THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000600100010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
The Directorate of Intelligence:
A Brief Description
Confidential
Office of the DDI
February 1977
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by
Exempt from General Declassi ication Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?58(1), (2), and (3
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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FOREWORD
This memorandum provides an overview of the Directorate of Intel-
ligence, its mission and products, and the management systems used to
control resources and the production of intelligence.
The memorandum also includes a discussion of the principal strengths,
and problem areas of the Directorate. The Directorate has recently
undergone a significant reorganization which is discussed in some detail.
Finally, the memorandum presents at annex brief discussions of the
procedures used for the coordination and review of intelligence production
and an organizational history of the Directorate.
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction to the Intelligence Directorate . . . 1
Mission 1
Principal Products 2
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Summary of FY 1977 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 4
III. Intelligence Production Management . . . . . . . . 5
IV. Strengths and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
--Quality of Directorate Personnel . . . . . . 6
--Achievements of Individual Offices . . . . . 6
B. Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
--Growing Scope of Intelligence Production . . 8
--Growing Sophistication of the Policymakers'
Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
--Growing Pressure on Resources . . . . . . 10
--Impact of New Methodologies and
Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
--Emerging Relationship with Congress . . . . 12
V. The 1976 Reorganization of the Directorate
of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Overview . . 13
B. The 25 August 1976 Interim Report . . . . . . 16
C. . . . . . . . . . 31
D. DDI Decisions on Reorganization . . . . . . . 41
Annexes
A. Coordination and Review of Intelligence
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al
B. Organizational History of the Intelligence
Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B1
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I. Introduction to the Intelligence Directorate
Mission
The primary responsibility of the Intelligence Directorate is to
serve the President--and the other senior officials responsible for the
formulation and implementation of national security policy--by providing
the authoritative information and assessments on what's going on abroad
that they need to do their jobs.
We provide this service by taking the raw material of intelligence--
the information gathered by the collection elements of CIA and other
intelligence organizations--and producing intelligence reports and
studies that are relevant to the concerns of senior policymakers. This
process involves many tasks: collation and evaluation of information;
research into intelligence already available; analysis of its significance;
and preparation of finished intelligence reports. We refer to this
entire process as "intelligence production".
The scope of this Directorate's intelligence production can fairly
be described as global. On a geographic basis, all foreign areas are
covered by the Directorate's major components in accordance with their
significance to the U.S. Functionally, the coverage provided by the
Intelligence Directorate is equally complete. Our analysts can cover
the affairs of any foreign country from the standpoint of politics,
economics, defense, science,technology, geography, cartography, or
biography.
The primary recipients of the reports produced by the Intelligence
Directorate are, of course, the President and his most immediate national
security advisors. In addition, our reporting has long been provided to
the leadership of those departments and agencies represented on the
National Security Council and to appropriate components of these organi-
zations. In recent years, a demand for our reporting has developed from
new quarters, principally the Congress, the Executive Branch departments
responsible for foreign economic policy and, to a lesser degree, the
general public.
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Principal Products
To serve this large and disparate group of consumers, the Intelli-
gence Directorate produces a broad range of publications and--for a
limited number of high-level policymakers--provides oral briefings. In
terms of the frequency with which they are issued and the number of
persons they reach, the most important group of Directorate products are
the daily intelligence publications. These journals are designed
to alert the foreign affairs community to significant developments
abroad and to analyze specific problems or broadly-based trends in the
international arena. The daily publication with the most complete
disclosure of intelligence sources and most exclusive distribution is,
of course, the President's Daily Brief. Nearly as explicit and broader
in coverage is the-National Intelligence Daily prepared for Cabinet and
sub-Cabinet level consumers, and a cable version distributed more
broadly to the defense and foreign affairs communities.
Equally important, in terms of their contribution to the under-
standing of events abroad and their implications for US national security,
are the in-depth research and analytical studies produced on a periodic
or one-time basis. Some of these monographs are self-initiated; others
respond to specific requests of the policymakers or their staffs.
The subjects of these publications cover the full range of intelligence
interests and may represent the efforts of a single component of the
Directorate or the coordinated views of several offices, or other
elements of the Intelligence Community.*
In addition to its own daily reports and research studies, the
Directorate is regularly involved in contributing to Community intelli-
gence products such as the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and
the NSC Policy Review Memoranda (PRMs). The NIEs are prepared under the
auspices of the Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence, and
issued over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence. The
bulk of the staff work for the NIEs, however, is usually provided by
Intelligence Directorate analysts. A second form of direct input to the
national security decision-making process is the intelligence product
prepared for incorporation in PRMs.
*A discussion of the process by which Intelligence Directorate
publications are coordinated is presented in Annex A.
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Organization
The organization required to produce so many types of intelligence
for such a varied group of consumers has undergone many changes since
the establishment of the Intelligence Directorate in 1952.* A chart of
the current organization is presented on the following page. Struc-
turally, the Directorate includes:
--the Office of the DDI and its supporting staffs for adminis-
tration, planning, and coordination. The Office of the DDI also
includes the Center for Policy Support, the principal mechanism for
monitoring Directorate production activities and maintaining
relations with the policy making community;
--the CIA Operations Center which serves as the 24-hour watch
and alert facility for the entire Agency and provides a focal point
for the receipt of new intelligence information and its exchange
with other elements of the Intelligence Community;
--the Current Reporting Group which provides continuous
monitoring and immediate analysis of current international develop-
ments, and is the principal producer of the Directorate's daily
intelligence publications;
--the Publications and Presentations Group which is respon-
sible for providing publication services to the production offices
and fulfilling Directorate goals for improving the quality of
published products and developing new presentational means.
--seven research offices which provide long range, in-depth
analysis and periodic reporting on foreign military, scientific,
technical, economic, political, and geographic affairs;
--the Office of Central Reference which is responsible for
maintaining central reference services for the Agency and for
producing biographic intelligence reports for the Community.
*A brief history of the organizational development of the
Intelligence Directorate is presented in Annex B.
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II. Summary of FY 1977 Resources
From a
resource allocation standpoint, the distinguishing characteristic of
this Directorate when compared to the other three directorates is the
extent to which its money goes for employee benefits. Intelligence
production is a people-intensive activity, requiring relatively little
in the way of supplies, equipment, structures and operational funding.
Of the Opositions provided for the Directorate, about three
quarters are classified as professional and the rest as clerical. Based
on the standard program categories used in the Agency's budget presentation
to the Congress these positions are allocated as follows:
-78% are directly involved in "intelligence production,"
(researching data, analyzing information and writing reports)
--229 are tasked with "intelligence processing,"
(performing reference and retrieval functions, preparing publications,
or providing other support services)
The FY 1977 resources allotted to the Intelligence Directorate are
distributed as follows:
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M
Positions Funds ...
Office of the DDI (ODDI)
CIA Operations Center (OPSC)
Office of Economic Research (OER)
Office of Geographic & Cartographic Research (OGCR)
Office of Strategic Research (OSR)
Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA)
Office of Central Reference (OCR)
Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
Office of Weapons Intelligence (DWI)
Office of Regional & Political Analysis (ORPA)
Current Reporting Group (CRG)
Publications & Presentations Group (PPG)
Center for Policy Support (CPS)
(millions)t
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR -INTELLIGENCE
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Administrative, CIA
Planning and
Coordination Operations
& Liaison Staffs Center
Current Publications &
Reporting Presentations
Group Group
Office of Office of Office of Office of
Central Imagery Scientific Weapons
Reference Analysis Intelligence Intelligence
Office of
Economic
Research
Office of Office of
Geographic & Regional &
Cartographic Political
Research Analysis
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Center
for
Policy Support
Office of
Strategic
Research
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III. Intelligence Production Management
The production of the Directorate's numerous intelligence publications
and the management of its widely varied research programs demand continuous
forward planning, monitoring, and coordination with Office managers. To
meet these needs the Intelligence Directorate:
--holds weekly production meetings to (1) assign the production
of ad hoc requests from policy makers: (2) formulate research
programs; and (3) review ad hoc research and production.
--exercises control over the external research program through
quarterly contract review meetings.
--centralizes the mechanical preparation of Directorate
production with the creation of the Publications and Presentations
Group. The Group is also responsible for exploring new presentational
means.
--exercises managerial control over all the production of the
offices of the Directorate through the newly-established Center for
Policy Support.
To fulfill its responsiblity for production monitoring, the Publi-
cations and Presentations Group maintains a computerized system that
provides weekly, monthly and quarterly schedules of finished intelligence
studies. Daily intelligence publications, other regular periodicals,
and interagency publications produced under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Office, the Intelligence Community Staff, or the National
Security Council Staff are not included.
The Directorate's production program is reviewed at least monthly
by the Center for Policy Support to ensure that planned projects are on
schedule and responsive to consumer needs; that the projects of different
offices are not duplicative; that interdisciplinary projects will include
all the appropriate offices; and that coordination will be arranged for
all interested components of the Intelligence Community.
The research and production programs of each office of the Directorate
evolve from the interaction of analysts with their counterparts in other
agencies, Agency and Directorate management, the NIOs, the officers of
the IC and NSC Staffs and, ultimately, the policy makers. In addition
to frequent Directorate-level contacts with policy makers and other
consumers who express an interest in intelligence information and
assessments on particular foreign policy issues, the KIQ (Key Intelli-
gence Question) process helps to identify and establish priorities for
research and production planning. The KIQ Strategy Report designates
who in the Intelligence Community will be responsible for collecting and
producing intelligence that is responsive to particular KIQs.
-5-
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IV. Strengths and Problems
A. Strengths
Quality of Directorate Personnel
The basic strength of this Directorate lies in the quality of the
individuals it employs. As indicated previously, intelligence pro-
duction is a people-intensive activity requiring first-rate analysts,
processors, and collectors of information on events abroad to provide
foreign intelligence reporting of value to our country's senior policy-
makers. Fortunately, this Directorate has long been able to attract,
develop and retain people who, because of their native ability, academic
training and capacity to keep learning throughout their Agency careers,
have responded handsomely to the demands for increasingly complex and
comprehensive intelligence products.
The qualifications of our employees to do this work are impressive.
Their professional disciplines range from agronomy to zoology, though
the majority have been trained as economists, political scientists,
linguists, historians, geographers, computer specialists, military
officers and librarians. Of those professionals directly involved in
the production of finished intelligence, more than half have earned
advanced degrees. But far more important than this evidence of good
education are the personal qualities of the Directorate's employees.
Ultimately, it is the imagination and initiative of our people, their
capacity for objective research and reporting, their commitment to this
profession and this institution and, above all, their integrity which
constitute the most important asset we have. Whatever the future holds
in terms of reorientinq the mission and structure of the Directorate,
this fundamental strength deserves to be recognized and fostered.
Achievements of Individual Offices
This Directorate takes justifiable pride in the quality of the work
performed by all its components--including the manner in which raw
intelligence information is processed and intelligence records maintained;
the sophistication with which analysts pursue their tasks; and the
degree to which our products are responsive to the policymakers' needs.
To cite the specific accomplishments of individual offices, recognition
is due to the CIA Operations Center for its increasingly effective
performance in the critical task of managing the flow of incoming
intelligence information, alerting the appropriate Agency mechanisms,
and coordinating with the Community. A comparably strong performer is
the Current Reporting Group whose daily and weekly intelligence publications
and capacity for rapid, accurate reporting and analysis are models for
other intelligence agencies.
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Among the seven production offices of the Intelligence Directorate,
the reputation of the Office of Economic Research has never been higher,
largely because of the quality of its recent work on international
monetary problems, world trade, and petroleum issues. Likewise, the
Office of Strategic Research has provided invaluable support to US
negotiators in the ongoing arms limitations discussions as well as doing
cost studies of Soviet and Chinese military programs and serving as an
independent center for critical analysis of the strategic balance between
East and West. The Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research has
been responsible for the Agency's very successful innovative program to
estimate Soviet grain production and has been a key supporter of the
Department of State in negotiations on the Law of the Sea. The Office
of Scientific Intelligence, recently transferred to the Intelligence
Directorate, is a principal participant in community efforts to monitor
foreign atomic energy programs and nuclear proliferation, but is giving
increasing attention to such things as scientific and engineering de-
velopments abroad and the impact of civil technology transfers. The
Office of Weapons Intelligence, also recently moved to the Directorate,
has compiled an enviable record in the early identification and technical
assessment of Soviet and Chinese offensive and defensive weapons systems.
