SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS ON ADMIRAL TURNER'S CONFIRMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 9, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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9 March 1977
014-x_'1-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Morning Meeting Participants
SUBJECT : Supplemental Questions on Admiral Turner's
Confirmation
REFERENCE : Memo from George Cary, Legislative Counsel,
to Morning Meeting Participants, dtd 2 March
1977, same subject
1. In follow-on to referent memorandum, it is requested that
you designate a representative to attend a meeting in the DDA Conference
Room, room 7D-32, at 10:30 a. m. , Thursday, 10 March.
2. The purpose will be to determine the status of office
responses to the supplementary questions and to reconcile and coordinate
where more than one office is involved.
3. Another object of the meeting will be to identify those
questions which can be satisfactorily answered by 16 March and those
which should be deferred for further consideration. On this latter
category we must, of course, be prepared to explain to Admiral Turner
why we 'recommend deferral and obtain his approval.
STATINTL
Legislative Counsel
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Morning Meeting Participants
1-
1
1 - Mr. Evans.
1
1 -- Dr. Stevens
1 -- Mr. Wells
1 - Mr. Dirks
1 - Mr. Blake
I - Mr. Tony Lapham
1 -- Mr. Waller
1 - Mr. Taylor
I - Mr. Falkiewicz
1-
1
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LC (George Cary has called a meeting
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at 10:0 tomorrow morning, would
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represe t you at th meeting?
Del/9 March
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File
MEMORANDUM FOR: Morning Meeting Participants
SUBJECT : Supplemental Questions on Admiral Turner's
Confirmation
1. Attached is a copy of a 28 February 1977 letter from
Chairman Daniel Inouye, of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, to Admiral Turner forwarding questions supplementary
to the Admiral's confirmation hearing. The letter pointed out that
the Admiral's answers,will be published by the Committee as part of
the record of the Admiral's confirmation hearing.
2. Please give your immediate attention to those questions and
answers which properly impinge on your component's interests. Admiral
Turner is sending an interim letter to Senator Inouye stating that he
hopes to have his reply ready by 16 March. We ask that your responses
reach OLC by 9 March to permit appropriate reconciliation and coordination
and approval by the Admiral.
3. Please note that the Senator's letter asks for unclassified
answers to all the questions, but adds that any answers requiring the
use of classified information be forwarded in a supplementary classified
letter.
Ge ge L. Gary
Legislative Counsel
Attachment
STATINTL
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1 March 1977
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 DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII. CHAIRMAN
JAKE GARN. UTAH, VICE CHAIRMAN '
UIRCH RAYH. IND: A rovedOFo1CsRelease 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014
~. DLALH. STEVENSON, ILL. pp STROM THUR.ONO, S.C.
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY. MAINE MARK O. HATFfSLO, OHEG.
JOSEPH R. (HIDER, JR;, DEL. ROBERT T. STAFFORD, ,r.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.. MD.
GARY HART. COLO.
' J ~'fT 2 s ez e s s~z OzC i 1 C ~/
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
PURSUANT TO 9, RES. 408. /" C0NGH859)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
February 28, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner:
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R6616
As I indicated to you at your nomination hear-
ing, the Members of the Committee would like you to
answer some additional questions which I am enclosing.
.We plan to publish the questions and your answers as
part of the hearing record.
The Committee would like unclassified answers to
all the questions. However, if full and complete an-
swers to any questions require the provision of clas-
sified information, please identify the questions and
answer them in a supplementary classified letter.
The Committee appreciated your forthright testimony.
I congratulate you once again on your appointment and
confirmation, and we look forward to working with you.
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 Admiral Turner
February 28, 1977
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A. CIVIL LIBERTIES
Currently, one of the important controversies in con-
stitutional law is the question of hoer the Presi-
dent's authority to conduct foreign intelligence ac-
tivities meshes with the provisions of the first and
fourth amendments. The question has most frequently
arisen in terms of wiretaps and foreign intelligence
cases.
Could you explain your views of the nature
and extent of Presidential authority and how
it is limited by the first and fourth amend-
ments?
Do you believe the President has the power
to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance of Americans at home or abroad for
foreign intelligence purposes?
C. Is it your understanding of the law that if
Congress enacts legislation setting stand-
ards and conditions for the use of electronic
surveillance in foreign intelligence cases,
the executive branch, including the Presi-
dent, is bound by those standards and con-
ditions?
