NSC BRIEFING 22 DECEMBER 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000700010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1960
• Content Type: MFR

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NSC BRIEFING
7 Dec ember 1960
FRANCE-ALGERIA
I. Flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde to Spain has
increased concern that Algiers-initiated coup attempt
imminent.
A. Four other defendants who also fled Paris trial of
January insurrection leaders have not been located,
However, rumors that several generals on active duty had
left their posts were unfounded.
IV. De Gaulle's scheduled 9 December arrival in Algeria could
spark rightist action.
State Dept. review completed
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nitia"d cow *1
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NSC BRIEFING
6 December 1960
FRANCE-ALGERIA
I. Flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde has increased con-
cern that Algiers-initiated coup attempt imminent.
A. Government has failed to apprehend Lagaillarde or four
other defendents who fled Paris trial of January insurrec-
tion leaders.
Several other generals are reported to have left their posts.
A. They are presumed to be Algeria-bound.
IV. De Gaulle's scheduled 9 December arrival in Algeria could spark
rightist action.
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RECENT BLOC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
I. Past year was biggest ever in bloc foreign aid program with total
new obligations of over $1.5 billion (bringing total since
January 1954 to about $5.5 billion).
A. Old customers--UAR, Iraq, India, and Indonesia--continued to
surances of additional assistance, but spate of new
aid offers and agreements in recent weeks ;(past two months)
underscore Bloc's growing drive in Latin America and Africa.
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NSC BRIEFING 29 December 1960
I. De Gaulle expected to win wide backing in France in 8 January
referendum on self-determination for Algeria despite opposi-
tion from Communists, rightists, and some center elements.
A. Referendum will give Algerians right to decide for them-
selves what type of government they want for Algeria.
B. A "yes" vote also means approval of an interim administra-
tion in Algeria which De Gaulle is now setting up.
II. De Gaulle spearheading a vigorous campaign for his plan and
restricting opposition.
A. Has scheduled three major personal speeches (20 and 31 Dec;
6 Jan.)
B. Allowing limited broadcast time only to the six parties
which have both parliamentary seats and a formal party
structure.
1. This requirement restricts some opposition groups such
as that of Jacques Soustelle which has been obliged to
buy time on the Luxembourg commercial station.
C. Most Frenchmen still convinced De Gaulle is their main
hope for an end to the rebellion.
III. In Algeria, however, outcome of vote in-doubt,
A. Massive settler opposition expected.
B. Many urban Moslems likely to heed FLN rebels instructions
to boycott the vote which rebels claim is a snare and de-
lusion.
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C. Outcome may hang on whether army will try to influence rural
Moslems one way or other.
TV. Rightists in Algeria plan anti-referendum demonstrations.
A. FLN will probably exploit these for own ends.
25X1
V. Official press statements hint De Gaulle may make a new bid be-
fore 8 January for negotiations with rebels, despite army
hostility.
VI. FLN rebels, however, see their hand strengthened by UN resolu-
tion and pro-rebel attitude of Moslem rioters in Algiers.
A. They are reported determined to reject administration
De Gaulle would set up after referendum and insist
De Gaulle has no alternative but to deal directly with
them.
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NSC BRIEFING 29 December 1960
I . T a n-day Soci
BELGIAN STRIKES
list-instigated strikes spreading today.
A. Strikes are protest against proposed economic austerity bill
of Prime Minister Eyskens' Social Christian (catholic)-Liberal
government to offset loss of Congo.
1. Bill calls for increased taxes and reduced social welfare
expenditures to offset loss of Congo revenues.
2. Opposition Socialist leadership, originally reluctant, now
heavily committed to strike.
3. Socialists trying to force Eyskens to reconvene parliament,
hoping parliament under mounting pressure will defeat bill,
also possibly cause downfall of government.
B. Violence and demonstrations increasing but no one killed as yet.
1.. Massive demonstrations expected in Brussels today.
2. Government has brought back six Infantry companies from
Germany and plans to bring 10 more.
fly general in southern (Walloon) industrial
area, partial in Brussels and somewhat less effective In
Flemish cities (Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges).
1. But Socialists are endeavoring to extend strikes into
Brussels and Flemist country..Strikes spreading there tod
ya
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NSC BRIEFING 28 December 1960
CONGO
I. Rival regimes in Leopoldville and Stanleyville continue to spar.
A. Mobutu hampered by logistical problems operating against
distant Orientale province.
B. Gizenga threatened by critical shortage food and gasoline in
Stanleyville.
H. Gizenga has broken Mobutu's "economic blockade," however, by
moving forces into Kivu Province which should relieve pressure on
food supply Stanleyville.
A.. Next move up to Mobutu who will probably now have to use stronger
measures.
B. Mobutu likely to ignore Hammarskjold's threat to withdraw
UN forces if Mobutu moves against Stanleyville in view of
UN inability to forestall Gizenga forays into Kivu.
C. Extent of dissident control in Kivu unclear, but apparently
most Congolese army troops there responsive to Gizenga.
III. African states still hesitant concerning extent to which they
should aid dissidents.
A. Gizenga may go to meeting African states in Rabat scheduled
to convene 3 January to plead cause in person.
B, While some are likely to offer some form of material aid,
pro-Gizenga sentiment not unanimous.
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C. Sudan continues to bar UAR overflights to Stanleyville and
no nation has formally recognized Gizenga regime as legal
Congo government.
IV. Moscow has publicly expressed sympathy for dissidents, and has
hinted that it might participate in any effort by Rabat conferences
to aid Gizenga.
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NSC BRIEFING
FRANCE--A,LGERI A
20 December 1960
I. Violent demonstrations in Algeria have aroused strong skepticism
in France over chances for De Gaulle's program to unite Moslem
and European factions.
II. 'Nevertheless, support has increased for De Gaulle as only man
capable of solving problem.
A. He is expected to win handily in France in 8 January referendum.
III. In Algeria, however, vote outcome in doubt.
A. Massive settler opposition expected.
B. Many urban Moslems likely to heed Ferhat Abbas' 16 December
"directive" to abstain.
C. Outcome may hang on which way army support goes in rural areas.
IV. Official press statements indicate De Gaulle may make new bid before
8 January for negotiations with FLN, despite army hostility.
V. Rebel leaders, encouraged by pro-FLN attitude of. Moslem rioters in
Algiers, are reported determined to reject any administration De
Gaulle sets up in Algeria as result of referendum.
A. They insist that De Gaulle has no alternative but to negotiate
directly with them.
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20 December 196Q
I. Continuing Communist challenge to West Berlin's status was high-
lighted in two sets of trade talks this past month.
A. West German trade negotiations with USSR foundered on 12
December when Soviets refused Bonn's condition that the Soviet-
West German trade agreement (over $300 million) cover West
Berlin (Previously West Berlin has been tacitly included, but
not mentioned in agreement).
1. This would have meant Soviet recognition of legal and po-
litical link between West Germany and West Berlin--a
point which Soviets consistently deny.
2. Economic aspects of talks proceeded with little difficuluty,
but Bonn felt compelled to insist on "Berlin clause" be-
cause failure to do so would have greatly weakened their
position; opposition Social Democrats led by Mayor Brandt
had publicly demanded this move.
II. Problem of Berlin is also the root of the current trade talks at
a semi-official level between East and West Germany over the
status of their interzonal trade pact ($468 million in 1959).
