PREPARATION OF BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 11, 1977
• Content Type: MF

4::~scu:ive RepiOt~
Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022
ES 77-72 I ~~'
11 August 1977
MEMORAi~WDUM PORT. See Distri,butian
SUBJECT Preparation of Briefing Materials for the DCI
DD/A Registry
1, As you knave;, Admiral Turner will be on leave until 79 August.
He has requested that important materials ire may wish to call to his
attention be pouched an 17 Au ust far his reading while returning from
the West Coast, and I wi71 assemble, and you should
be advised that rat6ier than receiving a large bundle of correspondence,
he will be furnished copies of the DCI Daily Journal, as well as Minutes
of the Morning Staff Meeting, annotated as appropriate.
2. Topics which are not time urgen'c should be reported an in
accordance with the attached guidelines for a briefing book. We wi71
assemble here and provide for his weekend reading (20-21 August}.
Contributions are due here by COB 19 August far Mr. Blake's review. STATINTL
.. vans
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Distribution;
D/DCI/~~1
D/DCI/IC
DDA
DDI
DDO
DDS&T
GC
LC
IG
Compt
A/DCI/F'A
Approved For Rele~a~ ~/f~~/~7? :~=Ch4-~ 80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
Pre~axation of Bxief:irzg Soaks fox- -the Dirc:cto~ ~~ri~I Ileptzt__y 1?ixt~c~~-ar.ct
. I. ~.s a gencra.l rule, we should neat report ~.rt. the: ~~7ri.e:fzng
boo's an ite~:~s trhz.ch isill be presented ~o them se:p~..-r, ate:4.y, such
as n?.nutes of the I~iaxning Meeting, zntel~igerzce. publicai _orzs,
correspo;?dence, cables, etc.
?,
2. ~,~e shaul.d include a brief, concise, up--ta-t~,c:~~rnirzutc~ -
state~~.ent. a~oout s:cgni:~icant things that }aa~re l~~ap,nencd d.tzr:.:i.ng tJxc:}.r
aas?~ce about ~Yhich tlzey should be rnacle acv~axe a[r p~~.o,npa~~y as
posszble. ~orrnally, if i,re refer- to corresporzderzcc, it sba=.zld be
s-~:-nrt?rzzed: rathex ~L-han enclosed. Tl~zexe rnay, of cnurse,, he
ex.ception.s. Same events nay rzot ].end -tltemse~:~=es ~:a ader~uat~; _ .
coverabe zrz -the brie:l;zng book. Zn .this case, it xni. h~P be -
dzsixab~.e: to include enough to ale-r-4 them arzd :~~ollo:~ u~T w_i-th a _
,fuller briefing at. their earliest convenience ax~ submit. a
fuller nemora~Xdum. `!'rz.via or xoutine t~zings about jrhich they .
have rza need to leaxrz promptly, if at all, shau:}_c~ not be
i.n~luded.~ ~ -
_ '? 3; ~'-~ ~.s to format, the briefing book ~~ri:L:~ i.rzclude exactzy
;tihat is- s.exved up. ln. order that the total package may have .same
uniformity, material should bo prepared an ~ x lOJ-/2 ping that you tvoul_cl rather. make
50 d.ec:i.s:ions of which 30 were right than rnalce ZS dec.i.sians, a11. of them
right. '.Chat suggests you would, a.ccep-t a 40 percent rate of failure.
Ca.ri the CI11,. the President, and the country really tolerate a Q~0 percent
rate of :E:'~~.il.ure in the performance of its Director of Central Inte:lli.gcncc?
Should it? Why not ma}ce fczaer, and better, decisions?
~1IVSltiI;P..: }~et me assure this Committee that I apps?eciate the caziccrn
t}zat that quote may have evoked.. In my years of Naval service, I have
always tiled to preserve and encourage in rna}sing nzy decisions; ~vhezr I
felt that I had to remove somc,~one or sorneth_i_ng, I tried to replace i~t
with somc~~thing better, samethi.ng fairer. :[ have tried to rnalce na
zni.stakes an the big decisions. Na man is infallible; and as th:i.s
Comnzitf:ce knaves, to make no decis_i.on is actually to make _ a deca.s~.an.
I"quite agree that the DCI cannot have a 40 percent rate of failure of
decisioa. I would ti~~ant to assure you that ~~~hi1e I would try to be decisive,
I would Haver ignore tlic good commander's first inzperati_ve: to be prudent.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
u
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A0~,,3 0040022-5
:~,
Q(JESTI0.~1: In your Naval sox~va.cc, you l~zave wax~zx ttvo command ]Mats
from timo to time. I1ow carnfortab~e will you be taearing the tt~Ta.n command
hats of the Director o# Centra.l? Intelligence, with overall responsibility
for the Intelligence Ca~mmznity, azid the Director a# the Central
Intelligence Agency? Should one maxz t,rear both hats?
