THE CURRENT STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000300010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 24, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memora
The Current State .of Sino-Soviet Relations
dum
Top Secret
44
24 April 1970
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE1VECY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 April 1970
The Current. State of Sino-Sovi
1. The Sino-Soviet talks in Pelting are entering
their seventh month. During this pe iod no progress
has been made toward a firm agreemen~ on the disputed
Sino-Soviet border, not to speak of ~jesoloing the more
fundamental clashes of ideology or national interest.
Early this month we received a few reports alleging
that "some progress" had been made i~ the negotia-
tions and raising the possibility th~t the Soviets
had made token troop withdrawals from the frontier.
Recent harsh propaganda blasts by both sides, how-
ever, together with a reported state~}~ent by chief
Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov flatly denying reports
of troop withdrawals, indicate that the stalemate
persists. Meanwhile, there has been maneuvering
over a possible exchange of ambassadors, but no ap-
pointments have yet been publicly ann,unced.
2. The recent upsurge in Sino-Soviet polemics--
particularly Peking's harsh and wide-ranging 18,000
word criticism of Brezhnev's "social militarism" is-
sued to mark the 22 April Lenin centennial--points
to a continuing deadlock over border ~roblems< In
addition, it underscores the suspicion and hostility
that make substantial progress in the talks exceed-
ingly difficult. The Peking tract culminated a month-
long escalation in China's polemics against Moscow.
Note: This is the first of a series ~:f biweekly
special reports on Sino-Soviet reZati nso Subse-
quent reports will concentrate more u~on current
developments during the reporting period and lesson
background information. This memoran um was pre-
pared by the Office of Current InteZZ'genee, and
coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research.
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For the first time since the talks b~gan, Peking
revived public charges of Soviet nuc ear blackmail
against China and "encroachment" on h~nese terri-
tory. For their part, the Soviets h~ve not been
sitting on the sidelines. Party chi~f Brezhnev has
within the past ten days made two public statements
placing full blame on China for the continuing dis-
pute and berating Peking for stirring up a "war
psychosis" that diminishes prospects for success
in the talks.
3. At present, the talks are apparently in
recess while Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is
back in Moscow, ostensibly for the Lenin centennial
ceremonies. Although a Soviet official has said
that Kuznetsov will be returning to Peking "shortly,"
he may tarry in Moscow to review the course of the
talks and discuss future policy with Soviet leaders.
The State of the Negotiations
4. The issue of Soviet militar pressure against
China has from the start been one of the fundamental
obstacles to progress in the talks. The Chinese, in
order to get out. from under the Sovi t gun, have in-
sisted that no progress is possible~n the negotia-
tions until the Soviets reduce thei military forces
along the frontier. Peking proposes a mutual with-
drawal of major military units from the border--a
move that would mainly affect the Soviets. It has
also demanded that the Soviets withdraw all armed
personnel--including border guards-from the dis-
puted areas of the frontier. The Soviets have here-
tofore adamantly resisted any move i~hat would either
reduce their military advantage or appear to acknowl-
edge Chinese territorial claims. Moscow, however,
has been sensitive to Peking's charge that it is
forcing negotiations under military pressure, and
has issued awkward, self-righteous tatements deny-
ing this.
-2-
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5. As a result of the sweeping conditions pro-
posed by Peking, the talks have not of down to seri-
ous discussion on demarcation of the frontier. From
the beginning the Soviets have sough to get Peking
to focus on this question, and Brezhn v, in his 14
April remarks, reiterated that an ag Bement on the
frontier remains "essential." The C inese, however,
see no immediate need to compromise their position.
The continuing discussions have provaded Peking with
a good reading of Soviet intentions end have accord-
ingly reduced fears over the possibility of precipi-
tous Soviet military action. Although the Soviets
have indicated their willingness to make "reciprocal
concessions" on the territorial question that would
even include relinquishing their clam to the con-
tested island of Damansky/Chenpao, ere is no .in-
dication that the Chinese are ready o negotiate
these questions seriously.