A. Current dispute goes back to 8 September when East Germans at-
tempted to pin down their right of control over East Berlin by
passing a law requiring special East German "residence permits"
for West Germans traveling to East Berlin.
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B. Bonn retaliated by denouncing the interzonal trade pact with
East Germany and by demanding that the law requiring permits
be rescinded as prerequisite for reinstating trade agreement;
formal cancellation of the trade pact takes effect on 1
January 1961.
C. A key section of this trade agreement contains procedures for
commercial shipments between West Germany and Berlin.
1. If agreement expires on 31 December, then the East Germans
would, in effect, have a legal pretext for exercising un-
limited controls over the vital Bonn-Berlin economic life-
line.
III. Negotiations between East and West Germany are currently under way
on question of reinstating agreement.
A. Two factors apparently restraining the East Germans from taking
hard line in these talks:
1. Moscow is apparently unwilling to foot the high, short term
costs of supporting the East German economy in critical
first six months next year. (We doubt that the bloc can
readily provide many of the goods which would be lost
through termination of the agreement.)
2. Soviets,furthermore, apparently prefer not to increase
tensions over Berlin prior to attempt to arrange high-
level negotiations with US~
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1. Not yet clear whether Bonn will stick to its demand that
this East German decree be formally rescinded; East German
negotiator said that this "impossible." West Germans,
therefore, pressing for written commitment that decree will
not be enforced and that police control posts be removed.
C. Without formal trade agreement some trade could continue on
cash basis but:
1. East Germany would undergo serious economic and perhaps
critical political strain.
2. For the West, the Berlin problem could become immediately
critical.
D. Confused status of agreements means that on 1 January there is
possibility that East Germany will bring greatly increased
pressure on access routes.
1. East Germans are publicly threatening that allied as well as
West German access rights will be terminated when trade
agreement expires.
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NBC BRIEFING 19 December 1960
FRANCE-ALGERIA
I. Recent violence in Algeria and international pressures are speeding
evolution of French opinion on Algerian problem.
A. Key factions shocked by vehement Moslem demonstrations are
reassessing basic positions.
1. All but French die-hard integrationists now realize
inevitability of drastic change in status of Algeria.
B. Support has increased for De Gaulle as only man capable of
solving problem.
1. Despite sharp rise in skepticism that his program can unite
Algerian communities, he is expected to win handily in France
in 8 January referendum.
2. In Algeria, however, vote outcome in doubt.
II. De Gaulle will probably go ahead with plans to establish separate
Algerian administration.
A. Army repression of rioters widened gulf between Moslem and
European communities, however, and may make it more difficult
to get capable Moslem participation.
B. Official press statements indicate De Gaulle may now stress
early negotiations with FLN.
C, In view FLN reluctance lay down arms, he may quietly drop
insistence on prior cease-fire agreement, or establish
unilateral cease-fire.
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III. If FLN agrees to undertake new negotiations, French army position
will be critical.
A. Army still hostile to political negotiations with FLN.
IV. Riots highlighted army as only force able maintain peace in
Algeria.
A. Moslem readiness to identify De Gaulle's self-determination
policy with FLN severe blow to army's hopes for success in
its social rehabilitation program.
B. Spread of Moslem rioting to rural Algeria or international
intervention could induce the army to assume a broader politi-
cal role.
V. PGAR, encouraged by UN support and pro-FLN attitude Algiers rioters,
may be less inclined to relax its current intransigence.
Vi. In any event, the threat of partition of the coastal departments
of Algeria and French intention to separate oil-rich Sahara from
Algeria make accord with PGAR remote.
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NSC BRIEFING 19 December 1960
I. Continuing Communist challenge to West Berlin's status was high-
lighted in two sets of trade talks this past month. A critical sit-
uation may arise after 1 January if there is no new agreement on
trade between East And West Germany.
A. West German trade negotiations with USSR foundered on 12 December
when Soviets refused Boffin"s condition that trade agreement
(over $300 million) cover West Berlin (Previously West Berlin has
been tacitly included, but not mentioned in agreement).
1. This would have meant Soviet recognition of legal and po-
litical link between Bonn and West Berlin--a point which So-
viets consistently deny.
2. Economic aspects of talks proceeded with little difficulty,
but Bonn felt compelled to insist on "Berlin clause" be-
cause failure to do so would have greatly weakened their po-
sition; opposition Social Democrats led by Mayor Brandt had
publicly demanded this move.
II. Problem of Berlin is also the root of the current negotiations be-
tween East and West Germany over the status of their trade pact
($468 million in 1959).
A. Current dispute goes back to 8 September when East Germans at-
tempted to pin down their right of control over East Berlin.
1. Passed law necessitating special East German "residence permit"
for West Germans traveling to East Berlin or East Germany.
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T
B. Bonn retaliad on 30 September by denouncing trade pact with
East Germany and by demanding that this law be rescinded as pre-
requisite for reinstating 'trade agreement; formal cancellation
takes effect on 1 January 1961.
C. A key section of this trade agreement contains procedures for
commercial shipments between Bonn and Berlin.
1. If agreement expires on 31 December, then the East Germans
would, in effect, h
ve a legal pretext for exercising un-
limited controls over the vital Bonn-Berlin economic life-
line.
III. Negotiations between East and West Germany are currently underway on
question of reinstating agreement.
A. Two factors apparently restraining the East Germans from taking
hard line in these talks:
1. Moscow is apparently unwilling to foot high, short term costs
of supporting East Germany economy in critical first six months
next year.
2. Soviets apparently prefer not to increase tensions over Ber-
lin prior to attempt to arrange high-level negotiations with
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C. Without formes trade agreement
some trade could continue on
cash basis but:
1. East Germany would undergo serious economic and perhaps
critical political strain.
2. For the West, the Berlin problem could become immediately
critical.
D. Confused status of agreements means that on 1 January there is
possibility that East Germany may bring greatly increased pres-
sure on access routes.
1. East Germans claiming allied access might be affected.
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L,viN "IUEIY ! IA
NSC BRIEFING 15 November 1960
1. Most violent reaction so far to De Gaulle's 4 November speech in'
which he acknowledged inevitability of an "Algerian Republic" was
Armistice Day rioting in Algiers.
A. Rioting largely limited to young toughs.
B. Major settler organization, French Algerian Front (FAF), ab-
stained.
1. FAF trying to demonstrate, particularly to army, that it
is responsible organization.
Ii. Army, which took no part in.11 November riots, remains decisive
factor.
A. Marshal Juin's Armistice Day statement may be army "warning"
to De Gaulle.
B. Reports of unilateral French truce to be applied in selected
areas may be feeler to both army and rebels.
III. De Gaulle simultaneously under increasing international pressures.
A. PAG is rejecting all French-sponsored overtures, at least
until after UN General Assembly takes stand.
1. Says it has lost confidence in bilateral negotiations.
2. Will probably reject current effort by French Community
states to mediate.
B. Algerian UN debate now expected in December, with AA states
continuing to press for direct UN involvement.
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%lope IV. De Gaulle?s next major step likely to be establishment separate
Algerian administration which would attempt to negotiate with PAG
leaders.
V. If De Gaulle makes such a move soon, he will need to seek public
endorsement of his course through a referendum in France.
