AGENCY VIEWS ON H.R. 6051

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000200100009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 28, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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DDA 77-2411
28 April 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
STATINTL ATTENTION:
FROM:
Acting Executive Officer/DDA
SUBJECT? Agency Views on H.R. 6051
The DDA concurs in the draft response prepared by your Office
relating to H.R. 6051, the "Federal Intelligence Agencies Control Act
of 1977." We have no suggested changes or additions to make.
STATINTL AEO/DDA:Ismf
Distribution:
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STATINTL
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Honorable Melvin Price, Chairman Honorable Jack Brooks, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515 Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter requesting this Agency's views
on H. R. 6051, the "Federal Intelligence Agencies Control Act of 1977.
This bill is a complex and far-reaching piece of legislation that would
restructure not only the Central Intelligence Agency but the entire
National Foreign Intelligence Program and the Federal criminal inves-
tigative mechanism. Although I realize the concerns to
which H. R. 6051 is addressed, I cannot support those provisions re-
lating to the Central Intelligence Agency and the other components of
the Intelligence Community. As to these provisions of the bill relating
to law enforcement and investigations, I defer to those agencies and
departments with authorities in such areas.
The President recently directed that possible reform of the CIA
and the Intelligence Community be studied within the Executive branch.
This review is proceeding with some urgency. Concurrently, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, pursuant to the terms of S. Res. 400,
is studying this matter including possible reforms to the CIA charter
and issues relating to the structure and authorities of the Intelligence
Community. Until such time as this review in the Executive branch
is completed, I would defer specific comment on those provisions of
H. R. 6015 relevant to my concerns as Director of Central Intelligence.
Regardless of whatever particular recommendations result from the
Administration's study of these matters, there is full recognition among
those concerned that the Government retain its ability to collect, analyze
and disseminate foreign intelligence to policy makers. I could not support
legislation, such as H. R. 6015, that would effectively neutralize the
Government's ability to engage in the clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence except during periods of declared war. Furthermore, the
restrictions on "covert collection" and "clandestine organization" in this
bill raise serious doubts that the CIA (or the "Foreign Information Service"
under H. R. 6015) or any other Federal agency or component could engage
in any intell igence collection activities during pc!acetimc. This is so
because "covert collection of foreign intelligence, " which would he prohibited
during peacetime, is defined in such a way as to include most, if not all,
activities reasonably necessary to collect foreign intelligence. For example,
prohibited activities would include any activity violative of the laws of
the country where collection occurs as well. as any activity not publicly
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acknowledged by the U.S. Government. These restrictions would make
our ability to collect foreign intelligence dependent on "the laws" of
other countries--whatever these would be construed to be. Also, these
limitations would allow collection to take place only if publicly acknow-
ledged. Simply stated, a basic precept of a country's national security
is that if you know what your potential adversaries are doing in terms
of collecting information, you know what countermeasures are necessary
to negate such collection activities.
Furthermore, the provisions of H. R. 6015 would prohibit the main-
tenance of an intelligence infrastructure during non-war periods that
would be necessary to engage in collection activities at other times. It
is important to realize, in this regard, that the capability to develop
and utilize intelligence resources can be realized only by long, considered
evaluation of intelligence needs and opportunities over a period of time.
This capability cannot be turned on and off and still remain effective.
This view of foreign intelligence, Mr. Chairman, overlooks the basic
reason for which an intelligence capability exists---namely, to present
the policy :makers with information necessary to make accurate and
knowledgeable decisions affecting this nation's foreign affairs and
national security. In large part, a foreign intelligence capability
exists to prevent the country from finding itself drawn into a situation
where a declaration of war would be necessary. Furthermore, the
foreign intelligence program supports a wide variety of essential
Government functions related to foreign military, political and economic
matters, such as arms limitation verification and world energy resources..
The Government's needs in these and other areas, where vital information
is often not available openly, require the maintenance of a continued capa-
bility to engage in such activities. The existence of a "central" intelligeii.ce
authority---the CIA--is, in my view, essential to the proper and efficient
functioning of this mechanism.
The congresional select committees, under Representative Pike and
Senator Church, which thoroughly studied the CIA and the National Foreign
Intelligence Program in general during the 94th Congress, did not con-
clude that clandestine collection of foreign intelligence should be "permitted"
only during time of war. Enactment of H. R. 6015, in my vievr, would be
at odds with such studied review by the Congress.