ANStV"~R: I appreciate that there are dif:E'exences of viet,r on tlri.s
matter. T'ar myself, I would res:x-ve judgment until after I had lead
azx apporttanit}' to see how well the ttti~a hats. fit, and how well otlYers--
particularl.y the President--felt that I, or any DCI, loaf` taith tl~.em on.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
QUESTION: jlrhat is the proper tale of a secret intelligence
organization in an oj~en society? ~~ `
AI~TSti~VER: Organizations which must operate. in secret contravene the
spirit of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency w}iich
nearly all ~nericans recognize as essential. It is ane that is Drell
established in the field of nationa."1 defense, .for examp:te. The rerxied~Y
to the inconsistency is to insure that intelligence agencies are
accountable to the established institutions of Government. The agencies
must act strictly trithin their charters, and ca.nn.at operate sa as to
abridge or in. any ~vay infringe on the constitutional rig}its of .Amer:i.cans.
lily pledge as DCI taauld bc; to have the CI.A and the Tntelligonc~::
Cairnnunity adhere faithfully to this charge under my direction.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ,~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-OO~A~00300040022-5
i.. /JJ
QUI:S']'ION: ltrhat r. elati.ve ral.c~s should civilians and tl~e mi.l.ita.ry
- - -.. ~.
.. ~ ._ .
have in producing intelligence?
ANSIV}R: Bot}-z civiliaxi agencies and military organizations Nave
important roles in the intelligence process. ~ ,
Generally spea.lcing, the military forces have special :i.ntelligence
reauircrnents that are related to their operational missions. This means
that the Department of Defense must have its ot~n. intel.ligezxce capability
with respect to both callect~.on azid analysis of foreign military information
relating 'to national defense.
Coordination mecharii.sn~s have evolved over t:}~.c years to try to
avoid unnecessary duplication and to assure full coverage.
Coordination process in the srabstantivc area is probably most
important in the production of National Intelligence I;st=ima.tcs. the
pos:i.tions in t}xese estiai~ates are those of tl~e DCI ; t}sey are arrived
at by a. process managed by his National Intel.ligez~-~ ice ~~~fficers "during
~~?hich the positions o-L- al1 civ:i7.ian and mili.taxy intelligence agencies
are considered fully. R~I7en agreement cannot be reaclxcrl on the position,
the DCI judges to be the soundest, either civil~.an or military a.gcncies
may take exception in the estimate itself.
This process allows the policy makers to make -their decisions
based on national estimates which fully cover a7.1 sides o.f tlxe issues
involved. It is the best assurance that estimates are not slantccl
or biased either in favor o-L- the military or tlxe civ:i7_ian agencies.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :.CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
,~
 Approved -For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA?=RDP80-~047~A000300040022-5
What is your position as to releasing the budget figures of CIA and
the Intelligence Community?
Answer: My predecessors, I understand, have been against publishing
the budget.;: and I gather that the weight of opinion in the Intelligence Community
and at CIA is still against budget disclosure. I would like time to consider
this problem and to assess what impact disclosure might have before responding
to this question.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 proved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80 ~0~73A00030004:0022-5
~? There has been much recent discussion of activities czf 10#~-iendly"
foreign i:ntelligercce services in the LT .S . Charges have been made that
CIA allo.vs these services a fxee hand in the U . S . izz exchange far. the
pxivilegE; of unharassed CZA operations abroad.. ~~?hat is youz- vieur of tZiE*
necessity of liaison lrrangements -and the propriety of pex-mitting thew-
groups to operate in the U .5 . , ofte.
I have stated t'rxat X believe in the necessity o# a strong i.rxtelligence
capability. Significant informa`3on can often tie obtained through Iiaisan.
Leith fr:tendly intelligence services, and 7 will support the practice of -
xnaintai.ning such liaison arraxa.gements in consonance Leith American foreign
policy aims and U.S. law. t'Vith xegard to the cluestian of operations of.
foreigz~a intelligence agetxts ix2 the U .5 . , regardless of the country th-ey
repxesent, this is an internal security matter, pxopezly the pxeserve of the
J'ustiCE: Department and rBX. Tn my view, these can~be no agreements made
LDitl2 az.2y foXeigzl lzztelligence' SC'YVices iKll3.1C~x violate U . S . Ia~.~s .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040~~~5
Are 'better. laws necessary to protect intelligence secrets?
Answer: The National Security Ac~t~..places on the DCI the responsibility to
protect intelligence sources and methods. Without such protection,. no
intelligence service can function. I understand that at the moment, no legal
sanctions are provided to the DCI to carry out this responsibility, and that
over the years, serious damage has. been done to our foreign intelligence effort
as a result of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources and methods.
I ~~understand that legislation was proposed in the last Congress which would
strengthen existing law in this area. I would strongly support such legislation.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.,
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A0~300040022-5
What changes need to be made in the National Security Act of :1947?
Answer: I would ask the Committee's understanding that I defer responding
to this question until. I, if confirmed as DCI, have an opportunity to get
better-acquainted with the CIA and the Intelligence Community ~,nd to get
the advice of the President, the NSC, the Presid.ent's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, and other elements of the Executive Branch.