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NSC BRIEFING 6 November 1960
FRANCE AND ALGERIA
I. De Gaulle's 4 November speech acknowledged growing op-
position in France, but clearly warned dissident ele-
ments that he would brook no interference in the Algerian
policy he is pursuing.
A. For the first time, he expressed the belief that
an Algerian republic will eventually come into ex-
istence, and he stressed that he has been working
toward an autonomous Algeria.
B. He hinted that a unilateral cease-fire declaration
by France may be possible.
1.
A tacit truce could precede preliminary
discussions of the political guarantees the
rebels insist on.
2.
De Gaulle co
must cease
begin.
'nues to hold that hostilities
re political negotiations can
II. In France, the immediate reaction to his speech followed
expected patterns, from Leftist Deputy Maurice Faure's
"pure illusion" re any hope of a solution short of imme-
diate independence, to Georges Bidault's "unacceptable."
III. In Algeria, the hostility of the majority of the European
community was reinforced. Moslems were reluctant to com-
ment, but seemed generally satisfied.
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IV. While frustration over the continuing stalemate in
Algeria has been mounting at an accelerated rate in
France, De Gaulle's stock is still high.
A. He could probably win wide acceptance for'
negotiations with the rebels encompassing
more than just cease-fire terms.
V, His obsession with national unity has made him hesitate,
however, in the face of concerted rightist pressures to
keep Algeria French,
A. Soustelle is organizing opposition behind a
broad economic-political program contrived to
catch all shades of anti-regime sentiment,
B. The current trial of La Gaillarde (La-guy-yard)
and other leaders of the abortive January insur-
rection in Algiers is a dangerous focus for right-
ist sentiment.
VI. French policy hinges on the army.
A. Most military men are increasingly inclined to con-
sider Algerian independence inevitable,
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The rebels, who feel international developments are swing-
ing back in their favor, have become increasingly outspok-
en in rejecting De Gaulle's terms for negotiating a set-
tlement.
A. No official reaction to De Gaulle's speech is
expected before the Provisional Government's
plenary session, which begins on 7 November in
Tunis.
B. They will demand concrete evidence of French good
faith before making any move.
VIII. Khrushchev's de facto recognition of the rebels' Provi-
sional Government, and Soviet and Chinese commitments of
assistance have multiplied pressures on France's allies
and on Algeria's neighbors.
A. Tunisia and Morocco are under heavy pressure from
the rebels and the Bloc to permit transit of ma-
teriel and possibly personnel.
IX. NATO could become involved if De Gaulle invoked the treaty.
A. It is not likely that he would .,4o however,
unless he considered Bloc aid was reaching con-
siderable proportions in materiel and personnel.
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X. At the UN, the Afro-Asian bloc wants a resolution calling
for a UN-supervised referendum.
XI. The states of the French Community have a mediation effort
under way.
A. But French spokesmen have played down the chances
De Gaulle would accept such mediation.
B. The rebels have also tended to disregard Black
African overtures.
C. Bourguiba has reportedly agreed to urge the rebels
to accept the Black Africans' proposals.
1. Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and the UAR have mis-
givings about Communist influence unless a
speedy solution is found.
XII. In any event, the initiative now seems to be with the
rebels, who are taking an uncompromising stand.
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NSC BRIEFING 28 October 1960
Several events this week--including the sixth anniversary of the
outhbreak of the Algerian rebellion--will quicken the pace of develop-
ments affecting De Gaulle's policy of self-determination for Algeria.
A. He unexpectedly scheduled a nationwide TV-radio address for
4 November.
1. He may call for a referendum to demonstrate that the bulk
of French public opinion backs his policy; he may announce
the formation of a separate Algerian administration as the
first step toward setting up an autonomous "Algerian Algeria"
linked to France.
B. The timing of his scheduled TV address' suggests that he wants to
assess the impact of other major events this week which could
affect his policy and to do something before the UN vote on the
Algerian problem in mid-November.
1. 1 November--the anniversary of the rebellion--is..likely to
see stepped up rebel terrorism and counter-demonstrations by
European settlers.
2. Events scheduled for 3 November are likely to add new pressures
against De Gaulle's position. The trial of Pierre Lagaillarde
and other leaders of the January 1960 insurrection will begin
and Jacques Soustelle'.s broad rightist front (ranging from
right-wing Socialists to fascists), which was formed last
June, will reconvene in Paris.
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II. The French army still holds the key to the situation. It apparently
is coming around to recognize the inevitability of Algerian independence,
but it insists on the appearance of a military victory and could not
swallow anything less, such as precipitate withdrawal or direct
political negotiations with the rebels.
III. The French political atmosphere has changed noticeably in the past
month, though De Gaulle's standing with the public is still high.
A. The bulk of the public wants to get the Algerian war over with
and seems ready to accept any settlement.
25X1
B. The noise is being made by small, articulate groups--left and
liberals on one hand, rightists on the other.
C. De Gaulle's problem, therefore, is to galvanize his public
support against the extremes.
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NSC BRIEFING 20 October 1960
1. De Gaulle still stands high with French public, but is under increas-
ingly heavy attack from hitherto silent opponents and some of his
former political backers.
A. Die-hard rightists in Assembly aligning with democratic left
against De Gaulle's proposed nuclear strikigg force and his opposi-
tion to NATO and integrated European Community.
B. Heavy-handed attitude of De Gaulle government toward parliament
and labor's demands for fairer share in an improved economy
are additional irritants.
II. Algeria increasingly focuses tensions.
A. Failure FLN talks, increasing terrorism, mutual reprisals, rebel
moves to internationalize problem arousing French public opinion,
B. Leftists, many clergy and other groups critical of army methods
and of use of conscripts in this type of ware
1. Student groups have called massive 27 October demonstrations;
wide labor support indicated.
C. Right continues appeals for maintenance of French Algeria.
III. Rightists also stepping up plotting against Fifth Republic and
seeking to unite De Gaulle's military and political opponents.
A. Soustelle on 19 October for first time publicly advanced him-
self as alternative to De Gaulle.
1. He recently set forth broad political-economic program in
opposition to De Gaulle, including French Algeria and inte-
gration of NATO forces.
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IV. However, De Gaulle could still rally most of French public to ac-
cept a move leading to negotiations or even Algerian independence
so long as it was French initiative, if he dared do this. If so,
he might have right-left revolution on his hands.
V. Hence, De Gaulle is still standing pat on his policy of self-
determination and shows no signs of making any move before UN
debate in November.
DTI. In addition to public popularity, De Gaulle holds some trump cards.
A. He can't be ousted legally.
Bo Threat of dissolution enough to block non-confidence vote in
assembly.
C. Most rightist opponents have no alternate candidate of stature.
1. Opponents primarily involved in stepped up "psychological
warfare" campaign in hope he'll abandon policy of self-
determination.
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NSC BRIEFING 28 September 1960
I. Stabilization program inaugurated July 1959 quickly achieved immediate
objectives.
A. It halted inflation, stabilized currency, and built up foreign
exchange receipts.
1. Foreign exchange holdings up from $76 million overdraft
July 1959 to $303 million balance July 1960.
II. This was done at cost of economic recession, however, which has been
prolonged by cabinet disagreement on steps needed to effect an upturn.
III. Credit curbs and uncertain business outlook have slowed economic
activity and swelled unemployment.
A. US Embassy reports substantial decline-in industrial:output,
although government apparently reluctant to publish overall
indices.
