaty is observed, the ICBMs and SLBMs surviving
a Soviet first-strike should be reliable enough to reach and attack their
targets. Bomber penetration is less certain, although the great majority
of the bombers should reach their targets, and planned modernization of the
force will preserve that confidence in the future.
A second-strike by such a mixed force, approaching enemy targets at
differing speeds, trajectories, and azimuths of attack, not only would
complicate the problem ot the defense; it would also permit a particular
target to be attacked with delivery systems and weapons of differing
characteristics. Cross-targeting increases the probability that even after
a highly effective enemy first-strike, and even atter some system failures,
targets of importance to the enemy would come under attack from at least
one element of the Triad.
For all these reasons. I believe we must continue with a Triad of
bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles.
The overall size and composition of the Triad must necessarily depend
on a variety of factors. l should point out in this connection that the
peacetime inventory of delivery systems, weapons, and megatonnage is only
one datum, and by itself not the most important, in indicating whether and
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in what ways U.S. forces need to be strengthened. What counts from the
standpoint of force planning is how much of a given peacetime inventory
would survive a first-strike, penetrate the enemy's defenses, and destroy
a designated set of targets. It matters very little if we have an
arsenal of 3,000 delivery systems, 8,500 warheads, and thousands of
megatons if only a few of those systems could survive a surprise attack
and reach their targets. In the perspective of the force planner, if 200
bombers need to reach their targets, attrition from defenses is estimated
at 20 percent, and we maintain a peacetime alert-rate no higher than 50
percent, the inventory would have to consist of at least 500 bombers.
Depending on the system, peacetime inventories must always exceed the
number of attacking systems, especially in the design of a second-strike
posture. In short, a premium must be paid for the safety and stability
of an assured retaliatory force. Such a premium should not be mistaken
for overkill.
E. Assured Retaliation
Force size and composition will also be sensitive to the types of
missions this retaliatory capability must perform. It is on this score,
in fact, that the most significant issues arise concerning U.S. strategic
nuclear forces. Widespread agreement exists that, at a minimum, the
U.S. second-strike capability should be able to execute the mission of
assured retaliation as the prime condition of deterrence. But even
here, arguments persist as to specific targets and the damage to be
assured. According to one approach, planners could simply target major
cities, assume that population and industry are strongly correlated with
them, and measure effectiveness as a function of the number of people
killed and cities destroyed. Thus, as one example, prompt Soviet fatalities
of about 30 percent and 200 cities destroyed would constitute a level of
retaliation sufficient to assure deterrence.
A different approach views assured retaliation as the effort to
prevent or retard an enemy's military, political, and economic recovery
from a nuclear exchange. Specific military forces and industries would
be targeted. The effectiveness of the retaliation would be measured in
two ways:
-- by the size and composition of the enemy's military capability
surviving for postwar use;
-- by his ability to recover politically and economically from
the exchange.
If the Soviet Union could emerge from such an exchange with superior
military power, and could recuperate from the effects more rapidly than
the United States, the U.S. capability for assured retaliation would be
considered inadequate.
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3oth approaches can obviously be carried to absurd lengths. The
point, however, is that whichever approach is taken, the number, yield, and
Accuracy of the weapons needed in the U.S. inventory will depend to an
-important degree on the level of damage required of the assured retaliation
mission. The ability to destroy only 10 cities on a second-strike makes
one kind of demand on the posture; the requirement to destroy 200 makes
quite another.
The present planning objective of the Defense Department is clear. We
believe that a substantial number of military forces and critical industries
fn the Soviet Union should be directly targeted and that an important
objective of the assured retaliation mission should be to retard significantly
the ability of the USSR to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the
status of a 20th-century military and industrial power more rapidly than
the United States.
This objective has been set for a number of reasons. With the growth
And diversification of the Soviet economy, and with continued Soviet efforts
to disperse and protect vital industries, the practice of simply targeting
the largest cities might no longer produce the effects previously assumed.
More specific and precisely designated aiming points are needed, especially
ficir the lower-yield weapons now in the U.S. strategic inventory. The
number of targets must be substantial because low levels of damage would
not necessarily deter a desperate leadership, whereas high levels of damage
and a low probability of recuperation might do so. Where the assured
retaliation mission is concerned, any prospective enemy must understand at
all times that the United States has a second-strike capability which can
do him, not significant or serious, but virtually irreparable damage as a
modern nation and great power.
F. Options
For some, a second-strike capability for counter-city retaliation is
the essential and sole condition of strategic nuclear deterrence. To go
beyond this minimal capability, as they see it, is to invite trouble:
further competition, arms race and crisis instability, an increased risk of
nuclear war, and a decreased probability of progress toward arms control
and disarmament. For the United States, however, the deterrence of nuclear
war requires a different approach than is embodied in the concept of counter-
city retaliation.
Soviet Capabilities
As previous Defense Reports have emphasized, the Soviet Union has now
developed a strategic nuclear offensive capability of such size and diversity
that a number of options must be taken into account. One could begin with
an attack on the theater-based forces of the United States and its allies,
atter which the Soviets might seek to defer retaliation with their large
strategic nuclear reserve capability. Second, a creeping attack on SSBNs
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at sea, selected military facilities in a theater, or even silos in the
continental United States itself, could be launched to demonstrate their
resolve and to force the United States into major concessions. A third
example would be an attempt to destroy U.S. bombers and ICBMs, disrupt our
command-control-communications, and avoid major damage to U.S. cities and
people, while at the same time holding in reserve a large follow-on capability
targeted against other U.S. assets and available for successive waves of
attack. Such a campaign would not necessarily disarm the United States,
but it could leave us with only the forces and the plans for partial
coverage of the enemy target system. With them, the United States might
be able to cause heavy damage to the industrial base of the Soviet Union
and even to its people. But the withheld Soviet force would be able to do
equal or greater damage to an equivalent target system in the United States.
2. The Problem of Deterrence
The credibility of a deterrent based solely on the capability and
doctrine of counter-city retaliation, however large or small the programmed
response, is likely to be low in the face of such contingencies. The
Soviets might be skeptical about the threat contained in such a posture,
and inclined to test U.S. resolve to defend allies by these means. Even
though we might delude ourselves about the credibility of the threat under
normal peacetime conditions, we might find that we were more deterred by it
than the Russians in a crisis.
These examples admittedly raise contingencies which, as far as can
be judged, have a low probability of occurrence. However, we should not
forget the risks that accompanied the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba
in the autumn of 1962. And, even the surprise attack everyone agrees should
be deterred tends to fall into this same category oE low probability and
high risk. Why then should the United States be any less concerned about
equally rational and more limited attacks?
3. Options and Escalation
Less than full attack contingencies raise enormous uncertainties. We
are totally lacking in any relevant experience of them. Yet we know that
once nuclear weapons are used, calamity of an unprecedented nature will
lurk in the wings. In these circumstances, even if the probability of
nuclear escalation is high, it seems appropriate to have available for the
President some options rather than only the full response of assured retaliation.
Accordingly, the U.S. posture should include the ability both to implement
some preplanned options and to improvise responses to events not anticipated
in contingency planning.
4. Options and Hard Targets
It should be evident that once the possibility of some options is
admitted, the range of targets becomes wide. Many targets important to a
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tlociety's economy and political system are separated to some degree from
heavy concentrations of people. That tends also to be the case with a
number of military targets, including general purpose as well as strategic
nuclear facilities. To attack relatively soft targets, and to minimize
collateral damage, relatively low-yield weapons with high accuracies are
required. In previous years, because of these considerations, it has been
U.S. policy to seek improved command and control, higher accuracy, and an
increased variety of warhead yieldsin order to implement an effective
range of options.
Uast year I stated we would be making system improvements such as
increased accuracy so as to ensure that any attack could be met by a
deliberate and credible response. Certainly the need for more than
a limited hard-target-kill capability was not foreseen. The costs of such
a capability are substantial, in part because the phenomenon of fratricide
timits the number of weapons that can be usefully applied to a hard target
and therefore imposes heavy demands for accuracy, reliability, and command-
control. A major effort to acquire a comprehensive hard-target-kill capability
is likely to raise apprehensions about crisis and arms race stability.
The United States has continued to hope that the Soviets would have a
similar outlook and comparable concerns. Today, however, it is much
less certain that they see the wisdom of abstaining from comprehensive
hard-target-kill capability. Not only have they failed to give serious
consideration to U.S. proposals for reductions in throw-weight; they are
actually in the process of increasing their own throw-weight by a substantial
amount. In addition, they are taking rapid improvements in the accuracy of
their ICBMs, and they could have a reload capability for some of those
tCBMs which can be cold-launched (that is, popped out of their silos prior
to ignition), permitting reuse of the silos.
It is uncertain how rapidly these programs will come to fruition. But
there is now an increasing probability that before the mid-1980s, the
Soviets could have the capability, with a small fraction of their ICBMs, to
destroy a substantial portion of the Minuteman/Titan force as well as
non-alert bombers and submarines in port. This potential would in no way
give the Soviets a disarming first-strike. But it could enable them to
create a dangerous asymmetry. As previous Defense Reports have emphasized,
much of the U.S. capability for deliberate, controlled, selective responses
resides in the Minuteman force. If much of that force were eliminated,
the Soviets would preserve their flexibility while that of the United
States would be substantially reduced. The Kremlin would still have
options; the choices open to a President would be limited.
This is not an acceptable prospect. It would be preferable to see the
life of the fixed ICBM forces on both sides prolonged a good deal longer.
Nventually, however, even with foreseeable arms control measures, improvements
in accuracy combined with large throw-weights could make such systems
unreliable as second-strike forces. But additional time in which to
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negotiate and make deliberate decisions about reasonable substitutes would
be valuable. That is the course the United States would still like to see
both sides follow. But, we cannot permit the major degradation in the
Triad that the growing Soviet capabilities threaten. And the United States
must not permit the development of a major asymmetry in potential outcomes,
with all the political and military hazards accompanying such a prospect.
SURVIVING SILO
800 -
600
400
200
CHART IX-3
SILO SURVIVABILITY
SENSITIVITY TO SOVIET ACCURACY
HIGHLY CONFIDENT ACCURACY
AT LEAST THIS GOOD
HIGHLY CONFIDENT ACCURACY
WILL NOT EXCEED
I I I
76 78 80 82
END FISCAL YEAR
84
86
If the life of the fixed, hard ICBMs cannot be extended, then
stability requires both sides to improve their land-based forces enough
so they they are more difficult to target by the other side. The United
States should not accept a strategic relationship in which we must bear
the heavier costs of alternative basing while the Soviets are allowed
the luxury of retaining their fixed ICBMs. Since high accuracies can be
built into mobile as well as fixed systems, the Soviet leadership should
be aware that if the United States moves toward mobility, the Soviets will
have strong incentives to go mobile as well.
5. Options and First-Strike
The United States is not interested in creating a first-strike capability,
acting provocatively, or threatening stability. The Congress will surely
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tecognize that it is the Soviet Union and not the United States which has
taken the initiative in creating this prospect. Members will also notice
that the same critics who oppose the necessary U.S. countermeasures argue
that the strategic nuclear balance is stable, not delicate, and that major
asymmetries do not matter. Perhaps critics can live with these inconsistencies.
The United States cannot.
The U.S. position is straightforward and consistent. We do not believe
either side can achieve a serious, high-confidence, disarming first-strike
capability, and we do not seek to attain one. To that extent, the strategic
auclear balance can be said to he stable. But significant asymmetries in
the outcome of a strategic nuclear exchange can be created, and these
asymmetries could give -- and would be seen to have given -- a meaningful
advantage to one side over the other. As long as so much of the U.S.
capability for flexibility is invested in the ICBM force, and as long as
some options continue to he desirable, such an asymmetry could arise if one
side eliminated most of the other's ICBMs. The United States should not
permit that eventuality to develop.
Options and Stability
This line of reasoning, tends to be opposed only by those who, despite
Lhe evidence, cling to the view that there is only one condition of stability,
namely mutual assured destruction; that the Soviets faithfully subscribe to
that doctrine; and that the Kremlin will respond cooperatively to U.S,
restraint. The same opponents contend that any options are provocative
and increase the probability of nuclear war. More or less simultaneously,
they assert that having options (and the limits on destruction implied by
them) is infeasible because any nuclear exchange is bound to escalate to
an all-out attack on cities, and because the collateral damage from nuclear
detonations on military targets, especially hard targets, would make even a
limited exchange indistinguishable from an all-out conflict. The conclusion
C.TOM this reasoning is inexorable: the maintenance of options is both
destabilizing and infeasible. Presumably, the prospective loss of the U.S.
capability need be of no concern, while any threat to a comparable Soviet
capability is provocative.
This is not a persuasive position. It depends upon assumptions about
soviet beliefs and behavior that are not borne out by the facts. It applies
different standards of conduct to the United States than to the Soviet
Union. And it is inconsistent. None of the allegations -- about the
provocative and damaging consequences of options -- have any basis in
experience. U.S. strategic plans have contained options for many years,
yet no one has been provoked or tempted in a crisis. Indeed, to attach
such importance to options, which are little different from other contingency
plans, is to ignore how decisions about peace and war are made. Far more
Important than options in the choice of capabilities is the degree of U.S.
conventional strength. If the nuclear threshold has been kept high, con-
ventional responses will be given first priority in a crisis (at least
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by the United States) regardless of whether nuclear options are available.
Experience should make that evident.
7. Options and Collateral Damage
As for the argument that anything less than a full-scale response
would be indistinguishable from direct attacks on population, data and
analyses indicate the contrary. In every case considered, both the short-
term and the longer-run collateral damage from attacks on a comprehensive
list of military targets (including ICBM silos) has been dramatically lower
than the fatalities from direct attacks on population targets. It must be
emphasized, however, that the results, even in limited and controlled
exchanges, could be appalling. They could involve the potential for millions
of fatalities, even though the distinction between 10 million and 100
million fatalities is great and worth preserving. No U.S. decision-maker
is likely to be tempted by this prospect, especially in view of the dangers
of nuclear escalation.
It is no inconsistency to recognize those dangers and still see the
desirability of having some options short of full retaliation. The other
side is fully capable of inventing and considering options. And precisely
because we are uncertain about the course and ultimate consequence of a
nuclear exchange beginning with less than a full response, surely all
would want to avoid bringing about a holocaust by U.S. actions and would
want any President to have at least the option to respond in a deliberate
and controlled fashion. Just as surely, if such were actually to be
the U.S. response in the terrible event of an attack, it is a response that
must be available for the purposes of deterrence. To depend on irrational
behavior by the Soviets, and to depend equally on an irrational response by
us, is to put nuclear deterrence in double jeopardy. The Soviets, by
their activities, indicate that they are not interested in mutual assured
destruction. Accordingly, they must be accepted for what they are, not for
what we want them to be. Their actions indicate that they take nuclear war
seriously; the United States must do no less. Part of taking it seriously
is responses short of full-scale retaliation in our strategic nuclear
capabilities. It is a condition of stable deterrence.
G. Equivalence
Satisfaction of the fundamental requirements of second-strike
survivability, Triad insurance, assured retaliation, and options should
ensure stable deterrence under most circumstances. These requirements, in
fact, underlie the current U.S. strategic nuclear posture. There is,
however, one other factor we must consider in our planning.
It is generally recognized that world stability depends to a remarkable
extent on the strength of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. Unfortunately,
not everyone assesses the effectiveness of that deterrent in the same way.
It is the subject of many and differing perceptions which, in turn, can
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affect the behavior of prospective enemies, allies, neutrals, and attentive
publics in the United States itself. If friends see the balance as favoring
the Soviet Union rather than the United States, their independence and
firmness may give way to adjustment, accommodation, and subordination. If
potential enemies have a similar perception, they could misjudge the situation
and make demands leading to confrontation, crisis, and unnecessary dangers.
if domestic audiences see real or imaginary imbalances, they could insist
on excessive and costly crash programs to restore the equilibrium. One has
only to recall the reaction of Mao Tse-tung to the appearances of Soviet
missile superiority after the Sputnik demonstrations, and the response in
the United States to charges of a "missile gap," to recognize the impact of
such perceptions on international affairs.
however much one might wish otherwise, popular and even some governmental
perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance tend to be influenced less by
detailed analyses than by such static indicators of relative nuclear
strengths as launchers, warheads, megatonnage, accuracy, throw-weight and
the like. If all or most of these indicators were to favor the Soviet
Union, a number of observers might conclude that the United States was not
equivalent to the USSR in strategic power and that the balance was now
weighted in favor of the Soviet Union.
It is to be hoped that, in designing the U.S. strategic posture to
meet the requirements of adequate and stable deterrence, the perception as
well as the reality of a strong deterrent will be created. U.S. programs
of research and development should be expected to be, and be seen to be,
sufficient to offset the dynamism of the Soviet Union in this realm. But
to the extent that rough equivalence is not credited to the United States
im these two respects, actions to create the necessary perception of equivalence
could be required.