The Office of Regional and Political Analysis--though only recently
established--is already providing some genuinely impressive in-depth
analyses of some of the issues and complex political problems facing
foreign countries, their relationships with one another, and with the
United States. Finally, the Office of Imagery Analysis continues to
provide first class intelligence on Soviet and Chinese economic and
military developments and support to the SALT and MBFR negotiating
teams.
The Office of Central Reference is successfully shouldering new
burdens in the field of biographic intelligence production and imaginatively
pursuing new ways of solving the Agency's increasing requirements for
sophisticated data storage and retrieval through automation. A prime
example of the latter effort is Project SAFE.
The Center for Policy Support, although new, has already moved
forcefully to fulfill its missions of establishing close contacts with
policymakers and consumers of our intelligence and to ensure that the
research offices' products are relevant to the needs of the President,
National Security Council, and other key officials.
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Such strengths notwithstanding, there are a number of present
problems and future challenges that are matters of substantial concern
to this Directorate.
Growing Scope of Intelligence Production
given a cursory look at the intelligence production expected of this
Directorate in years past and the demands placed upon it today reveals a
steady broadening of our areas of responsibility. For example, before
the mid-1960s we focused our analytical efforts almost exclusively on
the Communist nations; now we cover the world. Moreover, from a functional
standpoint, we limited our in-depth research largely to economic and
geographic analysis; today we are deeply involved in military and
political studies and are aware of the need to integrate the various
disciplines of intelligence into truly interdisciplinary analysis.
Much of the substantive work we are asked to do today is on topics
which previously were not considered within the purview of intelligence.
A prime example is our economic research in support of US policy on
petroleum, world trade, and international monetary problems. To a
significant extent, this analysis depends very little on traditional
intelligence sources of information since much of the data that is
needed is unclassified. Nevertheless, the odds are that we will con-
tinue to be asked to do more rather than less of this kind of work
because senior policymakers have discovered that we can do it with a
degree of thoroughness, rapidity and objectivity that they find lacking
elsewhere.
With external pressures broadening the subjects and the audience to
which we must respond, it is also important to note that internally we
have become aware of additional questions and consumers that this
Directorate probably ought to address. For example, we are still doing
very little on such increasingly important problems as world food
balances, raw material supplies, population pressures and pollution of
the environment. Such matters have not been the focus of national
security interest in the past, but they clearly will be within the next
ten years and this Directorate should be building its capacity to
analyze and report in these fields. Furthermore, there are a number of
policymaking or influencing groups to which we should extend our support.
For example, the advanced research and development component of the
defense community is busily engaged in developing expensive defense
options for senior policymakers--often without adequate intelligence
input on the issues relevant to the systems they devise.
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There is little doubt that the scope of intelligence production is
being enlarged--appropriately in some areas and inadequately in others.
It is also apparent that the Intelligence Directorate is being asked to
serve additional consumers and probably should be serving others as
well. But there are limits to what this Directorate can and should do
and they have not yet been clearly defined. From a resource standpoint,
a decision on these limits cannot be postponed much longer.
Growing Sophistication of the Policymakers' Questions
Only a few years ago, most of the questions to which this Directorate
had to respond had relatively simple, factual answers. Getting the
answer might be made complicated by the security measures taken by a
foreign power, but the information required was definitive in nature.
For example, how many tanks do the Russians have in East Germany? Where
are their missiles located? What is the size of their gold stocks? The
right photograph or the right agent might provide a positive, clear-cut
response to these questions. Increasingly, the questions we receive
today do not have definitive answers and place a far heavier burden on
our analysts. For example, how will the qualitative changes in Soviet
strategic forces impact on US military capabilities? What will be the
effects of the increasing pressures of world population on food resources?
What direction will post-Mao China take in the next decade and how will
this alter the US-Soviet-Chinese triangle? The simple analyses of years
past will no longer suffice and we are obliged to engage in more complex
and time-consuming research than ever before.
Moreover, it is apparent that our prime consumers are increasingly
interested in estimative analysis. They are seeking predictions and
opinions on the facts unearthed by our intelligence collectors rather
than just the facts alone. Finally, it is evident that our principal
customers are not always satisfied with analysis of a subject from a
single, functional vantage point, e.g. economics or politics. What they
increasingly seek is total, interdisciplinary analysis, a picture of the
matter under discussion from all sides. In sum, as our capability to
describe the present and the past has increased--partly because of
better collection and partly because of better analysis--there has been
a shift in the demands of our customers. Today, they are seeking a
better understanding of the factors which will affect future developments,
decisions and capabilities, and they are seeking this understanding on a
wider variety of foreign countries across a broader range of interconnected
topics. This demand for more sophisticated reporting is being met, but
there is no hiding the fact that it has resource implications.
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!:rowing Pressure on Resources
The resources of the Intelligence Directorate have not kept pace
with the growing demands placed on it for the processing of information
and the production of a wide array of finished intelligence products.
As more officials of the Executive Branch and members of Congress become
familiar with our ability to respond quickly to queries and to rapidly
produce high quality, objective reports we find ourselves hard put to
keep up with the demand. The challenge for the Directorate and its
management is to find new ways to perform its expanding missions without
relaxing standards and within the resource constraints imposed on the Agency.
Over the years the resource reductions imposed on the Intelligence
Directorate have not been so severe, in absolute terms, as the cuts
required of other Directorates. Relatively speaking, however, intelligence
production has been made increasingly difficult by the fact that resources
have not kept pace with the demands for our product which have substantially
increased. To cope with this imbalance the Directorate has economized,
consolidated and compromised wherever possible, but the effect of these
measures on the long-term health of the Agency's intelligence production
capability is not salutary.
For example, resources have been shifted to respond to the immediate
concerns of the policymakers, diminishing our ability to maintain
expertise on subjects which may concern them in the future. Offices
have been reorganized to focus our analysis on key countries, reducing
the attention paid to others to a monitoring status. Long-established
and worthwhile programs like the National Intelligenc_e Survey have been
eliminated to meet even more pressing needs. Directorate personnel have
been required to put in additional overtime hours, a practice which
reduces our flexibility and resilience to respond to the demands imposed
by crisis situations. Long-term research on some important subjects has
been stretched out or severely curtailed, depleting the analytical
"capital" on which we depend for future intelligence production.
Impact of New Methodologies and Automation
Among the most important means with which this Directorate has been
attempting to cope with the growing imbalance between its resources and
demands is the adoption of new analytical methodologies and automated
information-handling systems. The new methods we are employing are
essentially research techniques borrowed from the academic world such as
systems analysis, probability analysis, mathematical and statistical
procedures, and decision-making analysis. The information-handling
systems with which we are concerned are primarily those large computer-
driven records indexes which permit an analyst to store, retrieve and
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manipulate information in support of intelligence production. Our hope
and expectation is that the application of these new methods and devices
will enable us not only to do more work with fewer people but, more
importantly, to further enhance the quality of our product.
We expect to become increasingly involved with new analytical
techniques as well as automated information-handling systems for the
foreseeable future. The implications of this growing involvement are
substantial for the Directorate in terms of the hiring and training of
personnel and in its funding requirements. As the production offices
become increasingly engaged in the use of more sophisticated analytical
techniques they must become more selective in recruiting and more demanding
about retraining personnel already on board. Moreover, as all components
of the Intelligence Directorate become more dependent upon automated
data handling systems they will have to devote positions, space and a
greater share of their budgets to the faster and broader control over
information resources which these machines can provide.
Our largest automation project is SAFE. SAFE is designed to make
the power of the computer, via remote terminals, available to the intel-
ligence analyst in direct support of his analytic responsibilities. We
believe that it will enable analysts to deal with the increasingly
complex flow of incoming data and the growing inventory of information.
It should enable them to do a better job in a more timely fashion.
Under SAFE, incoming material in electrical form will be routed directly
to a computer terminal at the analysts' desks where they will be able to
call it up on a video screen, place it in their own computer files for
later recall, and route it electrically to other analysts with related
responsibilities. In addition, analysts will have ready and immediate
access, from their desk areas, to stored information in the Agency's
central files. Furthermore, SAFE will give them the necessary collation
and computational power for the complex analytical tasks which are
required for today's foreign policy considerations.
Probably more important than any of the above, SAFE will increase
our confidence that all of the relevant information has been taken into
account in our analysis. This is extremely important. As discussed
above, the policymakers are asking more questions of fewer intelligence
analysts, the questions are more complex, and the answers are being
demanded more quickly. To respond adequately we must have the capa-
bility to examine large volumes of information rapidly. SAFE is primarily
designed to provide this capability and must be done if the intelligence
analyst of the near future is to be able to do his job.
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EmerginqRe1ationship with, Congress
The new interest taken by Members of Congress and their staffs in
intelligence analysis and reporting also places an additional burden on
j.he resources of the Directorate. But beyond the basic question of how
t: he Directorate can respond to this greater workload is the subtler
matter of how it should comport itself in its emerging relationship with
.he Congress. The Directorate has, of course, been involved with providing
intelligence assessments to the Congress in the past by preparing the
periodic presentations of the DCI, by providing senior analysts to brief
on topics of interest to certain Committees, and by providing requested
publications to individual Congressmen. But traditionally, its primary
role has been to serve the President and the national security structure
of the Executive Branch.
If this Directorate is to become a principal supplier of intel-
ligence information and analysis to the Congress, it may be placed in
the awkward position of attempting to serve two masters who, by Constitu-
tional design, are frequently on different sides of major foreign policy
issues. Obviously, in these circumstances the objectivity which is the
)irectorate's most precious attribute will be challenged by both sides.
At a minimum, the Intelligence Directorate may lose the confidence of
other elements of the Executive Branch, particularly the Departments of
State and Defense, on which it depends for critically important feedback
can foreign policy planning and other sensitive information which these
?lements glean in the course of their work. Accordingly, one of the
foremost problems facing this Directorate in the years ahead is to find
a way in which we can respond to the proper demands of Congress without
;jeopardizing relations with the Executive.
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V. The 1976 Reorganization of the Directorate of Intelligence
A. Overview
During the past several years, the Directorate of Intelli-
gence has taken a number of steps to change the focus of its
production effort in order to be more responsive to the ex-
pressed needs of its consumers. The momentum for undertaking
a more intensive examination of the way in which CIA was or-
ganized to produce intelligence was given additional impetus
by the numerous Executive and Congressional examinations of
the production process. In particular, the findings of both
the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence and a
number of consumer surveys undertaken by the IC Staff all
seemed to focus on two basic areas--the need for CIA to pro-
duce more integrated or interdisciplinary analysis and the
need to create a working environment in which the analytic
career could flourish.
With the establishment of the Executive Advisory Group
in CIA, the new leadership of the Agency made one of its first
priorities a basic re-examination of intelligence production
in the Directorate of Intelligence. This study was taken
internally under the direction of Dr. Sayre Stevens, the
Deputy Director for Intelligence. It had four basic objec-
ti ves :
--To identify those organizational changes needed
to facilitate the production of interdisciplinary
analysis.
--To consolidate the total intelligence production
effort within CIA.
--To foster the production effort on three counts:
-the production of long-range issue-
oriented analysis..
-the development of new methodologies.
-the identification of more effective
presentational means.
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--To create a working environment in which an
analytic ethos could flourish and could be
recognized as the principal career track to
be followed in the DDI.
With these purposes in mind, starting in June 1976 the
:deputy Director for Intelligence convened a series of discus-
,-"ions with his office and staff chiefs to consider the organ-
izational forms which might best accomplish them. After
thorough discussion of the various alternatives, an interim
report (section V. B) on the DDI organization for production
was submitted by the DDI and considered by the Executive Ad-
visory Group on 25 August 1976. This report received the
general endorsement of the Executive Advisory Group and the
JDI was given authority to proceed with the preparation of
specific reorganization proposals.
At this stage, the Directorate of Intelligence con-
tracted with to make an exter-
nal survey of how the DDI was organized for production and
what changes, if any, would be required in its organization
and procedures to most effectively achieve its production
objectives. The study was conducted over
a period of two months during which the = experts gave
oral presentations of their findings and recommendations to
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, to the DCI, DDCI, the
Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Comptroller,
culminating in a final written report submitted in November
1,976 (section V. C).