I understand that questions have been raised about such matters as the
clarification of the role of the DCI vis a vis the Intelligence Community, and
the broadness and vagueness of some of the language .defining the functions
and prohibitions placed on the CIA.. I understand that this Committee has
established a subcommittee to work an the matter of intelligence charters, and.
I would. look fa~rard to working with the subcommittee on any changes that might
appropriately be made in the statutory authorities of CIA and the Intelligence
Committee.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ,~
 Approved for Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=FtDP80-0073 00300040022-5
g
C2tJ1"iSI'ION: iVliat are th.c strengths and ~~:ealc,nesse:s a:# 1.0. ~ "1905?
~,
ali~SS'dER: ~J;a:iia. 7 ~aavld reciYZest that the Corimti.ttee i~erm:it ~nc~ to
defer canxnent to the Can~ress until, a.f confir~n^d., I have an opportunity
to immerse ~ztyself in the business of t~~e DC;I and t.o consult with of}iers
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-0047~1Y~0300040022-5
'41~hat would be your test for when a covert operation should be
undertaken?
security."
X am not sure whether any hard and fast verbal formula is possible
or even desirable in this area. It should be recognized that the President
must be guided by the national interest of the United States and has primary
xesponsibility for carefully weighing the relative importance of these interests
against the passible. risks involved.
'~ Section. 062 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 196]., as amended.
The test presently embodied in law is "important to the national
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
_ ,z
 y ~,~,~
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300~48022-5
Is i1: really necessary for the United States to conduct covert action?
c,~,Cltil law ,,,.,.a.or_E..1,-c~n'7
Answer: I believe it is necessary for the U. S. Government to maintain a
covert action_;c~.pability, to try to accolish objectives which the policy-
makers determine should not be attempted in a public way, But I would
encourage the use of covert action only where vital American interests are
involved, only where prior determination has shown that an avert program
could nqt appropriately accomplish the same purpose, and only where the
covert action operation had an acceptable chance of success and the risks
of the consequences of failure were also acceptable.
I would insure that the President was fully knowledgeable of the cavert
action and supported it.
I wauld also refer you to the statement of Secretary of State Vance on .
covert action, made at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January. I fully endorse the Secretary's
statement.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
... ~
 9
11
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RD~80-00473A00030004002~~ ~ 17
grounds that we must use there because the Russians cta . ~.Ck~ey
have embraced all of the- black arts of covert operations. ~-~
bribery, false propaganda, physical coercion, abduction, ~.ndee
even attempted assassination of?foreign leaders. .
I don't know how we can be .true to our own. values as a
country and continue to believe ~tha?t it is our. r3.ght to use
such methods; though again, I recognize that ixi.extx~emity a
nation must do what is needed to assure its own survival..
Bu?t we are not discussing cases of extremity, and the habit
of the past has been to intervene in these ways in the affairs
of other lands, even `Then the obi ective was pure~.y tecl-ini.ca~, ~,
Now I would like your own view on this . T~ niethar~ ~.s
the essence of LJhethex or not we do adhere to our prof es~ed?.
values as a nation, what are your views and what will be your
policy as Secretary of State when it comes to decisions with.
respect to secret interventions in the affairs of other lands?
l~Zr. Vance. I am very happy to give my views an-this.
Let~me say by way of background that these kinds of
covert actions have long been gaing on in the gavernmexzt. '.~k~e
were going on when I was in the government,. and I was part
of the oversight committee at one point in connection with
these. So I have thought long and carefully about ,this subje~c
I have come to ~?the conclusion that covert actions -~- and
x App oved For Releasew~0~~10f~~~~~A-~28~~~~~4~~OS~~O~~~O~Z~~genGe on
,z
~ tI-te one part and covert actions against other countries, ~ and
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA=RDP80-00473A0003~f1
am talking about the latter ~-~ I am convinced that covert
17
18 I
action against other countries should be carried out on~.y
in the must extraordinary circumstances and that the px~ocedur,
should be set up so-that if there is a proposal to carx?~r out
a covert action, that that first has to be passed .u
Pon by a
committee of the senior Cahinet officers, to inc3,ude the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,/the National
Security Advisor, and importantly in any judgment. the
Attorney General of the United States.
I feel very strongly-that the T3:ttorney General of .the
Un:i.ted States should participate in the decision-ma~.inq pxc,ce
by which the decision is arrived at which goes to the ]~xesidE
of the United States. I think then that tI-ie President of the
Una.ted States himself should sign off in writing saying that
he believea this to be vital to the national secura.ty?aria se
endorse the carrying forward of this extraordinary circ~xmstanc
~ then feel that notice should be given in advance f:a
the apprr~priate committee or committees of the Congress so ..
that they can?.reflect their views to the President if they
disagree with the proposal.
. I do not believe that the Congress should have a veto in
T think that it is very likely that if the congressional.
commi
SaZ~pov~e~1~oP~eas~e'~k@9~3/02~
have great. ccancern for eah~f- ;
~t4~[~Pr~0~3A~0~o00see2 you.. as
~ r,~; ~~ ~~-_-- . ,
we
that regard because 2 think that splits the resporisi3ail.itXQ
 24
hav@p~~.?~~adLF$fe~,~~1~ o~i~an~2~resi~e~nt~ as4 to~whe?~h4he would
the
ga forward with the operation.