2. Last summer, this Committee and the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported S. 3197, a. bill to require war-
rants for electronic surveillance conducted in the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
/a. Do you favor such legislation?
Would you favor expanding such legislation
to require warrants for electronic surveil-
lance of Americans abroad, as well as in
the United States?
Would you favor expanding the proposed elec-
tronic surveillance legislation to require
warrants in foreign intelligence cases for
other intrusive investigative techniques
such as mail opening and surreptitious en-
tries when directed against Americans, ei-
ther at home or abroad?
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Do you think that electronic surveillance
of Americans for foreign intelligence pur-
poses at home or abroad should be limited.
to those instances where there is substan-
tial evidence that the American has engaged
in criminal activities?
For the purpose of obtaining a warrant,
would, you be willing to report to a Federal
judge the facts determining. the Agency's
belief that electronic surveillance should
be conducted against an American living
abroad?
B. LEGAL AUTHORITY
tive Order, particularly as it relates to the follow-
ing issues:
Gould you tell the Committee your views of the Execu-
In February of 1976, President Ford issued Executive
Order 11905 on United States foreign intelligence ac-
tivities. The Executive Order was issued in order to
"clarify the authority and responsibilities of the
intelligence agencies."
at the will of the President, and which pro-
vides no penalties for its violation, suffi-
cient to define the varying missions of the
intelligence agencies and to fix firm limits
on their activities?
a. Is an Executive order which can be changed
b. While the DCI is to provide guidance on the
relationship between tactical and national
intelligence, under the Executive Order the
DCI does not have any responsibility for
tactical intelligence. Previous DCIs have
had the right to review the allocation of
all intelligence resources, including tacti-
cal intelligence. Do you believe that the
Executive Order has an undesirable effect of
weakening the DCI's authority in this area?
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c. Under the Executive Order, the DCI is to
"ensure the development and the submission
of a national intelligence budget." At the
same time, the Committee on Foreign Intel-
ligence, now the Policy Review Committee
(PRC), is to "control budget preparation of
the national intelligence program," and the
Secretary of Defense has the responsibility
to "direct, fund, and operate" the NSA.
How can these potentially contradicting
charges be resolved?
/d. What changes would you recommend in the
present Executive Order?
2. The authority of the CIA to engage in certain activi-
ties rests on directives issued by the National Se-
curity Council, called National Security Council Di-
rectives or NSCIDs. These NSCIDs have in the past
been referred to as the CIA's secret charter and
were withheld not only from the public but also,.
until recently, from Congress..
a. If these NSCIDs are revised or new NSCIDs
,/ are issued, will you provide these to the
Committee as your predecessor has done?
Do you believe that the oversight commit-
tees of Congress should be consulted dur-
ing the preparation or revision of these
NSCIDs?
3. /CIA practices are also affected by directives issued
by other persons, such as the DCI and the Policy Re-'.
view Committee (PRC).
Will you provide to the Committee all such
directives and modifications of directives,
including DCIDs and directives from the PRC?
4. As Director of Central Intelligence, your advice may-
be sought on the question of charters for the intel-
ligence agencies. The 1947 National Security Act, the
CIA's statutory charter, has been termed inadequate in
/ a number of areas. At the present time, the National
S e 't A 1 h D f I 1'
t
l
%_L y gency anc
e e en se nte
igence Agency
have no statutory charters. The FBI's authority to
engage in domestic intelligence activities has been
questioned.
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Should a new CIA charter explicitly authorize
covert action?
Should there be specific statutory authority,
for the CIA to collect intelligence?
c What-activities should the CIA be allowed
to undertake in the United States? Should
a new charter precisely define those activi-
ties?
Do you favor statutory charters for the Na-
tional Security Agency and the Defense In-V
telligence Agency?
Do you agree with Attorney General Bell that
1 the FBI needs a clear charter?
Should there be statutory limitations on the
permissible activities of all of the intelli-
gence.agencies? Should violations carry
criminal sanctions?
C. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES
When you take over as Director of Central Intelligence,
you will inherit the present apparatus of ongoing cov-
ert action and clandestine collection operations.
,Will you pledge to consult with this Commit-
tee on the feasibility and wisdom of the
various ongoing programs before making any
final determination as to their continuation
or termination?
CIA clandestine operations, both covert action and
clandestine collection, comprise a wide variety of
activities. In this connection,*the Committee would
like to explore your attitude towards two specific
kinds of operations,
a. What are your views with respect to the cov-
ert involvement of the United States, in any
manner, in the elections of a foreign coun-
try?