Reported Troop Withdrawals
6. We have serious doubts that
earlier this month of Soviet troop w
the frontier reflect actual Soviet c
reports received
ithdrawals from
ncessions on this
The US press has focused on a i eren an
more sensational version of the troop withdrawal re-
ports. In early April a UPI dispatc allegedly orig-
inating with the Soviet Embassy in ondon claimed that
the Soviets had unilaterally pulled back their forces
40-50 kilometers, and had reason to think the Chinese
would reciprocate.
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8. Recent developments tend fur her to discredit
the alleged troop withdrawals. Kuzne sov himself has
reportedly told Western diplomats in IIeking that such
reports are without foundation and thalt the Soviets
would not consider acting unilaterally
Peking's renewed charges this week of
ment" along the border strongly sugges
moves by Moscow will not satisfy Peki,
Frontier Situation
negotiations. The Soviets, for example, have pri-
vately said that their frontier guards have been
given "strict instructions" to maintain correct re-
In addition,
Soviet "encroach-
t that token
g~
9. The border itself has apparently remained
relatively quiet for the past six mon hs. Occasional
rumors of incidents and references by both sides to
"provocations" suggest that there may have been some
pushing and shoving between frontier uards, but no
major clashes such as occurred last year. Both sides
have apparently abided by the "gentle an's agreement"
made between Kosygin and Chou En-lai last September
to avoid border incidents or provocations during the
lations with their counterparts,
the Chinese maintaine a ensive positions uring
the winter months on Damansky/Chenpao. The Chinese
apparently reoccupied the island after last spring's
fighting in order to reassert their claim to this
and other disputed islands in the Ussta~ri and Amur
rivers. The Soviets have not contested the Chinese
presence, although they have sent Peking a formal
note protesting frontier violations. They probably
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accept it as part of the status quo thlat Chou En-
lai and Kosygin agreed to observe and dare concerned
that a forcible move would risk rupturing the nego-
tiations. In addition, the Soviets arse not willing
at this stage to shed blood over an island that they
consider of little real value and that is in any
case probably isolated by spring flood waters.
State Relations
11. Soviet officials early this month began
privately spreading the word of the appointment of
a new ambassador to Peking, Vladimir S~tepakov. Re-
sumption of ambassadorial ties--broker in 1966--has
been one goal of the Soviet effort to "normalize"
relations with Peking. Premier Kosyg~n broached the
subject during his September 1969 mee ing with Chou
En-lai, and late last year a Soviet o ficial claimed
~~
there was an agreement in principle "with Peking on
the subject. The Soviets are now say ng that Peking
has agreed to name its envoy to Mosco "at a later
date," but Chinese officials have mad neither public
nor private statements to this effect
12. Soviet diplomats in Peking ~ave acknowledged
that one purpose of Stepakov's appoin ment may be to
facilitate the departure of chief negotiator Kuznetsov
and the continuation of the talks at the ambassadorial
level. Stepakov, who recently was ea ed out of his
post as head of the central committee propaganda de-
partment, does not have experience in either diplo-
matic or Chinese affairs. The designation of a party
official, however, nominally restores N,oscow's diplo-
matic representation to the level characteristic of
that in other socialist countries. ~n addition,
Stepakov's experience in the propaga da and ideolog-
ical fields well suits him to handle polemics with
China.