Finally, I believe there should be' an adequate mon9.torin
sys?~,em so that once a covert action is approved, one keeps oxx'
top of it to determine what .is happen~.ng, how it is proceeding
and whether it should be terminated.
? Unfortunately experience in the past has shown that. thes
develop alife of their own and once started ire hazel to tuxn
bac]r.. '
Senator, Church. I am very much reassured by.gour?;-
answer,. P~Lr. Vance. I think it reflects cancl~.sians tha?~ were
reached by my own committee investigating the a.ntellic~ence
services. Now that the Senate is possessed of a permanent
Intelligence Committee, X think what you have said is in ~.a.xxe
with the prevailing view on that committee, and indeed, in the
.Senate itself, where the decision was ta]~en to establish
that prevention.
Poly time is up. Let me dust end with tha,s comment..
When you establish a test, the one you have suggestectF
that covert operations be undertaken only a.n the most extra-~
ordinary circumstances, it is well to keep in mind that.. an our
kind of society, sooner or later, as long as tie area free
society,- the covert operation is going to cameo .into ~' serva:ce :iKn
some.line. Tt has not met .so exacting a standard.- Dnce it
surf ces itt o s
`~hpproved ~or ~2ele~~~~~03~t~l~l~c~~$~-d~~~Oti~~0~0~22~putation
.. ,~
.
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A0003000
??~I': The Intelligence Community recently authorized a cornpet-itive
team approacl-~ to preparation of the N1E o~e~. Sovi.et stzatet;ic foxr.es.,
whereby a group of outside e:cperts v~ras assembled to evaluate all
available intelligence and reach conclusions independently from those
naxmally tasked ~vith preparir_g such estimates . I understand the
xesults of the tc~?a groups ~~vexe quite clifferent.:'tNhat do you think of
this competitive evaluation. concept and do you think. it `would be use.Eully
utilized far other estimates?
The competitive team approach ,vas an. innovative development in
the px?epax?atian of Natiorial Intelligence Estimates. I hope to encourage
innovative approaches in all areas of CIA's pexforrnance. The xesults of
this participation of outsiders in the estimating pxacess axe to be xevieti~+ed
by the Natignal Security Council, and I tivould be reluctant to comment on.
tI-i,e efficacy of the concept priox to the xesults of the full-scale review of
this expexiement.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA'-RDP80-00473A000300022-5
-~
t ~ d
Would you explain the procedures that ire followed under the provisions
of Section 66Z of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with respect
Answer: As I understand it, the Special Coordination Committee of the
National Security Council is charged with reviewing proposals for covert
action. Upon the recommendation of the Committee, a proposed covert
action goes to the President for decision, Tf the President finds that the
proposed activity is important to the national security, he approves it.
When the activity involves a release of funds from the CIA's Reserve,
the Office of Management and Budget is notified and a withdrawal approved.
After the President has made his finding, relevant Congressional
committees are notified of a new finding; a.nd at the earliest convenience
of each committee, the Director of Central Intelligence briefs its members
on the nature and scope of the covert actiono
As you are aware, this currently involves briefing four Senate committees
(Foreign. Relations, Appropriations, Armed Services, and the Senate Select ..
Committee on Intelligenc:e)~~arid three committees of the House of Representatives
(Appropriations., Armed Services, and International Relations).
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
u
 . Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A~0~3~,$040022-5
What role do you feel that the Congress should have in covert action?
Answer: I fully support the current requirement under Section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1.961, the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment,
that the Congress through certain designated Members be kept advised of
covert actions in a timely fashion. There are some elements of such oversight
that I understand have been of concern to the- CIA and the Intelligence Community
in the past, and I would hope to consider these with this Committee if I am
confirmed- as DCI.
One point is the numbers involved in the Congress: now seven committees,
with sorrce:55 Members, are being advised. L do not question the integrity of
any individual Member; I would be concerned about wide dissemination. of
sensitive information on U. S, policy and plans, as a reflection of the intel-
ligence officer's continuing concern that the fewer who know, the more secure
is the information.
I would note in passing the suggestions of the Murphy Commission favoring
that Section 662 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to a Joint
Congressional Committee on National Security.
I would also note the Murphy Commission's recommendation to omit
any requirement that the President personally certify to the necessity of a
particular covert action activity. I appreciate that there may be problems with
associating the Head of State so formally with such activities; I wonder if there
is, indeed, no reasonable alternative.
But I know thaFFt the Congress has considered these matters, and I would
ho e to ccQxiSircier~hem fue therOw~th2/2r7e ~IA-RpdP80t00n7d3~000~000400s2-~f I am confirmed
p - g~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A00030Q040`~22-5
What would. you do if the President were to ask you to carry out an
order which you believed. was illeg al or wrong?
Answer: I fell confident that the days of improper requests made of CIA
are behind us; at least I hope that they are.