At the present time, it is widely agreed that the United States is
seen as having "rough equivalence" with the Soviet Union, even though, up
to now, we have not added to our strategic posture for that purpose. The
United States should also continue to stress the effectiveness of its
strategic forces in the performance of their missions as the basis for
:udging their adequacy. But the Congress and common sense require that
the United States not be inferior to the Soviet Union, and the Vladivostok
Understanding postulates equality between the two sides in central offensive
systems. Accordingly, U.S. plans and programs for future U.S. offensive
capabilities must be geared to those of the USSR.
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WARHEADS
CHART IX-4
MEASURES OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
-0N-LINE FORCES-
WARHEADS
U. S. TOTAL
USSR TOTAL
^ U.S.- BOMBERS
USSR BOMBERS
1976 1981 1936
END FY
20
THROWWEIGHT
THROW-WEIGHT
USSR TOTAL
? U.S. TOTAL
U.S. BOMBERS
USSR^ BOMBERS
0 1-7-7 L I I
19/6 1921 1986
END FY
H. Arms Control
lo[ MEGATONS
MEGATONS
USSR TOTAL /
U.S. TOTAL
0 1 1 1
1976
1 1 1 1
1981
END FY
USSR BOMBERS
U.S. BOMBERS
1 1 1
1986
TOTAL HARD TARGET KILL
4000- (including bombers)
?
0 _1
w
-
u X
w-
.....7,/
? __......--
o IL !mill
U.S.
USSR
.???".
1916 1981
END FY
1986
Whatever the influence of rough equivalence on U.S. force planning, it
is occasionally asserted these days that a powerful factor affecting the
U.S. strategic posture is a distorted view of arms control held by the
Defense Department. The allegation imputes to DoD an exploitation of every
loophole in existing agreements to develop exotic and unnecessary weapons
and drive the strategic force structure up rather than down. Arms control
negotiations and agreements, at least in their present form, are alleged to be
counterproductive in that they create demands for bargaining chips subsequently
converted into legitimized weapons programs. Just as bad, by this theory,
are the safeguards demanded by the Defense Department as the "price" for
endorsement of pending arms control agreements, since they, too, allegedly
can turn into entering wedges for further weapons developments.
Such charges might better be. directed at the Soviet Union. Certainly
they are wide of the mark when aimed at the United States. The idea of
bargaining chips is not new; it was not invented in our lifetimes. For
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example, in 1966, President Johnson began to use the ABM defense system as
a negotiating counter. In fact, despite its cost, the ABM "chip" did not
serve the United States badly. An ABM treaty would hardly have been signed
without it. It should be remembered, moreover, that weapons can only be
effective as bargaining chips if there is a serious need for the weapon
system in the U.S. strategic inventory. To develop systems simply to throw
them on the negotiating table would be folly. The Soviets would not pay
anything to stop them. U.S. policy is to develop only those weapon systems
for which there is a justifiable military need. Serious programs thus may
become bargaining chips and be affected in their development and deployment
by arms control considerations. What are seen merely as bargaining chips
will, not become serious programs, nor will they be effective bargaining
chips.
Tt is worth recalling that the United States has been able to detect
and investigate a number of questionable practices on the part of the
Soviets since 1972. U.S. monitoring of agreements has been adequate so
far. This reasonable level of confidence in national means of verification
is likely to decline, however, to the extent that the Soviets attempt to
conceal or disguise their programs, and if SALT negotiations attempt to
control the more qualitative, as opposed to quanitative features of strategic
arms. In these circumstances, it makes sense to take account of the
possibilities for cheating, the possible failure of complex negotiations.
or even the sudden abrogation of agreements, followed by a rapid Soviet
deployment of systems previously banned or controlled.
Arms control considerations do have an impact on strategic force
planning. The United States is committed to abide by existing and pending
SALT agreements. Strategic stability is considered next to deterrence in
force planning, and the United States has sought to preserve stability in
the presence of highly dynamic technology. But it must be recognized
that precisely because technology is dynamic, the contributions of arms
control to stability may well be modest, and may be overtaken on occasion
by events.
Even under more hospitable conditions than now exist, arms control
aegotiations and agreements could not be expected to substitute completely
for unilateral force planning or remove all the uncertainties with which
that planning is so centrally concerned. Given the attitudes of the
USSR toward war-fighting and stability -- which differ from ours -- the
results of arms control negotiations are bound to be limited. Accordingly,
the United States must continue its efforts in SALT while supporting them
with prudent unilateral planning to ensure the continuing credibility of
the deterrent and the maintenance of stability.
Damage-Limiting
One of the main uncertainties at the present time is the extent to
which the Soviets are developing a major damage-limiting capability. Since
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the concept of damage-limiting has not received much attention for some
time, it is useful to set out the range of damage-limiting strategies.
The most modest strategy attempts to limit the damage from attacks
directed against military and other targets not directly associated with
population. It does so primarily through fallout shelters and the
evacuation of people from exposed target-areas. The most ambitious
strategy dictates a first-strike capability against an enemy's strategic
offensive forces which seeks to destroy as much of his megatonnage as
possible before it can be brought into play. An enemy's residual retaliation,
assumed to be-directed against urban-industrial targets, would be blunted
still further by a combination of active and passive defenses, including
ASW, ABMs, anti-bomber defenses, civil defense, stockpiles of food and
other essentials, and even the dispersal and hardening of essential
industry.
Most damage-limiting strategies represent an effort by one belligerent
to maximize damage to his enemy and minimize it to himself. The assumption
behind such strategies is that, if major asymmetries in damage can be
achieved, one side (the "winner") will survive as a functioning nation
while the other will not. Thus, the outcome of damage-limiting campaigns
can in some sense be measured in terms of the ability of the two belligerents
to recuperate from such barbaric attacks. However, the techniques
currently used to assess the post-attack powers of recuperation of the two
sides are analytically weak and plagued with uncertainties. Key
decision-makers, in any event, are not likely to be very interested in the
possibility that the Soviet Union could restore its prewar Gross National
Product in 10 years, while it would take the United States twice as long
to achieve the same result.
The most modest approach to damage-limiting would not attempt to
protect urban-industrial targets from direct attacks. Consequently,
it would not seriously jeopardize an opponent's capability for assured
retaliation. The most ambitious approach, with its emphasis on active
and passive defenses for both population and industry, would obviously
try to minimize the effects of assured retaliation. In the United
States, such a strategy has been seen, therefore, as a major stimulus
to the strategic arms competition and a guarantee of instability.
The United States has never gone very far down the road of damage-
limiting. Opposition to that strategy has been sharp, and there have
been other reasons for stopping short in such an endeavor. The problems
of eliminating any enemy's entire strategic nuclear force by offensive
means have grown increasingly difficult with the years, and further
investments toward that end have always shown rapidly diminishing returns
to scale. Moreover, once SALT limited ABM deployments to one site,
little seemed feasible against the large, early-warning Soviet missile
force, and little worth doing against the small, late-arriving Soviet
bomber force. Emphasis therefore shifted from the elaborate dedicated
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continental air defenses popular in the 1950s to early warning, surveillance
and peacetime control of American airspace, and development of a mobile,
itghter-defense force based on AWACS. The advantage of the mobile force
is that, while it is intended primarily for defense of a theater overseas,
;.t. would be based in the United States and could be committed to continental
air defense in an emergency. With the emergence of the Soviet Backfire
le continued development of this dual-purpose force seems particularly
appropriate.
With the emphasis on active defenses substantially reduced, it was
considered almost pointless to advocate a major program of passive
defenses centered on blast shelters. Only a modest fallout shelter
program has been provided as what amounts to a hedge against limited
attacks on military and non-collocated economic targets -- attacks which
would not be directed at major urban-industrial centers but which could
produce serious short-term fallout effects on nearby concentrations of
people.
in sum, U.S. policy for some years has been to avoid the development
of large first-strike forces and major damage-limiting capabilities
through active and passive defenses. Restraint in both areas, it was
hoped, would demonstrate to the Soviets that the United States did not
tntend to threaten their capability for assured destruction, and that,
accordingly, their basic security was not endangered by the U.S. deterrent
posture. But such restraint cannot long be unilateral; it must be
reciprocated. Any effort by the Soviets to erode the U.S. capability
for assured retaliation by means of major damage-limiting measures must
Jead to adjustments on our part to maintain a credible deterrent.
Requirements
It is with all these factors, assumptions, and objectives in mind
that, over the years, the United States has adopted a strategy of flexible
nuclear response and arrived at a strategic nuclear posture consisting
of:
-- A high-confidence Triad of second-strike retaliatory forces
within the Vladivostok Understanding of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles;
-- Around 8,500 warheads on delivery vehicles for adequate coverage
of all relevant mission targets, even after the attrition suffered from
an enemy first-strike and from the penetration of his defenses;
-- A single ABM site on inactive status except for its Perimeter
Acquisition Radar (PAR) and a light dedicated air defense to provide
surveillance and peacetime control of U.S. airspace and prevent a "free
ride" over the North American continent;
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CHART TX-5
U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
250012400 TOTAL LIMIT
2000
500
FB 111 :11
-4-FE III IJ
1320 MIRV SUBLIMIT
POSEIDON
C-3
MM III
8-52
POLARIS
MM II
TITAN -4-
-4-- TITAN
TRIDENT
POSEIDON
C-4
POSEIDON
C-3
MM III
MX
5-52
MM II
IRV TOTAL IVIIRV TOTAL
CURRENT FORCE PLANNED FORCE
(END FY 1976) (END FY 1986)
? VFB-111 IS CURRENTLY NOT ACCOUNTABLE FOR SAL PURPOSES
-- A mobile fighter-interceptor force coupled with AWACS which
could be used for continental air defense in an emergency;
-- A civil defense program designed to shelter the population
against fallout in existing structures, and to develop the capability to
evacuate citizens from selected areas during a period of grave crisis;
-- A system of multiple, complementary surveillance and early
warning capabilities combined with a survivable command-control-communications
network designed to permit the President to direct the strategic nuclear
forces in a deliberate and controlled manner in pursuit of national
objectives.
With the necessary modernization to replace aging and obsolescing
systems, this remains a reasonable posture for the future. Whether the
United States can continue to adhere to these preferences much longer depends
on the cooperation of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, excessive
expectations on that score are not in order.
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
ft has been convenient for analytic purposes to separate nuclear
systems that fit into the strategic Triad from those directly supporting
Lactical operations -- commonly referred to as theater nuclear forces --
and those with more narrow defensive applications, such as antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) and antiair warfare (AAW) weapons. In reality, nuclear
systems provide a continuum of capabilities. As part of that continuum,
Lheater nuclear forces constitute a major capability in the defense
posture of the United States. Despite some controversy about them, the
arguments justifying their existence continue to be persuasive.
A_ Functions
since the detonation of the first Soviet atomic device, there has
aeen a growing recognition that U.S. strategic nuclear forces would not
be able to bear the entire burden of credible deterrence by themselves.
Some may have questioned that judgment in the past; no serious person
doubts it today. The need for other forces to provide a credible response
to contingencies less than a direct strategic attack on the United
States or its allies is no longer an issue. Clearly, theater nuclear
:orces must constitute a part of that spectrum of deterrence and response.
Further, as strategic nuclear forces have become less dependent on
overseas basing, adequate U.S. theater nuclear forces must be available
as part of the deterrent. It has been generally accepted that the
theater nuclear forces are not interchangeable with U.S. and allied con-
ventional forces, and that nuclear firepower is no convenient substitute
for manpower on the ground. But there should be no question about their
finportance as a backup to strong conventional defenses and as a major
hedge against a failure of those defenses.
The United States has never ruled out a first use of nuclear weapons.
If an enemy, whether by stealth and deception or by large-scale mobiliza-
tion, should attempt to defeat U.S. and allied conventional forces, it
is NATO and U.S. policy to take whatever action is necessary to restore
the situation. Thus, the theater nuclear forces provide a source of
options and flexibility that would be difficult and perhaps inadvisable
to incorporate exclusively into strategic nuclear forces. Accordingly,
to the extent that a nuclear response may be required locally, theater
nuclear forces have an indispensable function to perform in defense and
deterrence.
1erhaps most important of all, because other nations -- and most
particularly the Soviet Union -- have developed theater nuclear capa-
bilities, a U.S. deployment of such forces is required to deter and if
necessary counter them. The United States no longer has the choice of
whether or not to deploy strategic or theater nuclear capabilities.
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B. Foreign Capabilities
It is true that the United States set the example in the deployment
of theater nuclear forces. Postwar planners clearly misjudged the
length of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and the amount of time it would take
the Soviets to acquire theater nuclear forces of their own. Neither the
value of stolen secrets nor the level of Soviet investment was fully
anticipated. The size of the Soviet conventional forces oriented toward
Europe was overestimated. At the same time, it was assumed that the less
costly theater nuclear firepower could make up for shortfalls in NATO
manpower, and that there would be an enduring U.S. advantage in tactical
nuclear forces. But as early as 1956, the Soviets began deploying MRBMs
and nuclear-capable light and medium bombers. Nuclear-capable missiles
organic to the ground forces were deployed to Soviet forces by the early
1960s. Today it is estimated that the Soviets have, or soon will have, a
nuclear artillery capability, and their theater nuclear forces contain a
greater variety of missile delivery systems and more launchers (including
those based in the USSR) than those of the United States. The current
Soviet capability ranges from the variable-range ICBMs (SS-11, SS-13, SS-
17, SS-19) and the new SS-X-20 (described in the strategic section) to
short-range tactical rockets deployed with Soviet forces in the Far East
as well as in Eastern Europe and with other Warsaw Pact units. All in
all, so large and diversified is this capability that it has become
difficult to deduce the target system used by the Soviets to justify it.
Much of this force is based outside the NATO Guidelines Area; accord-
ingly, it does not come within the purview of the negotiations on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions. This is disturbing because the Soviets
continue not only to maintain and modernize their force, but also to
articulate a military doctrine which permits an early use of nuclear
weapons in a European war -- initiated either by NATO to avert a conventional
defeat, or by the Warsaw Pact to pre-empt NATO first use. On balance,
however, the Soviets would seemingly prefer to wage a purely conventional
campaign in Western Europe; they appear to see their growing theater
nuclear capabilities both as a deterrent and as a counter-capability to
the nuclear forces of NATO.
The USSR is not the only other nation besides the United States with
theater nuclear forces. The PRC officially entered the nuclear lists
only in 1964. But it has now deployed a medium-bomber force of 77 Tu-
16s which is nuclear-capable, and a small complement of MRBMs and IRBMs.
We also believe that the Chinese are now conducting a research and development
effort to acquire nuclear weapons of various yields along with differing
types of delivery means for direct support of their ground forces. This
effort underlines the possibility that any major clash between the Soviet
Union and the PRC could involve nuclear weapons at an early stage. For
the foreseeable future, however, Soviet tactical nuclear forces will
greatly outnumber those of the PRC.
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This is not the only possibility for nuclear conflict. Other
nations continue to show a strong interest in acquiring theater nuclear
forces; India already may have a small nuclear capability. Both Great
Britain and France have long-standing nuclear capabilities against
targets in Central Europe as well as in the USSR. Not only is the
United States obliged to maintain major theater nuclear forces in these
lifficult circumstances; we must also recognize that neither we nor the
Soviets are any longer necessarily the sole judges of where, when, and
how nuclear weapons will be used. To pretend that by unilateral restraint
alone, the United States can control this situation or decide whether
other nations will deploy nuclear weapons in a sensitive and important
region of the world is to ignore the realities, however unpleasant they
may he.
Foreign nuclear capabilities are bound to have an impact on the
size and composition of U.S. theater forces. But here as elsewhere, the
goal is not to make U.S. forces a mirror-image of what others deploy.
Tnstead, planners must consider what is needed as a function of specific
itheaters, threats, contingencies, and missions. And because accidents,
unauthorized acts and terrorist activities must be of concern where
nuclear weapons are involved, we must ensure that security and control
over the necessary nuclear warheads are maintained with high confidence
at all times.
Contingencies
The main planning contingencies to consider in determining a preferred
dheater nuclear posture are an attack by the Warsaw Pact in Central
Europe and an offensive launched against South Korea by North Korean
forces logistically reinforced from the outside. Enough nuclear warheads
should be maintained for both theaters, since the weapons required for
the one would not be available for the other. For planning purposes, an
Assumption is made that a U.S. decision to use theater nuclear forces
would be determined either by an overwhelming enemy conventional break-
ihrough or by his first use of nuclear weapons.
Within the framework of these planning contingencies, a number of
actors determine the conditions of deterrence and hence an appropriate
U.S. theater nuclear posture. Since planning allows for the possibility
::hat an enemy might strike first with theater nuclear forces, U.S.
1.apahilities must be sufficiently survivable to absorb such an attack
ond still have enough sufficient surviving launchers and weapons of the
appropriate yields to perform their assigned missions. This means not
only a proper mix of forces, but also -- because of the relatively short
distances between opposing battlefield systems -- an emphasis for surviva-
bility on mobility and concealment. Sophisticated and survivable command-
control-communications networks are an integral part of these forces
as well.
