RESULTS OF TEAM EXERCISES ON THE FIRST TWO DAYS IN RESIDENCE (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00308A000100070017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 29, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Results of Team Exercises on the
First Two Days in Residence
2"".*". "
Two team exercises were co _act1. ? one deal with Rilideareerist
Obstacles," and the other dealt with 'Up:m.5r Problems." The purposes
of each were stated in the Course Schedule.
Following is an unedited summary of the reeults of team deliberations
in each of the exercises. Basically, the tears were asked to formulate
their own statements of the problems, and then to develop their sugges-
tions for solutions, or approaches to solutions. These are reproduced
here in note form as received from the various teams.
STATI NTL
MMEES.3.40--ittlelta
Problem 11 Concentration by individuals on day-to-day duties causes them
to lose sight of overall objectives.
Response: Office of Training should arrange more seminars, guest speaker
programs, etc. to spread the word of what the Agency's overall ob-
jectives are. Second-hand information is sometimes (ar-
reMander is missing).
Hake certain that people get into the beat possible job slots. con-
sistent with their talents. For example, establish in WO a pro-
fessional desk officer corps and * professional operational officer
corps. -Throughout the Agency make higher slots available to the
competent senior analysts who are not cut out to be supervisors
but who now must undertgke managemeat chores in order to get the
higher grades.
Problem 2: How should the career service make known to marginal employees
their shortcomings and lack of perfOrnanoe early enough in their
career to allow the person to adopt career alternatives? How can
and when should the Agency begin identigying these marginal mi.
ployees?
Response: The first line supervisor should have the guts to tell the
person he is in the wrong place and actually force the person into
something else. Too often he is carried along getting a few grade
promotions until he has been kept on so long that he has no chances
for mobility left. Winds up hurting the organisation and, himself.
Realistically carry out personnel programs such as that operating
in TSD where the lowpet 10% are informaddthat they have one year
to shape up or they will be eliminated. Conferences between
supervisor and employee must be held as early on as possible and
solutions proposed to alleviate the problems.
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rankings known to individuala instead of sweeping them under
the rag.
Alternative ideas* Establish an underachievers course for marginal
types which would act something like remedial courses given
in schools, with the thought that it could possibly nsaven
a percentage of these types.
Over the years OTh has probably been exposed only to Agency
employees who are doing reasonably wall in their careers--
Midcareer Caarses Advanced Intelligence Courses Senior Seminars
etc. It should prove beneficial to OTB and to those who are
in course.
Perceived obstacle (stated in the two following ways): at steps
are being taken to allow an employee to advance up the GS
ladder (above GS-14) as a substantive specialist and not only
as a manager/administrator/
Promotional wiling unless moved in nanagerial position.
Response:
I. Steps to increase opportunity for substantive specialist
to advaaoe beyond the GS-14 level.
A. Create a etwe-tradke system which would provide the
opportunity to rise within the substantive ranks to the
C9-15 or (29-16 levels even in cases where administrators
directing this work might be at a lower grade level.
B. Beduc, the size of the current management structure to
permit allocation of higher grades in the area of shb-
stantive ppocialista.
Posaibilitien:
1. Vhho the deputy division chiefs (or deputy branch
chiefs in larger organisations) a substantive job,
allocated with the understanding that the deputy
is in the line of mnnagorial succession.
2. Alternatively, create high-grade eapecial aselatanto
slots available to exceptional analysts who aro not
inolined toward the aftiniErtrative role. (Currently,
ameh slots are used either to provide lower trade
levels identified as having Imenagerial potential!'
with expostr* to divisicn and offien level r=tace4ntnti
0.1*, as a ',bolding poeitiono for hither grade 0Z- gore
with nowhere to co.)
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Questiens Is it efficient from the leencyls point of view to insti-
tute tnndatory age 60 rotiremen?
,Respenses No. Primary (recnon?)--Inefficictey created bY hencere
en, necessity for en-going Agaacy'. Production of indilidunl
affected, re not create waveo uith any new ideas.
Other factors/question change.
1. Overall mendator, retirement age of 60.
2. Voluntary earlier age with no penalty--suggest 50 years With
25 years rereice. 50 years pith 20 years service, including
5 years overman, with 10 years minimum Agency employment.