If I were asked to order CIA to do something that I cons?dered illegal or
wrong, I would point out to the requester that the request was improper~.in
my view, and why. I would attempt to obtain the withdrawal of the order. If
unsuccessful, I would decline to follow it and would resign.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ,a
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=F2DP80-00473A000300040022-5
,~:' ti4hat is your concept of the objective of the CIA?
The intent of Coxzgress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency
was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from
all producir_g agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and.
disserninated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation of
national security palicies. This centralization would assure that all
information vital to the formulation of such policies was provided.
Further, under the direction. of tlYe President and the I\Tational Security
Gouncil, the Agency ~vould carry out such other duties as deemed
necessary in the national interest.
Th:e objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirexnez~.ts
as fully e>ffectively and efficiently as passible utilizing all intelligence
assets and resources of Government. The Agency must be unaffected by
any considerations which would in any way result in biased and uxzabj er_ti.ve
intelligence reporting .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
u
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.~~ ~~
You began your assignment as President of the Naval War College
by asking the question: "What is the objective in having a War Collegeq'r
Many have asked the same question about the GIA in the past few years,
with Chile, Watergate, assassinations, poison dart guns, etc. , in mind.
Wi11 you-ask that question?
ANSWER: Every commander knows there is no substitute far good
intelligence. As a consumer of intelligence for 3Q years, I have a profound
respect far its irreplaceable value and essentiality . The CIA is the
central instrument for providing intelligence to the United States. There
should be no doubt about its objectives: to provide the best intelligence
possible to the President, and to carry out, to the best of its ability the
requirements place upon it by the President.
At the same time, as a newcomer to the CIA and the Intelligence Community,
I would look carefully at the way the objectives are met, and suggest
anti make such changes as seem appropriate to meeting them better .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 ? Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA=RDP80-00473A000~0~0,~1,0022-5
QUESTION: In an editorial signed by you in the Naval War College
Review of July-August 1974, you stated that "a key element in the mutual
deterrence that has existed between the United States and the Soviet
Union for the past quarter century is the subtle communication of
intentions and capabilities to each other." What do you see as the
CIA's role in this process? CTA has its spies abroad, it undertakes
covert action programs, it puts out various kinds of propaganda, all
of which may be taken as signals by the USSR--rightly ar wrongly-- of
U.S. intentions and capabilities. Aren't the spy business and the strong-
arm action that we try not to acknowledge two ways to send confusing,
if not false signals? Don't we do better to let the President and the
Secretary of State send the signals?
ANSWER: Conveying signals of our intentions and capabilities to
a poteni~ial adversary is a delicate thing, as this Committee well
appreciates. Any activity which the CIA were to take in this area
would be done sb only at the express direction of the policy-makers,
the President and his policy representatives.
The collection of intelligence abroad is essentially an on-going
process, whatever a country's policies at the moment may be, and should
be done with maximwn discretion and minimum reflection of any kind of
policy decision. The success of covert action activity, by definition,
depends in large measure on the ability to hide its relationship to
the sponsoring country; its implications for communicating intentions
and capabilities must be carefully thought out and accepted before it
is undertaken. That is one good reason why proposed covert action must
have thE; approval of the highest authority in the Executive Branch of
this Government, and why I fully support the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
calling ai~~r~l~~~~~~/~onsRsQgi~~I?~.$i ~~~g?8~?~~~h5 overt action.
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA=I~DP8~0~3A000300040022-5
QUESTION: The CIA has taken same hard criticism in the last few
years. A recent newspaper article nuoted an unnamed friend of t'an's as
saying that you are not very good at "stroking". Does the CIA perhaps
need some "stroking", for a change, and will you be able to do that?
ANSWER: I have some understanding of the criticism directed
at the C;TA in recent years and some appreciation of the impact of
such criticism on the efforts of any organization and any group of
people. I also have some understanding of the devotion and hard work
and array of skills and talents and energy which the CTA's people
reflect.
As DCI, I would, of course, look at the CTA in terms of improving
ways of doing things, for that is apart of the job of the DCI and
I would judge that the Congress and the Committee, Like the President
would automatically except that of the DCI.
But I would also try to do it with a full understanding of the
human implications of change. Also, T have always welcomed advice and
ideas from people at all levels of my organizations. I sought the
insights of Naval lieutenants when looking at the War College, and I
would sE;ek the insights of GS-07s and GS-09s in any changes I might
canterrg~7_ate at the CIA.
If that is "stroking", then I am ready to do same in the future,
as T have tried to do in the past.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 ;?. ?- Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-~4'113~cQ00300040022-5
promise. I also ackTio,aledge problernS anal mistakes. All this is 9.n the
article.
about this in the August 1974 Second Annual Re:por-L of the College.
the changes I directed, I tried to .reflect purpose, progress, and
Qi7EST'ION: You sl~oolc the Naval. lt'ar College .from trop to bottom clurinf;
your tenure as its I'resa.dc:nt from 1972 to 1971, and apparently shook up
,.
a lot o:~ people in the Navy aaicl outsido in the process.. You yourself
have described your action a.s a "blitzkrieg". Should we brace ourselves
for the same kind of shaking of the CIA?