1. Freight car loadings down 23 percent in first half 1960.
2. Many firms have closed down.
3. Businessmen reluctant to invest because of doubts about
future.
B. Labor increasingly convinced sacrifices under stabilization
program borne primarily by working class.
1. Over 300,000 unemployed compared to 120,000 in 1958.
2. Elimination of overtime for most workers has cost them up to
fourth of take-home pay.
3. Unemployment insurance program available only for small
proportion of newly idle.
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VW1
Government seems unwilling to furnish incentives needed now for
economic expansion.
A. Little prospect of substantial further trade liberalization which
would permit expansion of industry.
B. Private investment tightly controlled.
1. License from Ministry of Industry required for any industrial
plant investment involving more than $33,000.
2. Foreign capital discouraged from building plants which would
compete with existing industries.
V. Minister of Industry Planell, leading opponent of stabilization plan,
would risk inflation by intervening directly in specific sectors of
economy to reactivate demand.
VI. Even Finance Minister Navarro Rubio, chief backer of stabilization
plan, tending to favor palliatives.
A. Navarro Rubio has induced government to seek to forestall labor
unrest by establishing special funds for:
1. Housing improvement t,
2. Scholarships, and
3. Stock-sharing programs for labor.
VII. Rising labor discontent overreduced pay, however, and growing pressure
for general wage hikes may renew inflationary threat.
VIII. There is danger that government may adopt politically palatable policy
leading to:
A. Abandonment stabilization program.
B. Return to measures immediately inflationary in impact.
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N SC BRIEFING
20 September 1960
I. Because of his desire to focus world attention on Berlin prior to UN,
Khrushchev is permitting East Germans to undertake a new campaign to
raise tensions on Berlin; East German regime on 8 September imposed
.permanent restrictions on travel of West Germans to East Berlin.
A. Move violates Four-Power agreements on freedom of movement within
city, but has not affected movement of those who work in one
sector of city and live in another.
1. Is step toward incorporating East Berlin into East Germany by
making own laws directly applicable to East Berlin, in effect
giving city sector border the "legal" character of an East
German frontier.
2. East German regime is emphasizing point that West Berlin is
not a part of West Germany.
B. Ulbricht regime wishes demonstrate "sovereignty" and show its
right and ability to impose arbitrary controls on movement within
city.
1. By concentrating on West Germans rather than Allies, Communists
probably consider themselves on s
fer ground and that their
actions less likely provoke strong reaction.
II. East Germans may also attempt introduce restrictions on travel of West
Germans to West Berlin.
A. East German officials have stated Four-Power agreements on free
access to Berlin null and void and claimed GDR not bound by
agreements of USSR.
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B. They have w ned Bonn not to retaliate against restrictions on
travel, saying this would only hasten measures making West Berlin
"free city."
111. Soviet Berlin Commandant Zakharov on 13 September supported the East
German position and warned the Western Powers that they must bear full
responsibility for the consequences of "misuse" of the air corridors
which were provided to meet the requirements of the Western garrisons
in the-city. ---
A, Zakharov's strong endorsement of East Germany's "sovereignty" over
its territory in this context suggests that the USSR will support
future East German efforts to assert some degree of control over
civilian air access to the city.
1. USSR may be considering some step to bring East Germans into
flight clearance procedures; such tactics would be aimed at
forcing Western civilian airlines into either acknowledging
East German control, operating without flight safety guarantees
from the Soviet. elements in BASC, or not flying to Berlin.
2. East German regime is trying to sell the idea that Western
airlines must negotiate with it for overflight privileges.
3. During the past week there has been an increase in "near misses"
between Western aircraft and Soviet fighters in the Berlin
corridors, suggesting that the Communists are attempting to
harass commercial pilots into refusing to fly.
IV. Bonn is concerned that too strong counter measures will provoke in-
creased East German harassments and a more serious crisis, and Adenauer
has told his cabinet to avoid any "rash moves," and wants Willy Brandt
to stop demanding Western reprisals.
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'"Ofe 14W
A. Vice-Chancellor Erhard has told Ambassador Dowling that Bonn could
not undertake economic sanctions against East Germany without
prior agreement among the four Western powers.
At the UN, the Soviets may point to dangers in the Berlin situation to
emphasize the urgency of their peace and disarmament proposals.
A. For this reason, they will almost certainly keep pot boiling.
B. They are not likely, however, to create a major crisis on Berlin
during the UNGA.sessign, as'this would be incompatible with the
peaceful posture they will probably seek to present there.
1. Furthermore, the Soviets probably doubt that their real position
on Berlin would have wide support in the UN: most UN members
probably would favor maintenance of the status quo.
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NSC BRIEFING
14 September 1960
I. In new campaign to raise tensions on Berlin, East German regime on
8 September imposed permanent restrictions on travel of West Germans
to East Berlin.
A. Move violates Four-Power agreements on freedom of movement within
city.
1. Is step toward incorporating East Berlin into East Germany by
making own laws directly applicable to East Berlin, in effect
giving city sector border the character of an East German
frontier.
2. East German regime's statement of 13 September that it will
refuse to recognize West German passports issued to West Ber-
liners intending to travel abroad??i,e., to Bloc countries--
is designed to emphasize East German contention that West
Berlin is not a part of West Germany, but will apparently not
affect movement between West Berlin and West Germany.
B. Ulbricht regime wishes demonstrate "sovereignty" and show its
right and ability to impose arbitrary controls on movement within
city.
C. Another important motivation is East German government's deep
concern over rising refugee flow to West Berlin.
1. 8,578 East Germans fled to West Berlin In two weeks 16-30
August (third and fourth highest weekly totals since 1955.)
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II. East Germans may also attempt introduce restrictions on travel of
West Germans to West Berlin.
A. East German officials have stated Four-Power agreements on free
access to Berlin null and void and GDR not bound by agreements
of USSR.
B. They have warned Bonn not to retaliate against restrictions on
travel, saying this would only hasten measures making West
Berlin "free city."
III. Ulbricht has made himself chief of East German state and is seeking
invitation to UNGA in order to present disarmament plan, including
withdrawal of Allied troops from Berlin.
IV. East Berlin moves have Khrushchev's backing.
A. They do not appear to mark change in his commitment maintain status
quo in Berlin until attempt made at new round of negotiations.
B. Ulbricht warned, however, that West Germans and West Berliners
will not be permitted "aggravate anomalous situation in West Berlin."
C. Moscow may consider threats and harassment useful to focus attention
on Berlin problem and maintain pressure on West to negotiate.
D. By concentrating on West Germans rather than Allies, Communists
probably consider themselves on safer ground:and that their actions
less likely provoke strong reaction.
E, Soviet Berlin Commandant Zakharov's reply on 1$ September to the
Western commanders' protest against East German travel restrictions
supported the East German position and warned the Western Powers
that they must bear full responsibility for the consequences of
misuse of the air corridors which were provided to meet the require-
ments of the Western garrisons in the city.
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Bonn is concerned that too strong counter measures will provoke
increased East German harassments and a more serious crisis, and
Adenauer has told his cabinet to avoid any "rash moves," and wants Willy
Brandt to stop demanding Western reprisals.
A. Prior to Adenauer's statement Vice Chancellor Erhard had called on
West German businessmen not to subject themselves to the new entry
procedure and to avoid travel to GDR as long as restrictions continue.