At this point, the Deputy Director for Intelligence es-
tablished an interim working group on reorganization to con-
sider both the DDI interim report of 25 August and the I
findings. This working group prepared a series of work g
papers on possible organizational measures and proposals
that would best serve the purposes of the reorganization
plans. When these studies were completed, the DDI and the
ADDI met with the working group representatives to formulate
specific reorganization proposals (section V. D). These pro-
posals which made relatively minor changes in the organiza-
tional structure of the Directorate were more significant
for the changes they directed in the focus of the DDI produc-
tion effort and its personnel management system. After dis-
cussion of these proposals with the DDI office and staff
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chiefs, they were briefed to the Executive Advisory Group and
received its endorsement. On the basis of EAG endorsement,
the Director of Central Intelligence on 15 November 1976 au-
thorized the DDI to proceed with the implementation of his
reorganization proposals.
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B. The 25Aust 1976 Interim Report
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Executive Advisory Group
FROM Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Analysis in the DDI: Problems and
,,sues
One of my first orders of business as DDI has been to
undertake a fresh examination of the process and product of
the directorate's principal activity: analysis. I have
sought the individual and collective counsel of many col-
leagues, and together we have developed some ideas about
what might be done in coming years to improve the quality
and utility of our analytical efforts.
This paper summarizes the initial results of our brain-
storming. It proposes several basic objectives to serve as
guidelines for a program to raise the level of our analysis
and make it more responsive to the present and future needs
of our consumers. it identifies a number of obstacles that
seem to stand in the way of progress toward these objectives,
and it then explores potential solutions--some procedural,
others involving major organizational changes. Finally, it
poses several basic policy issues that must be resolved by
senior management before we move ahead.
Our critique of the directorate's intelligence prod-
ucts and the way we approach the analytical process revealed
four areas in which substantial improvement seems imperative:
One We need to __pursue multidisciplinary analysis in
a more rigorous and institutionalized manner, without destroy-
ing existing centers of professional coalescence. There is a
growing demand from our consumers for intelligence products
that integrate all the relevant factors affecting many major
issues.
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Two: We need to improve the way we select analytical
problems and allocate resources to them so as to give better
support to po icy-makers. This means not only being more
responsive to the perceived needs of policy-makers but also
anticipating their needs and giving them longer lead times
to ponder emerging concerns and potential problems.
Three: We need to insure a more "adventurous" stance
in our analysis -an presentation. he DDI is lagging behind
in the application of modern techniques available in other
analytical professions and in the communications field. We
also tend to limit our papers to traditional subjects and
analytical frameworks and hesitate to push out into broader
fields of analysis.
Four: We need to strengthen the "analytical ethos" in
the directorate. Analysis must be our central function. It
must be accorded the highest priority in time, talent, and
resources, and not take second place to administration or
staff work. Our organizational structure and incentive sys-
tems should reflect this priority, not only for producers
of finished intelligence but also for the indispensable
elements that support analysis.
OBSTACLES
There are a number of features about our present organ-
ization and operating style that impede our achievement of
these objectives.
Obstacles to Objective One: More Multidisciplinary
Analysis
--The artificial splitting of analytical responsi-
bilities and subjects along organizational lines.
For understandable reasons, our production components
are, for the most part, organized vertically by discipline:
economists in one office, political scientists in another,
military specialists and geographers in other separate
offices. In the present DDI culture, these elements tend to
work relatively independently, developing their own research
programs, conducting their own analysis, and publishing their
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own papers. As a result, there is a tendency to have over-
lapping responsibilities, duplications, and, more importantly,
a lack of substantive input from other offices.
Furthermore, the present structure does not facilitate
imaginative analysis which would draw on disciplines not
represented in the directorate. This is most strikingly
true in the cases of weapons analysis and foreign technology
assessment. But other important factors are also routinely
left out of our consideration. The behavioral sciences,
for example, get short shrift in DDI products, even though
some of the more important questions of foreign attitudes
and policies ultimately come down to psychological and
sociological factors.
The result is that finished intelligence products tend
to be limited in scone to the frame of reference of the
analyst or his organization. This approach may be adequate
for projects where the consumer's requirement is fairly
narrow and falls within the expertise of a single analyti-
cal element. Many policy issues, however, are much broader
than that, and the policy-maker is left to his own devices--
if he does so at all--to develop an integrated appreciation
of the factors bearing on the issues he confronts.
Over the.years efforts have been made to increase the
amount of interaction and joint work, but they have not been
notably successful. An experiment with multidisciplinary
country teams, for example, proved a failure after a year
of trying. The Office of Political Research was formed in
part to produce more broadly based analysis, but OPR still
does not interact extensively with the other production
offices. While there has been an increase in joint studies
between offices, the DDI is not organized to encourage
multidisciplinary analysis, which remains sporadic and
largely dependent on the initiative of individuals.
--The lack of di al oaue_duri ng the early stages of
anal_ysis. To a large extent, this problem is a
subset of the first one, particularly for proj-
ects which involve more than one office. Our
structure does not have adequate mechanisms and
incentives for analysts to get together on a
problem at the start of the analytical process
to share each other's knowledge and insights.
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Obstacles to Objective Two: Improved Selection of
Analytical Problems
--The inadequacy of mechanisms for deciding what
analysis should be done to best serve our con-
sumers and for setting priorities. Obviously,
much of our work is--and should be--in response
to specific requests from policy-makers. But we
have a responsibility to do more than that: we
need to look ahead to determine what policy-makers
should concern themselves about and do the work
needed to inform them on such matters. Our track
record in this area is uneven, principally be-
cause we lack the institutional means and flexi-
bility to insure that the work of the directorate
is focused on the right questions, and to allocate
resources accordingly.
--The difficulty of serving diverse consumers with
our products. Many of our papers are tailored
for a specific audience and written in the jargon
and level of detail appropriate for that audience.
In so doing, we often fail to communicate the
relevance of our findings to a broader or higher
level clientele.
--The tendency to let current demands interfere with
research. There are some who believe that we de-
vote an inordinate amount of our resources to
"reporting the news" and not enough to providing
rigorous analyses of developments. Even the re-
search components of the directorate find it dif-
ficult to pursue sustained analysis because they
are constantly being tasked to respond to ad hoc
demands such as drafting estimates, supporting
the NIOs, and answering NSC queries. We must,
of course, be responsive to legitimate demands
such as these, but we need to find ways to insure
that we strike a proper balance between investing
in research and spending our capital on other
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Obstacles to Objective Three: More Adventurous Analysis
and Presentation
--The Qulf between new methodologies and "real" day-
b~-day__anal.ysis. It is not that the directorate
has neglected to investigate new analytical tech-
ques in the past few years, but rather that it has
not managed to put them into serious and sustained
use as an integral part of the analytical process.
In many cases, new methodologies are little more
than "showpieces" that attest to our interest but
remain on the shelf.
--The lack of a comprehensive pro ram -for developing
and implementing new presentational a mean's-. Various
elements of the DDI have taken initiatives to in-
vestigate--and in some cases adopt--new media and
techniques for getting our messages across to our
consumers. some good work has been done, but we
remain far behind what is happening in the commu-
nications field. Our lag in this area has not
clone unnoticed by critics.
We treat presentation as a matter for each office to
handle on its own. For the managers of production offices,
presentation tends to be a secondary concern, and the ef-
forts so far have been piecemeal and uncoordinated. We
lack a mechanism for bringing adequate expertise and re-
sources to bear on the problem in a way that would serve
the entire directorate.
Obstacles to Ob.j_ective Four: Strengthening the
Anal ytical_Ethos
-The cumbersome review process. The number of
reviewers a paper must pass through before being published
borders on the absurd. Office chiefs, division chiefs,
branch chiefs, and sometimes section chiefs all get in-
volved, and editorial processing is added to that. It
is not uncommon to have a paper bounce up and down this
ladder for five or six months before being approved. Each
layer of management justifiably feels responsible for the
work of its people and wants to insure quality control,
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but the process occupies too much of our analytical re-
sources and hurts the timeliness of our products.
--The overorganized management structure. The short-
comings of the review process are symptomatic of a larger
problem: the excessive layers in our management structure.
We are too highly organized to get on with our job effi-
ciently. Part of the reason for this may be our promotion
system, which requires that we move our good people into
supervisory or staff positions if they are to advance.
This system creates a bureaucratic imperative to prolifer-
ate supervisory and staff slots--and the layers they con-
trol.
--Shortcomings in analytical skills and substantive
expertise. Some critics of DDI analysis contend
that our ability to do first-class research in
some areas is declining. They perceive, for ex-
ample, a need for more people able to do sophis-
ticated analysis, a decline in language abilities,
a growing shortage of competent area specialists,
and a need for more adequate training programs for
developing the kinds of skills and knowledge we
need. The problem is exacerbated by a tendency
to divert our best analysts to nonanalytical
tasks. Because most of the current intelligence
reporting carries little analytical content, basic
analytical skills have not been valued appropri-
ately in substantial portions of the directorate.
The importance of these skills must be reaffirmed.
Moreover, it is becoming clear that we need to
maintain cadres in certain critical specialties
and shield them from the distractions of ephemeral
demands.
POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The system has been changing, particularly in recent
years, to meet new demands and deal with old problems. We
do not rule out the possibility that the evolutionary pro-
cess, coupled with a series of procedural changes, could
over time put us where we want to be without the disruption
of a reorganization. We will later suggest some procedural
innovations, but we have found through experience that they
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do not usually hit at the heart of the problem and that
structural changes in some form may be necessary.
An earlier attempt to pursue multidisciplinary analy-
sis through the creation of ad hoc teams, for example, simply
did not work. Because the teams were not assigned to spe-
cific projects and met mainly to exchange views, they were
artificial in nature and too dominated by the present organ-
izational structure. Some regularized mechanism, organiza-
tionally instituted, seems necessary. Although procedural
changes probably could help us establish a better mechanism
for selecting problems to address, the real cultural change
that would be a vital part of a more effective selection
process could probably come about only through a shakeup of
the existing system.
To achieve our third objective--a more adventurous
stance in adopting new approaches to analysis and presen-
tation--some revision of the present setup seems desirable.
It is true that new methodologies need to be rooted in
specific disciplines and probably can flourish in the pres-
ent environment, but there is so much fragmentation in the
effort to develop new presentational means that we have not
been able to move out vigorously in this field.
Finally, we see a direct relation between our objective
of strengthening the "analytical ethos" and the need for re-
organizing. There is, we think, a strong argument for a
fairly dramatic uprooting of the "bureaucracy" if we are to
change deeply ingrained ways of thinking.
In short, to achieve all of our stated objectives in
satisfactory and timely fashion, some degree of reorganiza-
tion may be required. Such reorganization could take sev-
eral forms. Of the various options discussed below, the
first three are aimed primarily at strengthening multi-
disciplinary analysis and secondarily the analytical spirit
of the directorate.
Geographic Organization
One option would be a reorganization along primarily
geographic lines. A logical realignment would be to divide
the directorate into two separate but equal parts, one deal-
ing with Intelligence Services and one with Intelligence
Production.
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The Intelligence Services segment would combine the
existing publications/cartographic elements in the DDI. It
would publish all current intelligence, finished intelligence
monographs, and periodicals as well as provide all carto-
graphic and geographic services.
The Intelligence Production segment would redistribute
the units of the present production offices into four
geographic units: USSR/Eastern Europe; Western Europe
and Western Hemisphere; Middle East/Africa/South Asia; and
East Asia/Pacific. The activities of the two DDS&T production
offices--OSI and OWI-- would logically be incorporated in
this setup. The special disciplines these offices represent
would add depth and breadth to our multidisciplinary efforts.
Another entity, the Office for International Programs, would
integrate for the first time work on problems of a genuinely
international nature--worldwide trade, monetary problems,
Law of the Sea, and so forth.
Advocates of this approach argue that there is a
geographic common denominator or thread for most DDI
activities, and that questions from consumers and answers
in the form of DDI products usually have a geographic
focus. An organization along these lines would permit
directorate offices to deal more effectively with counter-
parts within and outside the Agency, most of whom
have a geographic alignment. Also, whatever competition,
duplication, and overlapping of responsibility that exist in
the DDI would be reduced. Finally, and most importantly, a
geographic organization would encourage multidisciplinary
analysis and strengthen the regional focus of our
analytical efforts.