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t b. Under what circumstances would you approve
covert payments to foreign leaders?
What are the factors that would most influ-
ence your judgment on the advisability of
various types of clandestine operations,
such as the two mentioned above?
3. T,is Committee is reluctant to request the identity
f covert agents because we recognize the extreme
sensitivity of such information and because the need
for such information rarely exists.
If, in the view of the Committee., the con-
duct of its oversight role were to require
such information, would you provide it?
For example, if the Committee were to in-
vestigate an abuse involving a covert agent
whom it would wish to interrogate, would
the agent be made available to us?
D. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
1. You served as NATO's Commander of Allied Forces for
Southern Europe, and previously served as commander
of the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic. In both
positions, you were exposed to a great deal of in-
telligence, provided not only through service intel-
ligence agencies and national intelligence agencies
but also through NATO itself.
a. What was the value of the intelligence you
received to long-range military planning
and NATO operations?
b. What was the value of this intelligence to
your more day-to-day operational needs and
to your requirements for indications and
warning?
c. Did you perceive any significant gaps in
U.S. intelligence reporting?
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d. What ideas for improving the U.S. intelli-
gence effort have you. gained from your ex-
perience
as a commander of U.S. Navy and
NATO forces?
2. Between 1,971 and 1972, you served as chief of the
Systems-Analysis Division of the Office of Naval
Operations. In that capacity you were involved in
the Navy's efforts in "net assessments."
a. In light of your experience, how much empha-
sis do you think the intelligence community,
should put upon net assessments as opposed
to more traditional estimates?
b. What should be the role of the intelligence
agencies in net assessment?
c. Would you as DCI. be averse to conducting net
assessments in which analysis of U.S. capa-
bilities and intentions would be explicit
or implicit?
d. How would you evaluate the net assessments
efforts of the Defense Department and the
executive branch?
3. As Director of Central Intelligence, you will have
primary control over the collection and production
activities of the CIA. As part of its general ef-
fort in military intelligence areas to support the
President, the CIA produces intelligence on naval
forces.
a. What is your opinion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the CIA's analyses of naval,
forces?
b. How do their analytical efforts compare with
those of the Navy?
c. How do they compare with the work of DIA?
In the area of intelligence support to policymaking,
one of the Committee's concerns.is the degree to
which Congress has not been a recipient of intelli-
gence analysis that could assist the Members in mak-
ing important national decisions.
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Are you prepared to provide the Congress
with intelligence, even when it may not sup-
port the policies of the President, or when
it may embarrass the President?
5. Former DCI William Colby has recently argued that
more of the intelligence community's analysis should
be made available to the public.
a. Do you share this view?
b. What advantages do you see in this more open
procedure? What dangers?
E. THE ROLE OF THE DCI AND HIS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE PRESIDENT
1. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence en
compasses three somewhat conflicting responsibilities:
intelligence advisor to the President, Director of
the CIA, and manager of the intelligence community.
a. IIow.do you define the Director's role? Which
of these responsibilities will be most cen-
tral to you?
b. Do you believe that there is a potential con-
flict between the need to provide the Presi-
dent with objective intelligence and a natural
tendency to place your trust in the intelli-
gence generated by the Agency which you head?
2. One aspect of the personal relationship between the
DCI and the President involves the DCI's ability to
maintain the delicate balance between having the ab-
solute trust of, while still being independent of,
the President.
What steps will you take to ensure that agen-
cies in the intelligence community will not
overstep the bounds of legality or propriety
because of requests from the White House?
3. The DCI's Presidential advisory role overlaps in par-
ticular with those of the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State.
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g -.
a. Have you discussed this issue with. Mr.
Brzezinski and Mr. Vance? How do you view
your respective roles?
b. Do you think that your ability to bring in-
telliience to bear on policy would be en-
hanced by making the DCI a statutory member
of the National Security Council?
F. SELECTION OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR.
Under the provisions of the National Security Act of
1947, a DCI who is an active duty military officer
must have a civilian Deputy Director for the CIA. A
second deputy directorship with responsibilities for
the intelligence community was created by Executive
Order 11905. No restriction exists regarding that
Deputy's military or civilian status.
Will you choose or request an active duty
military officer for the position of Deputy
Director for the intelligence community?