B. American Ambassador Dowling in Bonn does not believe Allied plan
to refuse travel permits to East Germans is likely to have much
effect on Pankow.
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NSC BRIEFING 31 July 1960
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
I. The status of Katanga Province and of Belgian bases in the Congo
remains a major source of friction between UN and Belgian officials.
A. The Lumumba government is showing increased impatience at the
failure of the UN to take steps to occupy Katanga. If UN does
not, Lumumba may revive threats to call for Soviet intervention.
B. UN officials in Leopoldville sympathetic to Lumumba's evacuation
objectives, since Katanga's "independence" not generally recog-
nized and Brussels-Leopoldville agreement on bases never finally
ratified.
C. Belgians, meanwhile, are concerned about safety of.their na-
tionals and have reiterated their unwillingness to withdraw
from their bases or from Katanga.
1. Brussels' withdrawal of 1,500 of their 10,000 troops appears
designed as a gesture in the direction of the UN resolution
calling for a "speedy" Belgian troop withdrawal.
Ii. Belgian policy appears to be one of delay. Belgians probably hope
that with passage of time Lumumba will prove willing to nelgQtiate
with Tshombe concerning Katanga, and will meet his demand for a
loosely-,joined. Congo federation of semi-autonomous provinces.
A. Tshombe-.probably acting on advice of Belgians-.-continues to
talk tough and to refuse UN troops entry into Katanga.
B. But his bargaining position is not strong. Not even Belgians
have recognized Katanga's "independence," and parliamentary
opposition group has left assembly in protest over Tshombe's
policies.
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wrLIV. \V A
III. Despite Lumumba's withdrawal of his threat to request Soviet inter-
vention, and his remarks concerning his desire for Western assist-
ance, Congo's posture appears one of Soviet-oriented neutralism.
A. His vice premier has claimed that the Bloc has promised arms
to the Congo once the Belgians withdraw.
1. But Lumumba wants aid from any and all quarters; he is 25X1
therefore not anxious to burn his bridges to West.
C. Soviets appear disinclined to intervene militarily in Congo,
but will continue efforts to expand influence there by other
means,
IV. Although arrival of more than 10,000 UN troops has lowered tensions,
threat of violence remains.
A. US Embassy in Leopoldville has characterized UN military effort
as lacking direction.
1. UN failure to disarm Force Publique, and fact that UN troops
from Ethiopia appear to have themselves participated in
depredations, cast some doubt on effectiveness of UN force.
B. Unemployment is a potential security threat in Leopoldville and
other urban centers; in Leopoldville alone, an estimated 80,000
are unemployed.
1. Although food shortage considerably alleviated, many Congolese
lack money to buy food.
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w
V. Restoration of public order is only a prelude to solution:?of
critical problems facing Congo, especially that of obtaining
technical assistance in exploiting resources to provide eco-
nomic basis for independence.
A. Thousands of skilled Belgians have left, and many more will
follow if Belgian troops are withdrawn.
B. Congo is almost totally lacking in qualified native per-
sonnel to replace Belgians.
1. Foreign Minister Bomboko is only man in government
with college degree, and there are only about fifteen
others in entire country.
2. Congo has no native engineers or medical doctors.
C. TO is formulating plans for technical assistance, with
first objective to determine what must be done.
1. UN office for coordination of technical assistance has
been set up in Congo.
2. A UN telecommunications official and an agricultural
expert are in Leopoldville for a survey, and a member of
the UN's Economic Commission for Africa is en route to
help set up governmental administration.
D. Moscow statement on 31 July charged continuing "imperialist
aggression" in Congo and reiterated Soviet offer of eco-
nomic and technical aid to Congo.
1. Statement asserted aid to be "without any conditions
of a political, military, or other nature liable to
prejudice the interests or sovereign rights of the in-
dependent Republic of Congo."
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2. Also said Soviet ship to leave shortly for Congo
with 100 trucks, spare parts, repair depot, and group
of instructors.
3. Statement promised prompt disptach of medical per-
sonnel, medicines, and medical equipment.
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NSC BRIEFING `""" _ 6 July 1960 W-V
I. The rebels' current refusal to initiate substantive cease-fire
negotiations with the French stemmed from dissatisfaction concern-
ing restrictions imposed upon their advance delegation in Melun
last week.
A. They objected strongly to delegates' being kept isolated from
press and from imprisoned rebel ministers such as Mohamed Ben
Bella.
B. Also critical of French unwillingness to permit Ferhat Abbas
direct access to De Gaulle on arrival.
II. But rebel communique suspending further talks was conciliatory in
tone; merely characterized further contacts at this time as "not
opportune," leaving the door open for future overtures.
A. Nevertheless rebels sensitive to any suggestion of a capitula-
tion, and are unlikely to resume negotiations unless their
delegates are permitted greater freedom of movement.
III. French position essentially unchanged.
A. They are willing to arrange an "honorable" cease-fire with
rebels.
B. They will not recognize rebels sole spokesmen for Algerian
people or as representative of a legitimate government, but
only as leaders of the rebellion.
C. De Gaulle willing to meet Abbas only after agreement on a
cease-fire.
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D. De Gaulle on 6 July spoke in usual vein of advancing step by
step on the road of an Algeria linked to France with its
future decided by the Algerians themselves and warned "anything
that retards the big decision is not good action."
IV. Among rightist settlers in Algeria, suspension of cease-fire talks
has been received without elation.
A. Extremists expect talks to be resumed and still fear a "sellout"
to rebels.
B. But Melun negotiations seem to have been conducted in a manner
sufficiently tough to allay threat of rightist coup at present
time.
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WORLD REACTION TO PARIS DEVELOPMENTS
23 May 1960
1. Here is a brief rundown on reaction to Paris developments elsewhere
in the world. In Asia, reaction has generally been sophisticated
and responsible.
A. There is much sympathy for the United States position although
there is considerable criticism of its handling of the U-2 in-
cident. It seems to boil down, in many countries, to an attitude
of a "plague on both houses."
B. Khrushchev's personal behavior, as well as his wrecking tactics,
have been widely condemned.
II. A notable exception has been the Indian press which in recent days
has switched from initial criticism of Khrushchev to a theme blaming
the "whole trouble" on American "bungling."
A. Nehru, so far, has been cautious in his comment. He refuses to
fix blame for summit breakdown and has not condemned U-2
incident.
B. Deputy Prime Minister Pant turned his speech on summit into
censure of Communist China by noting there was "only one
country" which does not feel unhappy over outcome.
III. In Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China, Khrushchev's action
widely criticized, although some Japanese newspapers ascribe a
share of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident.
IV. No Southeast Asian official, in comment to date, has supported
Khrushchev's position.
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A. Indonesia's acting foreign minister Leimena has publicly
refused to assign blame and has called for early summit,
possibly under UN auspices.
B. K assailed by press and officials in Australia, New Zealand,
and Philippines.
V. In Pakistan, Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies lie,
observing that "today Free World must live under umbrella of
American nuclear deterrent."
A. He may be feeling the heat of Soviet threats, however, because
the government-monitored press has begun putting more blame
for world crisis on US.
West
VI. Initial7rB-uropean disappointment, anger and fear now tempered by
conviction crisis not imminent.
A. Some comfort drawn from spontaneous unity in free-world ranks.
VII. Press and politicians agree in blaming Khrushchev for wrecking
conference.
