PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON INTELLIGENCE

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CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1
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RIFPUB
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K
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37
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November 16, 2016
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May 19, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
May 1, 1969
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BOOK
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1? r Fs~r e o1G61o1 CIA7ROPM-7 -7 Df~ Dt ~ ESIDLNTS OF THE UNITED STATES am= _ R lNING Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON INTELLIGENCE MAY 1969 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ? OFFICE OF TRAINING Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Until World War II, American intelligence activities were sporadic and usually unknown to most Americans. Even when they were known, they were almost unwillingly acknowledged. Presidents of the United States, who have always borne the responsibility for the national security, have made statements over the years that have both acknowledged the existence of intelligence activities and revealed their importance in support of governmental policies and functions. From these presidential statements on the subject of intelligence service, highlights -- or "quotable quotes" -- have been extracted and are presented in this pamphlet. Although the statements of George Washington were written while he was the Commanding General during the American Revolution, they are significant enough to warrant inclusion here. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF TRAINING - APRIL 1969 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 (In the American Revolution there was no centralized intel- ligence organization in any mod- ern concept of the word. The Americans and British both em- ployed agents to secure neces- sary information on troop de- other line duties. Thus, Majorca John Andre' handled intelligence matters for the British General Clinton in New York and, when Andre' became Adjutant General of the British Armies in America, he continued to handle certain special intelligence cases, including the de- fection of General Benedict Arnold from West Point. General Forman, a line officer in New Jersey, was Washington's intelligence chief in that area for a time. As an example, General Forman wrote Governor Livingston of New Jersey in February 1782 that "I presume Your Excellency is not unacquainted that I am at the particular request of General Washington imployed in obtaining intilegence respecting the enemies movements at New York &c. By the Generals Letter to me of the 25 Inst. he in a very pointed manner asks my particular exertions as affairs at this time demand the best Intilegence." c a y chavg with intelligence functions, although a inost without excP?+- i r,,, , there were officers specifi 11 '' ployments and strengths and General Washington kept a very close tab on all intelligence matters and was perhaps the most brilliant American intelligence officer prior to General William Donovan, Director of OSS. General Washington often directed intelligence requirements and made his own estimates of the situation. He directed psychological warfare campaigns and had a "touch" for intelligence activities which was extremely fine.) Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : Clf 8Q-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 General Washington's appreciation of intel- ligence is set fo:cth in a letter he wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton, then his intelligence chief in New Jersey, dated 26 July 1777. In it he stated: "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged -- all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue." "I have received your Letter of the 4th. containing an apology for sending an agreeable piece of Intelligence which you have since discover'd to be false; mistakes of this kind are not uncommon and most frequently happen to those whose zeal and sanguineness allow no room for scepticism when anything favourable to their country is plausibly related." Letter from General Washington, 11 November 1777, to Daniel Clymer, Deputy Commissary General of Prisoners. (Three of General Washington's best spies were seized for prosecution by the American authorities in New Jersey, under misapprehension and that they were British agents. These prisoners could not disclose their true role. However, Washington learned of their capture and wrote the Governor of New Jersey for their release.) "Upon these Considerations I hope you will put a stop to the prosecution, unless other matters appear against them. You must be well convinced, that it is indispensibly necessary Page 2 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 to make use of these means to procure intelli- gence. The persons employed must bear the suspicion of being thought inimical, and it is not in their powers to assert their innocence, because that would get abroad and destroy the confidence which the Enemy puts in them." Letter from General Washington to Governor William Livingston, 20 January 1778. "I thank you for the trouble you have taken in forwarding the intelligence which was inclosed in your Letter of the 11th of March. It is by comparing a variety of information, we are frequently enabled to investigate facts, which were so intricate or hidden, that no single clue could have Led to the knoweldge of them in this point of view, intelligence becomes interesting which but from its connection and collateral circumstances, would not be important." Letter from General Washington to James Lovell 1 April 1782. Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RQPd$10Q$17A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 (In 1846, certain members of the House Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs raised a furor over the alleged misuse of foreign intercourse funds by Daniel Webster while ser- ving as Secretary of State. Portions of these funds, known as "secret service funds," were available for unvouchered use on the certificate of the President as to their expenditure for confiden- tial purposes. A resolu- tion of the House of Rept"eseritatives r quested President James K. Polk to furfish the House? ith all records of expenditures of these confidential secret service funds during Webster's tenure' i as Secretary of State under Presidents Harrison and Tyler. In denying the request of the House of Representatives, President Polk wrote:) "The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures the very object of which would be defeated by publi- city. ... In no nation is the application of such sums ever made public. In time of war or impend- ing danger the situation of the country may make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining infcrmation or rendering other important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least appre- hension that their names or their agency would in any contingency 1e divulged. So it may often become necessary to incur an expenditure for an object highly useful to the country; ... But this Approved For Release 2000/06/0 - A.DP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 object might be altogether defeated by the intrigues of other powers if our purposes were to be made known by the exhibition of the original papers and vouchers to the accounting officers of the Treasury. It would be easy to specify other cases which may occur in the history of a great nation, in its intercourse with other nations, wherein it might become absolutely neces- sary to incur expenditures for objects which could never be accomplished if it were suspected in advance that the items of expenditure and the agencies employed would be made public." President Polk's Message to the House of Represen- tatives, 20 April 1846 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA--W317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "The insurgents had been preparing for [the Civil War] more than thirty years, while the government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had care- fully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It un- doubtedly was a well pon- dered reliance with them that in their own unrestric- ted effort to destroy Union, constitution, and Law, all together, the government would, in great degree, be arriezr`!progrys. Their sympathizers perv"" f: departments--of the government, and nearlf a'l ommun;;ties of the people. From this mater ial,u der cover of 'Liberty of speech' 'Liberty of the press' and 'Habeas corpus' they hoped to keep on Foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, supplyers, and aiders and abettors of traeir cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugu- rating, by the constitution itself, the 'Habeas corpus' might be ,suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause.'' Let-:er from President Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others, 12 June 1863, shortly before the battle of Gettysburg. Approved For Release 2000/06/$1a:gclA6RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "Apropos of your mem- orandum of November 18, 1944, relative to the establishment of a central intelligence service, I should appreciate your calling together the chiefs of the foreign intel- ligence and internal security units in the various execu- tive agencies, so that a con- sensus of opinion can be secured. l.4VV VJ Vr4Ci Vv.'Y v vKVV Wv A partments, as well as the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission have a direct interest in the proposed venture. They should all be asked to contribute their suggestions to the pro- posed centralized intelligence service." Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Director of OSS, Major General William J. Donovan, 5 April 1945. Written just a week before the President's death, it authorizes Donovan to con- tinue planning for a post-war centralized intelligence service. Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-q-O)0317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "I considered it very im- portant to this country to have a sound, well-organized intelligence system, both in the present and in the future. Properly developed, such a service would require new concepts as well as better- trained and more competent #,. personnel. ... it was imper ative that we refrain from rushing into something that would produce harmful and un necessary rivalries among theme various intelligence agencies. I told Smith [Director of the Bureau of. Budget] that one thing was certain -- this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason." Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume One: Year of Decisions. pp. 98-99) "A President has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The President must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States. ... "Before 1946 such information as the Presi- dent needed was being collected in several dif- ferent places in the government. The War Depart- ment had an Intelligence Division -- G-2 -- and the Navy had an intelligence setup of its own -- the ONI. The Department of State, on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic channels, while the Treasury and the Departments of Approved For Release 2000/061,QaI CIff-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gathering information from different parts of the world -- on monetary, economic, and agricul- tural matters. "During World War II the Federal Bureau of Investigation had some operations abroad, and in addition the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by President Roosevelt during the war and placed under the direction of General William J. Donovan, operated abroad to gather information. "This scattered method of getting informa- tion for the various departments of the govern- ment first struck me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate. Our Senate committees, hearing the witnesses from the executive depart- ments, were often struck by the fact that dif- ferent agencies of the government came up with different and conflicting facts on similar subjects. It was not at first apparent that this was due to the un-co-ordinated methods of obtaining informa- tion. Since then, however, I have often thought that if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japan- ese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and the Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans. "In other words, there had never been much attention paid to any centralized intelligence organization in our government. Apparently the United States saw no need for a really comprehen- sive system of foreign intelligence until /orld War II placed American fighting men on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa and on the islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-R 9-Q9317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 'The war taught us this lesson -- that we had collect intelligence in a manner than would make the information available where it was need- ='c am when it was wanted, in an intelligent and _naerstandable form. If it is not intelligent .:r.,d understandable, it is useless. "on becoming President, I found that the aded intelligence information was not co-ordina- at any one place. Reports came acrcss my desk the same subject at different times rom the ous departments, and these reports often con- Vted. Consequentoy V asked Admiral neahy if ar- : thing was being done to improve the system. o'hy told me that in 1944, at Presiden- Roosevelt's cc;ion, he had rererred to the Joint Chiefs of ,f a plan for centralized intelligence work pared by General -onovan. This plan, so Leahy me, provided for an organization d-:rectly under resident and responsible only to h:m. The ivy, however, has worked out a countert:roposal nCer which there would be a central agancy to !Pve as an over-all intelligence organization, but th each of the departments responsibll for national security having a stake in it. Much of rye original work on this project was done by Pear admiral Sidney W. Souers, Deputy Chief c f Naval :nteiligence. "Wometime later I asked Secretary sr State rnes to submit his recommendations for a way to w--ordinate intelligence services among the partments, explain;,ng that 1 had already asked hid to look into tie subject but r,hat I wanted e State Department s recommendations since the ate Department would need to play an ,mportant -pole in the operation. "Cecretary Byrnes took the position that such an organization should be responsir:le to the Secretary of State and advised me tfiat he should be in control of all intelligence. The Army and the Navy, on the other hand, strongly :objected. They maintained that every depart- sent required its own intelligence out that Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 ace. L Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 there was a great need for a central organization to gather together all information that had to do with over-all national policy. Under such an organization there would be a pool of information, and each agency would contribute to it. This pool would make it possible for those who were responsible for establishing policies in foreign political and military fields to draw on author- itative intelligence for their guidance. "In January 1946 I held a series of meetings in my office to examine the various plans sug- gested for a centralized intelligence authority." Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope. (pp. 55-57) "Whether it be treason or not, it does the United States just as much harm for military secrets to be made known to potential enemies through open publication, as it does for military secrets to be given to an enemy through the clandestine operations of spies. ... " ..I do not believe that the best solution can be reached by adopting an approach based on the theory that everyone has a right to know our military secrets and related information affect- ing the national security." President Truman's News Conference, 4 October 1951. "When I became President -- if you don't mind me reminiscing a little bit -- there was no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled off from every other service in such a manner that when- ever it was necessary for the President to have information, he had to send to two or three Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-R-g01317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 departments to get it, and then he would have to have somebody do a little digging to get it. ... "...And finally one morning I had a conver- sation with Admiral Leahy, and suggested to him that there should be a Central Intelligence Agency, for the benefit of the whole Government as well as for the benefit of the President, so he could be informed. ''And the Admiral and I proceeded to try to work out a program. It has worked very success- fully. We have an intelligence information service now that I think is not inferior to any in the world. We have the Central Intelligence Agency, and all the intelligence information agencies in all the rest of the departments of the Government, coordinated by that Central Intelligence Agency. This agency puts the information of vital import- ance to the President in his hands. He has to know what is going on everywhere at home and abroad, so that he can intelligently make the decisions that are necessary to keep the government running. ... "...You are the organization, you are the intelligence arm that keeps the Executive informed so he can make decisions that always will be in the public interest ?or his own country, hoping always that it will save the free world from involvement with the totalitarian countries in an all-out war -- a terrible thing to contemplate. "Those of you who are deep in the Central Intelligence Agency know what goes on around the world -- know what is necessary for the President to know every morning. I am briefed every day on all the world, on everything that takes place from one end of the world to the other, all the way around -- by both the poles and the other way. It is necessary that you make that contribution for the welfare and benefit of your government. Approved For Release 2000/06/ ' -9IA1FDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "I came over here to tell you how appreciative I am of the service which I received as the Chief Executive of the greatest nation in the history of the world." Remarks of President Truman to a CIA Orientation Training Course, 21 November 1952. (The inscription on the photograph of Presi- dent Truman, which he presented to CIA, reads:) "To