G. SECRECY: SOURCES AND METHODS, ESPIONAGE LAW, LEAKS
1. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the
Director of Central Intelligence "shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and..rmlethods- from
unauthorized disclosure." This language has been un-
derstood to authorize, if not require,.the Director
of Central Intelligence to take action for protection
of such information in agencies other than the CIA.
a. How would you define "sources and methods.?"
b. Does the term include information not pres-
ently prohibited from disclosure by the Fed-
eral espionage statute or the Executive Order
on classification(E.O. 11652)?
c. Does it include information pertaining to
illegal acts by intelligence agencies? For
example, could the DCI withhold from the
Attorney General, the Congress or the press
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information pertaining to violations of the
CIA's "internal security" restrictions?
Could the DCI withhold a violation of the
Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring Congres-
sional notification of covert action?
d. How w6iild you define the scope of authority
relating to sources and methods in the lan-
guage of the 1947 Act?
e. Does this language only provide the authority
to coordinate the development of uniform
community-wide standards on protecting vital
secrets, the position taken by former DCI
Colby and the Church Committee?'- Or does it
provide an operational responsibility, e.g.
the authority to investigate "leaks," in-
eluding the authority to conduct surrepti-
tious entries and electronic surveillance
in the U.S. to determine the source of leaks,
an authority claimed by some former DCIs?
2. The Ford administration requested the Congress to en-
act amendments to the Federal espionage statute on
behalf of the intelligence community. Some aspects
of, that legislation are noncontroversial. Other pro-
visions may prompt some concern, especially those at-
taching criminal sanctions to the press for printing
classified information.
a. Do'you think it is appropriate to focus the
sanction upon the press as well as the govern-
ment employee who leaked the information?
b. Should such a statute authorize Federal in-
?vestigations of newspaper reporters who:re-
port classified information in their articles?
c. Do you believe that the Espionage Statute, of
1917 and the accompanying Presidential execu-
tive orders on classification permit too much
secrecy?
d. In addition to seeking amendments to Federal
law which provide sanctions against legitimate
secrets, will you seek amendments in both the
statute and the orders which will decrease un-
necessary secrecy?
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3. There has been a great deal of criticism in recent
years, some of it from the executive branch, sug-
gesting
that Congress has been irresponsible with
state secrets. However, two of the most serious
breaches of security to occur during this period
pertain to secrets in the exclusive domain of the
executive branch. Section 3(d) of Executive Order
11905 provides that the DCI, among other responsi-
bilities, develop programs to protect intelligence
sources and methods and ensure common security stand-
ards for the community.
Will you, pursuant to Section 3 of the Ex-
ecutive Order, reexamine these various se-.
curity procedures? Will you be proposing
changes in the procedures to combat such
leaks?
4. Vital secrets are leaked in the newspapers. In some
such cases, information has been leaked which may be
vital to the national security, e.g. a critical clan-
destine collection program or information which ap-
pears to compromise a particular source. These leaks
threaten intelligence operations because they put the
target of the operation in a position to take effec-
tive defensive measures. It would seem logical for
the CIA to attempt to confuse a hostile government
about what we had gained from that operation. In
other words, the Agency could actually engage in
"disinformation" by leaking confusing information to
the press,
a. Do you think it is appropriate for the
Agency to respond to such a leak by en-
gaging in such disinformation programs?
b. If so, should such disinformation or misin-
formation programs only be initiated after
there has been a damaging leak, or do you
believe that it is appropriate to conduct
such a program to confuse hostile govern-
ments in the absence of such a leak?
c. Do journalists knowingly participate in such
disinformation programs?
d. What checks or controls does the Agency have
upon such programs in order to avoid misin-
formation or disinformation from being used
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by the Agency to confuse the media or the
Congress about illegitimate activity of
the CIA?.
e. Will you provide the Committee with any CIA
assessment of the damage caused. by these
breaches of security?
5. At the time that Attorney General Levi and President
Ford were pursuing their wiretap proposal last year,
Attorney General Levi took the position that it was
.necessary to authorize electronic surveillance of
.corporations which export technology to foreign coun-
tries. In essence, he was arguing that our govern-
ment should monitor the export of technological pro-
cesses, even though such processes are not classified
or even classifiable, indeed, even though the export
of-that technology does not violate any law.
a. Do you agree with that position? Is there
information in the hands of private compa-
nies which is not directly relevant to-the
national defense but which we-should pro-
hibit from export or disclosure to a foreign
power, e.g. computer technology?
b.' Do you believe that such information should
be subject to control through amendments to
the Executive Order, the espionage statute
or perhaps some other Federal statute, such
as the Export Administration Act?
c. Is the real issue with such information
that it is vital to the national defense?