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D. Missions and Forces
The types of missions assigned to the theater nuclear forces will
have a major impact on their size and composition. It is noteworthy in
this connection that all of the U.S. theater nuclear forces are programmed
against military targets. In fact, although there is no less interest in
deterrence and stability here than in the strategic realm, the United
States plans its theater nuclear forces on the basis of warfighting
missions. Both the posture and the contingency plans place proper emphasis
on restraint rather than on indiscriminate damage, and on the achievement
of traditional military and political objectives, rather than on the
destruction of an enemy's society.
The principal missions needed to achieve these traditional ends are:
-- limited nuclear strikes designed to destroy selectively important,
fixed military targets and at the same time demonstrate a determination
to resist the enemy's attack by whatever means necessary;
-- regional nuclear strikes intended, as one example, to destroy
an attacking enemy force before it achieves a major breakthrough;
-- and theaterwide strikes directed at counter-air and counter-
missile targets, lines of communication, and troop concentrations both at
the front and in reserve.
Various methods exist for computing the number of theater nuclear
weapons needed to perform these missions with an acceptable level of
confidence. Owing to the transient nature of many tactical targets, the
most reasonable approach is to develop options keyed to likely military
targets -- such as ground force units, airfields, bridges, or ships --
and determine the number of weapons required to achieve a high probability
of significant damage to them on a second-strike. It is on this basis
that consideration should be given to whether the number of nuclear
weapons deployed to key theaters and at sea is sufficient for the performance
of the three vital main missions of the theater nuclear forces.
E. Modernization
Numbers alone, however, do not provide a satisfactory basis for
judging the adequacy of the theater nuclear forces. Since it is policy
to minimize collateral damage in any theater nuclear employment, an effort
is made to tailor warheads and delivery systems to their targets, and
to plan the use of yields no greater than necessary for the destruction
of designated targets. As nuclear and guidance technologies advance,
lower yields can be incorporated into the theater nuclear forces. Where
it is done, there is neither a plan nor an intention to blur or erase
the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The objective
has been and remains to increase kill probabilities, reduce collateral
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damage, and economize in the use of scarce nuclear materials.
Some opposition, even now, remains both to the current theater
nuclear posture and to its modernization. Some critics question the
feasibility of conducting a theater nuclear campaign resembling a con-
ventional conflict in any way, and doubt that the damage from such a
campaign could be kept below catastrophic levels. They express skepticism
about the stability of less than theaterwide nuclear options; they
suggest that any use of nuclear weapons would escalate rapidly to a
strategic nuclear exchange. With these reservations in mind, proposals
are made to reduce the U.S. overseas deployments of nuclear weapons and
to halt any procurement of the newer generation of nuclear weapons.
The difficulty with these proposals is that they seem to treat as
known what is intrinsically uncertain. That theater nuclear warfare
would resemble a traditional conflict can be described as a contradiction
in terms: damage might be unprecedented; chaos could ensue; rapid escala-
tion might follow. But the fact is, we do not know what the outcome
would be. Therefore, as long as theater nuclear capabilities exist --
and hardly anyone in a position of responsibility favors unilaterally
doing away with them -- the United States must surely insist on exercising
control over them and having the option to use them in as selective and
deliberate a manner as possible. Uncertainty is no excuse for irresponsibility
and the possibility of disaster is no reason to make certain that it
occurs.
Just as there are risks in most things, there are some risks associated
with the maintenance of non-central systems. But most of those systems
are dual-purpose, and there would be a need to deploy them with or
without nuclear weapons. in any event, the current Soviet nuclear
threat makes clear that there are serious risks in rejecting deployed
theater nuclear forces. Opponents could be tempted by their absence;
allies would question their own and U.S. capabilities. Greater flexibility
may be desirable in designing the characteristics of the U.S. theater
nuclear posture; but the basis for the posture itself should not be in
serious question.
To say this, and to recognize the importance of retaining our own
and allied confidence in U.S. theater nuclear capabilities, is not to
argue that the current posture should remain forever immutable. It
cannot. If U.S. defense capabilities and the deterrent are to remain
strong, periodic modernization is essential. A case in point is the
stockpile of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), which can be emplaced as
nuclear barriers. It is characteristic of the current generation of ADMs
that if they are subject to acceptable peacetime security and wartime
control, they are unlikely, without prepositioning, to be emplaced
in a timely enough fashion to be militarily useful. To take other
instances, nuclear air defense and ASW weapons have warheads which may
increase the probability of destroying aircraft and submarines once
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these targets are identified, tracked, and pinpointed. But their overall
probability of kill is not necessarily greater than that of their non-
nuclear counterparts. Since these weapons are expensive in terms of
nuclear material which could be effectively used for other purposes, we
should periodically modernize the force. Where newer weapons are more
efficient than their predecessors, they should be substituted in the
stockpiles -- overseas as elsewhere -- for older weapons. The test of
deterrence must not be the overall number, but the utility and capability
of the overall force.
Allies deserve to see the U.S. determination to collaborate in
their defense by available means. Critics are entitled to know that the
currently deployed nuclear forces are not simply dangerous relics from a
previous decade. Friend and foe, supporter and skeptic, need to recognize
that U.S. theater nuclear forces, even though they may evolve in size and
composition as technology advances, constitute an integral part of the
overall U.S. deterrent.
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Kl. CONVENTIONAL FORCES
HOW we see the relative strength and dynamism of the two superpowers
depends on judgments or intuitions about the nuclear balance. This nuclear
preoccupation is heightened by official and academic fascination with the
technology and strategy of central systems. At the same time, nuclear
equivalence, combined with the uncertainties which surround the consequences
of nuclear conflict, has led to a revived awareness of the importance of
conventional military power.
Increasingly in the West, and probably in the East as well, nuclear
Corces are seen as credibly deterring only a limited -- although potentially
devastating -- number of hostile acts. The main burden of deterrence has
once again fallen on the conventional forces. Assessments of where nations
stand in the international hierarchy of power may be made according to
auclear criteria (and frequently inadequate criteria at that). But with
the reality of rough equivalence in nuclear forces, gains and losses in the
international arena are largely determined by conventional military power,
will, and resolve. To complete the paradox, conventional military power
obtains authority from the nuclear capabilities underlying it. The two
basic forces are in this sense inseparable, although the history of the
past 30 years indicates that, so long as alliances hold firm, it is not
necessary for each member alone to maintain the full spectrum of nuclear
and conventional capabilities adequate to the total task. A division of
tabor has developed. Only the two superpowers have been obliged to carry
the burden and responsibility of covering the entire range of modern military
power.
A. The Utility of Conventional Forces
Acceptance of this paradox, and of the revived importance of conventional
Alilitary power, has not gone unchallenged. Questions continue to arise
about the need to maintain major conventional capabilities. Since the
burden is heavy -- conventional forces take nearly 70 percent of the
current U.S. defense budget -- these questions deserve consideration.
rhree in particular are fundamental to decisions about the size and composition
of U.S. conventional capabilities:
Pirst, are the risks and uncertainties any fewer in a conventional
than in a nuclear engagement, or is escalation just as probable and non-
nuclear capabilities simply a small but costly way-station on the road to
the nuclear war?
Second, whatever the controllability of conventional conflict,
what is the feasibility of balancing the large, manpower-intensive, con-
ventional forces of prospective opponents?
Third, is it even desirable for the United States to maintain a
large conventional capability? Will it deter, or will it weaken deterrence
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by its very presence, tempt decision-makers, and draw us into wars at the
wrong place or the wrong time?
Absolute answers to these questions are not available. No empirical
basis exists for comparing the nuclear with the conventional forces
simply because nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II.
There are a number of reasons, nonetheless, why a conflict begun at the
non-nuclear level seems less likely to end in a strategic nuclear exchange
than one which starts with nuclear weapons. The conventional campaign --
even if one thinks of it as a fuse -- has much further to burn than its
nuclear counterpart before the greatest risks and uncertainties are reached.
And the spark must cross the nuclear barrier. That barrier, or threshold,
has now stood for more than 30 years. The precedent is an important one.
It seems reasonable to assume that it can continue as a major obstacle to
escalation in the foreseeable future. For this reason alone, conventional
warfare should be less escalatory -- at least as long as the United States
and its allies keep adequate conventional capabilities on hand.
Equally important, we understand conventional warfare, and have been
engaged in two conventional wars since World War II, both without violent
escalation. The Soviet Union was not directly involved in either. But by
and large, it seems plausible to believe that non-nuclear wars will remain
more controllable than any nuclear counterpart. Their tempo is likely to
be somewhat slower, so that policymakers are under less pressure to make
momentous decisions. Sanctuaries can be tolerated more easily, and other
limitations on the conflict can be more readily defined and accepted.
Damage to the societies of the belligerents can be better controlled and,
as a consequence, war aims kept more manageable. Guarantees cannot be
given that conventional warfare will be controllable in the future, but
its salient features are such that there is certainly a higher probability
of limiting it than a nuclear campaign.
The feasibility of countering the main conventional challenges of the
future appears to be less open to doubt, despite much conventional wisdom
to the contrary. Admittedly the number, variety, and sophistication of
conventional probes may increase as the traditional international order
evolves, as modern conventional weapon technology proliferates, and as
certain nations become more venturesome because of nuclear equivalence.
But it is reasonable to suppose that if the United States and its allies
can meet the conventional challenge of the Soviet Union and its satellites,
they can deal with any of the lesser threats that might arise. The problem,
from the standpoint of feasibility, can thus be defined as the Warsaw Pact
with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union.
B. Foreign Capabilities
It would be a tragic mistake if, because of the various economic,
social, and political handicaps voluntarily assumed by the Soviet Union,
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that power were to be characterized as a military pygmy. it is not.
However, the zeal to underscore the serious military challenge we face
from Moscow should not cause the opposite mistake of describing the
Soviet Union as our military superior. It is not -- at this time.
What we are witnessing in the conventional as well as in the nuclear
realm, is a determined, energetic, sustained, and increasing effort by
the Soviets to develop two large and powerful theater capabilities --
one facing Europe, the other China -- with substantial and increasingly
modern offensive power. These forces, and a capability to project power
thousands of miles from their shores, are not new developments. They
are the product of an effort undertaken over more than a decade and
continued regardless of whether U.S. and allied forces have increased
or decreased. What is new is the growing recognition of its magnitude
and continuity.
CHART XI-1
DISPOSITION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES
40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
KEY
NSWP
AFGHANISTAN
rDIVISIONS: EASTERN EUROPE PLUS 3 WESTERN
MILITARY DISTRICTS; CHINA-ORIENTED: OTHER
SS-4 AND S5-5 MR/IRBMs
unah., ACTIVE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS, ATTACK
446 FIXED-WING AND SWING-WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT SUBMARINES. COASTAL PATROL TYPES MINE WARFARE
IN ACTIVE UNITS: SOME GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AS TYPES. AMPAIBIOUS SHIPS, AND LANDING CRAFT:
DIV:SIONS NORTHERN SLEET; BALTIC FLEET, BLACK SEA FLEET;
PACIFIC FLEET; CASPIAN SEA FLOTILLA
Out of the 4.4 million people in their armed forces, the Soviets
maintain a general purpose capability of about 2.1 million men (not
counting 450,000 border guards and internal security units of an essentially
military character). Of this total, about 1.8 million men are in the
ground forces. Last year, the number of Soviet divisions was estimated
to be 168. Now that total is believed to be over 170. Soviet Frontal
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Aviation remains at roughly the same size as last year, with about 4,600
tactical fighter and bomber aircraft. Most of the approximately 500
Badger/Blinder medium-range bombers could also be used for conventional
operations. The size of the Soviet general purpose forces navy also
remains essentially unchanged. The major surface combatant force consists
of approximately 210 ships, and attack submarines total about 150 diesel-
powered and and 84 nuclear-powered boats.
Soviet strategic airlift has continued to expand steadily, especially
in lift capability. With an air fleet consisting of approximately the
same number of aircraft as they had in 1966, the Soviets can currently
Lift better than 50 percent more cargo to a range of 2,000 nautical miles
(14,800 tons versus 9,600 tons). Soviet amphibious forces, which in the
past were designed principally for use in seas near the USSR, are now
being upgraded with the construction of new units apparently designed for
extended operations and open-ocean transit. The Soviet merchant marine is
receiving considerable attention as well. It is already integrated with
the Soviet navy, and is being given additional military support capabilities,
especially with roll-on/roll-off ships. Prior to 1973, the Soviets had
none of these types; they are expected to have as many as 40 by 1978.
As pointed out in previous years, about a third of the Soviet divisions'
are fully combat-ready, or what are considered Category I divisions.
Roughly another third are manned at 50-75 percent of combat strength and
may lack some equipment, while the remainder tends to be in cadre status.
These Category II and III division? would be filled out by reservists who
receive no further training once they leave active duty. Of more than 170
divisions, about 45 are deployed on the Sino-Soviet border, and about 30
percent of the total force remains east of the Urals.
The Soviets have done a great deal to increase the combat effectiveness
of their ground forces generally, and have notably favored those divisions
oriented toward Europe. The divisions have been expanded in size, and
their firepower and mobility have been increased and modernized. Of
particular note, a new tank (the T-72) is now being introduced; a capable
armored fighting vehicle (the BMP) has been deployed in increasing numbers
since 1967; self-propelled artillery is appearing; and army-level air
defenses will provide dense, all-altitude coverage. The ground forces
today have much greater combined-arms power, speed, and antiair protection
than they did a decade ago. They are equipped with chemical munitions,
emphasize protection against chemical warfare (CW), and conduct live
firings and training exercises to test their CW plans, doctrine, weapons,
and equipment. Their capabilities may be commensurate with long-standing
Soviet doctrine, which continues to favor rapid offensive thrusts reminiscent
of German blitzkrieg tactics in World War II.
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CHART XI-2
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET TANK DIVISION, 1976 COMPARED TO 1964
96
320 325 60
1964 1976
Medium Tanks
1964 1976
Artillery Pieces
1964 1976 1964 1976
Men Number of Divisions
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, 1976 COMPARED TO 1964
162
255 115
190 - 110
12,100
10,000
90
1964 1976
Medium Tanks
1964 1976 -
Artillery Pieces
1964 1976
Men
1964 1976
Number of Divisions
Includes irtillery and mortars 100 mm or larger, and multiple rocket launchers.
In the past, this doctrine was seen as an indication that the
Soviets were preparing to fight a short war of rapid maneuver. This
meant that if they could be held for a few days, their forces were expected
to exhaust the supplies available to sustain the campaign. Now, however,
there is evidence that both in Eastern Europe and in the Far East, the
Soviets have added to their war reserve stocks and non-divisional support
personnel. As a consequence, they may be acquiring a significant capability
to sustain an attack, even though in Europe they continue to emphasize
the goal of reaching the English Channel in about two weeks.
A similar effort to match capability with doctrine is evident in
the evolution of Soviet Frontal Aviation. Whereas about 2,100 of the
tactical aircraft are assigned to units with a primary mission of air
defense, most of these, as well as 1,800 ground-attack fighters and
tactical bombers are suited and train for offensive operations. Increasingly,
the force can deliver bomb tonnages as far west as the United Kingdom.
The late-model Fishbeds., and new Fitters, Floggers, and Fencers -- with
.substantially improved range, payload, avionics, and ECM capabilities --
are adding to the flexibility, reach, and power ot the force. The
capabilities of these new aircraft are in many ways competitive with
current U.S. aircraft such as the late-model F-4s. Although they are
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not comparable to the newest U.S. fighters (the F-15 and F-16), they are
already deployed in large numbers in operational units, while U.S.
aircraft are not. In short, the Soviets give evidence of developing an
offensive capability in the air which can complement the growing agility
of their ground forces.
1500
1250
1000
750
CHART XT-3
US/USSR FIGHTERS
(Central Region)
TOTAL SOVIET AIRCRAFT
NEW GENERATION SOVIET AIRCRAFT
TOTAL U.S. AIRCRAFT
ois OS 4* 440
WO e?
500 avir414p4446
250
411111 gm me NEN mo am
NEW GENERATION U.S. AIRCRAFT
got 111 MN
0 I I I
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
FISCAL YEAR
*U. S. FIGURES INCLUDE AIRCRAFT BASED IN UK: SOVIET FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE AIRCRAFT
BASED IN WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS
74 75 76
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Soviet general purpose naval forces will probably continue to grow in
combat power during the coming decade as older surface combatants and
submarines are replaced by more capable ships, even though the number
of ships may decrease slightly. Combat effectiveness will improve con-
siderably in units designed for both the high seas and peripheral
waters. One indication of the probable trend is the introduction to
the fleet of the aircraft carrier Kiev, which will probably be used
primarily for ASW, although its aircraft could support combat troops
ashore, and the ship itself has considerable antiship capability.
Another indication is the continued replacement of diesel with nuclear
attack submarines, including units that can launch antiship cruise
missiles while submerged. The Soviets also continue to improve their
shipboard antiaircraft defenses, and the worldwide command-control-
communications for their naval forces.