A. Even Laborite Daily Herald, caustic critic of U-2 flight,
charged Khrushchev with "spitting in the face of peace."
VIII.Still wide tendency to see Khrushchev subject to strong internal
Soviet and Bloc pressures.
A. Paris-Jour (mass circulation, sensationalist):
"Twelve days ago, on May 5, addressing the Supreme Soviet,
Khrushchev suddenly and without warning stopped talking like
Khrushchev. On that day he became the spokesman of Mao
Tse-tung...."
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IX. Increasing inclination, however, to see "an episode and maneuver"
to improve Soviet position, without any fundamental reorientation
of Moscow's foreign policy.
A. U-2 flight considered a convenient way out of conference when
Khrushchev saw no breach in Western unity.
X. Nevertheless, US not exonerated.
A. Le Monde said Khrushchev couldn't be blamed for taking
advantage of such a "fine opportunity" as the U-2 incident.
B. Finnish President Kekkonen told US ambassador he was "horrified"
by overflight admission, which he said left Russians no alterna-
tive but to present demands.
XI. There is widespread conviction that K's performance will tighten
Western alliance, but US likely to face new problems with allies.
A. Smaller countries will probably be more cautious about future
use their territories.
B. Some European press comment is beginning to indicate dissatis-
faction with American leadership of the Western camp.
De Gaulle told his cabinet on 20 May that "there must be no
dependence on others to assure our own destiny."
1. Couve de Murville assured parliament, however, that De Gaulle
did not envisage a separate role for France.
XII. In Latin America, there has been little official reaction to date.
A. The press in Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru and Venezuela
highlights Soviet responsibility,for wrecking summit.
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,JL 1%L! 4.a
B. Cuba tends to follow Communist line; controlled press and radio
using K's diatribes to emphasize Cuban charges that US policies
basically "aggressive."
C. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico were
critical of US in varying degrees.
1. Brazil, Chile and Ecuador media have suggested smaller
nations be given voice in tackling world problems.
2. Brazilian editorials accuse both sides of "imprudence"
and "inflexibility," and have expressed fear for the
"salvation of mankind."
XIII.Arab reactions vary widely in the proportion of blame attributed
to the US or USSR, but all show deep disappointment over the summit
breakdown and fear of extreme international tension to come.
A. Nasir believes that, while the US blundered seriously in its
handling of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev badly overplayed his
hand in Paris and Eisenhower's restraint has helped change
world opinion in America's favor.
B. Nasir added that Khrushchev's behavior had puzzled most Arabs
as much as it had his own young son who asked, "Has
Khrushchev gone crazy? Does he want a war?"
C. Israel, Jordan, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, have supported
the Western position.
D. In Iraq, the pro-Communist press has supported the USSR and
put all the blame on the United States. The nationalist press
has expressed a cautious view but charges the leftist news-
papers with "propagating for the Communist camp."
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XIV. Public and official reaction in Greece, Turkey and Iran is generally
favorable to the West and the US.
A. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis suggests that "now is the time
for the Free World to capture the initiative," and that the
West needs "to be up and coming with a variety of proposals to
capture the imagination of the Free World, and the neutrals."
XV. African press and leaders have stressed the danger to world peace,
especially the danger to smaller uncommitted nations, and have
shown some irritation that the "big four" should claim to speak for
the world. They have generally criticized the US for its intelli-
gence activities; they have rebuked the USSR for its intransigent
attitude.
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NSC BRIEFING
23 May 1960
TURKISH INTERNAL SITUATION
I. Tension and bitterness between Turkish government and opposition
continues to rise dangerously.
A. What started as a personal feud between Premier Menderes and
President Bayar on one side and Ismet Inonu on other has be-
come a constitutional struggle with unpredictable consequences.
B. Demonstrations against government begun by students have in-
creased in size and now contain many non-students.
1. This is how overwhelming pressures grew in South Korea.
II. Growing participation by military, exemplified by march of military
cadets in Ankara on 21 May, is serious blow to Menderes regime.
eas
n
t
_...,_
~
g an
gonism between police and mili-
tary in both Ankara and Istanbul. Police have roughed up
several army officers and army has reciprocated.
B. Senior army officers on active duty are largely indebted to
Menderes for appointments and will probably remain loyal to
government for present.
C. Increasing numbers of junior and middle grade officers,
previously dissatisfied at economic squeeze, are joining with
retired senior officers--loyal to Inonu--in civilian-led
demonstrations against government.
III. Key to future rests with Menderes, Opposition Republican Peoples
Party (RPP) has adopted wait-and-see attitude for present.
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A. Menderes may try conciliation by calling for early elec-
tions, removing certain officials of his government, or by
abolishing the immediate cause of the disorders--the par-
liamentary commission investigating opposition.
1. Opposition shows some fear that Premier will call elections
while it weakened by government repression. Menderes, how-
ever, unlikely to have elections unless sure of winning and
his recent loss of support throughout country thus makes
honest elections unlikely. Any rigging of election would
lead to serious disorders.
2. Menderes could remove Minister of Interior and Director
General of National Police--generally blamed by population
for severe repressive measures.
a. These moves may be forced on Menderes by members of
his own party.
3. Opposition probably would not be reconciled by either move
but would continue to demand Menderes step down.
B. There is evidence that Menderes does not realize true extent of
popular discontent. Such misjudgment could lead to new moves
by Premier which will cause further deterioration of security
situation and force army to take over.
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KHRUSHCHEV AND THE USSR AFTER PARIS
23 May 196?
I. Khrusbchev's activities since leaving Paris suggest he is undecided
what course to take from here.
A. In his generally moderate speech in Berlin on Friday, he seemed
to be reassuring the West that he does not intend to resort to
a hard "Stalinist" line toward the non-Communist world,
1. He appeared anxious to demonstrate that his detente policy
remains valid and justified, although he contended that the
"US treachery" which has embittered hiH relations with the
present US administration will block progress until after
the election.
2. He stated status quo in Berlin will be maintained until
next summit, which he "assumes" will be in 6-8 months.
3. The speech--which visibly disappointed his audience of high-
level East German communists--was delayed for a day, sug-
gesting that cooler second thoughts had prevailed after
Khrushchev's intemperate performance in Paris
B. On his return to Moscow the customary major speech to a "wel-
come-home" rally was omitted for the first time in recent years.
We believe, however, that he will feel compelled to make such
a speech within the next few days, in order to reassure the
Soviet people and set the line for the bloc,
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1. In the meantime, Soviet propaganda has echoed the themes
of his Berlin speech. While comment on the President
personally, and on other members of his administration is
increasingly harsh, it continpes to insist that, because
the American people are peaceloving, a new summit can be
held in 6-8 months in "new and more propitious circumstances."
2. Massive jamming of VOA, which was resumed an 17 May, was
reduced on 22 May.
C. In the military field, we have seen no indications that the de-
mobilization is to be called off. Pravda says there is to be no
increase in military budget.
II. Our general impression is that Khrushchev is attempting to prevent
the situation he created in Paris from getting any worse. His 6-8
months promise on the German peace treaty--which seems to us to be
more explicit than was required--may be intended to cover his rear
while he deals with problems which have arisen within his own party
and within the bloc as a whole.
III. The collapse of the Summit is bound to have repercussions within the
Soviet Union and perhaps on Khrushchev's own position as well.