ANS4VI~R: I Zvould wish this Committee and the CIA to know that I anE
not in favor of change for its oivn sa.l::c; Tarn in favor of change ror.
the sake of the rn~_ssion to bo a~comp7.3.shed and the people who serve and
are served. I hope that no one would fear the conseque7ices o-L- the
deliberate process I would bring to any consideration of change. I would
seek and ~ve7.come sug~;est:ions, I'ran~ tla:i_s Co~~uni.ttee~ and tl~e Congress as
ivelJ. as from all other responsible sources.
BACI~''Ul': I would like to conm~ericl my activity at the Naval ~1~ar
College t:o you as an indicatiozi of the way I try to work. I wrote
I would like to enl~hasize for-this Committee and to reassure
the people of the CIA that I kiiow that the CIA is conmlex as the College
was not; that I would have much to learn about the CTA before I would
be in a position to fa.ir7.y recolmnend changes; and that. I would not
suggest a.nd institute changes unless I were personally convinced that
the new forms and new procedures and new ideas would tx~zly improve upon
t:he work and product of the CIA a.s it is now.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
...
 . Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-F2DP8Q,l0~4'1~000300040022-5
. ~ 1
I would also life to enr~h~:~size that a~.'cl~ougl~ I p~rsonal.ly bocarne
convinced ZhaL- a bas:i.c reor_ientc~tion` in the Naval V~'ar Ca1.lege's program
wa.s in tlxe best interest of both the 1v'avy and the individual Naval
officer student, the dec~.sions and action taken ~ti~ere graced by the
advice oI` many others and the approval of my Naval super.:iors. I lti~oulcl
insure tlxe same for any changes I might propose at the CIA.
To those who nk~y find evidence of izmxatience in my work at the
College, I would note tYzat I had onl~r a pxedictab"le two years or so to
initiate change, and I felt X I~e-rsonally had to provide the maximum
impetus f'or it. I macle some dec~.sions that seem arbitrary--bui: that,
of course, is always a consecluen.ce of makiazg decisions.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
,~
 . Approved For Release 2003102/27_: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5, ;
I)o you agxee tti~i.th Secxetaxy of State-designate Vance that U.S.
~tmba_ssadaxs abxoad should get anything they xecluest fxom C:[A Station
Clxiefs?
~ fully support Presidential directives designating.Ambassadaxs as
Chiefs of the Country Team axz their >;rr~bassies, to be kept as fully infoxmed
as possible. Station Chiefs have the duty to afford the mast careful
protection ~o their sources and activities. Should there evex be
differences over iahat an .Ftmbassadox might be toT.d, X tivouT.d paxt3_ciPate
in the decision myself.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
,-
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA?=RDP8l!0-~~O,A73A000300040022-5
~'' ! ~~
How~will you insure that abuses that have occurred in the past will not
happen again in the future? How will you make sure that you will know what
is going on in the CIA?
Answer: The best way to avoid the possibility of -abuses is to have an effective
system of command and control. T have always favored. and worked for this
in the Navy, and would continue to do so as DCI. I would continue the policy
of recent DCIs in urging employees to bring to my personal attention activity
which they believe is inappropriate or illegal.
Though I am necessarily not well-e.cquainted Y~ith current Agency practices,
I understand that the functions of its Inspector General and its General Counsel
have been expanded to help guard against abuses. Also, I support the kinds of
internal and external oversight mechanisms which were created in Executive
Order 11905. ~~ ~ ~ ~`~~
iThere is no question that vigorous oversight and supervision are essential
in an intelligence organization. But I would also urge upon this Committee that
there is a danger of smothering initiative and incentive which must be avoided.
As DCI, I wauld try to help reach the delicate balance necessary to insure
the kind of soundly--managed. and controlled but imaginative and energetic
intelligence system which this country must have.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
_. u
 . Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A ~ .~00~40022-5
What is your position on past CIA practices such as assassination
plots and drug testing on unsuspecting people?
Answer: It is quite clear that some past activities of the CIA were improper
and ill-advised, at beat. My understanding is that clear instructions pro-
hibiting rnast of these activities were issued. within the Agency before they came
to public attention, and that none is now being practiced.
I would do all within my authority to insure that those programs and
activities which were undertaken by the CIA under my direction as DCI were
fully within the law of the United States, giving full respect to civil rights and
rights of privacy.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved for Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473Ap 0040022-5
~~
Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what can
be done to improve this situation? Do you support bills which would provide
criminal. penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification
of CIA employees under cover, such as have already been introduced?
Answer: This country must afford the best protection it can give to the dedicated
men and women it sends abroad to eng~.ge in foreign intelligence activities.
Since mast of them must not be openly identifiable as Intel ligence personnel
if they are to be professionally effective as well as properly protected, I
would be most concerned about the nature and protection of the cover arrangements
under which they work and live. I would like to defer comment as to how
cover might be improved pending my confirmation and study of the problem.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. x
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A00030004~6~1-5
Is the CIA cooperating with the I-Touse Select Committee on Assassinations?