There are, however, some very serious disadvantages. A
geographic setup would fragment the disciplinary focus,
which is apt to be dominant in much of our analysis. It
would also limit professional growth in disciplines and
specialties other than those centered on area studies,
and we cannot afford any loss of these functional skills.
Furthermore, this organizational scheme would require the
replication of expensive tools, such as computer programming
models, which are now centralized in the existing offices
and constitute the basis for much of our effort to develop
new analytical techniques. Finally, it would be highly
disruptive for the entire directorate.
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Office of Multidisciplina
-Analysis
Another approach to facilitate a crossdisciplinary
approach to problems would be to establish an Office for
Multidisciplinary Analysis organized on a geographic
basis. Analysts, selected from their parent offices and
representing various specialties and disciplines, would be
assigned to the Center for a rotational tour. There would
be a small permanent staff as well.
The virtue of this approach is that it is simple and
would be only minimally disruptive. The establishment of
a separate office directly tackles the problem of multi-
disciplinary analysis but at the same time keeps specialists
in their own environment.
On the negative side, the base for doing genuinely
crossdisciplinary work would be rather narrow, and little
would be done to create a genuine multidisciplinary culture.
Moreover, the directorate's management structure would
remain overly large and cumbersome. It is likely, too,
that the Office would become divorced from the real, day-to-
day work of the other DDI offices.
Matrix Scheme
Another possibility for reorganization aimed at
encouraging multidisciplinary analysis would be a matrix
arrangement which would preserve the individual offices
but introduce some changes. The offices would be seen as
parts of a vertical organization where the management
function would reside and where "pure" analysis would be
done by specialists. A large portion of the analysts in
each of the offices. perhaps 60 percent, would be involved
in doing research on a sole topic. Such research is critical
because it is the foundation on which longer-term projects
rest and is the building block for all other kinds of
analysis. The rest of the analysts would be a "floating"
labor force available to work on problems cutting across
organizational lines.
Laterally, "program directors" with responsibility
for cross-disciplinary research areas would orqanize projects
responsive to a stated or felt requirement. The teams
established for a particular project would be drawn from the
floating labor pool. The final product would be produced under
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the direction of a project leader reporting to a program
director, but the ultimate responsibility for professional
content would belong to the appropriate offices. Everyone,
including the program director, would be attached to
a given office.
The matrix approach, like the proposal for an Office of
Multidisciplinary Analysis, would directly grapple with
the cross-discipline problem while preserving separate
analytical disciplines. It has the added advantage of
creating a multidisciplinary culture that reaches throughout
the directorate without being divorced from line management.
And it would free us from some of the rigidities of the
present system by giving promising analysts a route upward
that is not linked to supervisory positions--a content that
would give credence to our claim that analysis is indeed
the central function of the DDI.
There are problems, however. Imposition of a matrix
system would create turbulence and would require additional
management at the directorate level. With analysts divided
into specialists on the one hand and a floating pool of
generalists on the other, the rise of a two-tiered system
in which one group or the other becomes the elite seems
almost inevitable. There would also be a potential conflict
because responsibility would be divided between program/
project leaders and office heads, both with certain
responsibilities for substantive content of projects. Finally,
the matrix scheme to some extent would duplicate the present
NIO structure.
Current Intelligence Setup
The three reorganization options discussed above
directly address the problem of fostering greater multi-
disciplinary analysis, but there is a separate problem
that needs to be considered: the proper approach to current
intelligence. The problem is a distinct one because we
must weigh the need to report all kinds of news promptly
and fully against the need to provide our consumers with
in-depth analysis. Some claim that too many of our resources
are now directed at the production of current intelligence.
If we decide that we do indeed devote too much of our
effort to current reporting and not enough to current
analysis, another possibility for reorganization would be
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to create a small White House and General Publications
Support Staff to handle the more limited reporting function
and free most of our current intelligence resources for more
in-depth analysis. The Support Staff would be manned around
the clock by analysts from the production offices of the
DDI and DDS&T. A group of perhaps 20-25 middle-to-senior
grade analysts would serve one or two year tours and then
return to their parent organizations. These "hot flue"
analysts would be responsible for drafting whatever daily
and weekly products are issued.
If this kind of staff is created, some revision in
the current intelligence publications would probably be
necessary. We might, for example, find it necessary to
abolish the National Intelli ence Daily, OCI's newspaper,
and instead report current nte"fligence by cable to our
principal consumers around the clock. A daily compilation of
the most significant cables could then be published for
broader dissemination.
More detailed commentary and analyses of current
developments--political, economic, and military--would be
published twice a week in a new publication which would
replace the various office weeklies and other periodicals.
There might be a need for continuation of certain specialized
publications such as OER's International Oil Developments,
but the basic concept would-6e tliatdirectorate publications
represent a "DDI product" and serve as the vehicle for
publishing the work of the directorate.
Although some OCI analysts would be assigned to this
new current staff, most of the analysts in that office
would be combined with OPR into an Office of Regional Analysis.
Such a merger would eliminate the anomaly of having two DDI
offices engaged in political research and would encourage the
production of more probing analysis. Creation of an Office
of Regional Analysis would be quite compatible with the
matrix proposal outlined earlier.
Office of Production
Under any of the above proposals for reorganization, it
might be wise to consider establishing a separate Office of
Production. The office would serve as a 24-hour processing
center for DDI publications, with units for technical editorial
review, machine processing, proofreading, layout, and
preparation of graphics. Creating such an office would
promote efficiency and perhaps would free resources that
could then be devoted to the analytical effort. The Office
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of Production would also be the center for developing and
implementing new presentational techniques for the entire
directorate. There would be a savings in equipment and
the advantage of greater quality control over the finished
product.
PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Whether or not we proceed with any organizational reforms
at this point, there are certain procedural and administrative
changes that can and should be made. One such change is
already in effect--a weekly meeting between the DDI and the
heads of the principal production offices to provide overall
direction and focus to the substantive work of the
directorate.
Other possibilities are suggested below:
--Tasking mechanism for the directorate. The production
group now meeting week ,y could be given an additional
function, that of serving as a tasking mechanism
for projects undertaken by the directorate, thereby
ensuring the proper assigning of priorities to given
programs.
--Periodic review of publications and projects. Rather
than the hurried reviews of recent years that
usually were the result of a request from on high
or from Congress or the White House, the DDI could
institute a program for regularly reviewing all of
its publications and research projects to see whether
they continue to meet the needs of the principal
consumers.
--Consumer seminars for evaluation of DDI products.
There a. pressing need for more feedback from our
consumers on what publications and products they value,
which they ignore, what they wish they had, and why.
On a regular basis, one-to-two day seminars involving
key consumers and office heads could be held to
discuss such questions.
--Review of our hiring practices. We need to take a
hard look at t- e kinds of people we are hiring to
be sure-that we are getting the proper mix of people--
behavioral scientists as well as political scientists,
for example. To pursue multidisciplinary studies we
must ensure that all of our analysts don't come out
of the same mold.
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--Increased intra-directorate rotational assignments.
Despite
sthat rotations o offerom the top and general
recognition advantages to almost
everyone, there is no practical and realistic scheme
for promoting such assignments. The cross-fertilization
that could result from tours ranging from 3 months
to 2 years could both promote multidisciplinary
analysis and break down some of the barriers between the
production and service offices.
--More cross-fertilization with the outside world. The
emphasis on current intelligence and the pressures of
publications and deadlines too often make contact
with outsiders--particularly the academic world--
difficult. The directorate could profit from a well-
thought-out seminar program involving different offices
in the DDI and outside specialists on a regular basis.
--More creative trainin_g_. The directorate should enlarge
and enhance the talents of its existing analysts through
a more innovative approach to training. One way to foster
greater multidisciplinary analysis, for example, is to
give analysts training in disciplines outside their
specialties--train political scientists in some of
the more important economic concepts, let economists
learn more about geography, and military strategists
more about political dynamics. At the same time, we
need to retain and strengthen our regional expertise.
--Renewed em hasis on-f--T language cap bi1i . Enhanced
language ski s also 1- in the category of "things
we need to improve in the DDI but do little about."
There is no rational plan for encouraging analysts to
sharpen old skills or learn new ones.
--Greater contact between the DDI and office analysts
on substance. To-under ine our contention that the
heart of the DDI is analysis, regular and continuing
contact between the DDI himself and analysts engaged
in substantive projects should be instituted.
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25X1
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
As you can see, we have developed a number of ideas
and options for consideration. We have also undertaken some
preparatory steps. We're collecting data, for example,
that will give us a better grasp of what kind of people we
have on board, what their area of expertise is, how much
time we spend on producing certain kinds of intelligence,
what priorities we attach to various positions, and whether
an independent production office is feasible. We have con-
tracted with consulting firm to do a
study on the Dul organizational setup and will provide them
with the results of our labors. We are also planning a review
of all our publications. At this point, what we need
is some guidance from you.
Before the directorate decides which way to move as it
comes to grips with its problems, there are certain issues
that the Executive Advisory Group should address.
--To what extent should the practice of current intel-
ligence as the art of "tending t e hot flue" e e-
emphasizeedd? Do we want to move away from this aspect--the
news function--in favor of a more genuinely analytical
product? What are the consequences of shifting the
emphasis away from interpretive current reporting
toward current analysis? At this point, is there any
real possibility that we could eliminate the National
Intelligence Daily or some version of a slick,
well-packageddaily publication for our consumers?
--Should we rely upon the NIOs to solve the problem
of operating across or anizationa lines? Does t e
CIA have a responsibility for solving these problems
within its own house without relying on the NIO
structure?
--To what extent should CIA extend its research and
ana ysis eyon t e classical ass intelligence topics to
address other foreign an g Tissues of concern to
national polcymaers? Should the directorate, for
example, be as concerned about scarce natural resources
as it is about the possibility of a Communist government
in Italy? Produce as much on agricultural production
as it does on military sales? Learn as much about
population problems as it does about foreign
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political parties? And if attention is paid to such
a diversity of topics, will the DDI and indeed the
Agency be that much less well-informed on critical
issues?
--Should the production offices of the DDS&T be somehow
___ _-, P - -._-
inte rated into the I56I3uction processes? Wou such
integration require that these offices be transferred
to the DDI? And, if so, would the separation from the
R&D and data processing activities o- the DDS&T
unacceptably weaken our capabilities in science and
technology?
--Should we endeavor to expand the areas in which we
produce national" i.e. coordinated inter-agency
intelligence? Would e Agency lose its rvunique role
as an objective observer and interpreter of events
if it regularly coordinated longer range studies with
agencies that have a decided stake in any intelligence
prediction?
--How much effort should we make to put the DDI and
the A9ency in the forefront of new presentational means
and analytic tec piques. Is it wort a major investment
in terms o resources in fields that are so experimental
that the ultimate pay-off could be minimal or at least
peripheral to our real mission?
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REPORT TO THE DDI
To a large extent, the problems which face the DDI derive
from perspectives and habits that have outlived their time.
For example:
--Intelligence analysis is concerned principally with
military and political threats to the physical secu-
rity and political interests of the U.S.;
--Intelligence analysis resources are sufficiently
large, and the Agency analysts sufficiently knowl-
edgeable, to provide all the information and analysis
needed about all relevant parties and problems in
the international system;
--Intelligence analysts provide products principally
to officials at the very highest level of govern-
ment who are themselves generalists without other
sources of information and analysis;
--Intelligence analysis has only two alternative
stances available: (1) report external developments
in a neutral, factual way; or (2) be drawn into the
role of supporting the policy preferences of current
political officials;
--Intelligence analysts best serve the nation by living
a professional life in a career service, apart from
governmental decision-makers and from the uncleared
professional, political, and business leadership
community;
--Intelligence analysis is best done by individual
generalists or by small groups organized around
specific intellectual disciplines.
In the early days of the Agency, these assumptions were
appropriate and no doubt promoted useful production. There
were few analysts, their individual coverage was broad, and
their data base could be small. At the same time, the user
community was small, broad-gauge, and demanded information
more than interpretation. Most importantly, the U.S. was
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only beginning to be a significant player on the international
scene, and classical politico-military moves were paramount
in the country's mind.