the Central Intelligence Agency, a necessity to the President of the United States, from one who knows. Harry S. Truman June 9, 1964" Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CI PgP> %-00317A000100060001-1 T%tj Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "America's funda- mental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrangements to make the peace both permanent and just. This can be done only on the basin of comprehensive and apprib'- priate information. "In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the S1;rengt_h of those facts. In peacetime the neees azJ f 'ts are of a different nature. They deal w 4 c di- tions, resources, requirements, and zttitudes pre- vailing in the world. They and their correct inter- pretation are esE~ential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part. tions of his opponent, and the proper iz.t rpr 'tion "No task could be more important. "Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the Nation's position in the international scene. "By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness, and self- lessness -- to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the Approved For Release 2000/06/01: CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 age Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternitu. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism -- their reward can be Little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true. "The reputation of your organization for quality and excellence of performance, ... is a proud one. 3ecause I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure. May it Long endure, to serve the cause of America and of peace." Remarks of President Eisenhower at the cornerstone-laying ceremony for the CIA building, 3 November 1959. "I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident. ... "The first point is this: the need for intelligence-gathering activities. "No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, espe- ciaZly those capable of massive surprise attacks. "Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. ... " ..ever since the beginning of my administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA c$0I09317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense. i'My second pcint: the nature of intel- ligence-gathering activities. "These have c: special and secret character. They are, so to speak, 'below the surface' activities. "They are secret because they must circum- vent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations. "They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities. "These elements operate under broad direc- tives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force ??- with operations supervised by responsible offici:als within this area of secret activities. ... "These activities have their own rules and methods of conceal:ment which seek to mislead and obscure "Third point: how should we view all of this activity? "It is a distasteful but vital necessity. "We prefer and work for a different kind of world -- and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer. ... "My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIIA-FRDP80-00317A000100060001-1 age Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today." Statement by President Eisenhower at his news conference of 11 May 1960, following the shooting clown of the U-2 by the Soviet Union. ...Accordingly, at this morning's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms: ... "In my statement of May 11th and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9th, the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union." Statement by President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev at the opening of the Summit Conference in Paris, 16 May 1960. "During the period leading up to World War II learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, "Moreover, as President, charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as Commander-in-Chief, charged with Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RPR&& -09 17A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 the direction of the operations and activities of our Armed Forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our government to secure and evaluate military intelligence. "It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred. "Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. Th? usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. ... "The plain t:nuth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even nego- tiation itself can be used to conceal prepara- tions for a surpr,.se attack. ... ..It must be remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. In fac;, their success has been nothing short of remarkable. ... "I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world." President Eisenhower's Radio and Television Report to the American people (following the Paris Summit Conference). 25 May 1960. Approved For Release 2000/06La1geCl1dRDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "As I think you know, I wish you and your associates in the Central Intelligence Agency well in the tremendously important job you do for our country. Upon the work of your organi- zation there is an almost frightening respon- sibility; I know all members of the CIA will continue to do the best they can for all of us." Letter from President Eisenhower to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, 18 January 1961, at the conclusion of the Eisenhower Administration. (The inscription on the photograph of President Eisenhower, which he presented to CIA, reads:) "To Central Intelligence Agency An indispensable organization to our country. Dwight D. Eisenhower" Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-F Q-OP317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "I want, first of all, to express my appreciation to you all for the oppor- tunity that this ceremony gives to tell you how grateful we are in the government and in the country for the services that the personnel of this Agency render to the country. "It is not always easy. Your successes are unheralded -- your failures are trumpeted. I some- timeV fide that feeling myself. But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is --? and how, in the long sweep of history, how significant your efforts will be judged. "So I do want: to express my appreciation to you now, and I'm confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past." RemELrks of President Kennedy at the CIA Headquarters, 28 November 1961, upon present- ing the National Security Medal to the retiring Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles. ...it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effec- tive guidance of the total United States foreign Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CI -RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 age Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 intelligence effort. As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and eval- uation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recip- ients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field. ... "As directed by the President and the Na- tional Security Council, you will establish with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels." Memorandum from President Kennedy to the Director of Central Intelligence, 16 January 1962. '1 wish to express to you, the members of the United States Intelligence Board, and to the indi- vidual members of the intelligence agencies my deep and sincere appreciation for your outstanding service to our Nation -- and the Free World -- during the recent international crisis. In the course of the past few months I have had occasion to again observe the extraordinary accomplishments of our intelligence community, and I have been singularly impressed with the overall professional excellence, selfless devotion to duty, resourcefulness and initiative manifested in the work of this group. The fact that we had timely and accurate information, skillfully analyzed and clearly presented, to guide us in our judgments during this crisis is, I believe, the greatest tribute to the effectiveness of these individuals and agencies. The magnitude of their contribution can be measured, in part, by the fact that the peace was sustained during a most critical time. Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-F tp-0A317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 ' - is, of course, a great source of strength me to know than we have.such dedicated and led men and women in the service of our Nation se times of peril. Although I cannot per ,onally commend each member of the intelligence -?ox:'zmunity for their: -;ndividual efforts, I would s'.ike you to convey to them, through the members of United States Inz-elligence Board, my personal he of commendat,:on. my deep admiration for their ?rcrzievements, and the appreciation of a grateful Letter from President Kennedy to the Director of Central Intell__aence, John A. Mccone, in his capacity as Chairman of the Un_ted States Intelligence Board, 9 January 1963. This letter of commendation was written after the Cuban Missile- Crisis of October 1962. ..We have Ivor' ed very closely together, in the tional Security Council in the last 2 months "tempting to meet trze problems we face ,1 in South viet-Nam. I can ,find nothing, and I have Looked :;hroucrh the record v=-ry carefully over, the last months, and I could go back further,, to indicate hzt the CIA has don,? anything but support policy. 't does not creat,? policy; it attempts to execute: in those areas where it has competence and ponsibility. ...: I can just assure you flatly t the CIA has not carried out independent -tc.ivLties but has operatea under close control the Director of Csntral Intelligence, operating the cooperation of the National Security ncil and under my instructions. '.Co I think that while the CIA may have made akes, as we all lo, on different occasions, ''Ind has had many successes which may go unheralded, opinion in this case it is unfair to charge Approved For Release 2000/06/01 _IA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job." President Kennedy's News Conference, 9 October 1963 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-Fc-017A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 ...we have committed our k "The purpose of this effort, like the purpose of all that we do, is to strive for an orderly, just, and peaceful world. In this effort more than in many others a high order of selflessness, of dedication, of devotion, is asked of men and women. The compensation of them comes not in fame, certainly not in rewards of salary, but the reward of the sure knowledge that they have made a contribution to freedom's cause. lives, our property, our resources, and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dis- honor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices that Americans have made if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and free- dom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency in this country. "For the leadership of this vital agency this nation has been vary fortunate to have the ser- vices of outstanding Americans: Allen Dulles, John McCone, now today Admiral William F. Raborn." Reriarks of President Johnson 28 April 1965, at the swearing in ceremony of Admiral Raborn as Director of Central :Intelligence and Mr. Helms as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Approved For Release 2000/06/0A - -CIA DP80-00317A000100060001-1 age Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "You know it is my hope that we can continue to build and strengthen the effectiveness of the Agency, making full utilization of the imaginative talent assembled in the organization. I hope . to asure and encourage all your employees to real- ize that their personal abilities and superior performance do not go unnoticed or unrecognized. "Our intelligence must be unquestionably the best in the world. You have my full support in our effort to make it so." Letter from President Johnson to Admiral Raborn, DCI, 29 July 1965, regarding the appointment of Mrs. Penelope Thunberg, ORR, to the U.S. Tariff Commission. "The interests of national defense and secu- rity require sustained effort on the part of the intelligence community to support me and other officials having policy and command responsibilit- i.es. Efficient management and direction of the complex activities which make up the total foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet day-to- day national requirements, and to ensure the development and application of advanced means for the collection, processing, analysis, estimating and reporting of intelligence information." Memorandum of 19 October 1965 from President Johnson to the DCI on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States. "I am extremely proud of both of these men (Admiral Raborn and Mr. Helms) and their col- leagues. The nature of their work does not often allow public acknowledgement. Praised or damned land we are living in an era where men who spend all their time concerned with the protection of the security of their country are frequently damned more than they are praised, I regret to say, Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA- -(j17A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 these men must go about their work without standing up for b4)ws and sometimes are not even permitted to speak out in their own defense. Their role is misunderstood by some of their supporters, and I never read a morning paper with- out seeing it being distorted by their critics. "In 2 1/2 years of working with these men I have yet to meet', a '007'. I have met dozens of men who are moaaed and motivated by the highest and most patrioti< and dedicated purposes -- men who are speciaZis,ts in economics, and political science, and histc?ry, and geography, and physics, and many other fi;lds where logic and analysis are crucial to thdz decisions that the President of their country :s called upon to make. Through my experience with these men I have learned that their most significant triumphs come not in the secrets passed in the dark but in patient reading, hour after hour, of highly technical periodicals. "In a real s4nse they are America's pro- fessional students; they are unsung, just as they are invaluable. "Although he'[Mr. Helms] has spent more than twenty years in public life attempting to avoid publicity, he has never been able to conceal the fact that he is one of the most trusted and most able and most dedicated professional career men in this Capital. No man has ever come to this high and critical office with better qualifications. "I think it was Patrick Henry who said, 'The battle is not to the strong alone, it is to the vigilant and to the active and to the brave,' and it is to Dick Helms and to the Agency that he will now head that we must look for this vigilance. His own record and the past achieve- ments of his Agency give us full confidence in the future operation of the Central Intelligence Approved For Release 2000/06/ ,'la?~IA2IDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Agency with judgment. with intelligence, and above all with great public integritu.' narks of President Johnson 0 June 1966, at the swearina in _-emonv of Mr. Helms as i, rector of Central Intelligence. "Your countrumen ... cannot know of your accomplishments in the equaLZy crucial business of the Central InteZZiaence Agency. For it is the lot of those in our inteZZigence agencies that they should work in s7;Zence--sometimes fail in silence, but more often succeed in silence. "Unhappily, also, it 7.s sometime their Got that then must suffer in silence. For, Like all in high public position. t1,eii are occasionaZZu subject to criticism which then must not ans,,wer. ,Pccrec7., in this work is essential. Achievements and triumphs can seldom be adver- tised. Shortcomings and failures often are advertised. The rewards can never come in public acclaim, only in the, quiet satisfaction of getting on with the job and truing to do well the work that needs to be cone in the interests of your Nation. "The best intelligence is essential to the best policy. So I am delighted that you have undertaken, as far as security permits, to tell the public that it. is well served by the Central Intelligence Agencu. "T am glad that there are occasions from time to time when 1, Like mu predecessors in this office, can also express m'z deep confidence in the expert and the dedicated service of the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agencu.' a marks of President Johnson, I Auu.qust 1966. at the presentation ,f- the National Security Medal to Admiral Raborn for his services as _reo r of Central Intelligence. >t_ Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RD80- 0 7A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "This is a day when you should all be proud-- especially those among you who have been a part of the Agency since its founding. "Twenty years ago, this country had no broad- scale professional intelligence service worthy of the name. Today, it has a strong and vital one-- the best in the world. "Twenty years ago, you began with a vague assortment of fun-~tions and a varied assortment of people. Your ,purposes were not well understood inside the Government, and barely understood at all outside. Since that time, you have become a dedicated and disgiplined core of professionals, with clearly defined responsibilities. "Those responsibilities are vast and demand- ing. You give us information on which decisions affecting the course of history are made. Your product must be as perfect as is humanly possible-- though the material you must work with is far from perfect. "You must keep pace with developments in a tremendously complex society, a society which, as your director, Mr. Helms, has said, 'gropes for answers to challenges its founding fathers could never have conceived.' "You have built a solid foundation in these past twenty years. America relies on your con- stant dedication to the truth--on your commit- ment to our democratic ideal. I believe our trust is well placed." Message from President Johnson, 18 September 1967, to Director Helms on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Agency. Approved For Release 2000/06/( ,1agC,lADP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "As I stand before you today, this is the first visit I have made to one of the Departments that is not re- presented officially in the Cabinet. "It has been truly said that the CIA is a professional organization. That is one of the reasons that when the new Administration came in and many changes were made, as they should be m d i a e n our American political system after