3. Opportunities to return under contract,
4. need of differing requirements for various officere.
Differencees an--no overman; ODD?with overseas. ,
5. RIP in a factor, however not condidered under retirement-
orgenizationsegiminating COrOt39 beard.
6. Lenethening probationary period to better assess career
potential of individual; one period euggested wan 10 years.
Problems Bureaucratic inertia, together with overlapping chartere
creates a antics eituation.
Responees There is, indeed empire protection and there is come ,
juntification to the charge that, we are near-sighted in our
objectives. However, reorganization is in program and much
of the more meaningless overlapping in disappearing. EBO
in a form of vieble eolntion end may, if kept in perspective,
be a real help. The need to create a more tIcroes-fortilizedn
case of:icer...tho geneealised epocialint or the specialized
generalist, is recoenired, ard the development scientist
with A.B. appreciation end the A.B. with scientific apprecia-
tion, in in program. The panel felt that where in the ma
and the DTAT there caintn sore overlapping, this was a mama-
ably cound cheek end belence. In conelueien, when it becoree -
necessary to rove or eolve, we will not sit and etewe but
ctend lee, fight, and If aboolutely neeencary, hil. Some
earl muct, however, be used in moving too cuiftly...eood
program have been destroyed for lack of a cufficiently
vocal or literate defenrler.
Problems How cnn the acency recover the epirit aletAeeney had prior
to the problems encountered in the 1970ge?
Responses Granted there may i A problem end non not junt in the
peeibi of the 19'70 a. Tea panel aenumen the thorn end ?rt.
of the problem is morale, esprit de corpc, public relations
stemming from (a) Vehlecelmger, (b) the Ouee "72 R717? end (o)
the Yetreagate eftoemeth, The preblem an neon by the panel
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howevorptis not as bleak or gloomy as the question seams to
euggest. Nbrale isn't all that bad. Granted, we took Hely
rows end tho like When we entered this Order, and to have a
particularly distasteful Mbncydhanger eater the temple only
to dispence desecrations is painful, but hes gone, and come
et the Changes that have resulted are for the better. Another
adjunct to the question may be "Is Williem Colby the right man
for the job?" With but one or two exceptions, it appears
M2 are an track, end rnny of the Changes that have been created
are going to solve some of the problems we are all complainift
about. It is not simply a one-time policy, however. The
changes will have to be continually refined. MBO is a damn
good vehicle for thin. As to R1F1s, the panel would be happy
to start a list, not a abort one, either, if the JUno '74
retirements are going to be insufficient and we need to do
this again. The point is, 1113 have to do it continuously?
not allowing a mu tbobb trapped with 4 college-aged Children
at ago 55, or whatever. Far earlier in a career, determinations
rust be made. hbetimes have changed, also. The world isn't
as filled with clarity=-doubts are more prevalent. Vbrale
is relevant to our times, and today -cannot be compared with
On. It is not that bad, and those who will make it better
are us. By being responsive and inaisttnt on our professional-
ism and competence. We still have a uniqueness.
Perceived obstacles Management by Indirection Problem. Lack of
personnel development, career guidance. Job- assignment fre-
quently more happenstance than the result of any plan. A
?omen feeling by individuals that they are drifting?the
result is too often low morale.
Responses Observations on personnel guidance, career development,
and job assignments.
A. Key factor underlying all decisions: A frank evaluation
of an individual's performance and potential reflected
to him in his fitness reports, particularly to give him
an accurate idea of whore management sees him among his
peers.
B. To make the job descriptions/letters of instruction against
which performance is rated meaningful, the individual
chould have a review?or drafting?responsibility, with
periodic updating.
C. 7_zatml:1/1 progrem3 often appear henhazard.
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Notes The following came from team members' notee, and presumably
was in reponse to the previously stated obstacle (en p. A),
but apparently became physically detached from the material
aa p. 48
7
It is unreal to offer an excuse that the individual *cannot
be spared& from the office.
C. (see p. A)
3. A planned program of training for those ehoming managerial
potential; a separate program of training to enhance the
capabilities of the individual in this specialty.