But the world, the nation, and the Federal Government no
longer reflect these assumptions in the way that they did
30 years ago. No longer is the community worried solely
about the Soviet military threat. In purely military areas,
the costs of competing proposals for strategic and tactical
force structures have led to the creation of enormous anal-
ytical efforts to weigh the costs and benefits of alternative
weapons systems in light of alternative policies and external
reaction to those policies all around the world. Moreover,
our national security concerns today range from changes in
Chinese leadership to economic pressures exerted by Middle
East sheiks, and to longer-range issues of proliferation,
terrorism, and the implications of technology transfer. The
analysis of context has become as important as the analysis
of factual data. A whole new methodology of sophisticated
issue-oriented policy analysis has evolved to deal with these
kinds of problems and has become institutionalized and
heavily relied upon by senior officials in the Executive
Office of the President, and in most departments and agencies.
Today's analyst is also forced to deal with staggering amounts
of information from many sources, only small parts of which--
well buried in the "noise" and highly dependent on context--
are likely to be useful. New collection methods and improved
communications systems complicated as well as helped the
community's ability to deal with changing world and changing
user needs.
The trend of the last thirty years is likely to continue--
problems will grow in complexity, the U.S. will play an ex-
panded role in world affairs, and the demands for analytical
production services will escalate. However, the intelligence
community cannot continue its trend toward an ever-increasing
number of analysts, each of whom knows more and more about
less and less.
The alternative is to reassess the assumptions so as to
arrive at a new set of perceptions and procedures for intel-
ligence production that will tailor the resources of the
community to newer priorities. For example, a new set of
assumptions might be:
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--Intelligence analysis is concerned with military,
political, and economic threats to the security of
the U.S., and with political, economic, and tech-
nological trends that shape the world community in
which the U.S. lives;
--Intelligence resources are limited and therefore
draw upon outside expertise as much as possible in
order to maximize the contributions of those
capabilities unique to the community;
--Intelligence analysts provide products to officials
at the very highest level of government and to the
various staffs that support those officials;
--Intelligence analysis maintains a continuously im-
proving factual data base on key international infor-
mation that will contribute to the policy analysis
process in support of national decision-makers;
--Intelligence analysts are drawn from our national
professional, political, and business leadership
community for temporary, part-time, or career service
and may participate on a classified or unclassified
basis, as appropriate;
--Intelligence analysis requires the flexibility to
assemble groups of analysts of varying skills ranging
from highly specialized to highly general, and to assign
very capabl e individual analysts to very specific
problems;
--Intelligence production should be the interface between
collection and use, and should reflect the problems and
opportunities of the one to the other.
The program which we propose is a step toward redirecting the
current effort of the DDI to comport with the changed
circumstances that these new assumptions represent. Key to
this proposal is the concept of the DDI as "Director of
Production" of the Agency, from whom comes much of the
leadership in the intelligence community for a new effort--
one directed at focusing the resources of the analytical
staff on the present and future issues affecting U.S. security.
To do this will require the active cooperation of his suppliers,
i.e., the collectors, and his consumers, i.e., the users.
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We envision a system in which more nearly than at present
the collectors collect what the analysts need to have
collected, not what can most readily be collected; where the
analysts analyze what the users want analyzed, not what they
want to analyze; and finally, where the users request and
receive what they need, not use what may be available.
An the Establishment of an Office of Policy Support
in the Directorate of Intelligence:
The Proposal-
-he DDI should establish an Office of Policy Support (OPS)
in the Directorate to assist the DDI in the timely production
of intelligence analyses helpful to those government officials
responsible for developing and analyzing policy options for
the President and selected heads of departments and agencies.
These analyses also should assist Congressional consideration
of major policy issues before the country. The concerns of
these consumers center on issues rather than particular events
abroad.
The OPS should report directly to the DDI and ADDI. It should
assist them as staff in managing the resources of the Direc-
torate in addition to having the line responsibility for
-formulating, carrying out, and reporting on special analyses
with its own personnel, and for tasking other offices in the
Directorate to help. It should act as the principal inter-
face between the Agency and the policy analysis community.
This new Office will have four major tasks: (1) develop
strong relationships between the DDI as the chief unit for
intelligence analysis and the user community just mentioned,
and between DDI and the external policy analysis profession;
(2) provide a model of a work style and appropriate incentives
to induce and assist other DDI offices to produce midterm
analyses focused on issues that will better serve the policy
formulating and evaluating community; (3) carry out major
studies on a small number of critical issues which clearly
cut across the specialties of other DDI offices and require
major analytic innovations, e.g., nuclear proliferation
and arms control, global resource supply, redistribution
of international economic power and wealth, assessment of
military competence (as distinct from force structure),
Africa. The issues would change over a period of several
years and might be eliminated or spun off to relevant offices,
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as appropriate; and (4) advise the DDI on changes in collec-
tion and information base priorities with the largest probable
payoff in policy-relevant analysis.
The Rationale
This proposal reflects considerations both internal and
external to the Directorate. Externally, there is a growing
sophistication and institutionalization of the analysis of
policy options for the consideration of national policy-
makers. Increasingly real budget constraints and the rapid
technological and political change of the last decade have
complicated greatly the formulation of national policy;
understanding the uncertainties and the contextual setting
of policy options have become major factors in establishing
national policy. Policy analysis offices have been established
in the National Security Council staff and in many executive
departments and agencies; professional practices and standards
of policy analysis methodology are beginning to evolve.
More and more national policy-makers are looking to this type
of analysis and to this community for assistance in formulating
national policy. The intelligence community, to serve the
national policy-makers in this new environment and to
preserve the legitimacy of intelligence institutions, must
begin to provide the kinds of intelligence outputs that are
needed by the policy analysis community, in addition to
providing the estimates and evaluations that are directly
useful to the policy-maker himself.
Internally, the Directorate is not organized or managed to
undertake many of the quick, multidisciplinary, issue-
oriented analyses where the interplay of assumptions, infor-
mation, uncertainties, and implications is essential to
assuring maximum usefulness of intelligence to the policy
process. Moreover, the Directorate does not now have the
personnel skilled in professional policy analysis methodology
that would be necessary to contribute to the policy analysis
process that policy-makers increasingly draw upon.
There is no point in seeking, from the President or anyone
else, some charter to implement this change. The best way
to proceed is simply for the DCI and the DDI to begin to
develop the capability and to offer more and better help
to the policy analysis community.
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This capability is not to be gained by eliminating the
more formal, specific, or conclusive intelligence production
process now in place, nor can it be accomplished by promotion
from within. Rather, it should be implemented as an overlay
that can add to and draw upon the existing professional
capabilities of the Directorate. This wi'1 require the
hiring of a number of professionals from outside the
intelligence community at senior and intermediate levels to
begin to function in the role envisaged.
Three caveats are in order: (1) Absent strong support from
the DCI, DDCI, and DDI, this approach wii be hard to
implement. (2) Even though there is a strong consensus
among policy-oriented users of intelligence that this
approach to intelligence production is much needed, no one
has ever tried to institutionalize it before, so that
considerable monitoring and fine-tuning wll be needed as
the capability is developed; in particular, intelligence
analysis for policy support is not the same thing as
policy analysis itself. (3) The success of this undertaking
is critically dependent upon hiring outstanding people,
knowing they can be kept only a few years, and on commitment
of adequate contract funds for ample outside assistance.
On the Reorientation of the Office of Economic Research
in the Directorate of Intelligence:
The Proposal_
The resources of the Office of Economic Research (OER)
should be reoriented to provide, in addition to its current
worthwhile program, three further kinds of economic
analysis: (1) policy-relevant microeconomic analysis of
specific industries, countries, technologies, and resources;
(2) organizational analysis of economic institutions,
including companies, government ministries, markets, procure-
ment processes, and regional and commodity institutions;
and (3) forecasts of economic developments and burdens which
will pressure foreign regimes to consider foreign and domestic
policy changes of importance to the United States. The
OER should expand its use of outside consultants and
contractors and should increase its sponsorship of unclassified
research and symposia on these kinds of analyses.
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The Rationale
The range of economic subject matter on which the President
and other key national policy-level decision-makers need
intelligence inputs is expanding as national security
increasingly depends on many factors other than military
force structure. Specifically, trade, technology, monetary
policies, and natural resources require more intelligence
production in both military and nonmilitary contexts.
Many of the newer tools for policy analysis are built on or
closely related to classical economic methods, and OER
reasonably ought to be strong in these methodologies, as well
as in the statistical estimation methodology and data base
maintenance functions it now performs. Consumers of
economic intelligence analysis will become increasingly
knowledgeable about the applications of these methods and
will increasingly assess the value of the OER contribution
in light of these methods. Moreover, many of these new
kinds of analysis will draw on unclassified sources and will
be built on unclassified methodologies; the OER program could
be much stronger and engender far more support if it were
open to considerable outside input. Importantly, the three
sorts of analytic capability recommended for increased emphasis
relate in explicit and policy relevant ways to political,
military, and technological courses of action that policy-
makers must consider.
It will be difficult to succeed with the overall purposes of
the new role for the Directorate that we have proposed if OER
is not reoriented along these lines to permit it to be an
asset rather than a drag on the Office of Policy Support and
the Office of Political and Regional Analysis.
...~ Implementation
OER should move immediately to define the priority areas,
adding new analytic talent in consultation with the DDI and
the heads of the new Offices of Policy Support and Political
and Regional Analysis. Specific contract support plans
should be developed, and funding support should be sought
... from the Office of Policy Support and the DDI.
It is likely that some of the present analysts in the OER
should be released, since funds and slots for the new
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Office of Policy Support will, in part, have to come from
OER, and other OER resources will need to be devoted
to the new directions for OER itself. It should be made
clear to everyone that such action is an affirmation of
the importance of OER and the role of economics in intel-
ligence production, rather than a denigration of past efforts,
many of which will continue.
On the Establishment of an Office of Political and Regional
Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence:
The Proposal
he DDI should establish an Office of Political and Regional
Analysis (OPRA), which would combine the Office of Political
Research and the Office of Current Intelligence, except for
the production and journalistic functions presently assigned
to the latter office. Consideration should be given to
includinq the analytical activities of CRS and OSI with
respect to biographical data in the OPRA.
The Rationale
there is far too little political analysis included in those
analytical reports from the Agency which concern military
economic, or technical issues. The dominant concern for per-
forming "research" in OPR and "current analysis" in OCI
gas precluded effective participation of these offices in
cooperative, issue-driven analysis, and has increased their
isolation from users. A deliberate decision was made, when
OPR was created, to insulate it from the NIOs and the user
community in order to ensure that the "research" effort would
not be aborted by requests for "current analysis". The
OCI had excellent working relations with their counterparts
in the State Department before the creation of the NIOs
eliminated that relationship.
Placing responsibility for publishing the NID in OCI has
had a number of undesirable side effects. Excessive
resources are beinq devoted to current reporting in contrast
to current event-driven analysis or to longer-term issue-
driven analyses. Cooperative efforts are discouraged,
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since recognition and promotions are heavily influenced
by the number of articles which an individual is able to
get printed.
Finally, maintaining two separate geographically-oriented
political offices seems to be an inefficient use of scarce
personnel and budget resources. By combining all of the
political and regional analysts in one organization,
professional analytic standards can be enhanced, and
political analytic resources can better be marshalled to
cooperate with OER, OSR, and the new OPS.
Implementation
In order to make the new office most effective, we believe
the following should accompany the organizational change:
--A charter should be written and distributed to all
office employees setting forth the mission and
objectives of the new office;
--Close working relationships with the Office of Policy
Support, OER, and counterparts in all of the using
agencies should be encouraged and supported at all
levels of management;
--Individual analysts should be rewarded for cooperative
efforts with other DDI components and for their
ability to tap the expertise which exists outside
of the intelligence community.
On Transferring OSI and OWI
from DDS&T to DDI:
The Proposal
OSI and OWI should be transferred from DDS&T to DDI.
The Rationale
An important part of our proposal is the concept that the
DDI should be the chief production officer of the CIA, a
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role that has not been explicit in recent years. Science
and technology are important considerations in the newer areas
of international concern for the Agency, just as they have
been in the more traditional politico-military intelligence
analysis. It will be important for production management and
quality control to have a strong science and technology analysis
capability in DDI. These considerations far outweigh the uncon-
vincing arguments for maintaining a single scientific and tech-
nical activity in the CIA, or for maintaining close organiza-
tional relationships between these two offices and the collectors.
Implementation
In implementing this proposal, consideration should be given
to redistributing the three divisions of OSI among existing
DDI offices.
OWI should remain as a separate office for the time being,
but it may make sense in the future to consolidate OWI
and OSR as workload, resources, and management considerations
may indicate.