A. Much will depend on whether Khrushchev can continue to dominate
those elements within the Communist bloc which have feared the
results of East-West negotiations.
1. Khrushchev has felt these pressures and has been obliged to
make some concessions to them.
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2. He conceded at the four-power meeting on 16 May that his
handling of the U-2 incident was influenced by domestic
policy considerations. The implication was, however, that
he was thinking more in terms of popular reaction than of
powerful critics within the hierarchy.
3. The Soviet people have been led to believe that Khrushchev
had discovered a magic formula for reducing international
tensions and that their own prosperity was closely tied
to his success.
4. If the rigid, Stalinist elements break through an across-
the-board tightening of the dictatorship is likely and many
of the economic and social concessions made to the Soviet
people in recent years will be withdrawn.
B. Despite the formidable political position which Khrushchev has
built up, he may have his problem within the Kremlin.
1. There is reason to believe that there was heated controversy
within the Soviet hierarchy on the handling of the U-2 inci-
dent.
2. There are also good indications that Mikoyan has stubbed his
political toe.
a. He has not appeared in Moscow since 7 May--he missed
both the departure of Khrushchev for Paris and his return
b. Khrushchev reportedly called him an opportunist and turn-
coat during his visit to France in March-April.
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d, There is nothing to indicate that Mikoyan has been sacri-
ficed to a "hardline" faction, but, if he has been cut
loose, Khrushchev will have deprived himself of a valu-
able aide and a moderating influence.
3. Some observers felt that Khrushchev paid unusual deference
to Marshal Malinovsky during his stay in Paris and Berlin
and concluded that the military are calling some of the
shots.
a. Without a doubt, many of the military have been unhappy
about Khrushchev?s troop reduction scheme. Conceivably,
they reckon that an intensification of the cold war will
reverse an unhealthy trend.
b. In assessing this possibility, however, we cannot help
but recall what has traditionally happened when the
Soviet military attempted to meddle in political deci-
sions--most recently in the case of Marshal Zhukov.
4. Another possible omen is the increased prominence recently
of Mikhail Suslov. Suslov, long considered the leading
Kremlin stiff-neck, was in the forefront when Khrushchev re-
turned to Moscow Saturday.
C. Another meeting of the party central committee is reportedly
scheduled for the near future.
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1. The meeting could well tip the balance in domestic
policy--toward a continuation of the Khrushchev line or back
in the direction of Stalin.
2. The meeting could also produce some political fireworks.
At the moment the bulk of the evidence points toward con-
tinued Khrushchev rule, even though the events of the last
two weeks have made us hedge on bitsa little.
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IV. Within the bloc, Khrushchev's greatest problem appears to be
necessity of demonstrating that he--not Mao--is the leader.
A. This not made any easier by his performance in Paris, when
he in effect said "Mao was right all along" about US intentions.
8. Chinese for their part, have welcomed Khrushchev back to the
fold. In response to summit breakdown, Peiping whipping up
largest and most acrimonious anti-American demonstrations in two
years.
1. Thus far over 30 million Chinese have taken part in variety
of rallies, meetings, and parades throughout mainland. In
language as intemperate as Khrushchev's, Peiping is denounc-
ing US and personally castigating President Eisenhower.
C. While publicly demonstrating support for USSR's moves in Paris,
Peiping is taking advantage of summit to vindicate its inter-
pretation of American motives,
1. Chinese say they are not at all surprised at summit break-
down because they--unlike some others, e.g., Khrushchev--
view international situation correctly and are not misled
by "superficial phenomena."
D. Peiping fears Khrushchev will not remain firm in attitude toward
US.
1. Therefore, Chinese say Paris events "helpful" and call for
further exposure of "US imperialism."
E. On defensive, Soviet Ambassador in Peiping said Soviets never
had illusions about "US imperialism."
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In its present triumphant mood, Peiping likely to be angered
by Khrushchev's moderate speech in Berlin, which may in part
have been intended to show that he was taking no advice from
Mao. Chinese have not reacted yet.
V. Latest move in this tangled game is article in Soviet party journal
Kommunist, violently attacking Yugoslavs in language reminiscent of
Chinese Red Flag articles last month, (in which Chinese criticized
Khrushchev's policies while ascribing them to Tito.)
A. Unlike Berlin speech, this will be welcomed in Peiping.
B. Our preliminary thought is that it could represent either:
1. A move by Khrushchev to appease his "hard-line" critics
by sacrificing what little remains of his rapprochement
with Tito, or--conceivably,
2. A move by Khrushchev's opponents in his own party to
embarrass him further.
VI. In this exceedingly complex situation, long-term direction of Soviet
policy virtually incalculable.
A. Although Khrushchev clearly does not now intend a fundamental
reversal of his detente line, this not entirely under his
control.
1. At a minimum, official US-Soviet relations will be strained,
and this, perforce, will effect to some degree all Soviet
relations with Free World.
2. Further effects of Khrushchev's animus toward President,
feeling of injured pride, generally vindictive mood in
Paris, difficult to assess. He may wish to "punish" US and
seek out opportunities to embarrass its leaders.
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B. Specific Soviet foreign policy behavior in the months ahead
may go along the following lines:
1. In relations with US, Moscow may effect an across the board
reduction of official contacts. Could withdraw ambassador,
reduce embassy staff here in Washington. F
25X1
2. Soviets may suspend or sharply curtail exchange of official
(though not private) delegations.
3. In Geneva, Soviet attitude at disarmament talks likely to
toughen, delegates will seek to exploit U-2 incident. May
stiffen demands at nuclear test talks.
a. Khrushchev claimed in Paris USSR ready to sign test
ban "at any time."
b. But may demand participation in planned US nuclear
experimental explosions (with right to inspect US
devices) and insist on very small number of explosions.
4. We do not expect cut-back in Khrushchev's travels and
personal diplomacy.
a. Scheduled for Austria next month, Africa in fall.
Said he would go to Latin America if invited.
5. We expect Soviets to seize every opportunity in Latin
America to make trouble in US "backyard."
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6. In respect to underdeveloped areas, Soviets not likely to
cut down on economic assistance. May even step up aid to
some countries (e.g., UAR, Ethiopia, Afghanistan) in order
to "show up" US.
a. At same time, Moscow likely to step up pressures against
US bases (in Libya, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, etc.).
b. May heighten subversive campaign too, with Greece and
Iran likely targets.
7. Together with Chinese Communists (or using Chinese) could
revert to "shooting" campaigns in Far East.
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NSC BRIEFING
18 May 1960
I. The Dutch intention to augment military forces in Netherlands New
Guinea, claimed by Indonesia, and to send naval units on a flag-
showing cruise to that area this summer will have broad repercussions
in Indonesian internal politics.
A. The Dutch decision: appearsunnedessary-,ill-timed and bound to
stimulate nationalist extremism in Indonesia, possibly to the
serious detriment of the US position there.
II. The Dutch have already diverted public attention from the anti-
Communist, anti-Sukarno campaign of a new political coalition,, the
Democratic League ~ the. Communists are using the West Irian issue
to brand the League as pro-Dutch.
A. It has also deflected attention from continuing Sino-Indonesian
friction which arose from the Overseas Chinese question.
III. Regardless of efforts by the Indonesian army to prevent exploitation
of the Irian issue by the Communist Party, the Communists will profit
from it even if they do no more than offer loud support to Sukarno.