2000
1500
600
NUMBER OF SHIPS
CHART XI-4
C HARACTERISTICS AND CHANGES IN
GENERAL PURPOSE*NAVAL FORCES - U.S./U.S.S.R.
!PILLIONS OF TONS
TONNAGE
X \
U.S. SOVIET U.S. SOVIET
1976
8
4
2
2000
1 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
U.S.S.R. '...
1505 - 0th,,,
,,,,,,,,
NUMBER OF SHIPS
1000
500
1966 1971 1976
FISCA L YEAR
*EWES NOT INCLUDE BALLISTIC MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES
TONNAGE
ON MILLIONS OF TONS)
U.S.
2 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,
U.S.S.R.
1966
1971
FISCAI YEAR
1976
Two other developments are noteworthy. The Soviets have deployed
an excellent system for surface ocean surveillance, and they have introduced
the Backfire to their naval aviation. The first enables them to keep
continued track of selected U.S. surface forces; the second gives them
an extended-range, rapid-response, antiship missile capability of considerable
power against U.S. surface ships.
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A portion of the growth in Soviet general purpose forces can be
related to the buildup in the Far East. However, the Soviets have made
no military sacrifices elsewhere to facilitate that buildup. On the
contrary, they have simultaneously improved precisely those forces which
must be of the greatest and most immediate concern to the United States.
The threat to NATO has not diminished; it has grown. Further, essential
sea lines of communication are less safe today than they were a decade
ago. And it must now be recognized that with their improved naval,
airborne, and airlift forces, the Soviets can intervene by sea and air
at considerable distances from the USSR, and can sustain such an intervention
for a substantial period of time.
Despite these facts, the challenge is a manageable one. Although
trustworthy comparative costs do not exist, NATO as a whole probably
spends about as much on its defense establishment as the Warsaw Pact.
NATO armed forces total about 4.8 million men and women, compared with
the Warsaw Pact's 5.6 million men.
Since there is every indication that the Soviets are engaged in a
steady, long-term effort which shows no signs of leveling off in the
near future, the feasibility of a NATO conventional defense of Europe
rests on continued improvements; it cannot be assured once and for all.
Unless the United States and its allies are prepared to make up the in-
creasingly obvious shortfalls in their collective security posture,
unless we are willing to sustain our efforts and increase them, the
response to the challenge could fail.
But failure, if it should occur, would not be for lack of the
necessary resources. Compared with the Warsaw Pact, NATO has them in
abundance. Despite the continued momentum of Soviet conventional programs,
a satisfactory conventional defense capability is feaSible for the
United States and its allies, and at less of a burden on our economies,
as a percent of GNP, than the Warsaw Pact countries have been bearing
for many years.
C. Conventional Deterrence
Despite the changes in the international military environment, the
argument can still be heard that the maintenance of a major non-nuclear
capability will undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Yet a
deterrent which depends solely on nuclear capabilities is credible over
too narrow a range of contingencies. In most circumstances, choices are
needed between passivity and the risks of nuclear warfare. No one
suggests that the Soviets have weakened their deterrent by maintaining
large conventional forces. What is good for them cannot always be bad
for others.
A second argument is that the availability of major conventional
forces will tempt Presidents into irresponsible acts. This is an
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argument without evidence to support it. We became involved in Korea
before we had sufficient forces to support the decision. We did not
become committed in Southeast Asia because we had the forces necessary
to intervention. Rather, the forces were raised to support the inter-
vention.
Surely we do not want to restrain a President by attempting to
deprive the United States of the defense capabilities necessary to
aational security. Weakness has not become a virtue simply because, in
the view of some -- and then, after the fact -- strength may have been
used unwisely at some point in the past. We must face the fact that in
the current era, as in the past, there can be no risk-free posture for
Lhe United States.
One hears the argument, finally, that however desirable it may be
in principle to keep the nuclear threshold high, we are not getting
value received for the money spent on b.S. conventional forces. The
assumption seems to be that conventional forces do not buy additional
security; they simply add to the costs of defense. The strong implication
is that the world is no safer with the existence of U.S. conventional
forces than it would be without them.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it does serve to remind us
that the prevention of war cannot be taken for granted. It is almost
axiomatic that we can never be certain of achieving deterrence, nuclear
or conventional; in a given situation, there is always some probability
that deterrence could fail. The burden of conventional deterrence is
particularly complex and demanding. Conventional forces are more familiar;
if a military response seems justified, their use represents less of a
leap into the unknown. The prospects for controlling the most destructive
i'orms of escalation seem better; catastrophe appears to be less probable.
Where nuclear forces are concerned, an adequate posture -- including
Clexibility and a sound declaratory policy -- may suffice to deter all
but the most critical nuclear contingencies. Where conventional forces
are concerned, a nation's will and demonstration of resolve loom large.
Since the risks of using conventional capabilities may be seen as
c!ommensurate with the objectives sought -- which is rarely the case
where nuclear weapons are concerned -- the prospective attacker, to be
deterred, must have powerful evidence that his intended adventure will
be unduly expensive or cannot be counted on to achieve his objective.
it is for others to judge, and avoid error, with respect to the
will, resolve, and staying power of the United States. Nonetheless,
several points should be made here in response to any who still question
the necessity of major U.S. conventional forces. What has not happened
is as important as what has happened in our troubled world. International
order has broken down in many places, frequently at the instigation or
with the encouragement of the Soviet Union. But it has not broken down
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in Western Europe since 1945, and it has not broken down in Korea since
1953, despite recklessness and irresponsibility on the part of North Korea.
That peace and stability exist in those two key regions after so many years
must be credited in no small measure to the deterrent effect produced by the
presence and steadiness of U.S. and allied conventional forces. They have
worked as a deterrent. They have more than paid for themselves by their
silent effectiveness in Western Europe and Northeast Asia.
Just as we are not the world's policeman, so we cannot be expected
to deter events in every instance that are off our beat. To say that,
however, is not reason to dismantle U.S. conventional forces. That those
forces may be 80 rather than 100 percent effective is no argument against
their continuation. On the contrary, strength -- conventional as well as
nuclear -- contributes to peace; weakness, clearly in this day and age,
but also throughout history, can invite war. It is not even too much to
say that present circumstances make weakness a greater provocation than
strength.
For these reasons, the United States has a clear requirement to
naintain an unquestionably strong conventional posture -- land, sea, and
air. However, such a declaration of general policy is not enough. It is
necessary to be more specific in any statement of needs. To do so, a
number of factors must be considered:
-- the contingencies to be used for planning purposes (including
the details of the threat and the circumstances of a hypothetical attack);
the contributions made by allies;
-- basic strategic objectives;
the missions to be performed;
the measures of effectiveness to be employed;
the levels of confidence sought; and
the expected duration of a conflict.
It must be stressed in this context that the definition of a mission
in a particular theater -- sea control, for example -- does not automatically
result in the specification of a unique force package. The size and
composition of the package will depend on a number of factors which can
vary, including the magnitude of the threat. As a consequence, caution
should be exercised in trying to reach major defense decisions on the basis
of missions alone.
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O. Contingencies, Missions, and Forces
U.S. force planning approach calls for the United States, in conjunction
with its allies, to deal with a major contingency in Europe. Since the
threat from the Warsaw Pact to the Central Region of NATO is the worst
case, it is given primary attention for planning purposes. However, the
aorthern and southern flanks of NATO also influence the design of the U.S.
posture. An attack on the Republic of Korea would have its impact on
planning largely in the realm of logistics and overseas deployments.
t. Europe
In Central Europe, two contingencies have concerned the United States
for many years. The first is a short-warning attack initiated by the
deployed and combat-ready forces of the Warsaw Pact stationed in East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The second is an attack by these
forces reinforced, primarily from the USSR, after perhaps 30 days of
mobilization and deployment. In both cases, attacks on NATO naval forces
and sea lines of communication are assumed.
a. Short-Warning Attack in Central Europe
These two cases continue to be the most appropriate for the purpose
3f generating the U.S. conventional posture. But there is reason to give
careful attention and emphasis to the possibility of an unreinforced
attack which minimizes warning time. Soviet doctrine has highlighted this
possibility for some time; the divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces,
Germany (GSFG), have been expanded and given increased firepower and
mobility; war reserve stocks have been built up; and more sophisticated
aircraft with a greater offensive capability have been deployed to Eastern
Europe. The conditions for tactical surprise have become more favorable
in the last few years.
Surprise, it should be emphasized, can be much more than the rapidity
of the transition from peace to war. Soviet doctrine emphasizes a variety
of ways to confuse opposing commanders, disrupt critical defense decisions,
and delay their implementation. For the potential attacker, such measures
could be preferable to the deployment of massive ground and air forces and
all the other preparations for a long, costly, and less winnable war.
The Warsaw Pact already deploys 58 divisions in varying degrees of
readiness opposite NATO's Central Region. Of these, 27 are the Soviet
divisions in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The remainder
consists of 6 East German, 15 Polish, and 10 Czechoslovakian divisions,
It is conceivable that the entire force could be ready to attack within
96 hours of a decision for war. Almost certainly the 20 divisions of the
GSFG and the 6 East German divisions could meet or exceed this schedule.
The other divisions could be used as a first element of reserves.
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Because of these possibilities, the size of the attack force could
vary from a low of about 500,000 men to a high of as many as a million.
They could bring to bear anywhere from 9,000 to 15,000 tanks. The Pact
could also commit on the order of 2,900 tactical aircraft to a surprise
attack. Of that total, around 1,400 would consist of modern fighter
aircraft at the present time.
To defend against such a very short-warning attack, NATO would have,
at best, about 25 maldeployed non-U.S. divisions at low states of readiness
and alert. To implement a forward defense strategy along a front of about
900 kilometers, this force -- without any U.S. contribution -- would have
to be stretched thin. Even against the GSFG only, its chances would be
poor since the attacker would have the initiative. Against the higher
threats and a fast-breaking attack, its position could well prove untenable
without an early use of nuclear weapons. Quite apart from any advantages
of deception and tactical surprise, division frontages and force and
firepower ratios would so favor the Pact that an early breakthrough of
major proportions would have to be expected. Without a major U.S. presence,
defense against such an attack would be precarious and problematic at
best.
To increase military and political stability in Central Europe in the
face of a possible short-warning attack, the United States has for many
years supplemented the allied contingent with a deployed force of five
division equivalents and eight fighter-attack wings. These capabilities
help to improve coverage of the front and make force and firepower ratios
much less favorable to the Pact. Because an attack could come with little
warning, the divisions and air wings have to be stationed in Europe, or be
rapidly deployable, if they are to have any effect on the battle and its
deterrence. They must also have prepositioned stocks of combat consumables
and materiel. The size of these stocks is affected by estimates of the
length and intensity of the war and the ability to deliver additional
stocks from the United States with hardpressed airlift and sealift assets.
A reasonable goal for prepositioned war reserve stocks in Europe, all
possibilities considered, is at least 60 days of supply, assuming intense
rates of combat consumption.
As can be seen, a first slice -- but only a first slice -- of the
U.S. conventional posture is based on four assumptions:
-- the possibility of a short-warning attack by in-place Warsaw
Pact forces;
an attacking force which could amount to 500,000 or more men;
a forward allied defense;
- the need to keep the ratio of attack to defense well below two-
to-one.
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Although these assumptions are tenable, others are possible. In
principle, a larger allied and a smaller U.S. contribution to the common
defense could be postulated. In practice, the difficulties of such a
substitution are obvious. The bulk of any replacement for deployed U.S.
forces would have to come from the Federal Republic of Germany; the
aecurity of U.S. nuclear weapons would become an increasing issue; and
the political stability induced by a major U.S. presence would be shaken.
It should be noted that the force numbers used in arriving at ludgments
about U.S. requirements may not always coincide with those used in the
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (14BER). Several
reasons exist for the difference. First, force planning dictates that
we took beyond the NATO guidelines area and, as appropriate, consider
other capabilities, including those of Denmark and France and forces
atationed in the United Kingdom. Second, we are interested, for planning
purposes, in the field forces which might become engaged rather than in
the manpower totals for armed forces with which MBFR must be concerned.
b. Mobilization and Deployment in Central Europe
The size and composition of U.S. general purpose forces are sensitive
to the short-warning attack contingency in Europe. But their need
derives primarily from a more demanding contingency. This is a case
where, during a period of rising tension in Central Europe, the Warsaw
Pact mobilizes and adds to the forces already deployed in Eastern Europe,
after which it attacks. Since so much of the U.S. conventional posture
is dictated by this contingency, the key assumptions about it need to be
made explicit.
or planning purposes, it is postulated that, within 30 days, the
Soviets could mobilize, flesh out, and deploy to East Germany the 29
divisions and 900 aircraft that they station in the three western military
districts of the USSR. With the rounding out of other units, the total
Warsaw Pact capability facing the Central Region of NATO would amount to
about 87 divisions, 1.3 million men, 27,000 tanks, and about 3,700
iactical aircraft.
Although the Soviets have not conducted a mobilization and deployment
on this scale since World War II, it is conceivable that they could do
;t in fewer than 30 days with a substantial use of air and road transportation
Lo supplement movement by rail. It is also quite possible that the
deployment would take longer.
With additional time, the attack force could be built up still
further by divisions drawn from other regions, including the Far East.
To do this, however, would create vulnerabilities on other Soviet borders
and would afford NATO additional days in which to improve its posture.
The United States in particular would have more time to move its forces.
The Soviets, recognizing this, might choose to begin the attack earlier,
with somewhat smaller forces.
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Ea'
0

< ?
CC (4
C.)
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CHART XI-5
WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE RATIO
(CENTRAL REGION)
UNCERTAINTY
10 20
11111(1
III
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
? DAYS AFTER PACT M-DAY
For these reasons, force planning, as contrasted with contingency
planning, continues to use a force of 87 Warsaw Pact divisions attacking
at M+30 as the basis for designing the U.S. response. I should stress,
however, that an attack of this magnitude could occur after substantially
fewer days of mobilization and deployment by the Pact, although it would
have to include low-readiness divisions. There is also a possibility
that NATO could fail to use effectively the available warning time and
therefore could lag in its response to the Pact buildup sufficiently so
that little more than the currently deployed forces would be available
for defense along the Central Front. That is one reason why contingendy
plans exist for the possible use of nuclear weapons at a relatively
early stage in the Pact attack.
The standard planning assumption is that NATO would have fairly
clear warning of Pact intentions to attack, would begin its mobilization
and deployment by seven days after the Pact's, and would, accordingly,
have 23 days in which to build up its defenses. For force planning
purposes, it is hypothesized that the main allied effort would take the
form of rounding out and adding support forces to the divisions already
deployed. This would leave to the United States the main burden of
bringing NATO back into balance with the Pact. It has been judged that
the early addition of about ten more divisions and 15 more tactical air
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wings from the United States (for a total U.S. contribution of 15 divisions
and 23 tactical air wings by approximately M+30), along with the strengthened
Ailed forces, would provide an adequate basis for an initial forward
defense against the 87-division attack force of the Pact. According to
this planning concept, a total NATO capability in the Central Region of 40
divisions and 3,900 tactical aircraft should give reasonable coverage of
the front, provide a reserve, and prevent force and firepower ratios
from favoring the Pact to an excessive degree.
Once such basic planning assumptions are made, and the initial force
are postulated, other requirements follow. Because U.S. forces should
be on line in Germany within 23 days, most of them have to be ready and
come from the active inventory. Major reserve units, however valuable
for subsequent reinforcement and other less time-urgent situations,
cannot be expected to meet even this, let alone the more exacting mobilization
and deployment schedules generated by attacks with little or no warning.
Because the deployment schedule would allow so little time for the
arrival of the crucial U.S. reinforcements, the means of bringing them
on line are limited. One obvious way to solve the problem is by keeping
as many as 15 divisions and 23 air wings in Europe at all times. That
is not desirable for a number of reasons, including the fact that, while
the Central Region of Europe is of vital interest to us, there are
other contingencies we seek to deter as well. To tie down most of our
ground and air forces in Central Europe, with all the problems of extracting
them for use in the event of a crisis elsewhere, would be unacceptable.
As Soviet power in Eastern Europe has grown, the United States has
added two brigades to the deployed forces in Germany, just as we have
added to the total number of Army divisions. We have also added fighter-
attack aircraft in Germany and the United Kingdom.
For purposes of rapid reinforcement, we can preposition stocks of
materiel and supplies in a threatened theater, and fly in the men to
"marry up" with that equipment. Another choice is to use airlift to
move both men and materiel in the early stages of a buildup and rely on
sealift for the satisfaction of longer-term needs.
Koch of these methods has its own vulnerabilities. In order to
spread the risks, we preposition several division sets of equipment in
Europe and expect to improve the U.S. capability for sealift. But
because of the demanding NATO deployment schedule (and the U.S. need
for worldwide mobility), we rely most heavily on strategic airlift for
quick response, and place particular value on wide-bodied aircraft with
their ability to move outsize cargos. As long as large tonnages must
he delivered rapidly over long distances, there is no other choice.