A.. Individual ought to have a means of actively seeking
change ithin, or without, his organization without
the etigma often attached to expressed or implied die.-
satisfaction. Seek counsel without *making waves.*
Greater opportunity for rotational tours.
Ettabliihment of goals for the individual, with an
attempt to structure job assignments to provide Jac:reseed
capabilities to achieve these goals.
Got out of the pattern of being &frozen * into jobs.
Perceived obstacle: Fitness reports.
Responses
ORen_es_ncept--The individual being rated should see the entire
repem. Eating officer's comments will be moderated cs a
remit.
B. Coomant60-A specific section should be included in the _
?-
report form for a listing of "weak" skills or characteristics.
. C. Bate the snpervieot?Sone system of feeding back to the
supervieer hau he is seen and what are his strengths and
weaknesses as sem by his subordinates.
D. Eplition yithia gra.d--Among one's peers or grade level,
anate position ehould be ?monad; an a miniramm, down to
which thiri of the total one has been rated tato.
, E. Trick gpti.pn--Rather than force specialists into management,
cmd at the same time, loss the technical expertise, provide
prenium or professional pay with the need for grade pro-
motions oltrinated.
F. grobatioWtonurre?Provide for early selection out--with
tenure guaranteeing retirement after probation.
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Perteived obstacles Inefficiency and poor communicationf,due to
physical separation of buildings.
Responses Obvious solution (getting everybody into the same building)
is not possible for many reasons. Still doesn't solve the
problem, since bni1A4ngs would be too big, end there is still
the problem of interagency communication. Therefore, simply
reeitectse whatever posnibilities there are for ?ammo. (130
the following two perceived obstacles and responses).
Perceived obstacle: Limited opportunities for informal communication.
Responses Informal comma a function of people and offices. It's
veey good some places and poo* elsewhere. Start by training
people to ousel informal system from their first day. Mhke
euporvisor3 know that they are responsible for helping their
employees to grow and develop within the Agency.
Perceived obstacles Compartmentalisation stifling co mmo between
compenentte
Responses Coepartmentalisation and oommo obstacles AII overcome
by competent professionals. Every supervisor must promote
broad expoeure for their people and themselves. Absolutely
a met for 12-14 grades.
All this suggests that services of OTR be easily available to
components E9e roans of getting "all interested parties
together in a constructive environment to replace components'
dry briefings.
Perceived obstacles. Decisions made an actions for political reasons'
.instead of intelligence needs or technical feasibility.
Responses 144 nada a. distinction between this the of problem on
the personal level and an the Agency level. In the former
we really C1'3 not taikieg ebeut mything peculiar to C126
bet rather the wry things aro in all humnn inetitutione.
There are times ehen the individual will have to have the
feetletude to attend un end be oounted, to be a mitners to the
truth dereite contreey preseuree from his boss, who eny have
eoliticel =enema for minting a certain slant given to a ctudy
ere eneeostion, ce report. At the Agency level, there oleo hove
been &A will continue to be oconsione when CIA's estimates
or reports do not Jibe with the pooition of another government
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agency,-the torigrens; et the 'President. If we are going to
deal-tith the tenth lamed in tho'flature,'thero"t1.Weei'Wn
be rere-bituatiend (such ca'ue have. hal filth 3OVie.tiMAn,7Y.
eapabilitioal or the b.:thing effoat en -North Vietnar)-tti. --
findingirote politically tnpalatable'for neme'lltertettpc=a-
er trtUp, and the tendency uill 'be .for the Aemcl':tetefer-
tete-form Of retribution. -Yet, loohlng to the. ftturo,--C77
principal contributien to Amoricom moiety m7y well be te-
fulfill properly and foarlesely its role es en oblective end
.-
informed observer without a partisan are to grind on major
insues affecting the mpenditurg or saving of billions of
dollars--and possibly oven our survival in the nuclear age.
Mg aim should be prudent enough to avoid rnneconnary confrenta-
?tion and We nhouN not pursue martyrdon, but rather, like
do everything we can to sort cat UMW end
ma tern until the monant of truth 'arrives, and we
are forced to lay it on the line.
Perceived obstacles We have all been told different meanings of the
Vidcareor Course. Apparently different Directorates end
divisions une the course for different purposes. Mat should;
selection to Nidcareer Course man to us? .