Or is the real issue that since American
"know how" may be an important "bargaining
chip" in negotiations with foreign govern-
ments such information must be controlled
for foreign policy reasons? .
H. BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
1. This Committee has responsibility for exercising over-
sight over national intelligence, not only in the con-
stitutional sense but also in the broader context of
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ensuring that the long-range development of collec-
tion and production supports the needs of the na-
tional policy. Thus, it is important that the Com-
mittee understand your objectives and goals for na-
tional intelligence.
a. Given your unique perspective as a consumer
of intelligence in the senior ranks of the
Defense Department, what do you think are
the most pressing challenges facing national
intelligence in the coming decade?
b. In your opinion, what are the strengths and
weaknesses in the way national intelligence
is now dealing with those challenges?
c. Given the vast complexity of intelligence,
what type of management approach will you
take in monitoring and directing the focus
.of the national intelligence community in
the coming decade?
d. Has the President, or any senior-ranking of-
ficial provided you with guidance on what
they expect the national. intelligence com-
munity to achieve in the coming years?
[If so] What were the principal themes in
that guidance?
[If not] What do you believe are the major
management and policy objectives
which should guide your actions
during your tenure as DCI?
One-of the major arguments against disclosure of the
aggregate intelligence budget figure is that publica-
tion will. result in demands for more detailed infor-
mation.
What is your response to that argument?
3. An argument against annual disclosure of the aggregate
budget figure or any element of the intelligence budget
is that publication will allow our adversaries to de-
termine the program changes in specific U.S. intelligence
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capabilities, such as 'a major allocation for the
development of a new technical collection system.
What is your response to that argument?
I. CIA INTERNAL INSPECTION AND REGULATIONS
1. Existing procedures require that the CIA's General
Counsel review activities which raise questions of
legality. Some potentially sensitive clandestine
activities are reviewed by the CIA's General Counsel
who is placed in a somewhat contradictory position
of both reviewing the particular activity and facili-
tating CIA's overall mission.
a. Would you support a requirement that poten-
tially sensitive clandestine activities such
as those alleged to have taken place in Mi-
cronesia be reviewed for legality by the, At-.
torney General of the United States?
b. What threshhold would you establish to 'trig-
ger such a review?
2. At present the General Counsel is required to refer
to the Department of Justice allegations regarding
activities by CI.A employees that violate Federal
law.
In order to assist the Committee in its
oversight role, will you instruct the
General Counsel to notify the Committee
when and if such referral takes place?
3. Executive Order 11905 directs heads of intelligence
agencies or departments to "ensure that Inspectors
General and General Counsels of their agencies have
access to any information necessary to perform their
duties..." At present, CIA regulations require that
the Inspectors General and General Counsels have ac-
cess to all information necessary for the performance
of their respective duties, but these regulations can
be withdratm or modified at any time by the Director.
a, Should the General Counsel and Inspector Gen-
eral be assured, by statute, of access to all
Agency information necessary for their work?
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b. Will you. notify this Committee if either of
these officers is denied, on your authority,
access to CIA information?
One of the most effective tools of the Inspector Gen-
eral is the component survey--an in-depth study of a
particular segment of the CIA, such as the Office of
Current Iitelligence.
Will you instruct the Inspector General to
notify this Committee of the schedule, of
component surveys and to brief the Commit-
tee as to the general findings of each?
Since 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence has
regularly issued a call to CIA employees to report to
him any activities which raise questions of legality
and propriety.
Do you think that this call is sufficient to
create an incentive structure that will in
practice bring forth reports of questionable
activities? If not, what measures are you
considering to ensure your ability to be ap-
pri6ed of questionable activities?
6.- It has been suggested that CIA employees having ac-
cess to secret intelligence might misuse that infor-
mation for personal profit. At present managerial-
level employees must: disclose their financial hold-
ings so that a determination can be made as to whether
or not there is any conflict of interest. In addition,
Section 203 of Executive Order 11222 provides that
employees may not "engage in, directly or indirectly,
financial transactions as a result of, or primarily
relying upon, information obtained through their em-.
ployment."
a. Will you take steps to ensure that this pro-
vision is enforced vis-a-vis CIA employees?
b. Will you notify the Committee of what steps
you have taken?
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