I shall be glad to discuss with you the many vital. issues connected
with this legislation at the appropriate time.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint: of the Administration's
program.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFJELD TURNER
Admiral, U. S. Navy
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C. H. R. 6051 - To Prevent and Establish Corrective Mechanisms
for fuses o ower y me igence Agencies
1. Introduced 5 April 1977 by Representative Herman Badillo (D...
N.Y. ) and 13 others.
2. Referred to Judiciary, Banking, Armed Services and Government
Operations.
3. Entitled the "Federal Intelligence Agencies Control. Act of 1977. f'
4. Title I encompasses domestic intelligence activities.
a. The Government is prohibited from engaging in.
"political surveillance" (basically, anything related to
First Amendment rights); "preventive action" (harassment,
false information, provocation, etc.) also is prohibited.
b. "Selective" investigations and prosecutions are
prohibited.
c. The FBI is renamed the Federal Bureau of
Criminal Investigation and its jurisdiction over allowable
investigative procedures strictly delimited. The bill
would establish detailed investigative review procedures
and limit the Director to a single six-year term.
d. All responsibility for Government background
investigations now conducted by the F13I would be transferred
to the Civil Service Commission. FBCI employees would be in
the competitive service.
e. The Bureau's budget would be published and GAO
would have annual audit responsibilities,
f. "Agent of a foreign power" is narrowly defined to include
only officers or employees of foreign powers,
g. Both civil remedies and criminal penalties are provided,
5. Title II covers prohibitions and limitations on investigative procedures.
a. Electronic surveillance is prohibited,
b. Restricts undercover activities involving groups engaged
in "First Amendment activity. "
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c. Government access to and review of credit or tax records
and other material would be severely restricted, and the bill
would allow mail covers only in very limited circumstances by
the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation.
d. Both civil remedies and criminal penalties are prescribed
for violations.
6. Title III encompasses "E"oreign Intelligence Activities. "
a. The CIA would be redesignated the "Foreign Information
Service" and the DC 1 would become the Director of the FTS.
b. Except in time of war, the FIS would be prohibited
from engaging in any covert collection activities. The FIS
would have authority to engage, in limited counterintelligence
abroad? The National Security Act would be further amended
to limit: the FIS to advising the NSC on foreign intelligence
matter.--3; to making recommendations for coordinating foreign
intelligence activities; and to correlating, evaluating and
disseminating intelligence information within the Government.
c. All background investigations shall be conducted by the
Civil Service Commission.
d. The FIS is prohibited from collecting any information on
the "First Amendment activity" of protected persons.
e. The following sections of the CIA Act would be repealed:
5(a) [transfer authority], 5(b) [funds exchange], 6 [exemption for
disclosure of Agency personnel, organization, etc. ], and 8(b)
[unvouchered funds].
f. Publicly-disclosed authorizations would be required for
each agency involved in foreign intelligence activities.
g. Criminal penalties and civil remedies are provided for
any violation or evasion of the requirements or limits
enumerated in this title.
h. "Covert collection" includes techniques which are in
violation of the laws of either the U. S. or of the country in
which the collection occurs, or which would be in violation of
U. S. Laws if committed by a foreign country in the U. S.
i. "Clandestine organization" [the use of which in
furtherance of covert collection in peacetime would be
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prohibited] includes any "secret" proprietorship, corporation
or association.
j. "Covert operations" include paramilitary operations,
burglaries, bribes, secret payments and assassinations,
7. Title IV amends the FOIA and defines "national defense information.
a. The FOIA exemption would be narrowed to cover only
properly classified national defense information, but informa-
tion that "appears to relate to illegal or unconstitutional
activity" would not be exempt from FOI.A requirements.
b. "National defense information" is narrowly defined to
cover only aspects of military information.
8. Title V establishes the crime of "Official Deceipt" by Govern-
ment ofri'-vials-involved in any cover-'up of activities in violation of this
Act.
9. Title VI protects Federal officials and employees from adverse
action for if'scI'osing or refusing to participate in activity reasonably
believed to be illegal.
a. Adverse action against such an individual creates
a presumption of wrongful disciplinary action.
b. Civil remedies for violations of this title are
provided.
10. Title VII establishes an independent "Office of Special Prosecutor
for Viola it ~n Law by Intelligence Agencies. "
a. The Special Prosecutor appointed thereunder would
have exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute all
Federal offenses arising out of intelligence or counter-
intelligence activities.
b. A special panel of the U. S.. Court of Appeals for D. C.
would be established.
C. This title would cease to have effect five years after it
takes effect.
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