Specifically, for the NATO contingency, the United States would need to
Aove on the order of 370,000 tons within about 30 days. With a capability
of that magnitude in hand, it should be possible to deal with most other
contingencies that could arise.
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The alternative to such a large capability would be a willingness
to engage in the classic practice of trading space for time. As a
result of such a trade, mobilization could proceed more slowly, and
deployment capabilities would not have to be as massive and costly. But
planning to give up territory to buy time is an unattractive proposition
on several counts. Those whose territory would be traded -- our NATO
allies -- are unlikely to see merit in the idea, and we would find that
in saving peacetime investment and operating costs, we had simply deferred
larger costs and greater risks to wartime.
Forward flexible defenses are often an advantage because smaller
forces are required to hold a well-chosen line than to retreat and
subsequently take the offensive to recover territory previously lost.
Casualties also tend to be lower in the first than in the second case.
In the circumstances,it is clearly why strategic airlift is regarded as
such a bargain. The continued inability to fund the proposed modifications
in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (to make it adaptable to military cargos)
is therefore particularly disappointing.
If there were complete confidence that the deterrence of conflict
in NATO and elsewhere (including at sea) would require only short-war
capabilities, the bulk of U.S. conventional needs could probably be met
by active ground forces, tactical air wings, strategic mobility, and
naval power projection forces. There is little confidence, however,
that future NATO wars necessarily would be short or that other contingencies
would not require longer-war capabilities.
As far as can be determined, the Soviets plan for a short, violent,
fast-moving attack on NATO which, if not successful, would burn itself
out in a relatively short time. But doctrine and practice do not always
coincide; rationing of supplies and less violent offensives could lengthen
Pact endurance. In any event, the evidence mounts that the Soviets are
investing more in non-divisional support units and other elements of
staying power.
It would make little sense to strengthen U.S. short-war capabilities
at the expense of staying power only to discover that the enemy could
outlast us. Accordingly, for the sake of deterrence alone, NATO must
hedge substantially against longer-war eventualities. One part of the
solution is to have the main Guard and Reserve forces serve as a first
echelon of reinforcements and replacements for the active units which
will have borne the brunt of the initial defense. Another part would
be, in critical areas, to provide sufficient war reserve stocks so that
we could fight from D-day to P-day (the time when production lines can
satisfy our combat needs).
Uninterrupted access to the main sea Lines of communication would
be essential to any major overseas combat operation by the United States.
Otherwise, even if an enemy could not defeat us directly in the land battle,
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he could force us into a desperate situation by using his naval forces
lo cut us off from our home base of supply.
Lu the event of a major mobilization in Europe, the United States
would begin to move and protect cargos at sea, partly because the period
of crisis might last more than 30 days, and partly because it cannot be
assumed that a major war in Europe, once started, would stop at U.S.
convenience. Nor can it he assumed that the conflict would not actually
have begun elsewhere (in the Middle East, for example), or that it would
not spread elsewhere. In these circumstances, it seems essential for
us, in conjunction with our allies, to have the capability to protect
the sea lines of communication in the Atlantic, through the Mediterranean,
sad in the Pacific as far west as Japan and South Korea.
The main naval threats, for planning purposes, come primarily from
the Soviet fleets based in the Barents Sea, the Black Sea, and the
western Pacific, and from long-range Soviet naval aviation. These
h,rces might begin operations only after D-day. But since the Soviets
would have the initiative, they might be able to deploy some of their
ships and submarines into the North Atlantic, Eastern Mediterranean, and
Western Pacific before a conflict began. In either event, U.S. strategy
would be to create a series of barriers that Soviet aircraft, submarines,
and surface combatants would have to cross to attack our merchant
shipping and surface combatants, and cross again to return to their home
bases.
U.S. carrier and land-based air would provide the main defense
against Soviet naval aviation and surface combatants, but they would
also participate along with U.S. barrier forces in a campaign of attrition
against Soviet submarines. Three types of barriers could be formed. The
first could deploy in relatively narrow waters and consist primarily of
aines, submarines, and patrol aircraft. The second and much looser
harrier could be formed in the open ocean and depend for its effectiveness
primarily on ocean surveillance systems, attack submarines, and patrol
aircraft. The third barrier could consist of the close-in defense of
.luch high-value units as carriers, amphibious groups, convoys, and
underway replenishment groups and be based primarily on escort ships,
.ielicopters, direct-support submarines, and where available, carrier-
-ased air. The requirement for surface and submarine combatants is
Largely determined by this task. For force planning purposes it is
ossumed that around 240 frigates, destroyers, and cruisers, and enough
direct-support submarines would be necessary to protect 12 carrier task
Forces, two amphibious groups, the necessary underway replenishment
groups, and at least 6 convoys. Manning the other two types of barriers
Largely accounts for the remaining U.S. patrol aircraft, submarine, and
modest surface mine-laying capabilities.
Naval forces also fulfill other important roles. In particular, the
capability of the aircraft carrier to project tactical air power from the
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sea represents an effective means of supporting national policy.
Aircraft carriers constitute a mechanism for showing a presence,
managing crises, and projecting power. Since World War II, U.S.
policymakers have used naval forces and carrier strike groups to support
major interests on at least 43 occasions. The circumstances have ranged
from reminding potential nations of the U.S. presence to engaging in combat
operations. For the foreseeable future, there is little reason to expect
that the need for carriers to perform such roles will decline.
Accordingly, planning of future naval forces should sustain the present
capability for crisis management and power projection. The main elements
of that capability will consist of task groups built around a mix of large-
deck aircraft carriers and smaller, less expdnsive, conventionally-powered
V/STOL carriers.
c. The Flanks
An attack on the Central Region of NATO is, of course, not the only
basis for the U.S. non-nuclear posture. The flanks of NATO could come
under attack simultaneously with a Pact offensive in the Central Region.
Either in North Norway, Jutland, or possibly in Greek or Turkish Thrace,
the weight of a Pact offensive could require reinforcement of the
allies. For force planning purposes, it is assumed that at least part
of this requirement would be satisfied by a U.S. Marine Amphibious Force
and its associated lift. If used in other than a reinforcing role, this
expeditionary force would have to depend, in turn, on fire support from
accompanying surface combatants and, if available, from the aircraft of
at least two carriers until Marine airpower could be established ashore.
2. The Minor Contingency
The strategic concept calls for the United States to plan on the
occurrence of a minor contingency prior to or simultaneously with a
major contingency. The reason for this relationship is twofold: not
only could a small engagement result in a larger conflict elsewhere; it
could require the commitment of U.S. forces which could not then be
extricated in time for use against the major threat.
An example of this possible sequence of events arose with the
covert introduction of Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs into Cuba. The problem
for U.S. policymakers at that time was how to force the missiles out of
Cuba and simultaneously deter the Soviets from taking action in some
other region, particularly Europe, where their military leverage was
greater. The solution was to place U.S. strategic nuclear forces on a
high alert and mobilize land, naval, and air forces against Cuba while
maintaining an ability to respond to a contingency in Europe with general
purpose forces. Even though in the autumn of 1962 the general purpose
forces were already being developed for two simultaneous contingencies
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considerable size (attacks in Europe and Korea), this response to the
(nban missile crisis made extraordinary demands on the U.S. non-nuclear
tosture and stretched it thin.
tinder present circumstances, it does not seem excessively conservative
Jo program at feast three divisions, amphibious lift for an additionai
brigade of troops, at least 4 wings of Air Force and Marine Corps tactical
aircraft, and two attack carriers for a minor contThgency. This force
would he no larger than the capability actually deployed against Cuba in
962, well before the proliferation of modern non-nuclear technology.
to some areas of the world, it might not be any better equipped than the
orces of potential adversaries.
rorefe Implications
MI: is now possible, based on standard plannirw assumptions, to
iiiiimarize the main elements of the active non-nuclear force structure
Mlle United States would require to deal with a major contingency in.
Europe and a more or less simultaneous minor contingency comparable in
magnitude to the Cuban emergency of 1962. Land forces would consist of
V) active divisions, of which three (by law) would consist of Marines
with accompanying air wings. Other land-based fighter-attack needs
would be met by 26 active Air Force tactical fighter wings. Strategic
?Jirlift, measured in mission objective rather than aircraft, would be
:Jufficient to move about 370,000 tons of military equipment over a range
/4 3,500 nautical miles in fewer than 30 days. Naval forces. with their
farflung responsibilities for sea control and specialized power projection,
would comprise a two-ocean ASW capability, 12 carrier task forces, and
the amphibiOus lift for the assault elements of a Marine amphibious force
and one Marine amphibious brigade. These are, in fact, the general
purpose forces that have been programmed for the past two years.
Northeast Asia
There is a view, I realize, that the United States is actually
preparing to deal simultaneously with more than one major contingency.
According to this theory, not only are substantial forces oriented
toward a high-technology war in Europe; the two-front strategy has been
kept as well. Critics of this persuasion cite U.S. Navy deployments in
the Pacific, the 2 divisions and 3 tactical air wines there, and the
fact that some of the Continental U.S. (CONUS) based divisions still
remain light and suitable primarily for the so-called third-world contingencies.
Several points are relevant to such suspicions, and should allay
item.
first, it makes sense in peacetime to maintain a limited
presence in the vital area of Northeast Asia to guard U.S. interests and
keep watch over the sea lanes. Current deployments are there for defensive
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purposes and are not excessive to their missions. Indeed, the U.S.
military presence in the Western Pacific is smaller than at any time
since 1950.
Second, a war in Europe could spread to the Pacific. Some
forces would be needed in that area to hold positions, tie down Soviet
forces in the area, and protect essential sea lines of communication.
-- Third, the great majority of the U.S. forces, including those
based on the west coast and some elements in the Pacific, would be
needed for a NATO contingency. The peacetime location of these forces
does not necessarily indicate or restrict their use in wartime.
Fourth, funds to accelerate the "heavying up" of two more Army
divisions are being requested, and consideration is being given to the
problem of retaining the amphibious capability and, at the same time,
making the Marine Corps more adaptable to the high-intensity wars of
modern technology.
E. Conclusions
In correcting misapprehensions, the opposite error should not be
made of mistaking the force planning process for a prediction of 'how the
resulting posture will be used. The European contingency is a iajor
factor in shaping the U.S. conventional force structure. And i a full-
blown crisis should develop in Europe, it would absorb the bulk. of U.S.
conventional forces. But it is a planning contingency, not a flat
statement of where an emergency will arise or the only theater where
U.S. forces will necessarily be required. Without such a planning
contingency, we could be left with unlimited demands on U.S. national
resource's, or even less satisfactory methods of designing the posture.
Nonetheless, we must avoid becoming literal in equating contingencies
with reality, rigid in committing forces to specific theaters and contingencies
regardless of the circumstances, unimaginative in remaining wedded to a
particular strategic concept independently of U.S. interests and the
dangers to them.
The main U.S. security objectives continue to be peace and stability
through suitable defense and deterrent forces. Aside from the Western
Hemisphere itself, Western Europe and Northeast Asia are the two regions
most essential to U.S.. security. Whatever the strategic concept used for
force planning purposes, it is necessary to avoid a demonstration of capa-
bility and will to resist pressure and aggression in one of these great
regions at the cost of denuding the other and inviting pressure there as
well. We may be willing to arrive at the necessary size and composition
of U.S. forces on the basis of a major and minor contingency. But we
must be equally sure to have a posture that is sufficiently large,
modern, ready, and well-positioned to face the most demanding threat in
Europe and still maintain the deterrence produced by a forward deployment
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a Northeast Asia. if the strategic planning concept does not permit that,
the concept should be changed.
Conventional deterrence does not come without cost in the modern.
world. Although the United States has a. large stale in peace and stability,
., could pay less tor that deterrence. Others may choose to follow just
auch a course. Under the guise of efficiency, they may urge the redeploymeut
and reduction of U.S. general purpose forces -- possibly, in part, to
avoid those responsibilities which entail risk_ T am convinced that the
risks of irresolution and weakness are greater. The current U.S. conventional
posture and deployments are the very least we can afford to provide for
the security and stability we enjoy in an increasingly precarious world.
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XII. OTHER CAPABILITIES
The size and composition of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces
will be highly sensitive to the assumptions made about the factors
reviewed here. It is possible to be more or less conservative in the
way the structure is designed; more or fewer risks could be taken.
The present course continues to be a moderate one. The world has
not changed significantly for the better in the past decade. In many
ways, it holds more dangers and surprises for the American people than
It did in the mid-1960s. The military threat has not declined; it has
expanded, and become more diversified. Yet the United States has tried
over a number of years to maintain security with defense budgets which,
in real terms, have been lower than they were before the war in Vietnam,
and with a defense posture which is smaller in many respects (if more
capable in some) than it was in 1964.
Whether the adverse trends of recent years can be arrested, and the
necessary conditions of security maintained with these forces, remains
problematic. Certainly it cannot be done by reducing the other capabilities
which add so much to the overall deterrent. The United States must have
adequate funding for programs in intelligence, research and development,
military cooperation with other nations, command-control-communications,
and logistics.
A. Intelligence
Without the collection and analysis of the various intelligence
capabilities, uncertainty about the size and composition of adversary
forces would be much more substantial, and we would know even less than
we now do about opponents' plans and capabilities. Risks would increase.
It would be necessary to introduce greater conservatism into the planning
and programming of the U.S. posture and take out heavier insurance
against surprises in action and technology. As one example, we have
made relatively modest deployments to Europe based on our knowledge
about current Warsaw Pact capabilities and deployments. Without that
knowledge, either U.S. requirements would grow or our dependence on a
nuclear strategy would have to increase.
B. Research and Development
Without a major program of research and development, the United
States could not keep pace with the Soviet Union, improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of our posture, or even understand adequately what our
opponents are doing. The Soviets have had a long-standing and deep
commitment to technological excellence in the military sphere; they have
made great strides toward their goal. That is one reason why we must be
cautious about the transfer of advanced technologies to them. In many
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&Man
FY 1978
Dollars
70
50
51)
10
30
20
10
ptiART XII-1
COMPARATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET INVESTMENT
IN MIUTARY FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
113. AND SOVIET MILITARY ,NVESTMENT
$curernanl, Faecal., P0T8E1
(Constant FY 1?73 Dollars)
USSR
? 60
50
10
121
1"
L...
M 75 M 77 M
0 I I._
1954 65
8itlion
EY 1973
Dollars
66 67 68 60 70
21
I I
72 73
U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY ROME
ITApstant EY 1970 Dollars/
(Prrlirn.,
so.
oar
20
10
il.S./11.S.S.R, ENGINEERS
AND 5;11ENYISTS ENGAGER IN ELSO
800,000
1,S 00 THOUSANDS
GRADUATING U.SJU 50.9. ENGINEERS
WITH BACHELOR DEGREES
rid Mr .11
an I/
0 Ill.-1-1-1 J I 1I- 0 0
1914 65 66 67 88 69 70 71 72 73 75 75 76 77 78 ORES 1970 197910
Sr eased ((a 1974 data. Data Ior 1970 nnt yet avadahle.
Areas of their military establishment, they have actually increased the
,Aze of their forces as they have heightened their sophistication. For
;The most part, quantity has not been traded for quality.
This development has several implications for the United States:
- We must recognize that the principle of diminishing marginal
productivity is as applicable in mature technologies as elsewhere; additional
tnvestments in those technologies will not produce returns to scale, and
Lhe Soviets will catch up -- as they are doing in inertial guidance.
- This means that we must be more alert than ever for new techno-
logical opportunities with defense applications and invest more to bring
them along. At present, for example, we must pursue the technologies of
ong-range cruise missiles and guidance which, in combination, can permit
mprovement in our conventional capabilities against many targets. There
is also the possibility of improved sensors to detect, locate, and identify
rhe presence and activity of foreign military forces. Space-based sensors
are especially interesting, as are mini-micro computers.
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-- Finally, since geography remains important, we must recognize
that the substitution of quality for quantity has only so much potential.
Numbers remain essential in most military operations, whether\ of men to
provide a certain density along a front, of aircraft to saturate a
defense system, or of carriers to maintain a presence in separate oceans
around the world. Accordingly, the U.S. investment in procurement as
well as research and development must be increased.
C. Military Cooperation with Other Nations
Cooperation with other nations through programs of loans, sales,
and some grants is desirable in certain cases to support U.S. foreign
policy and national security. Some look at such programs and fail to
see that it is in our interest for the NATO allies to purchase arms from
the United States, that it makes sense to approve certain military sales
to Israel, that it is better that we, rather than the Soviets, sell an
air defense system to Jordan. The overall security assistance program
has been a useful foreign policy tool since the Marshall Plan. Every
administration and Congress in the past 29 years has supported the
program.
Without military sales and assistance, it would be difficult for
many of our friends and allies to share the burdens of collective security
with us. Nor could we count on their forces to complement ours with any
degree of efficiency. Overseas base rights and other facilities sometimes
depend on a willingness to make U.S. defense equipment available.