Answer: I would say first that as DCI I would pledge full cooperation of
the CIA and the Intelligence Community with the inquiries of duly-constituted
Congressional Committees, consonant with my responsibilities to the President
and for fhe protection of intelligence sources and methods,-
I uncTerstand that CIA officials have met with Mr. Sprague and others on
the Committee staff at Agency initiative to explain CIA records systems and
to prepare.for their investigation, and that the CIA is ready to continue cooper-
ating as appropriate to the Committee's purposes.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-5 ~{; #~
QUI;5TION: You are familiar with the public controversy over the
recent estimate of Soviet military strength and intentions and the A and
B team versions. Are you in favor of such competitive analyses by CIA
professionals and. outsiders? What is the effect on the morale of CIA
analysts to have outside experts looking over their shoulders and
perhaps second-guessing them?
ANSWER: I would like to reserve judgment on the matter of
inviting; outsiders to participate in the estimate process until I have
had more opportunity to evaluate the recent experience of the A and
B teams? I understand that Mr, Bush felt there was merit in the
exercise, both before and after it was conducted and despite the
publicity which followed. I do think that the results of such estimates,
and any differences which arise, should remain a matter of confidence
within the Government pending release by the consumer--the President.
Casual or deliberate public revelations of differences by those who
disagree with the main thrust of the findings will probably kill the
process., As for the attitude of the CIA toward outside participation,
I would expect the Agency analysts as good professionals to participate
wholeheartedly in what is designed to try to give the policy-makers
a better appreciation of the subject at hand, and I have no doubt that
they would do so.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A0003000~@32-5
Axe you in favor of malting. public the names of journalists, academics,
. or others who have cooperated with the CIA?
Answer: I believe that every American has the right to voluntarily cooperate
with his Government. Therefore, i do not believe it would be proper for the
CIA to release. such names. I believe that this is a matter of individual privacy.
I understand that the CIA has already adapted a policy of not entering
into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time news correspondent
ar stringer accredited py a U. S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio
or television network or station.
I also understand that the Agency has several kinds of relationships with
scholars and academic institutions. These include paid and unpaid consultations
between scholars and CIA research analysts, and contacts with persons who '~-
travel abroad. They also include contracts for scientific research and develop-
ment work and for research in the social sciences on matters related to foreign
affairs, bc~t these contracts are only made with the approval of a corporate officer
of lae institution involved.
I believe that such relationships should continue to exist on a co mpletely
voluntary basis. I think it is entirely consistent with academic freedom and with
the free search for truth for an individual to want to assist an agency of his
Government in providing the best possible assessments for the policy-makers,
I would be mast reluctant for the CIA and the Intelligence Community to give up
important links- with academic institutions and personalities.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved -For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-~ /
What are your views of the CIA's reported activities in Micronesia?
Answer: I understand that this Committee has held executive session hearings
on the press reports of such activity. I don't think it would be appropriate for
me to discuss this in open session.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5:
Question:: The GAO does not audit the expend~.tures of th4 CIA.
?~"` Are you wiilirig to allow GAQ to conduct auc_?its of CIn
activities?
which would require careful protection., x have~na precancei.ved
ideas about it but, in principle, z should think something
could b~ ~.~orked out with bath Houses of the Congress whereby
G.~10 daci~:ents and reports could be made available to-the du:l.y
constituted oversight Co.~rmittees wi~in same mutually agreeable
thoroughly acc?uaintea with tha rules and procedures o~ i.he
? Congress pertaining to tre control and distribution of C~pO
documents and reports, ar th? extent to which they are
available to the m~emhershi.p and staEts. Any worthwhile CAD
? study would necessarily cover same very sensitive activities
Anstiver: ~ That is a question X will certainly look into. x am not
constraints. ?.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5 ?
 ~, ~ Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA~RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
~? Should Government classification of information be governed by
statute or Executive order? Why?
The essential point is that whatever classification system is
adopted anust afford sufficient protection for sensitive information.
Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Dzrector of Central
Intelligence is made responsible far the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collec-
tion programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court
decisions concerning secrecy have recognized this statutory responsi-
bility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and fle:~ibiJ.ity
to mold. its security programs to assure the protection of intelligences
sources and methods . Any statutory classification grogram must grant an
equal degree of protection, and must be administratively workable .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
~. u
 .T? ~ ~ Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300~(y022-5
Do yc~u feel. that C7A classifies more information than needs to be classified?
If so, what might be done to reduce the amount of information that is classified?
Answer: I think that the point is to try to achieve a proper balance between
classified and unclassified information so that the national security is not
endangered and that the public is informed. As DCI, I would carefully
review Intelligence ~7ommunity programs to identify those activities which
require continued protection and those where a broader disclosure will not
be harmful. I .understand that ~~vith the issuance of Executive Order 11652
regarding classification. and declassification, the CIA has been able to reduce
by 50 percent the number of materials classified. I would assess classi-
fication procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible
consistent with national security requirements.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 . f.~ , Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-5 ~ ')
Low morale has been described as a principal problem of the CIA,
If you ar. e confirmed. as DCI,. what assurances can you give this Committee
and the people of the CIA that you will be able to raise their morale?