13. The Chinese thus far have
feet on accepting Stepakov's appoint
almost certainly see as presaging a
slap at China by recalling Kuznetsov
ragged their
ent, which they
oviet effort to
and downgrading
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the negotiationso Peking probably also interprets
Stepakov?s poor diplomatic qualifications as a cal-
culated .insult to China, Peking appeared to be in-
directly objecting to Stepakov last week when it
vigorously-and accurately-critci ed errors in an
ideological. tract that the former p opaganda chief
probably had a hand in publishingo Despite these
objectionso however the Chinese pr bably will feel
constrained eventually to accept St pakov as a show
of reasonableness in the dispute an to keep the
25X1 1 border ne otiations in sessi~on~ Indeed,
ave
the y
already done so
dor, but we are
onfirrnation~
out c
and in turn name eir
reluctant to accept
amb
assa-
with-
14: Moscow has been pressing ox~ "normaliza-
tion" of state ties in other areas, such as, commer-
cial relations, but there has been o sign of ap-
preciable movement Low level "ego .iations on a
trade pact for 1970 have apparently aot nowhere"
Military Developments
~~_
tarv buildup has continue una a e
the Soviet mi i-
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begun in 1965. We continue to beli.ev that. the So-
viet goal. is to establish a force cap b1e of repel-
ling any Chinese military initiative o of conducting
limited military operations across th Chinese bor~
der. The buildup thus fa.r does not a pear designed
to prepare for large-scale ground ope.ations against.
16. Present evidence indicates that. the Soviet
buildup has proceeded at the steady aid deliberate pace
There is no eve. ence t at t e ra e
of buildup has been changed because o the series of
border clashes last year or as a resu t of the Peking
talks. Given the. time leads involved we judgF? ghat
the decisions t.o deploy the new units identified on
the border last year probably were ma e prior to ?he
clashes.
17. Soviet ground forces near t
their combat support units probably n
tween 240,000 and 265,000 men?
18, As in previous years, the c ntinuation
of the Soviet bu.ildu has not led to lar e scale
Chinese res onse.
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We now estimate that t e C inese ave a ou
595,000 men in the military regions adjacent to the
Soviet Union, most of them garrison d well back from
the border.
Short Term Outlook
19. The short term prospects for the talks will
continue to reflect the basic motives of both. sides
for entering the negotiations and tie strategy they
have employed in conducting them. he Chinese came
to the bargaining table as a result of the military
and political pr.essure., including h'nts of n.uclea.r
war, that the Soviets mounted last ~ummer~ The Chi-
nese, increasi.ng.l.y fearful of Sovis~ intent.i.ons, wanted
to damp down the situation on the b rder lest; i.t eit.her
lead to or provide the pretext for ~ Sovi.et attack.
This goal has now been. temporarily ~et by agreements
reached in the Kosygin-Chou meeting and by conti..nua-
tion of the Peking talks. As long as the negotia-
tions drag on, China probably feels the threat of
immediate Soviet mi.l.itary action hay di.mi.nished. As
a result, Peking has remained unwilling to swallow
its pride and reach an accommodation over the frontier.
20~ On the other hand, Soviet. concern over the
drift of events on the frontier was compounded by
suspicions of Chinese intentions to~ard Soviet ter-
ritory. Moscow wanted relief from ~-he uncertainty
that border tensions had caused. Tie Soviets also
feared that third parties such as t e US were taking
advantage of their p.reoccupat.i.on or would calculate
that the USSR's problems with China would force it to
make concessions to o~:her r.ivals~ '~hus the Soviets
also have a vested .interest in the ont:inuatwi.on of
the talks as a means of keeping the frontier calm and
creating an appearance of some stab~li.ty in relations
with China.
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2.1. Nevertheless, the Soviets in .recent months
have begun to show publicly signs of impatience and
frustration over the lack. of progress. This has been.
reflected in inc.reasi.ngly strident atitacks on China
in the Soviet press, such as one mid~March article
by "Alexandrov"--an authoritative pseudonym last used
on the eve of the Czech invasion--which implicitly
warned the Chinese that they should be more forth
coming in the talks. Peking, instead of being cowed
by these Soviet attacks, has recently)I responded in
kind, suggesting that. China wial continue to resist
Soviet demands that i.t get. down to business on a
frontier treatyo The Soviet move in naming an ambas-
sador to China seems to signal a Soviet realization
that the negotiations are not getting anywhere and
that it is time to ut their valued e ot.iator Kuznetsov
to better use
There
is a good possibility that. the Sovie s will propose
in the next few weeks a change in the level or per-
haps the location. of the discussions but, like the
Chinese, they see value in the talks and want them
to continue.
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