(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000400020008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 9, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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9 July 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
In response to a request from the Deputy Director
the attachorl ?r,n?+ ,
a ence Vyeek ly kevzew
ve eon prepare or yoL,r nformation. Other ad hoc
or temporary Oci publications are prepared in response
to specific requirements given us by the principal
consumers. For example, the Vietnam Checklist for the
Director of Central Intelligence In its present orn~
was develope as a response to a White [louse require-
merit for greater detail on all aspects of the Vietnam
problem.
C14
cring llirector
rent Intelligence
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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9 July 1965
Guidelines for the Central Intelligence Bulletin*
1. There are three basic criteria which all CIB
items must meet.
a. They ust be concerned with national
securi.e ec -~initi-on oriafional security"
useTc ~in the US Government is so broad, however,
that the formula gives virtually no Iuiciance to
the selector. It merely requires that an item
present information pertaining to developments--
potential or actual- -which impinge fairly di-
rectly on important interests of the US.
bLa They must present intelligence. This
means they must deal primarily with for-
eign actions or policies rather than those of
the US. This distinction is not easy to main-
tain, however, since the conduct of foreign af-
fairs is a continuous process of action and re-
action between the US and other nations. It is
most difficult to discuss a foreign action, for
instance, without relating it--either implicitly
or explicitly--to the US action which stimulated
it.
c. T must be Im ortant enotz h to be
worth the attention o -menlbers of the National
ecur~-ity`~ Council. _In other wools , and teni must
cIeeal vith a matter which is now or has the po-
tential of becoming the subject of considera-
tion at the Presidential or NSC level. This
*Since the CIB is coordinated with
State
and
DIA, these guidelines were drawn up and
given
to
these Agencies several months ago in an
effort
to
develop common understanding as to the
mission
of
the CIB.
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C
a n
criterion is exceptionally difficult to define
further because of the large element of sub-
jective judgment built into it. Furthermore,
the interest of high-level readers will vary
from day to day and individual to individual.
2. Beyond these theoretical considerations,
there are also a number of practical ones. The day-
to-day make-up of the CIB is largely determined by
the interplay of the following factors:
a. Degree of government interest. When
the policy-making apparatus has focussed its
attention on a crisis, its appetite for detail
is insatiable. Items are printed in the CIB
which would in normal times never be cons-IJered.
On the other hand, lack of high-level interest
in a potentially dangerous situation can often
be a reason for periodically calling attention
to it. Since such situations can remain un-
changed for months, this sometimes requires the
use of a relatively unimportant piece of new
information as a "peg" on which to hang what
is basically a repetitive reminder that the
problem continues to exist.
b. Contiin uity. CIA must ask itself whether
each piece of raw -information records a new de-
velopment or adds detail to one already recorded
in the CIB, and whether it tends to change or to
reinforce assessments already published. When
something is new or when a judgment should be
changed, there is pressure to publish in the CIB.
This is especially true if the direction of events
is running counter to a National Intelligence
Estimate. On the other hand, crises which sim-
mer along for several days with no detectible
change must not be allowed to drop out of sight.
There is a danger that the policy-maker, seeing
no intelligence reporting, might assume that the
situation is improving. Pressure therefore builds
up to report even when no significant information
has been received.
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\ "
c. Timeliness. Items otherwise important
enough for tie CT1;)_may be withheld because the
events they predict are scheduled to occur before
the CIB is distributed or because the government
has aT-feady reacted to the information. Items may
also be withheld because they are so long-range
that delay for one reason or another will do no
harm.
d. Open-source Reporting. If incoming, raw
intelligence is paralleled uy accurate press re-
porting, pressures for CIB publication may be
decreased. On the other-land, if press report-
ing is contradictory, incomplete, or inaccurate,
items of lesser importance may be selected for
CIB treatment in order to clarify situations for
tie reader.
e. Length. There are no limits on length
of the CIB, but CIA believes that high-level
readership will be overloaded if the normal CIB
runs much beyond a dozen items a day. Of course,
all items of obvious importance are printed, but
it is also true that an item of marginal import-
ance is more likely to be printed on a day when
the CIB is short than on one when it is long.
S E C
HA!
N L..Y
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9 July 1965
c v ~< 1. 4 1 U l l
-~_
o th rents ntc lli~(ncc Reel:ly Pc:vic
1. Ot r `'
M.hl asa p ' in in producing the CI1,'R .i s t o
create a dacu which treats the in ortai,t events
of the week thoughtfully anti analytically, huts them
into perspect, ve more Hilly Lb in can be clone in
other regular `,lrrent into l li g:gence pub lications
identifies signi:fic".;rlt. trends, and attempts itt least
a brief glimpse, wheic Possible, into the near future.
2. The emphasis of the CIIVIR is largely politJ call
but military and econor,ic devC7o nlents rep'oive (tile
treatment and mooed o~~ten constitute a considerablo
portion of the hook.
3. Since space in the P'1eelkly is, thou ;h generous
in comparison with most Currcnt~Tnteli -igence p ublics
tions, still at a proillitni, we co not strive: to clt-~i- li-
cate the national Press in its coil:.prehens-ive covera;mc
of the news. On the outer hand, we -do not hesitate
to handle topics which have received full gross treat-
ment when we have into l li"ence to add or more accurite
analysis to apply. In many instances, the C:I'PR
handles subjects which have; earlier been ciiscizssep
in other current int:elli,,c nce publications . The
ileekix, however, stresses analysis as a a111St ll!ere
reporting. The writer oil the i'~'eekly article, haviin
more space at his disposal ilia i tr`lc: writer of a CT'
article, can develop his thoughts more fully and L111
in more of the backe-roulhd of his story than can the
latter.
4. The CII/Ip_ provides a vehicle for taking bits
and pieces whci individually are not significant
enough to be printed in the CIb , d
, for example an
constructing from theni a story~wh ich is not only
interesting but of real intelli erica value.
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5. The Special Reports, although distrioutect
under separate covers, are considered as parts of
the Weekly and are planned and Orocessed in the same
manner as the Weekly. Normally not more than three
Special Reports are printed per week, and on rare
occasions none has been produced. The criteria ap-
plied to articles in the Weekly apply generally to
Special Reports also. Topics for Special Reports,
however, are more general, requiring more lengthy
treatment and more extensive analysis. Another
distinction is that the events dealt with in Weekly
articles have usually occurred during the week or so
prior to publication, whereas those discussed in a
Special Report may cover a much larger time span.
HANDLE tl 4 A CO " "g 'Ili 'f (` f.. 1 `%N r \i Ci4.S OI _
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