Answer: None. I can-only try. And. I shall.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
The Congress had made it clear that it will henceforth take a
continuing critical look at the CIA and the Intelligence Community, and
this Committee is witness to that determination. Naval officers, like
intelligence chiefs, are not always fond of Congressional criticism. flow
will you get along with us?
ANSWER: I will get along with the Congress as well as I can, and
you permit rne. I do not anticipate fundamental clashes, though our views
as honest and honorable men may differ. As I said in my article in Foreign
Affairs: "We live in an open society. The press probes. Congress
investigates . Searching questions are. good, if not always comfortable,
for the soul . Such dialogue works in its abrasive way . Professional opinion
is pressed hard on the technical military issues; civilian opinion has to
think: hard on matters of national policy; and from this interaction arises
the consensus essential to the support of whatever level of naval forces
is selected." (Page 353) . So it is with intelligence.
We are all engaged in the common endeavor of the nation's
business, -- indeed, perhaps its survival. As DCI, I would be at alI
times responsible to the President, but also would try at all times to be
responsive to the Congress .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
_ .~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDp80-00473A00030~0040022-5
QU'sSTION: What da you peTCe1VC to be your respans~.b
the Congress as Director of Central Intelligence if you are coxrfirmed for
..
that pos i tia3~.?
A1~Sti4~R: It would be my policy to be a.s responsive as possible
to the Congress.
I would, respond to the best of iriy abiJ_ity within whatever oversight
framework the Congress considers suitable and seek to develop a good
working relationship between the Congress and both the CI/~ and the
Intelligence Community.
I recognize, far instance, that arrar~.f;ements for budget autl7orization
and review of Intelligence Coi7~nnznity funding needs are still in tl~e
process of development, and I t~rould work to assure that the Congress
gets the kind of. budget information that it rcq,uires.
I would also snake every effort to meet congressioiral needs for
substant:l.ve information, consistent with my -responsibilities to the
President: and to the National Security Council for the provision of
a_ntelligence on policy problems curxen.tly under consicleratiatY.
Approved For Release- 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
.. ~
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA=RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
Q~JES'].'I:QN: ~4~rat is your. opinion as to the effectivene ss of congressional
..
oversa.glii~ of CIA over the years?
ANSiti~~R; Tl~:e effectiveness o:E tl~e congressional oversi~;lit is ultimately
a matter for the Congress itsel:E to judge. IIoZ,~ever, it appears to me that
the Congress is now exercising conscientious and thorough oversight t}trough
designated corrnnittecs.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27.: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 ~ . Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80=00473A000300040022=5
" QUESTION: 1Vhat is yaur view of the degree to which Cozlgrc;ss slio~zld
oversee intelligence activities?
ANSj~VIJR: Congress has fa.r-reacllir,.g legislative aversight and
. .
alzpropriatians responsibi.l.it~.es tzllder i;he Constitut;ian. Ap~~ropr:Late
conunittees a.f Congress must have lcnoza].edge of intelligence activities so
that they can exercise these fundazne?zlta:l responsibilities. I would be
ready to wox?k wholclieartedly with Congress in tl7.is regard.
I. think the American people want string and effective ca,Igress:ional.
aversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence orf;ani.zations,
while at the same time preserving the effecta.veness of the U. S. foreign
intelligence effort.
Because of the sensitivity of much of the :rnfol-niatton involved,
I would hope that the Congress znay dec.icle to concentrate its overs:igb.t
activities to the extent feasib:te and limit r. equiremerzts that I iirova cle
the same .sensitive information to a sizeable number of d:ilfcrer~.i;
CammlttGE'.S .
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 .~
Q~`~pp o"ved~~or F~eQeas~2~~~~1/x1alLt Cp~~DP~-~~~~0~~~~1t~an
to the Coz~~gress and in keeping the Congress informed?
)
~~f~
11NS~~~;R: I clearly recognize that the C;ongress rntist be ~.idequa.tely
informed in order to make praper and infox~l~.ed judgments in matters of
legislat:ioii and oversight. Corn~ni.ttecs nnist acquire required information
i~rithi_n their jurisdiction to ca-rxy out tlxese responsib3.lities. Tnfox~r~~tion
provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires protection
under statute or Executive order must, ha~rever, be handled accordingl}r
by the Congress. 1~urther, the Congxess exercises its prerogative of
nandisclasure through .executive sessions sand other closed meetings.
Similarly, the Jxecutive must exercise its prerogatives of nonclisc7.osure
in matters of executive privilege and clear statutory nk~ndates.
I t:cust that an atmosphere of c.omlty and tznderstatiding wi11 allow
a .mutual resalutian of_ tlxis problem and. avoid canfrontatians. 1'he
national .interest must always be the para~novnt consideration.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA~RDP80-00473A000300040022-5
QU?:STICN: ~'ou made th.e -L-ollo~;eing stai.ement :in yow- article; in
)orcigrz l~.ffairs of: Janu