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D. DDI Decisions on Reorganization
--Establish a Center for Policy Support
--Establish an Office of Regional and Political Analysis
--Establish a Current Reporting Group
--Establish a Publications and Presentations Group
--Recommend transfer of OWI and OSI
--Establish mechanisms linking analytical activities to
Agency R&D
--Maintain OSI intact but better relate its programs to
policy issues
--Re-examine OER`s analytical focus in light of
comments
--Rename IAS in recognition of its production role
--Reject proposal to consolidate all biographic intelli-
gence but undertake a seminal effort in this regard
--Strengthen Global Resource Analysis in OGCR
--Improve Directorate Personnel Policy
--Broaden the function of the Coordinator for Academic
Relations and develop for EAG review a plan for
strengthening DDI links with the outside world
--Consider " security recommendations from more
realistic viewpoint
1. Center for Policy Support (CPS)
The Center for Policy Support is established in the
Office of the DDI to assist the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence in carrying out his responsibilities:
STAT
25X1
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--for increasing the relevance of CIA intelligence
production to the needs of policy-makers,
--i~or executing and managing Directorate-wide in-
telligence analysis of issues Key to the formula-
tion of U.S. policy,
--for moniLorinq and maintaining effective manage-
'T=ient control of the production activities of
DDI components.
The function of the CPS can be best understood by
viewing it as the CIA production linkage between consumers
of the CIA analytical product--both within the Intelligence
Community and in the policy-formulating sectors of the
Government--and the primary producers of this intelligence
within the DDI.
Pol i cy__._Sup_port
In carrying out these responsibilities, the CPS is spe-
c-ifically enjoined from supplanting existing arrangements
between the production line components of the Directorate and
their principal consumers. It will, however, in the course
of other activities, be free to maintain contacts with many
Of these same consumers, particularly with regard to those
intelligence production activities which will be carried on
independently by the CPS.
he CPS will be expected to concentrate its policy support
activities on those areas where existing producer-consumer
relations appear to be inadequate or where consumer interests
are broader than the responsibility of any single production
component. Examples of these would be the White House, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the International
Security Affairs component of DOD, and the Arms Control
community.
CPS would also be involved in sharpening the focus of
intelligence production support to consumers during selected
crisis situations.
Oirectorate-Wide Intelligence Production
[his type of intelligence production refers to that inter-
disciplinary analysis which will be carried on as an independent
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production activity at the DDI level and may, on occasion,
include critical intelligence production assignments which
involve more than one production office, but are not truly
interdisciplinary in nature. The latter usually will not be
produced by the CPS but will be produced under the general
direction and guidance of the CPS.
It is anticipated that the number of these projects will
be small. They will be planned and completed as a DDI re-
search activity done partly with the resources of the CPS,
but also with resources made temporarily available to the CPS
by line production components.
A candidate list of activities which would be done by
the CPS includes:
--Proliferation
--Soviet R&D Costing
--Technology Transfer
--"New World Economic Order"
--Political Impact of Oil Price Rises
--Policy Implications of Global Resource Issues
--Alternative Hypothesis Analysis
--Arms Control Futures and Verification Requirements
Management Control of Production
The third major responsibility of the CPS in support of
the DDI will be to review and monitor the production activities
of DDI line components. In executing this responsibility, the
CPS will also serve as the DDI's focal point to control the
tasking of line offices by the NIOs. To assist the DDI in his
production management responsibilities, the CPS will be charged
with maintaining a DDI production program and will serve as a
secretariat for production review matters. This secretariat
will also be responsible for assigning line production action
for such special support activities as NSSMs, support to the
NIO's, and support to the other interagency consumers.
CPS Staffing
To ensure maximum flexibility and to prevent the creation
of competitive organizational units, the size of the CPS will
be kept deliberately small. It will consist of a Core Group
and a number of small staffs charged with Directorate-wide
responsibilities.
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The permanent cadre of the CPS will consist only of the
Director, Deputy Director, a Production Control Staff, and
requisite clerical help.
The Core Group will consist of personnel detailed from
line offices to the CPS on a rotational basis. These rota-
tions will be for a fixed term of 12-24 months. In addition
the Core Group will be supplemented by rotational assignments
to complete short-term projects. The CPS will also consist
of a limited number of non-Agency personnel recruited from
other Government agencies on a rotational basis, or from
outside the Government on a contractual basis.
The Core Group of CPS personnel will be selected from our
most experienced and senior personnel. They will be expected
to have the capacity to work effectively at each of the three
major responsibilities of the CPS.
The size of the Core Group cannot be stated precisely at
this time. It is anticipated that the initial seeding might
be satisfied by recruiting personnel with the following skills
from the line offices:
Military - at least one expert in strategic/
conventional forces and one expert
in strategic doctrine
F.conomic - probably a Free World and a
Communist economic expert
Geographic - at least one expert with a good
background in geographic/
environmental matters
Scientific
Technical
Political
- an expert in civil technology and
a life scientist
- an expert in weapons development
and an expert in energy matters
for openers, experts on the Middle
East, South and Southeast Asia,
Africa, Latin America, the USSR,
Communist China, and Western Europe
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Research and - two collection specialists to assist
Development the CPS in collection evaluations and
to provide Agency R&D components a
better understanding of analytic
needs
The Director of the CPS should also be responsible for
general supervision of other DDI units created specifically
to conduct special intelligence support or liaison activities.
These would include the SALT Support Staff and the Congressional
Liaison Support Staff. The functions of the DDI Coordinator
for Academic Relations should also be assumed by the CPS.
The position should be made full-time in order to carry out
a number of activities designed to expand DDI liaison with
academic and policy analysis centers.
Finally, there are a number of activities presently
carried on in the line offices which should be transferred
to the Directorate level. These include certain activities
of the OCI Foreign Liaison Staff and the responsibilities
of the DDI Coordinators for Narcotics and International
Terrorism. In order to avoid encumbering the CPS with too
many functions, these activities will be made the responsi-
bility of the ODDI Executive Staff.
2. Office of Regional and Political Analysis
The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA)
is being established to strengthen our support to policy-makers
by consolidating and strengthening our analytical capabilities
in these areas. ORPA's three missions will be:
--current intelligence, where the stress will
be on the analysis of current events rather
than on their reporting.
--midterm analysis, which will focus on issues
rather than events over a six-month to two-
year time frame.
--long-term research, which will emphasize se-
lected topics of concern to the formulation
of U.S. policy.
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ORPA will be the principal office in the Directorate
where inter-disciplinary analysis is done on a regional or
country basis. It will specialize on papers where regional
expertise is paramount and will complement rather than com-
pete with the Center for Policy Support, where analysis will
be conducted on a small number of issue-driven, fairly long-
term problems requiring inter-disciplinary treatment. Although
ORPA will be staffed essentially with political scientists and
area specialists, analysts from other disciplines, such as
economics, sociology, psychology, etc., will be included where
their dominant concern is regional.
ORPA will have a minimum of bureaucratic structure.
It will be organized largely along geographical lines, al-
though there will be provision for research on issues of a
global character. The analysts in ORPA will work on the full
range of current, midterm and long-term research problems
under the general supervision of the chief of the geographic
divisions.
We are mindful of the need to maintain a proper
balance between current/midterm analysis and long-term analy-
sis and to prevent the erosion of either capability. Therefore,
the Director of ORPA will have two deputies, one to supervise
current/midterm research activities, and the other to super-
vise long-term activities.
3. Current Reporting
Group rt(.CRG)
Providing timely reporting and analysis of current
issues on a 24-hour basis remains a high priority of the DDI.
The Current Reporting Group (CRG) will be the principal mech-
anism for carrying out the Agency's responsibilities for re-
porting national current intelligence. CRG analysts will
serve as journalists identifying appropriate areas of news
coverage, and writing articles for the current intelligence
publications. They will also provide commentary based on
their own expertise and on consultation with analysts in the
research offices.
The specific responsibilities of the CRG will be:
--to provide current coverage of events for
the President via the President's Daily
Brief;
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--to support all other consumers by current
coverage of significant events via the
National Intelligence Daily and a weekly
summary;
--to provide key consumers informed comments
in cable form on events as they unfold on
a 24-hour basis.
The CRG will prepare the President's Daily Brief,
the National Intelligence Daily, and a weekly publication.
The NID will be the principal daily reporting mechanism and
as such should be given much wider distribution than at
present. Extremely sensitive material could be disseminated
in a separate annex to particular customers with a need to
know.
The CRG will limit its reporting in the current in-
telligence publications to those unfolding events where classi-
fied intelligence data and analysis make a significant and spe-
cial input. Other events, where the DDI can add little to
what the newspapers carry, will simply be noted briefly.
The size of the daily publication will not be a pre-
determined 2, 3 or 4 pages. On any given day, the paper will
contain only those articles or commentary and analysis judged
essential or useful to the consumer at that point. The empha-
sis will thus be on selectivity rather than on mass coverage.
The CRG will maintain an intimate relationship with
the production offices and will have the responsibility for
tasking them with writing articles of an analytical nature,
features, and other special items for the daily and weekly
publications. The CRG will be independent of the other pro-
duction offices and will report directly to the DDI.
The CRG will be drawn principally from the present
Office of Current Intelligence, with personnel coming from
the geographic divisions, from the OCI Production Division,
and from the White House Support Group. All production of-
fices and the CIA Operations Center will be expected to pro-
vide some analysts to the CRG. Assignments will be on a
rotational basis, with analysts serving tours of 6 months to
2 years.
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The senior officers for each shift will be respon-
sible for the substantive content of the publications; layout
and technical problems will be left to specialists from the
new Publications and Presentations Group. Shifts will be
staggered to accommodate the handling of materials as they
arrive in the Agency and the demands of publication deadlines.
Each shift will include enough area experts, editors, proof-
readers, and clericals to make it self-sufficient.
The CRG will work closely both with the CIA Opera-
,ions Center and the Publications and Presentations Group. The
SDO will retain the responsibility for alerting Agency of-
cicials to critical intelligence and for supporting the CRG
with traffic on a timely basis.
4. DDI Publications and
The Publications and Presentations Group (PPG) is
established to provide the offices with a professionally
staffed and technically advanced publishing facility for a
majority of their analytical products and to fulfill the
-Following production support goals of the Directorate:
--improving the quality of the printed
products currently emanating from the
Directorate through standardizing formats
and making other improvements in publi-
cations design, text layout, typography,
and the use of graphic arts;
-promoting innovative approaches to our
use of print and less conventional media
by creating a center in which the devel-
opment of new presentational means can
flourish;
--establishing a focal point for monitoring
the totality of the Directorate's production
effort, for working out production priorities,
and for facilitating coordination with PPD;
concentrating advanced text-editing equip-
ment in a location where it can be more
expertly managed, fully utilized, and
easily maintained; and
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--enhancing the professionalism and career
opportunities for those Directorate per-
sonnel involved in production support
activities.
In establishing this group, it is recognized that:
--those Offices presently located outside
Headquarters will not be in a position to
make frequent use of the PPG and will con-
tinue to ready their products for publi-
cation much as they do today;
--CRS has a number of computer-processed
publications and biographic briefing books
which will continue to be prepared with
its own equipment;
--all Offices should retain that capability
required to produce limited-distribution,
quick-response memoranda on an "in-house"
basis; and
--Offices presently maintaining internal
publishing units will experience a loss
of control over the final phase of the
production process which will require
some adjustment in their current practices.
These limitations notwithstanding, the move to con-
solidate production support is considered worthwhile because
of the opportunity it affords to upgrade the presentational
quality of Directorate products, to free personnel for other
tasks, to make more efficient use of expensive equipment,
and to explore new means of communication with our consumers.
The PPG will have four working groups supervised
by a Chief, a Deputy, and a Production Monitoring and Coordi-
nation Unit. The groups are: 1) Product Design, Editing, and
Graphics Preparation; 2) Text Preparation, Composition, and
Proofing; 3) Registry and Dissemination; and 4) Presentational
Means Development. The first group will task but will not
require the incorporation of the graphics preparation unit
of OGCR.