ResponSes Again, we found ourselves making a basie distinction: between
the intrinsic dividends of attending end participating in the
course, and the career imnlications of attendtnes. U.71 (Treed -
that the former benefitn, which involve- broadening of r7.
speetive, an well 03 lerTninglehpratha Agency stendl today, both
in terms of itn rissien and its structure; ere really the rest
irnortant, and are available to each student, meanness of
such considerations es promotion, 07 the like. Tho career
implicationn are better knom to eseh individual, who elene
C7M C1C2S0 whore he stands,end where be is ping bureaucratic-
ally. Sono bosses do think of thin course in terms of career
development, but there in no uniformity on thin inttes. 17 C.7.7 .
'mans. Only three of the class (in a thou of hands) had even
been told why they had been sent to Eldeareer. Conn, in foot:,
had been told by their boss thst they should not th.:7.n?.7 of the7-
selves as nvcrbers of em elite t7 thoSr eolestion to nIcarzc.7.
Vinnl co long en we do not delude ourselves into thiuin
that mere attendance in primary, end instead anpresicto thi
fact thst the benefits will bo rom intangible than canercte,_
end more related to whet un put into it than to what we uill
el7170 by pannive attendance, ladearecr will be effective enn
ImethUhile.
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Perceived problems What can be done about the leaking of elascifici
info to tha prow)?
- Responses All leaks seem to be politically motivated. An axe to
erind, or roney involved. It is nnt poseible to control other
egeneies. The best we can hope for is to set the record straight
In none cases by an unattributable source.
.7- Perceived problems (stated in two ways) How does the Agency maintain
ite objectivity under pressure from the Office of the President
to conform to Administration policy?
How do we avoid the politicisation of the Ammer? Do we have
a way to ensure that the Agency is never suckered into domestic
political affairn?
Responses A DCI with integrity is the only answer to maintaining
objectivity. This mould then inspire the people ender him
to point out preblees. The DCI or DWI (at least co) ehouId
be a professional. If the DCI is non-pro, the Dra ehould be
a civilize pro, not necessarily military, and selected by rm.
It would be best for the DCI to have direct access to the
President.
&WI typo of CIA eparterly professional journal?a type of
interne' or unofficial journal to reach the individual ere1eeee4
about inteerityg
a. Cengreseional attitudes.
b4 ceplein to crployees cm a general level current intelligenee
differences.
Uee CIA employeen as PR men by keeping them informed so thee
cen inform others.
Veit) a treatise of detailed description be a well Imeve author
to creleim the irportence of Rainteining the inteerity of to
inteilieence proelnet in a politic-A_ etmenphere.in professionel
Ice:mein to knoOlelgeatle (text riseing).
Produoo a sterile version of political and eeononie CIA studies
and rake them evellable to Congress end peblio to get them
awnre of CIA product as finishod intelligence.
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yPerceivedpreiblem-(statod in throo relOtod Wayl)s Shotid-dra-con-
paion bo directed primarily at tho Congress or tho public?-
,
How can the Agoncy improve its image- before Congtosti and tho--
public, and nlogitimicimon (sic) its image in the future? -
How would CIA inprove relations with Congress? Should CIA -
try to direct COM3 of Ito products to Congress as a sample
of our outstanding work?
? Responsos Romonoibility_k_),public--Agency has no specific PR
rosponnibiliffes to ngrans roots publics To attempt such a- ..
campaign would probably result only in omharassmcnt or nuoroon
imago. Such things as oppnaring on Illoot the Press would be .
dotrimontal. Contacts should be 'made to public through pro-
fossional, social, and community organizations as well as
recognizing tho responsibilities of each individual Staff
etployeo to others in tho' community on a nono-for-ono" basis*
Individual staff employees ehould become loss sensitive to -
personally directed dorocatory rannrkn. In most cases, these
are Endo only in jest for "chock valuo."