Regional balances of power that could affect world stability and peace,
as in the Middle East, may depend on the U.S. ability to support well-
disposed nations, especially when others are being supported by assistance
and sales from the many sources of arms in the USSR and Europe. Balance-
of-payments considerations, while not central, cannot be ignored. Where
proud and independent states with large dollar earnings see it in their
self-interest -- as well as their sovereign right -- to acquire defensive
capabilities, their requests must be taken seriously, just as we have an
obligation to decide which sales are in the U.S. interest.
D. C3, Readiness, and Production
Other capabilities are central to the U.S. posture as well. Without
the command-control-communications permitted by modern technology, military
resources could not be used in the most efficient possible fashion, and
we could hardly hope to depend as we now do on deliberate, second-strike
responses for strategic deterrence. Without a high level of readiness --
materiel as well as personnel readiness -- it would be impossible to
substitute quick, forward, and economical defenses for the much larger
forces required when space is traded for time and lost territory must be
regained. In an era of uncertainty, without a war production base which
can satisfy current equipment and supply needs, and expand rapidly to
meet sudden emergencies and demands, the United States would encounter
even greater difficulties than in the past in responding to a Soviet
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surge in the production and deployment of guns, tanks, aircraft and
missiles. It is necessary only to recall the demands made on U.S. materiel
inventories as a result of the Middle East war of 1973, and the difficulties
since encountered in replacing those drawdowns, to realize how limited
Lhe U.S. war production base has become. As that WAT demonstrated, the
2ntire annual U.S. production of tanks could be consumed in a war lasting
only a month or two. To be sure, war reserve stocks can substitute in
;ome measure for a "hot" production base, but they are not a proof against
ancertainty. The expanding Soviet production base, and the possibility
of its being surged, mean that a diversified and "warm" production base
Ls an essential condition of U.S. security in these uncertain times.
Assumptions and Planning
As indicated, changes in assumptions about key factors relevant to
force planning can lead to modifications in the U.S. defense posture.
An example of such a modification occurred in 1970 when it was decided to
go from a "two-plus" to a "one-plus" strategic concept on the ground that
,be Sino-Soviet split removed the previous need to deter a two-front war.
Greater or fewer risks can also be taken with the force structure,
The Army would prefer the higher confidence of narrower division
ontages than are now being assumed for the European contingency. This
would drive up the number of divisions necessary to keen in the active
land force structure.
The Navy would like more ASW and AAW barriers in the Atlantic,
Mediterranean, and Pacific, which would increase the probability of kill
against Soviet submarines and other forces attacking our SPA lines of
communication.
]n. these and other instances, however, it must be decided whether
increments of effectiveness would be worth the additional costs, partly
because of diminishing returns to scale, but also because of opportunities
to invest resources elsewhere with larger returns in the overall effectiveness
of U.S. forces.
in an era of significant uncertainty, U.S. forces must have much
better than even odds of achieving their essentially defensive objectives.
They need not be overdesigned in the search for a no-risk posture, but we
must clearly avoid creating a capability which inspires low confidence
among friends and over-confidence among foes.
A posture which depends for its effectiveness on the restraint and
Looperation of our enemies is not a satisfactory deterrent. Opponents
who are assumed to ignore U.S. vulnerabilities and attack U.S. strengths
may be a convenient fiction for wishful thinkers. They are not the stuff
of real life. Now is not the time for major vulnerabilities or the
facade of deterrence. To deter, the United States must have a credible
capability to fight back if attacked -- that, above all. is clear.
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XIII. NET ASSESSMENTS
A. Methods
To what extent does the current defense posture of the United States,
and the one projected through FY 1981 -- essentially the posture described
and recommended to the Congress a year ago -- achieve U.S. objectives?
To answer that question requires use of the same analytical methods
employed in the design of the posture. If future trends in the factors
that shape our posture have been accurately foreseen -- and particularly
trends in the threat -- the previously programmed posture should prove
adequate to fill current and future needs. Nonetheless, periodic and
separate assessments of that posture need to be made.
Just as weapon systems should not be evaluated by the same group
that designed them, the effectiveness of the U.S. defense posture is best
assessed by groups not intimately engaged in its construction. It is
also the case that, because of long lead-times for the development and
production of weapon systems, and for the training of military personnel,
the posture today is bound to reflect decisions made some years previously.
Since many of those decisions had to be taken under conditions of uncertainty
about a number of planning factors, what was judged adequate only a short
time ago may no longer fit the situation.
The United States is involved in 'a highly dynamic political-military
process. Accordingly, our posture and programs must be continually
assessed in light of more precise data so as to ensure the continued
appropriateness of the capabilities to our needs.
In making such assessments, a number of off-design contingencies
are considered, as well as the basic cases from which the U.S. defense
posture is derived. However, the main tests the posture must pass before
we can be satisfied as to its adequacy are:
-- the ability of the strategic nuclear forces to survive a surprise
Soviet attack and execute its missions with the desired level of effectiveness;
-- the ability of the general purpose forces, in conjunction with
allied capabilities, to conduct a successful, forward, non-nuclear defense
of Central Europe or South Korea;
-- the ability of U.S. naval forces to maintain selective control
of the seas to permit essential support of forward defenses and allies.
In addition, because of nuclear equivalence and the revived role of con-
ventional forces in maintaining U.S. security, it is necessary to begin
examining the ability of the U.S. war production base to respond to a
sudden surge in Soviet military outputs.
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Not only should these assessments deal with the current military
balance; they must also consider where the United States and the Soviet
Union expect to be militarily in the future. Only if such an assessment
;s made, allowing for uncertainties, is it possible to judge whether the
ive-Year Defense Program is adequate to estimated U.S. needs.
The Strategic Nuclear Balance
The Present Situation
At the present time. U.S. strategic nuclear forces are capable of
completing the missions prescribed for them under second-strike conditions.
Even after a full-scale Soviet surprise attack concentrated on U.S. forces,
4: is estimated that the on-station SLBMs, the bulk of the ICBMs, and most of
the alert bombers would survive, along with the minimum essential command-
control-communications system. The surviving force should be able, if
uecessary, to cause major destruction to the military and industrial capacity,
and to the leadership and population of the Soviet Union. In addition,
elements ot the surviving force would be available to engage in other responses.
The Soviets appear to be in a comparable position.
These conclusions suggest that despite differences between the U.S. and
Soviet strategic capabilities, the two sides are roughly equivalent at the
present time.. As now constituted, the U.S. posture contributes to both
crisis and long-term stability. It lacks capability for a disarming first-
sLrike; its ability to destroy fixed hard ICBMs on a time-urgent basis is
severely limited. In no way does the posture threaten to degrade significantly
by offensive or defensive means the Soviet capability for second-strike
assured retaliation.
The Future
Evidence of restraint on the part of the Soviet Union would be welcome.
Unfortunately, it has not been forthcoming. Along with the increasingly
large throw-weight they are deploying in their ICBMs, the Soviets have
dramatically improved the accuracy of this force. At exactly what point the
combination of throw-weight, MIRVs, high yields, and low CEPs will give them
1 high kill potential against U.S. Minuteman/ Titan ICBMs still remains a
matter of some uncertainty. There can be little doubt, however, that within
a decade or less, confidence in the present U.S. fixed hard forces as high-
confidence, second-strike weapons will be seriously eroded.
At the same time that the Soviets are developing their hard-target
kill capability, they are making a massive research effort in strategic
ASW, improving their anti-bomber defenses and continuing an active
program of SAM, ABM, anti-satellite, and possibly anti-tactical ballistic
missile research and development. They have already developed a mobile
defense system with an impressive probability of kill against bombers and
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cruise missiles, and the system could have an anti-ballistic missile
capability because of its phased array radar and high-acceleration
missile. Moreover, it could be produced in large numbers, stockpiled,
and deployed rapidly on short notice.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the potential impact of the
Soviet passive defense program. This long-standing program provides
protection for key government and military leaders in hardened shelters,
protection of key economic facilities and essential workers through
dispersal and hardening programs, and lastly, protection for the majority
of the population (through fallout shelters and evacuation).
During the last six months we have become more aware of the magnitude
of Soviet civil defense efforts, although major gaps in the intelligence
data preclude us from making any confident judgments about effectiveness.
What we see, however, suggests to us a continuing Soviet interest in
enhancing the Soviet capability to survive a nuclear war, coupled with a
steadfastness of purpose which is of concern.
This civil defense capability -- if it continues to grow as we
expect -- coupled with high accuracy and more reliable missiles, could
adversely affect our ability to implement the U.S. deterrent strategy.
Thus, it could provide the Soviets with both a political and a military
advantage in the event of a nuclear crisis.
With the initiative, if they develop better military capabilities,
the Soviets in a first-strike could conceivably eliminate 95 percent of
the fixed U.S. ICBM force, all of the non-alert bombers (and perhaps
even some of the alerts), and all of the SLBMs in port. Furthermore,
their civil defense capabilities could enable them to protect key leaders, key
facilities, and some of their population from a U.S. counterstrike.
They would also retain a large residual offensive capability which they
could either withhold or use to attack U.S. population and industry. It is
at least conceivable, under these conditions, that U.S. second-strike
retaliatory forces would have a damage expectancy, not of 40 percent
prompt fatalities and 70 percent of Soviet industry destroyed, but 5 percent
prompt fatalities and perhaps 30 percent of industry destroyed. Soviet
damage expectancy against the United States, by contrast, would remain at
more than 50 percent prompt fatalities and as much as 80 percent of in-
dustry destroyed. The Soviet society and system could probably survive
such an exchange; the United States probably could not. It is clearly
not in our interest to allow such an imbalance to evolve.
It is premature to say that such a damage-limiting asymmetry is
developing. But the vigor of Soviet efforts in this direction raises a
number of issues for the U.S. strategic nuclear posture and programs.
The Five-Year Defense Program, as it was presented to the Congress last
year, concentrated on two broad efforts.
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-- The first entailed an orderly modernization of the Triad by
means of the Trident, B-1, and improvements to Minuteman ITT.
The second involved the development, again at a measured pace.
of several hedges against the possibility of Soviet efforts to upset the
strategic balance. These hedges included work on Missile X (M() -- an
tCBM designed to have more survivable basing options, improved guidance,
and better yield-to-weight warheads for ballistic missiles, continued
development of ABM systems technology, and a very modest base of civil
defense activities which. if necessary, could be built on in the future.
In none of these eftorts, as projected in the Five-Year Defense
Program, was the effect to reduce the Soviet capability for assured
fetaliation. After programming the funding profile below, it was possible
to see if the Soviets would reciprocate by leaving their population and
industry hostage to our capability for assured retaliation.
CHART XIII-1.
STRATEGIC FORCES BUDGET TREND
-- Constant FY 73 Budget Dollars
ANNUAL DIRECT STRATEGIC COSTS
7.0
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
STRAlEGIC COMMAND. CONTROL
A COMMUNICATIONS
OFFENSIVE FORCES
1962 64 66 68
70
72
'FISCAL YEARS
1......rmaTM7r7477)
74 76 78 80
62
Xvidence of reciprocity has not been forthcoming. Accordingly, in
the FY 1978 budget cycle, it has been necessary to assure ourselves that
the Five-Year Defense Program maintains the U.S. strategic nuclear
deterrent. We have tried to identify steps that must be taken now so
that the United States will be capable of countering potentially destabilizing
actions of the USSR. A number of potential vulnerabilities in the U.S.
strategic posture are developing. So far, these problems have been
anticipated in ongoing research and development programs.
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C. The Conventional Balance in Europe
Any assessment of the current balance of conventional power in
Central Europe must evaluate NATO's ability to contain an attack with little
or no warning as well as a major mobilization and deployment by the
Warsaw Pact.
1. The Current Situation
At present, the United States and its allies in NATO have sufficient
active forces to maintain an acceptable ratio of defense-to-offense
against either type of attack. However, it would be a mistake to conclude
that, because of an acceptable ratio, we have high confidence of conducting
a successful forward defense in all instances. NATO forces are badly
positioned to cope with a short-warning attack by deployed Pact units
(one U.S. division is on the wrong side of the Rhine); they would probably
be slow in their response to such an attack because of readiness problems;
and NATO does not have the streamlined and ready command structure necessary
to deal with a short-warning, fast-moving battle, a sufficiently responsive
logistics system, or the central reserves necessary to pinch off a major
enemy salient.
CHART XIII -2
COMPARISON OF FORCES
(CENTRAL REGION)
UNCERTAINTY IN SOVIET BUILDUP RATE
.70 Er READINESS PACT
?
60
NATO
50
40
30
20
10
U.S. CONTrIBUTION OF
GROUND FORCES
NON-U.S. NATO
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
DAYS AFTER PACT IVI-DAY
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A full-scale, reinforced attack would require the Warsaw Pact to take
as much as a month to deploy the additional 29 divisions and 900 aircraft
from the western military districts of the USSR, make ready a full 87-
division force, and launch a well-coordinated offensive. Even assuming
that NATO would have no more than 23 days in which to respond, the alliance
should be able to mobilize a capability sufficient to contain an attack of
this magnitude. But whether warning time would be fully utilized, whether
reinforcements from the United States would arrive early enough to stem
the Pact offensive, and whether the alliance would have sufficient staying
power to outlast the Pact, continue to be the most disturbing uncertainties
facing NATO.
The U.S. strategic airlift capability remains seriously deficient both in
total capacity and in the capacity to move the necessary outsize cargos.
Allied and U.S. war reserve stocks remain below what are considered prudent
levels for a conflict lasting more than a few weeks. Firepower ratios
favor the Pact. The main line of communciations to the front is excessively
exposed. NATO could not be sure of winning the initial battle on the frontier.
2. Future Prospects
As to the future, the outcome of a Pact attack on NATO becomes even
less certain. The Soviets may well continue to add manpower to their
forces in Eastern Europe, and they seem likely to continue increasing and
modernizing their firepower, mobility, non-divisional support, and frontal
CART XIII-3
SUMMARY OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE
FOR A CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE at
OCTOBER 1976
NATO
NON-U.S.,
NATO
TOTAL
TOTAL
WARSAW PACT
NON-SOVIET ,
WARSAW PACT.'
SOVIET -,/
MAIN BATTLE TANKS
5.000
5,500
10.530
23,200
6,900
16,300
LIGHT TANKS AND ARMS -21.
900
1.700
2,6GO
6.500
BOO
5,700
MAJOR AT WEAPONS
5,400
D.000
10.400
5009
2.700
3,300
ARTILLERY PIECES
3.000
7.900
5,910
7,700
2,400
5,300
MULTIPLE ROCKET LHRS
0
ZOO
ZOO
1,000
500
1,160
APCs
10,000
14.400
24.400
13,600
6.900
6,700
HELICOPTERS
4.500
1,750
6.200
1,200
300
900
DOES NOT INCLUDE WAR RESERVES.
I.TS FORCES FOR KOREA, AND THOSE FORCES DEPLOYED TO CONTINGENCY
At FORCES OF BELGIUM. CANADA, DENMARK. FRANCE. WEST GEFIMANY, LUXEMBOURG,
TIIERLAINDS and U.K.
di FARCES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY. AND POLAND.
7OVIET FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. EAST GERMANY, POLAND ANO THE THREE
'CISTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS.
II ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES
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aviation; they will probably improve still further their nuclear and
chemical warfare capabilities, which are already formidable. As they do
so, NATO deficiencies in artillery, tanks, and multiple rocket launchers
will become more serious. If uncorrected, force and firepower ratios
could become dangerously unfavorable.
Adjustments in the current Five-Year Defense Program to repair these
prospective weaknesses in U.S. forces are required. Our allies must also
do more. Contrary to conventional wisdom, NATO may have enough manpower
to stem both the short-warning and the full-scale attack, but without
prompt remedial action, the alliance may lack the necessary firepower and
mobility to enable that manpower to do its job, especially if the current
qualitative advantage in fighter-attack aircraft weakens.
D. The Conventional Balance in Northeast Asia
Despite recent events in Korea, the military situation in Northeast
Asia is relatively stable. It should remain stable for the foreseeable
future, provided the United States maintains an adequate presence in that
vital region. The main test of the posture there would come from an
attack on South Korea. The North Koreans might launch such an attack
without major external assistance. If they did, the South Koreans could
have some difficulty containing an attack north of Seoul without the
support of some U.S. ground, air, and logistical units. In the unlikely
event that the North Koreans received major external assistance, substantial
U.S. support would be required to help maintain a forward defense north of
Seoul.
The U.S. division in Korea, in addition to its deterrent function,
provides both an initial response capability and the base on which deploy-
ments could be made in the event of a major attack. The Marine amphibious
force in Japan (Okinawa) and theater air forces could provide additional
reinforcements in the short-run. Additional air and ground forces, if
needed, could be deployed in a timely fashion to contain a large-scale
attack, provided, of course, that the needed U.S. forces had not been
committed previously to another theater. The forces programmed for a
minor contingency help reduce the risk that the United States could not
respond in Northeast Asia in the event of a need to withhold substantial
forces for Europe.