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The resource requirements of the PPG will be less
than those of the present decentralized system. In terms
of personnel the Group can be staffed with a mixture of
full and part-time employees roviding approximately
man-years of effort. Another man-years--including a
least two production o icersor each Office--probably
officers will be needed to sustain the publishing activity not being
handled in PPG. The net savin for application elsewhere in
the Offices should be about man-years. If OSI and OWI
are transferred to the Directorate, it is anticipated that
the bulk of their production will be processed by the Center.
Some of OSI's production support specialists would be expected
to serve in the PPG, and a savings in man-years comparable to
the other Offices should result.
In terms of equipment, the Group will require a
large capacity, shared logic, text-editing and composition
system (possibly ETECS), supported by a less sophisticated
back-up system and several stand-alone text editors for
smaller tasks. The Offices will retain sufficient word-
processing equipment to support the work not being done in
the PPG, but the total number of machines should show a
substantial decline. To further reduce the cost of this
equipment and ensure its compatibility with the principal
text-editing system, PPG will take the lead in standardizing
the Directorate's word-processing inventory. It will also
work closely with PPD to select mutually acceptable equipment
and procedures for preparing the Directorate's products.
Transfer OWI and OSI to the DDI
The production offices of the DD/S&T should be
transferred to the DDI in the interests of consolidating
the management of CIA analysis and production.
Weapon system performance, technology advances,
and other technical matters are such an integral part of
national issues that they must be effectively treated in
policy-support analyses. There are gross inefficiencies
now in combining technical analyses with broader issues
in CIA studies. The purposes to be achieved by our overall
reorganization of production will be markedly less effective
if there is not an intimate incorporation of technical
analysis.
25X1
25X1
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The technical analysis offices have much to offer
in providing leadership for issue-oriented studies. They are
accustomed to considering the interactions among elements in
weapon systems. In many ways, the inter-disciplinary approach
for which we are striving is an extension of the systems
approach. This experience needs to be incorporated into the
DDI production system.
At the same time, it is important to preserve the
specialized skills of technical analysis. Organizational
changes, therefore, would be at the higher levels only--
directed toward the integration of technical analysis in
broader studies. Technical analysis would remain a distinct
discipline at the basic levels.
OWI has an obvious relation to the military con-
cerns of OSR. There may be some efficiencies to be gained
by a closer association of the two offices, but they should
remain separate analytic groups.
OSI's activities touch those of the DDI on a much
broader front. Separate OSI groups interact naturally with
OWI, OSR, OER, and OPR. There is a strong temptation to con-
sider incorporating the functions of OSI in other substantive
groups. In the end, however, we have concluded that at this
time it is of overriding importance that OSI's specialized
technical areas be preserved intact. For this reason, it is
proposed to retain OSI as a separate entity. We will, how-
ever, have to take strong measures to integrate OSI's work
on civil technology with OER's economic analysis.
Safeguards to protect the close association between
technical analysts and their data sources will have to be
included in the new structure. In addition, rotational slots
will be established in the DDI so that collection R&D per-
sonnel will have a close and continuing view of the problems
and needs of analysts.
The close association of technical analysis with
collection R&D within the DD/S&T has been of considerable
value. Special provisions will have to be made to insure
that R&D personnel continue to have day-to-day access to
the concerns of analytic offices and that analysts have
the same access to collectors and processors. To this end,
we propose the following:
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--Rotational slots in the Center for Policy
Support to be established for collection
system developers. These personnel would
be responsible for collection system
evaluations, and for contributing to col-
lection considerations in policy-support
analyses. From this vantage point, they
would have a good view of the concerns of
all elements of the DDI.
--A rotational assignment of an R&D specialist
on .WI's Action Staff to serve the same
function for weapon systems analysis.
---A similar rotational assignment with OSI,
and possibly OSR.
---lhe creation of a new publication which
would provide a regular status report
on progress in issue-oriented analysis.
This publication would be directed to the
policy community, but it should provide
DD/S&T management with a continuing
appreciation of analytic needs.
.fie believe these steps will constitute effective measures
for maintaining the important relationship between OSI and
OWI and developmental elements of the Agency. Hopefully,
relationships with other DDI elements will be improved.
Furthermore, we note that such relationships have flourished
between those developing new analytical methodologies in
ORD and their customers in the DDI.
6. Establishment of a Resources Analysis Center
in the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research
The Intelligence Directorate will establish a
Resources Analysis Center in OGCR in order to study certain
global resource issues in an interdisciplinary fashion.
The Geography Division will form the core of the
Center and will provide a central data bank, area and geo-
graphical expertise, and leadership for developing inter-
disciplinary teams. Three or four such teams organized
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around the Geography Division will concentrate on specific
issues which lend themselves to analysis by remote-sensing
techniques such as agricultural production and resource
and energy problems.
A food and agriculture team (the old Environmental
Analysis Staff) will continue to estimate Soviet grain pro-
duction and will in time apply the same methodology to the
estimate of Chinese wheat production and other agricultural
production. The other teams will accumulate the various
specialists--including geographers, photo interpreters,
economists, hydrologists, demographers, geologists, systems
analysts, etc.--necessary to conduct research in other
similar areas. Each team will acquire its core personnel
from within the Directorate but will also use contract ex-
perts to provide needed technical assistance.
The new Center will consist of the present Geog-
phy Division and the OGCR Environmental Analysis Staff. The
remaining positions will come from other offices and com-
ponents within the Directorate now doing work in these areas.
7. Directorate Personnel Management
The Directorate's current personnel policies have
tended to foster narrow career tracks that have inhibited
the development of analytical skills and expertise on a
Directorate-wide basis. To correct these deficiencies and
to develop a personnel management system that will facilitate
the accomplishment of our mission, the Directorate will take
a number of positive steps:
--creation of a single Directorate career
service that will provide for systematic
selection and promotion of employees above
the "journeyman" level on a Directorate-wide
basis;
--creation of an Assignments Board to improve
the selection of personnel for rotational
assignments, to ensure career service consid-
eration of people while on rotation, and to
ensure proper placement of returning assignees.
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establishment of a Director of Career
Development responsible for promoting
career development programs and monitor-
ing their implementation.
--establishment of new career management
procedures for Directorate clericals, to
improve selection for assignments, train-
ing, and promotions.
--provision of incentives now missing for
accomplishing Directorate-wide analytical
objectives.
--elimination of selected management positions
to put many highly-talented analysts back
into the production process and to emphasize
the primacy of analysis by separating it from
administration.
--development of training programs which will
enhance analytical skills, including fre-
quent seminars and lectures by outside
experts from a wide range of disciplines.
--development of a more systematic means of
selecting and training Directorate managers
by identifying those people who have man-
agerial talents early enough to provide
them with the proper training.
--fostering the development of analysts'
skills and understanding of the policy
support process through planned rotational
assignments within and outside the Directorate.
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Annex A
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Coordination and Review of-Intelligence Production
The purpose of coordinating intelligence products among concerned
elements of the Agency and the Community prior to publication is to
assure that the facts and judgments presented therein are as compre-
hensive, objective and accurate as possible.
The time and effort required to accomplish coordination varies
according to the subject being considered, the type of publication, and
its potential use. In most instances, it is a simple process carried
out between analysts regularly in communication with one another and
sharing some interests about the topic involved. Sometimes it becomes
more complex when legitimate differences on form and/or substance have
to be worked out. On occasion, the process may be obstructed by an
attempt by one or more parties to avoid or delay the publication of
unwelcome information or analysis. Usually, an irreconcilable dif-
ference of opinion can be accommodated by publishing the opposing view
as a part of the text, or as a footnote or annex to the original product.
However coordination is achieved, the Intelligence Directorate is
committed to the principle of multiple examination of intelligence
production prior to publication to insure that in its reporting on
important events abroad every reasonable interpretation of these events
is brought to the attention of the policymakers.
The starting point in the coordination process is notification.
For the Directorate's daily publications, this is accomplished by the
Current Reporting Group (CRG) which routinely distributes a list of all
articles it plans to run in the next day's publications to all of the
appropriate offices in the Community. For less time-urgent publica-
tions, primarily monographs produced by the research offices, much more
lead-time is available through the exchange of quarterly research and
production programs. For major studies, such as a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) or interagency memoranda, in which other Community elements
participate, a formal notification procedure is followed.
The methods of achieving coordination and the degree for which an
identity of views is sought also vary. For example, the drafts of
articles for the National Intelligence Daily Cable, a Community
product published by CIA, are exchanged between agencies by long-distance
xerography and no part is published without word-by-word agreement. For
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drafts of articles for the National Intelligence Daily, Intelligence
Directorate analysts discuss differences with their Community counterparts
by secure telephone. But, because CIA is solely responsible for the
content of this publication, it is not obligated to change its texts if
these differences cannot be resolved. Even here, if differences are of
major significance, opposing views can be included. No coordination is
attempted on articles in the President's Daily Brief (PDB) on the grounds
that this document represents a personal communication between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief Executive.
For the monographs produced on an aperiodic basis by the Intel-
ligence Directorate's research offices, the bulk of the coordination
effort is between these offices. For example, an economic analyst
writing on conditions in Brazil might routinely consult his counterparts
in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) and the Current
Reporting Group (CRG) for political insights. Occasionally such coordina-
tion will cross directorate lines as, for example, between the Office of
Strategic Research (OSR) and the DDS&T's Office of ELINT (OEL). Moreover,
most Intelligence Directorate reports are passed in draft to the appropriate
country desks in the Operations Directorate. Coordination outside the
Agency of these kinds of intelligence products is less frequent. An
Intelligence Directorate analyst may meet with his opposite numbers in
State or DIA prior to publishing an article in their mutual field, but
the consultation is likely to take place in the research phase of the
project rather than after the text has been drafted.
For the formal estimates which Intelligence Directorate offices
produce in concert with other elements of the Community, the method of
achieving coordination is quite structured and the degree of consensus
attempted is high. Drafts are circulated to all the participants and
written comments solicited. Meetings are held to air differences of
opinion on the data and the judgments and if all issues are not resolved,
the minority views are printed in full as addendums to the basic text.
In addition to these various efforts to coordinate among the pro-
ducers of intelligence reporting, there are several procedures for
senior review of the finished products either before or after publica-
tion. For example, the Director of Central Intelligence regularly
reviews the National Intelligence Daily prior to publication and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence checks over each edition of the
President's Daily Brief. National Intelligence Officers supervise the
production of studies released under the auspices of the Community. The
NFIB formally reviews all NIEs before they are signed and released by
the DCI. After publication, further reviews are conducted, sometimes by
the Intelligence Directorate, and most frequently by the Intelligence
Community Staff. Its Product Review Division regularly appraises all
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articles and studies, testing them for objectivity, balance and respon-
siveness. In addition to this continuing process, the Division period-
ically focuses on the performance of the Directorate and the Community
in their reporting on specific developments in foreign affairs--especially
crisis situations--to determine the completeness and accuracy of their
intelligence production.
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Annex B
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Organizational History of the Intelligence Directorate
The Directorate of Intelligence was formally established on
January 2, 1952, with the following charter:
"The Deputy Director (Intelligence) will assist the Director
of Central Intelligence in the coordination of the intelligence
activities of the Government, as prescribed by statute and by
National Security Council directives. He will also be responsible
for directing and coordinating the activities of the Office of Col-
lection and Dissemination, Research and Reports, National Estimates,
Intelligence Coordination, Current Intelligence, Scientific Intel-
ligence, and Operations, for the fulfillment of such additional
functions as may be specified by the Director." (CIA Regulation
Specifically, the intelligence activities which the DDI originally
administered were:
a. Production of finished intelligence by the Offices of
National Estimates (ONE), Current Intelligence (OCI), Research and
Reports (ORR), and Scientific Intelligence (OSI).
STAT
c. Dissemination, storage and retrieval of unevaluated
intelligence information and basic reference documentation by the
Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD).
d. Coordination of intelligence collection by the Office of
Intelligence Coordination (OIC).
Bl
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In the twenty-three years since its founding, the Intelligence
Directorate has gone through a number of reorganizations stimulated by
advice from external panels, changing international circumstances,
shifting requirements for finished intelligence production, and dwin-
dling resources with which to perform its mission. Changes in the early
years were fairly numerous but were mostly realignments of activities
within the DDI and between Directorates. In 1976 a major reform was
undertaken designed to consolidate production under the leadership of
the DDI, to improve support to the policy analysis community, to empha-
size interdisciplinary research and analysis, and to achieve greater
efficiency in the production process. The early changes and this
recent restructuring of the organization and functional activities are
described below.