IV, Sukarno, on returning from a global tour in early June will undoubtedly
lead a highly emotional mass anti-Dutch propaganda campaign which will
submerge all other issues and restore any prestige he may have lost
before and during his latest world tour.
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NSC BRIEFING 3 May 1960
1. We foresee a variety of problems arising as the Congo approaches the
30 June independence date amid frantic efforts by Brussels to
prepare Congolese for self-government and resolve economic diffi-
culties.
A. Legislative election campaign has begun despite recurring
indications of tribal unrest. Should be some consolidation
among 80-odd political parties of Congo before elections begin
16 May.
B. Elections unlikely lead to domination by any one party or
coalition, but two men leading field (Patrice Lumumba, Joseph
Kasavubu).
1. Lumumba intelligent and magnetic, but often irresponsible
in his actions. Supported by Belgian Communists, the UAR,
Ghana, and some Belgian financial interests. Possibly
Brussels reconciled to him as first premier.
2. Kasavubu's support seems limited to Leopoldville area, and
some nationalist concern over his reported French ties.
II. Confusion in Congo may facilitate Communist penetration.
A. Roundtable conference in Brussels last January was occasion for
Congo politicians to seek outside financial aid for elections.
Some delegates visited European satellites and several are
believed to have been promised Communist support.
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B. Although no known Communists among Congo leaders, bloc help to
several persons--including Lumumba--may enable Communists to
influence policies of independent Congo.
1. At present, Czech Consulate is only bloc representation in
Congo.
C. US Consulate-general believes Communist penetration activities
increasing. Growing interest in post-independence bloc aid may
push Congo toward bloc-oriented neutralism.
III. Meanwhile, Belgians seeking US aid to meet Congo deficit.
A. Belgian officials have warned that "economic and political
turmoil" will result if outside aid of $120-$135 million not
obtained before independence.
B. Flight of European capital from Congo, accelerated with promise
of independence, is a major problem (first half '59 - $50
million; second half '59 - $80 million; Jan '60 alone - $20
million). Recent Belgian controls governing outward flow of
capital irritating interests with large holdings unable to
repatriate funds.
C. Economic roundtable conference now in progress in Brussels.
Results up to now inconclusive, but Congolese critical of shaky
economic structure being presented them by Belgians.
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NSC BRIEFING
23 March 1960
1. De Gaulle's blunt rejection of demands by a majority in the
National Assembly for a special parliamentary session to discuss
agricultural policy has produced a new high in domestic politi-
cal criticism of the De Gaulle regime.
A. Hostile reaction extends into all parties, even government
coalition.
B. De Gaulle will probably face no large-scale public displays
of hostility until after Khrushchev visit (23 March to 3
April), but will then probably face new farmer demonstrations
and efforts to topple Debre government.
1. Next session of parliament scheduled for 26 April.
II. Opposition to De Gaulle, long-evident among rightist elements,
only recently has become vocal in responsible left and center parties.
A. Left and center parties had previously de-emphasized their
opposition to some of De Gaulle's policies in order to give
him a free hand in Algeria, but now feel they must speak out
if they are not to risk further loss of political influence.
B. Left and center believe De Gaulle has now moved away from
attempts to achieve early solution in Algeria.
C. Rightist parties, long convinced De Gaulle is unable to solve
Algerian problem, have been steadily moving into overt
opposition with an eye to the post-De Gaulle period.
III. Fundamental deterrent to an all-out campaign against De Gaulle
is still the lack of a ready alternative.
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A. Since opposition has no easy mechanism to "get" De Gaulle
(constitution does not allow parliament to oust president),
the Deb ?e government will bear the brunt of the attack.
B. Our embassy in Paris doubts that De Gaulle's opponents can
muster an absolute majority to oust Debre at next session,
IV. Increased parliamentary obstructionism to his policies may well
lead De Gaulle--who is already irritated with the "politicians"
and the nearly unanimously critical press--even further toward
one-man government.
A. In 1946 when faced with parliamentary frustrations, De Gaulle
retired in disgust to Columbey des Deux Eglises, and a repeat
performance, while it seems most unlikely, is not impossible.
B. A major factor today, however, is that De Gaulle, unlike in
1946, now has a constitution which gives him the power to
run France while ignoring parliament.
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NSC BRIEFING 8 March 1960
BACKGROUND
WEST INDIES FEDERATION POLICY PAPER
I. Struggle between advocates of a centralized federation and
states rightists coming to a head this year.
A. Premier Williams of Trinidad wants a stronger federation with
a federal income tax and a customs union.
B. Jamaica, determined to conserve its economic autonomy opposes
a strong center.
1. Premier Manley threatens to secede unless satisfied.
2. All other islands willing to make broad concessions to
keep Jamaica within Federation. Constitutional committee
recently satisfied Jamaica's demand for proportional
representation by allocating it 48 percent of the seats
in proposal for new legislature.
C. Constitutional conference adjourned last fall may reconvene
this spring.
II. Once constitutional framework is agreed, and approved by London,
independence may come shortly, but probably not before 1961 at
earliest.
III. Preparations now under way for tripartite talks with Federation
on revision of 1941 US-UK base agreement.
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NSC BRIEFING 8 March 1960
BACKGROUND
WEST INDIES FEDERATION POLICY PAPER
I. Struggle between advocates of a centralized federation and
states rightists coming to a head this year.
A. Premier Williams of Trinidad wants a stronger federation with
a federal income tax and a customs union.
B. Jamaica, determined to conserve its economic autonomy opposes
a strong center.
1. Premier Manley threatens to secede unless satisfied.
2. All other islands willing to make broad concessions to
keep Jamaica within Federation. Constitutional committee
recently satisfied Jamaica's demand for proportional
representation by allocating it 48 percent of the seats
in proposal for new legislature.
C. Constitutional conference adjourned last fall may reconvene
this spring.
II. Once constitutional framework is agreed, and approved by London,
independence may come shortly, but probably not before 1961 at
earliest.
III. Preparations now under way for tripartite talks with Federation
on revision of 1941 US-UK base agreement.
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A. Of many sites obtained, US now uses principally 13, mainly
missile-tracking and radar stations. Only one over which
there is controversy is naval facility and missile tracking
station at Chaguaramas Trinidad, which Williams still wants
for the federal capital.
B. West Indians want to revise agreement only, not abolish bases.
Demands center on release of unused areas, compensation, and
considerable shortening of 99-year lease.
IV. Serious snag caused by Williams comment to US consul on 4 March
that he is "washing his hands" of conference and refuses to be
bound by anything the Federation negotiates.
B. Williams--who may later become federal prime minister--prefers
to delay negotiations and considers old US-UK agreement won't
be binding after independence.
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. J b February 1960
~~~?' FRANCE-ALGERIA
1. De Gaulle's firm stand on self-determination may improve long-
term prospects for cease-fire talks with FLN.
A. But rebels will continue to demand guarantees beyond De
Gaulle's personal assurances.
II. At home, De Gaulle faces some rough going if he presses action
against prominent figures involved in long-planned plot against
regime.
A. "Respectable" civilian leaders implicated apparently include
Georges Bidault and Independent leader Duchet.
B. Generals apparently implicated include Zeller, former chief
of staff; Allard, commander in Germany; and Salan.
III. Indications that rightists plan to exploit Shrushchev visit in
March on theme De Gaulle selling out completely to Communists.
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