E. The Maritime Balance
The main test of U.S. naval forces comes precisely from the possibility
of having to deal with a major contingency in Europe and the threat of one
in Northeast Asia, with the accompanying requirement to ensure the sea
lines of communication to these two theaters, the Mediterranean, and
Persian Gulf. Soviet cruise-missile and torpedo attack submarines represent
the principal threat to these sea lanes. However, we must also be in-
creasingly concerned in some waters with Soviet land-based naval aircraft
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as the Backfire comes into service, and with the increasingly capable
fleet of Soviet surface combatants when it is within firing range.
CHART XIII-4
CHANGES !Ai NAVAL FORCE LEVELS-- U.S./ U.S.S.R.
(1936-1976)
ATTACK SUBMARINES
400
400
300
.,
rat,
300
NUMBER
OF
NUMBER
SI-UPS
OF
200
200
SUBMARINES
U.S
100
100
NUMBER
OF
PLATFORMS
I I I I_ 1 I
Er, .67 643 69 70 71 7273747576
AR
STANDOFF WEAPON SHIP DELIVERY PLATFORMS
250
4.00""ka, ...
2001? 41,
'50r
100L
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 76 76
AR
These forces might be able to deny us access to waters adjacent
to the USSR and full initial use of the eastern Mediterranean. However,
present U.S. naval capabilities, in conjunction with those of our allies,
should be able to ensure the delivery of essential tonnage to Europe and
Japan during the first three months of a war, and gain virtually unimpeded
control of the seas thereafter. Despite this expected outcome, losses
of both combatant and merchant tonnage could be heavy, and could jeopardize
seriously the U.S. ability to sustain land and tactical air operations
in Europe and Asia. Because of this risk, and projected improvements in
the Soviet fleet, the time has come to move systematically toward a
posture capable of earlier and more decisive sea control.
MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS
U.S.
or. """ ??? .
111111_1J
66 67 68
ele
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
YEAR
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
150
NUMBER
OF
SHIPS
100
Seven major conclusions of our recent study of the maritime problem
warrant summary in this context.
-- The Soviet maritime threat constitutes a substantial and growing
challenge to the United States and its free access to the seas. The
main components of that threat are:
Lhe Soviet submarine fleet;
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- the Soviet naval aircraft, including the Backfire, equipped
with sophisticated air-to-surface, antiship missiles.
- the Soviet surface fleet equipped with antiship missiles
when at firing range;
Our allies have a substantial maritime capability which can,
and should be considered to augment U.S. capabilities.
-- The rate at which the U.S. Navy is rebuilt should nonetheless
be accelerated to meet the Soviet challenge.
-- In the expansion of the Navy, continued emphasis should go to
improving the U.S. ASW capability. The Soviet Union has the world's
largest submarine fleet; numerically, it is three times larger than
ours. U.S. attack submarines are quieter and have a better sonar suite
than their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. Mark-48 torpedo is effective
against deep, fast-running targets. U.S. air ASW platforms -- the P-3
and S-3 -- have improved sonobuoys and acoustic processors. The Underwater
Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) is being upgraded and expanded. The
tactical towed array sonar and the LAMPS helicopter now under development
promise to add a new dimension to the ASW capability of the surface
fleet. When operational, these systems will provide a major improvement
in the local ASW defenses of convoys, underway replenishment groups, and
amphibious forces. However, the number of surface combatants presently
authorized is not sufficient to provide an adequate capability against
the Soviet submarine threat. Equally important, should some cruise
missile launching submarines go undetected and launch their missiles,
the ability of U.S. naval forces to defend against these missiles is
inadequate.
-- This is one dimension of the problem. There is also a major
deficiency in the U.S. capability to meet the more general antiship cruise
missile threat, especially the high-density threat posed by air-launched
missiles. Land-based Soviet naval aircraft operating from fields in the
Black Sea area can attack shipping throughout the Mediterranean. From
northern fleet bases, the Backfire can range deep into the Atlantic to
strike resupply and reinforcement convoys to Europe. In the Pacific,
the Backfire can reach areas south of Hawaii, making U.S. resupply of
Hawaii, Japan, and Korea increasingly difficult. The introduction of
the F-14/Phoenix system has brought a major improvement in the ability
of the carriers to defend against this type of attack. There will,
nonetheless, be situations where significant numbers of hostile bombers
could penetrate the interceptor screen to launch air-to-surface missiles
that must be met by the surface-to-air missile systems of the surface
forces. Needed capabilities can be acquired with a mix of AEGIS-equipped
DDG-47 destroyers, CSGN strike cruisers, and FFG-7 frigates.
-- The major platform for sea control will continue to be the large-
deck carrier through the 1990s. However, in view of advancing technology and
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i-he high cost ot new carriers, we must find new ways to put aircratt over
The world's seas. Through a vigorous Service Life Extension Program
SLEP) for the carriers, the United States can keep a total of 12 large-
deck carriers in the force into the 1990s. The extension program will
hegin in the early 1980s and continue into the 1990s.
The President, in addition, has decided to move toward smaller air-
apable ships and V/STOL aircraft because of the large unit investment
-e.presented by the NIMITZ class carrier and the prospective technological
advances in the threat (particularly Soviet satellite surveillance
!;ystems coupled with advanced offensive strike capabilities). In these
circumstances, development of less costly, flexible replacements for
iarge-deck carriers must be pursued. That is why the President, last
May, proposed budget amendments to accelerate research and development
oa several new technologies related to V/STOL aircraft. antiship missiles,
=ocuise missiles, and long-range, land-based aircraft.
Once combatant ship force levels are established, the in-
creased needs for specialized support and auxiliary ships must be addressed.
Vhere is little doubt that the requirement for sustained overseas deploy-
ments and operations oi the U.S. Fleet will continue, as will the need
,or modern support ships.
The Production Balance
A determined adversary who sees that the United States is intent on
eaiing off one avenue of potential attack could well look for others.
In the past, we have seen precisely this process in the growing Soviet
:Ilipport for "wars of national liberation" as the opportunities for more
conventional political and military gain diminished. Now, as Soviet
military technologies grow more mature, there may well be yet another
-;earch for Western vulnerabilities.
To take the critical case of the military balance in Europe as an
,-xample, its stability depends on the U.S. ability to defeat either an
attack with little or no warning or a full-scale attack launched by the
T'act after a period of intense mobilization and deployment. But there
still another possibility. As the Soviets have expanded their military
orces, they have increased their considerable war production base.
They are moving into a position to surge their output of war materiel
and marry it 1.11) with trained manpower (in the form of reservists) to
produce, over a period of about 18 months, a substantially expanded
.2.ombat capability. To the extent the Soviets believed the United States
could not compete with such a surge, it could be persuasively argued
dithin their councils that it would pay them to engage in a war production
race before embarking on any large-scale adventure.
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35
30
25
20
15
10
5
CHART XIII-5
COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF NEW SYSTEMS
DEVELOPED DURING 1965-1376 BY U.S. AND U.S.S.R.
USS
US
F XED-WING HELICOPTERS
AIRCRAFT
USSR
STRATEGIC TACTICAL
OFFENSIVE MISSILES
MISSILE3
USSRrr
1975-1976
1970-74
1965-1969
USSR
SURFACE SUBMARINES
SH PS
Given this possibility, two questions should be asked:
--- how many equipped and combat-ready units could the Soviets
raise after 18 months of intense mobilization?
-- what response could the United States make during the same
time with its current war production base?
As far as can be estimated, the Soviets have enough recently trained
reservists so that, within 18 months, they could add an increment to
their general purpose forces of about 1.3 million men. At the same
time, they could produce around 1,600 additional front-line aircraft,
together with, enough equipment sets, spares, and other materiel to
support the additional forces.
In an equivalent period of time, the United States would be able to
call up and ready its Guard and Reserve forces, amounting to one million
men. Of this total, 8 Army divisions and about 12 tactical wing equivalents
(with over 800 aircraft) would have their equipment, as would a Marine
Amphibious Force. The current war production base surged to maximum
capacity, could (by diverting deliveries from intended FMS recipients)
provide the materiel for another 10 divisions and the aircraft for 4 additional
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CHART XIII-6
ESTIMATED U.S./USSR RELATIVE
RODUCTION RATES
(1972- 1976)
USSR U.S. USSR/U.S.
1na-16 1972-76 RATIO
AVG AVG 1972-75
7,770 469 5.9:1
4,990 1,555 3.2:1
1,310 162
l,O90 573
666 733
27,000 27,351
Ground bunched antitank missiles
.?.49
23
54
US/USSR COMBATANT SHIP DELIVERIES
1966-1976
2.055,520 TONS
1.503,990 TONS
US. U.S.5 R. U.S. U.S.S.R.
DISPLACEMENT
NUMBER OF SHIPS
11 SUPPORT SHIPS OTHER THAN THOU CAPABLE OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT ARE NOT INCLUDED.
126
8:1
1.9:1
0.8:1
1:1
UNDERWAY REPLEN-
ISHMENT
nMAJOR COMBATANTS
10,000 TONS OR MORE
t72!
MAJOR COMBATANTS
1000-10,000 TONS
MINOR COMBATANTS
100-1,000 TONS
EjSUBMARINES
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wings. The total U.S. force, including both high-priority Guard and
Reserve and essentially new units, would comprise about 3.1 million men
and 5,500 aircraft. By the standard tests of force and firepower ratios,
this new force could probably neutralize the increment to the threat
added by the Soviets over a comparable period of time.
Too much should not be made of this comparison at the present time.
It is worth noting, however, that if such an assessment is even reasonably
accurate, the main constraint on the United States, ironically enough,
is not trained manpower but military equipment and supplies. The greatest
industrial nation in the world ought to be in a better position to deal
with such a contingency.
G. The Basic Choice
A little more than forty years ago, Winston Churchill had these
somber words to say about his country:
"I have watched this famous island descending incontinently, fecklessly,
the stairway which leads to a dark gulf. It is a fine broad stairway at
the beginning, but after a bit the carpet ends. A little farther on
there are only flagstones, and a little farther on still these break
beneath your feet."
The United States must not follow that path. We have been born to
freedom; we must be wise enough, purposeful enough, and strong enough to
preserve that freedom.
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XIV. CONCLUSIONS
Assessments of the international military situation and of the U.S.
contribution to deterrence, make it clear that the United States faces a
number of difficult but manageable security problems in the years ahead.
We have not entered a static phase of history; ours is a dynamic
age. In part, the momentum comes from the revolution in technology, the
breakup of old empires, and the frictions of growing economic inter-
dependence. Global tensions understandably exist.
We must not mistake such frictions for the main problem. The
principal cause of international instability lies elsewhere. It lies in
the Soviet Union -- with its combination of beliefs and military power --
and there is no pretending to the contrary.
A. The Problem
The United States seeks peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.
The United States has continued, cautiously, to believe that the current
Soviet leaders will probably see it in their interest to seek hegemony
by peaceful means, and avoid a direct conflict with the United States.
But the Soviets understand violence well, and have the connoisseur's
taste for the psychological and political uses of military power. It
should come as no surprise, therefore, that they are in deadly earnest
about their military programs, that stability -- as we have defined
it -- apparently concerns them less than it does us, that they have
designed their forces -- nuclear as well as non-nuclear -- for warfighting
purposes, and that they proceed toward their force planning objectives
with persistence. Self-restraint in the expectation that we will follow
their example has not been a part of their doctrine or their pattern;
neither has reciprocity on their part for restraint on ours. Western
weakness and irresolution are not examples the Soviets are likely to
emulate, but an opportunity to seize. If international peace and stability
are to be preserved, the United States must cope with these predispositions
rather than expect the Soviets suddenly and uncharacteristically to
adopt ours.
3. Arresting Adverse Trends
In FY 1977, the United States has set in motion programs intended
to arrest the decline in U.S. capabilities relative to those of the
USSR. The task now is to stay on that path, preserve the stability of
the main balances of power, and ensure the future adequacy of the U.S.
defense posture, despite the magnitude and velocity of Soviet military
programs. To do so, the level of the Five-Year Defense Program must be
raised. To do less would be able to take unnecessary risks with our
nation's future.
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CHART XIV-1
U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAM TRENDS
(U.S. Outlays and Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs)
&BILLIONS (Constant FY 1978 Dollars)
IBC
170
160
150
'140
ISO .............
.........
eft-ttme-
......
120
W/0 SEA
Nt.
........... oft.
oft
110
...........
...........
100
90
U.S.S.R. (JAN 77 ESTIMATE)
.... 04000010.0
???4 ? .....
?????????? ? .
*** TREND OF US DECLINE
SOURCE: BASED ON JANUARY 1911 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THE DOLLAR.COST OF SOVIET
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND OF U.S, EXPENDITURES ON A COMPARABLE BASIS.
CONVERTED BY 000 FROM CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS TO CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS.
I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1
65 86 67 68 69 70 71 72 13 74 76 Is 77 78 70 la II 82
FISCAL YEAR
NOTE: HI U.S. 78 TRANSITION QUARTER IS EXCLUDED TO IMPROVE COMPARABILITY BETWEEN
U.S AND u.s.s.R.
(21 U.S. OUTLAYS INCLUDE ITEMS SUCH AS COAST GUARD, SELECTIVE SERVICE, MID
E110111?FUNDED NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
PROJECTIONS
C. The Conditions of Security
Deterrence and stability remain the prerequisites of security and
peace in this last quarter of the 20th century. Our country's ability
to contribute to deterrence and stability must be foremost in considering
the design of the U.S. defense posture. Our three major capabilities --
strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional -- must be maintained.
Each must have the responsiveness, flexibility, and effectiveness necessary
to permit the appropriate action in support of U.S. security objectives.
Only under those conditions can it be said that we have a credible
deterrent.
1. The Strategic Nuclear Posture
The strategic nuclear posture must satisfy six requirements:
It must be able to survive a large-scale surprise attack.
-- It must be able, if necessary, and be seen as able, to cause a
high level of destruction in the mission of assured retaliation.
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it must be designed to implement options short of full-scale
retaliation so as to be able to avoid unnecessary escalation.
-- It must contain programmatic and R&D hedges against an effort
by the Soviets to create a strategic asymmetry unfavorable to the United
States.
ft must be, and be seen as, equivalent to the Soviet strategic
posture in force effectiveness.
-- And it must be tailored so as to comply with existing arms
control agreements and encourage equitable agreements in the future.
2. The Theater Nuclear Posture
We can be no less stringent in the demands on the theater nuclear
forces. They too must be capable of riding out a surprise attack in
sufficient numbers to execute a variety of theater-related plans. They.
too must be designed to minimize unnecessary collateral damage. They
too must permit appropriate responses.
3. The Conventional Posture
The United States must not be in the position of having to cross
the nuclear threshold for lack of other choices. Nuclear forces are an
Inadequate deterrent to many contingencies. Accordingly, the U.S. conven-
tional posture continues to be essential to deterrence, stability, and
security. We must have the conventional capability, in conjunction with
our allies, to maintain a forward defense in Europe against a Warsaw
Pact attack, whether atter little or no warning or after a period of
mobilization and deployment. This capability must also be sufficient to
allow for a prior U.S. response to a minor contingency. We can and must
continue to contribute to peace and stability in the Western Pacific as
well as Europe and to the deterrence of sudden attacks in these two
vital regions.
4. Other Capabilities
The U.S. command-control-communications network is indispensable to
our entire defense posture; it must have the survivability, reliability,
capacity, and security to implement the decisions of the National Command
Authorities.
To complement U.S. active forces and their reserve components, security
assistance programs are necessary to help strategically located friends,
maintain access to necessary facilities overseas, substitute where
possible for U.S. forces, and stabilize regional balances.
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Both U.S. and allied forces need to be combat-ready and capable of
sustained operations. Without modern equipment, adequate supplies,
adequate maintenance, and realistic training, their size and composition
will not avail. They must be able, and be seen as able, to fight.
Strategic mobility is essential to their flexibility and combat effectiveness.
To support this posture, the United States requires a solid program
of research and development, and a production base sufficient to supply
current needs and permit a surge capability as necessary.
D. Major Objectives
The programmed force structure, with the exception of the Navy's
general purpose forces, should meet U.S. security needs insofar as they
can now be anticipated. U.S. requirements can be met in the years
ahead, given the present situation, at a military personnel level of
about 2 million men and women. However, if we are to have reasonable
confidence of meeting the growing Soviet military challenge as we now
assess it, there are seven major requirements to meet during the course
of the new Five-Year Defense Program. It will be necessary to:
1. Strengthen U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities and accelerate
those development programs necessary to balance any efforts by the
Soviets to develop major offensive and defensive damage-limiting capa-
bilities.
2. Increase the firepower, armor, air defenses, and tactical
mobility of U.S. land forces to meet the growing Soviet emphasis on
surprise, maneuver, and concentrated fire.
3. Accelerate the equipment and modernization of the 26-wing
tactical air force, to improve deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack through
the ability to defeat a Soviet air offensive, disrupt enemy lines of
communication into the battlefield, and disperse armor-heavy forces.