Boanonlitzto Consrepo--It is felt -that any attempt to
inatonco Wilts Etousepsoononnol -during thp romainder of tho
current administration wnuld be of little oz' no value Zoo
quontion was rained, as to Whether the ir"ogo'or-tho Agency in
the cyon of Congress ts really that bad. .The best moans of
a favorable imago with Congress in via a euperioo
end product. Perhaps more -could he done to solactivoly rol0000
documonts directly to Coogross. 1iowaoor9 it should be roaliood
thnt Congress's basic goal is very politically influencod,? . .
to achieve re-election. The statement we made thatthe cool
of th6 Agency in not necosoarily to protect eocrotap tot to
protect sources of inforootion end related relationships.
A good relationship with the press could be onhanced-through
identifying a limited nutbor of oymoathotic newsmen. A oinglo
Asoncy person such as Yos Thuermor is adequate to regulate
press releases and related activities.
conpluoioot--PR could be host dofined As Professional Relations
ver thon Public Relations. Our performance end image in
directly related to tho Quality of product produced croanci,
internol- communication bottroon Agency compononttsio an nach
C7 rnro needed el is extoonol public relations to the general
Amoricon publics
Perceived problems Increased coordination of reports with other
ntrboro of tho IC makes for a watered-clown product. (Mar
members of the IC have vented interacts, such an palling a
Soviet SIN an ABM to justify budget appropriations.)
Responses Lot each group submit their oatimato end cu iortint data.
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Ponponse (cont.) Closer combination (sic) of the intelligence
community.
ra assumes in reality his central position.
Perceived problems Will MHO eaUSO a continuation of the enuthers
games rather than bringing About an improvement in the quality
ef our product?
Response: ProbablE remain the same. Startin with .0.1.k. and filtering
damn, the e?Ipthaliq Should be an . Tone/ft An
cott4igffee4 obAnctives (realistic) c). EEO in jp1A a MmIngror-1
toehnioue; can be misused.
Perceived problem: Hew can the Agency become more of a working enit2
For instance, the analyst vis-a,vie the operations he reports,
DDUcT vis-a-vis DDC/
Response: The need-to-know principle is overemphasised. This in
part of the fragmmtation problem in the Agency. TO do your
job we need people to understand the preblems from beginning
to end. Allry fears that mess job in going to be pre-empted.
Step protecting empires by Special Access security. There
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Perceived problem: Is the CIA intelligence product relevant, timely,
rnd satieeetory for the 19701s?
Rospense: Is relevant, but changes must continue to becems more so
end ehreges with needs ahango (sic). (Presumably, this means
to ogy that tho product must Chrngs with changing neen.)
Arrney runt move to predicting the intelligence needs of
n!7,.ties rni not only reacting to ettutNI.La. Perla melein need
to blooms a largo:. part of our methodology. Intelligence in
to r-er7lited rn4 is not integrated to form a cchemlva model
ter proactive pmposes.
Perceived prdn'llans The Agency has been too occupied with militez.y
intelliveneo (cotntfng missiles); how can it alter this
cituntieuT
Repponee: Coup does not have background to know what areas are
being (tent missing).
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/0 Perceived problem: Hou can the DPO change in the near end intermcd-
late future to eatisfy the rore otringent requirencnts bcing
pinced upon it?
Responses Tho changes themselves will be dictated by the regnircrrntss ?
a. Paurcr pcopth.
b, tharper foci of targeting.
c. Pmcder uso of ease officers.
d. Potter underntanding of areas snd political dyncries.
STATI NTL
Porsoilmi problem (stated in three related wys)sA rnjor cenecrn-
ef students, C7pitn1 Fill, end se:adonis liberals9 is that ne ?
Agency uill beecre en intornnl cecnrity agency, rev onn these
ceneorns be elleyed?
Vhnt hind of ire ehourt3re try to project in a public rcic.tiens
enrpaign?
Ecu c7n CIA build a *mastic constituen0y? -
Responses penplusionsr-All agree there is a need for bnilding a-
positLve9 ems.6ructive image of the A701,70 IF.3 scs11 te 110
fa trouble uith the Mrinistration? the press, ani perhnpol
the people0 cego3ng effort of It?. Colby end one:73 tn
re e ecnc73ng 1,r1 alarda7Ao ene end ehould be continncd.
Public elnentio7--a grass-roots cempaign to explain uhy the
figcncy oyintse1 uhat its objectives area,
PY:;7"77(1 n 0:71r7n1cn 1:71tttn the Agency. 11770 CCT3
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