1. Intelligence Production
Policy Support
A Center for Policy Support was established in late 1976 in
recognition of the need to strengthen decision making on intelligence
production priorities and on the allocation of resources, and to make
intelligence more accessible and relevant to the policymakers' needs.
This small, select staff will focus on 1) improving the Directorate's
usefulness to the policymaking community by establishing working relation-
ships with key staff officers responsible for developing foreign policy
captions, 2) producing in-depth studies of emerging foreign intelligence
issues, and 3) exercising management control of production to insure its
increasingly interdisciplinary character.
Estimative Intelligence
Producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) was the function of
the Office of National Estimates (ONE) which was in the Intelligence
Directorate until 1966, when it became a staff under the direction of
the Director of Central Intelligence. This move was made, in part, to
emphasize that the NIEs were the product of the entire Intelligence
Community rather than a single agency. ONE was abolished in 1973 and
its responsibilities were transfered to the newly formed National Intel-
ligence Officers attached to the Office of the DCI. With this move,
much of the work of producing draft estimates reverted to the production
offices of the Intelligence Directorate.
Current Intelligence
Until the reorganization of 1976, primary responsibility for pro-
ducing current intelligence remained where it had been since the Direc-
torate was established--i.e., in the Office of Current Intelligence.
Originally, OCI was responsible for all current intelligence reporting
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except economic. In recent years it concentrated on current political
analysis reporting, leaving the preparation of reports on economic,
military, geographic and scientific developments to the research offices
responsible for these matters. OCI coordinated and consolidated reporting
on all subjects for presentation in its daily intelligence publications.
In 'late 1976, the responsiblity for political reporting was consol-
idated in a newly established Office of Regional and Political Analysis
and a new Current Reporting Group was established to prepare the daily
intelligence publications and see them through the coordination and
publication process. The CRG prepares on-the-spot analyses for the
daily publications while longer, in-depth analyses are prepared by those
offices responsible for political, military, economic, geographic and
scientific intelligence, which submit them to the CRG for publication
in current dailies.
Political Research
In-depth foreign political intelligence reporting has not been,
until recently, represented in the Office structure of the Intelligence
Directorate. Originally, whatever efforts were made in this field were
concentrated in OCI. In 1962, a modest step toward increased foreign
political research was taken with the establishment of a Special Research
Staff (SRS) in the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence. In
recent years, however, the diminished role of State's Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research in Community affairs, a perceived need for more
sophisticated work in this field by CIA and the appearance of new
methods of political research, including computer applications, encour-
aged the Directorate to invest more resources in this area. Accord-
ingly, an Office of Political Research (OPR) was established in 1974.
It incorporated the Special Research Staff, some people from OCI and
the then disbanding Office of National Estimates.
There was recognition in 1976 that political analyses had come
to concentrate excessively on either immediate reporting or in-depth
research of an academic character that had insufficient impact on the
Directorate's key customers. Consequently OPR and analysts from the
defunct OCI were fused into the Office of Regional and Political Analysis
(ORPA). ORPA will retain responsibility for current analysis and long-
range research, but will also focus on the production of mid-term studies
of issues which are of key interest to policy analysts. The quality of
this research will be enriched by the inclusion of specialists from other
disciplines, e.g. economics, sociology, science and military affairs, into
the ORPA structure. ORPA will also augment its coverage of political
developments by increasingly analyzing events from a regional point of
view and by focusing more on emerging trans-national issues.
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Basic Intelligence
Production of basic intelligence was stimulated primarily by the
realization in World War II that the US Government had too little infor-
mation about many of the foreign countries with which it was required to
deal. The basic Intelligence Division (BID) of ORR was charged with
responsibility for coordinating the production of "factual intelligence.. .of
a fundamental and more or less permanent nature on all foreign countries."
Because of the scope of the subject matter, the production of this type
of intelligence required a cooperative effort involving the resources
and capabilities of several departments and agencies of the Federal
Government. The product of this government-wide effort was knowias the
National Intelligence Surveys (NIS).
In 1955, BID became a separate office, the Office of Basic Intel-
ligence (OBI). This was in line with recommendations made in May 1955
by the Task Force on Intelligence Activities*. The elevation of Basic
Intelligence to Office status was an acknowledgement of the importance
that the Agency and the rest of the national security apparatus attached
to the NIS Program.
The early years of OBI were devoted mostly to the coordination of
this program. Many of the chapters were written by other elements of
CIA or by other government agencies on a contractual basis. In 1961,
OBI took over responsibility for the production of the political sections
of the NIS from the State Department's Bureau of intelligence Research
when State claimed that it no longer had the resources to do this work.
OBI delegated the task of producing these sections to OCI in 1962. In
1965, the geographic research funtion was transferred from the office of
Research and Reports creating the Office of Basic and Geographic Intel-
ligence. The NISs continued to be published until 1974 when the program
was terminated because of lack of resources. At this time, OBGI became
the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research (see below).
Geographic Intelligence
]'he Geographic Research Area (GRA) of the Office of Research and
Reports (ORR) originally had the responsibility for geographic intel-
ligence production. The GRA was transferred in 1965 to the Office of
Basic Intelligence changing its title to the Office of Basic and
*The Clark Task Force, headed by Gen. Mark Clark, of the Hoover
Commission.
B4
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Geographic Intelligence (OBGI). In 1974, OBGI became the Office of
Geographic and Cartographic Research (OGCR) when the National Intel-
ligence Survey (NIS) Program was abandoned.
The study of Soviet grain production undertaken by OGCR has proved
to be the most successful application of interdisci linar analysis in
the Directorate. Starting with data provided by 25X1
and combining it with information provided by a host o other sources,
OGCR has assembled a team of geographers, agronomists, economists,
photointerpreters and meteorologists to produce remarkably accurate
forecasts of wheat output in the Soviet Union. The Directorate has
capitalized on the success of these analytical techniques and organiza-
tional approach by establishing a new Environmental and Resources Center
in OGCR to continue and enlarge upon this research. The Directorate
expects, also, to expand this research to include food crops in
Communist China, world water resources, and other basic materials whose
exploitation or scarcity can have an impact: on strategic balance between
nations.
Scientific and Military Intelligence
Until the mid 1950's, the production of intelligence on military
matters had been considered the primary responsibility of the Depart-
ment of Defense. But the "bomber gap" and later the "missile gap"
controversies gave CIA a prominent role in foreign military research, an
involvement which has continued and expanded because of the utility
policymakers find in having an independent source of analysis and reporting
on important military matters. In 1960 the DDI created an ad hoc Guided
Missiles Task Force to foster the collection of information on Soviet
deployment. The Task Force was abolished in 1961 and a Military
Research Area was established in ORR. As a result of increasing demands
for CIA analysis of military developments, a new Office of Strategic Research
was established in 1967 by consolidating the Military-Economic Research
Area of ORR and the Military Division of OCI. The scope and focus of
a.: responsibilities of OSR have increased over the years and in 1973 a new
component for research in Soviet and Chinese strategic policy and military
doctrine was added.
When the Agency's Science and Technology Directorate was founded
(in 1962) to concentrate primarily on the technical collection and
analysis of information about Soviet strategic weapons systems, it
was decided that the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) should be
transferred from the Intelligence Directorate to enrich the new organiza-
tion's analytical base. Subsequently, a second analytical element
was created in the DDS&T called the Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI).
These offices accomplished their initial purpose admirably but left
the Agency's principal organization for analysis, the Intelligence
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Directorate, without a scientific dimension and became less
vital to the DDS&T as it has evolved primarily into the tech-
nical collection counterpart of the Agency's human collection
organization, the Operations Directorate.
Economic intelligence
Activity in this area remains the responsibility of the
organization that succeeded the Office of Research and Reports
in 1967: the Office of Economic Research. In earlier years,
the Agency concentrated its economic research largely on the
Communist states. In recent years, however, the Department of
State has dropped much of its intelligence production on the
non-Communist areas, leaving this job to the Agency. OER has
also expanded its research into such subject areas as inter-
national energy supplies and international trade. Today it is
the largest research office in the Intelligence Directorate.
iliograph_i_c Intelli_e_nce
Prior to the establishment of the Intelligence Directorate,
the Office of Collection and Dissemination was in and then out
of the business of biographic reporting. The Hoover Commission
Report of 1949 recommended dividing the responsibility for
biographic intelligence production within the Community to
prevent costly duplication. As a result, the political per-
sonality dossiers maintained by OCD were transferred to State.
In 1961, however, the Bureau of Intelligence Research claimed
it no longer had the resources to provide this service and the
responsibility for reporting on foreign political personalities
and, subsequently, for all non-military biographic intelligence
reporting was transterred to CIA. The task was taken over by
OCD's successor organization, now the Office of Central Ref-
erence.
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Round-the-Clock Watch/Alert
The Cuban Missile Crisis of the fall of 1962 clearly spot-
lighted the need for a single Directorate facility for round-
the-clock receipt of intelligence information and for a center
in which the expertise of all its offices could be rallied in
crisis situations. In March 1963, the DDI set up a Special
Study Group on DDI Organizational Tasks to study this and other
problems. One of the results of its work was the establishment
of an operations center under the administrative direction of
the then Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). Over the next
ten years, the Operations Center grew in size and capability
largely as a result of the Vietnam War. In 1974, it was sep-
arated from.OCI and renamed the CIA Operations Center, a title
warranted by the fact that all Directorates of the Agency now
maintain permanent duty officers within the Center. Today, the
CIA Operations Center provides the mechanism and facilities
with which the full information resources of CIA can be mo-
bilized to work in concert with the Community in foreign
crisis situations.
II. Intelligence Collection
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fhe history of the Foreign Documents Division is discussed
below under Information Processing.
III. Information Processing
Between the collection and production phases of the in-
telligence process there is an activity known as "information
processing." information processing involves special skills
or equipment to convert certain kinds of raw information into
a form usable by intelligence analysts who are producing
finished intelligence. It includes things like photo inter-
pretation and translations of foreign documents as well as
the receipt, dissemination, indexing, storage, and retrieval
of the great volumes of data which must be available to the
production offices if they are to do their analytical work.
Information Dissemination, Storage a_nd Retrieval
One of the oriainal offices of the Central Intelligence
Group, the Office of Collection & Dissemination (OCD), began
this work in 1948 when it introduced business machines to
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improve reference, liaison and document security services.
Ultimately, this Office became CIA's own departmen al library
and centralized document service. 5X1
In 1955,
OCD was renamed the Office of Centro Reference to more
accurately reflect its Agency-wide responsibilities. In 1967,
OCR was renamed the Central Reference Service but in 1976 it
was redesignated the Office of Central Reference. Today OCR
can offer intelligence analysts throughout the Community some
of the most sophisticated information storage and retrieval
systems to be found anywhere in the world.
Photographic Interpretation
CIA's work with photographic interpretation began in 1952
and was initially centered in the Geographic Research Area,
ORR. In 1958, a new Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC)
was created by fusing the Photo Intelligence Division of ORR
with the Statistical Branch of OCR. The new Center was given
office-level status and the responsibility for producing
photographic intelligence and providing related services for
CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community. In 1961 PIC
was further elevated to become the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC). This Center was staffed by
former members of PIC and DIA personnel detailed to NPIC.
All personnel were functionally under the Director, NPIC,
who continued to report to the DDI.
An interagency study conducted in 1967 concluded that
NPIC's national intelligence responsibilities had grown so
substantially that departmental imagery analysis requirements
were not being adequately served. Accordingly, the DDI estab-
lished an Imagery Analysis Service (IAS) as a separate office
of the Directorate to deal exclusively with the photo intel-
ligence requirements of CIA. in 1973, it was decided that
NPIC would be more appropriately placed in the Directorate
of Science and Technology with other elements dealing with
reconnaissance at the national
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In 1976 IAS was redesignated
the Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) in recognition of its
unique production capability.
translation Services
The Foreign Documents Divisions (FDD) of the Office
of Operations (00) had its origin in the Army and Navy's
Washington Document Center. Founded in 1944, it was a
repository for captured Japanese and German records.
it was absorbed by the Central Intelligence Group in 1946
and, during the late forties, evolved from a repository
into an exploiter of all foreign language documents coming
into the Community. it joined the Central Intelligence
a-F-- _F_ 25X1
in
1952, FDD continued to expand its work into the ield of 25X1
materials received from the Communist countries.
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Confidential
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