4. Expand U.S. strategic airlift capacity to meet long-range
mobility requirements, and preposition additional division sets of
equipment in Europe to compensate, in part, for the refusal by Congress
to support the more cost-effective Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAP)
modifications.
5. Accelerate progress toward a modern Navy based on 12 carrier
task forces and a two-ocean ASW capability to provide the necessary sea
control, power projection, and peacetime presence, in the face of the
growing worldwide reach of the Soviet maritime capability.
6. Flesh out U.S. division sets and war reserve stocks in Europe
and reduce major maintenance and overhaul backlogs so that scarce active
capabilities are ready and in a position to sustain combat.
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7. Increase investment in research, development, test, and evaluation,
(RDICE), procurement, and the production base in recognition that, as
Soviet technology matures, numbers of systems will be as crucial as
their sophistication.
E. The Costs
These are the requirements. Meeting them will necessitate a higher
Five-Year Defense Program than was presented last year. Total costs of
the additional effort over the five-year planning period will amount to
approximately $15 billion (in FY 1978 dollars). The benefits of continued
confidence in the U.S. security position will be worth the cost.
F. The Task
More than 30 years have passed since the end of World War II. This
modest record of relative peace nonetheless surpasses the 20-year interval
between the first and second of this century's great wars. That we have
come so far cannot be attributed to restraint and cooperation by others.
Technology, and some luck, have undoubtedly played their part. Above
all, however, the steadfastness and strength of the United States have
brought us this still uneasy but priceless peace.
Friend and foe will judge our determination by our actions. With
support for the programs outlined here, and described in detail in
Section II of this Report, it will be clear to all that we value our
freedom and our independence -- and intend to preserve them for those
who follow.
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SECTION II
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I. THE NUCLEAR FORCES
A. Strategic Forces
L. Strategic Offensive Forces and Programs
a. The Basis for the Program
U.S. force planning continues to emphasize programs to ensure a
fully credible second-strike strategic deterrent. As indicated in
Section I, assessments reveal a need for systems with increased military
effectiveness and survivability in order to:
-- counter projected improvements in Soviet offensive systems and
damage-limiting capabilities;
improve survivability under a potentially heavier Soviet attack;
-- accommodate reasonable growth projections in the number of Soviet
targets; and
meet the needs of our targeting doctrine.
Force planning under current policy is constrained by the numerical
Limitations of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and in particular,
those limitations anticipated in light of the Vladivostok Accord. Current
U.S. force planning through FY 1986 is depicted in Chart I-1 on the next
page, and is consistent with these limitations. Similarly, projections of
Soviet force capabilities assume that they, too, will be constrained by the
proposed SALT limits, although the USSR has the capacity to exceed these
Limits. U.S. forces programmed through FY 1982 are shown in Table 2 of
the appendix.
Given the objective of deterrence, which relies most heavily on the
military effectiveness of our retaliatory forces under a variety of possible
circumstances, there are a number of factors which must be considered in
shaping our forces. We must:
-- have strong confidence in the ability of U.S. strategic forces,
individually and collectively, to absorb and survive a large scale, enemy
first strike and still mount a second strike in retaliation.
-- be alert to the age of U.S. strategic forces, taking timely steps
to enhance the effectiveness of aging systems as Soviet modernization de-
grades their capabilities, and to replace obsolete systems when cost and
effectiveness considerations dictate. Further, U.S. planning must be
sensitive to the pace of future deployments to prevent, to the extent
possible, future block obsolescence of strategic force elements.
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2500
2000
w
1-U0^ 1500
=
CC 1-1-1
>
C',)-
-
L1.1 cc
- w
En
>
1000
D
0
0

-0
-0
n
0
<
M
a
-In
o
n
X
(D
(TO
fa
OD
a)
r..)
0
0
r..)
0
Co
i:3
"
? ?
0
-
>
*I
0
-0
CO
0
O
0
4=.
'.4
(.4
>
0
0
o
o,
0
0
-%
0
0
0
-%
-%
2-4
1:Ail Ihats of
Social &
Economic
14,334
14,881
14,376.
16,043
17,962
17,739
14,112
15,025
19,187
22,865
28,375
32,632
32,177
35,183
39,151
40,686
46,969
50,853
56,886
64,151
74,007
76,226
83,699
90,341
95,565
102,942
109,913
123,287
141,091
157,680
174,080
196,288
227,368
254,542
278,944
322,629
369,343
416,672
455,770
Government -- Federal, State and Local;
Agency Federal
Total Undistributed Net Total
1,075
1,090
6,046
24,917
65,660
78,080
81,858
41,553
11,601
7,845
11,761
12,405
21,775
43,261
49,864
46,304
39,862
39,754
42,266
43,821
45,936
45,219
46,596
50,376
51,548
52,738
48,581
55,856
69,101
79,409
80,207
79,284
76,807
77,356
75,072
78,569
86,585
92,759
101,129
of the United
958
L037
1,110
1,259
1,779
2,544
3,541
4,678
4,885
5,087
5,364
5,692
5,557
5,985
6,576
6,406
6,501
6,818
7,244
7,561
7,771
9,048
8,911
9,177
10,066
10,588
10,984
11,7./4
12,822
13,881
15,690
17,960
19,257
20,225
22,813
28,072
30,974
34,835
41,297
16,941_
18,038
22,247
43,722
86,977
99,734
101,657
66,205
47,833
46,839
58,226
64,315
68,856
92,683
102,599
99,772
100,387
104,950
114,930
124,431
136,769
139,605
149,341
161,636
169,702
180,638
185,234
208,148
240,937
268,105
286,566
310,469
340,672
370,946
395,967
450,403
510,810
572,156
625,555
-225
-260
-310
-358
-502
-626
-814
-904
-994
-1,068
-1,184
-1,197
-1,297
-1,417
-1,237
-1,361
-1,507
-1,859
-1,943
-2,241
-2,526
-2,456
-2,525
-3,011
-2,893
-3,162
-3,613
-4,573
-5,460
-5,545
-6,567
-8,427
-8,137
-12,318
-16,651
-14,076
-15,208
-18,841
16,941
17,813
2,,O77
43,412
86,619
99,232
101,031
55,392
46,929
45,845
57,158
63,131
67,659
91,386
101,182
98,535 '
99,026
103,443
113,071
122,488
134,528
137,079
146,885
159,111
166,691
177,745
182,072
204,535
236,364
262,645
281,021
303,902
332,245
362,809
383,649
433,752
496,734
556,948
606,714
8,841
9,455
13,634
35,114
78,533
91,280
92,690
55,183
34,532
29,773
38,834
42,597
45,546
67,721
76,107
70,890
68,509
70,460
76,741
82,575
92,104
92,223
97,795
106,813
111,311
118,584
118,430
134,652
158,254
178,833
184,548
196,588
211,425
231,876
246,526
268,392
324,601
373,535
394,237
9,000
9,229
9,200
9,190
9,000
8,863
9,200
11,028
14,000
17,684
20,200
22,787
24,400
26,098
27,910
30,701
33,724
36,711
40,375
44,851
48,887
51,076
56,201
60,206
63,977
69,302
74,546
82,843
93,350
102,411
116,728
131,332
150,674
166,873
181,086
211,400
221,856
243,200
273,000
-900
-872
-847
-892
-914
-911
-859
.819
-1,603
-1,612
-1,876
-2,253
-2,287
-2,433
-2,835
-3,056
-3,207
-3,728
-4,045
-4,938
-6,463
-7,020
-7,111
-7,908
-8,597
-10,141
-10,904
-12,960
-15,240
-18,599
-20,255
-24,018
.29,854
-35,940
-43,963
-46,040
-49,723
-59,787
-60,523
15,941
17,811
21,987
43,412
86,619
99,232
101,031
65,392
46,929
45,845
57,158
63,131
67,659
91,186
101,182
98,535
99,026
103,443
113,071
122,488
134,528
137,079
146,885
159,111
166,691
177,745
182,072
204,535
236,364
262,645
281,021
105,992
332,245
362,809
183,649
433,752
496,734
556,948
606,711
States Government - PT li
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
? FINANCIAL SUMMARY BY MAJOR PROGRAM ?
-0
-0
-0 "0
n n
0 (BILLIONS OF $) 0
<
<
MILITARY PROGRAM

00
CURRENT DOLLARS
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978
.
Strategic Forces
General Purpose Forces
Intelligence Et Communications
C
Airlift Et Sealift
Guard Et Reserve Forces
Research Et Development
Central Supply Et Maintenance
Training, Medical, other Gen.
Pers. Activ.
Administration Et Assoc. Activities
Support of Other Nations
TOTAL
$ 7.3
33.0
6.7
1.4
5.4
8.7
9.8
21.6
2.1
1.6
$ 9.8
38.2
7.5
1.5
6.0
10.1
11.1
22.7
2.1
1.3
$11.0
44.3
8.2
1.7
7.2
11.1
11.8
24.3
2.3
1.3
$97.5
$110.2
$123.1
Approved For Release 2002/08/S1EWRDP80-00473A000600100011-7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
B.Y MAJOR PROGRAM - CONSTANT PRICES
(BILLIONS OF $)
CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITT
MILITARY PROGRAM
FY 1976
FY 1977
FY 1978
Strategic Forces
$8.3
$10.4
$11.0
General Purpose Forces
37.5
40.5
44.3
Intelligence &Communications
7.7
8.0
8.2
Airlift & Sealift
1.6
1.6
1.7
Guard &Reserve Forces
6.1
6.4
7.2
Research & Development
9.8
10.7
11.1
Central Supply & Maintenance
11.2
11.8
11.8
Training, Medical, other Gen.
Pers. Activ.
24.4
24.1
24.3
Administration &Assoc. Activities
2.4
2.2
2.3
Support of Other Nations
1.8
1.3
1.3
TOTAL
$110.8
$116.9
$123.1
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000600100011-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/SECRK-RDP80-00473A000600100011-7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FINANCIAL SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATION CATEGORY
(BILLIONS OF $)
CURRENT DOLLARS
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
APPROPRIATION TITLE FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978
0
0-
0
to
Military Personnel
$25.4
$26.2
$27.7
Retired Pay
7.3
8.2
9.1
oo
Operation and Maintenance
28.8
32.2
35.0
CI)
m
"K3
..
Procurement
21.3
27.9
35.1
m
>
RDTElf
9.5
10.6
12.1
oo
Military Construction
2.2
2.4
1.5
0
Family Housing
1.3
1.3
1.4
0
Civil Defense
.1
.1
.1
0
0
Revolving and Management Funds
.1
.2
.2
Military Assistance
1.4
1.1
1.0
TOTAL
$97.5
$110.2
$123.1
Approved For Release 2002/08/2SEaRCRDP80-00473A000600100011-7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FINANCIAL SUMMARY ?
-0
BY APPROPRIATION CATEGORY - CONSTANT PRICES -0
-,
m
<
m
(BILLIONS OF $) o_
-n
o
-,
X
ca
47
a)
ci)
41)
n.)
0
0
N.)
0
03
N.,
_a
0
>
33
0
-o
03
0
(5
0
4
???1
C.4
>
0
0
0
o,
0
0
..8
0
0
..L
..L
?:,
APPROPRIATION TITLE
CONSTANT FY 1978 DOLLARS
TOTAL OBLIGATION/a AUTHORITY
FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 19Th
Military Personnel
$28.5
$27.8
$27.7
n
Retired Pay
8.2
8.7
9.1
col
MI
.p?
Operation Et Maintenance
33.2
34.2
35.0
23
rm
...4
Procurement
24.4
29.6
35.1
RDT Er E
10.8
11.2
12.1
Military Construction
2.5
2.5
1.5
Family Housing
1.5
1.3
1.4
Civil Defense
0.1
0.1
0.1
Revolving and Management Funds
0.2
0.2
0.2
,
Military Assistance
1.5
1.1
1.0
TOTAL
$110.8
$116.9
0111/1/11
$123.1
0/ZOOZ aseeieu Jod peAoiddv
L-1.1.0001.009000VELP00-09dCltl-tifi
ANNUAL INFLATION RATES
-c,
n
1
i--,
ui
FY 1973 TO FY 1974
FY 1974 TO FY 1975
FY 1975 TO FY 1976
FY.1976 TO FY 1977-1/
FY 1977 TO FY 1978
COMPOUND ANNUAL
AVERAGE, FY 1973-1978
CONSUMER
PRICE
INDEX
WHOLESALE
PRICE
INDEXa)
GNP
DEFLATOR
INFLATION ON
DEFENSE BUDGET:
OUTLAYS
TOA
9.0%
11.1%
7.1%
6.4%
5.4%
16.3%
16.9%
5.3%
5.5%
5.4%
8.0%
10.9%
6.6%
6.6%
6.0%
9.0%
11.7%
7.1%
7.1%
6.4%
9.9%
9.6%
6.7%
7.2%
6.1%
7.4%
9.3%
7.2%
7.8%
7.4%
_.
1/15 months "
24
L-1.1.0001.009000VELP00-08daiMPSIZ/90/ZOOZ aseeieu JOd 130A0iddV
FY 1978 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FY 1977 SUPPLEMENTALS
PURPOSE
($ THOUSANDS)
SUPPLEMENTALS
0
(D
0-
11
0
Civilian and Military Pay Raises
Octoba,? 1, 1976
1,167,401
Wage Board Pay Increases
306,537
Pc i
113,90C
TOTAL
1,587,838
TITLE
Military Personnel
791,865
Operation and Maintenance
Research, Development, Test Et
Family Housing
Evaluation
730,801
43,706
5,512
m
m
0??4
"
"
o
5
Civil Preparedness, DCPA
954
Military Assistance Program
15,000
Co
0
TOTAL
1,587,838
COMPONENT
Army
622,903
Navy
383,223
Co
Air Force
458,507
Defense Agencies
101,692
Defense-wide
5,559
Civil Preparedness; DCPA
954
Military Assistance Program
15,000
TOTAL
1,587,838
I?Z/80/ZOOZ aseeieu Jod peAoiddv
L-1.1.0001.009000VELP00-086fiai :
FY 1978 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
>
SCHEDULING OF BUDGET REQUESTS 13
13
-s
(TOA, $ MILLIONS) o
<
m
a
DOD MIL m
o
APPROPRIATIONS CON/FAMILY CIVIL MILITARY GRAND -s
FY 1977
ACT HOUSING DEFENSE ASSISTANCE TOTAL X
(1:0
Appropriations (TOA) Requested with (7)
lv
Budget Transmitted in January 1977 105,428 3,612 83 1,066 110,190 0)
(1:0
FY 1978 r..)
o
Appropriations (TOA) Requested with o
r..)
Budget Transmitted in January 1977 116,757 2,888 90 1,030 120,766 0
0
Appropriations to be Requested at a
later date, but included in Defense CA ? -%?
Budget Estimate: I" 0
?
C) CI-) 35 >
I October 1, 1977 Civilian and
1--.MI 41
-4 Military Pay Raise (2,050) (6) (1) (2,057)
0
-CI
FY 1978 Wage Board Raises (259) (10) (269) 03
0
Proposed Legislation: O
0
Retirement Modernization (25) (25) 4=.
-4
Military Trailer Allowance (8) (8) (.4
>
Family Separation Allowance (29) (29) 0
0
Retired Family Protection Plan (7) (7) o
o,
Quarters Allowance (10) (10) 0
o
Officer Pers Management Act (13) (13) -%
0
Dual Compensation (-30) (-30) 0
Cadet/Midshipmen Pay (-4) (-4) 0
-%
-%
Total Appropriations to be ?44
Requested Later 2,367 16 1 2,384
Total FY 1978 Budget Estimate 119,125 2,904 91 1,030 123,150
Approved For Release 20AKIRE1T: CIA-RDP80-00473A000600100011-7
LONG-RANGE FORECASTS
AND PAY/PRICE ASSUMPTIONS
FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 >
-a
-a
TOA($ BILLIONS):
Military Assistance $1.0 $1.0 $1.0
Military Retired Pay 9.1 9.8 10.6
Other Military Functions 113.0 124.6 134.2
Total, Current Prices 123.1 135.4 145.8
Total, Constant (FY 1978) Prices 123.1 128.8 132.3
00 Outlays ($ Billions)
Military Assistance $0.6 $0.5 $0.5
Military Retired Pay 9.1 9.8 10.6
Other Military Functions 100.4 111.0 122.7
Outlays, Current Prices 110.1 121.3 133.8
Outlays Constant (FY 1978) Prices $110.1 $115.1 $120.9
Composite Pay/Price Assumptions
FY 1978=100):
TOA 100.0 105.1 110.2
Outlays 100.0 105.4 110.6
$1.0
11.3
144.4
$1.0
12.1
153.7
156.7
166.8
135.7
138.6
tif3
ra
m
-i
$0.4
$0.4
11.3
12.1
133.9
143.9
145.6
156.4
$125.7
$129.2
115.4
120.4
115.9
121.1
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000600100011-7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/0MfgLRDP80-00473A000600100011-7