an election, and a change of Parties, as far as the Executive Branch is concerned, I did not make a change. "I surveyed the field. I checked the qualifica- tions of all of the men, or, for that matter, any women who might possibly be the Director of the CIA. "But I concluded that Dick Helms was the best man in the country to be the Director of the CIA and that is why we have him here. "...Going back during the eight years I was Vice President, I sat on the National Security Council and there I learned to respect the organiza- tion, its Director and its reports that were made to the Council, and through the Council to the President of the United States. "I know how vitally important the work of this organization is, I also know that this organization has a mission that, by necessity, runs counter to Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIPP?q-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 some of the very deeply held traditions in this country and feelings, idealistic feelings about what a free society ought to be. '? ,Americans don't Zike war, of course. Americans also do not Zike secrecy. They don't like cold war and consequently, whenever it is necessary in the conduct of our foreign policy, whether in a cold war or whether, as is the :situation now, in a hot war, or whether in inter- national tension, caZZ it a cold war or simply a period of confrontation or even of negotiation, whatever you want to call it, that whenever it becomes necessary to obtain intelligence informa- tion by an intelligence organization, many Americans are deeply concerned about this. And they express their concerns. They express them quite violently sometimes, quite frequently, as you all know from the experience that this organiza- tion has had over the nears. "This is a dilemma. It is one that I wish did not exist. But in the society in which we Zive, as I am sure all of you are so completely aware, it is necessary that those who make decisions at the highest level have the very best possible intelligence with regard to what the facts really are, so that the margin of error will be, to that extent, reduced. "And in a sense, then, I Zook upon this organization as not one that is necessary for the conduct of conflict or war, or call it what you may, but in the final analysis as one of the great instruments of our government for the preservation of peace, for the avoidance of war, and for the development of a society in which this kind of activity would not be as necessary, if necessary at all. It is that that I think the American people need to understand, that this is a necessary adjunct to the conduct of the Presidency. And I am keenly aware of that. I am keenly aware of the fact that many of you at times must have Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : C14- I P8 000317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 had doubts, perhaps you have not, but perhaps there may have been times that you have had doubts about your mission, the popularity of what you do in the country, and I want to reassure you on that score. "I realize that in this organization the great majority of you are not in the kind of covert activities which involve great, danger, but I also know that some of your colleagues have been involved in such activities and are involved in such activities. "I know, too, that there will be no Purple Hearts, there will be no medals, there will be no recognition of those who have served far beyond the call of duty because by definition where the CIA is concerned your successes must never be publicized and your failures will always be publicized. "So that makes your mission a particularly difficult one. It makes it difficult from the standpoint of those who must render service beyond the call of duty. And I recognize that and I am deeply grateful for those who are willing to make that kind of sacrifice. "In another sense, too, I want to pay proper recognition to great numbers of people that I see in this room and that I saw outside who do not get down to the Cabinet Room to brief me as does Mr. Helms, and his colleagues, who are not in the positions where, even private recognition comes too often, but whose work is so absolutely essential to the quality of those little morning briefing papers that I have read every morning and read so carefully and that are so important because the decisions I make will be based sub-consciously sometimes, other times consciously, on the accuracy of those reports and their findings from around the world. Approved For Release 2000/06/01: CIA'-R8Pg0-0a317A0001000600014 Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1 "I think sometimes that all of us know that one of the ironies of life is that it takes more heroism to render outstanding service in positions that are not heroic in character than it does the other way round. What I mean to say is that in an organization like this, gathering facts and infor- mation and intelligence, there are literally hundreds and thousands of positions here and around the world that must at times be very boring and certainly frustrating and sometimes without recognition. "And I do want you to know that I appreciate that work. I know how essential it is and I would ask that yov: as the leaders, you who necessarily and very properly do get more recognition than those down the ranks, that you would convey to them my appreciation for 7;heir heroism, heroism in the sense that they have done an outstanding job and that the Director is able to do a better job than he otherwise could do in briefing the President of the United States and his colleagues in the National Security Council. "So finally, I would simply say that I understand that when President Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States. From one who knows. "I know. And I appreciate what you do." Remarks of President Nixon at the Central Intelligence Agency, 7 March 1969 "This organization, the CIA, has a distinguished record of being bipartisan in character. It is a highly professional group. It will remain that in this Administration ... ". Remarks of President Nixon, 7 May 1969, at the swearing-in ceremony of General Cushman as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Approved For Release 2000/06/01 : CIA-RDP80-00317A000100060001-1